

Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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*** Northcutt, good work, solid process, shows what is possible with a firewall. 76 *

Practical for GIAC Certified Intrusion Analyst Certification

By Jeff Towry

April 21, 2000

Detect 1 –

| Apr 17 6560 | 17:18:46 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |
|-------------|----------|-----|-------------|-------|------------|
| Apr 17 6563 | 17:18:46 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |
| | 17:18:46 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |
| Apr 17 6565 | 17:18:46 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |
| Apr 17 6566 | 17:18:46 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |
| | 17:18:46 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |
| Apr 17 6560 | 17:18:59 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |
| | 17:18:59 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |
| | 17:18:59 | tcp | afiaibt.com | https | p.q.50.251 |

<u>Active Targeting</u> – Yes, these packets are being sent to the outside address of our firewall

<u>Intent</u> - 216.61.102.52 ARC Information Assurance Institute is doing a port scan on this address.

<u>Technique</u> This attack seems to be script driven since the time between the packets is very small and the destination ports are wrapping and starting over. My first thought was someone went to a server that is constantly updating the browser screen with new information. The only thing odd about this is the fact that the destination port is wrapping and normally this increments continuously. So this may be a DOS attack against the firewall since it is targeting the outside interface of it.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were not getting through the firewall. If it continues then we will add this address to the access list on the outside router to keep the workload of processing the packet and logging it off the firewall.

Detect 2 –

Apr 12 04:43:24 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:24 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.1 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp Apr 12 04:43:25 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:25 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.1 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp Apr 12 04:43:27 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:27 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.1 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp Apr 12 04:43:33 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:33 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.2 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp Apr 12 04:43:34 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:34 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.2 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp Apr 12 04:43:36 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:36 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.2 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp Apr 12 04:43:42 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:42 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.3 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp Apr 12 04:43:44 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:44 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.3 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp Apr 12 04:43:45 buster1 BUSTED: 04:43:45 207.214.144.126 64558 adsl-207-214-144-126.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net p.q.60.3 137 No DNS Name No Flags netbios-ns udp

<u>Active Targeting</u> – Yes, these packets are being sent to an internal subnet behind the firewall..

Intent – To detect Windows based systems on this subnet.

<u>Technique</u> – This appears to be a Null scan of an internal subnet. The packets come in groups of 3 from the same source port of 64558 with no flags set. The only port it probes is 137 which is the Netbios name service.

<u>History</u> – No other activity was seen over the day. This is coming from a ISP customer The Source Group in San Francisco.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were not getting through the outside router. The outside router blocks all udp below 1023 coming in. A check of the firewall logs for the same time period showed no activity from this address.

Detect 3 –

Apr 12 00:04:05 buster1 BUSTED: 00:03:54 202.154.4.145 2991 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 80 No_DNS_Name S www-http tcp Apr 12 00:04:05 buster1 BUSTED: 00:03:57 202.154.4.145 2991 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 80 No_DNS_Name S www-http tcp

Apr 12 00:04:05 buster1 BUSTED: 00:04:03 202.154.4.145 2991 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 80 No DNS Name S www-http tcp

Apr 12 00:04:15 buster1 BUSTED: 00:04:15 202.154.4.145 2991 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 80 No_DNS_Name S www-http tcp

Apr 12 00:04:39 buster1 BUSTED: 00:04:39 202.154.4.145 3027 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 8080 No DNS Name S 8080 tcp

Apr 12 00:04:42 buster1 BUSTED: 00:04:42 202.154.4.145 3027 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 8080 No DNS Name S 8080 tcp

Apr 12 00:04:48 buster1 BUSTED: 00:04:48 202.154.4.145 3027 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 8080 No DNS Name S 8080 tcp

Apr 12 00:05:00 buster1 BUSTED: 00:05:00 202.154.4.145 3027 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 8080 No DNS Name S 8080 tcp

Apr 12 00:05:24 buster1 BUSTED: 00:05:24 202.154.4.145 3071 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 3128 No_DNS_Name S 3128 tcp

Apr 12 00:05:27 buster1 BUSTED: 00:05:27 202.154.4.145 3071 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 3128 No_DNS_Name S 3128 tcp

Apr 12 00:05:33 buster1 BUSTED: 00:05:33 202.154.4.145 3071 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 3128 No DNS Name S 3128 tcp

Apr 12 00:05:45 buster1 BUSTED: 00:05:45 202.154.4.145 3071 No_DNS_Name p.q.237.99 3128 No_DNS_Name S 3128 tcp

<u>Active Targeting</u> – Yes, these packets are being sent to an address behind the firewall.

<u>Intent</u> – This PC's have been infected with the Ring 0 trojan and are looking for the existence of proxy servers.

Technique – This is the standard Ring 0 probe looking on ports 80, 8080, 3128.

<u>History</u> – We see this all day long from different networks to multiple addresses.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were not getting through the outside router. .

Detect 4 –

Apr 7 06:45:51 buster1 BUSTED: 06:44:31 171.209.75.173 1843 No_DNS_Name p.q.50.1 53 ns1.my.dom S domain tcp

Apr 7 06:47:11 buster1 BUSTED: 06:44:34 171.209.75.173 1843 No_DNS_Name p.q.50.1 53 ns1.my.dom S domain tcp

Apr 7 06:50:14 buster1 BUSTED: 06:48:53 171.209.75.173 2466 No_DNS_Name p.q.50.2 53 ns2.my.dom S domain tcp

Apr 7 06:51:34 buster1 BUSTED: 06:48:56 171.209.75.173 2466 No_DNS_Name p.q.50.2 53 ns2.my.dom S domain tcp

Apr 7 06:52:54 buster1 BUSTED: 06:50:14 171.209.75.173 2647 No_DNS_Name p.q.50.1 53 ns1.my.dom S domain tcp

Apr 7 06:58:51 buster1 BUSTED: 06:57:31 171.209.75.173 3762 No_DNS_Name p.q.50.1 53 ns1.my.dom S domain tcp

Apr 7 07:00:13 buster1 BUSTED: 06:58:53 171.209.75.173 3950 No_DNS_Name p.q.50.1 53 ns1.my.dom S domain tcp

Apr 7 07:01:33 buster1 BUSTED: 06:58:56 171.209.75.173 3950 No_DNS_Name p.q.50.1 53 ns1.my.dom S domain tcp

Active Targeting – Yes.

<u>Intent</u> – Trying to pull zones.

Technique – Trying to initiate a zone transfer every 1-2 minutes.

<u>History</u> – These addresses mapped to the AOL domain. So these are probably just dialup users.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were not getting through outside router. The router is setup to only allow from our secondaries.

Detect 5 -

Apr 12 08:05:16 buster1 BUSTED: 08:05:16 156.46.8.135 1348 mars.capital-internet.net p.q.50.251 113 host.my.dom S auth tcp
Apr 12 08:05:19 buster1 BUSTED: 08:05:19 156.46.8.135 1348 mars.capital-internet.net p.q.50.251 113 host.my.dom S auth tcp
Apr 12 08:05:25 buster1 BUSTED: 08:05:25 156.46.8.135 1348 mars.capital-internet.net p.q.50.251 113 host.my.dom S auth tcp

Active Targeting – Yes.

<u>Intent</u> – This series of packets was doing a scan to see if port 113 was open on the firewall.

Technique – This appears to be automated with a backoff timer that doubles.

<u>History</u> – No other activity was seen over the day. This is coming from a ISP customer in Milwaukee, WI.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were not getting through the router.

Detect 6 –

Mar 31 18:52:28 buster1 BUSTED: 18:52:19 24.16.51.74 No_Src_Port c1054142-a.smateo1.sfba.home.com 131.63.0.3 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo Request ping

Mar 31 18:52:28 buster1 BUSTED: 18:52:19 24.16.51.74 No_Src_Port c1054142-a.smateo1.sfba.home.com 131.63.0.4 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo Request ping

Mar 31 18:52:28 buster1 BUSTED: 18:52:19 24.16.51.74 No_Src_Port c1054142-a.smateo1.sfba.home.com 131.63.0.5 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo_Request ping

Mar 31 18:52:28 buster1 BUSTED: 18:52:19 24.16.51.74 No_Src_Port c1054142-a.smateo1.sfba.home.com 131.63.1.3 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo Request ping

Mar 31 18:52:28 buster1 BUSTED: 18:52:19 24.16.51.74 No_Src_Port c1054142-a.smateo1.sfba.home.com 131.63.1.4 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo Request ping

Mar 31 18:52:28 buster1 BUSTED: 18:52:19 24.16.51.74 No_Src_Port c1054142-a.smateo1.sfba.home.com 131.63.1.5 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo_Request ping

Active Targeting – Yes.

<u>Intent</u> – This host appears to be trying to determine which hosts are alive on our network.

<u>Technique</u> – Fast ping probe.

<u>History</u> – More activity was seen over the next few days. The activity ceased finally with no other traffic from this network coming to ours.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were not getting through the router and we silently discard them.

Detect 7 –

Apr 12 18:06:53 buster1 BUSTED: 18:06:32 193.216.116.247 No_Src_Port mp-116-247.daxnet.no p.q.0.255 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo_Request ping Apr 12 18:06:53 buster1 BUSTED: 18:06:32 193.216.116.247 No_Src_Port mp-116-247.daxnet.no p.q.255.0 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo_Request ping Apr 12 18:06:53 buster1 BUSTED: 18:06:32 193.216.116.247 No_Src_Port mp-116-247.daxnet.no p.q.255.255 No_Dst_Port No_DNS_Name No_Flags Echo_Request ping

Active Targeting – Yes.

Intent – Network mapping but to the broadcast addresses on our networks.

Technique – Fast ping probe to the broadcast addresses.

<u>History</u> – No other activity was seen over the day from this network address space.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were not getting through the router and we silently discard them.

Detect 8 -

Apr 12 07:56:19 buster1 BUSTED: 07:56:18 206.137.100.2 21130 netva01.wangfed.com p.q.139.27 1601 No_DNS_Name S 1601 tcp Apr 12 08:10:52 buster1 BUSTED: 08:10:52 206.137.100.2 25956 netva01.wangfed.com p.q.139.27 1601 No_DNS_Name S 1601 tcp Apr 12 08:21:51 buster1 BUSTED: 08:21:51 206.137.100.2 30193 netva01.wangfed.com p.q.139.27 1601 No_DNS_Name S 1601 tcp

Active Targeting – Yes.

Intent – Someone trying to connect to a sql server on the host.

<u>History</u>— We get a lot of traffic from wangfed.com so we went to firewall logs and found this to be valid traffic.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were going to a host that was open for testing by these contractors.

Detect 9 –

```
10:37:45.931756 p.q.244.65.3996 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.931891 p.q.244.65.3996 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.936792 p.q.244.65.5599 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.936973 p.q.244.65.5599 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.943580 p.q.244.65.5600 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.943729 p.q.244.65.5600 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.948406 p.q.244.65.5601 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.948604 p.q.244.65.5601 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.953926 p.g.244.65.5603 > p.g.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
10:37:45.954050 p.q.244.65.5603 > p.q.242.4.161: C=AFLAN
```

```
GetRequest(18) [|snmp]
```

Active Targeting – Yes.

<u>Intent</u> – Initially the thought was we had found someone with too much free time on their hands and had downloaded some of the DOS tools of off the web

<u>Technique</u> – DOS attack on one of our internal routers.

<u>History</u> – These packets were picked up after someone noticed that SNMP Get Request counters were significantly higher for this one router. It turned out to be misconfigured HPOV software on a test machine.

<u>Severity</u> – Low since these packets were not getting outside the core of the network and going to the outside of the network.

Detect 10 -

```
04:30:37.784998 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@53280+)
04:30:37.786230 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@54760+)
04:30:37.787461 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@56240+)
04:30:37.788694 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@57720+)
04:30:37.789923 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@59200+)
04:30:37.791161 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@60680+)
04:30:37.792388 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@60680+)
04:30:37.793622 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@63640+)
04:30:37.793964 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@63640+)
04:30:37.793964 p.q.244.179 > p.q.235.172: (frag 15770:1480@63640+)
```

Active Targeting – Yes.

Intent – Denial of service attack from the inside.

Technique – Ping of death.

<u>History</u> – Upon researching the attack found it was the PC Security shop was doing scans of the network to find people that were reloading their own PC's and not putting the service packs back on with the latest security fixes.

Severity – Low since it was a controlled test and was being run after hours.