



Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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*** Northcutt, Very interesting, Bill is making use of BlackIce while I get three to four messages a day from my students telling me why they can't detect anything. That has to be worth a few points! Good use of an analysis process. A little attention for formatting would improve clarity. 82 ***

Certification Exercise
Submitted by Bill Connett
4/06/2000

Unfortunately, I don't yet have sophisticated sensors in place. As a result of the Sans IDIC course we are now working on developing security policies, additional protection to our networks and putting IDS in place. All of these traces are from BlackIce Defender on my work PC (using a program called "ethereal" to format the traces). A big problem using BlackIce is that the Detect traces are only "incoming" and you have to look in separate logs if you want to try to find both incoming and outgoing packets -- not nice at all. As you can see, other than being behind a switch, we are pretty open to the world. We do have limited ingress and egress router (routers not under our control) filtering in place to prevent address spoofing but at this point that's about it. Hopefully we will be in much better shape in the near future. I should add that I couldn't figure out why so few people from the previous class did this assignment until I tried to do it. For those who have been doing this as part of their jobs for awhile it is clearly a piece of cake. For those of us who haven't and who don't have IDS systems in place it is a pretty daunting exercise. I've been struggling with this assignment for several days and am biting the bullet today and will finish it before I sleep, if I sleep. :-)

Detect 1:

No.	Time	Source	Destination
2	22:40:34.0920	mapper	xxx.xxx.146.169
TCP 0 > 111 [FIN, SYN] Seq=3729129472 Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0			
3	23:23:35.5820	mapper	xxx.xxx.146.169
TCP 0 > 143 [FIN, SYN] Seq= 508624896 Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0			
4	00:06:03.4229	mapper	xxx.xxx.146.169
TCP 0 > 53 [FIN, SYN] Seq=3679911936 Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0			

This is a Syn,Fin port scan scanning Sun RPC, IMAP and DNS (Zone transfer because it is TCP instead of UDP) ports. The source port of 0 is not normal and is an indication of crafting and perhaps indicates the use of the program "linux portz 0.1" (Northcutt, Intrusion Analysts Handbook, p98) which sets the default source port to 0. Because this is logged on a machine behind several switches it is not possible to see the other addresses that are being scanned. The lag of several minutes between scans to this address is probably due to the sequential scanning of all of the ports of the same number in the Class C network. The sequence numbers also are not in order and may be crafted as well. Mapper was a single address but could not be located in whois.

Active Targeting: Yes

Intent: Mapping well known potentially vulnerable assets

Technique: Syn/Fin scan of RPC, DNS, and IMAP ports for potential revisit

Severity: (C4+L1)-(CM4+N1)= 0 Explanation- Desktop machine but with critical system access (C4),

attack not likely to succeed on this machine (L1),
Running two
personal firewalls and current
patches (CM4), Network countermeasures weak N1)
Please Note: The
utility of the severity formula is limited in this set of
examples due to most of the detects being on the same
machine and
network. If the sensor was able to detect exploits
on more than one machine I would be able to see a
broader range of
exploits or more importantly exploits on a broader range of
equipment, then the formula results would vary and
demonstrate a
greater degree of usefulness.
Source: BlackIce Detect

Detect 2:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
54	05:45:55.7050	xxx.xxx.72.120	xxx.xxx.146.169	TCP	23 > 23 [ACK] Seq=1675637262 Ack=1761221395 Win=1028 Len=0
55	05:49:17.2159	xxx.xxx.72.120	xxx.xxx.146.169	TCP	4 > 80 [FIN, SYN] Seq=963161181 Ack=95514272 Win=1028 Len=0
56	05:49:17.3099	xxx.xxx.72.120	xxx.xxx.146.169	TCP	5 > 80 [PSH] Seq=963161181 Ack=95514272 Win=1028 Len=0
57	05:49:17.3489	xxx.xxx.72.120	xxx.xxx.146.169	TCP	5578 > 139 [SYN] Seq=1534610384 Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0
58	05:49:20.0249	xxx.xxx.72.120	xxx.xxx.146.169	TCP	5578 > 139 [SYN] Seq=1534610384 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0

This is an interesting set of port probes to one dest
address ports 23
(telnet), 80 (http), and 139 (Netbios). The interesting
thing is the variety
of source ports and the variety of flags used. The
sequence numbers in

pairs indicate crafting as do the ack numbers. The attempt to probe port 80 and 139 twice each indicates a less than stealth approach and may be some indication of the talent of the prober. It isn't clear to me what the 3 minute gap is between the first and second probe. This could be waiting for a response before running a script as the subsequent probes are pretty fast.

Active Targeting: Yes
Intent: Probing selected well known ports
Technique: Random anomalous flag sets
Severity: (C4+L1)-(CM4+N1)= 0 Low. Probably a script kiddie with limited skills. No evidence of system compromise.
Source: BlackIce Detect

Detect 3:

```
6044 15:09:34.5640   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33120 > 61 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6045 15:09:34.5789   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33120 > 101 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6046 15:09:34.5989   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33120 > 873 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6047 15:09:34.6139   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33120 > 370 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6048 15:09:34.6339   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33120 > 42 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6049 15:09:34.6490   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33120 > 465 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6050 15:09:34.6649   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33121 > 405 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6051 15:09:34.6840   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33121 > 816 [FIN,
```

```
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6052 15:09:34.6990   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33121 > 224 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6053 15:09:34.7139   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33121 > 802 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
6054 15:09:34.7339   xxx.xxx.146.253   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
33121 > 203 [FIN,
PSH, URG] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=3072 Urg=0 Len=0
```

This is a contrived Detect. One of my co-workers scanned my PC with nmap because we wanted to see what BlackIce would do and what the Detect would look like. BlackIce identified this scan as the TCP xmas scan although not all the flags are turned on.

Active Targeting: Yes for sure
Intent: Testing, non malicious hopefully
Technique: nmap with random dst port numbers and three anomalous flags set.
Seq numbers crafted and ttl also set arbitrarily to 62 (not shown)
Severity: (C4+L1)-(CM4+N1)= 0 Low
Source: BlackIce Detect

We also did a Syn Scan and a Null Scan. Nothing interesting to report as far as differences between them except for flags. BlackIce did correctly detect and identify them.

Detect 4:

```
15 11:01:44.6679   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2882 > 1 [SYN]
Seq=3403969300 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
16 11:01:56.6330   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2879 > 21 [SYN]
Seq=3408068459 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
17 11:02:20.6480   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2876 > 111 [SYN]
```

```

Seq=3402534135 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
18 11:03:08.6829   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2873 > 23 [SYN]
Seq=3409999887 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
19 11:03:08.6829   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2883 > 515 [SYN]
Seq=3408648014 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
20 11:04:44.7130   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2882 > 1 [SYN]
Seq=3403969300 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
21 11:06:44.7230   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2879 > 21 [SYN]
Seq=3408068459 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
22 11:08:44.7430   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2876 > 111 [SYN]
Seq=3402534135 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
23 11:10:44.7779   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2873 > 23 [SYN]
Seq=3409999887 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
24 11:10:44.7779   xxx.xxx.72.167   xxx.xxx.146.169   TCP
2883 > 515 [SYN]
Seq=3408648014 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0

```

Date: 2/22/2000

Active Targeting: Yes

Intent: A combination of OS fingerprint (port 1 - SGI) and scan for open

ports -- particular concern

is the RPC port (111). Not sure what the importance of 515 (printer spooler port) is?

Technique: Standard Syn scan with crafted src ports and Seq # (note matches between them) and Ack=0 on all.

Timing is erratic and may have something to do with the stealthing

on the attacked machine on some

ports causing the attacker to wait for a timeout on that port before

moving on to the next one? Or

interleaved scanning?

Repeated scanning of same ports is low stealth - this repeated

additional times

Severity: (C4+L1)-(CM4+N1)= 0 Low

Source: BlackIce Detect

Detect 5:

```
38 17:29:10.1380   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1762 [SYN]
Seq=4001384687 Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0
39 17:29:56.2680   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1769 [SYN]
Seq=936374699 Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0
40 17:29:56.2730   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1769 [SYN]
Seq=936374699 Ack=0 Win=16060 Len=0
41 17:29:56.2779   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1772 [SYN]
Seq=2517046452 Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0
42 17:29:56.2829   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1772 [SYN]
Seq=2517046452 Ack=0 Win=16060 Len=0
43 17:29:56.2829   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1772 [SYN]
Seq=2517046452 Ack=0 Win=16060 Len=0
44 17:29:56.2879   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1769 [SYN]
Seq=936374699 Ack=0 Win=16060 Len=0
45 17:30:29.3839   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1774 [SYN]
Seq=8415158 Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0
46 17:30:29.3880   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1774 [SYN]
Seq=8415158 Ack=0 Win=16060 Len=0
47 17:30:29.3930   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1774 [SYN]
Seq=8415158 Ack=0 Win=16060 Len=0
48 17:30:29.3980   xxx.xxx.218.150 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
20 > 1776 [SYN]
Seq=1907674164 Ack=0 Win=512
```

Date: 4/01/2000

Active Targeting: Yes, port mapping by web server
(www.trinux.org)

Intent: Not clear what the intent of this is. It is not
targeted at a
netbios port

or, as far as I know, a known trojan port. This occurs when you attempt to see the list of downloadable files.

Technique: Very fast scan of ephemeral ports in three with some variation.

Interesting that the window size changes. Do sequence numbers indicate a very busy server?

Severity: (C4+L1)-(CM4+N1)=0 Low

Source: BlackIce Detect

Detect 6:

43 18:59:14.5049 xxx.xxx.126.41 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
4560 > 139 [SYN]
Seq=248663655 Ack=0 Win=8192 Len=0
44 19:00:21.1349 xxx.xxx.126.41 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
4560 > 139 [SYN]
Seq=248663655 Ack=0 Win=8192 Len=0
45 19:00:21.1390 xxx.xxx.126.41 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
4560 > 139 [SYN]
Seq=248663655 Ack=0 Win=8192 Len=0
46 19:00:21.1490 xxx.xxx.126.41 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
4560 > 139 [SYN]
Seq=248663655 Ack=0 Win=8192 Len=0
47 19:00:58.7100 xxx.xxx.126.41 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
4576 > 139 [SYN]
Seq=248663916 Ack=0 Win=8192 Len=0
48 23:57:58.6799 xxx.xxx.216.42 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
1986 > 139 [SYN]
Seq=1791183030 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0
49 23:58:01.6890 xxx.xxx.216.42 xxx.xxx.146.169 TCP
1986 > 139 [SYN]
Seq=1791183030 Ack=0 Win=32120 Len=0

Date: 3/08/2000

Active Targeting: Yes Netbios port probe from a residence hall

Intent: Two bored students putting off studying or one with two machines?

Technique: This looks like they were browsing the network neighborhood for open shares. No packet crafting,

just poking around.
Severity: (C4+L1)-(CM4+N1)=0 Low
Source: BlackIce Detect

Detect 7:

264 06:37:38.8760 xxx.xxx.10.102 xxx.xxx.146.169 UDP
Source port: 60000
Destination port: 2140

Date: April 1, 2000 (happy April fools day present)
Active Targeting: Yes
Intent: A trojan (Deep Throat) Scan. Note from San website
writeup on Deep
Throat: "Using outbound source port 60000,
the DT client sends UDP to port 2140. If successful in
finding the
DT server (compromised box) the DT
client initiates a back door, BO-like remote session
using ports
2140 and 3150"
Technique: A single packet to the dst address. Address is
traceable to a UK
AOL address with 17 hops from the
victim. This is reasonably consistent with a ttl of
113 found on
the incoming Detect.
Severity: (C4+L1)-(CM4+N1)=0 Low -- no indication of
client/server
connection or outgoing packets to http which is
characteristic of an infected machine. BlackIce would
not detect
this but the second personal firewall (AtGuard)
running on this host would detect outgoing attempts.
Source: Human Scanning a BlackIce Trace -- BlackIce did not
detect this
probe.
I noticed it as I looked through a trace that BlackIce
had triggered
for a false positive UDP Scan

Detect 8:

```
84 13:46:33.4550   xxx.xxx.64.137   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 19220  Destination port: 51200
85 13:46:33.4550   xxx.xxx.64.137   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 19220  Destination port: 51200
86 13:46:33.4550   xxx.xxx.64.137   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 19220  Destination port: 51200
87 13:46:33.4550   xxx.xxx.64.137   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 19220  Destination port: 51200
88 13:46:33.4600   xxx.xxx.64.137   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 19221  Destination port: 51201
89 13:46:36.4149   xxx.xxx.64.137   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 19221  Destination port: 51201
90 13:47:26.7309   xxx.xxx.64.139   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 18068  Destination port: 51200
91 13:47:26.7309   xxx.xxx.64.139   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 18068  Destination port: 51200
92 13:47:26.8049   xxx.xxx.64.139   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 18068  Destination port: 51200
93 13:47:26.8300   xxx.xxx.64.139   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 18068  Destination port: 51200
94 13:47:26.8550   xxx.xxx.64.139   xxx.xxx.146.169
UDP      Source
port: 18068  Destination port: 51200
```

Date:2/24/2000

Active Targeting: No

Intent: At first blush this looked really interesting. Two high UDP ports getting pounded by lots of incoming packets. After looking at the trojan lists and not finding any identified with these ports, I did a net search and found a reference to the internet telephony program DialPad using

destination port 51200 and realized this was around the time I was experimenting with DialPad! My assumption at this point is that this was one of the dialpad hosts trying to respond to a request from my machine for a connection. When I have a little time I will try to recreate this.
Technique: Normal function
Severity: (C4+L1)-(CM4+N1)=0 to None
Source: BlackIce UDP scan trace

Detect 9: taken from Sans -- I realized at the last minute that I had duplicated two detects, uggg

Brian Friday from .edu has a close encounter with Brazil, I deleted about 60 of the attempts)

Mar 31 05:08:28 myhost portsentry[172]: attackalert:
Connect from host: 150.183.91.134/150.183.91.134
to TCP port: 111
Mar 31 10:36:38 myhost portsentry[173]: attackalert:
Connect from host: dgt048.cpunet.com.br/200.254.53.48
to UDP port: 111
Mar 31 10:38:36 myhost portsentry[173]: attackalert:
Connect from host: dgt048.cpunet.com.br/200.254.53.48
to UDP port: 111

Mar 31 12:34:44 myhost portsentry[173]: attackalert:
Connect from host: user-
33qslhs.dialup.mindspring.com/199.174.6.60
to UDP port: 31337
Mar 31 12:35:10 myhost2 portsentry[8311]: attackalert:
Connect from host: user-
33qslhs.dialup.mindspring.com/199.174.6.60
to UDP port: 31337

Date: 3/09/2000
Active Targeting: Yes
Intent: 3 RPC probes (port 111), two from Brazil and one self inflicted?
Weird (sometimes when I feel

completely inadequate a sense of humor is all I have
to fall back
on). and two back orifice
probes.
Technique: Low stealth scan -- fast and twice on same port.
30 second
interval on the BO so might be
manual.
Severity: Don't have all the info but I would judge low on
both
Source: Sans Web site

Detect 10:

59 18:06:15.9110 xxx.xxx.235.11 xxx.xxx.146.169 UDP
Source port: 1512
Destination port: 31337

Date: 3/27/2000
Active Targeting: Likely a broad scan
Intent: Scanning for Back Orifice (port 31337) trojan
Technique: Insufficient information. UDP TTL was 53 and
backtrace to IP
address was to an existing dns.
Could have been (likely?) a spoofed address.
Severity: Low
Source: BlackIce Scan

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