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# **GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst (GCFA)**

## ***Forensic Analysis of Shared Workstation***

### **Practical assignment**

Version 1.3  
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## **First Steps - Preparation**

### **Toolkit Preparation**

Before any forensic investigation can take place some work is involved in order to have confidence that the results produced are consistent, reproducible, and most importantly, correct. In order to have total confidence in the tools I would be using I undertook considerable research in order to choose the most functional and up to date freely available applications. With the small exception of the Winalysis, Sysinternals utilities (and of course Windows), everything else was open source and was digitally signed either by the software publisher or the software distributor.

My investigation would require both a Windows and Linux forensics workstation with large hard drive capacity and good processing power, for this purpose I built the following machine as my main forensics workstation:

AMD Duron 1.3Mhz  
256Mb RAM  
liteon 52x CDRom  
Seagate 13Gb IDE HDD (for OS)  
Seagate 80Gb IDE HDD in removable drive bay (for images)  
Iomega ATAPI Zip100 disk drive  
OS: Redhat 9 Shrike (Workstation install)

And utilised a Toshiba Satellite TE2100 Laptop as an onsite workstation  
Intel 1.4Ghz P4  
512 RAM  
Toshiba 30Gb HDD  
OS: Windows 2000 Professional

Main software tools chosen:

#### Linux

Autopsy 1.73  
Sleuthkit 1.62

#### Windows

Winalysis  
The Forensics Acquisition Utilities

In addition to these tools, I chose to use the F.I.R.E (Forensics Incident Response Environment) utility CD. This toolkit packages up many small utilities from both Linux and Windows, creating a trusted environment from which to launch many of the nuts and bolts applications used in information gathering at the scene. As I detail each step of the image acquisition and binary analysis the usefulness of this CD will become apparent.

Included on the F.I.R.E CD and used in my investigation are:

- env (show environment variables)
- fport (enumerate listening ports and map to processes)
- hunt (enumerate shares and local users)

- listdlls (List all dlls currently in memory)
- netstat (List all ports in use)
- ntlast (List all recent logins)
- printenv (show environment variables)
- psinfo (display detailed system information)
- pslist (show running processes)
- psloggeon (show current users logged on and logged on via shares)
- uname (show machine specific information)
- uptime (display how long machine has been up for)
- whoami (display operators login)
- dd (disk imaging tool ported from unix)
- netcat (nc, send data streams over the network)
- md5sum (create md5 hash sums for files)
- binText (extract strings)
- strace (log system calls from an executable)

### Building A Trustworthy Forensic Environment.

In order to have total confidence in the tools used, all software sources should be verified as unmodified since being published by the developers. Verification of the windows installation media is reasonably straight forward. I used an original Microsoft Windows 2000 installation CD, resplendent with it's holographic seal burnt into the topside of the disc<sup>1</sup>.



My signed  
Windows 2000 CD

On the other hand the Redhat installation CDs, and all of the Linux tools were downloaded from the internet.

In order to verify an ISO image it is necessary to locate the accompanying md5 checksum file. This in turn is digitally signed by the publisher, guaranteeing its authenticity. In order to verify the checksum file it is first necessary to obtain the signers public pgp/gnupg key. In this case it was [security@redhat.com](mailto:security@redhat.com). The concept of pgp/gnupg's web of trust requires the key to be signed by either my own private key, or by someone else who I have chosen to trust<sup>2</sup>. Unfortunately I do not have the good fortune to be well acquainted with any of the signers of the Redhat security key, nor do any of my already trusted public keys in turn trust this key, and so on. My general rule in these situations is to trust a key if I can obtain it identically from three different sources. The public key for [security@redhat.com](mailto:security@redhat.com) was identical at these different sources;

1. The Redhat Web Site

<sup>1</sup> Microsoft's Website has detailed instructions on examining CD's in order to determine authenticity, <http://www.microsoft.com/resources/howtotell/uk/applications/default.mspc>.

<sup>2</sup> These explanations are brief, but the larger fields of PGP security and cryptography in general are off the topic of my paper. Interested people should check out the Gnupg Privacy Handbook and RSA's cryptography faq for a every good introduction to cryptography.

2. [pgp.mit.edu](http://pgp.mit.edu)
3. [wwwkeys.pgp.net](http://wwwkeys.pgp.net)

Based on this I felt it was reasonable to trust the [security@redhat.com](mailto:security@redhat.com) public key, and therefore locally signed the key on my key ring. Once the key was signed and trusted the digital signature embedded in the md5 checksum file was evaluated. It checked out fine and meant I was now able to verify the downloaded ISO images against these values by creating my own checksums and comparing.

Below is the output of the session, showing the signing of the public key, the checking of the digital signature on the md5 file, and finally the hash value calculation and comparison. My commands are in bold, everything else is output.

```
kerrm@mandrill:~/isos$ gpg --edit-key security@redhat.com lsign
gpg (GnuPG) 1.2.1; Copyright (C) 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY.
This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
under certain conditions. See the file COPYING for details.

pub 1024D/DB42A60E  created: 1999-09-23 expires: never      trust: -/-
sub 2048g/961630A2  created: 1999-09-23 expires: never
(1). Red Hat, Inc <security@redhat.com>

pub 1024D/DB42A60E  created: 1999-09-23 expires: never      trust: -/-
Primary key fingerprint: CA20 8686 2BD6 9DFC 65F6 ECC4 2191 80CD DB42 A60E

Red Hat, Inc <security@redhat.com>

How carefully have you verified the key you are about to sign actually belongs
to the person named above?  If you don't know what to answer, enter "0".

(0) I will not answer. (default)
(1) I have not checked at all.
(2) I have done casual checking.
(3) I have done very careful checking.

Your selection? 3
Are you really sure that you want to sign this key
with your key: "Michael Kerr (Michael Kerr) <zokuju@telstra.com>"

The signature will be marked as non-exportable.

I have checked this key very carefully.

Really sign? yes

You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Michael Kerr (Michael Kerr) <zokuju@telstra.com>"
1024-bit DSA key, ID 15FC8E6E, created 2003-04-27

Enter passphrase:
Command> save

kerrm@mandrill:~/isos$ gpg --verify MD5SUM
gpg: Signature made Wed Apr  2 07:07:31 2003 EST using DSA key ID DB42A60E
gpg: Good signature from "Red Hat, Inc <security@redhat.com>"
gpg: checking the trustdb
gpg: checking at depth 0 signed=1 ot(-/q/n/m/f/u)=0/0/0/0/0/1
gpg: checking at depth 1 signed=0 ot(-/q/n/m/f/u)=1/0/0/0/0/0
kerrm@mandrill:~/isos$ openssl dgst shrike*
MD5(shrike-i386-disc1.iso)= 400c7fb292c73b793fb722532abd09ad
MD5(shrike-i386-disc2.iso)= 6b8ba42f56b397d536826c78c9679c0a
MD5(shrike-i386-disc3.iso)= af38ac4316ba20df2dec5f990913396d
kerrm@mandrill:~/isos$ cat MD5SUM.txt
400c7fb292c73b793fb722532abd09ad  shrike-i386-disc1.iso
6b8ba42f56b397d536826c78c9679c0a  shrike-i386-disc2.iso
```

```
af38ac4316ba20df2dec5f990913396d  shrike-i386-disc3.iso
0727c51ab359dafa9ab31e0c50958aa6  shrike-SRPMS-disc1.iso
2ddd8e6a8502869cd2e78d47590b9be1  shrike-SRPMS-disc2.iso
f378cf68b22c3b9a64c86b5067511630  shrike-SRPMS-disc3.iso
```

This process proved invaluable, as my first attempted download from my local mirror site produced a corrupted ISO image of disk 1. While the disk was usable, and the installer functioned correctly, it would prove to be my downfall later, if scrutinised. I therefore downloaded the image again directly from the Redhat ftp site.

A similar process of verification was followed for the F.I.R.E ISO image, the @tstake Sleuthkit, Autopsy and the FAU archive files. This machine was now dedicated use, its software verified and it was physically located in an area with restricted access. I now had confidence that the lab environment was trustworthy and would produce accurate, reliable and reproducible results.

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## Part 1 – Binary Analysis

I began my investigation on Linux. The file provided was called `binary_v1.3.zip`. Using the Gnu unzip utility I extracted a report from the zip file using the following command.

```
unzip -Z -v binary_v1.3.zip
```

The full report is attached as appendix A. Key information reported is as follows:

- File size
  - compressed 5,567 bytes
  - uncompressed 26,793 bytes
- MAC times
  - Last modified date 2003-02-20 12:45:48

Unfortunately without access to the original file system it would not be possible to derive more detailed MAC information from the file, as the full metadata information is not packaged in the zip file, but on the filesystem.

From the command line I extracted the file using unzip.

```
[kerrm@forensics binary analysis]$ unzip -u binary_v1.3.zip
Archive:      binary_v1.3.zip
  inflating: target2.exe
```

Once the file was extracted I immediately produced a hash value in order to check the integrity of the binary subject during and after the investigation.

```
[kerrm@forensics binary analysis]$ md5sum target2.exe > target2.md5; cat target2.md5
848903a92843895f3ba7fb77f02f9bf1 target2.exe
```

```
[kerrm@forensics binary analysis]$ file target2.exe
target2.exe: MS-DOS executable (EXE), OS/2 or MS Windows
```

After considering the output from the file utility I moved the investigation the Windows platform.

## Windows 2000 Analysis

From Windows I again unzipped the binary and produced a hash value using the `md5sum` utility supplied with the FIRE CD. The hash value can be seen to match the value obtained from the Linux workstation.

```

kerrm@forensics:~/binary analysis
File Edit View Terminal Go Help
kerrm@forensics:~/binary analysis
[kerrm@forensics binary analysis]$ ls
binary analysis.sxw  binary_v1.3.zip  target2.exe  target2.md5
[kerrm@forensics binary analysis]$ md5sum target2.exe > target2.md5; cat target2.md5
848903a92843895f3ba7fb77f02f9bf1 target2.exe
[kerrm@forensics binary analysis]$ file target2.exe
target2.exe: MS-DOS executable (EXE), OS/2 or MS Windows
[kerrm@forensics binary analysis]$ ls -l target2.exe
-rwxrwxr-x  1 kerrm  kerrm    26793 Feb 20 13:45 target2.exe
[kerrm@forensics binary analysis]$

```

MD5 hash creation of unknown binary on the Linux system

```

Forensic Cmd Shell
Ctrl-D or Ctrl-F for Directory and filename completion
The Shell Path has been modified to find trusted cdrom binaries first
Do not navigate away from the CD drive letter.
=====
15:00:32.53 E:\> md5sum "d:\gcfa\binary analysis\target2.exe"
\848903a92843895f3ba7fb77f02f9bf1 >d:\gcfa\binary analysis\target2.exe
15:00:34.29 E:\>

```

MD5 hash creation of unknown binary on the Windows system

The next step was to extract all readable strings from the exe. Using BinText I extracted 150 lines of text, listed in Appendix B, the most interesting are also listed here:

```
Sleep
HeapAlloc
GetProcessHeap
TerminateProcess
ReadFile
PeekNamedPipe
CloseHandle
CreateProcessA
CreatePipe
WriteFile
GetLastError
LocalAlloc
KERNEL32.dll
StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA
SetServiceStatus
RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA
CloseServiceHandle
ControlService
QueryServiceStatus
OpenServiceA
CreateServiceA
OpenSCManagerA
DeleteService
StartServiceA
ChangeServiceConfigA
QueryServiceConfigA
ADVAPI32.dll
WSAIoctl
WSASocketA
WS2_32.dll
MFC42.DLL
memmove
fprintf
sprintf
perror
strstr
printf
MSVCRT.dll
impossibile creare raw ICMP socket
RAW ICMP SendTo:
===== Icmp BackDoor V0.1 =====
===== Code by Spoof. Enjoy Yourself!
Your PassWord:
loki
Hello from MFC!
\winnt\system32\smsses.exe
\\199.107.97.191\C$
\winnt\system32
\winnt\system32\reg.exe
```

Based purely on the banner and the password string I expected the application to be some type of variant of the original Loki ICMP backdoor first documented in 1996 in the whitepaper “Project Loki”<sup>3</sup> by daemon9 & Alhambra, and still available at [www.phrack.org](http://www.phrack.org). Loki facilitates the transport of data through the ICMP\_ECHO standard packet. The version number of 0.1 suggests this is an initial/early attempt of a port to win32. The source code to the original UNIX version is still available at phrack<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=49&a=6>

<sup>4</sup> Loki2 source available at <http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=51&a=6>

**Banner**

The exe contains the banner

```
===== Icmp BackDoor V0.1 =====
===== Code by Spoof. Enjoy Yourself!
```

Which clearly states the applications purpose, or at least its advertised purpose. The alias “Spoof” is the clearest indication of the responsible entity, either one person or a group. Searching of the internet using Google, Altavista, and Teoma failed to find anyone operating under this alias distributing an ICMP tool.

**Loki**

The two lines

```
Your PassWord:
loki
```

Indicate the application supports some sort of simple authentication, but its usage is not clear from the strings file.

**External application dependency**

Two external applications are referenced in the exe.

```
\winnt\system32\smsses.exe
\winnt\system32\reg.exe
```

After extensive searching on the internet I could find no reference to any application known as smsses.exe. This suggests the application either creates the file when run, or attempts to create it, or the code which uses this string is unused.

The second program, reg.exe is commonly known as a Microsoft tool used to write registry values, and can be called from the command line. However, reg.exe is not present on most Windows systems, as it is distributed as part of the NT4 resource kit, and in the support tools for Windows 2000<sup>5</sup>. Either the reg.exe referred to by target2.exe is a different application with the same name, or the MS file is bundled in the target2 installation package, or the author has made a fairly large assumption that the file would be present on the target machine; perhaps he/she had detailed information on the intended target host? The only way to know for sure would be to obtain the target2 installation package and compare md5hash values against the MS reg.exe file and the bundled file, if present.

**Hello from MFC!**


The string “Hello from MFC!” gives away some information on the history of the applications development. This string is used in the default creation of a

---

5

[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/scriptcenter/scrguide/sas\\_reg\\_sgq\\_w.asp](http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/scriptcenter/scrguide/sas_reg_sgq_w.asp)

console application in Microsoft's Visual C++, indicating the application started out as a VC++ project supporting Microsoft Foundation Classes.




## IP Address

The presence of an IP address in the form

```
\\199.107.97.191\C$
```

is hugely useful. In this form it shows the application may attempt to either copy to or from the hidden administrative share on the C drive of the machine 199.107.97.191. A quick whois search on arin.net shows the address range of 197.107.96.0 – 199.107.99.255 to be registered to a Californian University. It's common practice for universities to apply externally routable IP addresses to workstations. With sufficient resources it could be possible to track down the very machine this application connects to.



## System DLLs

The target2.exe contains references to several windows DLLs. The API calls extracted can be linked to each of the DLLS as follows:

### KERNEL32.dll

- Handles memory management and I/O
  - o CreateProcessA
  - o ReadFile
  - o Sleep
  - o HeapAlloc
  - o GetProcessHeap
  - o TerminateProcess
  - o PeekNamedPipe
  - o CloseHandle
  - o CreatePipe
  - o WriteFile
  - o GetLastError
  - o LocalAlloc

### ADVAPI32.dll

- Handles calls to registry and security related functions.
  - o StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA
  - o QueryServiceConfigA
  - o SetServiceStatus
  - o RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA
  - o CloseServiceHandle
  - o ControlService
  - o QueryServiceStatus
  - o OpenServiceA
  - o CreateServiceA
  - o OpenSCManagerA

- o DeleteService
- o StartServiceA
- o ChangeServiceConfigA

WS2\_32.dll

- Windows sockets function
  - o WSAIoctl
  - o WSASocketA

MSVCRT.dll

- console printing and string manipulation
  - o memmove
  - o fprintf
  - o sprintf
  - o perror
  - o strstr
  - o printf

MFC42.DLL

- Microsoft foundation Classes

The API calls are essentially listed in opposite order to the strings output, making the information more readable.

## Running The Application

At this point I decided the only way to learn more would be to run the application in my controlled environment. This step contained some risk, and although the forensics operating system was ultimately expendable I took several precautions before running the application. My internet connection was shut down and I set Ethereal running to report on any traffic sent from my machine.

Based on the examined output of the strings I expected to see the application do one, or several of the following things:

- o Install a new service.
- o stop a current service
- o grab files from the Californian computer
- o send files, or a report to the Californian computer
- o output the banner to the console
- o request a password
- o write to the registry
- o read from the registry
- o open a socket
- o access system DLLs

Again I used tools from the FIRE CD, but in addition I required several monitoring tools from the internet.

- o Strace (FIRE CD)
- o Winalysis<sup>6</sup>
- o Filemon<sup>7</sup>
- o Regmon<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.winalysis.com/>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.sysinternals.com>



- **Ethereal<sup>9</sup>**

My methodology was as follows:


1. Take Winalysis snapshot of system
2. start Filemon to monitor file system activity
3. start Regmon to monitor registry activity
4. start the target2 executable, but attach the Strace program to log system calls
5. After program exit take Winalysis snapshot and compare
6. examine filemon log
7. examine regmon log
8. examine Strace log

The exe was run from the command line with the command

```
D:\gcfa\binary analysis\strace target2.exe > strace.log
```

Running the executable took approximately 5 seconds, the application exited with no messages.

My first examination was of the Winalysis comparison. The output shows only modification to the filemon and regmon keys, and the access to the systems random number generator seed value, which changes often under normal conditions, I was sure this was not modified as a result of our test, as it was not recorded by regmon as being done by target2.



<sup>8</sup> <http://www.sysinternals.com>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.ethereal.com>



The filemon, regmon and strace log files are attached as Appendix C, D and E respectively.

There were of course many log entries created directly by the monitoring tools, and the system itself. Shown here in concise table form is a listing only of entries directly created by target2.exe for both filemon and regmon. The information, while initially overwhelming, is quite repetitive and describes the applications search for its required DLL. The final table, showing sections of the strace output, shows the application looking for MFC42LOC.DLL, which is not present. Finally the application attempts to open a pipe but returns the status STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED and then exits. Based on this we can see the application is not statically linked, and would probably require the MFC to be bundled with it's distribution in order to run correctly. MFC support files are not readily distributed by Microsoft, it would be moderately difficult to obtain and install the correct version for this application. Based on the information I had gathered so far I felt I could confidently describe the applications purpose without actually successfully running it.

### FileMon Log

10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CREATE	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CREATE	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CLEANUP	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CREATE	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CLEANUP	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and

		Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CREATE	C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42.DLL
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CLEANUP	C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42.DLL
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CLOSE	C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42.DLL
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CREATE	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_STANDARD_INFO	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_CLEANUP	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42LOC.DLL
10:21:00 PM	FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop
10:21:00 PM	FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN	C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42LOC.DLL
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll
10:21:00 PM	IRP_MJ_READ*	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll

## Regmon Log

OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager	SUCCESS
QueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode	NOTFOUND
CloseKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon	SUCCESS
QueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\LeakTrack	NOTFOUND
CloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKLM	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Error Message Instrument\	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility32	SUCCESS
QueryValue	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility32\target2	NOTFOUND
CloseKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility32	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility2	SUCCESS
QueryValue	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility2\target20.0	NOTFOUND
CloseKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility2	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\IME	SUCCESS
QueryValue	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\IME\Compatibility\target2	NOTFOUND
CloseKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\IME\Compatibility	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCompatibility\target2.exe	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows	SUCCESS
QueryValue	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs	SUCCESS
CloseKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKCU	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\MUILanguages	NOTFOUND
OpenKey	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop	SUCCESS
QueryValue	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\MultiUILanguageId	NOTFOUND
CloseKey	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop	SUCCESS
CloseKey	HKCU	SUCCESS
OpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceCurrent	SUCCESS
QueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceCurrent\ (Default)	SUCCESS
CloseKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceCurrent	SUCCESS
CloseKey	HKLM	SUCCESS

Strace Log	
158 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242152, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0	
159 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "???\C:\binary analysis\MSVCP60.dll"}, 1243076, ... ) == 0x0	
160 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242908, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0	
161 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242352, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0	
162 912 624 NtOpenFile (0x100020, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "???\C:\binary analysis\MSVCP60.dll"}, 1243232, 5, 96, ... 36, ) == 0x0	
356 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "???\C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42LOC.DLL"}, 1241268, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	
357 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1240904, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0	
358 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "???\C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42LOC.DLL"}, 1241828, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	
359 912 624 NtTestAlert (... ) == 0x0	
360 912 624 NtContinue (1244464, 1, ... )	
361 912 624 NtSetInformationThread (-2, 9, 1245176, 4, ... ) == 0x0	
362 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x1, {24, 52, 0x40, 0, 0, "System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceCurrent"}, ... 80, ) == 0x0	
363 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (80, "□", 2, 1244012, 144, 1244164, ... ) == 0x0	
364 912 624 NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0	
365 912 624 NtOpenFile (0x100080, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\DosDevices\pipe\"}, 1244232, 3, 32, ... 80, ) == 0x0	
366 912 624 NtFsControlFile (80, 0, 0, 0, 1244240, 1114136, 1274896, 50, 0, 0, ... ) == STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT	
367 912 624 NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0	
368 912 624 NtCreateFile (0xc0100080, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, 1244208, "???\pipe\net\NtControlPipe9"}, 1244228, 0, 128, 3, 1, 96, 0, 0, ... ) == STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	

## Legal Implications

Based on what I have seen so far I will assume the application facilitates the transport of data over a network using a well known application of an ICMP weakness. This can be taken further to assume that, like the Unix based Loki applications, the transmitted data is intended to be executed by the target server. An application such as this really has only one intended purpose, the clandestine execution of code on a remote server which can be performed in such a way as to bypass packet filtering technology intended to manage standard traffic.

Therefore, it seems reasonable to state that any use of this application would be an attempt to gain “unauthorised use of a computer”, as described in Australia’s *Cybercrime Act 2001*(477.1), which carries a penalty of ten years imprisonment<sup>10</sup>.

Unfortunately, a WinZip file contains only a files last accessed timestamp; it is therefore difficult to recover details of the files history. Only an image of the originating machines file system would provide MAC times detailing creation, access, modification or deletion dates. Without this information it cannot be proven that the file was ever run, indeed, my own tests failed to even execute the application, perhaps the file does not run at all.

<sup>10</sup> [http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol\\_act/ca2001112/sch1.html](http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001112/sch1.html)

## Interview Questions

The circumstances surrounding an opportunity to interview the suspect should begin with some evidence to indicate this individual above others. Perhaps audit logs or modem logs, or the user found at a terminal during a detected breach. Some circumstantial evidence, at least, should place the user on the system at the time of the binaries detection.

Questions should begin vague; asking general questions about the system, how the user accesses it, and what tasks the user performs using it. Care should be taken not to reveal any detailed information on the binary at an early stage. For example:

1. Are you familiar with system X?
2. Do you access system X?
3. How do you access this system?
  - a. Dial in?
  - b. Web?
  - c. Telnet?
  - d. Citrix?
  - e. Local?
4. What tasks do you perform on this system?
5. What level is your access on this system?
  - a. User?
  - b. Guest?
  - c. Power User?
  - d. Administrator?

More specific questions regarding the user's actions during the time in question should be asked. Generally the suspect should be asked if they made any modifications to the system, or installed any software.

6. What tasks did you perform on [date]?
7. Have you ever installed software on this system?
8. Did you install software on [date]?

The suspect could be shown some information regarding the program, its filename, location or permissions. An audit log could be referred to, but not shown; indicating any access to the program by the suspect has been recorded. The suspect could be asked

1. Are you familiar with this program?
2. Do you know what this program does?
3. Do you know how and when this application was installed?
4. Have you ever used this application?

At this stage it would be appropriate to provide evidence linking the user to the software, audit logs showing either access to or installation of the program would be enough. After referring to this evidence more specific questions could be asked.

1. Where did the software come from?
2. Are you/do you know 'spoof'?

And again

1. What does the program do?

2. When did you use it?
3. How did you use it?

## Conclusion


The file target2.exe was obtained in compressed format within a Windows Zip file named binary\_v1.3.zip. It is a windows console application which was last modified, possibly compiled, on February 20<sup>th</sup> 2003. It was created using Microsoft Visual C++ IDE. Its intended use is most likely a Win32 version of the original Loki or Loki 2 applications available on the UNIX platform for many years. It is a networking application possibly installing a service which listens for ICMP\_ECHO packets and manipulates the payload of ICMP packets, taking advantage of the lack of ICMP data handling standards. It manipulates Windows services, either installing a new service or replacing an existing one with a trojaned version. It was coded by a person or persons with the alias "Spoof" who most likely has some relationship with a Californian university. The application has some dependency on the Microsoft C++ libraries, and will not run without at least MFC42LOC.DLL. The file is most likely not advertised as available for download from any indexed websites.

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## Part 2 – Option 1: Perform Forensic Analysis On A System

### Background

Our company purchases bandwidth from our telecommunications provider by the megabyte. Recently an exercise was undertaken to graph the amount of data passing through our firewall and reconciling this information with the statistics supplied by the Telco. What we found was disturbing. Between the months of January through to May 2003 there was a clear difference between the amount of data the company was being billed for the amount of data actually passing through our firewall. We keep a small internet segment between our external firewall and our egress router; it was possible that it was here that the data was travelling to and from. There are less than 5 machines in this network segment, a secondary DNS server and two or three workstations used for internet troubleshooting. One of the workstations was mine, one my manager's and one unclaimed desktop machine used by several people. I requested that I be able to take an image of the PC and perform a forensic analysis in order to determine if it was being used for any unauthorised or unintended purpose.



### On Site Response

#### Evidence Collection

Once access to the machine had been approved it was necessary to examine the hardware configuration and put together a plan for capturing data.

The desktop machine was a HP e-Vectra, based on sales material, until I knew otherwise I assumed the specifications to be:

- Intel Pentium III 600Mhz
- 128Mb RAM
- 8Gb HDD

After image capture I physically examined the case and hard drive retrieved the following serial numbers and tagged the items as follows:

Tag # 1: Hard Drive - HP S/N D9919 – XXXXX

## Tag # 2: Case - HP S/N D9898A – XXXXX



Catalogue image of  
HP eVectra

I found the machine to be running, and logged in as local Administrator, I performed a cursory, non obtrusive, examination by right clicking on 'My Computer' icon and selecting properties. Several pieces of general information were available for viewing from this screen; I then entered 'My Computer' and examined the drive configuration. This brief examination indicated the active OS was Windows 2000 Professional, installed on a fat32 partition approximately 8 GB in size.

At this stage I had confidence in the following facts:

- The machine was not in constant use, or the responsibility of any one individual
- The machine was running Windows 2000 Professional
- The machine was logged in as local Administrator (I therefore had very good access to the running os).
- The machine had been running for an unknown period of time.

With this information I formed the following strategy for obtaining the most information possible whilst having the minimum impact of the machine:

1. Image physical memory
2. Gather information on running processes
3. Power down machine and image hard drive
4. Dismantle machine and obtain drive and case serial numbers
5. Securely store machine.

In preparation I connected my Windows 2000 laptop to the internet segment and manually configured a compatible IP address 192.168.1.2<sup>11</sup>. I inserted the F.I.R.E CD (I had burnt two copies from the iso image) into my laptop and started a command shell by clicking the "Open forensic cmd shell" button on the main menu. The F.I.R.E CD alters the path variable to use binaries from the CD instead of the OSs normal path, this is vital when working on a possibly compromised machine. I then started netcat<sup>12</sup> and configured it to listen on port 40000, and to output data to a file c:\images\pc\_mem.img (it's


<sup>11</sup> Obviously a fictitious IP address, but an important point to remember is that IP addresses in this Network Segment are public.

<sup>12</sup> Netcat is a hugely useful program capable of setting up adhoc network connections between hosts, enabling the no fuss transport of data [www.insecure.org](http://www.insecure.org).




necessary to change the output file for each image). Starting and configuring netcat was done using the command

```
nc -l -p 40000 > c:\images\pc_mem.img
```



### ***Imaging Physical Memory***

My first obstacle was a compatibility issue with the tools I had chosen. It became apparent that the only version of dd ported to Windows capable of imaging physical memory was the version distributed in the Forensic Acquisition Utilities Package. The version of dd bundled with F.I.R.E is older, from the UnixUtils package, attempting to image the running machines memory using this version produced only an error.



```

Forensic Cmd Shell
Ctrl-D or Ctrl-F for Directory and filename completion
The Shell Path has been modified to find trusted cdrom binaries first
Do not navigate away from the CD drive letter.
=====
14:28:53.01 E:\> dd if=\\.\PhysicalMemory | nc 192.168.0.10 40000
dd: \\.\PhysicalMemory: No such file or directory

14:29:37.49 E:\>

```

dd error message showing failure to image physical memory

I had prepared another CD with the Forensic Acquisition Utilities on it. The version on this CD worked perfectly, and dd performed a bit by bit copy of the memory, piping it through netcat to the forensics laptop. Once the image was safe on the notebook I obtained a hash value using md5sum.

```
c:\images>md5sum pc_mem.img > c:\images\eVectra.md5
```

### **Gathering information on running processes**

The F.I.R.E CD provides one click reporting of a Windows operating system. Inserting a floppy disk and clicking on the local analysis/ report runs the 'Fred' batch script, this executes many command line utilities from the CD designed to produce a single file report detailing running processes, loaded dlls etc. Appendix G is the Fred script, appendix H is the report produced from the suspect machine. This script consecutively runs many forensic, and administrative command executables, in order they:

1. Output the system's current time (time /t)
2. Output the system's current date (date /t)
3. Summarise system information (Psinfo)
4. Show information on password policy (net accounts)
5. Show open files (net file)
6. Show any network sessions with other machines (net session)
7. List shared directories (net share)
8. List running services (net start)
9. List current or disconnected network connections (net use)
10. Show local accounts (net user)
11. Show any other machines in the same domain (net view)
12. Show any entries in the arp cache (Arp -a)
13. Show all listening ports, and display routing table (netstat -anr)

14. Show any logged on sessions (psloggedon)
15. List all running processes, and any dlls associated (procinterrogate – list)
16. Map listening ports to running processes (fport /p)
17. List processes in detail, record kernel itmes and thread information (pslist –x)
18. List contents of netbios name cache (nbtstat –c)
19. List hidden files on C drive (dir /s /a:h /t:a c)
20. List hidden files on D drive (**redundant**) (dir /s /a:h /t:a d)
21. List any jobs configured in the at service (at)
22. Print the finish time (time /t)
23. Print the finish date (date /t)

The script also attempted to generate md5 hash values for system directories on the machine. Unfortunately the results returned were not useful. All attempts to perform md5 hashing within the Fred script failed, this was hardly an issue though, I simply hashed the file manually, producing the following MD5 sum.

report.log MD5 hash:

1daa807267731a339adcb7410eeb71f5

Once hashed I write protected the floppy disk and stored it for later reference.

The Fred script is very convenient, saving me having to write and store separately my own batch script.

After running the report I briefly examined the output, and decided it was time to reboot the machine.

### **Imaging the hard drive**

The machine was rebooted with the FIRE CD loaded in the drive. FIRE is bootable and runs a minimal Linux kernel providing command line and X as well as preconfigured text menus for performing networking setup and standard forensic tasks quickly.

The first task on the FIRE menu is to set up an IP address for copying data to another machine. I chose to hardcode an IP address of 192.168.1.3 before continuing on with my examination. I ran fdisk from the command line to examine the hard disk.

```
[root@FIRE root]>fdisk /dev/hda
```

The number of cylinders for this machine is set to 1027. There is nothing wrong with that, but this is larger than 1024 and could on certain setups cause problems with:

- 1) software that runs at boot time (eg., old versions of lilo)
- 2) booting and partition software from other OSs (eg., DOS FDISK, OS/2 FDISK)

Command (m for help):p

Disk /dev/hda: 255 heads, 63 sectors, 1027 cylinders  
Units = cylinders of 16055 \* 512 bytes

Device	Boot	Start	End	Block	Id	System
/dev/hda1		1	2	16033+	12	Compaq Diagnostics
/dev/hda2	*	3	1027	8233312+c		Win95 FAT32 (LBA)

The results from this were interesting, but not altogether surprising. Compaq (HP) machines have for many years created a small hidden partition at the start of a hard drive and used it to store recovery and configuration applications. This machine had a 16Mb hidden partition which was not reported by the Fred script earlier. I would need to image and analyse this partition as well.

Prior to extracting images it was necessary to create hash values from the raw partitions. As I stated earlier, the version of dd on the FIRE CD is not as advanced as the FAU version available, the same can be said for the netcat executable. FAU netcat allows for computing hash values for data file on the fly. This is convenient and hopefully will become a feature in the future, but for now I was required to first hash the partitions on the suspect system, then compare those values to my netcat images captured to the notebook.

```
[root@FIRE root]>md5sum /dev/hda1
f319e102207902f3eec8ceeddbb792a1 /dev/hda1

[root@FIRE root]>md5sum /dev/hda2
d73412ea5ab865e55d0e7937901ed0a4 /dev/hda2
```

Using netcat I again set up my laptop to listen for data and output it to an image file. I first imaged the Compaq Utilities partition, then the actual Windows 2000 system partition.

On the laptop:

```
nc -l -p 40000 > c:\images\pc_utils.img
```

On the suspect PC:

```
dd if=/dev/hda1 | nc 192.168.1.2 40000
```

And then

On the laptop:

```
nc -l -p 40000 > c:\images\pc.img
```

On the suspect PC:

```
dd if=/dev/hda2 | nc 192.168.1.2 40000
```

With all images on the notebook I produced a file containing all md5 hash values for the e-Vectra PC.

```
[root@FIRE root]>md5sum /mnt/ext/*.img > /home/kerrm/supporting \forensic
\work/eVectra.md5
[root@FIRE root]>cat /home/kerrm/supporting \forensic \work/eVectra.md5
d73412ea5ab865e55d0e7937901ed0a4 /mnt/ext/pc.img
5d004eebc40cb78a6229bd25271a3dd9 /mnt/ext/pc_mem.img
f319e102207902f3eec8ceeddbb792a1 /mnt/ext/pc_utils.img
```

This indicates perfect copies of the two partitions from the suspect machine. With all data collected I chose to secure the PC until a decision could be made regarding its future. Small form factor PCs are convenient, in this case I was able to lock the PC in my drawer!

## Offsite Image Analysis

At the forensic lab I connected the notebook to the analysis machine via crossover cable, configured an IP address and transferred the images one by one via netcat again. Once copied it was necessary to calculate and compare hash values of the images to ensure they remained unaltered by the network copy.

Using the already created md5 file, it was easy to at once calculate and compare the three images to the values in the file.

```
[kerrm@forensics ext]$ ls
lost+found pc.img pc_mem.img pc_utils.img
[kerrm@forensics ext]$ md5sum --check /home/kerrm/supporting \forensic
\work\eVectra.md5
/mnt/ext/pc.img: OK
/mnt/ext/pc_mem.img: OK
/mnt/ext/pc_utils.img: OK
```

I had loaded the images onto a dedicated partition. I could further ensure their integrity during the investigation by modifying the fstab table to mount the dedicated partition in read only mode on start up. Appendix J shows the modified fstab file directing /dev/hdd2 to be mounted read only (ro) to /mnt/ext on start up. After a reboot the images were now ready and the analysis began.

## Analysis of Reports

My first step was to examine the FRED report and gain preliminary information which may provide some clues on the machines current activity. The following is excerpts of the report, with brief explanations. The entire report is included as Appendix H.

FRED v1.1 - 2 April 2002 [modified for fire 10/2002]

-----  
START TIME

-----  
11:50a  
Fri 05/02/2003

-----  
PSINFO

-----  
PsInfo v1.31 - local and remote system information viewer  
Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Mark Russinovich  
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Querying information for ...

System information for \\HP1:  
Uptime: 1 day, 1 hour, 14 minutes, 0 seconds  
Kernel version: Microsoft Windows 2000, Uniprocessor Free  
Product type: Professional  
Product version: 5.0  
Service pack: 2  
Kernel build number: 2195  
Registered organization:  
Registered owner: administrator  
Install date: 5/10/2000, 3:46:07 PM  
IE version: 6.0000  
System root: C:\WINNT

```
Processors:          1
Processor speed:     605 MHz
Processor type:      Intel Pentium III
Physical memory:     126 MB
Volume Type          Format      Label              Size      Free      Free
A: Removable         FAT          1.4 MB            1.4 MB    100%
C: Fixed              FAT32       ATRYP00ABK        7.8 GB    5.2 GB    66%
E: CD-ROM             CDFS        FIRE-0.3.5b       220.1 MB  0%
```

This information is very generic; it does little other than to confirm my original assumptions regarding the machine specification. It does however show the installation date of 10<sup>th</sup> of June 2000. Note that the Compaq diagnostic partition is not listed here; it is marked as hidden and is not visible to Windows.

```
-----
NET SHARE
-----
```

```
Share name    Resource                                Remark
-----
```

```
ADMIN$        C:\WINNT                                Remote Admin
C$             C:\                                     Default share
IPC$           Remote IPC
```

The command completed successfully.

These shares are all automatically created by the operating system, there is nothing unexpected here.

```
-----
NET START
-----
```

These Windows 2000 services are started:

```
COM+ Event System
Computer Browser
DHCP Client
Distributed Link Tracking Client
Event Log
IPSEC Policy Agent
Logical Disk Manager
Messenger
Network Connections
Plug and Play
Print Spooler
Protected Storage
Remote Access Connection Manager
Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
Remote Registry Service
Removable Storage
RunAs Service
Security Accounts Manager
Server
Still Image Service
System Event Notification
Task Scheduler
TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper Service
Telephony
Windows Management Instrumentation
Windows Management Instrumentation Driver Extensions
WMDM PMSP Service
Workstation
```

The command completed successfully.

These are all Windows 2000 services. Note however the “Still Image Service”, it is a Microsoft service, but is only installed when an usb imaging device such as Digital Camera or Scanner is attached to the machine. Therefore, at some stage this machine has been attached to an imaging device. With this in mind it will be worthwhile conducting a thorough image search later on in the analysis.

```
-----
NET USER
-----
```

```
User accounts for \\HP1
```

```
-----
Administrator          Fooman                  Guest
The command completed successfully.
```

Fooman doesn't sound like a corporate account. This is a local account, as this machine is not a member of any domain it is reasonable to expect someone to create their own account. I made a note to examine the user directory later.

```
-----
LOGGED ON
-----
```

```
PsLoggedOn v1.21 - Logon Session Displayer
Copyright (C) 1999-2000 Mark Russinovich
SysInternals - www.sysinternals.com
```

```
Users logged on locally:
    5/1/2003 10:37:24 AM    HP1\Administrator
```

```
No one is logged on via resource shares.
```

This is good.

```
-----
ProcInterrogate
-----
```

```
ProcInterrogate Version 0.0.1 by Kirby Kuehl vacuum@users.sourceforge.net
-----
```

```
-----
C:\WINNT\System32\smss.exe (Process ID: 140)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\winlogon.exe (Process ID: 160)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\services.exe (Process ID: 212)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\lsass.exe (Process ID: 224)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\svchost.exe (Process ID: 384)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\spoolsv.exe (Process ID: 412)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\svchost.exe (Process ID: 444)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\regsvc.exe (Process ID: 480)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\MSTask.exe (Process ID: 496)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\stisvc.exe (Process ID: 524)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\Wbem\WinMgmt.exe (Process ID: 572)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\System32\mpmmpspsv.exe (Process ID: 592)
-----
```

```
C:\WINNT\Explorer.EXE (Process ID: 792)
-----
```

```

-----
popupkiller.EXE (Process ID: 852)
-----
qttask.exe (Process ID: 864)
-----
SETI@home.exe (Process ID: 880)
-----
E:\win32\fire.exe (Process ID: 936)
-----
E:\win32\cmd.exe (Process ID: 1172)
-----
E:\win32\procinterrogate.exe (Process ID: 1156)

```

Procinterrogate lists all executables currently running. It also lists any DLLS in use by the exe, but here I've removed them for readability. Most of the exes here are from Windows, but also listed are; a pop up ad killer, the Quicktime tray launcher, SETI@home, the FIRE CD (in use by me), our trusted cmd binary from the CD and procinterrogate itself.

```

-----
FPORT (fport /p)
-----

```

```

FPort v2.0 - TCP/IP Process to Port Mapper
Copyright 2000 by Foundstone, Inc.
http://www.foundstone.com

```

Pid	Process	Port	Proto	Path
384	svchost	-> 135	TCP	C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe
8	System	-> 445	TCP	
496	MSTask	-> 1025	TCP	C:\WINNT\system32\MSTask.exe
8	System	-> 1028	TCP	
384	svchost	-> 135	UDP	C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe
8	System	-> 445	UDP	
212	services	-> 1027	UDP	C:\WINNT\system32\services.exe
792	Explorer	-> 1088	UDP	C:\WINNT\Explorer.EXE
936	fire	-> 1142	UDP	E:\win32\fire.exe

Fport lists very few open ports listening, this is also a relief. The last entry, fire, is my toolkit.

## Memory Image Interrogation

I found the memory image file unmountable. To examine it I created a strings file from the image and perused the contents for suspicious text. The command used was

```
[kerrm@forensics kerrm]$ strings pc_mem.img > mem_strings
```

The output of which was over 10Mb of pure text. To make the file more manageable the strings file was grepped, looking for instances of ".exe". This would give a good indication of applications which were in some way associated with the machine.

```
[kerrm@forensics kerrm]$ fgrep -e exe -i -n mem_strings > fgrep_mem_strings
```

Fgrep, with these options performed a case insensitive search for instances of exe, outputting the matching line with their original line number into a new file, fgrep\_mem\_strings.

Viewing this file was much easier, and almost immediately gratifying. Held in memory were references to dozens of non OS related executables. Common



downloads such as SETI, game demos and possibly warez-like files were also mentioned. The following sample output shows executable names of game demos, and the Microsoft Direct X 8 distribution for Windows 2000, necessary to play most modern 3D games. It would not be likely these files were downloaded for any business reason.

```
100719:DX80NTeng.exe
100720:DX80NT~1.EXE
100724:LegendsFirstLook.exe
100725:LEGEND~1.EXE
100746:setiathome_win_3_03.exe
100747:SETIAT~1.EXE
100750:startrekawayteamdemo.exe
100751:STARTR~1.EXE
100753:thmpls410_s.exe
100754:THMPLS~1.EXE
100758:winzip80.exe
100788:Tribes2.exe
100789:TRIBES2.EXE
100790:UNWISE.EXE
102531:"C:\Program Files\SETI@home\SETI@home.exe" -min
102725:arcanum_en_1074.exe
```

The internal workings of an application can be very handy to a forensic investigation. The win32 function FindExecutableImage and FindExecutableImageEx are both called by an application wishing to find all executables in a given location<sup>13</sup>. The following output from the grepped strings file show a call to both FindExecutableImage and FindExecutableImageex which in turn lists all executables from the a directory. Note the seti@home exe, and the BRYCE\_~1EXE entry, probably Bryce 3D. Also in this list is eye.exe, this is probably the All Seeing Eye from Udpsoft<sup>14</sup>, a multiplayer game server browser.

```
849847:FindExecutableImage
849848:FindExecutableImageEx
851035:SYSOCMGREXE
851053:TWUNK_16EXE
851057:TWUNK_32EXE
851081:VCMD EXE
851086:MSTASK EXE
851100:ODBCAD32EXE
851102:ODBCCONFEXE
851107:WINLOGONEXE
851111:WJVIEW EXE
851127:UNREGMP2EXE
851137:ACCWIZ EXE
851401:SETI@HOME.EXE
851663:MSIEXEC EXE
851668:MRINFO EXE
851670:MSINFO32EXE
851689:MSPAINTE EXE
851692:PROCTEXEOCX
851703:MSCDEXNTEXE
851706:MSSWCHX EXE
851713:MSTINIT EXE
851717:MSDTC EXE
851748:MWCLoad EXE
851750:MWCLoadWEXE
851757:NETDDE EXE
851758:MWCPYRT EXE
851759:MWCSW32 EXE
851761:MWMDMSVCEXE
```

<sup>13</sup> <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/debug/base/findexecutableimage.asp>

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.udpssoft.com/eye2/index.html>

851768:MWRCOV16EXE  
851770:MWREMINDEXE  
851772:MWSSW32 EXE  
851784:NARRATOREXE  
854194:C:\WINNT\System32\cmd.exe  
854397:BRYCE ~1EXE  
854403:KMD171~1EXE  
854405:OLWAR~1EXE  
855215:RAR EXE  
855218:UNINST~1EXE  
855219:UNRAR EXE  
855221:WINRAR EXE  
855726:AUTOEXECBAT 4.0  
857597:\_execvp  
857788:NBTSTAT EXE  
857790:NLSFUNC EXE  
857796:NDDEAPIREXE  
857802:NOTEPAD EXE  
857804:NSLOOKUPEXE  
857808:NPPAGENTEXE  
857818:NET EXE  
857821:NET1 EXE  
857831:NTDSUTIL.exe  
857842:NTSD EXE  
857853:NTVDM EXE  
857869:NW16 EXE  
857875:NWSCRIPTEXE  
857883:OSK EXE  
857884:PACKAGEREXE  
857892:NETSH EXE  
857901:NETSTAT EXE  
857904:PRINT EXE  
858922:\_18be6784.exe  
858937:Slingo.exe  
861017:SMSS EXE  
861116:eye.exe  
861307:BSC4.exe  
861862:WINMSD EXE  
861876:WINSPOOLEXE  
861884:WINVER EXE  
861889:WANGIMG EXE  
861892:WORDPAD EXE  
861894:WOWDEB EXE  
861895:WOWEXEC EXE  
861896:WB32 EXE  
861898:WPNPINSTEXE  
861903:WRITE EXE  
861914:WSCRIPT EXE  
861923:XCOPY EXE  
861928:WABMIG EXE  
861929:WUPDMGR EXE  
861932:MSIMN EXE  
861936:WBEMTESTEXE  
861939:OEMIG50 EXE  
861941:WELCOME EXE  
861942:WEXTRACTEXE  
861947:WINCHAT EXE  
861949:WINHELP EXE  
861951:SETUP50 EXE  
861977:WAB EXE  
863490:CMSTP EXE  
863503:COMPACT EXE  
863506:COMP EXE  
863507:CDPLAYEREXE  
863515:COMCLUSTEXE  
863522:CONF EXE  
863523:CHARMAP EXE  
863526:COMREPL EXE  
863529:COMREREGEXE  
863532:CLUSTER EXE  
863537:CONIME EXE  
863540:CONTROL EXE  
863542:CONVERT EXE  
863544:CONVLOG EXE  
863548:CIDAEMONEXE  
863559:CMD EXE  
863566:CSRSS EXE

```

863571:CIPHER  EXE
863576:CISVC   EXE
863580:CKCNV   EXE
863585:DDESHAREXE
863586:DDMPXY  EXE
863594:DCOMCNFGEXE
863600:DFRGFAT EXE
863603:DFRGNTFSEXE
863606:DEBUG   EXE
863607:DPLAYSVREXE
863608:CLEANMGREXE
863614:CLIPBRD EXE
863618:CLIPSRV EXE
863623:CLSPACK EXE
863634:DISKPERFE
863639:DLLHOST EXE
863642:DLLHST3GEXE
863645:DMADMIN  EXE
863647:DIALER   EXE
863648:DIANTZ   EXE
863649:IE4UNITEXE
863655:DISCOVEREXE
863656:CMDL32  EXE
863764:COGS_1~1EXE
864542:eXeh

```

My initial impressions are that there have been or still are non work related files on this machine, some of them, such as game demos, or the SETI daemon are capable of consuming large amounts of bandwidth and may be responsible for our traffic discrepancy. At this stage I didn't know if the files had simply been downloaded, or were in fact installed on the machine.

### ***C Drive Image Interrogation***

Before utilising the Sleuthkit I did some simple searches to look for anything which could provide quick clues to help the investigation. The partition storing the image files was already mounted read only; therefore it was a simple matter to mount the drive image in loop back mode to gain access to the file system without compromising the integrity on the image


```
[kerrm@forensics kerrm]$ mount -t vfat -o loop /mnt/ext/pc.img /mnt/images/disk
```

I performed several high level searches, similar to what I would do if I was operating within the OS, as well as a couple of tricks I couldn't do in Windows as well. My method was:

- Search for .log files, follow clues
- Search for .txt files, follow clues
- Search for EXEs, follow clues
- View contents of recycle bin
- Extract strings from internet history files (index.dat)
- Examine cookies

## Search for Log Files

From the Gnome Find utility it was trivial to search for some easy sources of information. My first search was for the term \*.log, this returned over 50 matches.



The search returned these files:

```
/mnt/images/disk/hp/masters/mouse/setup.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/config/system.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/config/software.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/config/default.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/config/userdiff.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/config/security.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/config/sam.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/wbem/Logs/wbemcore.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/wbem/Logs/mofcomp.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/wbem/Logs/wmiprov.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/wbem/Logs/WinMgmt.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/wbem/Logs/DSPProvider.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/wbem/Logs/wbemsnp.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/wbem/Logs/ntevt.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/export/encinst.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/qtplugin.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/DTCLog/msdtc.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/system32/QuickTime/Uninstall.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/repair/setup.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/security/logs/scesetup.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/security/logs/backup.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/security/logs/scesrv.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/security/res2.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/security/res1.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/security/edb.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/security/edb00004.log
```

```

/mnt/images/disk/winnt/Debug/UserMode/userenv.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/Debug/passwd.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/Debug/oakley.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/Debug/ipsecpa.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/wmsetup.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/setupact.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/setuperr.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/iis5.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/comsetup.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/ockodak.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/ocgen.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/mmdet.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/setupapi.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/COM+.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/Directx.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/DtcInstall.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/Sti_Trace.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/imsins.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/coder.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/svcpack.log
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/Windows Update.log
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/All
/mnt/images/disk/Users/Documents/DrWatson/drwtstn32.log
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Application
Data/Identities/{7BFA2DFB-B5B6-497B-A008-9996A0C2600C}/Microsoft/Outlook
Express/cleanup.log
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Thumbs4/install.log
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WindowsUpdate/wuhistv3.log
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/install.log
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lavasoft Ad-Aware/install.log
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/SpyBlocker Software/UnInst.log
/mnt/images/disk/games/Microsoft Golf 2001/crash.log

```

We can see here many Windows related log files, but at least seven stand out.

*Firstly winnt/IIS.log* indicates this machine had at one time IIS installed and running. Running the tail command on this file indicates it has not been active for some time, the 26<sup>th</sup> of November in 2001 in fact.

```

[root@forensics images]# tail /mnt/images/disk/winnt/iis5.log
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:OC_NEED_MEDIA Called=0
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:OC_NOTIFICATION_FROM_QUEUE
Called=0[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:OC_QUERY_STEP_COUNT Called=0
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:OC_ABOUT_TO_COMMIT_QUEUE Called=0
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:OC_FILE_BUSY Called=0
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:OC_COMPLETE_INSTALLATION Called=0
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:OC_CLEANUP Called=1
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:OC_DEFAULT Called=0
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:RtlValidateHeap(): Good.
[11/26/2001 16:48:48] OC_CLEANUP:Final Check:LogFile Close.

```

Secondly, the file *install.log* has been just dumped in the Program Files directory; this alone draws attention to it. Running tail on this log produces this output

```

[root@forensics images]# tail disk/Program\ Files/install.log
*** Installation Started 08/28/2001 14:36 ***
Title: Virtua Girl Installation
Source: E:\MODRIV~9\NAUGHTY\VIRTUA~A\VIRGIRL\ADDON_~3\STRIP.EXE | 07-21-2001 |
21:24:36 | 2324647
Installation Aborted!

```

Virtua Girl is a popular piece of free software, and also a well known Trojan. This log file indicates the installation was aborted for some reason, this is good. Interestingly enough the installation seems to have been run from a CD.

Next, the file /mnt/images/disk/games/Microsoft Golf 2001/crash.log of course indicates that games have been installed on this machine (already suggested by the presence of a DirectX setup log as well).

Many of the Windows logs in the security and debug directories are empty (I would need to check the MAC times later to detect any unexpected modification), but one /winnt/Debug/NetSetup.log has some interesting information. This log shows the process of a machine joining and rejoining the workgroup named “workgroup” three times, each as a different machine name. The machine started out as HP-6DDLKBKXXXXX, was renamed ETECTRA01 and then finally HP1. Was this an attempt to assume some anonymity? The full log is attached as Appendix I.

The file /winnt/coder.log provided some alarming information. Running tail on this file produces only two lines.

```
www.hacker.ag 03/13/03 15:49:36 dialer start
www.hacker.ag 04/09/03 12:04:15 dialer start
```

This indicates some type of dialling software, which, although the machine has no modem, could be a real problem and deserves more investigation. Next I browsed to the location of the log file in the file manager, and found that in addition to the log file there was also an ini file and a directory by the same name. The directory was empty, but the contents of the ini file were as follows;

```
[cfg]
country=3
ln_2-hags-1-0-.exe=2-hags-1-0-
user=CILABYALZRJHDOSVWAXEFWYNDJXXXX
modem=
prefix=
tone=yes
```

A visit to the [www.hacker.ag](http://www.hacker.ag) website showed the site to be offering cracked software, keys and tuition in hacking techniques. The visitor is required to disconnect from the internet and reconnect using the dialup software. The service is charged by the minute. The user on this machine probably did not realise they would require a modem to use the software, after running it once deleted it. The coder.log file supports this theory, with only two entries.

Not a concern, but of note is the Ad-aware and Spy Blocker installation logs. This indicates the user was trying to clean the machine and may have already dealt with the above software, which would also explain why there is no executable. I made a note to attempt to recover the “hag” exe later on.

### Search for Text Files

My next search was for text files in general. This search returned over nine hundred results. I was able to quickly eliminate many of these as Microsoft files by their location in the i386 directory, which contained the Windows 2000

installation files. This was of course pending the examination later on in Autopsy. The search for text files also returned all user's cookies. I could ignore them for the moment, as they would be the subject of my next search. The remainder were almost entirely application readme files, data files or License files. Again, this search indicated the installation of several game demos. The following is a sample of the returned search:

```
1.0/cogsdata/lists.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/GameArena/COGS 1.0/cogsdata/sounds/cogs.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/GameArena/COGS 1.0/readme.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/GameArena/COGS 1.0/development.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Winamp/whatsnew.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Winamp/readme.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Thumbs4/readme.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The All-Seeing Eye/filters.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The All-Seeing Eye/countries.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The All-Seeing Eye/history.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The All-Seeing Eye/buddylog.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lionhead Studios Ltd/Black & White/unin.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lionhead Studios Ltd/Black & White/MemoryLeaks.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The Playa/PLAYA-LICENSE.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The Playa/README-PLAYA.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/ReadMe.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/License.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/Rar.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/Rar_Site.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/Register.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/TechNote.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/UnrarSrc.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/WhatsNew.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WindowsUpdate/v4/iuident.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Adobe/Acrobat 5.0/Reader/Optional/readme.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Adobe/Acrobat 5.0/Reader/Legal/License.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/DivXCodec/license.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/DivXCodec/readme.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lavasoft Ad-Aware/License Agreement.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lavasoft Ad-Aware/Readme.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lavasoft Ad-Aware/ad-aware log29-08-02-151103.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/SpyBlocker Software/agreement.txt
Software/pone.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/SpyBlocker Software/readme.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/SpyBlocker Software/License.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinMX/license.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Sierra/Arcanum/Documents/portrait.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Sierra/Arcanum/PatchReadme.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Sierra/Arcanum/Version.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Sierra/Arcanum/EULA PATCH.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Test/incomplete downloads.txt
/mnt/images/disk/Kazaa/XXXXXXXXXXXXX_key.txt
```

This list shows lots of game directories, as well as the All Seeing Eye there is also a directory for COGS, another game server management application. The last entry shows a download directory for the Peer to Peer application Kazaa. If Kazaa has been running on this machine it could definitely be related to our bandwidth issues. Later I would try to find the Kazaa executable.

### *Search for Executables*

Using the same method I searched for files with an EXE extension. Again a huge list was returned, over nine hundred. I quickly discounted Windows exes for the moment, focussing on large files such as installers and looking for some of the applications I believed existed somewhere. Finding many of

the installation files was surprisingly easy; at least one copy still resided in the Administrators temporary internet files directory. Sections of the search results are printed here. The first section shows a selection of installers, the second section shows some of the garbage installed into the Program files directory. File types include more games, Seti@home, the COGS application and the All Seeing Eye, as well as another dialler called “hotporn.exe”, charming. Listed also is the installer for Kazaa 1.71, and another installed peer to peer application called winmx. Kazaa itself seems to be uninstalled. Also in the Administrators profile was the hackers.ag “hag” dialler setup. If I had more time it would make an interesting binary analysis.

```
/mnt/images/disk/winnt/Windows Update Setup Files/ie6setup.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local
Settings/Temp/pft20F~tmp/Reader/AcroRd32.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local
Settings/Temp/pft20F~tmp/Setup.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local
Settings/Temp/pft20F~tmp/_ISDel.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temp/setup_wm.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/0ssbo0es/movenrun[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/s7ynavil/SP20953[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/wxurod2j/QuickTimeInstaller[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/ghct0zwl/SP19474[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/ghct0zwl/EyeInstaller[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/65grgjw9/cogs[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/wd2r05un/ar500enu[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/kxa3otaj/SP21494[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/kxa3otaj/Hacker AG SE(2-hags-1-0-#) [1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/mriruny9/SP20954[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary
Internet Files/Content.IE5/xrvfhtse/cogs[1].exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My
Documents/setiathome_win_3_0.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/wmp7.exe
```

```
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinZip/wzsepe32.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinZip/winzip32.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/GameArena/COGS 1.0/cogs.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/GameArena/COGS 1.0/movenrun.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/QuickTime/qttask.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/QuickTime/QuickTimeUpdater.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/QuickTime/QTInfo.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/QuickTime/QuickTimePlayer.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/QuickTime/Plugins/DeleteMe1.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Winamp/Winamp.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Sierra On-Line/SIGSPat.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Thumbs4/unwise.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Thumbs4/Thumbs.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Thumbs4/helpshel.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Thumbs4/TPView.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The All-Seeing Eye/movenrun.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The All-Seeing Eye/eye.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The Playa/uninstall.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The Playa/ThePlaya.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/The Playa/validator.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/Rar.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/Uninstall.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/UnRAR.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinRAR/WinRAR.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/DiallerProgram/hotporn.exe
```



```

/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Adobe/Acrobat 5.0/Reader/AcroRd32.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/DivXCodec/uninstall.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Adaptec/Shared/ECDC Engine/wmburn.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/My application/C-a-s-i-n-o.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/My application/dome.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lavasoft Ad-Aware/unwise.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lavasoft Ad-Aware/Ad-aware.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lavasoft Ad-Aware/Ad-watch.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/Lavasoft Ad-Aware/lvdel.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/SpyBlocker Software/sbuninst.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/SpyBlocker Software/spyblocker.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/SpyBlocker Software/regdns.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/PopUp Killer/PopUpKiller.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinMX/WinMX.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/WinMX/uninstall.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/KaZaA/My Shared Folder/XXXXXXXXXX.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Program Files/KaZaA/My Shared Folder/XXXXXXXXXX.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/mp71.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/quicktime/QuickTime403/QuickTimeInstaller.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/quicktime/QuickTimeInstaller.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/setiathome_win_3_03.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/kmd.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/network/Netboot_detectcards.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/DivX4FullInstaller.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/ydsxgw9x/audio/yamaha/Win9X/dsuninst.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/ydsxgw9x/audio/yamaha/Win9X/setup.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/ydsxgw9x/audio/yamaha/Win9X/_isdel.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/arcanum30.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/puksetup.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/arcanum_en_1074.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/QTrax/setup.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/sb/spyblock.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/XXXXXXXXXX.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/RealArcade.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/setiathome_win_3_07.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/lego chess.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Downloads/cogs-1.0-setup.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Kazaa/BRYCE_5.exe
/mnt/images/disk/Kazaa/kmd171gu_en.exe

```

### View Recycle Bin

Next I viewed the contents of /mnt/images/disk/Recycled. Disappointingly, the recycle bin was empty, and looked as if it had been recently emptied. I made a note to examine it again later in Autopsy.

### Extract Strings from Internet History Data files


Within the “Documents and Settings” directory is a directory for each user that has logged onto this machine.

```

[kerrm@forensics kerrm]$ cd /mnt/images/disk/Documents\ and\ Settings\
[kerrm@forensics Documents and Settings]$ ls
Administrator  All Users  Default User  fooman

```

The Documents and Settings folder contained four directories. All Users is for sharing common settings across all users. The Default User directory is copied each time a new user logs onto the machine. The directories Administrator and fooman are actual user directories, containing tmp files, internet history, start menu and individual registry information for the user. Firstly, from the Documents and Settings/Administrator/Local Settings/Temporary Internet Files/Content.IE5 directory I created a strings file from the index.dat file. This file shows in text format the history of requested



web sites by this user. The following command was used to create the text file of the Administrators history file.

```
[kerrm@forensics Content.IE5]$ strings index.dat > /home/kerrm/supporting\ forensic\
work/Administrator_index_dat_strings.txt
```

And the same from fooman's Content.IE5 directory

```
[kerrm@forensics Content.IE5]$ strings index.dat > /home/kerrm/supporting\ forensic\
work/fooman_index_dat_strings.txt
```

Fooman's history was fairly sparse, listing only requests to an online map service. In fact this profile had an overall feeling of only minor use. I was sure the examination of MAC times would show this account as being either old, with little recent use, or very recent. In fact the last accessed date on fooman's ntuser.dat file was April 29<sup>th</sup> 2002, some 12 months prior to this investigation.

The following is an extract of fooman's index.dat file. The first request shown here is the search query for Austway, an online map site in Australia. Subsequent requests are for the Google results page, and lastly is listed the request for the Austway site.

```
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=ausways
search[1]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Encoding: gzip
Content-Type: text/html
~U:fooman
URL
```

```

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=ausways
search[2]
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Length: 12625
Content-Type: text/html
URL
http://www.google.com/images/res1.gif
res1[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 1704
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.google.com/images/res0.gif
res0[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 3648
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.google.com/images/res3.gif
res3[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 716
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.google.com/nav_current.gif
nav_current[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 376
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.google.com/nav_first.gif
nav_first[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 1033
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.google.com/images/res2.gif
res2[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 1538
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.google.com/nav_page.gif
nav_page[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 373
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.google.com/nav_next.gif
nav_next[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 1514
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.google.com/images/bar.gif
bar[1].gif
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Length: 2471
~U:fooman
URL
http://www.ausway.com.au/start.html
start[1].htm
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html
~U:fooman

```

Examining the strings file of the Administrator's internet history was much more varied. Amongst many entries of news, games and movie sites there were also entries from the COGS application connecting to game servers.

With the abundance of game and warez related content found so far the relative absence of porn becomes more and more curious. The image search would be interesting.

The following is an extract from Administrator's index.dat strings file.

```
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogsdata/dedserver/urbant.htm
urbant[2].htm
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "a2864-1b6d-3ea8ca77"
Content-Length: 7021
Content-Type: text/html
X-Pad: avoid browser bug
~U:administrator
URL
http://www.ezboard.com/image/email.gif
email[1].gif
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
ETag: "86c8933-68-3db54ea2"
Content-Length: 104
Content-Type: image/gif
X-Cache: HIT from web5
~U:administrator
URL
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogs.exe
cogs[1].exe
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "b7029-5f038-3e8bbd8c"
Content-Length: 389176
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
~U:administrator
URL
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogs.pdb
cogs[1].pdb
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "b702d-d0400-3e8bbd8c"
Content-Length: 852992
Content-Type: chemical/x-pdb
~U:administrator
URL
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogscode/dedserver/flprot.dll
flprot[1].dll
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "a301c-a000-3e7fd80c"
Content-Length: 40960
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
~U:administrator
URL
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogscode/dedserver/gsprot.dll
gsprot[1].dll
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "a3017-c000-3e7fd813"
Content-Length: 49152
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
~U:administrator
URL
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogscode/dedserver/hlprot.dll
hlprot[1].dll
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "a3018-b000-3e7fd81e"
Content-Length: 45056
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
~U:administrator
URL
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogscode/dedserver/q3prot.dll
q3prot[1].dll
```

```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "a3019-b000-3e7fd823"
Content-Length: 45056
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
~U:administrator
URL
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogscode/dedserver/quakeprots.dll
quakeprots[1].dll
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "a301a-b000-3e7fd82a"
Content-Length: 45056
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
~U:administrator
URL
http://202.12.147.24:10080/cogs/stable/cogscode/dedserver/tribesprots.dll
tribesprots[1].dll
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
ETag: "a301b-b000-3e7fd831"
Content-Length: 45056
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
~U:administrator

```

Notice the port of 10080 used by the COGS application. This traffic would normally be blocked by our firewall, and goes a long way towards explaining why this software has been installed on this machine.

## Search for Cookies

In order to get an overall look at cookies I used a search string of `*@*` at the "Document and Settings" level. The results were surprisingly bland. The cookies showed what amounted to be an average user's recreational browsing activities. News, PC hardware, gamer and movie websites were the predominant entries. Not work related, but not really damning either. The only entries remotely nefarious were two Playboy cookies, which happened to record their date in the body, which also supported their reported MAC values. These were over a year old, and not much use to my investigation. Shown here are the contents of one of the cookies.

```

zzzplayuniq
free3-chi-121-2002-Jan-14_02:57:22
playboy.com/
0
612335616
29756829
3300260192
29465773
*
RMID
cb20123d3c425290
playboy.com/
0
3567004032
30124358
3300360192
29465773
*
mega
true
playboy.com/
0
3078300416
29469279
3221796160
29465790
*

```

## Autopsy

For a more thorough analysis it was time to move to specialised tools. The Autopsy browser is a user friendly front end to the @tstake Sleuthkit. It provides an easy format for managing and categorising multiple cases, hosts and drive images being handled by the investigator while performing procedures such as recovery of deleted files, sorting on file type and viewing of unallocated data clusters. This is a remarkable tool, as a similar commercial product would cost hundreds, Autopsy is free.

Using the autopsy browser my plan was to:

- Using C Drive image:
  - Create a timeline
  - View deleted files (Including Recycle Bin)
  - Report on images
  - Attempt to recover 'hag' binary
- Using Compaq utilities Image:
  - Confirm no modification to files had taken place since installation.


The latest versions of Autopsy have removed many of the “clunky” aspects of earlier versions, producing a polished case management system. From the command line it is now possible to start autopsy without specifying host or port, and without editing a morgue file.

```

kerrm@forensics:/usr/src/forensics/autopsy-1.73
File Edit View Terminal Go Help
kerrm@forensics:~ kerrm@forensics:/forensics/Intern... kerrm@forensics:/usr/src/forens...
[root@forensics autopsy-1.73]# autopsy
=====
Autopsy Forensic Browser
ver 1.73
=====
Evidence Locker: /forensics/
Start Time: Sun Jun 22 09:59:44 2003
Paste this as your browser URL on localhost:
http://localhost:9999/38993114141132395049/autopsy
Keep this process running and use <ctrl-c> to exit

```



Starting autopsy with no arguments is now easy



From the browser Autopsy presents an easy point and click interface allowing the investigator to create a case, add hosts and then add images to the host. I created the following logical structure to organise my images.

```
Internet_Segment/
  e-Vectra/
    pc.img
    pc_utils.img
```

In Autopsy 1.73 it is no longer necessary to physically move images into the evidence locker. Using the add image page it was possible to sym link images directly from a read only partition, ensuring the integrity of the image during the autopsy session. Upon adding the images to the case file Autopsy was configured to create its own md5 hash which can be verified at any time during an investigation. The hash can be seen to match my own checksums generated earlier.



After successfully creating the case file and organising images it was time to begin analysis.



## C Drive Analysis

### Timeline Creation

Timeline creation in Autopsy is a quick and easy process. Autopsy requires a data file extracted from the current image. After selecting the default name of “body” I created the data file and configured Autopsy to create an md5 hash of it. From the data file Autopsy calls the 'mactime' tool to create a chronological report of all creation, modification and access dates for all files on the image. The file system of the suspect machine's C drive was fat32, this presents slightly different information from that which would be available on an ext or ntfs partition. The following table represents the information available from a fat32 file system<sup>15</sup>.

Property	Description
Written	The last time the file was written to.
Accessed	The last time the file was accessed, only accurate to the day.
Created	Creation time of the file.

The default timeline created by Autopsy was 30.6 Mb and represented tens of thousands of entries. In order to better summarise the data I chose to directly call the mactime executable, passing it some extra parameters to better flexibility.

Firstly I passed a date of 01/01/2003, indicating to start the timeline at the first of January 2003, this time period covered the times I was interested in.

I had already examined much of the web surfing data, file access in the internet cache represented by far the most activity on the system and clogged the over all view of the system, therefore I decided to eliminate all internet cache files by removing entries located in the content.ie5 directory, a sub directory of all user's 'Temporary Internet Files' directory. Dead files were also excluded, as they provided me with little immediate information. The following command was used. The -d option created a slightly better format, placing a time stamp on each line, grepped entries could be immediately recognised chronologically.

```
[kerrm@forensics output]$ mactime -d -b body 01/01/2003 | grep -i -v -e
content.ie5 | grep -v -e -dead- > ~/supporting\ forensic\
work\grepped_timeline.txt
```

My timeline was now considerably smaller at 6066 lines; it was possible to visually scan the file for information. My first piece of interesting data came in the following section; it describes the installation of the COGS application. COGS is an all in one game server browser and chat application distributed by an Australian ISP<sup>16</sup>. The sequence shows firstly the setup file, the creation of temporary files (note the deleted indicator in brackets) and finally the creation of the program files, indicated by the .c. flag.

01/30/03 10:47 4781568 m..	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	28640113
----------------------------	--------------	---	---	----------

<sup>15</sup> [http://www.sleuthkit.org/sleuthkit/docs/skins\\_fat.html](http://www.sleuthkit.org/sleuthkit/docs/skins_fat.html)

<sup>16</sup> <http://games.telstra.com/gamearena/resources/dsb.php>

/mnt/images/disk/DOWNLO~1/cogs-1.0-setup.exe (COGS~1~1.EXE)					
01/30/03	10:47	23040	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 28066444
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/INSTAL~1/_2fe170.ipi (deleted)					
01/30/03	10:47	49152	..c	d/drwxrwxrwx	0 0 28774292
/mnt/images/disk/DOCUME~1/ADMINI~1/STARTM~1/PROGRAMS/_DMINI~1 (deleted)					
01/30/03	10:48	4096	..c	d/drwxrwxrwx	0 0 10660742
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/bitmaps/skin/buttons/sidepanel (SIDEPA~1)					
01/30/03	10:48	4096	..c	d/drwxrwxrwx	0 0 10656399
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/DEDSER~1/images/SCREEN~1/Medal of Honor Allied Assault (MEDAL ~1)					
01/30/03	10:48	4096	..c	d/drwxrwxrwx	0 0 10660613
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/bitmaps/skin/buttons					
01/30/03	10:48	4096	..c	d/drwxrwxrwx	0 0 10660361
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/bitmaps/icons					
01/30/03	10:48	4096	..c	d/drwxrwxrwx	0 0 10639751
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/bitmaps					

The timeline shows many instances of the COG applications use, almost daily. The next sample shows typical COGS program activity.

04/30/03	15:00	389176	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10639624
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogs.exe					
04/30/03	15:00	995	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 28517027
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/DOWNLO~1/mpeg4ax.inf					
04/30/03	15:00	253	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10652017
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/DEDSER~1/et.txt					
04/30/03	15:00	87552	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 17914426
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/system32/occache.dll					
04/30/03	15:00	131	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 31789936
/mnt/images/disk/DOCUME~1/ADMINI~1/COOKIES/administrator@warnerbros[3].txt (AD880A~1.TXT)					
04/30/03	15:00	166	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10651923
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/DEDSER~1/mohaa.txt					
04/30/03	15:00	3767	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10639755
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/blank.ht					
04/30/03	15:00	412	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10639752
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/colormap.txt					
04/30/03	15:00	1270	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10639627
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/default.cif					
04/30/03	15:00	202	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10651950
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/DEDSER~1/bf1942.txt					
04/30/03	15:00	697	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10639754
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/lists.txt					
04/30/03	15:00	45056	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10732938
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogscode/DEDSER~1/q3prot.dll					
04/30/03	15:00	1981	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 10651983
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/GAMEAR~1/COGS1~1.0/cogsdata/DEDSER~1/cogs.css					

Less common was the other game server browser application “The All Seeing Eye”. The following is one of only two instances of the eye.exe being accessed in the three month period; this in fact shows the installation of the binary, inferring that the program had only been used once since installation.

01/31/03	02:38	440832	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 102125460
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/THEALL~1/_ye.exe (deleted)					
01/31/03	02:38	4096	..c	d/drwxrwxrwx	0 0 28785207
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/The All-Seeing Eye (THEALL~1)					
01/31/03	02:38	445952	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 102125463
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/THEALL~1/eye.exe					
01/31/03	02:38	440832	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0 0 102125445
/mnt/images/disk/PROGRA~1/THEALL~1/_ye.exe (deleted)					

Lastly, the installation of the “hag” binary is also shown in the timeline. This segment shows the creation of the directory and files I had seen earlier. In addition the binary, \_2-hags-1-0-.exe is shown, also marked as deleted. Curiously, this section also shows the backup of the systems host file, and being a networking application I expected to find some modifications in the

system's host file. I made a note to examine it later whilst browsing the file system in Autopsy.

03/14/03 07:49 33280	m.c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	76116871
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/CODER/ 2-hags-1-0-.exe ( 2-HAG~1.EXE) (deleted)					
03/14/03 07:49 1258	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	28774289
/mnt/images/disk/DOCUME~1/ADMINI~1/STARTM~1/PROGRAMS/HackerAG.lnk ( ACKERAG.LNK) (deleted)					
03/14/03 07:49 1252	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	32975937
/mnt/images/disk/DOCUME~1/ADMINI~1/DESKTOP/HackerAG.lnk (_ACKERAG.LNK) (deleted)					
03/14/03 07:49 778	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	9669258
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/system32/drivers/etc/hosts.bak					
03/14/03 07:49 92	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	28516909
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/coder.log					
03/14/03 07:49 114	..c	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	9311418
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/coder.ini					
03/14/03 07:49 4096	..c	d/drwxrwxrwx	0	0	28516922
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/Coder (CODER)					
04/09/03 15:00 114	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	9311418
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/coder.ini					
04/09/03 15:00 92	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	28516909
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/coder.log					
04/09/03 15:00 33280	.a.	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	76116871
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/CODER/ 2-hags-1-0-.exe ( 2-HAG~1.EXE) (deleted)					
04/10/03 03:04 1252	m..	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	32975937
/mnt/images/disk/DOCUME~1/ADMINI~1/DESKTOP/HackerAG.lnk (_ACKERAG.LNK) (deleted)					
04/10/03 03:04 92	m..	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	28516909
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/coder.log					
04/10/03 03:04 778	m..	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	9669253
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/system32/drivers/etc/hosts					
04/10/03 03:04 114	m..	-/-rwxrwxrwx	0	0	9311418
/mnt/images/disk/WINNT/coder.ini					


I found no mention of the Kazaa application and so performed a word search for 'Kazaa.exe', but again found no entry for it.

After examining the timeline I concluded that, whilst satisfying to identify the creation and usage of applications, the timeline examination had provided me with very little new information. As the file system was fat32 it contained no information on file deletion dates, therefore it was very difficult to pinpoint the date Kazaa, or the 'hag' binary were uninstalled.

### *Browse File System / Deleted Files*


The next step in the analysis was to browse the file system using the Autopsy browser, examine deleted files and identify anything of interest. Autopsy provides a point and click explorer like interface to view the file system with.

Viewing only deleted files is possible by clicking a button. I decided that since I had already carried out a file system search on existing files it would be efficient to limit my next searches to deleted files on the image. The one click report lists all deleted files, making it possible to simply search the page using the Mozilla page search dialog. My first search was for Kazaa, whose binary I still had not positively located. Using this method I quickly located the kazaa.exe file.



From here Autopsy reported that the inode was still unallocated, that the file was contained on 16 sectors and that it was last accessed on July first 2002. Whilst again, I could not determine the deletion date, the accessed date was enough information to prove that Kazaa did not figure in our current scenario.

Switching back to the regular file system view I browsed to the default Kazaa download directory, "[C:\downloads](#)". Here were many files listed both deleted and still allocated. Upon sorting the files by creation date it became clear the directory was still in use, as many files were created right up to the end of January 2003. Included in the directory was the COGS installer, showing it as



being created and accessed on the 30<sup>th</sup> of January, which supported the information I gathered earlier in the timeline analysis.


Whilst in directory view mode I also examined the file [c:\winnt\system32\drivers\etc\hosts](#), the hosts file backed up by the 'hag' installation process that I saw earlier. Surprisingly it was unaltered from its

original form, perhaps the backup procedure was a default action of the installer, or a left over routine for a previous version of the application.

This stage of the investigation allowed me to confirm the installation of Kazaa, but at the same time discount it as a factor in our recent bandwidth issues.

### Image File Analysis

As stated earlier, considering the underground nature of much of the downloaded content, the absence of porn is curious. Using the new “sorter” application in Autopsy I planned to generate html reports on all image files, both current and deleted, and examine them using the thumbnail html pages generated automatically. Despite the fact the sorter application saves hours of time in file retrieval, the task was still a large one, over 245 pages of thumbnails images were generated.



Examination confirmed all the data I had already seen, the files downloaded from this machine represent typical domestic, non-business related internet browsing. The web surfer seemed to have some interest in current affairs, games, space (NASA type images) and basic hacking information like cracked software. While a handful of pornographic images were present, they were low res, smaller banner type images, probably advertising from warez or hacker sites. It is also worth noting that several images of workmates were recovered, taken no doubt with a digital camera and uploaded to the PC, explaining the installation of the image service noted earlier. This would provide one avenue of further investigation if required.

## 'hag' Binary Retrieval

As a final stage I planned to attempt to recover the 'hag' binary from unallocated clusters.

Autopsy produces a concise report which details all of the partitions physical information, this report is shown below. Although the disk is fat32, and cluster information is reported here, it is important to note that Autopsy does not use the fat cluster unit of measure to reference locations on disk. By design the first cluster on a fat partition is not located at the start of the disk. Using clusters to reference location would mean a conversion between cluster number and sector address in order to reference or locate anything. Instead Autopsy uses only the sector number to reference all data; therefore all my calculations are referring to sectors<sup>17</sup>.

```
FILE SYSTEM INFORMATION
-----
File System Type: FAT
OEM: MSWXXXX
Volume ID: 7115XXXX
Volume Label: ATRYPXXXX
File System Type: FAT32

META-DATA INFORMATION
-----
Range: 2 - 262951810
Root Directory: 2


CONTENT-DATA INFORMATION
-----
Sector Size: 512
Cluster Size: 4096
Sector of First Cluster: 32132
Total Sector Range: 0 - 16466623
FAT 0 Range: 32 - 16081
FAT 1 Range: 16082 - 32131
Data Area Sector Range: 32132 - 16466623
```

Seen here is the location of the first cluster, at sector 32132. Also reported is the cluster size of 4096 bytes and the sector size of 512 bytes.

Using the file browse mode I located the binary in C:\winnt\coder (shown in the screenshots as /winnt/coder/) and clicked the “meta” information link to see the full details of the file. The detailed view showed several pieces of information. The file was listed as \_2-HAG~1.EXE, its reported size was of 33280 bytes with a listing of allocated sectors, the sector list did not match the reported file size which immediately indicated recovery would be problematic. Based on the reported file size I calculated it occupied  $33280/512 = 65$  sectors. The starting sector was listed as 70644; I therefore expected the file to occupy the sectors 70644 to 70709, unless fragmentation had caused the file to be split across non contiguous sectors. An examination of the file allocation table would allow me to account for the space.

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.sleuthkit.org/sleuthkit/docs/skins\\_fat.html](http://www.sleuthkit.org/sleuthkit/docs/skins_fat.html)

Unfortunately the file allocation table reported the sectors 70492 through to 70659 to be allocated to another file, C:\i386\C\_20939.NL\_. This was disappointing, but was not surprising; the disk had seen a lot of work and was



very active right up to the date of the image. Constant disk activity will greatly increase the chance of sectors being reallocated back into use.

One thing did strike me as strange, the file was a component of the Windows 2000 installation files which had probably shipped installed on the PC, for completeness I again queried the timeline, but would need a new version, without the filters I had applied earlier. The following command produced me a timeline containing all files, as well as placing the timestamp on all rows; this output was piped to grep which returned only the activity surrounding this file.

```
[kerrm@forensics output]$mactime -d -b body | grep -e C_20939.NL_
Thu Jan 01 1970 10:00:00,51792,..C,-/-
rwxrwxrwx,0,0,592423,/mnt/images/disk/I386/C_20939.NL_
Wed Dec 08 1999 04:00:00,51792,m..,-/-
rwxrwxrwx,0,0,592423,/mnt/images/disk/I386/C_20939.NL_
Mon Mar 13 2000 16:00:00,51792,.a.,-/-
rwxrwxrwx,0,0,592423,/mnt/images/disk/I386/C_20939.NL_
```

This showed the last file activity for C\_20939.NL\_ to be well before the installation and removal of the hag binary. I reasoned this could be attributed to the defrag utility being run on this machine, as any other access would modify the MAC time of the file.

This section of the analysis had revealed very little extra information; other than specific information on the partition dimensions and file size of the deleted exe. I was unable to recover the hag binary.



## Compaq Utilities Analysis

As a final step I wanted to quickly verify the Compaq Utilities partition as bona fide and unaltered from it's factory state. My strategy was to:


- create and examine a timeline
- extract list of deleted files

## Create a Timeline

Using the same process as before I proceeded to create a data file from the pc\_util.img file, then specifying no start date and no end date I generated the util timeline. Being a far smaller timeline I viewed the contents from within the autopsy timeline browser, viewing first the summary information, which indicated no file activity on this partition since March 2000, and then viewing each of the eleven pages showing file activity. The results were good, showing modification at an early date (Dec 1969) with minor access from time to time and an upgrade of some type to most files on Jan 3 2000. Autopsy allows for viewing of images directly from the file browser view, an examination of several on the listed BMP files showed Asian character bitmaps and menu images.

Date	Time	Size	Permissions	File Path
Sun Jan 02 2000	22:52:16	224	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/CMDBOOT.COM
Sun Jan 02 2000	23:06:16	2295	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/HPDT/CMDSDNST.COM
Sun Jan 02 2000	23:06:22	2301	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/FLASHBIO/CMDDFBIOS.COM
Sun Jan 02 2000	23:06:30	1283	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/CMDHELP.COM
Mon Jan 03 2000	02:31:40	2740	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/AUTOEXEC.COM
Mon Jan 03 2000	13:46:26	2086	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH00010.BMP
		2478	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH00009.BMP
		30218	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CENTER.BMP
		1526	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH00008.BMP
		5726	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH00011.BMP
		3486	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH00012.BMP
		2222	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/BUTTON.BMP
		1974	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH.BMP
Mon Jan 03 2000	13:46:28	1582	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH00019.BMP
		2758	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH00014.BMP
		2702	m.. -rwxrwxrwx	/mnt/images/utis/BMP/CH00030.BMP





### Unallocated Data

Using the one click report of unallocated files turned up no results, indicating no files had been deleted from the partition since leaving the factory.

After this examination I was satisfied this partition had been used for no purpose other than its intended use.

### MD5 Hash verifications

To complete my investigation it was necessary to confirm the images remained unaltered from their original state as captured from the subject system. As the images had never left the read only partition, only a final hash comparison of the entire partition would be necessary, although in different circumstances Autopsy could generate and track md5 hash values for almost any object. I simply reran the check I had done earlier, using the md5 sum created at the beginning of the investigation.

```
[kerrm@forensics ext]$ md5sum --check /home/kerrm/supporting \forensic
\work\eVectra.md5
/mnt/ext/pc.img: OK
/mnt/ext/pc_mem.img: OK
/mnt/ext/pc_utils.img: OK
```

The images remained in their original state, and I could now draw my conclusions.

## Conclusions

Many pieces of evidence have pointed towards non-business related activity being conducted from this pc.

Image analysis had shown the presence of many recreational files in memory, game demos, movie trailers and seti@home were some of the files referenced and visible through the strings files. However no running processes that could easily be linked to high bandwidth usage were found.

The C drive image file revealed many of the files already indicated, as well as recording the browsing patterns and history of the PC's users. In addition software diallers and game server browser software was discovered, some deleted whilst others were still active. Timeline analysis of the disk image showed plenty of usage as a web browsing and game server browsing workstation. However, again the PC's use as any kind of public file server (which was suspected) could not be verified. It was proven though the IIS.log file that the IIS service had been uninstalled long ago. The one time presence of Kazaa was verified, however it was also removed at some time prior to our time frame of interest.

No attempt to identify users was made, at management's request. If user identification was required, more extensive analysis could be performed on the browser cache and cookies which would be highly likely to return identifying information. However, the use of the Administrators account by all users makes it difficult to easily attribute specific usage to individuals.

## Recommendation

Whilst the use of the machine as a web surfing station may be seen as a useful employee service, the possible presence of warez software creates a legal vulnerability which the company should be wary of. Depending on company policy, the use of this machine for non – business related web surfing could be restricted through the installation of web filtering software. Unauthorised installation of software could be controlled through the locking down of the OS and control of the Administrator account. As a clean up and lock down measure the machine should be reformatted and reinstalled with Windows 2000 utilizing the NTFS file system. Whilst my investigation has highlighted several important issues the evidence collected does not on its own account for the initial bandwidth discrepancy. Other areas which need to be explored include errors with logging methodology between firewall software and the telecom provider's system as well as bandwidth usage on other machines in this network segment.

### Part 3 - Legal Issues of Incident Handling

An attack against a government computer in Australia indicates the investigator would be a Federal Police officer or some other commonwealth investigator, acting within the provisions of the *Commonwealth Cybercrime Act (2001)*<sup>18</sup>.

In addition, the scenario described is a question of the user's privacy. In Australia this is dictated by the *Commonwealth Privacy Act (2000)*<sup>19</sup>, which updates the *Privacy Act of 1988*<sup>20</sup>. Supporting the Privacy Act are the *National Privacy Principles (NPP)*<sup>21</sup>, these outline specific elements, and are useful for determining lawful and required actions.

Section 2.1(h) of NPP allows for personal information such as user details contained in log files to be released to law enforcement for the purposes of investigation. This can be done upon request from law enforcement agencies and does not require formal authorization. However, if refused the law enforcement officer can obtain a court order, directing the sys admin to assist<sup>22</sup>. Section 2.2 of the NPP requires that the release of information must be recorded in writing by the company. This is in addition to the correct treatment of evidence, as discussed later.

For the purposes of law enforcement investigation the sys admin is able, but not legally bound, to provide information to the investigating officer without formal authorization, as long as it is reasonably required for the purposes of investigation<sup>23</sup>. Therefore, in this scenario it would be allowable to confirm the presence of the logged in user account over the phone to an investigator whose identity was certain. Similarly, the log files can be sent to the investigator without formality, more important is how the log files are handled as evidence.

Prior to being identified as evidence the log files must be handled in a secure fashion in order to carry evidentiary weight. The AUSCERT organisation is in the process of publishing the *Guidelines for Management of IT Evidence* handbook<sup>24</sup>, currently in draft form. The handbook outlines the IT Evidence Management Lifecycle, and describes the process of 'designing for evidence'. Systems should be known to be functioning correctly, generated documents which could potentially become evidence should be identified, stored securely (that is, their access should be controlled and audited) and accurately time stamped<sup>25</sup>. Once identified as evidence the log files must be handled in such a way as to maximise their evidentiary weighting, which means they should

<sup>18</sup> <http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/3/3486/0/PA000080.htm>

<sup>19</sup> [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/num\\_act/pasa2000n1552000373.txt](http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/num_act/pasa2000n1552000373.txt)

<sup>20</sup> <http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/157/top.htm>

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/npps01.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> See Note to Cybercrime Act section 8 Subsection 3L(1)

<sup>23</sup> National Privacy Principle 2.1(h)(i)

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3117&cid=1920>

<sup>25</sup> *Guidelines for Management of IT Evidence*, section 3.2

not be modified in any way. Computer generated files are provided for in the *Commonwealth Evidence Act*, section 146<sup>26</sup>, which also incorporates the “best evidence” requirement. Given that the originals of any computer generated document will reside in an organisations archive or system, a copy of the log file will be acceptable to a court, provided that it can be proven to be identical to the original. Methods for ensuring the state of the evidence are listed in the handbook, and include<sup>27</sup>:

- Archive to CDROM
- Using MAC value hashes to prove file state
- Conversion to paper and secure storage

In a situation where the logs were to be emailed to the investigator the most appropriate steps would to be:

1. Produce hash value of original evidence
2. Copy files
3. Hash copy and compare MD5 values (they must match)
4. Securely store original under controlled conditions
5. Send log files

In addition to these requirements, from the initial gathering of evidence to the presentation at court accurate chain of custody documentation must be maintained. RFC 3227, *Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving*<sup>28</sup> sums up Chain of Custody in section 4.1.

#### 4.1 Chain of Custody

You should be able to clearly describe how the evidence was found, how it was handled and everything that happened to it.

The following need to be documented

- Where, when, and by whom was the evidence discovered and collected.
- Where, when and by whom was the evidence handled or examined.
- Who had custody of the evidence, during what period? How was it stored.
- When the evidence changed custody, when and how did the transfer occur (include shipping numbers, etc.).

In the above situation, the initial collection of evidence from the corporate system, any change of hands of the media, as well as its release to the investigative officer must all be documented. Key facts are where, when and who.

From the perspective of a sys admin who had been approached by an investigator in regard to a possible security breach, it could be considered not duly diligent not to check the integrity of the organisations systems<sup>29</sup>. An officer of an organisation has an ethical obligation to ensure their systems are still functioning correctly and do not pose a threat to the community, if there is

<sup>26</sup> <http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/2/1182/0/PA001890.htm>

<sup>27</sup> *Guidelines for Management of IT Evidence*, section 3.2.3.2

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3227.txt?number=3227>

<sup>29</sup> <http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/3/3448/0/PA002380.htm> Corporations Act section 180

any doubt of this then the systems integrity must be checked. With the log files stored securely it would be appropriate to examine copies of logs looking for suspicious activity. However, deeper examination of the system may have serious implications for any official forensic analysis of the system. Common sense would suggest any further investigation should only be done in consultation with the law enforcement officer. Based on the investigators instructions no further interaction of the system may be permitted, the system may indeed be seized as evidence<sup>30</sup>.

Log files indicating the attacker had in fact gained unauthorised access to our organisation adds another offence to the attacker's actions, but does not significantly alter what actions I, as the organisations sys admin, should perform. In this case however the systems role as evidence is certain at a very early stage, and should be removed from production as soon as possible, or practical. The best practices outlined in AUSCERT'S handbook are equally relevant to the collection of a system's operational data. The handbook recommends the use of "forensically sound"<sup>31</sup> methods to collect evidence; again, the ability to produce and prove the exactness of copies is vital. Any further investigation should be carried out on a disk image and in consultation with the law enforcement officer.

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<sup>30</sup> <http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/3/3486/0/PA000080.htm> Cybercrime Act Subsection 3K(2)

<sup>31</sup> *Guidelines for Management of IT Evidence*, section 3.4.1.1

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## Appendix A

### Zipinfo Report Of Binary\_V1.3.Zip File

Archive: binary\_v1.3.zip 5687 bytes 1 file

End-of-central-directory record:

-----

Actual offset of end-of-central-dir record: 5665 (00001621h)  
 Expected offset of end-of-central-dir record: 5665 (00001621h)  
 (based on the length of the central directory and its expected offset)

This zipfile constitutes the sole disk of a single-part archive; its central directory contains 1 entry. The central directory is 57 (00000039h) bytes long, and its (expected) offset in bytes from the beginning of the zipfile is 5608 (000015E8h).

There is no zipfile comment.

Central directory entry #1:

-----

target2.exe

offset of local header from start of archive: 0 (00000000h) bytes  
 file system or operating system of origin: MS-DOS, OS/2 or NT FAT  
 version of encoding software: 2.0  
 minimum file system compatibility required: MS-DOS, OS/2 or NT FAT  
 minimum software version required to extract: 2.0  
 compression method: deflated  
 compression sub-type (deflation): normal  
 file security status: not encrypted  
 extended local header: no  
 file last modified on (DOS date/time): 2003 Feb 20 12:45:48  
 32-bit CRC value (hex): d185fd18  
 compressed size: 5567 bytes  
 uncompressed size: 26793 bytes  
 length of filename: 11 characters  
 length of extra field: 0 bytes  
 length of file comment: 0 characters  
 disk number on which file begins: disk 1  
 apparent file type: binary  
 non-MSDOS external file attributes: 81FF00 hex  
 MS-DOS file attributes (20 hex): arc

There is no file comment.



## Appendix B

### Strings Output From File Target2.Exe, Produced By Bintext.

File pos	Mem pos	ID	Text
=====	=====	==	=====
0000004D	0040004D	0	!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
000000C8	004000C8	0	Rich
000001D0	004001D0	0	.text
000001F8	004001F8	0	.rdata
0000021F	0040021F	0	!.data
00000248	00400248	0	.rsrc
000010C4	004010C4	0	hl@@
00001108	00401108	0	SUVW
000011D0	004011D0	0	D\$,QPR
000011EA	004011EA	0	4,3
000011FC	004011FC	0	D\$ j'P
0000121E	0040121E	0	T\$,j'RP
000012F5	004012F5	0	L\$,j
000012FE	004012FE	0	T\$,VRS
00001327	00401327	0	D\$ j'P
00001349	00401349	0	T\$,j'RP
0000138E	0040138E	0	\$ h
000013A8	004013A8	0	L\$0h
00001408	00401408	0	L\$ j'Q
00001422	00401422	0	D\$"j
0000142B	0040142B	0	D\$,j'PQ
00001478	00401478	0	SUVW
00001540	00401540	0	D\$0QPR
0000156E	0040156E	0	D\$\$j'P
00001590	00401590	0	T\$0j'RP
0000166F	0040166F	0	L\$0j
00001678	00401678	0	T\$0URV
000016A1	004016A1	0	D\$\$j'P
000016C3	004016C3	0	T\$0j'RP
00001780	00401780	0	T\$\$h
00001803	00401803	0	D\$ j'PQ
000018F3	004018F3	0	D\$(h
00001903	00401903	0	L\$(Q
00001977	00401977	0	h(@@
000019AF	004019AF	0	T\$\$QRj
000019CE	004019CE	0	D\$\$PW
00001AF2	00401AF2	0	5 @@
00001AF8	00401AF8	0	5,@@
00001B43	00401B43	0	5 @@
00001B49	00401B49	0	5,@@
00001BB4	00401BB4	0	5 @@
00001BBA	00401BBA	0	5,@@
00001BD6	00401BD6	0	h0A@
00001BF3	00401BF3	0	VPPP
00001C25	00401C25	0	5 @@
00001C2B	00401C2B	0	5,@@
00001C8A	00401C8A	0	IRQh
00001CDE	00401CDE	0	5H0@
00001CEA	00401CEA	0	SPhxD@
00001CF1	00401CF1	0	h D@
00001D10	00401D10	0	SQhpD@
00001D17	00401D17	0	htD@
00001D3D	00401D3D	0	\$,h
00001D5E	00401D5E	0	D\$ j
00001D65	00401D65	0	D\$@SPS
00001D99	00401D99	0	D\$TD
00001DB2	00401DB2	0	=d0@
00001DC2	00401DC2	0	5P0@
00001DD4	00401DD4	0	-T0@
00001DF1	00401DF1	0	T\$ h
File pos	Mem pos	ID	Text
=====	=====	==	=====
00001E16	00401E16	0	T\$ RP
00001E77	00401E77	0	USSSP3

00001EAA	00401EAA	0	- @@
00001EB0	00401EB0	0	-,@@
00001EF1	00401EF1	0	SUVW
00001F25	00401F25	0	D\$(PQ
00001F31	00401F31	0	5d0@
00002023	00402023	0	- @@
00002029	00402029	0	-,@@
00002044	00402044	0	;eui
00002050	00402050	0	x!xu\
00002056	00402056	0	x"iuV
0000205C	0040205C	0	x#tuP
0000207A	0040207A	0	IQh@A@
00002098	00402098	0	- @@
0000209E	0040209E	0	-,@@
0000216F	0040216F	0	u Wj
000021E3	004021E3	0	hhA@
00002228	00402228	0	hPA@
0000224C	0040224C	0	5LD@
00002252	00402252	0	5PD@
00002258	00402258	0	5TD@
0000225E	0040225E	0	5XD@
00002270	00402270	0	tlh@D@
00002283	00402283	0	5TD@
00002289	00402289	0	5XD@
000022B4	004022B4	0	Ht Ht
000022DF	004022DF	0	h@D@
000022E6	004022E6	0	5LD@
000022F6	004022F6	0	5TD@
000022FC	004022FC	0	5XD@
00002308	00402308	0	5D@@
00002323	00402323	0	VWh?
00002379	00402379	0	hPA@
00002393	00402393	0	=@0@
000023AB	004023AB	0	hPA@
000023C4	004023C4	0	hPA@
0000243E	0040243E	0	Ph<B@
00002451	00402451	0	h(B@
00002460	00402460	0	T\$(QR
00002488	00402488	0	hPA@
0000249D	0040249D	0	L\$0PQ
000024B1	004024B1	0	=\$0@
000024F6	004024F6	0	hPA@
00002528	00402528	0	Ph0C@
00002553	00402553	0	5\$0@
0000262F	0040262F	0	hPA@
00002634	00402634	0	hxC@
00002658	00402658	0	hXC@
00002690	00402690	0	h8C@
000026E6	004026E6	0	% 0@
00002706	00402706	0	%x0@
00002710	00402710	0	h 'e
00002731	00402731	0	%p0@
00002737	00402737	0	%l0@
000027B2	004027B2	0	h(1@
000027CC	004027CC	0	SVW
0000281C	0040281C	0	= D@
000032EA	004032EA	0	Sleep
000032F2	004032F2	0	HeapAlloc

File pos	Mem pos	ID	Text
=====	=====	==	=====
000032FE	004032FE	0	GetProcessHeap
00003310	00403310	0	TerminateProcess
00003324	00403324	0	ReadFile
00003330	00403330	0	PeekNamedPipe
00003340	00403340	0	CloseHandle
0000334E	0040334E	0	CreateProcessA
00003360	00403360	0	CreatePipe
0000336E	0040336E	0	WriteFile
0000337A	0040337A	0	GetLastError
0000338A	0040338A	0	LocalAlloc
00003396	00403396	0	KERNEL32.dll
000033A6	004033A6	0	StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA
000033C4	004033C4	0	SetServiceStatus
000033D8	004033D8	0	RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA
000033F6	004033F6	0	CloseServiceHandle

0000340C	0040340C	0	ControlService
0000341E	0040341E	0	QueryServiceStatus
00003434	00403434	0	OpenServiceA
00003444	00403444	0	CreateServiceA
00003456	00403456	0	OpenSCManagerA
00003468	00403468	0	DeleteService
00003478	00403478	0	StartServiceA
00003488	00403488	0	ChangeServiceConfigA
000034A0	004034A0	0	QueryServiceConfigA
000034B4	004034B4	0	ADVAPI32.dll
000034C4	004034C4	0	WSAIoctl
000034D0	004034D0	0	WSASocketA
000034DC	004034DC	0	WS2_32.dll
000034E8	004034E8	0	MFC42.DLL
000034F4	004034F4	0	memmove
000034FE	004034FE	0	exit
00003506	00403506	0	fprintf
00003510	00403510	0	_iob
00003518	00403518	0	sprintf
00003522	00403522	0	perror
0000352C	0040352C	0	strstr
00003536	00403536	0	time
0000353E	0040353E	0	printf
00003546	00403546	0	MSVCRT.dll
00003554	00403554	0	__dllonexit
00003562	00403562	0	_onexit
0000356C	0040356C	0	_exit
00003574	00403574	0	_XcptFilter
00003582	00403582	0	_p__initenv
00003592	00403592	0	_getmainargs
000035A2	004035A2	0	_initterm
000035AE	004035AE	0	_setusermatherr
000035C2	004035C2	0	_adjust_fdiv
000035D2	004035D2	0	_p__commode
000035E2	004035E2	0	_p__fmode
000035F0	004035F0	0	_set_app_type
00003602	00403602	0	_except_handler3
00003616	00403616	0	_controlfp
00003624	00403624	0	??0Init@ios_base@std@@QAE@XZ
00003644	00403644	0	??1Init@ios_base@std@@QAE@XZ
00003664	00403664	0	??0_Winit@std@@QAE@XZ
0000367C	0040367C	0	??1_Winit@std@@QAE@XZ
00003692	00403692	0	MSVCP60.dll
00004049	00404049	0	ERROR 3
00004055	00404055	0	ERROR 2
File pos	Mem pos	ID	Text
=====	=====	==	=====
00004061	00404061	0	ERROR 1
0000406C	0040406C	0	impossibile creare raw ICMP socket
00004098	00404098	0	RAW ICMP SendTo:
000040AE	004040AE	0	===== Icmp BackDoor V0.1
=====			
000040F4	004040F4	0	===== Code by Spoof. Enjoy Yourself!
0000411E	0040411E	0	Your PassWord:
00004130	00404130	0	loki
00004138	00404138	0	cmd.exe
00004142	00404142	0	Exit OK!
00004150	00404150	0	Local Partners Access
0000416A	0040416A	0	Error UnInstalling Service
0000418A	0040418A	0	Service UnInstalled Sucessfully
000041B2	004041B2	0	Error Installing Service
000041CE	004041CE	0	Service Installed Sucessfully
000041F5	004041F5	0	Create Service %s ok!
0000420D	0040420D	0	CreateService failed:%d
00004229	00404229	0	Service Stopped
0000423D	0040423D	0	Force Service Stopped Failed%d
00004260	00404260	0	The service is running or starting!
00004288	00404288	0	Query service status failed!
000042A8	004042A8	0	Open service failed!
000042C1	004042C1	0	Service %s Already exists
000042DC	004042DC	0	Local Printer Manager Service
000042FC	004042FC	0	smsses.exe
00004309	00404309	0	Open Service Control Manage failed:%d
00004338	00404338	0	Start service successfully!
00004358	00404358	0	Starting the service failed!

00004378	00404378	0	starting the service <%s>...
00004398	00404398	0	Successfully!
000043A8	004043A8	0	Failed!
000043B4	004043B4	0	Try to change the service's start type...
000043E0	004043E0	0	The service is disabled!
000043FC	004043FC	0	Query service config failed!
00006005	00406005	0	SMB2
000060AA	004060AA	0	SMB2
000061BC	004061BC	0	SMB2
00006261	00406261	0	SMBq
00006288	00406288	0	SMBu
000062DB	004062DB	0	?????
000062E6	004062E6	0	SMB2
00006574	00406574	0	SMB2
00006812	00406812	0	SMB2
0000686A	0040686A	0	SMB/
00005064	00405064	0	Hello from MFC!
000060F3	004060F3	0	\winnt\system32\smsses.exe
00006181	00406181	0	\winnt\system32\smsses.exe
000062B3	004062B3	0	\\199.107.97.191\C\$
0000632F	0040632F	0	\winnt\system32
000063A7	004063A7	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
0000642F	0040642F	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
000064B7	004064B7	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
0000653F	0040653F	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
000065BD	004065BD	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
00006645	00406645	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
000066CD	004066CD	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
00006755	00406755	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
000067DD	004067DD	0	\winnt\system32\reg.exe
00005062	00405062	1	Hello from MFC!

## Appendix C

### Filemon Log

```

1      10:20:57 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
10108928 Length: 8192
2      10:20:57 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
12288 Length: 4096
3      10:20:57 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
4096 Length: 4096
4      10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
5      10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
6      10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open Directory

7      10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS FileBothDirectoryInformation: target2"*

8      10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS
9      10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CLOSE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS
10     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
11     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open Directory

12     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      NO SUCH FILE FileBothDirectoryInformation:
target2.COM
13     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS
14     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CLOSE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS
15     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
16     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open Directory

17     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS FileBothDirectoryInformation: target2.EXE

18     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS
19     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CLOSE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\      SUCCESS
20     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
21     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\target2.exe      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open

22     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\target2.exe      SUCCESS
23     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      IRP_MJ_CLOSE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\target2.exe      SUCCESS
24     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
25     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
26     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
27     10:21:00 PM      CMD.EXE:588      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
28     10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open Directory

29     10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
30     10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
31     10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS

```

```

32      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
33      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
34      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
35      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
36      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
37      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CREATE
C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
38      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
39      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLOSE
C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
40      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
41      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
42      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
43      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
44      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
45      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
46      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
47      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
48      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CREATE
C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
49      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL      SUCCESS
50      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLOSE
C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL      SUCCESS
51      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
52      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
53      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
54      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
55      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
56      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
57      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
58      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
59      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CREATE
C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42.DLL      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
60      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42.DLL      SUCCESS
61      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLOSE
C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42.DLL      SUCCESS
62      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
63      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
64      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
65      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
66      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open

67      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_STANDARD_INFO
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Size:
401462
68      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 4096

```

```

69      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS
70      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Offset: 360448 Length: 16384
71      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Offset: 180224 Length: 16384
72      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Offset: 212992 Length: 16384
73      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Offset: 245760 Length: 16384
74      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Offset: 229376 Length: 16384
75      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
76      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\WS2_32.dll      SUCCESS
77      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
78      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42LOC.DLL      SUCCESS
79      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
80      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42LOC.DLL      SUCCESS
81      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Offset: 8192 Length: 32768
82      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\MSVCP60.dll      SUCCESS Offset: 376832 Length: 8192
83      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\target2.exe      SUCCESS Offset: 4096 Length: 8192
84      10:21:00 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$Mft SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length:
4096
85      10:21:00 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_READ*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop\target2.exe      SUCCESS Offset: 16384 Length: 4096
86      10:21:01 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp      SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 4096
87      10:21:02 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$Bitmap      SUCCESS Offset:
139264 Length: 4096
88      10:21:02 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$Bitmap      SUCCESS Offset:
77824 Length: 4096
89      10:21:02 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
10117120 Length: 4096
90      10:21:02 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
8192 Length: 4096
91      10:21:02 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset: 0
Length: 4096
92      10:21:03 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Local Settings      SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 4096
93      10:21:07 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
10121216 Length: 8192
94      10:21:07 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
12288 Length: 4096
95      10:21:07 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
4096 Length: 4096
96      10:21:12 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
10129408 Length: 8192
97      10:21:12 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
8192 Length: 4096
98      10:21:12 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset: 0
Length: 4096
99      10:21:14 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$Mft SUCCESS Offset: 12005376
Length: 4096
100     10:21:14 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 4096
101     10:21:14 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator      SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 4096
102     10:21:14 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$Mft SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length:
4096
103     10:21:14 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$MftMirr      SUCCESS Offset: 0
Length: 4096
104     10:21:14 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$Mft SUCCESS Offset: 6377472
Length: 8192
105     10:21:15 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS
106     10:21:15 PM      target2.exe:284      IRP_MJ_CLOSE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Desktop      SUCCESS

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107      10:21:18 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
10137600 Length: 4096
108      10:21:18 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
12288 Length: 4096
109      10:21:18 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_WRITE*      C:\$LogFile      SUCCESS Offset:
4096 Length: 4096
110      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
111      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
112      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
113      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
114      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
115      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
116      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
117      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
118      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
119      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
120      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
121      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
122      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
123      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
124      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
125      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
126      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
127      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
128      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION
C:\WINNT\system32\config\software.LOG SUCCESS FileEndOfFileInformation
129      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION
C:\WINNT\system32\config\software.LOG SUCCESS FileEndOfFileInformation
130      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION
C:\WINNT\system32\config\software.LOG SUCCESS FileEndOfFileInformation
131      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
132      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
133      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
134      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
135      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
136      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
137      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
138      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
139      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
140      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
141      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CREATE
C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
142      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL SUCCESS
143      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLOSE
C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL SUCCESS
144      10:21:21 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS

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145 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
146 C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
147 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
148 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
149 C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
150 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
151 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
152 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CREATE
C:\WINNT\System32\csui.dll SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
153 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
C:\WINNT\System32\csui.dll SUCCESS
154 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CLOSE
C:\WINNT\System32\csui.dll SUCCESS
155 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
156 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
157 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
158 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
159 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
160 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN
C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll SUCCESS
161 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
162 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
163 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CREATE
C:\WINNT\System32\CSCDLL.DLL SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
164 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
C:\WINNT\System32\CSCDLL.DLL SUCCESS
165 10:21:21 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CLOSE
C:\WINNT\System32\CSCDLL.DLL SUCCESS
166 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
167 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS
168 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
169 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS
170 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
171 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
172 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CREATE C:\ SUCCESS Attributes:
Any Options: Open Directory
173 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_QUERY_INFORMATION C:\
SUCCESS FileNameInformation
174 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_QUERY_VOLUME_INFORMATION C:\
SUCCESS FileFsVolumeInformation
175 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_QUERY_VOLUME_INFORMATION C:\
SUCCESS FileFsAttributeInformation
176 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CLEANUP C:\ SUCCESS
177 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CLOSE C:\ SUCCESS
178 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
179 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CREATE C:\ SUCCESS Attributes:
Any Options: Open Directory
180 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL C:\
SUCCESS FileBothDirectoryInformation: Documents and Settings
181 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CLEANUP C:\ SUCCESS
182 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 IRP_MJ_CLOSE C:\ SUCCESS
183 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED C:\binary
analysis SUCCESS
184 10:21:22 PM FILEMON.EXE:440 FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS

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185      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
186      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS
187      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
188      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
189      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CREATE
C:\WINNT\System32\shell32.dll SUCCESS Attributes: N Options: Open
190      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_BASIC_INFO
C:\WINNT\System32\shell32.dll SUCCESS Attributes: A
191      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION
C:\WINNT\System32\shell32.dll SUCCESS FileBasicInformation
192      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_READ
C:\WINNT\System32\shell32.dll SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 12
193      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_STANDARD_INFO
C:\WINNT\System32\shell32.dll SUCCESS Size: 2354448
194      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_STANDARD_INFO
C:\WINNT\System32\shell32.dll SUCCESS Size: 2354448
195      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
C:\WINNT\System32\shell32.dll SUCCESS
196      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLOSE
C:\WINNT\System32\shell32.dll SUCCESS
197      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
198      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and Settings\
SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open Directory
199      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL
C:\Documents and Settings\      SUCCESS FileBothDirectoryInformation:
Administrator
200      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP C:\Documents and Settings\
SUCCESS
201      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLOSE      C:\Documents and Settings\
SUCCESS
202      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
203      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open Directory
204      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\      SUCCESS
FileBothDirectoryInformation: Recent
205      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\      SUCCESS
206      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLOSE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\      SUCCESS
207      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
208      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS
209      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
210      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
211      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CREATE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
212      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_LOCK      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini SUCCESS Excl: No Offset: 0 Length: -1
213      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_STANDARD_INFO
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini SUCCESS Size: 122
214      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_READ      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 122
215      10:21:22 PM      System:8      IRP_MJ_CLOSE      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\Desktop.ini SUCCESS
216      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_UNLOCK      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini RANGE NOT LOCKED      Offset: 0 Length: -
1
217      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini SUCCESS
218      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
219      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS
220      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS

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221    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
222    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CREATE    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini    SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open

223    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_LOCK    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini    SUCCESS Excl: No Offset: 0 Length: -1
224    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_STANDARD_INFO
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini    SUCCESS Size: 122

225    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_READ    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini    SUCCESS Offset: 0 Length: 122
226    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_UNLOCK    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini    RANGE NOT LOCKED    Offset: 0 Length: -
1
227    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CLEANUP    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini    SUCCESS
228    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CLOSE    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent\desktop.ini    SUCCESS
229    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
230    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
231    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
232    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
233    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
234    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
235    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
236    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
237    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CREATE
C:\WINNT\System32\ntshrui.dll    SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
238    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
C:\WINNT\System32\ntshrui.dll    SUCCESS
239    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CLOSE
C:\WINNT\System32\ntshrui.dll    SUCCESS
240    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
241    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
242    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
243    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
244    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
245    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
246    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
247    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
248    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CREATE    C:\WINNT\System32\ATL.DLL
SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
249    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CLEANUP    C:\WINNT\System32\ATL.DLL
SUCCESS
250    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    IRP_MJ_CLOSE    C:\WINNT\System32\ATL.DLL
SUCCESS
251    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
252    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
253    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
254    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
255    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS
256    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN    C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent    SUCCESS
257    10:21:22 PM    FILEMON.EXE:440    FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED    C:\binary
analysis    SUCCESS

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258      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
259      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CREATE
      C:\WINNT\System32\NETAPI32.DLL      SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open

260      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
      C:\WINNT\System32\NETAPI32.DLL      SUCCESS
261      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLOSE
      C:\WINNT\System32\NETAPI32.DLL      SUCCESS
262      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
263      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS
264      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
265      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS
266      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
267      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FASTIO_QUERY_OPEN      C:\Documents and
Settings\Administrator\Recent SUCCESS
268      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
269      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      FSCTL_IS_VOLUME_MOUNTED      C:\binary
analysis      SUCCESS
270      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CREATE
      C:\WINNT\System32\SECUR32.DLL SUCCESS Attributes: Any Options: Open
271      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLEANUP
      C:\WINNT\System32\SECUR32.DLL SUCCESS
272      10:21:22 PM      FILEMON.EXE:440      IRP_MJ_CLOSE
      C:\WINNT\System32\SECUR32.DLL SUCCESS

```

## Appendix E

### Regmon Log

1	1.42633100	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480
2	1.42636955	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuPopup\.Current	SUCCESS Key: 0xE12A48A0
3	1.42639274	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuPopup\.Current\ (Default)	SUCCESS ""
4	1.42644079	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuPopup\.Current	SUCCESS Key: 0xE12A48A0
5	1.42646090	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480
6	1.42649778	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480
7	1.42651482	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuPopup\.Current\Active	NOTFOUND
8	1.42652432	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue HKCU\ (Default)	NOTFOUND
9	1.42654164	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480
10	1.42658885	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480
11	1.42660478	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion	NOTFOUND
12	1.42662238	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\MediaPath	SUCCESS "C:\WINNT\Media"
13	1.42664110	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480
14	1.68048593	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE20F94E0
15	1.68052616	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuPopup\.Current	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480
16	1.68054990	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuPopup\.Current\ (Default)	SUCCESS ""
17	1.68059739	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuPopup\.Current	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480
18	1.68061723	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE20F94E0
19	1.68065327	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE20F94E0
20	1.68066975	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuPopup\.Current\Active	NOTFOUND
21	1.68067953	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue HKCU\ (Default)	NOTFOUND
22	1.68069573	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE20F94E0
23	1.68074238	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion	SUCCESS Key: 0xE20F94E0
24	1.68075859	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion	NOTFOUND
25	1.68077619	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\MediaPath	SUCCESS "C:\WINNT\Media"
26	1.68079491	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion	SUCCESS Key: 0xE20F94E0
27	3.14343918	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU	SUCCESS Key: 0xE1C3A480

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28      3.14348025      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey
      HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuCommand\.Current      SUCCESS Key:
0xE1E92980
29      3.14350874      WINLOGON.EXE:168      QueryValue
      HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuCommand\.Current\ (Default)      SUCCESS ""

30      3.14355456      WINLOGON.EXE:168      CloseKey
      HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuCommand\.Current      SUCCESS Key:
0xE1E92980
31      3.14357663      WINLOGON.EXE:168      CloseKey      HKCU      SUCCESS Key:
0xE1C3A480
32      3.14361434      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey HKCU      SUCCESS Key: 0xE2009980

33      3.14363166      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey
      HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\.Default\MenuCommand\.Current\Active      NOTFOUND

34      3.14364395      WINLOGON.EXE:168      QueryValue      HKCU\ (Default)      NOTFOUND

35      3.14366155      WINLOGON.EXE:168      CloseKey      HKCU      SUCCESS Key:
0xE2009980
36      3.14371072      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1B49720

37      3.14372721      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Curr
entVersion      NOTFOUND
38      3.14374732      WINLOGON.EXE:168      QueryValue
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\MediaPath      SUCCESS
      "C:\WINNT\Media"

39      3.14376855      WINLOGON.EXE:168      CloseKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1B49720

40      6.18530232      CMD.EXE:588      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe      NOTFOUND
41      6.18623792      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe      NOTFOUND
42      6.18625663      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe      NOTFOUND
43      6.18646951      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe      NOTFOUND
44      6.23884572      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\target2.exe      NOTFOUND
45      6.24007576      target2.exe:284      OpenKey
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager      SUCCESS Key:
0xE1F15600
46      6.24010538      target2.exe:284      QueryValue
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode
NOTFOUND
47      6.25870634      target2.exe:284      CloseKey
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager      SUCCESS Key:
0xE1F15600
48      6.25897956      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1F15600
49      6.25900890      target2.exe:284      QueryValue
      HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\LeakTrack
NOTFOUND
50      6.25904186      target2.exe:284      CloseKey
      HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon      SUCCESS Key:
0xE1F15600
51      6.26524181      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1F15600

52      6.26534713      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics      NOTFOUND
53      6.26617685      target2.exe:284      OpenKey
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Error Message Instrument\      NOTFOUND

54      6.26652326      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility32      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1D41460
55      6.26655343      target2.exe:284      QueryValue
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility32\target2
NOTFOUND
56      6.26657438      target2.exe:284      CloseKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility32      SUCCESS Key:
0xE1D41460
57      6.26662020      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility2      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1D41460

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58      6.26666825      target2.exe:284      QueryValue
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility2\target20.0
      NOTFOUND
59      6.26668334      target2.exe:284      CloseKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility2      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1D41460
60      6.26671351      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
      NT\CurrentVersion\IME Compatibility      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1D41460
61      6.26673055      target2.exe:284      QueryValue
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\IME Compatibility\target2
      NOTFOUND
62      6.26674508      target2.exe:284      CloseKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\IME Compatibility      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1D41460
63      6.26704204      target2.exe:284      OpenKey
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session
      Manager\AppCompatibility\target2.exe      NOTFOUND
64      6.26708618      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
      NT\CurrentVersion\Windows      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1CC0AC0
65      6.26710574      target2.exe:284      QueryValue
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs
      SUCCESS ""
66      6.26715043      target2.exe:284      CloseKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1CC0AC0
67      6.26798350      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKCU      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1CC0AC0
68      6.26801786      target2.exe:284      OpenKey
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\MUILanguages      NOTFOUND
69      6.26804915      target2.exe:284      OpenKey HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop
      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1EA07A0
70      6.26808268      target2.exe:284      QueryValue      HKCU\Control
      Panel\Desktop\MultiUILanguageId      NOTFOUND
71      6.26809944      target2.exe:284      CloseKey      HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop
      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1EA07A0
72      6.26811396      target2.exe:284      CloseKey      HKCU      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1CC0AC0
73      6.30466358      target2.exe:284      OpenKey
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceCurrent      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1CC0AC0
74      6.30469599      target2.exe:284      QueryValue
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceCurrent\ (Default)      SUCCESS 0x9
75      6.30474571      target2.exe:284      CloseKey
      HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceCurrent      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1CC0AC0
76      21.30137015      target2.exe:284      CloseKey      HKLM      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1F15600
77      26.55605084      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey HKCU      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1D05180
78      26.55609107      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey
      HKCU\AppDataEvents\Schemes\Apps\Default\MenuPopup\Current      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1DF5FC0
79      26.55611342      WINLOGON.EXE:168      QueryValue
      HKCU\AppDataEvents\Schemes\Apps\Default\MenuPopup\Current\ (Default)      SUCCESS ""
80      26.55616063      WINLOGON.EXE:168      CloseKey
      HKCU\AppDataEvents\Schemes\Apps\Default\MenuPopup\Current      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1DF5FC0
81      26.55618130      WINLOGON.EXE:168      CloseKey      HKCU      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1D05180
82      26.55621874      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey HKCU      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1D05180
83      26.55623578      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey
      HKCU\AppDataEvents\Schemes\Apps\Default\MenuPopup\Current\Active      NOTFOUND
84      26.55624472      WINLOGON.EXE:168      QueryValue      HKCU\ (Default)      NOTFOUND
85      26.55626148      WINLOGON.EXE:168      CloseKey      HKCU      SUCCESS Key:
      0xE1D05180
86      26.55630841      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion      SUCCESS Key: 0xE1D05180
87      26.55632406      WINLOGON.EXE:168      OpenKey
      HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Curr
      entVersion      NOTFOUND

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88	26.55634138	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue		
		HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\MediaPath		SUCCESS	
		"C:\WINNT\Media"			
89	26.55636093	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey		
		HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion		SUCCESS Key: 0xE1D05180	
90	27.97856487	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU		SUCCESS Key: 0xE1EA07A0
91	27.97860426	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey		
		HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\Default\MenuCommand\Current		SUCCESS Key:	
		0xE1D05180			
92	27.97862745	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue		
		HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\Default\MenuCommand\Current\Default		SUCCESS ""	
93	27.97867271	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey		
		HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\Default\MenuCommand\Current		SUCCESS Key:	
		0xE1D05180			
94	27.97869282	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey	HKCU	SUCCESS Key:
		0xE1EA07A0			
95	27.97872886	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey HKCU		SUCCESS Key: 0xE1EA07A0
96	27.97874590	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey		
		HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\Default\MenuCommand\Current\Active		NOTFOUND	
97	27.97875568	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue	HKCU\Default	NOTFOUND
98	27.97877216	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey	HKCU	SUCCESS Key:
		0xE1EA07A0			
99	27.97881742	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey		
		HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion		SUCCESS Key: 0xE1EA07A0	
100	27.97883390	WINLOGON.EXE:168	OpenKey		
		HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion		NOTFOUND	
101	27.97885206	WINLOGON.EXE:168	QueryValue		
		HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\MediaPath		SUCCESS	
		"C:\WINNT\Media"			
102	27.97887106	WINLOGON.EXE:168	CloseKey		
		HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion		SUCCESS Key: 0xE1EA07A0	
103	27.97931944	FILEMON.EXE:440	OpenKey		
		HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Comdlg32		NOTFOUND	
104	27.97934291	FILEMON.EXE:440	OpenKey		
		HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Comdlg32		NOTFOUND	
105	27.97946583	FILEMON.EXE:440	OpenKey HKCU		SUCCESS Key: 0xE1DF5FC0
106	27.97949488	FILEMON.EXE:440	OpenKey		
		HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\MUILanguages		NOTFOUND	
107	27.97952617	FILEMON.EXE:440	OpenKey HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop		
		SUCCESS Key: 0xE1E4C460			
108	27.97955969	FILEMON.EXE:440	QueryValue	HKCU\Control	
		Panel\Desktop\MultiUILanguageId		NOTFOUND	
109	27.97957506	FILEMON.EXE:440	CloseKey	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop	
		SUCCESS Key: 0xE1E4C460			



## Appendix F

### Strace log from target2.exe

```

1 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x80000000, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution
Options\target2.exe"}, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
2 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x80000000, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution
Options\target2.exe"}, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
3 912 624 NtCreateEvent (0x100003, 0x0, 1, 0, ... 12, ) == 0x0
4 912 624 NtCreateEvent (0x100003, 0x0, 1, 0, ... 16, ) == 0x0
5 912 624 NtQuerySystemInformation (0, 1243348, 44, 0, ... ) == 0x0
6 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1243292, 0, 1243512, 8192, 4, ... ) == 0x0
7 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1243464, 0, 1243516, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
8 912 624 NtCreateEvent (0x100003, 0x0, 1, 0, ... 20, ) == 0x0
9 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1242760, 0, 1242792, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
10 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x80000000, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution
Options\target2.exe"}, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
11 912 624 NtOpenDirectoryObject (0x3, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\KnownDlls"}, ... 24, ) ==
0x0
12 912 624 NtOpenSymbolicLinkObject (0x1, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "KnownDllPath"}, ...
28, ) == 0x0
13 912 624 NtQuerySymbolicLinkObject (28, ... "C:\WINNT\system32", 0x0, ) == 0x0
14 912 624 NtClose (28, ... ) == 0x0
15 912 624 NtFsControlFile (0, 0, 0, 0, 1243132, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) ==
STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE
16 912 624 NtFsControlFile (0, 0, 0, 0, 1242448, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) ==
STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE
17 912 624 NtOpenFile (0x100020, {24, 0, 0x42, 0, 0, "?\C:\binary analysis\"},
1243404, 3, 33, ... 28, ) == 0x0
18 912 624 NtQueryVolumeInformationFile (28, 1243404, 1243436, 8, 4, ... ) == 0x0
19 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "KERNEL32.dll"}, ... 32, ) == 0x0
20 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (32, -1, 1243364, 0, 0, 0, 1243356, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
21 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0
22 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
23 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 32, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
24 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2011697152, 1324, ... ) == 0x0
25 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 4, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
26 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 2, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
27 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 4206592, 296, ... ) == 0x0
28 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "ADVAPI32.dll"}, ... 32, ) == 0x0
29 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (32, -1, 1243364, 0, 0, 0, 1243356, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
30 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0
31 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
32 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 32, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
33 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2010845184, 1428, ... ) == 0x0
34 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
35 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 32, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
36 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2010845184, 1428, ... ) == 0x0
37 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "RPCRT4.DLL"}, ... 32, ) == 0x0
38 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (32, -1, 1243240, 0, 0, 0, 1243232, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
39 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0
40 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
41 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 32, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
42 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2010320896, 784, ... ) == 0x0
43 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
44 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 32, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
45 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2010320896, 784, ... ) == 0x0
46 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
47 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 32, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
48 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2010320896, 784, ... ) == 0x0
49 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
50 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 32, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
51 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2010845184, 1428, ... ) == 0x0
52 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 4, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
53 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 2, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
54 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 4206592, 296, ... ) == 0x0
55 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "WS2_32.dll"}, ... ) ==
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND

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56 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242152, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
57 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\\C:\\binary
analysis\\WS2_32.dll"}, 1243076, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
58 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242152, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
59 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 28, 0x40, 0, 0, "WS2_32.dll"}, 1243076, ... )
== STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
60 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242152, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
61 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\\C:\\WINNT\\System32\\WS2_32.dll"}, 1243076, ... ) == 0x0
62 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242908, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
63 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242352, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
64 912 624 NtOpenFile (0x100020, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\\C:\\WINNT\\System32\\WS2_32.dll"}, 1243232, 5, 96, ... 32, ) == 0x0
65 912 624 NtCreateSection (0xf, 0x0, 0, 16, 16777216, 32, ... 36, ) == 0x0
66 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0
67 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (36, -1, 1243364, 0, 0, 0, 1243356, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
68 912 624 NtClose (36, ... ) == 0x0
69 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "MSVCRT.DLL"}, ... 36, ) == 0x0
70 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (36, -1, 1243240, 0, 0, 0, 1243232, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
71 912 624 NtClose (36, ... ) == 0x0
72 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
73 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 2, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
74 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2013474816, 564, ... ) == 0x0
75 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
76 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 32, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
77 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1963134976, 388, ... ) == 0x0
78 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "WS2HELP.DLL"}, ... ) ==
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
79 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242028, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
80 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\\C:\\binary
analysis\\WS2HELP.DLL"}, 1242952, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
81 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242028, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
82 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 28, 0x40, 0, 0, "WS2HELP.DLL"}, 1242952, ... )
== STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
83 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242028, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
84 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\\C:\\WINNT\\System32\\WS2HELP.DLL"}, 1242952, ... ) == 0x0
85 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242784, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
86 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242228, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
87 912 624 NtOpenFile (0x100020, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\\C:\\WINNT\\System32\\WS2HELP.DLL"}, 1243108, 5, 96, ... 36, ) == 0x0
88 912 624 NtCreateSection (0xf, 0x0, 0, 16, 16777216, 36, ... 32, ) == 0x0
89 912 624 NtClose (36, ... ) == 0x0
90 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (32, -1, 1243240, 0, 0, 0, 1243232, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
91 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0
92 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
93 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 32, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
94 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1963069440, 308, ... ) == 0x0
95 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
96 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 32, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
97 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1963069440, 308, ... ) == 0x0
98 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
99 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 32, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
100 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1963069440, 308, ... ) == 0x0
101 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
102 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 32, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
103 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1963134976, 388, ... ) == 0x0
104 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 4, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
105 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 2, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
106 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 4206592, 296, ... ) == 0x0
107 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "MFC42.DLL"}, ... ) ==
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
108 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242152, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
109 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\\C:\\binary
analysis\\MFC42.DLL"}, 1243076, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
110 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242152, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
111 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 28, 0x40, 0, 0, "MFC42.DLL"}, 1243076, ... )
== STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
112 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242152, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
113 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\\C:\\WINNT\\System32\\MFC42.DLL"}, 1243076, ... ) == 0x0
114 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242908, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
115 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242352, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0

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116 912 624 NtOpenFile (0x100020, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\\??\C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42.DLL"}, 1243232, 5, 96, ... 32, ) == 0x0
117 912 624 NtCreateSection (0xf, 0x0, 0, 16, 16777216, 32, ... 36, ) == 0x0
118 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0
119 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (36, -1, 1243364, 0, 0, 0, 1243356, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
120 912 624 NtClose (36, ... ) == 0x0
121 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
122 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 2, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
123 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1816178688, 2076, ... ) == 0x0
124 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
125 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 2, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
126 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1816178688, 2076, ... ) == 0x0
127 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "GDI32.dll"}, ... 36, ) == 0x0
128 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (36, -1, 1243240, 0, 0, 0, 1243232, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
129 912 624 NtClose (36, ... ) == 0x0
130 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
131 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 32, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
132 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2012483584, 440, ... ) == 0x0
133 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 4, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
134 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243152, 1243092, 32, 1243096, ... ) == 0x0
135 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2012483584, 440, ... ) == 0x0
136 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "USER32.DLL"}, ... 36, ) == 0x0
137 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (36, -1, 1243116, 0, 0, 0, 1243108, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
138 912 624 NtClose (36, ... ) == 0x0
139 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243028, 1242968, 4, 1242972, ... ) == 0x0
140 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243028, 1242968, 32, 1242972, ... ) == 0x0
141 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2011238400, 1200, ... ) == 0x0
142 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243028, 1242968, 4, 1242972, ... ) == 0x0
143 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243028, 1242968, 32, 1242972, ... ) == 0x0
144 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2011238400, 1200, ... ) == 0x0
145 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
146 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 2, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
147 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1816178688, 2076, ... ) == 0x0
148 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
149 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 2, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
150 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 1816178688, 2076, ... ) == 0x0
151 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 4, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
152 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 2, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
153 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 4206592, 296, ... ) == 0x0
154 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 4, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
155 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 2, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
156 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 4206592, 296, ... ) == 0x0
157 912 624 NtOpenSection (0xe, {24, 24, 0x40, 0, 0, "MSVCP60.dll"}, ... ) ==
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
158 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242152, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
159 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\C:\binary
analysis\MSVCP60.dll"}, 1243076, ... ) == 0x0
160 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242908, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
161 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1242352, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
162 912 624 NtOpenFile (0x100020, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\\??\C:\binary
analysis\MSVCP60.dll"}, 1243232, 5, 96, ... 36, ) == 0x0
163 912 624 NtCreateSection (0xf, 0x0, 0, 16, 16777216, 36, ... 32, ) == 0x0
164 912 624 NtClose (36, ... ) == 0x0
165 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (32, -1, 1243364, 0, 0, 0, 1243356, 1, 0, 4, ... ) ==
0x0
166 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0
167 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
168 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 2, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
169 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2014228480, 360, ... ) == 0x0
170 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 4, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
171 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243276, 1243216, 2, 1243220, ... ) == 0x0
172 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 2014228480, 360, ... ) == 0x0
173 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 4, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
174 912 624 NtProtectVirtualMemory (-1, 1243400, 1243340, 2, 1243344, ... ) == 0x0
175 912 624 NtFlushInstructionCache (-1, 4206592, 296, ... ) == 0x0
176 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x80000000, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution
Options\target2.exe"}, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
177 912 624 NtQuerySystemInformation (50, 2012088280, 4, 0, ... ) == 0x0
178 912 624 NtQuerySystemInformation (0, 2013060640, 44, 0, ... ) == 0x0
179 912 624 NtCreateSection (0xf001f, 0x0, 1242536, 4, 67108864, 0, ... 32, ) == 0x0
180 912 624 NtSecureConnectPort ("\Windows\ApiPort", 1242524, 1242488, 1254584,
1242512, 1242552, 1242448, 1242556, ... 40, ) == 0x0
181 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0

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182 912 624 NtQueryObject (40, 4, 1242426, 2, 0, ... ) == 0x0
183 912 624 NtSetInformationObject (40, 4, 1242426, 2, ... ) == 0x0
184 912 624 NtQuerySystemInformation (0, 1242260, 44, 0, ... ) == 0x0
185 912 624 NtQueryVirtualMemory (-1, 2293760, 0, 1242328, 28, 0, ... ) == 0x0
186 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1242376, 0, 1242428, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
187 912 624 NtCreateEvent (0x100003, 0x0, 1, 0, ... 32, ) == 0x0
188 912 624 NtRequestWaitReplyPort (40, {28, 52, 0, 1256860, 1243332, 2013060448,
2012788137}, ... {28, 52, 2, 912, 624, 13203, 0}, ) == 0x0
189 912 624 NtRegisterThreadTerminatePort (40, ... ) == 0x0
190 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1241784, 589864, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
191 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "??\C:\binary
analysis\target2.exe.Local"}, 1242708, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
192 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, -1092756228, 0, -1092756232, 4096, 260, ... )
== 0x0
193 912 624 NtOpenMutant (0x1, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\NlsCacheMutant"}, ... 44, ) ==
0x0
194 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1242272, 0, 1242304, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
195 912 624 NtOpenSection (0x4, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "NLS\NlsSectionUnicode"}, ... 48,
) == 0x0
196 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (48, -1, 1242756, 0, 0, 0, 1242632, 2, 0, 2, ... ) ==
0x0
197 912 624 NtClose (48, ... ) == 0x0
198 912 624 NtQueryDefaultLocale (0, 2012087320, ... ) == 0x0
199 912 624 NtOpenSection (0x4, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "NLS\NlsSectionLocale"}, ... 48,
) == 0x0
200 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (48, -1, 1242744, 0, 0, 0, 1242656, 2, 0, 2, ... ) ==
0x0
201 912 624 NtClose (48, ... ) == 0x0
202 912 624 NtOpenSection (0x5, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "NLS\NlsSectionSortkey"}, ... 48,
) == 0x0
203 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (48, -1, 1242752, 0, 0, 0, 1242644, 2, 0, 2, ... ) ==
0x0
204 912 624 NtQuerySection (48, 0, 1242728, 16, 0, ... ) == 0x0
205 912 624 NtClose (48, ... ) == 0x0
206 912 624 NtOpenSection (0x4, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "NLS\NlsSectionSortTbls"}, ...
48, ) == 0x0
207 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (48, -1, 1242756, 0, 0, 0, 1242664, 2, 0, 2, ... ) ==
0x0
208 912 624 NtClose (48, ... ) == 0x0
209 912 624 NtQueryVirtualMemory (-1, 2147295232, 0, 1242716, 28, 0, ... ) == 0x0
210 912 624 NtOpenSection (0x4, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "NLS\NlsSectionSortkey0000C09"},
... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
211 912 624 NtRequestWaitReplyPort (40, {28, 52, 0, 2013060256, 1241604, 2012088192,
2013057856}, ... {28, 52, 2, 912, 624, 13204, 0}, ) == 0x0
212 912 624 NtWaitForMultipleObjects (2, 1240708, 1, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
213 912 624 NtClose (48, ... ) == 0x0
214 912 624 NtClose (52, ... ) == 0x0
215 912 624 NtRequestWaitReplyPort (40, {24, 48, 0, 0, 1048579, 1240464, 1241540}, ...
{24, 48, 2, 912, 624, 13205, 0}, ) == 0x0
216 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1242824, 0, 1242856, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
217 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x1, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager"}, ... 52, ) ==
0x0
218 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (52, "SafeDllSearchMode", 2, 1243088, 16, 1243112, ... )
== STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
219 912 624 NtClose (52, ... ) == 0x0
220 912 624 NtOpenProcessToken (-1, 0x8, ... 52, ) == 0x0
221 912 624 NtQueryInformationToken (52, 11, 0, 0, 1242624, ... ) ==
STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
222 912 624 NtQueryInformationToken (52, 11, 1264600, 4, 1242624, ... ) == 0x0
223 912 624 NtClose (52, ... ) == 0x0
224 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x20019, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"}, ... 52, )
== 0x0
225 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (52, "LeakTrack", 2, 1242560, 144, 1242712, ... ) ==
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
226 912 624 NtClose (52, ... ) == 0x0
227 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x2000000, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\REGISTRY\MACHINE"}, ... 52, )
== 0x0
228 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x20019, {24, 52, 0x40, 0, 0, "Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics"}, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
229 912 624 NtQuerySystemInformation (0, 1242992, 44, 0, ... ) == 0x0
230 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1242936, 0, 1243156, 8192, 4, ... ) == 0x0
231 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1243108, 0, 1243160, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
232 912 624 NtCreateEvent (0x100003, 0x0, 1, 0, ... 48, ) == 0x0
233 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1242404, 0, 1242436, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0

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234 912 624 NtRequestWaitReplyPort (40, {28, 52, 0, 65536, 1265304, 3080192, 1245944},
... {28, 52, 2, 912, 624, 13206, 0}, ) == 0x0
235 912 624 NtQueryVolumeInformationFile (8, 1243084, 1243092, 8, 4, ... ) == 0x0
236 912 624 NtRequestWaitReplyPort (40, {28, 52, 0, 912, 624, 13206, 0}, ... {28, 52,
2, 912, 624, 13207, 0}, ) == 0x0
237 912 624 NtOpenSection (0x4, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\NLS\NlsSectionCType"}, ... 64, )
== 0x0
238 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (64, -1, 1241636, 0, 0, 0, 1241540, 2, 0, 2, ... ) ==
0x0
239 912 624 NtClose (64, ... ) == 0x0
240 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1242628, 0, 1242660, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
241 912 624 NtQuerySystemInformation (0, 1243196, 44, 0, ... ) == 0x0
242 912 624 NtQuerySystemInformation (1, 1243240, 12, 0, ... ) == 0x0
243 912 624 NtQuerySystemInformation (0, 1243304, 44, 0, ... ) == 0x0
244 912 624 NtRequestWaitReplyPort (40, {28, 52, 0, 2097224, 2097184, 2097184,
2097184}, ... {28, 52, 2, 912, 624, 13208, 0}, ) == 0x0
245 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x20019, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Error Message Instrument\"}, ... )
== STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
246 912 624 NtMapViewOfSection (64, -1, -1096348376, 0, 0, 0, -1096348388, 2, 0, 2,
... ) == 0x0
247 912 624 NtCreateEvent (0x1f0003, 0x0, 1, 0, ... 68, ) == 0x0
248 912 624 NtQueryObject (68, 4, -1096348498, 2, 0, ... ) == 0x0
249 912 624 NtSetInformationObject (68, 4, -1096348498, 2, ... ) == 0x0
250 912 624 NtOpenThreadToken (-2, 0x8, 1, ... ) == STATUS_NO_TOKEN
251 912 624 NtOpenProcessToken (-1, 0x8, ... 72, ) == 0x0
252 912 624 NtQueryInformationToken (72, 10, 0, 0, -1096348860, ... ) ==
STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
253 912 624 NtQueryInformationToken (72, 10, -504580952, 56, -1096348860, ... ) == 0x0
254 912 624 NtClose (72, ... ) == 0x0
255 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, -1096348616, 0, -1096348688, 4096, 4, ... )
== 0x0
256 912 624 NtFreeVirtualMemory (-1, -1096348616, -1096348688, 32768, ... ) == 0x0
257 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x20019, {24, 0, 0x240, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility32"}, ...
-2147483388, ) == 0x0
258 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (-2147483388, "target2", 2, -504584600, 332, -1096349012,
... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
259 912 624 NtClose (-2147483388, ... ) == 0x0
260 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x20019, {24, 0, 0x240, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility2"}, ...
-2147483388, ) == 0x0
261 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (-2147483388, "target20.0", 2, -516371928, 32, -
1096349008, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
262 912 624 NtClose (-2147483388, ... ) == 0x0
263 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x20019, {24, 0, 0x240, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\IME Compatibility"},
... -2147483388, ) == 0x0
264 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (-2147483388, "target2", 2, -507912920, 332, -1096349236,
... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
265 912 624 NtClose (-2147483388, ... ) == 0x0
266 912 624 NtQueryDefaultLocale (0, -1096349008, ... ) == 0x0
267 912 624 NtGdiQueryFontAssocInfo (0, ... ) == 0x0
268 912 624 NtUserCallNoParam (18, ... ) == 0x0
269 912 624 NtGdiCreateCompatibleDC (0, ... )
270 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, -1096350628, 0, -1096350632, 12288, 4, ... )
== 0x0
269 912 624 NtGdiCreateCompatibleDC ) == 0xd7010443
271 912 624 NtGdiGetStockObject (0, ... ) == 0x1900010
272 912 624 NtGdiGetStockObject (4, ... ) == 0x1900011
273 912 624 NtGdiCreateBitmap (8, 8, 1, 1, 2011347328, ... ) == 0x4d05020f
274 912 624 NtGdiCreateSolidBrush (0, 0, ... )
275 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, -1096350616, 0, -1096350620, 12288, 4, ... )
== 0x0
274 912 624 NtGdiCreateSolidBrush ) == 0xf810024f
276 912 624 NtGdiGetStockObject (13, ... ) == 0x18a0021
277 912 624 NtGdiCreateCompatibleDC (0, ... ) == 0x77010424
278 912 624 NtGdiSelectBitmap (1996555300, 1292173839, ... ) == 0x185000f
279 912 624 NtUserGetThreadDesktop (624, 0, ... ) == 0x4c
280 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x80000000, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session
Manager\AppCompatibility\target2.exe"}, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
281 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x20019, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows"}, ... 80, )
== 0x0
282 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (80, "AppInit_DLLs", 2, 1241552, 64, 1241656, ... ) == 0x0
283 912 624 NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0

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284 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10011
285 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 2011300511, 128, 0,
... ) == 0x815cc017
286 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10011
287 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 2011300512, 128, 0,
... ) == 0x815cc01c
288 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10011
289 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 2011300513, 128, 0,
... ) == 0x815cc01e
290 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10011
291 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 674, 128, 0, ... ) ==
0x815c8002
292 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10013
293 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 2011300515, 128, 0,
... ) == 0x815cc018
294 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10011
295 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 2011300516, 128, 0,
... ) == 0x815cc01a
296 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10011
297 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 2011300517, 128, 0,
... ) == 0x815cc01d
298 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10011
299 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 2011300519, 128, 0,
... ) == 0x815cc026
300 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1240952, 1240968, 1241536, ... ) == 0x10011
301 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241492, 1241556, 1241572, 2011300518, 128, 0,
... ) == 0x815cc019
302 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241444, 1241508, 1241524, 0, 128, 0, ... ) ==
0x815cc020
303 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241444, 1241508, 1241524, 0, 130, 0, ... ) ==
0x815cc022
304 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241444, 1241508, 1241524, 0, 128, 0, ... ) ==
0x815cc023
305 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241444, 1241508, 1241524, 0, 130, 0, ... ) ==
0x815cc024
306 912 624 NtUserRegisterClassExWOW (1241444, 1241508, 1241524, 0, 128, 0, ... ) ==
0x815cc025
307 912 624 NtCallbackReturn (0, 0, 0, ...
308 912 624 NtGdiInit (... ) == 0x1
309 912 624 NtGdiGetStockObject (18, ... ) == 0x290001c
310 912 624 NtGdiGetStockObject (19, ... ) == 0x1b00019
311 912 624 NtQueryInformationProcess (-1, 12, 1243292, 4, 0, ... ) == 0x0
312 912 624 NtSetInformationProcess (-1, 12, 1243308, 4, ... ) == 0x0
313 912 624 NtQueryInformationProcess (-1, 12, 1243292, 4, 0, ... ) == 0x0
314 912 624 NtSetInformationProcess (-1, 12, 1243308, 4, ... ) == 0x0
315 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1242768, 0, 1242800, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
316 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1243148, 0, 1243144, 8192, 4, ... ) == 0x0
317 912 624 NtAllocateVirtualMemory (-1, 1243156, 0, 1243152, 4096, 4, ... ) == 0x0
318 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243280, ... ) == 0xc04e
319 912 624 NtUserGetDC (0, ... ) == 0x1010051
320 912 624 NtUserCallOneParam (16842833, 41, ... ) == 0x1
321 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1242620, 1242636, 1243204, ... ) == 0x10015
322 912 624 NtUserFindExistingCursorIcon (1242620, 1242636, 1243204, ... ) == 0x10011
323 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243280, ... ) == 0xc04f
324 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc004
325 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc003
326 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc002
327 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc00a
328 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc00b
329 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc00d
330 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc00e
331 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc00f
332 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc006
333 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc007
334 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc050
335 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243272, ... ) == 0xc051
336 912 624 NtUserRegisterWindowMessage (1243280, ... ) == 0xc04f
337 912 624 NtQueryInformationProcess (-1, 12, 1242980, 4, 0, ... ) == 0x0
338 912 624 NtSetInformationProcess (-1, 12, 1242996, 4, ... ) == 0x0
339 912 624 NtQueryInformationProcess (-1, 12, 1242980, 4, 0, ... ) == 0x0
340 912 624 NtSetInformationProcess (-1, 12, 1242996, 4, ... ) == 0x0
341 912 624 NtQueryDefaultUILanguage (2013063980, ...
342 912 624 NtOpenThreadToken (-2, 0x20008, 1, ... ) == STATUS_NO_TOKEN
343 912 624 NtOpenProcessToken (-1, 0x20008, ... 80, ) == 0x0
344 912 624 NtQueryInformationToken (80, 1, -1096350048, 80, -1096349960, ... ) == 0x0
345 912 624 NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0

```

```

346 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x2000000, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-
515967899-1078145449-1343024091-500"}, ... 80, ) == 0x0
347 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x80000000, {24, 0, 0x240, 0, 0,
"\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\MUILanguages"}, ... ) ==
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
348 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x80000000, {24, 80, 0x240, 0, 0, "Control Panel\Desktop"}, ...
-2147483388, ) == 0x0
349 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (-2147483388, "MultiUILanguageId", 2, -1096349868, 256, -
1096349604, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
350 912 624 NtClose (-2147483388, ... ) == 0x0
351 912 624 NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0
341 912 624 NtQueryDefaultUILanguage ) == 0x0
352 912 624 NtQueryInstallUILanguage (2013063982, ... ) == 0x0
353 912 624 NtQueryDefaultLocale (1, 1241928, ... ) == 0x0
354 912 624 NtQueryDefaultLocale (1, 1241848, ... ) == 0x0
355 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1240344, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
356 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\\?\C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42LOC.DLL"}, 1241268, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
357 912 624 NtFsControlFile (28, 0, 0, 0, 1240904, 589864, 0, 0, 0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
358 912 624 NtQueryAttributesFile ({24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0,
"\\?\C:\WINNT\System32\MFC42LOC.DLL"}, 1241828, ... ) == STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
359 912 624 NtTestAlert (... ) == 0x0
360 912 624 NtContinue (1244464, 1, ...
361 912 624 NtSetInformationThread (-2, 9, 1245176, 4, ... ) == 0x0
362 912 624 NtOpenKey (0x1, {24, 52, 0x40, 0, 0,
"System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceCurrent"}, ... 80, ) == 0x0
363 912 624 NtQueryValueKey (80, "□", 2, 1244012, 144, 1244164, ... ) == 0x0
364 912 624 NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0
365 912 624 NtOpenFile (0x100080, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 0, "\DosDevices\pipe\"}, 1244232,
3, 32, ... 80, ) == 0x0
366 912 624 NtFsControlFile (80, 0, 0, 0, 1244240, 1114136, 1274896, 50, 0, 0, ... )
== STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT
367 912 624 NtClose (80, ... ) == 0x0
368 912 624 NtCreateFile (0xc0100080, {24, 0, 0x40, 0, 1244208,
"\\?\pipe\net\NtControlPipe9"}, 1244228, 0, 128, 3, 1, 96, 0, 0, ... ) ==
STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
369 912 624 NtTerminateProcess (0, 0, ... ) == 0x0
370 912 624 NtSetInformationThread (-2, 10, 1244636, 4, ... ) == 0x0
371 912 624 NtRequestWaitReplyPort (40, {20, 44, 0, 1244676, 1266856, 1244988,
2012964084}, ... {20, 44, 2, 912, 624, 13223, 0}, ) == 0x0
372 912 624 NtTerminateProcess (-1, 0, ...
373 912 624 NtQueryObject (68, 4, -1096349798, 2, 0, ... ) == 0x0
374 912 624 NtSetInformationObject (68, 4, -1096349798, 2, ... ) == 0x0
375 912 624 NtClose (68, ... ) == 0x0
376 912 624 NtClose (76, ... ) == 0x0
377 912 624 NtClose (4, ... ) == 0x0
378 912 624 NtClose (8, ... ) == 0x0
379 912 624 NtClose (12, ... ) == 0x0
380 912 624 NtClose (16, ... ) == 0x0
381 912 624 NtClose (20, ... ) == 0x0
382 912 624 NtClose (24, ... ) == 0x0
383 912 624 NtClose (28, ... ) == 0x0
384 912 624 NtClose (32, ... ) == 0x0
385 912 624 NtClose (36, ... ) == 0x0
386 912 624 NtClose (40, ... ) == 0x0
387 912 624 NtClose (44, ... ) == 0x0
388 912 624 NtClose (48, ... ) == 0x0
389 912 624 NtClose (52, ... ) == 0x0
390 912 624 NtClose (56, ... ) == 0x0
391 912 624 NtClose (60, ... ) == 0x0
392 912 624 NtClose (64, ... ) == 0x0
393 912 624 NtClose (72, ... ) == 0x0

```

## Appendix G

### FRED1.1 Script Source (Reproduced In It's Entirety From The FIRE CD)

```

title Obtaining live response details
echo off
@echo FRED v1.1 is running...
@echo FRED v1.1 - 2 April 2002 [modified for fire 10/2002] > a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo START TIME >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
time /t >> a:\audit.txt
@time /t
date /t >> a:\audit.txt
@date /t
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo PSINFO >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
\win32\sysinternals\Psinfo >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NET ACCOUNTS >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
echo on
net accounts >> a:\audit.txt
echo off
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NET FILE >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
echo on
net file >> a:\audit.txt
echo off
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NET SESSION >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
echo on
net session >> a:\audit.txt
echo off
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NET SHARE >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
echo on
net share >> a:\audit.txt
echo off
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NET START >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
echo on
net start >> a:\audit.txt
echo off
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NET USE >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
echo on
net use >> a:\audit.txt
echo off
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt

```



```

@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NET USER >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
echo on
net user >> a:\audit.txt
echo off
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NET VIEW >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
echo on
net view >> a:\audit.txt
echo off
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo ARP (arp -a) >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
arp -a >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NETSTAT (netstat -anr) >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
netstat -anr >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo LOGGED ON >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
\win32\sysinternals\psloggedon >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo ProcInterrogate >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
\win32\procinterrogate -list >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo FPORT (fport /p)>> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
\win32\foundstone\fport /p >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo PSLIST (pslist -x) >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
\win32\sysinternals\pslist -x >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo NBTSTAT >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
nbtstat -c >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo HIDDEN FILES (dir /s /a:h /t:a c: d:) >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
dir /s /a:h /t:a c: >> a:\audit.txt
dir /s /a:h /t:a d: >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@echo. >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo MD5SUM >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
md5sum c:/*. * >> a:\audit.txt
md5sum c:/winnt/*. * >> a:\audit.txt
md5sum c:/winnt/system/*. * >> a:\audit.txt
md5sum c:/winnt/system32/*. * >> a:\audit.txt
md5sum d:/*. * >> a:\audit.txt
md5sum d:/winnt/*. * >> a:\audit.txt
md5sum d:/winnt/system/*. * >> a:\audit.txt
md5sum d:/winnt/system32/*. * >> a:\audit.txt

```

```
@call \win32\makeline
@echo AT scheduler list >> a:\audit.txt
at >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
@echo END TIME >> a:\audit.txt
@call \win32\makeline
time /t >> a:\audit.txt
@time /t
date /t >> a:\audit.txt
@date /t
@echo.
@echo.
@echo.
@echo.
@echo.
@echo FRED is done.
@echo.
@echo The MD5 sum of the audit log is:
@md5sum a:\audit.txt > a:\audit.md5
@type a:\audit.md5
@echo.
@echo ** WRITE THIS NUMBER DOWN AND INCLUDE IT ON THE EVIDENCE TAG **
@echo (this value also saved to a:\audit.md5)
@echo.
@echo Remove your audit floppy from the computer and write protect it NOW.
echo on
```

## Appendix H

### FRED Output As Written To A:\Audit.Txt

FRED v1.1 - 2 April 2002 [modified for fire 10/2002]

-----  
START TIME  
-----

11:50a  
Fri 05/02/2003

-----  
PSINFO  
-----

PsInfo v1.31 - local and remote system information viewer  
Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Mark Russinovich  
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Querying information for ...

System information for \\HP1:

Uptime: 1 day, 1 hour, 14 minutes, 0 seconds  
Kernel version: Microsoft Windows 2000, Uniprocessor Free  
Product type: Professional  
Product version: 5.0  
Service pack: 2  
Kernel build number: 2195  
Registered organization:  
Registered owner: administrator  
Install date: 5/10/2000, 3:46:07 PM  
IE version: 6.0000  
System root: C:\WINNT  
Processors: 1  
Processor speed: 605 MHz  
Processor type: Intel Pentium III  
Physical memory: 126 MB

Volume	Type	Format	Label	Size	Free	Free
A:	Removable	FAT		1.4 MB	1.4 MB	100%
C:	Fixed	FAT32	ATRYP00ABK	7.8 GB	5.2 GB	66%
E:	CD-ROM	CDFS	FIRE-0.3.5b	220.1 MB		0%

-----  
NET ACCOUNTS  
-----

Force user logoff how long after time expires?: Never  
Minimum password age (days): 0  
Maximum password age (days): 42  
Minimum password length: 0  
Length of password history maintained: None  
Lockout threshold: Never  
Lockout duration (minutes): 30  
Lockout observation window (minutes): 30  
Computer role: WORKSTATION  
The command completed successfully.

-----  
NET FILE  
-----

There are no entries in the list.

-----  
NET SESSION  
-----

```
-----
There are no entries in the list.
```

```
-----
NET SHARE
-----
```

Share name	Resource	Remark
ADMIN\$	C:\WINNT	Remote Admin
C\$	C:\	Default share
IPC\$		Remote IPC

The command completed successfully.

```
-----
NET START
-----
```

These Windows 2000 services are started:

COM+ Event System  
 Computer Browser  
 DHCP Client  
 Distributed Link Tracking Client  
 Event Log  
 IPSEC Policy Agent  
 Logical Disk Manager  
 Messenger  
 Network Connections  
 Plug and Play  
 Print Spooler  
 Protected Storage  
 Remote Access Connection Manager  
 Remote Procedure Call (RPC)  
 Remote Registry Service  
 Removable Storage  
 RunAs Service  
 Security Accounts Manager  
 Server  
 Still Image Service  
 System Event Notification  
 Task Scheduler  
 TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper Service  
 Telephony  
 Windows Management Instrumentation  
 Windows Management Instrumentation Driver Extensions  
 WMDM PMSP Service  
 Workstation

The command completed successfully.

```
-----
NET USE
-----
```

New connections will be remembered.

There are no entries in the list.

```
-----
NET USER
-----
```

User accounts for \\HP1

```
-----
Administrator          Fooman                  Guest
The command completed successfully.
```

```
-----
NET VIEW
-----
```

There are no entries in the list.

```
-----
ARP (arp -a)
-----
```

No ARP Entries Found

```
-----
NETSTAT (netstat -anr)
-----
```

```
=====
Interface List
```

```
0xl ..... MS TCP Loopback interface
```

```
0xl000003 ...00 01 02 00 0e 15 ..... 3Com EtherLink PCI
=====
```

```
=====
Active Routes:
```

Network	Destination	Netmask	Gateway	Interface	Metric
	127.0.0.0	255.0.0.0	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	1
	255.255.255.255	255.255.255.255	255.255.255.255	1000003	1

```
=====
```

```
Persistent Routes:
```

None

Route Table

```
-----
LOGGED ON
-----
```

PsLoggedOn v1.21 - Logon Session Displayer  
Copyright (C) 1999-2000 Mark Russinovich  
SysInternals - www.sysinternals.com

Users logged on locally:

5/1/2003 10:37:24 AM HP1\Administrator

No one is logged on via resource shares.

```
-----
ProcInterrogate
-----
```

```
ProcInterrogate Version 0.0.1 by Kirby Kuehl vacuum@users.sourceforge.net
-----
```

unknown (Process ID: 0)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
-------------	------	------	--------

```
-----
```

unknown (Process ID: 8)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
-------------	------	------	--------

```
-----
```

C:\WINNT\System32\smss.exe (Process ID: 140)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x48589586	0x48580000	0000E000	\SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x68011080	0x68010000	000F0000	C:\WINNT\System32\sfcfiles.dll

-----  
 unknown (Process ID: 164)  
 -----

Entry Point    Base            Size            Module  
 -----  
 C:\WINNT\System32\winlogon.exe (Process ID: 160)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x01001678	0x01000000	0002D000	\\??\C:\WINNT\system32\winlogon.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.DLL
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.DLL
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.DLL
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\system32\USERENV.DLL
0x769A1084	0x769A0000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\NDDEAPI.DLL
0x7698671B	0x76980000	0001B000	C:\WINNT\system32\SFC.DLL
0x68011080	0x68010000	000F0000	C:\WINNT\system32\sfcfiles.dll
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\system32\SECUR32.DLL
0x690F5D00	0x690F0000	0000B000	C:\WINNT\system32\PROFMAP.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETAPI32.dll
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETRAP.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\system32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x76B914A8	0x76B90000	00054000	C:\WINNT\system32\msgina.dll
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.DLL
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x77574164	0x77570000	00030000	C:\WINNT\system32\WINMM.dll
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\system32\setupapi.dll
0x76952F60	0x76930000	0002B000	C:\WINNT\system32\wintrust.dll
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x77921158	0x77920000	00023000	C:\WINNT\system32\IMAGEHLP.dll
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll
0x76A01380	0x76A00000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\mscat32.dll
0x7CA0D2BA	0x7CA00000	00023000	C:\WINNT\system32\rsaenh.dll
0x77563789	0x77560000	00009000	C:\WINNT\system32\wdmaud.drv
0x77821114	0x77820000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\VERSION.dll
0x759B1A3F	0x759B0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\LZ32.DLL
0x770C6B43	0x770C0000	00023000	C:\WINNT\system32\csd11.dll
0x76921388	0x76920000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\system32\WlNotify.dll
0x769611DD	0x76960000	00017000	C:\WINNT\system32\WINS CARD.DLL
0x77801AFC	0x77800000	0001D000	C:\WINNT\system32\WINSPOOL.DRV
0x7784288A	0x77840000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\cscui.dll
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.DLL
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x77402638	0x77400000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\msacm32.drv
0x7741DA10	0x77410000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSACM32.dll
0x00000000	0x782D0000	0001E000	C:\WINNT\system32\msv1_0.dll

-----  
 C:\WINNT\System32\services.exe (Process ID: 212)  
 -----

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x010014F8	0x01000000	00018000	C:\WINNT\system32\services.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.DLL
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETAPI32.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.DLL
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\system32\SECUR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETRAP.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\system32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL

0x767A3C6C	0x767A0000	00018000	C:\WINNT\system32\UMPNPMGR.DLL
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\system32\USERENV.DLL
0x76812A40	0x76810000	0003B000	C:\WINNT\system32\SCESRV.DLL
0x77BF39C5	0x77BF0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\NTDSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x76890000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\eventlog.dll
0x7736727A	0x77360000	00019000	C:\WINNT\system32\dhcpcsvc.dll
0x775218B2	0x77520000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\ICMP.DLL
0x77342C35	0x77340000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\IPHLAPI.DLL
0x77321290	0x77320000	00017000	C:\WINNT\system32\MPRAPI.DLL
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLE32.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.DLL
0x773B123C	0x773B0000	0002E000	C:\WINNT\system32\ACTIVEDS.DLL
0x773812A8	0x77380000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADSLDPC.DLL
0x77831D22	0x77830000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\RTUTILS.DLL
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\system32\SETUPAPI.DLL
0x774E24E0	0x774E0000	00032000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASAPI32.DLL
0x774C2170	0x774C0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASMAN.DLL
0x77532E60	0x77530000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\TAPI32.DLL
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\system32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x00000000	0x76880000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\lmhsvc.dll
0x65782421	0x65780000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\system32\WINSTA.DLL
0x74FD182C	0x74FD0000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll
0x750111A4	0x75010000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\wshtcpip.dll
0x768C1854	0x768C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\dmserver.dll
0x00000000	0x770B0000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\CFGMR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x767E0000	00016000	C:\WINNT\system32\Srvsvc.dll
0x77801AFC	0x77800000	0001D000	C:\WINNT\system32\WINSPOOL.DRV
0x00000000	0x76770000	0001A000	C:\WINNT\system32\wkssvc.dll
0x76674054	0x76670000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPTDLL.DLL
0x768D1250	0x768D0000	00012000	C:\WINNT\system32\cryptsvc.dll
0x768512D4	0x76850000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\psbase.dll
0x7CA0D2BA	0x7CA00000	00023000	C:\WINNT\system32\rsaenh.dll
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x00000000	0x76800000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\seclogon.dll
0x767C4B9C	0x767C0000	00019000	C:\WINNT\system32\trkws.dll
0x00000000	0x768F0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\system32\browser.dll
0x00000000	0x76870000	0000B000	C:\WINNT\system32\msgsvc.dll
0x74FF122C	0x74FF0000	00012000	C:\WINNT\system32\mswsock.dll
0x785C11E9	0x785C0000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\rnr20.dll
0x777E10C5	0x777E0000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\winrnr.dll
0x777F1380	0x777F0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\rasadhlp.dll
0x76753FD4	0x76750000	00015000	C:\WINNT\system32\wmicore.dll
0x76952F60	0x76930000	0002B000	C:\WINNT\system32\WINTRUST.dll
0x77921158	0x77920000	00023000	C:\WINNT\system32\IMAGEHLP.dll
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.DLL

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C:\WINNT\System32\lsass.exe (Process ID: 224)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x01001258	0x01000000	0000A000	C:\WINNT\system32\lsass.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x00000000	0x78540000	0007D000	C:\WINNT\system32\LSASRV.dll
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.DLL
0x76674054	0x76670000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPTDLL.DLL
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.DLL
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\system32\SECUR32.DLL
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x00000000	0x77CC0000	0005E000	C:\WINNT\system32\SAMSRV.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\system32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETAPI32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETRAP.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x00000000	0x765E0000	0000D000	C:\WINNT\system32\msprivs.dll
0x78282F14	0x78280000	00033000	C:\WINNT\system32\kerberos.dll
0x00000000	0x782D0000	0001E000	C:\WINNT\system32\msv1_0.dll
0x7658DD61	0x76580000	0005C000	C:\WINNT\system32\netlogon.dll

0x77BF39C5	0x77BF0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\NTDSAPI.DLL
0x78161581	0x78160000	00026000	C:\WINNT\system32\schannel.dll
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.DLL
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\system32\USERENV.DLL
0x7CA0C9BD	0x7CA00000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\rsabase.dll
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll
0x750915EB	0x75090000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\mpr.dll
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\system32\setupapi.dll
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.dll
0x764316BC	0x76430000	0001C000	C:\WINNT\system32\scecli.dll
0x764E12B8	0x764E0000	0001E000	C:\WINNT\system32\polagent.dll
0x76FB5E9A	0x76FB0000	000F2000	C:\WINNT\system32\MFC42U.DLL
0x7650374C	0x76500000	00077000	C:\WINNT\system32\OAKLEY.DLL
0x77342C35	0x77340000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\IPHLPAPI.DLL
0x775218B2	0x77520000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\ICMP.DLL
0x77321290	0x77320000	00017000	C:\WINNT\system32\MPRAPI.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.DLL
0x773B123C	0x773B0000	0002E000	C:\WINNT\system32\ACTIVEDS.DLL
0x773812A8	0x77380000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADSLDPC.DLL
0x77831D22	0x77830000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\RTUTILS.DLL
0x774E24E0	0x774E0000	00032000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASAPI32.DLL
0x774C2170	0x774C0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASMAN.DLL
0x77532E60	0x77530000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\TAPI32.DLL
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x7736727A	0x77360000	00019000	C:\WINNT\system32\DHCPSCV.DLL
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\system32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x74FD182C	0x74FD0000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll
0x750111A4	0x75010000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\wshtcpip.dll
0x00FAD2BA	0x00FA0000	00023000	C:\WINNT\system32\rsaenh.dll
0x67405829	0x67400000	00027000	C:\WINNT\system32\dssenh.dll

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C:\WINNT\System32\svchost.exe (Process ID: 384)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x010010B8	0x01000000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.DLL
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.DLL
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLE32.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.DLL
0x76196CA4	0x76190000	0003D000	c:\winnt\system32\rpcss.dll
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.DLL
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	c:\winnt\system32\USERENV.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	c:\winnt\system32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	c:\winnt\system32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	c:\winnt\system32\SECUR32.DLL
0x74FF122C	0x74FF0000	00012000	C:\WINNT\system32\mswsock.dll
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\system32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x74FD182C	0x74FD0000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll
0x750111A4	0x75010000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\wshtcpip.dll
0x785C11E9	0x785C0000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\rnr20.dll
0x77342C35	0x77340000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\iphlpapi.dll
0x775218B2	0x77520000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\ICMP.DLL
0x77321290	0x77320000	00017000	C:\WINNT\system32\MPRAPI.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETAPI32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETRAP.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.DLL
0x773B123C	0x773B0000	0002E000	C:\WINNT\system32\ACTIVEDS.DLL
0x773812A8	0x77380000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADSLDPC.DLL
0x77831D22	0x77830000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\RTUTILS.DLL
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\system32\SETUPAPI.DLL
0x774E24E0	0x774E0000	00032000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASAPI32.DLL
0x774C2170	0x774C0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASMAN.DLL
0x77532E60	0x77530000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\TAPI32.DLL
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x7736727A	0x77360000	00019000	C:\WINNT\system32\DHCPSCV.DLL
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\system32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x777E10C5	0x777E0000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\winrnr.dll
0x777F1380	0x777F0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\rasadhlp.dll
0x00000000	0x782D0000	0001E000	C:\WINNT\system32\b



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 C:\WINNT\System32\spoolsv.exe (Process ID: 412)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x01001124	0x01000000	0000D000	C:\WINNT\system32\spoolsv.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.DLL
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.DLL
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.dll
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.DLL
0x76A922BC	0x76A90000	00012000	C:\WINNT\system32\SPOOLSS.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\system32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x77342C35	0x77340000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\iphlpapi.dll
0x775218B2	0x77520000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\ICMP.DLL
0x77321290	0x77320000	00017000	C:\WINNT\system32\MPRAPI.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETAPI32.DLL
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\system32\SECUR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETRAP.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLE32.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.DLL
0x773B123C	0x773B0000	0002E000	C:\WINNT\system32\ACTIVEDS.DLL
0x773812A8	0x77380000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADSLDPC.DLL
0x77831D22	0x77830000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\RTUTILS.DLL
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\system32\SETUPAPI.DLL
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\system32\USERENV.DLL
0x774E24E0	0x774E0000	00032000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASAPI32.DLL
0x774C2170	0x774C0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASMAN.DLL
0x77532E60	0x77530000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\TAPI32.DLL
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x7736727A	0x77360000	00019000	C:\WINNT\system32\DHCPCSV.DLL
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\system32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x777F1380	0x777F0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\rasadhlp.dll
0x76AC5002	0x76AC0000	00040000	C:\WINNT\system32\localspl.dll
0x77821114	0x77820000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\VERSION.DLL
0x759B1A3F	0x759B0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\ LZ32.DLL
0x7698671B	0x76980000	0001B000	C:\WINNT\system32\SFC.DLL
0x68011080	0x68010000	000F0000	C:\WINNT\system32\sfcfiles.dll
0x77801AFC	0x77800000	0001D000	C:\WINNT\system32\winspool.drv
0x733E1480	0x733E0000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\cnbjmon.dll
0x76AB1162	0x76AB0000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\pjlmon.dll
0x76A8119C	0x76A80000	0000D000	C:\WINNT\system32\tcpmon.dll
0x76A710CC	0x76A70000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\usbmon.dll
0x785C11E9	0x785C0000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\rnr20.dll
0x777E10C5	0x777E0000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\winrnr.dll
0x76A512A4	0x76A50000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\win32spl.dll
0x76B017C2	0x76B00000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\inetpp.dll

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 C:\WINNT\System32\svchost.exe (Process ID: 444)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x010010B8	0x01000000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\svchost.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.DLL
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.DLL
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLE32.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.DLL
0x76293B2C	0x76290000	0003A000	c:\winnt\system32\es.dll
0x004944E0	0x00440000	00061000	c:\winnt\system32\TXFAUX.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.dll
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.DLL
0x761D94DE	0x761D0000	00064000	c:\winnt\system32\ntmssvc.dll
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x7618401A	0x76180000	0000C000	c:\winnt\system32\sens.dll
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.dll
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.dll
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x77342C35	0x77340000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\iphlpapi.dll

0x775218B2	0x77520000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\ICMP.DLL
0x77321290	0x77320000	00017000	C:\WINNT\System32\MPRAPI.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\System32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETAPI32.DLL
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\System32\SECUR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETRAP.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\System32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x773B123C	0x773B0000	0002E000	C:\WINNT\System32\ACTIVEDS.DLL
0x773812A8	0x77380000	00022000	C:\WINNT\System32\ADSLDPC.DLL
0x77831D22	0x77830000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\System32\RTUTILS.DLL
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\System32\SETUPAPI.DLL
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\System32\USERENV.DLL
0x774E24E0	0x774E0000	00032000	C:\WINNT\System32\RASAPI32.DLL
0x774C2170	0x774C0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\System32\RASMAN.DLL
0x77532E60	0x77530000	00022000	C:\WINNT\System32\TAPI32.DLL
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x7736727A	0x77360000	00019000	C:\WINNT\System32\DHCPCSVC.DLL
0x5F3E2D3C	0x5F3E0000	00012000	C:\WINNT\System32\ATL.DLL
0x7624117C	0x76240000	0002C000	C:\WINNT\System32\NTMSDBA.dll
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\Shell32.dll
0x66E10ED0	0x66DF0000	0002C000	c:\winnt\system32\tapisrv.dll
0x7571B878	0x75710000	00029000	c:\winnt\system32\rasmans.dll
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x6A4E5370	0x6A4B0000	00089000	c:\winnt\system32\netcfgx.dll
0x7588FF96	0x75870000	00083000	c:\winnt\system32\RASDLG.dll
0x76271228	0x76270000	00019000	c:\winnt\system32\netman.dll
0x76F24AA	0x76F20000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETSHELL.dll
0x00000000	0x76110000	00004000	C:\WINNT\System32\WMI.dll
0x75674F29	0x75670000	00010000	C:\WINNT\System32\rastapi.dll
0x644F2CE0	0x644D0000	00034000	C:\WINNT\System32\unimdm.tsp
0x756012C0	0x75600000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\uniplat.dll
0x00000000	0x770B0000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\CFGMGR32.dll
0x69C04BA0	0x69BF0000	0001D000	C:\WINNT\System32\NTMARTA.DLL
0x77801AFC	0x77800000	0001D000	C:\WINNT\System32\WINSPOOL.DRV
0x77BF39C5	0x77BF0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\System32\NTDSAPI.dll
0x645411F0	0x64540000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\kmddsp.tsp
0x64531460	0x64530000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\ndptsp.tsp
0x64552060	0x64550000	00006000	C:\WINNT\System32\ipconf.tsp
0x64567220	0x64560000	00044000	C:\WINNT\System32\h323.tsp
0x75910822	0x75900000	00033000	C:\WINNT\System32\rasppp.dll
0x756E1738	0x756E0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntlapi.dll
0x00000000	0x68C30000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\raschap.dll
0x68B18750	0x68B10000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\System32\rastls.dll
0x78161581	0x78160000	00026000	C:\WINNT\System32\SCHANNEL.dll
0x769611DD	0x76960000	00017000	C:\WINNT\System32\WinSCard.dll
0x695C9140	0x694F0000	00162000	C:\WINNT\System32\COMSVCS.DLL
0x69A40040	0x699E0000	000AF000	C:\WINNT\System32\MSDTCPRX.dll
0x6A7AAB00	0x6A7A0000	00010000	C:\WINNT\System32\MTXCLU.DLL
0x77821114	0x77820000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\VERSION.dll
0x759B1A3F	0x759B0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\LZ32.DLL
0x00000000	0x73930000	00010000	C:\WINNT\System32\CLUSAPI.DLL
0x689D2420	0x689D0000	0000D000	C:\WINNT\System32\RESUTILS.DLL

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C:\WINNT\System32\regsvc.exe (Process ID: 480)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x01002E80	0x01000000	00014000	C:\WINNT\system32\regsvc.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.DLL
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\system32\secur32.dll

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C:\WINNT\System32\MSTask.exe (Process ID: 496)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x01002F10	0x01000000	0001E000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSTask.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.dll
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.DLL

0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETAPI32.dll
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\system32\SECUR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETRAP.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\system32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\system32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x77BF39C5	0x77BF0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\NTDSAPI.dll
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.dll
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\system32\USERENV.dll
0x74FF122C	0x74FF0000	00012000	C:\WINNT\system32\mswsock.dll
0x74FD182C	0x74FD0000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\msafcd.dll
0x750111A4	0x75010000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\wshtcpip.dll
0x785C11E9	0x785C0000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\rnr20.dll
0x77342C35	0x77340000	00013000	C:\WINNT\system32\iphlpapi.dll
0x775218B2	0x77520000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\ICMP.DLL
0x77321290	0x77320000	00017000	C:\WINNT\system32\MPRAPI.DLL
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLE32.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.DLL
0x773B123C	0x773B0000	0002E000	C:\WINNT\system32\ACTIVEDS.DLL
0x773812A8	0x77380000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADSLDPC.DLL
0x77831D22	0x77830000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\system32\RTUTILS.DLL
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\system32\SETUPAPI.DLL
0x774E24E0	0x774E0000	00032000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASAPI32.DLL
0x774C2170	0x774C0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\RASMAN.DLL
0x77532E60	0x77530000	00022000	C:\WINNT\system32\TAPI32.DLL
0x7736727A	0x77360000	00019000	C:\WINNT\system32\DHCPCSVC.DLL
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\system32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x777E10C5	0x777E0000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\winrnr.dll
0x777F1380	0x777F0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\rasadhlp.dll
0x76A4127B	0x76A40000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSIDLE.DLL

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C:\WINNT\System32\stisvc.exe (Process ID: 524)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x010086D0	0x01000000	00011000	C:\WINNT\system32\stisvc.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\system32\SETUPAPI.dll
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\system32\USERENV.DLL
0x67335351	0x67330000	0000D000	C:\WINNT\system32\STI.dll
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.dll

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C:\WINNT\System32\Wbem\WinMgmt.exe (Process ID: 572)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x0041EF26	0x00400000	00030000	C:\WINNT\System32\WBEM\WinMgmt.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x65C8862C	0x65C20000	000AD000	C:\WINNT\System32\WBEM\wbemcomn.dll
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\system32\CLBCATQ.DLL

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C:\WINNT\System32\mspmssv.exe (Process ID: 592)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x01007C20	0x01000000	0000D000	C:\WINNT\System32\mspmssv.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.DLL
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL

0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.dll
0x69C04BA0	0x69BF0000	0001D000	C:\WINNT\System32\NTMARTA.DLL
0x77801AFC	0x77800000	0001D000	C:\WINNT\System32\WINSPOOL.DRV
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.dll
0x77BF39C5	0x77BF0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\System32\NTDSAPI.dll
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\System32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETAPI32.DLL
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\System32\SECUR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETRAP.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\System32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.dll

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C:\WINNT\Explorer.EXE (Process ID: 792)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x004015A8	0x00400000	0003E000	C:\WINNT\Explorer.EXE
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.DLL
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.DLL
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.DLL
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\msvcrt.dll
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x732E520F	0x732E0000	00020000	C:\WINNT\System32\shim.dll
0x77821114	0x77820000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\version.dll
0x759B1A3F	0x759B0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\LZ32.DLL
0x4000421C	0x40000000	00009000	C:\WINNT\AppPatch\W2KPLYR.DLL
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLE32.DLL
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x7779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
0x7784288A	0x77840000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\System32\cscui.dll
0x770C6B43	0x770C0000	00023000	C:\WINNT\System32\CSCDLL.DLL
0x71019B2E	0x71000000	00148000	C:\WINNT\System32\SHDOCVW.DLL
0x7118485C	0x71160000	000FD000	C:\WINNT\System32\browseui.dll
0x750915EB	0x75090000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MPR.DLL
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\System32\USERENV.DLL
0x702BF821	0x702B0000	00078000	C:\WINNT\system32\URLMON.DLL
0x704433D3	0x70440000	0008F000	C:\WINNT\System32\mlang.dll
0x70D7ED52	0x70C50000	002A3000	C:\WINNT\System32\mshtml.dll
0x702018CB	0x70200000	00094000	C:\WINNT\system32\WININET.DLL
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x774E24E0	0x774E0000	00032000	C:\WINNT\System32\RASAPI32.DLL
0x774C2170	0x774C0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\System32\RASMAN.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x77532E60	0x77530000	00022000	C:\WINNT\System32\TAPI32.DLL
0x77831D22	0x77830000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\System32\RTUTILS.DLL
0x75AB1641	0x75AB0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\sensapi.dll
0x76FA1936	0x76FA0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntshrui.dll
0x5F3E2D3C	0x5F3E0000	00012000	C:\WINNT\System32\ATL.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETAPI32.DLL
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\System32\SECUR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETRAP.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\System32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\System32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WSOCK32.DLL
0x00000000	0x71930000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\shdoclc.dll
0x00000000	0x75AC0000	00028000	C:\WINNT\System32\MSLS31.DLL
0x75E61264	0x75E60000	0001A000	C:\WINNT\System32\IMM32.DLL
0x75161358	0x75160000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntlanman.dll
0x75211323	0x75210000	00015000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETUI0.DLL
0x751D15F4	0x751D0000	00038000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETUI1.DLL
0x76F24A0A	0x76F20000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\NETSHELL.dll
0x7034219D	0x70340000	00041000	C:\WINNT\System32\webcheck.dll
0x766D2716	0x766D0000	00018000	C:\WINNT\System32\stobject.dll

0x767410E1	0x76740000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\BATMETER.DLL
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\System32\SETUPAPI.DLL
0x766F108C	0x766F0000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\POWRPROF.DLL
0x77574164	0x77570000	00030000	C:\WINNT\System32\WINMM.DLL
0x7722888D	0x770F0000	001FD000	C:\WINNT\System32\MSI.DLL
0x77563789	0x77560000	00009000	C:\WINNT\System32\wdmaud.drv
0x77402638	0x77400000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\msacm32.drv
0x7741DA10	0x77410000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\MSACM32.dll
0x00000000	0x719D0000	00012000	C:\WINNT\System32\browselec.dll
0x70511C9A	0x70510000	0000A000	C:\WINNT\System32\imgutil.dll
0x6665DE8C	0x66650000	00054000	C:\WINNT\System32\USP10.DLL
0x74FD182C	0x74FD0000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll
0x750111A4	0x75010000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\wshtcpip.dll
0x785C11E9	0x785C0000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\rnr20.dll
0x77342C35	0x77340000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\iphlpapi.dll
0x775218B2	0x77520000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\ICMP.DLL
0x77321290	0x77320000	00017000	C:\WINNT\System32\MPRAPI.DLL
0x773B123C	0x773B0000	0002E000	C:\WINNT\System32\ACTIVEDS.DLL
0x773812A8	0x77380000	00022000	C:\WINNT\System32\ADSLDPC.DLL
0x7736727A	0x77360000	00019000	C:\WINNT\System32\DHCPCSVC.DLL
0x777E10C5	0x777E0000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\winrnr.dll
0x777F1380	0x777F0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\rasadhlp.dll
0x00000000	0x770B0000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\CfgMgr32.dll
0x044EE8F0	0x044E0000	00029000	C:\WINNT\System32\dsquery.dll
0x76B31DE5	0x76B30000	0003E000	C:\WINNT\system32\comdlg32.dll
0x0451A080	0x04510000	0001E000	C:\WINNT\System32\dsuixt.dll
0x77BF39C5	0x77BF0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\System32\NTDSAPI.dll
0x77801AFC	0x77800000	0001D000	C:\WINNT\System32\WINSPOOL.DRV
0x6B72BF3C	0x6B700000	00090000	C:\WINNT\System32\jscript.dll
0x69B29278	0x69B10000	00114000	C:\WINNT\System32\msxml3.dll
0x6AC3C530	0x6AC20000	00037000	C:\WINNT\System32\mstask.dll
0x68D48B40	0x68C60000	00160000	C:\WINNT\System32\query.dll
0x76711840	0x76710000	00009000	C:\WINNT\System32\LINKINFO.DLL
0x16201120	0x16200000	00006000	C:\PROGRA~1\WinZip\WZSHLSTB.DLL
0x379CC0A3	0x379B0000	0008C000	
C:\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\WEBFOL~1\MSONSEXT.DLL			
0x05BC1000	0x05BC0000	00024000	C:\Program Files\WinRAR\rarext.dll
0x76952F60	0x76930000	0002B000	C:\WINNT\system32\WINTRUST.dll
0x77921158	0x77920000	00023000	C:\WINNT\system32\IMAGEHELP.dll
0x71F017E7	0x71F00000	0004D000	C:\WINNT\System32\docprop2.dll
0x6A8F442A	0x6A8F0000	00020000	C:\WINNT\System32\MSVFW32.DLL
0x74874EB2	0x74870000	00016000	C:\WINNT\System32\AVIFIL32.DLL
0x700214F0	0x70020000	00005000	C:\WINNT\system32\faxshell.dll
0x72211F49	0x72210000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\diskcopy.dll
0x71C940C0	0x71C80000	00026000	C:\WINNT\System32\dskquoui.dll
0x10001000	0x10000000	00008000	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat
5.0\Reader\ActiveX\AcroIEHelper.ocx			
0x658F2374	0x658F0000	00114000	C:\WINNT\System32\webvw.dll
0x76DF1A8C	0x76DF0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\System32\mydocs.dll
0x70F89613	0x70F30000	0006E000	C:\WINNT\System32\mshtml.dll

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popupkiller.EXE (Process ID: 852)

	Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
Killer\popupkiller.EXE	0x00455000	0x00400000	0005A000	C:\Program Files\PopUp
	0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
	0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.DLL
	0x73421AD8	0x73420000	00153000	C:\WINNT\System32\MSVBVM60.DLL
	0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
	0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
	0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
	0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
	0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll
	0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
	0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL
	0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.dll
	0x110011E4	0x11000000	00006000	C:\WINNT\System32\Line3D.ocx
	0x01701A64	0x01700000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\System32\hRef.ocx
	0x749AFF40	0x749A0000	00024000	C:\WINNT\System32\asycfilt.dll
	0x27588820	0x27580000	00105000	C:\WINNT\System32\mscomctl.ocx
	0x76B31DE5	0x76B30000	0003E000	C:\WINNT\system32\comdlg32.dll
	0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
	0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
	0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.DLL
	0x217A14B0	0x217A0000	00023000	C:\WINNT\System32\COMDLG32.OCX
	0x02101344	0x02100000	00009000	C:\WINNT\System32\XFXSysTray.ocx

```

0x234C12FC 0x234C0000 0001E000 C:\WINNT\System32\MSINET.OCX
0x702018CB 0x70200000 00094000 C:\WINNT\system32\WININET.dll
0x77444ACC 0x77440000 00075000 C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0 0x77430000 00010000 C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x02196000 0x02190000 0000B000 C:\Program Files\PopUp Killer\fgeo.dll
0x77801AFC 0x77800000 0001D000 C:\WINNT\System32\WINSPOOL.DRV
0x760211C8 0x76020000 00033000
C:\WINNT\System32\spool\DRIVERS\W32X86\3\UNIDRVUI.DLL
0x76EF119C 0x76EF0000 0002B000
C:\WINNT\System32\spool\DRIVERS\W32X86\3\UNIDRV.DLL
0x6B7724A0 0x6B770000 00013000 C:\WINNT\System32\mscms.dll
-----

```

qtask.exe (Process ID: 864)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x0040578E	0x00400000	00014000	C:\Program Files\QuickTime\qtask.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\msvcrt.dll
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x66AB1009	0x66800000	0041C000	C:\WINNT\System32\QuickTime.qts
0x77574164	0x77570000	00030000	C:\WINNT\System32\WINMM.dll
0x76B31DE5	0x76B30000	0003E000	C:\WINNT\system32\comdlg32.dll
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll
0x77821114	0x77820000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\VERSION.dll
0x759B1A3F	0x759B0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\LZ32.DLL
0x702018CB	0x70200000	00094000	C:\WINNT\system32\WININET.DLL
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
0x51038811	0x51000000	0004A000	C:\WINNT\System32\ddraw.dll
0x728A112C	0x728A0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\System32\DCIMAN32.dll
0x673110D9	0x672D0000	00079000	
C:\WINNT\system32\QuickTime\QuickTimeEssentials.qtx			
0x66E77919	0x66DF0000	000CD000	
C:\WINNT\system32\QuickTime\QuickTimeInternetExtras.qtx			
0x672ABA69	0x67260000	00068000	
C:\WINNT\system32\QuickTime\QuickTimeMPEG.qtx			
0x6738B329	0x67350000	00064000	
C:\WINNT\system32\QuickTime\QuickTimeMPEG4.qtx			
0x66CA3260	0x66C20000	000B7000	
C:\WINNT\system32\QuickTime\QuickTimeStreaming.qtx			
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WSOCK32.dll
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x6764A480	0x67640000	0001C000	
C:\WINNT\system32\QuickTime\QuickTimeStreamingExtras.qtx			

SETI@home.exe (Process ID: 880)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x00423C0D	0x00400000	0007F000	C:\Program
Files\SETI@home\SETI@home.exe			
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\msvcrt.dll
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WSOCK32.dll
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x702018CB	0x70200000	00094000	C:\WINNT\system32\wininet.dll
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll

0x774E24E0	0x774E0000	00032000	C:\WINNT\System32\RASAPI32.DLL
0x774C2170	0x774C0000	00011000	C:\WINNT\System32\RASMAN.DLL
0x77532E60	0x77530000	00022000	C:\WINNT\System32\TAPI32.DLL
0x77831D22	0x77830000	0000E000	C:\WINNT\System32\RTUTILS.DLL
0x75AB1641	0x75AB0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\sensapi.dll
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	00005D000	C:\WINNT\System32\USERENV.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\System32\netapi32.dll
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\System32\SECUR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETRAP.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\System32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\System32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x74FD182C	0x74FD0000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll
0x750111A4	0x75010000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\wshtcpip.dll
0x785C11E9	0x785C0000	0000C000	C:\WINNT\System32\rnr20.dll
0x77342C35	0x77340000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\iphlpapi.dll
0x775218B2	0x77520000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\ICMP.DLL
0x77321290	0x77320000	00017000	C:\WINNT\System32\MPRAPI.DLL
0x773B123C	0x773B0000	0002E000	C:\WINNT\System32\ACTIVEDS.DLL
0x773812A8	0x77380000	00022000	C:\WINNT\System32\ADSLDPC.DLL
0x77882AB8	0x77880000	0008D000	C:\WINNT\System32\SETUPAPI.DLL
0x7736727A	0x77360000	00019000	C:\WINNT\System32\DHCPSCVC.DLL
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x777E10C5	0x777E0000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\winrnr.dll
0x777F1380	0x777F0000	00005000	C:\WINNT\System32\rasadhlp.dll

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E:\win32\fire.exe (Process ID: 936)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x00401454	0x00400000	0003B000	E:\win32\fire.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x73421AD8	0x73420000	00153000	C:\WINNT\System32\MSVBVM60.DLL
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll
0x77A23A50	0x779B0000	0009B000	C:\WINNT\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
0x7760EAE0	0x775A0000	00085000	C:\WINNT\System32\CLBCATQ.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.dll
0x71019B2E	0x71000000	00148000	C:\WINNT\System32\shdocvw.dll
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.dll
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\comctl32.dll
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHELL32.dll
0x702018CB	0x70200000	00094000	C:\WINNT\system32\WININET.dll
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x749AFF40	0x749A0000	00024000	C:\WINNT\System32\asycfilt.dll
0x00000000	0x71930000	00088000	C:\WINNT\System32\shdoclc.dll
0x702BF821	0x702B0000	00078000	C:\WINNT\system32\urlmon.dll
0x77821114	0x77820000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\VERSION.dll
0x759B1A3F	0x759B0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\LZ32.DLL
0x70416E7B	0x70400000	00023000	C:\WINNT\System32\MSRATING.dll
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WSOCK32.dll
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x00000000	0x30000000	00011000	C:\WINNT\System32\msratelc.dll
0x704433D3	0x70440000	0008F000	C:\WINNT\System32\mlang.dll
0x74FD182C	0x74FD0000	0001F000	C:\WINNT\system32\msafd.dll
0x70D7ED52	0x70C50000	002A3000	C:\WINNT\System32\mshtml.dll
0x750111A4	0x75010000	00007000	C:\WINNT\System32\wshtcpip.dll

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E:\win32\cmd.exe (Process ID: 1172)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x4AD1A420	0x4AD00000	00048000	E:\win32\cmd.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.dll

E:\win32\procinterrogate.exe (Process ID: 1156)

Entry Point	Base	Size	Module
0x004031C4	0x00400000	0000E000	E:\win32\procinterrogate.exe
0x00000000	0x77F80000	0007B000	C:\WINNT\System32\ntdll.dll
0x77E874CA	0x77E80000	000B5000	C:\WINNT\system32\KERNEL32.dll
0x77E2FE7E	0x77E10000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\USER32.dll
0x00000000	0x77F40000	0003C000	C:\WINNT\system32\GDI32.DLL
0x77DB7CDA	0x77DB0000	0005B000	C:\WINNT\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77D43905	0x77D40000	00070000	C:\WINNT\system32\RPCRT4.DLL
0x690A10BC	0x690A0000	0000B000	C:\WINNT\System32\PSAPI.DLL
0x77821114	0x77820000	00007000	C:\WINNT\system32\VERSION.dll
0x759B1A3F	0x759B0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\system32\LZ32.DLL
0x7CA0C9BD	0x7CA00000	00022000	C:\WINNT\System32\rsabase.dll
0x77A52804	0x77A50000	000F6000	C:\WINNT\system32\ole32.dll
0x77C1D43C	0x77C10000	0005D000	C:\WINNT\System32\USERENV.dll
0x78001000	0x78000000	00046000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSVCRT.DLL
0x77444ACC	0x77440000	00075000	C:\WINNT\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x774333F0	0x77430000	00010000	C:\WINNT\system32\MSASN1.DLL
0x782F7238	0x782F0000	00242000	C:\WINNT\system32\shell32.dll
0x70BEE493	0x70BD0000	00064000	C:\WINNT\system32\SHLWAPI.DLL
0x717889EC	0x71780000	0008A000	C:\WINNT\system32\COMCTL32.DLL
0x75173309	0x75170000	0004F000	C:\WINNT\System32\netapi32.dll
0x77BE56C2	0x77BE0000	0000F000	C:\WINNT\System32\SECUR32.DLL
0x00000000	0x751C0000	00006000	C:\WINNT\System32\NETRAP.DLL
0x75153777	0x75150000	00010000	C:\WINNT\System32\SAMLIB.DLL
0x750312D4	0x75030000	00013000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2_32.DLL
0x750211AE	0x75020000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WS2HELP.DLL
0x779536C2	0x77950000	00029000	C:\WINNT\system32\WLDAP32.DLL
0x77987CC5	0x77980000	00024000	C:\WINNT\System32\DNSAPI.DLL
0x00000000	0x75050000	00008000	C:\WINNT\System32\WSOCK32.DLL

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FPORT (fport /p)

-----  
FPort v2.0 - TCP/IP Process to Port Mapper  
Copyright 2000 by Foundstone, Inc.  
<http://www.foundstone.com>

Pid	Process	Port	Proto	Path
384	svchost	-> 135	TCP	C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe
8	System	-> 445	TCP	
496	MSTask	-> 1025	TCP	C:\WINNT\system32\MSTask.exe
8	System	-> 1028	TCP	
384	svchost	-> 135	UDP	C:\WINNT\system32\svchost.exe
8	System	-> 445	UDP	
212	services	-> 1027	UDP	C:\WINNT\system32\services.exe
792	Explorer	-> 1088	UDP	C:\WINNT\Explorer.EXE
936	fire	-> 1142	UDP	E:\win32\fire.exe

-----  
PSLIST (pslist -x)

-----  
PsList v1.2 - Process Information Lister  
Copyright (C) 1999-2002 Mark Russinovich  
Sysinternals - [www.sysinternals.com](http://www.sysinternals.com)

Process and thread information for HP1:

Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
Idle	0	0	1	0	16	0:00:00.000	0:25:41.025	25:14:34.360
			VM	WS	WS Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page	PageFile
			0	16	16	0	1 0 0	0 0
Tid Pri	Cswtch		State		User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time	
0 0	195625		Running		0:00:00.000	0:25:41.025	0:00:00.000	
Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
System	8	8	33	100	212	0:00:00.000	0:00:12.908	25:14:34.360
			VM	WS	WS Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page	PageFile
			1668	212	644	24	2225 0 0	0 24
Tid Pri	Cswtch		State		User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time	



4	0	4299	Ready	0:00:00.000	0:00:06.409	0:00:00.000
12	14	157	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:53.097
16	13	73539	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.210	25:14:53.097
20	14	603259	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.811	25:14:53.097
24	13	535444	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.660	25:14:53.097
28	13	656660	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.841	25:14:53.097
32	12	187590	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.460	25:14:53.097
36	12	58	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.020	25:14:53.097
40	12	4842	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.170	25:14:53.097
44	15	3162	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:53.097
48	14	90874	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:53.097
52	18	3199	Wait:VirtualMem	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.160	25:14:53.077
56	17	47634	Wait:FreePage	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.150	25:14:53.077
60	16	1038544	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:53.077
64	23	1031758	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.070	25:14:53.077
68	16	1	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:52.957
72	17	1	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:52.957
76	8	343	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:52.777
80	17	151	Wait:VirtualMem	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:52.767
84	8	1	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:52.436
88	8	15	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:42.562
92	9	44	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:40.669
96	8	3	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:35.472
104	8	1	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:35.472
108	8	1	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:34.731
116	8	499	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:34.521
112	8	3534	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:34.521
120	8	131	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:34.521
124	8	1614	Wait:Executive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:34.521
132	8	60	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:34.380
640	9	36	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:18.057
644	9	43	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:18.047
268	8	362147	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.030	25:13:43.848

Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
smss	140	11	6	33	336	0:00:00.020	0:00:00.460	25:14:34.360
VM WS WS Pk Priv Faults NonP Page PageFile								
				5248	336	2004	1068	626 1 5 1068
Tid	Pri	Cswtch	State	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time		
136	13	480	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.010	0:00:00.470	25:14:34.360		
144	13	7	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:34.220		
148	13	3	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:34.220		
100	13	2	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:30.915		
156	13	4	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:30.915		
152	13	2	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:30.915		

Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
csrss	164	13	10	273	1744	0:00:00.120	0:00:13.108	25:14:30.915
VM WS WS Pk Priv Faults NonP Page PageFile								
				17404	1744	1752	1148	1730 4 33 1148
Tid	Pri	Cswtch	State	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time		
168	15	125	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:29.894		
172	14	3241	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.030	0:00:00.090	25:14:29.784		
176	15	2	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:29.684		
180	15	4	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:29.684		
184	14	3217	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.040	0:00:00.120	25:14:29.283		
188	19	10805973	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:01.522	25:14:28.572		
192	16	58018	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:10.314	25:14:28.572		
228	16	5	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:27.821		
504	14	3190	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.040	0:00:00.080	25:14:21.892		
1064	15	205	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.020	0:01:02.029		

Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
winlogon	160	13	16	359	3040	0:00:00.610	0:00:02.523	25:14:29.674
VM WS WS Pk Priv Faults NonP Page PageFile								
				33436	3040	11136	5480	5881 59 35 5480
Tid	Pri	Cswtch	State	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time		
128	15	264576	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.290	0:00:01.381	25:14:29.674		
200	13	3036	Wait:DelayExec	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:28.232		
204	13	356	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:14:28.202		
216	13	46	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:28.192		
248	15	122	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:27.280		
264	15	2698	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.020	0:00:00.180	25:14:26.289		
560	15	6	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:17.676		
660	15	11	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:16.635		
664	14	2685	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.050	0:00:00.200	25:14:16.635		
668	14	55	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.020	0:00:00.070	25:14:11.097		

252	13	753	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:14:11.067		
328	11	1523	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:11.027		
672	15	107	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:14:10.746		
196	15	45	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.030	25:13:59.020		
744	15	2	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:58.929		
772	15	3	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:58.859		
Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
services	212	9	35	549	15320	0:00:13.379	0:00:08.492	25:14:28.192
			VM	WS	WS	Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page PageFile
			55936	15320	20988	12492	65069	212 32 12492
Tid	Pri	Cswtch	State		User Time		Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
236	9	8802	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.010		0:00:00.020	25:14:27.581
304	10	1551	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.010		0:00:00.050	25:14:25.708
308	9	1809	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.060		0:00:00.080	25:14:25.698
312	9	3064	Wait:DelayExec		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:25.588
320	10	157	Wait:Executive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:25.548
332	11	5	Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:25.057
336	9	12081	Wait:DelayExec		0:00:00.610		0:00:01.702	25:14:25.057
324	10	150	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.030		0:00:00.010	25:14:24.817
340	11	13	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:24.817
356	11	8	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:23.605
360	9	12	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:23.505
364	11	2	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:23.505
368	11	39	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:23.505
392	9	606	Wait:Executive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.010	25:14:23.345
396	9	10820	Wait:UserReq		0:00:12.277		0:00:05.437	25:14:23.345
436	11	86	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.010	25:14:22.994
456	9	718	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.010		0:00:00.010	25:14:22.814
484	9	534	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:21.892
516	11	28	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:21.362
544	10	5856	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.070		0:00:00.330	25:14:20.901
944	10	5826	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.080		0:00:00.220	25:13:36.107
952	10	3561	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.030		0:00:00.280	25:13:35.516
956	9	360	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:13:34.985
968	9	355	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:13:34.855
460	10	1587	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.070		0:00:00.080	25:13:28.996
796	11	4	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:13:28.876
1008	11	1480	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.020		0:00:00.080	25:13:28.846
784	11	15	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:13:13.835
756	11	4	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:13:13.795
1104	11	17	Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	24:49:29.436
692	9	4	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	24:49:27.273
632	11	22	Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.010		0:00:00.000	0:03:12.286
820	10	3	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	0:02:56.654
948	10	5	Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	0:00:52.335
316	9	3	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.220
Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
lsass	224	9	15	277	1060	0:00:00.370	0:00:00.550	25:14:28.121
			VM	WS	WS	Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page PageFile
			28292	1060	4864	2128	2425	35 27 2128
Tid	Pri	Cswtch	State		User Time		Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
232	11	19	Wait:Executive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:27.601
240	10	42	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.010	25:14:27.320
244	11	3	Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:27.310
256	9	5077	Wait:DelayExec		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:27.070
260	9	4208	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.010		0:00:00.000	25:14:26.970
272	10	5080	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.090		0:00:00.260	25:14:25.938
276	9	253	Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:25.918
288	9	340	Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:25.908
292	11	3	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:25.908
468	10	190	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.210		0:00:00.050	25:14:22.804
508	11	3	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:14:21.372
648	10	150	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.020		0:00:00.020	25:14:18.037
1000	11	3	Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:13:13.755
1052	13	3	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	25:13:13.094
616	9	18	Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.000	0:00:27.389
Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
svchost	384	8	8	242	3192	0:00:00.230	0:00:00.330	25:14:23.475
			VM	WS	WS	Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page PageFile
			20620	3192	3312	1220	2848	17 25 1220
Tid	Pri	Cswtch	State		User Time		Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
380	10	24	Wait:Executive		0:00:00.000		0:00:00.010	25:14:23.475
388	8	911	Wait:DelayExec		0:00:00.020		0:00:00.030	25:14:23.445
400	10	521	Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.060		0:00:00.090	25:14:23.315

372	9	5	Wait:UserReq	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:23.224
404	8	326	Wait:Queue	0:00:00.010	0:00:00.000	25:14:23.104
1112	8	1341	Wait:DelayExec	0:00:00.020	0:00:00.000	25:12:22.050
752	8	39	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	2:51:22.315
488	9	51	Wait:LpcReceive	0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	0:08:29.482

Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
spoolsv	412	8	11	147	3436	0:00:00.060	0:00:00.180	25:14:23.024
			VM		WS	WS Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page PageFile
			25248		3436	3460	2296	1253 693 22 2296
Tid Pri	Cswtch		State		User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time	
408 10	27		Wait:Executive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:14:23.024	
416 10	17		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:23.014	
420 8	306		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:23.014	
432 8	153		Wait:Executive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:23.014	
900 9	215		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.030	0:00:00.100	25:13:45.240	
428 10	4		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:45.210	
376 10	3		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:44.328	
904 8	1066		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.010	0:00:00.040	25:13:44.278	
908 10	2		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:44.278	
920 10	3		Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:44.208	
916 8	4		Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	0:00:53.296	

Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
svchost	444	8	30	396	6884	0:00:00.150	0:00:00.340	25:14:22.984
			VM		WS	WS Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page PageFile
			38336		6884	6964	2888	2183 62 38 2888
Tid Pri	Cswtch		State		User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time	
440 9	94		Wait:Executive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:14:22.984	
452 10	44		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:22.934	
464 10	576		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.010	0:00:00.040	25:14:22.804	
600 10	157		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:18.948	
612 8	3039		Wait:DelayExec		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:14:18.758	
624 10	22		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.010	0:00:00.010	25:14:18.488	
628 10	3		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:18.488	
296 10	18		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:55.134	
1016 9	8		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:28.756	
208 10	26		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:13:13.755	
1020 9	3030		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:13.604	
1036 9	658		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.010	0:00:00.000	25:13:13.604	
1044 10	201		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.050	25:13:13.594	
1048 10	36		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:13:13.594	
896 10	155		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:13:12.723	
1072 11	4		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:12.623	
1076 10	59		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:12.533	
1080 10	4		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:12.523	
1084 10	4		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:12.503	
1088 10	3		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:12.413	
1092 10	3		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:12.413	
1100 10	6		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:12.202	
1116 8	314		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:13:12.022	
636 9	555		Wait:DelayExec		0:00:00.020	0:00:00.040	24:43:08.829	
548 8	197		Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.010	0:00:00.010	24:25:40.622	
1024 8	65		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	0:03:20.288	
988 9	40		Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.010	0:00:00.000	0:03:20.217	
928 8	7		Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	0:03:20.107	
748 8	12		Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	0:00:53.216	
1164 8	2		Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.010	0:00:00.000	0:00:52.435	

Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
regsvcs	480	8	2	30	740	0:00:00.010	0:00:00.020	25:14:22.734
			VM		WS	WS Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page PageFile
			9664		740	748	240	188 9 7 240
Tid Pri	Cswtch		State		User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time	
476 10	29		Wait:Executive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.010	25:14:22.734	
500 8	307		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:22.383	

Name	Pid	Pri	Thd	Hnd	Mem	User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time
MSTask	496	8	6	143	3080	0:00:00.040	0:00:00.060	25:14:22.393
			VM		WS	WS Pk	Priv	Faults NonP Page PageFile
			25188		3080	3088	1008	852 14 25 1008
Tid Pri	Cswtch		State		User Time	Kernel Time	Elapsed Time	
492 10	43		Wait:Executive		0:00:00.020	0:00:00.010	25:14:22.393	
512 8	98		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.010	0:00:00.040	25:14:21.362	
528 10	3		Wait:LpcReceive		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:21.262	
532 10	3		Wait:UserReq		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:21.242	
536 8	307		Wait:Queue		0:00:00.000	0:00:00.000	25:14:21.222	

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540 10      1656      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:14:21.222

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd   Mem   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
stisvc    524  8   4   59  1444   0:00:00.030  0:00:00.040  25:14:21.312
           VM      WS   WS Pk   Priv   Faults NonP Page PageFile
           12616    1444   1456   432    364    2    15    432
Tid Pri   Cswtch      State   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
520 10      39      Wait:Executive  0:00:00.010  0:00:00.010  25:14:21.312
552 10       5      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:14:20.801
556 10      47      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:14:20.791
564 10       3      Wait:LpcReceive 0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:14:20.711

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd   Mem   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
WinMgmt   572  8   3   94   172   0:00:06.359  0:00:00.350  25:14:20.701
           VM      WS   WS Pk   Priv   Faults NonP Page PageFile
           19168    172   4496   672   5547    3    15    672
Tid Pri   Cswtch      State   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
568 10      57      Wait:Executive  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.020  25:14:20.701
580  8     137      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.020  25:14:19.579
596  9     246      Wait:LpcReceive 0:00:00.020  0:00:00.040  25:14:18.988

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd   Mem   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
mspmspsv  592  8   2   48  1340   0:00:00.020  0:00:00.020  25:14:19.509
           VM      WS   WS Pk   Priv   Faults NonP Page PageFile
           12184    1340   1340   412    334    2    13    412
Tid Pri   Cswtch      State   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
588 10      27      Wait:Executive  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.010  25:14:19.509
472 10      22      Wait:Executive  0:00:00.010  0:00:00.000  25:14:18.958

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd   Mem   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
Explorer  792  8  18  395 12200   0:00:12.087  0:00:24.945  25:13:58.439
           VM      WS   WS Pk   Priv   Faults NonP Page PageFile
           90308    12200  16096   9348 124429   22    65   9348
Tid Pri   Cswtch      State   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
788 10    648479      Wait:UserReq  0:00:02.914  0:00:07.891  25:13:58.439
800 11   205829      Wait:UserReq  0:00:02.483  0:00:05.347  25:13:57.638
804  8      498      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.030  0:00:00.030  25:13:56.977
696  8       3      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:13:55.214
828  8     3031      Wait:DelayExec 0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:13:53.241
832 10   103978      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.090  0:00:00.751  25:13:53.041
836  8     5652      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.070  0:00:00.370  25:13:52.831
856 15       2      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:13:52.440
1140  8     365      Wait:Queue  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:13:11.431
620 10   32866      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  22:49:16.505
1132  8    2795      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.030  0:00:00.050  22:49:16.505
676  8      31      Wait:LpcReceive 0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  0:19:36.411
868  8      25      Wait:LpcReceive 0:00:00.000  0:00:00.010  0:13:35.412
448  8      23      Wait:DelayExec 0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  0:08:29.472
808  8      37      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  0:08:28.371
1068  8     118      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.010  0:00:00.010  0:05:09.394
300  9       3      Wait:LpcReceive 0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  0:03:20.097
700 10    1148      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.150  0:00:00.330  0:01:43.188

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd   Mem   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
popupkiller 852  8   2   97  6236   0:00:09.733  0:00:01.011  25:13:52.620
           VM      WS   WS Pk   Priv   Faults NonP Page PageFile
           50620    6236   6236   2540   1745    5    31   2540
Tid Pri   Cswtch      State   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
848 10   3677634      Wait:UserReq  0:00:09.723  0:00:01.001  25:13:52.620
1060  8       2      Wait:LpcReceive 0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:07:47.535

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd   Mem   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
qttask    864  8   5  170  4248   0:00:00.650  0:00:00.220  25:13:52.420
           VM      WS   WS Pk   Priv   Faults NonP Page PageFile
           109364    4248   4248   2332   1267    4    92   2332
Tid Pri   Cswtch      State   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
860 10      523      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.640  0:00:00.190  25:13:52.420
844 11       2      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:13:49.606
888 12       2      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:13:45.730
892 11       2      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:13:45.730
912  9       3      Wait:UserReq  0:00:00.000  0:00:00.000  25:13:43.077

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd   Mem   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time
SETI@home 880  4   3  132 13608  24:38:30.619  0:03:10.073  25:13:52.120
           VM      WS   WS Pk   Priv   Faults NonP Page PageFile
           54120    13608  17036  16104 11681535    4    33   16104
Tid Pri   Cswtch      State   User Time   Kernel Time   Elapsed Time

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876 6 5309641 Wait:UserReq 0:00:01.902 0:00:11.105 25:13:52.120
840 4 7 Wait:UserReq 0:00:00.000 0:00:00.000 25:13:48.895
824 2 13485635 Ready 24:38:28.636 0:02:58.857 24:49:09.828

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd  Mem  User Time  Kernel Time  Elapsed Time
fire      936 8 4 129 1360 0:00:00.090 0:00:00.170 0:03:45.163
          VM      WS  WS Pk  Priv  Faults NonP Page PageFile
          61176 1360 6248 1724 1989 6 44 1724
Tid Pri  Cswtch      State  User Time  Kernel Time  Elapsed Time
1096 10 980 Wait:UserReq 0:00:00.080 0:00:00.160 0:03:45.163
960 8 1 Wait:LpcReceive 0:00:00.000 0:00:00.000 0:03:44.883
424 9 94 Wait:UserReq 0:00:00.000 0:00:00.000 0:03:44.683
652 8 8 Wait:UserReq 0:00:00.000 0:00:00.010 0:03:44.653

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd  Mem  User Time  Kernel Time  Elapsed Time
CMD      1172 8 1 24 820 0:00:00.060 0:00:00.410 0:01:02.089
          VM      WS  WS Pk  Priv  Faults NonP Page PageFile
          11300 820 824 256 219 1 13 256
Tid Pri  Cswtch      State  User Time  Kernel Time  Elapsed Time
884 10 3345 Wait:UserReq 0:00:00.050 0:00:00.410 0:01:02.059

Name      Pid Pri Thd  Hnd  Mem  User Time  Kernel Time  Elapsed Time
PSLIST   1156 8 2 71 1160 0:00:00.020 0:00:00.040 0:00:00.160
          VM      WS  WS Pk  Priv  Faults NonP Page PageFile
          14416 1160 1160 532 289 2 13 532
Tid Pri  Cswtch      State  User Time  Kernel Time  Elapsed Time
740 14 77 Running 0:00:00.010 0:00:00.040 0:00:00.160
1168 8 0 Ready 0:00:00.000 0:00:00.000 0:00:00.000

```

-----  
NBTSTAT  
-----

Local Area Connection:  
Node IpAddress: [0.0.0.0] Scope Id: []

No names in cache

-----  
HIDDEN FILES (dir /s /a:h /t:a c: d:)  
-----

Volume in drive C is ATRYP00ABK  
Volume Serial Number is 2A69-1EE3

Directory of C:\

```

03/13/2000 12:00a      214,836 IO.SYS
05/10/2000 12:00a      1,553 MSDOS.SYS
08/05/2002 12:00a      93,812 COMMAND.COM
03/13/2000 12:00a      <DIR>      PARATool
10/27/2000 12:00a      0 BOOTLOG.TXT
05/02/2003 12:00a      84 AUTOEXEC.BAT
05/10/2000 12:00a      810 BOOTLOG.PRV
04/30/2001 12:00a      1 CONFIG.SYS
03/13/2000 12:00a      512 BOOTSECT.DOS
03/25/2002 12:00a      214,432 ntldr
03/25/2002 12:00a      34,468 NTDETECT.COM
08/08/2002 12:00a      206 BOOT.INI
05/01/2003 12:00a      201,326,592 pagefile.sys
05/10/2000 12:00a      <DIR>      Recycled
          12 File(s)      201,887,306 bytes

```

Directory of C:\WINNT

```

05/10/2000 12:00a      <DIR>      inf
03/13/2000 12:00a      24,076 winnt.bmp
03/13/2000 12:00a      48,540 winnt256.bmp
03/25/2003 12:00a      21,692 folder.htt
03/25/2003 12:00a      271 desktop.ini
03/14/2000 12:00a      <DIR>      CSC
05/10/2000 12:00a      <DIR>      Installer

```

```

05/01/2003  12:00a          930,172 ShellIconCache
10/24/2001  12:00a      <DIR>          msdownld.tmp
05/01/2003  12:00a          54,156 QTFont.qfn
03/25/2002  12:00a      <DIR>          $NtServicePackUninstall$
07/01/2002  12:00a      <DIR>          PIF
03/25/2002  12:00a      <DIR>          $NtUninstallQ280838$
03/25/2002  12:00a      <DIR>          $NtUninstallQ259728$
03/25/2002  12:00a      <DIR>          $NtUninstallQ253934$
          6 File(s)          1,078,907 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\system32

```

03/13/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          dllcache
04/30/2001  12:00a          21,692 folder.htt
10/25/2001  12:00a          271 desktop.ini
03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          GroupPolicy
          2 File(s)          21,963 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\system32\config

```

03/13/2000  12:00a          1,024 system.LOG
05/02/2003  12:00a          1,024 software.LOG
05/01/2003  12:00a          1,024 default.LOG
03/13/2000  12:00a          1,024 userdiff.LOG
03/13/2000  12:00a           0 TempKey.LOG
05/01/2003  12:00a          1,024 SECURITY.LOG
05/02/2003  12:00a          1,024 SAM.LOG
          7 File(s)          6,144 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\system32\dllcache

```

05/01/2003  12:00a          626,960 oleaut32.dll
05/01/2003  12:00a          143,632 asycfilt.dll
05/01/2003  12:00a          16,896 stdole2.tlb
03/25/2002  12:00a          1,411,344 query.dll.tmp
03/25/2002  12:00a          42,768 webhits.dll.tmp
03/25/2002  12:00a          121,104 idq.dll.tmp
03/25/2002  12:00a          164,112 olepro32.dll.tmp
          7 File(s)          2,526,816 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\system32\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-18\User

```

02/14/2002  12:00a          336 0541ff9c-2a66-4420-bb86-a633f52274a1
02/14/2002  12:00a          24 Preferred
          2 File(s)          360 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\repair

```

03/14/2000  12:00a          122,880 ntuser.dat
          1 File(s)          122,880 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\inf

```

03/25/2002  12:00a           0 oem6.inf
03/25/2002  12:00a           0 oem7.inf
          2 File(s)           0 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\Fonts

```

03/13/2000  12:00a          36,672 app850.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          6,352 cga40850.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          4,320 cga80850.fon
05/02/2003  12:00a           67 desktop.ini
05/02/2003  12:00a          36,656 dosapp.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          8,384 ega40850.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          5,328 ega80850.fon
05/01/2003  12:00a          24,480 marlett.ttf
05/01/2003  12:00a          26,112 smalle.fon
05/01/2003  12:00a          56,336 symbole.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          5,232 vga850.fon
05/01/2003  12:00a          5,360 vgafix.fon
05/02/2003  12:00a          5,168 vgaoem.fon
05/02/2003  12:00a          7,280 vgasys.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          10,976 8514fix.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          12,288 8514oem.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          9,280 8514sys.fon
03/13/2000  12:00a          21,504 smallif.fon

```

```

03/13/2000 12:00a      5,184 vga860.fon
03/13/2000 12:00a      5,200 vga863.fon
03/13/2000 12:00a      5,184 vga865.fon
                21 File(s)      297,363 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\Web

```

04/09/2003 12:00a      1,316 webview.css
04/09/2003 12:00a      4,659 controlp.htm
11/06/2002 12:00a      5,296 default.htm
05/02/2003 12:00a      3,210 folder.htm
11/27/2002 12:00a     13,280 nethood.htm
07/23/2001 12:00a     13,798 printers.htm
11/06/2002 12:00a     11,149 recycle.htm
03/14/2000 12:00a      6,489 schedule.htm
08/05/2002 12:00a      8,898 dialup.htm
05/01/2003 12:00a      8,248 wvleft.bmp
05/01/2003 12:00a        54 wvline.gif
03/25/2003 12:00a     14,865 wvlogo.gif
08/07/2002 12:00a     90,056 classic.bmp
08/07/2002 12:00a      634 classic.htm
08/07/2002 12:00a     31,080 folder.bmp
03/14/2000 12:00a      1,024 starter.htm
03/14/2000 12:00a     31,080 starter.bmp
03/14/2000 12:00a     31,080 preview.bmp
08/14/2002 12:00a     16,981 imgview.htm
05/01/2003 12:00a      830 deskmovr.htm
03/14/2000 12:00a      2,913 safemode.htm
05/02/2003 12:00a     19,355 fsresult.htm
08/07/2002 12:00a     28,565 standard.htm
11/06/2002 12:00a     31,438 webview.js
11/27/2002 12:00a     12,403 wvnet.gif
03/14/2000 12:00a      2,642 exclam.gif
03/14/2000 12:00a      842 bullet.gif
03/14/2000 12:00a       80 plushot.gif
03/14/2000 12:00a       59 pluscold.gif
03/14/2000 12:00a       77 minhot.gif
03/14/2000 12:00a       56 mincold.gif
04/29/2002 12:00a     11,083 ftp.htm
                32 File(s)     403,540 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\Temp

```

10/23/2001 12:00a      6,336 OLD12.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a      4,304 OLD14.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a     23,408 OLD16.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a     31,712 OLD18.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a      8,368 OLD1A.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a      5,312 OLD1C.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a     57,936 OLD25.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a     81,728 OLD27.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a     64,656 OLD29.tmp
10/23/2001 12:00a     89,856 OLD2B.tmp
                10 File(s)     373,616 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\Tasks

```

05/02/2003 12:00a      65 desktop.ini
05/01/2003 12:00a       6 SA.DAT
05/02/2003 12:00a     396 {842CA231-A137-4998-B7F8-
4F7D9C2CA493}_HP1_Administrator.job
                3 File(s)      467 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\Downloaded Program Files

```

05/02/2003 12:00a      65 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)      65 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\WINNT\Offline Web Pages

```

05/02/2003 12:00a      65 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)      65 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings

```

03/13/2000 12:00a      <DIR>      Default User
                0 File(s)      0 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User

```

03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        Application Data
03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        NetHood
03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        PrintHood
03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        Recent
03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        SendTo
03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        Templates
03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        Local Settings
05/10/2000  12:00a                122,880 NTUSER.DAT
05/10/2000  12:00a                1,024 NTUSER.DAT.LOG
                2 File(s)        123,904 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\My Documents\My Pictures

```

05/02/2003  12:00a                438 Desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        438 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings

```

03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        Application Data
                0 File(s)        0 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files

```

05/02/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        67 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5

```

05/02/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        67 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\UP88TB8V

```

05/02/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        67 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\DEIPPZXX

```

05/02/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        67 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\NUGVFTZQ

```

05/02/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        67 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\3WL0TNHB

```

05/02/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        67 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings\History

```

05/02/2003  12:00a                113 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        113 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\Local Settings\History\History.IE5

```

06/27/2002  12:00a                113 desktop.ini
                1 File(s)        113 bytes

```

## Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\All Users

```

03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        Application Data
03/13/2000  12:00a    <DIR>        Templates
09/21/2001  12:00a    <DIR>        DRM
05/10/2000  12:00a                1,024 NTUSER.DAT.LOG

```



```

05/10/2000  12:00a                2,370 ntuser.pol
              2 File(s)                3,394 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows
NT\MSFax

03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          faxreceive
03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          queue
              0 File(s)                0 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents

03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          My Faxes
              0 File(s)                0 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM

09/21/2001  12:00a                1,536 drmv2.lic
09/21/2001  12:00a                1,536 drmv2.sst
              2 File(s)                3,072 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator

05/02/2003  12:00a          1,048,576 NTUSER.DAT
04/22/2002  12:00a      <DIR>          Local Settings
03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          Templates
03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          SendTo
03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          Recent
03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          PrintHood
03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          NetHood
03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          Application Data
05/02/2003  12:00a                1,024 ntuser.dat.LOG
05/01/2003  12:00a                180 ntuser.ini
              3 File(s)          1,049,780 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings

03/14/2000  12:00a      <DIR>          Application Data
              0 File(s)                0 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\History

05/02/2003  12:00a                113 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)                113 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local
Settings\History\History.IE5

03/14/2000  12:00a                113 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)                113 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary
Internet Files

04/08/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)                67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary
Internet Files\Content.IE5

04/08/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)                67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary
Internet Files\Content.IE5\WXUROD2J

08/21/2002  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)                67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary
Internet Files\Content.IE5\GHCT0ZW1

01/30/2003  12:00a                67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)                67 bytes

```

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\OH274X2Z

06/27/2002 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\4PA3OXIF

06/27/2002 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\C5IRGPUR

06/27/2002 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\65GRGJW9

04/08/2003 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\WD2R05UN

01/13/2003 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\KXA30TAJ

03/13/2003 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\2484M309

06/27/2002 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\8LQ34PE3

06/27/2002 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\GPYJ01AB

06/27/2002 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\MRIRUNY9

06/27/2002 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\XWS3LHK5

03/17/2003 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\6HH2NMTO

03/17/2003 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\XRVFHTSE

03/17/2003 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\O7TZEABX

03/17/2003 12:00a 67 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows

05/01/2003 12:00a 8,192 UsrClass.dat  
03/14/2000 12:00a 1,024 UsrClass.dat.LOG  
2 File(s) 9,216 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Recent

05/02/2003 12:00a 122 Desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 122 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\My Pictures

05/02/2003 12:00a 438 Desktop.ini  
05/11/2000 12:00a 7,168 Thumbs.db  
2 File(s) 7,606 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Favorites

05/02/2003 12:00a 83 Desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 83 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Microsoft\Internet Explorer

05/01/2003 12:00a 2,526 Desktop.htt  
1 File(s) 2,526 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-1078081533-842925246-1708537768-500

03/14/2000 12:00a 456 481efaca-4e99-45bc-b796-eedaf04d1038  
03/14/2000 12:00a 24 Preferred  
2 File(s) 480 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-940727086-1440894624-411895618-500

05/10/2000 12:00a 456 4e0140b6-4ff7-466b-aaf1-8c5371e69970  
05/02/2003 12:00a 24 Preferred  
04/22/2002 12:00a 456 0c4a33a8-e733-4b23-956b-292238d853e7  
05/02/2003 12:00a 456 ccb97d40-4e29-4d15-b3d1-9e032b11375d  
4 File(s) 1,392 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman

04/29/2002 12:00a 229,376 NTUSER.DAT  
04/29/2002 12:00a 1,024 NTUSER.DAT.LOG  
04/29/2002 12:00a <DIR> Local Settings  
04/29/2002 12:00a <DIR> Templates  
04/29/2002 12:00a <DIR> SendTo  
04/29/2002 12:00a <DIR> Recent  
04/29/2002 12:00a <DIR> PrintHood  
04/29/2002 12:00a <DIR> NetHood  
04/29/2002 12:00a <DIR> Application Data  
08/05/2002 12:00a 180 ntuser.ini  
3 File(s) 230,580 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings

04/29/2002 12:00a <DIR> Application Data  
0 File(s) 0 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\History

05/02/2003 12:00a 113 desktop.ini  
1 File(s) 113 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\History\History.IE5

```

06/27/2002  12:00a          113 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          113 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files

05/02/2003  12:00a          67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\Temporary Internet
Files\Content.IE5

05/02/2003  12:00a          67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\Temporary Internet
Files\Content.IE5\3WL0TNHB

05/02/2003  12:00a          67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\Temporary Internet
Files\Content.IE5\NUGVFTZQ

05/02/2003  12:00a          67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\Temporary Internet
Files\Content.IE5\DEIPPZXX

05/02/2003  12:00a          67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\Temporary Internet
Files\Content.IE5\UP88TB8V

05/02/2003  12:00a          67 desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          67 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Local Settings\Application
Data\Microsoft\Windows

04/29/2002  12:00a          8,192 UsrClass.dat
04/29/2002  12:00a          1,024 UsrClass.dat.LOG
              2 File(s)          9,216 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Recent

05/02/2003  12:00a          122 Desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          122 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\My Documents\My Pictures

05/02/2003  12:00a          438 Desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          438 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Favorites

05/02/2003  12:00a          83 Desktop.ini
              1 File(s)          83 bytes

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\fooman\Application Data\Microsoft\Internet
Explorer

04/29/2002  12:00a          2,656 Desktop.htm
              1 File(s)          2,656 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files

01/30/2003  12:00a          21,952 folder.htm
05/02/2003  12:00a           271 desktop.ini
03/14/2000  12:00a          <DIR>          InstallShield Installation Information
10/24/2001  12:00a          <DIR>          Uninstall Information
              2 File(s)          22,223 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Folders

```

```

05/10/2000  12:00a          7,994 PUBPLACE.HTT
              1 File(s)          7,994 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer

10/24/2001  12:00a      <DIR>          Backup Data
10/24/2001  12:00a      <DIR>          Uninstall Information
              0 File(s)          0 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\Backup Data

04/29/2002  12:00a          17,158,756 IE5BAK.DAT
04/29/2002  12:00a          11,128 IE5BAK.INI
              2 File(s)          17,169,884 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\Uninstall Information

04/29/2002  12:00a          17,403 IEEX.DAT
04/29/2002  12:00a          431 IEEX.INI
04/29/2002  12:00a          27,207 IEREADME.DAT
04/29/2002  12:00a          359 IEREADME.INI
              4 File(s)          45,400 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files\Thumbs4

04/23/2001  12:00a          10,860 THUMBS4.GID
              1 File(s)          10,860 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files\Uninstall Information

10/24/2001  12:00a      <DIR>          OutlookExpress
04/29/2002  12:00a      <DIR>          IE UserData NT
              0 File(s)          0 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files\Uninstall Information\OutlookExpress

04/29/2002  12:00a          4,797,900 OutlookExpress.DAT
04/29/2002  12:00a          8,535 OutlookExpress.INI
              2 File(s)          4,806,435 bytes

Directory of C:\Program Files\Uninstall Information\IE UserData NT

04/29/2002  12:00a          346 IE UserData NT.DAT
04/29/2002  12:00a          329 IE UserData NT.INI
              2 File(s)          675 bytes

Directory of C:\Recycled

05/02/2003  12:00a          65 desktop.ini
04/14/2003  12:00a          20 INFO2
              2 File(s)          85 bytes

Total Files Listed:
      191 File(s)      230,230,844 bytes
       50 Dir(s)      5,544,497,152 bytes free

-----
MD5SUM
-----
-----
AT scheduler list
There are no entries in the list.
-----
END TIME
-----
11:51a
Fri 05/02/2003

```

## Appendix I

### Netsetup.Log (Sanitized)

```

03/14 00:00:53 -----
03/14 00:00:53 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
03/14 00:00:53 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse: for 'WORKGROUP' returned: 0x858
03/14 00:00:53 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x858
03/14 00:00:53 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
03/14 00:00:53 -----
03/14 00:00:53 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
03/14 00:00:53 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse: for 'WORKGROUP' returned: 0x858
03/14 00:00:53 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x858
03/14 00:00:53 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
03/14 00:00:54 -----
03/14 00:00:54 NetpDoDomainJoin
03/14 00:00:54 NetpMachineValidToJoin: 'HP-6DDLKBKHD7P4T'
03/14 00:00:54 NetpGetLsaPrimaryDomain: status: 0x0
03/14 00:00:54 NetpMachineValidToJoin: status: 0x0
03/14 00:00:54 NetpJoinWorkgroup: joining computer 'HP-6DDLKBKXXXXX' to workgroup
'WORKGROUP'
03/14 00:00:54 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
03/14 00:00:54 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse: for 'WORKGROUP' returned: 0x858
03/14 00:00:54 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x858
03/14 00:00:54 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
03/14 00:00:54 NetpSetLsaPrimaryDomain: for 'WORKGROUP' status: 0x0
03/14 00:00:54 NetpControlServices: open service 'NETLOGON' failed: 0x424
03/14 00:00:54 NetpJoinWorkgroup: status: 0x0
03/14 00:00:54 NetpDoDomainJoin: status: 0x0
03/14 00:01:39 -----
03/14 00:01:39 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'HP-6DDLKBKXXXXX' is valid as type
1 name
03/14 00:01:51 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'HP-6DDLKBKXXXXX' [MACHINE] returned
0x0
03/14 00:01:51 NetpValidateName: name 'HP-6DDLKBKXXXXX' is valid for type 1
03/14 00:01:51 -----
03/14 00:01:51 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
03/14 00:01:51 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
03/14 00:01:51 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
03/14 00:01:51 -----
03/14 00:01:51 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
03/14 00:01:51 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
03/14 00:01:51 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
03/14 00:01:51 -----
03/14 00:01:51 NetpDoDomainJoin
03/14 00:01:51 NetpMachineValidToJoin: 'HP-6DDLKBKXXXXX'
03/14 00:01:51 NetpGetLsaPrimaryDomain: status: 0x0
03/14 00:01:51 NetpMachineValidToJoin: status: 0x0
03/14 00:01:51 NetpJoinWorkgroup: joining computer 'HP-6DDLKBKXXXXX' to workgroup
'WORKGROUP'
03/14 00:01:51 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
03/14 00:01:51 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
03/14 00:01:51 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
03/14 00:01:51 NetpSetLsaPrimaryDomain: for 'WORKGROUP' status: 0x0
03/14 00:01:51 NetpJoinWorkgroup: status: 0x0
03/14 00:01:51 NetpDoDomainJoin: status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:02 -----
05/10 13:46:02 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
05/10 13:46:02 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
05/10 13:46:02 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2

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05/10 13:46:02 -----
05/10 13:46:02 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
05/10 13:46:02 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
05/10 13:46:02 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
05/10 13:46:02 -----
05/10 13:46:02 NetpDoDomainJoin
05/10 13:46:02 NetpMachineValidToJoin: 'EVECTRA01'
05/10 13:46:02 NetpGetLsaPrimaryDomain: status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:02 NetpMachineValidToJoin: status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:02 NetpJoinWorkgroup: joining computer 'EVECTRA01' to workgroup
'WORKGROUP'
05/10 13:46:02 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
05/10 13:46:02 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
05/10 13:46:02 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
05/10 13:46:02 NetpSetLsaPrimaryDomain: for 'WORKGROUP' status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:02 NetpJoinWorkgroup: status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:02 NetpDoDomainJoin: status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 -----
05/10 13:46:03 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'EVECTRA01' is valid as type 1
name
05/10 13:46:03 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'EVECTRA01' [MACHINE] returned 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 NetpValidateName: name 'EVECTRA01' is valid for type 1
05/10 13:46:03 -----
05/10 13:46:03 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
05/10 13:46:03 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
05/10 13:46:03 -----
05/10 13:46:03 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
05/10 13:46:03 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
05/10 13:46:03 -----
05/10 13:46:03 NetpDoDomainJoin
05/10 13:46:03 NetpMachineValidToJoin: 'EVECTRA01'
05/10 13:46:03 NetpGetLsaPrimaryDomain: status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 NetpMachineValidToJoin: status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 NetpJoinWorkgroup: joining computer 'EVECTRA01' to workgroup
'WORKGROUP'
05/10 13:46:03 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
05/10 13:46:03 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
05/10 13:46:03 NetpSetLsaPrimaryDomain: for 'WORKGROUP' status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 NetpJoinWorkgroup: status: 0x0
05/10 13:46:03 NetpDoDomainJoin: status: 0x0
11/22 14:21:40 -----
11/22 14:21:40 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'HP1' is valid as type 1 name
11/22 14:21:47 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'HP1' [MACHINE] returned 0x0
11/22 14:21:47 NetpValidateName: name 'HP1' is valid for type 1
11/22 14:21:47 -----
11/22 14:21:47 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'hp1.' is valid as type 5 name
11/22 14:21:47 NetpValidateName: name 'hp1.' is valid for type 5
11/22 14:24:48 -----
11/22 14:24:48 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
11/22 14:24:48 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
11/22 14:24:48 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2
11/22 14:24:48 -----
11/22 14:24:48 NetpDoDomainJoin
11/22 14:24:48 NetpMachineValidToJoin: 'HP1'
11/22 14:24:48 NetpGetLsaPrimaryDomain: status: 0x0
11/22 14:24:48 NetpMachineValidToJoin: status: 0x0
11/22 14:24:48 NetpJoinWorkgroup: joining computer 'HP1' to workgroup 'WORKGROUP'
11/22 14:24:48 NetpValidateName: checking to see if 'WORKGROUP' is valid as type 2
name
11/22 14:24:48 NetpCheckNetBiosNameNotInUse for 'WORKGROUP' [ Workgroup as MACHINE]
returned 0x0
11/22 14:24:48 NetpValidateName: name 'WORKGROUP' is valid for type 2

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```
11/22 14:24:48 NetpSetLsaPrimaryDomain: for 'WORKGROUP' status: 0x0  
11/22 14:24:48 NetpJoinWorkgroup: status: 0x0  
11/22 14:24:48 NetpDoDomainJoin: status: 0x0
```

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## Appendix J

### Forensics (Hostname) Fstab File Showing The Partition Configured To Mount In Read Only Mode.

```

LABEL=/                                /                                ext3      defaults        1 1
none                                  /dev/pts                        devpts    gid=5,mode=620   0 0
none                                  /proc                          proc      defaults         0 0
none                                  /dev/shm                       tmpfs     defaults         0 0
/dev/hda3                             swap                           swap      defaults         0 0
/dev/cdrom                             /mnt/cdrom                     udf,iso9660 noauto,owner,kudzu,ro 0 0
/dev/hdd2                             /mnt/ext                       ext2      ro               0 0
/dev/hdd3                             /forensics                     ext2      defaults        0 0
/dev/fd0                               /mnt/floppy                    auto      noauto,owner,kudzu 0 0
/dev/hdb4                             /mnt/zip                       auto      noauto,owner,kudzu 0 0

```