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Secure Intranet Host Setup Checklist Author: Joe Callis GIAC USERID: callis001 GCUX Practical Version 1.6d August 22, 2001

Secure Intranet Host Setup Checklist

This checklist is to be used by all administrators and operators setting up Solaris 8 hosts that are deemed to be "secure" servers. A secure server is one that will either sit on a screened network, at a client site, or even sit on the intranet, if the machine contains sensitive information. The point of this checklist is to show how to setup a machine so that access is restricted to only those allowed access and to limit the number of potential vulnerabilities. It should be noted here, that security is not a single step, but rather an ongoing process. This list may have to be adjusted or modified to take into account new security concerns.

The host to be built is going to reside on the company intranet. The hardware used in this setup is a Sun Netra T1 AC200 with two 18 Gb internal drives. The machine has a 500 MHz processor with 512 Mb of RAM. An internal cdrom drive can be put in the machine for installation only, and then must be removed before putting the system into production. If an internal cdrom drive is not available, an external will need to be used. (This setup assumes that an internal drive is being used.) The only other equipment needed is a RJ-45 cable with a Netra t term connector and of course, the Solaris 8 cd as well as the internal applications cd.

Console Access

Since initial access to the machine will be through console only, that will need to be setup. Netra T1s require a special T-term connector between the RJ-45 cable and the RS-232 port on the switch box (if a switch box is not available, you will need a cross-over cable). This is shipped with the hardware and should be labeled accordingly. Once wiring is completed and the power connected (Note, the machine should NOT be connected to the network at this time), you will need to login to a unix host, pull up a terminal window.

<i>J</i> 1	rust focal bill/suub rust/tocal/bill/ket litt, and enter your password. At the kething
promp	t, type the following:
	set line /dev/ttya (tells kermit which serial port to use)
	set carrier-watch off (tells kermit not to expect a carrier detect signal)

c (tells kermit to connect to the remote system)

Type: /usr/local/bin/sudo /usr/local/bin/kormit and enter your nessword. At the karmit

Since Netra's come with a lights-out management feature, wup and power down functionality, the prompt that you will lom>	-
At the lom prompt, type in	
poweron	
Once the machine is up and you are at the "ok" prompt, the	OS installation can begin.
PROM Settings	
The decision of whether or not to set an Open boot PROM couple of factors. Is the machine sitting in a potentially hos physical control? One example might be a machine sitting example is a machine on our own intranet with enough sense the added security measure.	stile environment out of our at a client-site. Another
A major caveat about setting an obp password; if the passw recovered. Sun has to send a replacement PROM chipset in password is to be used, follow all password rules and do NO Assuming that the machine is still at the "ok":	n order to recover the box. If a
setenv security-mode command setenv security-password password	
It is important to check the auto-boot variable. If the system any reason, you want to make sure it comes back up, otherwoffice visit at 2am.	
seteny auto-boot? true	
Operating System Installation	
One of the quirks of the AC200 Netra's, is they need to use an earlier release of 8 is required, you will need to get the c system. For bookkeeping sake, please note the version of S	ds that shipped with the
Place the cdrom in the drive and boot: boot cdrom	

Once the system loads the cdrom, you will be asked several questions. Please use the following in answering the questions:
Format /dev/dsk/c1t0d0 Swapsize should be 1024 Mb Yes, swap space can begin at the beginning of the disk Yes, erase entire disk
Solaris will now setup the swap space and install a mini-root on the disk. Please note, that if you make a mistake specifying the swap space size and do not realize it until later, you will need to restart from the beginning.
Is system networked? The system should not be on the network, but say "yes" anyway. This way we can setup the ip address, etc. DHCP will not be used Enter hostname. Please record here: Enter IP address. Please record here: Enter netmask. Please record here: Do not enable Ipv6 Enter "None" for Name Service Enter default route. Please record here: Select timezone from geographic area. Please record here: Do not worry about setting the exact time, NTP will adjust it, once the machine is networked Enter the root password. Please do not write down or email the password Please confirm the information just entered with the information recorded on the
checklist. If any discrepancies are found, please select " n " and redo the system configuration section.
Software Installation
The software will be installed from the Solaris 8 Software disks 1 and 2. The system will prompt you for the type of media (select "cd") and will ask you to insert the Software 1 cd into the drive.
Select "Custom Install." This will enable us to eliminate several packages that we do not want. Accept the default settings for the regional questions. Toggle "off" the Documentation packages. Under "Solaris Software 2 of 2" toggle "on" the Disksuite 4.2.1 (for mirroring the disks).
Toggle "off" the "Solaris Supplemental Software." Select "none" for additional products.

Select both 64-bit and 32-bit support.
Select the "End User Software Group."
 Select the default installation.

File System Layout

For the file system layout, we are limited to seven partitions. One is used for swap (setup earlier) and another is for disksuite (needs to be partition 4), so we are limited to five partitions for our own use. We typically will setup /, /usr, /var, /opt and a hostname partition with the remainder of the disk space. A couple of caveats about setting up the partitions, make /usr large enough so that it can be patched, if and when necessary. Sun's recommended size of 683 Mb is sufficient, but to allow a bit more breathing room, it can be increased to 800 Mb. Be careful about making /var too small as well. Nothing is more frustrating that having to reformat a drive because /var is not sufficient. It is recommended to make it around 1 Gb.

Since most of our software is placed in the hostname partition, /opt can be minimally sized. Home directories, additional logging and configuration directories will be placed in the hostname partition.

In order to make a single cylinder partition, you will need to setup the entire disk and when done, go into "cylinder" mode and modify partition 5 so that the starting cylinder is one higher.

Please record the final partition setup.

Slice	Mount Point	Size (Mb)
0		
1	swap	1024
3		© ,
4	metastate db	~6 (1 cylinder)
5		
6		
7		

When finished, select done, confirm the software installation and start the installation.

Patch Cluster Installation

The best way to get the latest patches on the system (which is still not connected to the network) is by downloading them from an internet-connected machine and putting them on an external scsi disk that can be hung off of our secure system. The best way to get the patch cluster and checksums is to go to http://sunsolve.Sun.COM/pub-cgi/show.pl, and download via ftp. While you are on this page, download the README file and checksum data, so that you can confirm that the patches have not been tampered with or corrupted.

to look for special instructions, dependencies and potential conflicts. Once the download has completed, run an md5sum on the zipped patch file. Confirm the signature matches that contained in the checksum file. Mount the external disk onto the new Netra. Create a directory in the hostname partition called "patches". Copy the patches into the /hostname/patches directory. Unzip the file: unzip 8 Recommended.zip. Install the patch cluster by running the install script. Once the install has completed, reboot. Setting up / (root filesystem) Often times administrators have several windows open to different hosts. To alleviate the chances of an admin running "init 6" on the wrong machine, it is recommended creating /.profile with prompt information, as well as information you do not want to rely on getting from the system default profile. vi /.profile Enter the following information: PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/sbin; export PATH umask 022 stty erase <^v><bkspace> *EDITOR=vi;export EDITOR PS1*="<hostname>#";export PS1 TERM=vt100;export TERM Save and exit. Change mode to 0500 and check to make sure ownership is root:root. ./.profile (to source the .profile) Create a bogus .rhosts file to trip up anyone attempting to create one. touch /.rhosts chmod 000 /.rhosts chown root:root.rhosts

While the patches are downloading, it is a good idea to read through the README file,

Securing Networking

In order to prevent different types of network-based attacks the following parameters should be added to the end of /etc/init.d/inetinit	
ndd -set /dev/tcp tcp_conn_req_max_q0 10240 ndd -set /dev/arp arp_cleanup_interval 60 ndd -set /dev/ip ip_ignore_redirect 1 ndd -set /dev/ip ip_send_redirects 0 ndd -set /dev/ip ip_ire_arp_interval 60000 ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_directed_broadcasts 0 ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_src_routed 0 ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forwarding 0 ndd -set /dev/ip ip_strict_dst_multihoming 1	
Sun announced in early 2001 that the default setting for the TCP initial sequence number generation was not as random as was originally thought and recommended that the setting be changed to RFC 1948 sequence number generation.	
Edit /etc/default/inetinit Change TCP_STRONG_ISS to "2"	
Eliminating Unwanted Services	
Solaris ships with quite a number of services turned on at boot time. Some of these services make life easier (vold, CDE, etc.) but most are not used and some pose a very serious security threat (nfs, nis, rpc, etc.). This section will go through each startup directory and remove the files from the startup sequence. I will give the entire command sequence for the first one, and after that will just name the files that should be changed.	
cd /etc/rc3.d for i in S15nfs.server S76snmpdx S77dmi <return> do<return> mv \$i _\$i<return> done<return></return></return></return></return>	
Now do a listing (/usr/bin/ls) and it should look like this:	
# ls /etc/rc3.d _S15nfs.server _S76snmpdx _S77dmi S25mdlogd	
This disables nfs.server, snmpdx and dmi from starting at boot up, but allows mdlogd to start up. A more secure method would be to delete the files entirely. Since this system will be an intranet system, we will keep the files around, in case we decide at a later time that we need to enable some of these features.	
cd /etc/rc0.d	

rename files K07dmi K07snmpdx K10dtlogin K28nfs.server K33audit K35volmgt K36sendmail K36wbem K37power K39lp K39spc	
K41rpc K52llc2	
cd /etc/rcS.d	
rename files K07dmi K07snmpdx K10dtlogin K28nfs.server K33audit	
K35volmgt K36sendmail K36wbem K37power K39lp K39spc K40nscd	
K41autofs K41ldap.client K41rpc K41slpd K52llc2	
cd /etc/rc1.d	
rename files K07dmi K07snmpdx K10dtlogin K28nfs.server K33audit	
K35volmgt K36sendmail K36wbem K37power K39lp K39spc K40nscd	
K41autofs K41ldap.client K41rpc K41slpd K52llc2	
cd /etc/rc2.d	
rename files K07dmi K07snmpdx K28nfs.server S40llc2	
S71ldap.client S71rpc S72slpd S73cachefs.daemon S73nfs.client	
S74autofs S76nscd S80lp S80spc S85power S88sendmail S90wbem	
S92volmgt S99audit S99dtlogin	
vi /etc/init.d/inetsvc	
Go to the last line, where inetd is started and add a "-t". This will turn on log	ging
for all inetd processes. Save and exit the file.	55
vi /etc/init.d/sendmail	
Look for where sendmail is started. The command should look like	
"/usr/lib/sendmail -bd -q10m". Remove the "-bd". We have disabled sendmail at stabut just in case, we need to start it manually, the smtp port will not be opened.	artup
Crontab Modifications	
As cron is a good place to hide things, we want to run as few as possible. Solaris 8 comes with three crontab files: root, adm and lp. Root is the only one that is needed.	
crontab –r adm	
crontab –r lp	
crontab –e	
Remove the entries for nfsfind and gsscred clean	
Add an entry for sendmail:	
0,10,20,30,40,50 * * * * /usr/lib/sendmail –q	
This last entry will start up sendmail (every 10 minutes), empty the mail queue, and sendmail.	stop
Defere you get much further it is a good idea to reheat the machine into the confirm	th = 4
Before you get much further it is a good idea to reboot the machine, just to confirm	ınat
everything comes up as expected.	

Installing TCP Wrappers

TCP Wrappers provides nice functionality, is easy to compile and install. Basically, tcp wrappers will listen on all inetd ports. As connections come in, tcpd (the binary) logs the incoming connection, does a reverse lookup, confirm that it is not a spoofed address and then makes a call to the daemon requested. If the host requesting service is not allowed access, a prompt is never issued to the remote client, thus preventing brute force attacks. Since this machine is going to sit on the intranet, we want to ensure that only certain machines are allowed access. The allowed hosts should not be on NIS/NIS+. This will prevent anyone from logging into the "jump-off" host and subsequently attempting to telnet to the secure host.

Solaris 8 requires a Ipv6 version of 7.6 TCP Wrappers. The version that works with Solaris 8 is available from

ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/tcp wrappers 7.6-ipv6.tar.gz.

Because there is not have a compiler (or gzip for that matter), tcp wrappers will need to be compiled on a similar Solaris 8 machine. Once compiled, the binaries and libraries can be put on removable media and transferred to the new host.

Download tcp wrappers
Check pgp signature with the gzipped tar file
gzip –cd tcp_wrappers_7.6-ipv6.tar.gz tar xvf –
cd tcp_wrappers_7.6-ipv6
cd tcp_wrappers_7.6-ipv6 wi Makefile
Remove the comment from the line REAL_DAEMON_DIR for Solaris 2.x
Remove the comment on the line " $IPV6 = -DHAVE_IPV6$."
Insert "CC=gcc" at the top of the script
Change FACILITY to LOG_AUTH
Save and exit. Now run the make: make sunos5
Copy tcpd, tcpdmatch, try-from, libwrap.a,tcpd.h and tcpdchk onto removable
media. You can also copy safe finger, but it will not be used during the course of this
setup. Make sure that the files are owned by root. The group should be daemon.
Mount the disk onto the secure host
Create the appropriate directories: mkdir –p /hostname/local/sbin
/hostname/local/lib /hostname/local/include
Copy the binaries (tcpd, tcpdmatch, try-from and tcpdchk) to/hostname/local/sbin
Change their permissions to 0555.
Copy libwrap.a to /hostname/local/lib and tcpd.h to /hostname/local/lib.
Create a symbolic link: In -s /hostname/local /usr/local.

Trimming Down inetd.conf

Unfortunately, Solaris has quite a few processes turned on by default in the inetd.conf file. Some of these processes have been the cause of remote root exploits, internal root exploits as well as providing aid to malicious users trying to glean information from a system. The inetd daemon can be turned off entirely, by simply commenting out the last

line in the /etc/init.d/inetsvc script. In the case of this server (it is going to sit on the intranet), we can leave telnet and ftp enabled. All other lines should be deleted.
vi /etc/inet/inetd.conf Remove all lines, except telnet and ftp Now is tcp wrappers are installed. In place of the /usr/sbin/in.telnetd and /usr/sbin/ftpd, put /usr/local/sbin/tcpd. This will invoke tcpd first, which will make the call to telnetd Save and exit Kill –HUP the inetd daemon.
Adding Access Control
Now that tcp wrappers have been added and the appropriate lines have been modified in the /etc/inetd.conf file, access control can now be added. The tcp wrappers access control allows for hosts to be allowed or denied access to either specific daemons or all daemons. One caveat about the access control files, the hosts.allow file is checked first. If the host/service is allowed, then no further checking occurs. If there is not a specific rule in place, the deny rule is checked. If there is still not a match, the host is allowed access. cat ALL:ALL >/etc/host.deny cat telnetd: {enter hostname(s) of allowed host(s)} >/etc/hosts.allow cat ftpd: {enter hostname(s) of allowed host(s)} >>/etc/hosts.allow
Tweaking Logging
As logs are the only way of keeping watch over the system, it is quite important that as much information is logged as possible. One important bit of information that Solaris does not log by default, is failed login attempts. While the average user will mistype a password every once in a while, a consistent pattern of failures points to someone trying to brute force crack an account. TCP Wrappers provides a nice logging feature, but it has to be enabled in /etc/syslog.conf first.
vi /etc/syslog.conf At the bottom of the file, add auth.info <tab over="">/var/log/wrap_log (NOTE: It is very important that the columns be separated by a tab, not a space. If a logging server is used, add auth.info<tab over="">@loghost touch /var/log/wrap_log touch /var/log/loginlog (This log file will monitor failed login attempts). Change ownership of the two files to root:sys. The permissions should be 600. kill -HUP `/usr/bin/cat /etc/syslog.pid`</tab></tab>

Enabling NTP

In thinking about enterprise network and systems security, it is important that all systems be synchronized to the same time. In computer time, a few seconds difference make logs much less useful and effective. Since the machine is not connected to the network, ntp will not be started yet. However, at the next reboot, ntp will start (the startup script looks for the presence of /etc/ntp.conf as its signal to start). Copy /etc/ntp.client to /etc/ntp.conf Edit /etc/ntp.conf, adding (to the end of the file): server <IP address>. Save and exit. Modifying the /etc/hosts File Solaris was not told anything about our fully qualified domain name (FQDN) when the OS was installed, so we can add that information, as well as the name of our logging server (if appropriate). In a screened network environment, it would be necessary to put all hosts that our host needs to know about in this file. This host will be using DNS for its name resolution, so this is not necessary. vi /etc/hosts Add the FODN to the line with the IP address and hostname. The format should be: IP address<white space>FQDN<white space>unqualified hostname If a separate logging server is used, add its information here (in the same format), add an unqualified hostname of "loghost" at the end. If a separate logging server is not used, put "loghost" at the end of the "localhost" entry. Save and exit. Log Rotation After adding the logs for tcp wrappers and failed logins, the logs need to be configured to rotated on a regular basis. This prevents the files from growing too large and filling up the /var partition. This also makes looking through the files easier. vi /usr/lib/newsyslog Copy one of the entries for another log (syslog for instance), paste it twice. Modify each (one for loginlog, the other for wrap log).

(or is too long), modify accordingly.

Save and exit.

The syslog template will keep the log around for 8 weeks. If this is not sufficient

Passwd/Shadow File

As with many things, Solaris comes with extraneous accounts in the passwd/shadow file. Some of the accounts (nobody4) date back to sunos4.x and are kept around for compatibility issues. One vulnerability announced shortly before the writing of this checklist found that all accounts with a two character password could allow someone to log into a machine with a trivial (or no) password. This vulnerability was using a third-party software, but does highlight the problem with having extra accounts with "NP" as the password.

Edit the /etc/passwd file. Make sure that none of the accounts have a real shell
(except for root). If a bogus shell is needed, do not use /bin/false, use /dev/null.
Save and exit. Run pwconv
Edit the /etc/shadow file.
(in "vi") :1,\$s/:NP:/:*LK*:/ (find/replace replacing all ":NP:" with ":*LK*:")
This does two things, it prevents the vulnerability mentioned above from being effective.
but also, it puts an illegal password character in the password field, thereby rendering the
account completely useless.
Save and exit.
If user accounts are going to exist on the machine, password aging should be used. The
minimum and maximum password age can be set in /etc/default/passwd. This value
should be set based on current security policy.
should be see custom on continuous seeding points.
Edit /etc/default/passwd
Set MAXWEEKS=13
Set MINWEEKS=2
Set WARNWEEKS=1. Save and exit.
It is important to set up certain default login settings, to prevent potential abuse by either
malicious or uneducated users. The /etc/default/login file is a good place to do that.
Edit /etc/default/login
Uncomment TIMEOUT variable
Uncomment UMASK variable
Add "umask 022" to /etc/skel/local.* and /etc/.login and/etc/.profile.
If user accounts need to be created on this machine, those accounts can be created at this
time. The safest way to do that is via the useradd command.
mkdir /hostname/home, change permissions to 0555 and owned by root:root
ln -s /hostname/home /home
/usr/sbin/useradd $-c$ <full name=""> $-u$ <userid <math="">\#> $-g$ <groupid <math="">\#> $-d$</groupid></userid></full>
/home/ <login> -m -s <shell> <login></login></shell></login>
Check the /etc/shadow file, to confirm that password aging parameters were set.

DNS Configuration

For the DNS configuration, no more than three IP addresses of DNS servers (preferably secondary servers) are needed. If the system is sitting on a screened network, this step can be ignored, since the host will probably not be able to talk to local or remote DNS servers.

Edit /etc/resolv.conf. The first line needs to be dom	nain <domain name="">. After</domain>
which the DNS servers can be listed, one per line.	
Save and exit.	
cp /etc/nsswitch.dns /etc/nsswitch.conf	
Banners	
A lot of UNIX systems like to advertise themselves throug most common way for malicious users to determine the OS not have access to. Because of this, it is advisable to replact that basically tell the user nothing. Check with current sec that the banners comply with all legal requirements.	S and version of a host they do ce the OEM banners with ones
Edit /etc/default/telnetd Add a line similar to the following: BANNER="\n\nAuthorized Users only. All system activity	is monitored. $\n\n'$
Save and exit. Do the same for /etc/default/ftpd.	
Kernel-level Changes	
Be very careful about making changes to the /etc/system fi cause system problems. Kernel level changes are useful fo executable or for hard-coding network speed and duplexity Edit /etc/system	or setting the system stack non-
Add set noexec_user_stack=1 (to set stack non-exe_ Add set noexec_user_stack_log=1 (to set stack non-exe_ Add set noexec_user_stack_log=1)	
Since an attacker can use a core file as a DOS tool (by filling should be nixed as well	ng up disk space), this feature
Add set sys:coredumpsize=0 (to turn off the system	ms ability to dump a core file).
These lines set up the network speed and duplexity. Unless place that states otherwise, always try to have the switch have	

duplexity (as compared to auto negotiated).

```
Add the following lines:
set hme:hme adv autoneg cap = 0
set hme:hme adv 100 \text{fdx cap} = 1
set hme:hme adv 100hdx cap = 0
set hme:hme adv 10 \text{fdx cap} = 0
set hme:hme adv 10hdx cap = 0
Just to complete the changes we have made up to this point, reboot the system. This will
apply our changes, clean out the proc table, etc. and get the system in a stable state,
before we start setting up mirroring. Be sure watch during the reboot, so that you can
determine if you made any misspellings in the /etc/system file.
   /usr/sbin/init 6
Disk Mirroring
One method of introducing fault tolerance into our system is to mirror the root disk.
During the installation, we installed Disksuite 4.2.1 on the system. One patch needs to be
added before beginning. Use the url above to download it.
      Apply patch number 108693-04
Format the second disk and partition it like the first.
       prtvtoc /dev/rdsk/c1t0d0s2 | fmthard -s - /dev/rdsk/c1t1d0s2
Configure the metastate database. (-a= attach, -f=create initial state db, -c=# of
replicas/slice)
       /usr/sbin/metadb -a -f -c 2 /dev/rdsk/c1t0d0s4 /dev/rdsk/c1t1d0s4
       /usr/sbin/metadb –i (to confirm creation and proper configuration)
Create one-way concatenations for partitions that are to be mirrored. The concatenations
are not created for the backup slice (slice 2) or the metastate db slice (slice 4).
       /usr/sbin/metainit -f d0 1 1 c1t0d0s0 (-f=force creation, d0=metadevice name,
"1 1" = number of stripes and number of slices/stripe respectively)
       /usr/sbin/metainit -f d1 1 1 c1t0d0s1
       /usr/sbin/metainit –f d3 1 1 c1t0d0s3
      /usr/sbin/metainit –f d5 1 1 c1t0d0s5
      /usr/sbin/metainit -f d6 1 1 c1t0d0s6
      /usr/sbin/metainit –f d7 1 1 c1t0d0s7
      /usr/sbin/metainit –f d10 1 1 c1t1d0s0
      /usr/sbin/metainit –f d11 1 1 c1t1d0s1
      /usr/sbin/metainit -f d13 1 1 c1t1d0s3
       /usr/sbin/metainit -f d15 1 1 c1t1d0s5
```

/usr/sbin/metainit -f d16 1 1 c1t1d0s6

/usr/sbin/metainit –f d17 1 1 c1t1d	0s7
Make a backup copy of /etc/system.	le ng the mirrors. Example: / ufs 1 no logging ly done for the root filesystem (c1t0d0s0)
Confirm sane entries in /etc/system a	and /etc/vfstab prior to rebooting
init 6	
Now that the partitions are set up for mirror synced. Do not reboot during the sync period mirroring might take as long as 1 hour to co /usr/sbin/metattach d100 d10/usr/sbin/metattach d101 d11/usr/sbin/metattach d103 d13/usr/sbin/metattach d105 d15/usr/sbin/metattach d106 d16/usr/sbin/metattach d107 d17	d. For an 18 Gb disk with 6 partitions, the
The progress of the sync can be monitored u	sing the /usr/sbin/metastat command.
Physical Security and Wrap-Up	
the machine. Do NOT run these tools on the the network or worse, bring down switches, Observing all data center rules regard hours, rack mount the machine in secured data.	ternal cdrom (if applicable). lab and run nmap, nessus, saint, etc. against production network, EVER! Nmap can clog routers and even systems. ding installing machines during production at a center. rk and console) are in no danger of being brough proper cable channels.

	at you can connect to the console and ensure that you can connect from host. It is a good idea to try connecting from other hosts, just to confirm
	working and logging properly.
	check to ensure that NTP is syncing up properly with the timeserver.
	e client that the host is ready for production testing.
Sign, date	and hand carry this form to security for audit and review.
signature	date installed

Problems encountered during build and resolution (please be specific):

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