



# Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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1.

```
Feb 18 12:38:51 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 24.25.227.65:67 X.X.X.X:68 L=341 S=0x00 I=45618 F=0x0000 T=126
(#1)
Feb 18 12:38:51 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 24.25.227.65:67 X.X.X.X:68 L=341 S=0x00 I=45874 F=0x0000 T=126
(#1)
```

This is to be a bootp scan for tftp services coming from the same cable modem network.

2.

```
Feb 19 11:28:20 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 171.220.22.141:5321 X.X.X.X:23 L=78 S=0x00 I=11211 F=0x0000
T=326 (#6)
Feb 19 11:28:22 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 171.220.22.141:5321 X.X.X.X:25 L=78 S=0x00 I=13207 F=0x0000
T=326 (#6)
Feb 19 11:28:23 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 171.220.22.141:5321 X.X.X.X:143 L=78 S=0x00 I=41301 F=0x0000
T=326 (#6)
Feb 19 11:28:25 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 171.220.22.141:5321 X.X.X.X:111 L=78 S=0x00 I=51303 F=0x0000
T=326 (#6)
Feb 19 11:28:28 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 171.220.22.141:5321 X.X.X.X:34555 L=78 S=0x00 I=31806 F=0x0000
T=326 (#6)
Feb 19 11:28:30 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 171.220.22.141:5321 X.X.X.X:2049 L=78 S=0x00 I=13608 F=0x0000
T=326 (#6)
Feb 19 11:28:33 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0
PROTO=17 171.220.22.141:5321 X.X.X.X:12345 L=78 S=0x00 I=13309 F=0x0000
T=326 (#6)
```

UDP scan for trojan and available ports from American On-Line. Notice the 34555, wonder if they have included a search for DDOS indicators in the scanning software. Also notice the source port does not change and stays at 5321 (fingerprint?)

3.

```
Feb 24 13:14:57 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=exp0 from
X.X.4.61:1373 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 23
Feb 24 13:19:18 MyServer kernel: securityalert: udp if=exp0 from
X.X.4.61:63600 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 33441
Feb 24 13:19:18 MyServer kernel: securityalert: udp if=exp0 from
X.X.4.61:63600 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 33442
Feb 24 13:19:18 MyServer kernel: securityalert: udp if=exp0 from
X.X.4.61:63600 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 33443
```

Our DMZ user tried to telnet to the firewall, couldn't and then tried a traceroute.

4.

```
Feb 22 20:58:36 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=exp0 from
204.7.154.3:47754 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 8080
Feb 22 20:58:37 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=exp0 from
204.7.154.3:47755 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 8080
```

This person from PSInet is a scanning for a proxy port.

5.

```
Feb 15 10:57:09 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=exp0 from
211.40.176.54:3951 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 32773
Feb 18 23:32:56 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=exp0 from
211.40.176.49:4074 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 32773
```

Variation of a back orifice port scan. Notice the different dates and the same class C address... guess our friend from Korea didn't know when to quit.

6.

```
Jan 31 08:01:18 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:3537 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
Jan 31 08:02:49 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:3553 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
Jan 31 08:10:46 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:3683 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
Jan 31 08:11:30 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:3703 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
Jan 31 08:26:33 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:3925 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
Jan 31 08:37:31 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:4069 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
Jan 31 08:43:49 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:4128 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
Jan 31 08:56:17 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:4488 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
Jan 31 09:02:55 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=lo0 from
127.0.0.1:4660 to 127.0.0.1 on unserved port 4090
```

This one was interesting...turned out to be a misconfigured internal Netscape browser trying to proxy localhost to localhost on port 4090.

7.

```
Jan 27 16:47:51 MyServer kernel: securityalert: tcp if=exp0 from
195.159.0.90:6667 to X.X.X.X on unserved port 1444
```

Someone from Norway trying to IRC to us on port 1444.

8.

```
Mar  3 12:29:48 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input ACCEPT eth0 PROTO=1
209.184.87.221:8 X.X.X.X:0 L=60 S=0x00 I=49503 F=0x0000 T=23 (#18)
Mar  3 12:29:49 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input ACCEPT eth0 PROTO=1
209.184.87.221:8 X.X.X.X:0 L=60 S=0x00 I=50015 F=0x0000 T=23 (#18)
Mar  3 12:29:50 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input ACCEPT eth0 PROTO=1
209.184.87.221:8 X.X.X.X:0 L=60 S=0x00 I=50527 F=0x0000 T=23 (#18)
Mar  3 12:29:51 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input ACCEPT eth0 PROTO=1
209.184.87.221:8 X.X.X.X:0 L=60 S=0x00 I=51039 F=0x0000 T=23 (#18)
Mar  3 12:37:37 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:3427 X.X.X.X:1 L=44 S=0x10 I=27746 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN (#41)
Mar  3 12:37:37 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:3428 X.X.X.X:2 L=44 S=0x10 I=28002 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN (#41)
Mar  3 12:37:37 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:3429 X.X.X.X:3 L=44 S=0x10 I=28258 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN (#41)
>>> Continues through the entire range of ports<<<<

Mar  3 12:38:26 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:4443 X.X.X.X:1017 L=44 S=0x10 I=39526 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN
(#41)
Mar  3 12:38:26 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:4444 X.X.X.X:1018 L=44 S=0x10 I=39782 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN
```

```
(#41)
Mar  3 12:38:26 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:4445 X.X.X.X:1019 L=44 S=0x10 I=40038 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN
(#41)
Mar  3 12:38:26 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:4446 X.X.X.X:1020 L=44 S=0x10 I=40294 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN
(#41)
Mar  3 12:38:26 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:4447 X.X.X.X:1021 L=44 S=0x10 I=40806 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN
(#41)
Mar  3 12:38:26 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:4448 X.X.X.X:1022 L=44 S=0x10 I=41062 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN
(#41)
Mar  3 12:38:26 MyServer kernel: Packet log: input DENY eth0 PROTO=6
209.184.87.221:4449 X.X.X.X:1023 L=44 S=0x10 I=41318 F=0x4000 T=119 SYN
(#41)
```

This person from Southwestern Bell scans the entire range of low ports. Points to notice however. Starts with a low port (8) using icmp and stays there when he scans for port zero on my box. Then jumps to a high port (3427) using tcp and increments the source port when scanning the other destination ports (1-1023). Also notice he repeats the port zero scan 4 times before moving on to the other ports. Looks like he may have combined two scanning tool source codes to get this result or he ran two tools in succession.

9.

```
Feb 28 03:42:32 MyServer named[18977]: unapproved AXFR from
[195.153.248.240].4863 for "111.BBB.CCC" (acl)
Feb 28 03:55:14 MyServer named[18977]: unapproved AXFR from
[195.153.248.240].1087 for "222.BBB.CCC" (acl)
Feb 28 04:04:02 MyServer named[18977]: unapproved AXFR from
[195.153.248.240].1118 for "333.BBB.CCC" (acl)
Feb 28 04:21:03 MyServer named[18977]: unapproved AXFR from
[195.153.248.240].1357 for "444.BBB.CCC" (acl)
Feb 28 05:11:36 MyServer named[18977]: unapproved AXFR from
[195.153.248.240].1934 for "555.BBB.CCC" (acl)
Feb 28 05:19:26 MyServer named[18977]: unapproved AXFR from
[195.153.248.240].2021 for "666.BBB.CCC" (acl)
Feb 28 05:29:43 MyServer named[18977]: unapproved AXFR from
[195.153.248.240].2161 for "777.BBB.CCC" (acl)
```

CORPEX-NET (PSInet lan) a web hosting company tried to pull our DNS Zone files unsuccessfully.

10.

```
Nov 20 18:40:24 MyServer pop3[9437]: connect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110
Nov 20 18:40:24 MyServer pop3[9437]: disconnect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110 in=0 out=0
duration=0
Nov 20 18:40:24 MyServer pop3[9438]: connect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110
Nov 20 18:40:24 MyServer pop3[9438]: disconnect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110 in=0 out=0
duration=0
Nov 20 18:40:24 MyServer pop3[9439]: connect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110
Nov 20 18:40:24 MyServer pop3[9439]: disconnect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110 in=0 out=0
duration=0
Nov 20 18:40:27 MyServer pop3[9440]: connect
```

```
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110
Nov 20 18:40:27 MyServer pop3[9440]: disconnect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110 in=0 out=0
duration=0
Nov 20 18:40:28 MyServer pop3[9436]: connect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110
Nov 20 18:40:28 MyServer pop3[9436]: disconnect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110 in=0 out=0
duration=5
Nov 20 18:40:32 MyServer pop3[9447]: connect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110
Nov 20 18:40:32 MyServer pop3[9447]: disconnect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110 in=0 out=0
duration=0
Nov 20 18:40:39 MyServer pop3[9448]: connect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110
Nov 20 18:40:39 MyServer pop3[9448]: disconnect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110 in=0 out=0
duration=0
Nov 20 18:40:50 MyServer pop3[9449]: connect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110
Nov 20 18:40:50 MyServer pop3[9449]: disconnect
host=oo7.st.hmc.edu/134.173.46.38 destination=X.X.X.X/110 in=0 out=0
duration=0
```

<shortened for brevity>

This one is pretty obvious. Attacker from Claremont College tried to brute force the pop server user accounts verified by reviewing the login log.

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