



# Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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# David Hed

## GIAC/GCIA Certification Practical

SANS 2001 Baltimore (International Attendee)

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(picture blatantly stolen from the panorama view of Baltimore from their Touristpage in hope of showing that Baltimore was a beautiful city)

### Information/Disclaimer

Some IP's are left unsanitised, no ip has been altered if unobfuscated. MY.NET has in some cases been changed to 10.0. Sometimes the attacker is named "he" that is somewhat intentional based on the probability of gender. No electrons were harmed in the capture of the packets. There is a separate appendix with the information of the top alert hosts.

# Assignment 1

## Detect 1

---

### BIND Exploits still popular to search for

#### 1. Source of Trace.

Corporate network. Outside of the firewalls.

#### 2. Detect was generated by:

Snort IDS with ACID, with portscan logging

Below you can see the logfile with snort alerts. After the “from” you will see from what IP the connections came. You also see the number of connections and if they were TCP or UDP (icmp doesn't have any ports although ping sweeps is a sort of scanning).

#### Portscan Summary:

```
[**] [100:1:1] spp_portscan: PORTSCAN DETECTED from 209.207.190.234 (THRESHOLD 4 connections exceeded in 0 seconds) [**]
[**] [100:2:1] spp_portscan: portscan status from 209.207.190.234: 222 connections across 220 hosts: TCP(220), UDP(2) [**]
[**] [100:2:1] spp_portscan: portscan status from 209.207.190.234: 411 connections across 411 hosts: TCP(410), UDP(1) [**]
[**] [100:2:1] spp_portscan: portscan status from 209.207.190.234: 590 connections across 590 hosts: TCP(590), UDP(0) [**]
[**] [100:2:1] spp_portscan: portscan status from 209.207.190.234: 407 connections across 407 hosts: TCP(407), UDP(0) [**]
[**] [100:2:1] spp_portscan: portscan status from 209.207.190.234: 29 connections across 29 hosts: TCP(29), UDP(0) [**]
[**] [100:3:1] spp_portscan: End of portscan from 209.207.190.234: TOTAL time(18s) hosts(1653) TCP(1656) UDP(3) [**]
```

He sweeps through big parts of our nets here.

#### Interesting parts:

[...]

```
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2488 -> 192.168.43.0:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:49 209.207.190.234:2490 -> 192.168.43.2:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:49 209.207.190.234:3876 -> 192.168.43.2:53 UDP
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2492 -> 192.168.43.4:53 SYN *****S *
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2494 -> 192.168.43.6:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2496 -> 192.168.43.8:53 SYN *****S*
[...]
```

```
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2692 -> 192.168.43.184:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2694 -> 192.168.43.186:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2489 -> 192.168.43.1:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2491 -> 192.168.43.3:53 SYN *****S*
```

```
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:3876 -> 192.168.43.3:53 UDP
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2493 -> 192.168.43.5:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2495 -> 192.168.43.7:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:52 209.207.190.234:2497 -> 192.168.43.9:53 SYN *****S*
[...]
```

```
Jul 18 18:01:53 209.207.190.234:2718 -> 192.168.43.209:53 S YN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:53 209.207.190.234:2712 -> 192.168.43.204:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:53 209.207.190.234:2715 -> 192.168.43.206:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:53 209.207.190.234:2717 -> 192.168.43.208:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:53 209.207.190.234:2719 -> 192.168.43.210:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:53 209.207.190.234:3876 -> 192.168.43.3:53 UDP
Jul 18 18:01:56 209.207.190.234:3142 -> 192.168.43.220:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:56 209.207.190.234:3143 -> 192.168.43.221:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:56 209.207.190.234:3144 -> 192.168.43.222:53 SYN *****S*
Jul 18 18:01:55 209.207.190.234:2720 -> 192.168.43.211:53 SYN *****S*
```

[...]

And he goes further:

The alertlog from snort reveals some further information gathering.

```
#0-(1-376701) DNS named iquery attempt 2001 -07-18 18:01:53
209.207.190.234:3876 192.168.43.3:53 UDP

#1-(1-376700) DNS named version attempt 2001 -07-18 18:01:52
209.207.190.234:3876 192.168.43.3:53 UDP

#2-(1-376699) DNS named iquery attempt 2001 -07-18 18:01:49
209.207.190.234:3876 192.168.43.2:53 UDP

#3-(1-376698) DNS named version attempt 2001 -07-18 18:01:49
209.207.190.234:3876 192.168.43.2:53 UDP
```

In my snort configuration used at this time i did not have complete dumps of the complete traffic. I do not see the need for it for these scanning attempts.

### 3. Probability the source address was spoofed:

HIGHLY UNLIKELY, he took action (although it seems automated) from the response he got from the portscanning. But it is likely that the source could be a compromised system.

### 4. Description of attack:

The attacker tried to check for Inverse Query support and the version of the DNS software.

### 5. Attack mechanism:

This is a typical information gathering attack. If #defining INVQ isnt commented out from the bind configuration the attacker could gather information about our domain structure. Ancient nslookup can however crash if INVQ is commented out. (source: <http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-05.html>)

The following can be read at: <http://packetderm.cotse.com/CIE/RFC/1035/59.htm>

## The contents of inverse queries and responses

Inverse queries reverse the mappings performed by standard query operations; while a standard query maps a domain name to a resource, an inverse query maps a resource to a domain name. For example, a standard query might bind a domain name to a host address; the corresponding inverse query binds the host address to a domain name.

Inverse queries take the form of a single RR in the answer section of the message, with an empty question section. The owner name of the query RR and its TTL are not significant. The response carries questions in the question section which identify all names possessing the query RR WHICH THE NAME SERVER KNOWS. Since no name server knows about all of the domain name space, the response can never be assumed to be complete. Thus inverse queries are primarily useful for database management and debugging activities. Inverse queries are NOT an acceptable method of mapping host addresses to host names; use the IN-ADDR.ARPA domain instead.

Where possible, name servers should provide case-insensitive comparisons for inverse queries. Thus an inverse query asking for an MX RR of "Venera.isi.edu" should get the same response as a query for "VENERA.ISI.EDU"; an inverse query for HINFO RR "IBM-PC UNIX" should produce the same result as an inverse query for "IBM-pc unix". However, this cannot be guaranteed because name servers may possess RRs that contain character strings but the name server does not know that the data is character.

When a name server processes an inverse query, it either returns:

1. zero, one, or multiple domain names for the specified resource as QNAMEs in the question section
2. an error code indicating that the name server doesn't support inverse mapping of the specified resource type.

When the response to an inverse query contains one or more QNAMEs, the owner name and TTL of the RR in the answer section which defines the inverse query is modified to exactly match an RR found at the first QNAME. RRs returned in the inverse queries cannot be cached using the same mechanism as is used for the replies to standard queries. One reason for this is that a name might have multiple RRs of the same type, and only one would appear. For example, an inverse query for a single address of a multiply homed host might create the impression that only one address existed.

### 6. Correlations :

We have had previous portscans and events for our DNS servers. On the [www.incidents.org](http://www.incidents.org) archives you can see this IP-number scan port 111 only a few days before. (source <http://www.incidents.org/archives/intrusions/msg01071.html> )

### 7. Evidence of active targeting:

Probably not, he could have gotten the IP's for our DNS servers in a more easy way. The scans were probably part of a bigger sweep.

### 8. Severity:

Calculated Severity = (Criticality+Lethality) -(System Countermeasures+Network Countermeasures)

Criticality: **5**

These servers are the main dns servers. A compromise on them (without knowing) would be disastrous. So the potential of damage was high.

Lethality: **2**

Information gathering about the systems. Nothing to much to worry about. [there was bugs/exploits for BIND8]

System Countermeasures: **5**  
Systems patched and updated.

Network Countermeasures: **1**  
This is normal traffic, nothing will stop this. No additional logging is made except on the server itself.

Severity:  $(5+3)-(6) = 2$

**9. Defensive recommendation:**

Continued logging and use of IDS for inventory logging of these kinds of events.

**10. Multiple choice test question:**

iquery is a

- a) inverse query towards the DNS
- b) incomplete query towards the DNS.
- c) internet query for domains.
- d) important query towards the DNS

Correct answer is A

**Additional Info:**

In an attempt to track down who this was I saw that this must be some spooky happenings

<http://www.sampade.org/t/lookat.cgi?address=209.207.190.234&whois=on&clueless=no>

Official name: [chembid.com](http://chembid.com)  
Addresses: [209.207.190.234](http://209.207.190.234)  
Error checking for DNS forgery

---

```
Whois for chembid.com
[...]
whois -h whois.crsnic.net chembid.com
Crsnic redirect failed
Whois Server Version 1.3
```

[...]

No match for domain "CHEMBID.COM".

>>> Last update of whois database: Sat, 21 Jul 2001 01:56:18 EDT <<<

[...]

---

HE IS GONE!!! The DNS dont resolve

---

I tried manually from another network

Whois Server Version 1.3

Domain names in the .com, .net, and .org domains can now be registered with many different competing registrars. Go to <http://www.internic.net> for detailed information.

No match for "CHEMBID.COM".

>>> Last update of whois database: Sat, 21 Jul 2001 01:56:18 EDT <<<

The Registry database contains ONLY .COM, .NET, .ORG, .EDU domains and Registrars.

```
machine# ping www.chembid.com
ping: cannot resolve www.chembid.com: Unknown host
machine# ping 209.207.190.234
PING 209.207.190.234 (209.207.190.234): 56 data bytes
^C
--- 209.207.190.234 ping statistics ---
7 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
```

---

Looking for the owner of the network at WWW.ARIN.NET i find:

Verio, Inc. ([NET-VRIO-209-207-128](#)) 8005 South Chester Street Englewood, CO 80112 US

Netname: VRIO-209-207-128 Netblock: [209.207.128.0](#) - [209.207.255.255](#) Maintainer: VRIO Coordinator: Verio, Inc. ([VIA4-ORG-ARIN](#)) vipar@verio.net 303.645.1900

---

Not giving up I also try

```
machine# whois -m 209.207.190.234
route:      209.207.128.0/17
descr:     digitalNATION, Inc.
origin:    AS7019
notify:    noc@dn.net
mnt-by:    MAINT-AS7019
changed:   bradd@dn.net 19991229
source:    VERIO
```

---

Looking at <http://www.dn.net> i get redirected to <http://home.verio.com/products/dedicated/index.cfm> so my guess is that this individual was thrown out of their hosting services... oh well, case closed.

At least he got as far as poking around a little on our systems.

The above tracing is the only one included in the detects! (the ones in analyze this is in the appendix)

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## Detect 2

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Frontpage exploitables, not served here...

### 1. Source of Trace.

Educational network

Apache webserver logfiles and correlated with another networks Snort/tcpdump

### 2. Detect was generated by:

Apache webserver logfiles and correlated with another network

#### The logfiles are placing in the following order:

Who did:	10.xxx.6.xx --
when did it happen:	[10/Jun/2001:21:10:36 +0200]
what happened:	GET /_vti_inf.html HTTP/1.1" 404 302
additional details of the event:	Mozilla/2.0 (compatible; MS FrontPage 4.0)"

#### Step 1:

```
Accesslog
10.xxx.6.xx - - [10/Jun/2001:21:10:36 +0200] "GET /_vti_inf.html HTTP/1.1" 404 302 "-"
"Mozilla/2.0 (compatible; MS FrontPage 4.0)"
```

#### Step 2:

```
Accesslog
10.xxx.6.xx - - [10/Jun/2001:21:10:36 +0200] "POST /_vti_bin/shtml.exe/_vti_rpc HTTP/1.1" 404 316
"- "MSFrontPage/4.0"
```

### 3. Probability the source address was spoofed:

Unlikely, he was looking for response not disrupting service.

### 4. Description of attack:

The attacker tried by remote to exploit Front Page extensions on the http service. I have seen this kind of behavior from **searchbots** before looking for file inventory. But this IP was **internal!** Which had me interested.

### 5. Attack mechanism:

Looking further online for an explanation:

Get \_vti\_inf.html could be a probe for frontpage extensions

(<http://www.insecure.org/sploits/Microsoft.frontpage.insecurities.html> )

Post shtml.exe could be a try to find the webserver path

(<http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5NP0J0U1FO.html> )

Looking at Technet you see that shtml.exe is the Server Extensions browse-time stub program \_vti\_inf.html is the FrontPage information file.

([http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/TechNet/prodtechnol/office/reskit/fp98serk/appendixes/A\\_UNPERM.asp](http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/TechNet/prodtechnol/office/reskit/fp98serk/appendixes/A_UNPERM.asp))

This bug/exploit is reported at:

(<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1174> )

Although this could just be a functionality test for frontpage extensions from Office2000 as described by Richard Bejtlich.

(<http://www.sans.org/y2k/062000.htm> )

## 6. Correlations:

Since I got access to some other networks I am using the same detect here for correlation

```
Packet 9715
TIME: 10:56:58.340165 (1.649911)
LINK: 03:33:8E:33:33:00 -> 94:21:73:12:9C:30 type=IP
  IP: h107n1f1s3o804 -> yyycacheeyyy hlen=20 TOS=00 dgramlen=299 id=5510
  MF/DF=0/1 frag=0 TTL=117 proto=TCP cksum=E23E
  TCP: port 1351 -> www seq=3060279280 ack=2014254625
  hlen=20 (data=259) UAPRSF=011000 wnd=17520 cksum=A7B7 urg=0
DATA: GET /_vti_inf.html HTTP/1.1.
  Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2001 08:56:41 GMT.
  MIME-Version: 1.0.
  Accept: */*.
  User-Agent: Mozilla/2.0 (compatible; MS FrontPage 4.0).
  Host: www.yyy.se.
  Accept: auth/sicily.
  Content-Length: 0.
  Connection: Keep-Alive.
  Cookie: visited=true.
.
```

```
-----
Packet xxxxxx
TIME: 10:56:58.620071 (0.279906)
LINK: 03:33:8E:33:33:00 -> 94:21:73:12:9C:30 type=IP
  IP: h107n1f1s3o804 -> yyycacheeyyy hlen=20 TOS=00 dgramlen=404 id=551A
  MF/DF=0/1 frag=0 TTL=117 proto=TCP cksum=E1CB
  TCP: port 1352 -> www seq=3060500022 ack=2495324808
  hlen=20 (data=364) UAPRSF=011000 wnd=17520 cksum=F149 urg=0
DATA: POST /_vti_bin/shtml.exe/_vti_rpc HTTP/1.1.
  Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2001 08:56:41 GMT.
  MIME-Version: 1.0.
```

```
User-Agent: MSFrontPage/4.0.
Host: www.yyy.se.
Accept: auth/sicily.
Content-Length: 41.
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded.
X-Vermeer-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded.
Connection: Keep-Alive.
.
method=server+version%3a4%2e0%2e2%2e2611
.
```

-----  
Packet xxxxxxxx+1

### 7. Evidence of active targeting:

What we are dealing with here are bored CS students staying at campus over the summer. I know for a fact that the IP number next to this server is a unpatched IIS server, although this host that got attacked we removed the FrontPage extensions and functionality a while back.

### 8. Severity:

Calculated Severity = (Criticality+Lethality) -(System Countermeasures+Network Countermeasures)

Criticality: **5**

This server is the main dns, smtp-relay and http/ftp server for the student network! If it went down or got compromised hundreds of PFY's would lose their internet connectivity/activity.

Lethality: **3**

If we were running IIS or still having the FrontPage extensions available the harm could have been done. Or serious information gathering about the system could have been made.

System Countermeasures: **5**

**The FrontPage extensions had been removed for some time**, besides this is a FreeBSD server running apache, not IIS on Windows.

Network Countermeasures: **1**

This is normal traffic, nothing will stop this. No additional logging is made except on the server itself.

Severity: (5+3) -(6) = 2, although i would go even higher than 5 on System Countermeasures if i could. Since the only attack it made was filling up the logfile in /var

### 9. Defensive recommendation:

Talk to the admins running IIS on the other segment that they really should consider changing operating system and http-server. Or atleast firewall it for their internal use.

### 10. Multiple choice test question:

For FrontPage support the /\_vti\_inf.html is the

- a) Frontpage Virtual Transmission Interface page.
- b) FrontPage information file

c) valuable transaction integrity checker for IIS servers.

d) Frontpage exploit collector

Correct answer is B

**Additional Info:**

I did trace the guy down the other day and asked him about this, he denied anything of everything, although he seemed to know his ways with computers. Oh well no harm done here but its good to know thee enemy.

**[Added 2001-07-24: I did some tests with the server with Office 2000 and confirms that it is Word/Office looking for Frontpage extensions! The server itself lacks frontpage extensions]**

Resources on the web:

<http://www.insecure.org/sploits/Microsoft.frontpage.insecurities.html>

<http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5NP0J0U1FO.html>

[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/TechNet/prodtechnol/office/reskit/fp98serk/appendixes/A\\_UNPERM.asp](http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/TechNet/prodtechnol/office/reskit/fp98serk/appendixes/A_UNPERM.asp)

<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1174>

<http://www.sans.org/y2k/062000.htm>

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## Detect 3

---

Worms in the house (this detect replaces a previous ida ISAPI Overflow )

### 1. Source of Trace.

Corporate network. Snort Sensor

### 2. Detect was generated by:

Snort IDS connected to MySQL/ACID management representation

IP	source addr	dest addr	Ver	Hdr Len	TOS	Length	ID	Flags	Offset	TTL	chksum	
	<a href="#">204.210.243.191</a>	Our.iis.server	4	5	0	1500	2134	0	0	110	13336	
	FQDN	Source Name Wv1243191.columbus.rr.com						Dest. Name www.hostname.xyz				
	Options	<i>none</i>										

TCP	source port	Dest port	R	R	U	A	P	R	S	F	seq #	Ack	offset	Res	Window	urp	chksum
			1	0	G	K	H	S	T	N							
	<a href="#">4614</a>	<a href="#">80</a>				X	X					1868438840	1440451	5	0	17520	0
Options	<i>none</i>																

	Length = 1460	
Payload	000 : 2F 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 2E 69 64 61 3F 4E 4E 4E	/ default.ida? NNN
	010 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	020 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	030 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	040 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	050 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	060 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNN NNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	070 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	080 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	090 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	0a0 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	0b0 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	0c0 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	0d0 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E	NNNN NNNNNNNNNNNNNN
	0e0 : 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 4E 25 75 39	NNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9
	0f0 : 30 39 30 25 75 36 38 35 38 25 75 63 62 64 33 25	090%u6858%ucbd3%
	100 : 75 37 38 30 31 25 75 39 30 39 30 25 75 36 38 35	u7801%u9090%u685
	110 : 38 25 75 63 62 64 33 25 75 37 38 30 31 25 75 39	8%ucbd3%u7801%u9
	120 : 30 39 30 25 75 36 38 35 38 25 75 63 62 64 33 25	090%u6858%ucbd3%
	130 : 75 37 38 30 31 25 75 39 30 39 30 25 75 39 30 39	u7801%u9090%u909
	140 : 30 25 75 38 31 39 30 25 75 30 30 63 33 25 75 30	0%u81 90%u00c3%u0
150 : 30 30 33 25 75 38 62 30 30 25 75 35 33 31 62 25	003%u8b00%u531b%	
160 : 75 35 33 66 66 25 75 30 30 37 38 25 75 30 30 30	u53ff%u0078%u000	
170 : 30 25 75 30 30 3D 61 20 20 48 54 54 50 2F 31 2E	0%u00=a HTTP/1.	
180 : 30 0D 0A 43 6F 6E 7 4 65 6E 74 2D 74 79 70 65 3A	0..Content -type:	
190 : 20 74 65 78 74 2F 78 6D 6C 0A 48 4F 53 54 3A 77	text/xml.HOST:w	
1a0 : 77 77 2E 77 6F 72 6D 2E 63 6F 6D 0A 20 41 63 63	ww.worm.com. Acc	
1b0 : 65 70 74 3A 20 2A 2F 2A 0A 43 6F 6E 74 65 6E 74	ept: * /*.Content	
1c0 : 2D 6C 65 6E 67 74 68 3A 20 33 35 36 39 20 0D 0A	-length: 3569 ..	
1d0 : 0D 0A 55 8B EC 81 EC 18 02 00 00 53 56 57 8D BD	..U.....SVW..	
1e0 : E8 FD FF FF B9 86 00 00 00 B8 CC CC CC CC F3 AB	.....	
1f0 : C7 85 70 FE FF FF 00 00 00 00 E9 0A 0B 00 00 8F	..p.....	
200 : 85 68 FE FF FF 8D BD F0 FE FF FF 64 A1 00 00 00	.h.....d....	
210 : 00 89 47 08 64 89 3D 00 00 00 00 E9 6F 0A 00 00		

**3. Probability the source address was spoofed:**

Unlikely, this is an automated attack that isn't known to spoof itself in anyway.

**4. Description of attack:**

Automated Worm attack, towards IIS servers (indexing service). Pretty famous at the time of writing.

The signature that spotted the detect was:  
 alert tcp \$EXTERNAL\_NET any -> \$HTTP\_SERVERS 80 (msg: "ida ISAPI Overflow";content: ".ida?"; dsiz: >239; flags: A+; nocase:)

This was on the 20:th of July so it this is a Code Red version CRv1 I caught in the IDS. (this assumption is based on the information provided at [http://www.incidents.org/react/code\\_red.php](http://www.incidents.org/react/code_red.php) that the worm tried to deface the page with the [www.worm.com](http://www.worm.com) text)

## 5. Attack mechanism:

From the CERT advisory ( <http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html> ) you can read the following:

The "Code Red" worm attack proceeds as follows:

3. The "Code Red" worm attempts to connect to TCP port 80 on a randomly chosen host assuming that a web server will be found. Upon a successful connection to port 80, the attacking host sends a crafted HTTP GET request to the victim, attempting to exploit a buffer overflow in the Indexing Service described in CERT advisory [CA-2001-13](#)
4. The same exploit (HTTP GET request) is sent to each of the randomly chosen hosts due to the self-propagating nature of the worm. However, depending on the configuration of the host which receives this request, there are varied consequences.
  - **IIS 4.0 and 5.0 servers with Indexing service enabled** will be compromised by the "Code Red" Worm
  - **Unpatched Cisco 600 -series DSL routers** will process the HTTP request thereby triggering an unrelated vulnerability which causes the router to stop forwarding packets.  
[\[http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-code-red-worm-pub.shtml\]](http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-code-red-worm-pub.shtml)
  - **Systems not running IIS, but with an HTTP server listening on TCP port 80** will probably accept the HTTP request, return with an "HTTP 400 Bad Request" message, and potentially log this request in an access log.
5. If the exploit is successful, the worm begins executing on the victim host. In the earlier variant of the worm, victim hosts with a default language of English experienced the following defacement on all pages requested from the server:  
HELLO! Welcome to <http://www.worm.com>! Hacked By Chinese!  
Servers configured with a language that is not English and those infected with the later variant will not experience any change in the served content.

## 6. Correlations:

This attack hits all over the internet more or less, we even had some false alarms in the previous week, but I choose to take a "real" one towards a WinNT system.

Looking at the statistics from the [www.incidents.com/diary/](http://www.incidents.com/diary/)

07/20 09:00 EDT updated Code Red summary from cas.org's IDS:

Date	# Worm Probes	# Unique Source Addr's Probing (For the Day)	# Unique Source Addr's Probing (Cumulative)	# Unique Dest Addr's being Probed (Day)
07/12	3	1	1	1
07/13	611	27	28	19
07/14	36273	1076	1080	659
07/15	215020	3498	3642	1845
07/16	316828	6137	7147	2705
07/17	316359	7097	10213	2717
07/18	294345	8247	13867	3131
07/19	4080321	272052	279912	64768
<b>07/20</b>	<b>74954</b>	<b>3485</b>	<b>280443</b>	<b>20611</b>
07/21 *	7588 *	641 *	280405 *	2506 *

So it looks like we got hit at the end of the first wave. None of our systems were affected and I shared the tools available for letting other associates battle this problem.

## 7. Evidence of active targeting:

Nah... Well active targeting against the WinNT platform. Not against us.

### 8. Severity:

Calculated Severity = (Criticality+Lethality) -(System Countermeasures+Network Countermeasures)

Criticality: **5**

The systems attacked has alot of "pr -value" for my company, they are running WinNT and are somewhat of the black sheep's in the webserver farm.

Lethality: **5**

Defacing the site and potentially doing DoS-attacks towards a foreign government, NOT good for public relations with our NATO -friends (we say we are neutral here in Sweden).

System Countermeasures: **5**

I almost started laughing during the pre -post-mortem analysis. Indexing Service is turned off and the server is running with Swedish language settings so it wasnt defaced. And these WinNT servers are the only Windows boxes exposed to the internet. I almost looked forward for my first real Incidenthandling and post-mortem analysis. Oh well better luck next time =)

Network Countermeasures: **2**

Couldnt stop it. We detected it in the IDS, analysed it.

Severity: (5+5) -(7) = 3, This could have been dangerous, although no traces of a successful attack was made.

### 9. Defensive recommendation:

Continue to ke ep these servers on a separate DMZ and take them down after migration of the web applications to Solaris. [also recommended and did a security scanning over other Windows servers for the vulnerability with the tool from eeye available from <http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Tools/CodeRedScanner.exe>] [added 2001 -10-08 The servers are still running with appropriate patches, but at a boardmeeting this incident lead to a new project: migrating away from IIS]. These systems should be observed if new patches will be needed before the migration can take place.

### 10. Multiple choice test question:

The reason Code Red Worm did not successfully **deface** the majority of IIS sites was:

- a) Because Microsoft makes software secure by default(© to OpenBSD).
- b) Because one patch is enough to solve all problems.
- c) Because Open Source Software is Communism.
- d) Because America isn't the center of the world (i.e. have English/American language set by default).

Correct answer is D, and hopefully the crax0rs dont read this so they make exploits work with other language settings then English/American...

[ This is hopefully considered as a joke by egocentric Americans, so no offense :-]

### Additional Info:

Resources on the web:

<http://www.incidents.org/diary/diary.php>

[http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2001\\_07/0396.html](http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2001_07/0396.html)



[http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA\\_-2001-19.html](http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA_-2001-19.html)  
[http://www.incidents.org/react/code\\_red.php](http://www.incidents.org/react/code_red.php)

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## Detect 4

They shut our fault mouth?

### 1. Source of Trace.

Corporate network. Snort (production sensor number4 towards internet)

### 2. Detect was generated by:

Snort IDS connected to MySQL/ACID management representation

Meta	ID #	Time	Triggered Signature		
	1 - 438362	2001-07-21 17:33:12	ICMP Destination Unreachable (Communication with Destination Network is Administratively Prohibited)		
	Sensor	Name	Interface	Filter	
		snort4	fxp0	None	
Alert Group	none				

IP	source addr	Dest addr	Ver	Hdr Len	TOS	length	ID	flags	offset	TTL	chksum
	<a href="#">217.5.127.49</a>	192.168.43.233	4	5	0	56	19029	0	0	52	57593
	FQDN	Source Name				Dest. Name					
		Unable to resolve address				Unable to resolve address					
Options	None										

ICMP	type	Code	Checksum	id	seq #
	Destination Unreachable	Network ANO	25811		

Payload	length = 32
	000 : 00 00 00 00 4 5 00 00 28 F9 E9 00 00 1D 06 46 1D .....E..(.....F.
	010 : C2 47 40 92 D9 50 81 9F 07 42 00 71 28 37 68 39 .G@..P...B.q(7h9
	[that a nice feature in word... makes an e-mail link...]

### 3. Probability the source address was spoofed:

Unlikely, although it is a chance that that the initial attacker spoofed us making us the destination address.

#### 4. Description of attack:

It is more of a detect towards our system then a attack on us. [I have tried to contact the source ip owners without any response].

#### 5. Attack mechanism:

A wild guess here is the attacker was abusing the senders service and that the other (source address) network has closed down communication. Strange though that this was the only detect to/from this network.

#### ICMP CODES:

RFC 1700 contains the possible values for each ICMP type and code:

Type	Name	Code(s)
0	Echo reply	0 - none
1	Unassigned	
2	Unassigned	
3	Destination unreachable	0 - Net unreachable 1 - Host unreachable 2 - Protocol unreachable 3 - Port unreachable 4 - Fragmentation needed and DF bit set 5 - Source route failed 6 - Destination network unknown 7 - Destination host unknown 8 - Source host isolated 9 - Communication with destination network is administratively prohibited 10 - Communication with destination host is administratively prohibited 11 - Destination network unreachable for TOS 12 - Destination host unreachable for TOS
4	Source quench	0 - none
5	Redirect	0 - Redirect datagram for the network 1 - Redirect datagram for the host 2 - Redirect datagram for the TOS and network 3 - Redirect datagram for the TOS and host
6	Alternate host address	0 - Alternate address for host
7	Unassigned	
8	Echo	0 - None
9	Router advertisement	0 - None
10	Router selection	0 - None
11	Time Exceeded	0 - Time to live exceeded in transit 1 - Fragment reassembly time exceeded
12	Parameter problem	0 - Pointer indicates the error 1 - Missing a required option 2 - Bad length
13	Timestamp	0 - None
14	Timestamp reply	0 - None
15	Information request	0 - None
16	Information reply	0 - None
17	Address mask request	0 - None
18	Address mask reply	0 - None
19	Reserved (for security)	
20-	Reserved (for robustness)	

29 experiment)  
30 Traceroute  
31 Datagram conversion error  
32 Mobile host redirect  
33 IPv6 where -are-you  
34 IPv6 I-am-here  
35 Mobile registration request  
36 Mobile registration reply  
37- Reserved  
255

[Source: http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/bsd/2001/04/04/FreeBSD\\_Basics.html](http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/bsd/2001/04/04/FreeBSD_Basics.html)

## 6. Correlations:

none, I have tried mailing the network admins for both networks without any good response. Oh well it was back in 1995 or so when you could actually get a reply quickly from a NOC - engineer.... ;-)

## 7. Evidence of active targeting:

Highly Unlikely that he was. My suggestion as above is that we just got a detect from the crossfire, a ricochet if you would like ballistics terms.

## 8. Severity:

Calculated Severity = (Criticality+Lethality) -(System Countermeasures+Network Countermeasures)

Criticality:

1

We don't have a host at this IP, we just got a detect in the crossfire.

Lethality:

1

Information gathering about other systems. Nothing to much to worry about.

System Countermeasures: 5

Systems patched and updated. Not our rule -set being sent out... :-)

Network Countermeasures: 5

It got logged, it got dropped in the firewalls. We logged it, analysed it.

Severity:  $(1+1) - (10) = -8$ , this was the only "Communication with destination host is administratively prohibited" detected so far. Although I don't see a problem with it since it must have been a spoofed transmission in the communication **before** it reached our network.

## 9. Defensive recommendation:

Continued logging for more strange ICMP messages, they are getting more and more interesting. Also recommending myself and others around me to read up on the excellent paper by Ofir Arkin (listed in the resources).

## 10. Multiple choice test question:

ICMP is:

- a) Only useful for ping and traceroute in some cases.
- b) An obsolete protocol that should be dropped at the firewalls
- c) A protocol rightfully getting more and more attention from the IDS -community
- d) Never used for covert channels or fingerprinting of operating systems.

Correct answer is C

**Additional Info:**

Resources on the web:

[http://www.sys-security.com/archive/papers/ICMP\\_Scanning\\_v3.0.pdf](http://www.sys-security.com/archive/papers/ICMP_Scanning_v3.0.pdf)

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## Detect 5

---

### Detection of scan towards unknown host with crafted packet

#### 1. Source of Trace.

Perimeter of own network. (outside the firewalls)

#### 2. Detect was generated by:

Snort intrusion detection system 1.8, portscanner configuration.

```
Portscan log:  
Jul 19 06:59:58 194.65.57.182:0 -> 192.168.43.134:0 NULL *****
```

Snort intrusion detection system 1.8, inventory configuration

ID	≤ Signature ≥	≤ TimeStamp ≥	≤ Source Address ≥	≤ Dest. Address ≥	≤ Layer 4 Proto ≥
#0-(1-378147)	[arachNIDS] SCAN NULL	2001-06-19 06:59:58	194.65.57.18 2:0	192.168.43.1 34:0	TCP
#1-(1-378145)	[arachNIDS] SCAN NULL	2001-06-19 06:59:56	194.65.57.18 2:0	192.168.43.1 34:0	TCP
#2-(1-350473)	[arachNIDS] SCAN NULL	2001-06-18 06:04:19	194.65.57.18 2:0	192.168.43.2 28:0	TCP
#3-(1-350474)	[arachNIDS] SCAN NULL	2001-06-18 06:04:21	194.65.57.18 2:0	192.168.43.2 28:0	TCP

---

*My configurations on the outside is to log portscans locally and more important events in a database:*

*One snort process picks up portscans and logs them locally on the sensor*

*The second reports other alerts to a MySQL database (ACID as representation)*

#### 3. Probability the source address was spoofed:

Probably not, well it could be if the attacker/scanner wasn't interested in the results.

#### 4. Description of attack:

Null SCAN, Setting both payload flags and port to 0  
Possibly probing our network.

IP	source addr	dest addr	Ver	Hdr Len	TOS	length	ID	flags	offset	TTL	chksum
	<a href="#">194.65.57.182</a>	192.168.43.1	4	5	0	20	24773	0	0	108	50723
	FQDN	Source Name				Dest. Name					
		Unable to resolve address				Unable to resolve address					
	Options	None									

TCP	source port	dest port	R	R	U	A	P	R	S	F	seq #	ack	Offset	res	window	urp	chksum
	0	0	1	0	G	K	H	T	N	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

What had me worried here was that he probed a network of ours that wasn't registered at the DNS I wasn't that familiar with the address space. It turns out however that the class-C network he was probing **isn't in use yet. So he is shooting blindly**.

The signature in snort that picked it up was

```
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"SCAN NULL"; flags:0; seq:0; ack:0;
reference:arachnids,4; classtype:attempted_recon; sid:623; rev:1;)
```

#### 5. Attack mechanism:

The scan is made by setting sequence number and control bits to zero, no SYN, FIN or anything. [in this case even the port numbers were 0] This is a pretty basic surveillance scan and is low risk compared to other more sophisticated scans.

#### 6. Correlations:

None, haven't even seen this guy in any alert before on any network I have sensors. [off the record: a friend did some test on the "31337h4x0r" and it seems like it was infected by some trojans!, so perhaps the box did someone else's bidding at the time]

#### 7. Evidence of active targeting:

Not really, it seems like an automated scan with wrong number, this network hasn't been alive for at least 6 years (= never). What made me look into the event was that it intrigued me since I didn't recognize the target of the scan.

#### 8. Severity:

Calculated Severity = (Criticality+Lethality) -(System Countermeasures+Network Countermeasures)

Criticality: 1

This whole segment that he scans over these two days isn't active.

Lethality: 1

This scan is the equivalent to ping, using TCP. The attack was a disaster from his perspective.

System Countermeasures: N/A

He was shooting blindly, I got worried at first that it was a system I was unaware of.

Network Countermeasures: 5

Firewalls isn't passing anything to this network.

Severity: (1+1) - (5) = -3, or less

**9. Defensive recommendation:**

Continued logging of events and a followup if this IP had any further traffic to us.

**10. Multiple choice test question:**

A SCAN NULL type of scan sets the following crafted package:

- a) source address to all zeros, causing a massive ping -DoS attack on all older BSD -server all over the internet.
- b) sets the sequence number equal to the checksum, which fools the TCP/IP stack to resend the same package from an arbitrary open port in the operating system.
- c) sets the sequence number to zero as well as the control bits.
- d) sets defrag to 0 causing the loopback interface to keep sending 0-bit packages, usually eating up all resources and eventually stops the Kernel from Context Switching.

Correct answer is B, just kidding it's C

**Additional Info:**

The alerts show:

```
[**] [100:1:1] spp_portscan: PORTSCAN DETECTED from 194.65.57.182 (STEALTH)
[**]
06/19-06:59:56.258452 194.65.57.182:0 -> 192.168.43.134:0
06/19-06:59:58.929306 194.65.57.182:0 -> 192.168.43.134:0

[**] [100:2:1] spp_portscan: portscan status from 194.65.57.182: 1
connections across 1 hosts: TCP(1), UDP(0) STEALTH [**]
[**] [100:3:1] spp_portscan: End of portscan from 194.65.57.182: TOTAL
time(2s) hosts(1) TCP(1) UDP(0) STEALTH [**]
```

Resources on the web:

[http://www.whitehats.com/cgi/arachNIDS/Show?\\_id=ids4](http://www.whitehats.com/cgi/arachNIDS/Show?_id=ids4)  
<http://advice.networkkice.com/Advice/Intrusions/2000309/default.htm>



# Assignment 2(new)

## Assignment 2 - State of Intrusion Detection

***Implementing IDS; getting yet another tool, or how to get a capable automated security officer and the hardware to assist the process. (Recommendations from my experience)***

This text is a summary of some design and technical issues common for IDS projects. I have tried to focus on technical and architectural issues with new insights not mentioned elsewhere. But also giving room for theories about the state of Intrusion Detection considering the firms and solutions that exist. Bare in mind that my spelling grammar maybe somewhat terrible since English isnt my primary language. I have tried to write so certain parts can be used/integrated for some form of FAQ.

The goal audience is those who are in the process of investing in hardware for Intrusion Detection. A little disclaimer on the products mentioned, I am in no way related to any of the products or companies. I do see the serious problem with IDS being a immature productline today and there are alot of consultants that wants your money. My path of choice has been to try to fix things independently and with collaboration with my coworkers using the best hardware performance vs. price ratio with Open Source products. I have tested alot of the commercial products and lets be fair, they are all terrible more or less today and Snort is the only one worth its price/time (it is free for those who are not familiar with Snort). I am not going into details in configurations/deployment here since its not the time or place. I am just trying to mention the implementation of products that are pretty of the shelf but not that "vendorized" to be IDS - equipment. Perhaps their sales offices will catch on in time...

### Inside or outside the firewall

The design issue that always seem to come up in every IDS -project is "outside or inside the firewall?". In my opinion the answer is both. Just as the question on the hen and the egg, it was the cock that was there first. You must have an open mind thinking out of the boundaries to get the implementation you need/want. IDS is not a product you get from the shelf it is a process, more on this later.

### Promises, Promises, Promises...

As IDS is a somewhat new and immature securityproduct if you relate to firewalls. There are alot of consultants and firms that will promise you gold and green forests without performing those when you get them in the lab environment. "We will have that in the next version" is a term im beginning to hate more and more. The biggest problem with going your own path is that i dont have any vendor to call when i/someone fsck up. I see my colleagues when they experience problems with Microsoft servers or SUN servers, they always have a ace up their sleeve for these situations "Vendor X has been notified and we are working on the problem". So perhaps im in for a rough journey using Open Source products on Intel hardware with a free UNIX operating system. I dont get support from any of the camps since i betray them both in some way. Well now the situation isnt that bad, you can/will get allies in other camps and Quislings among the others. Open Source is here to stay and gaining ground for special purposes. I am glad i have a

manager that trusts my judgement, well actually its more at stake then his trust... Oh well dont get scared of going your own way it will be rewarding!

### Do not do it in your "sparetime"

For a successful implementation i do recommend making the implementation and pilot a project with set timedates. Both for your sake as a future intrusion analyst, but also for your company. We need to get the show on the road, the scriptkiddies and 31337h4x0rz are out there ready to battle, at least you can open your eyes to get an inventory of the weapons they use quickly.

### Get the managers to grasp on what IDS really is

The first obstacle you have to win over is budget/resource allocation, how do i get management to understand the importance of IDS. In my case it was the revelation of the use of firewalls. They dont stop attackers, they act as a traffic controller. Sure they stop some of the attackers but not those in disguise and with nasty payload. You could see the firewall as a castlewall with some openings. If this were a castle the IDS would be a security officer looking down on the carriages load. The firewall/guards look at the coachman and asks where he is from and where he plans to go and if there are more carriages that will follow. The IDS will give you a more in depth view of what is going on in the network. Not just "who from?", "where to?", hopefully the IDS will give you additional information of what happened. This gives the chief of operations the ability to ask what happened before you start speculating on how it could happen if something goes wrong.

### But we got our loyal firewalls that should be enough!

One big advantage with ID Sensors is that they will be the ability to verify the integrity/configuration of a firewall. Especially if you place your sensors both inside and outside of the firewall. If i may go back to my castle you can see this as keeping track of the log for what is said to have come pass the guards and what your automated security officer have seen get passed.

### Outsourcing this IDS thingie?

Outsourcing IDS is not an option for most big enterprises because my belief is that one will always get what one pays for. Consider you having your own IT -security personnel they know much more about your environment then any other company will ever do. If you pay less for others to watch over your network, my opinion is that you would be better of with a trafficdumper and a simple IDS that you check on from time to time, if you wish to save your money. A price offer from a consultantfirm was equal to three fulltime analysts in -house so in our case it wasn't even cheaper! I could spend a whole paper on discussing around the clock availability and the issues with that, but i feel that is very different for other organizations. I would rather invest in a huge fileservers just to keep evidence on what passed to/from your network (complete payload) in case something happens. My opinion is that if your taking IT -security seriously you should dedicate the time and resources for a complete infrastructure. Feel free to read Charles Hutsons work about outsourcing to get both sides of the story:

[http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Charles\\_Hutson\\_GCIA.doc](http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Charles_Hutson_GCIA.doc)

## Trafficdumping with a Redundant Array of INEXPENSIVE Disks

If you don't want to go on expensive SCSI drives or using a storage array network (SAN) you can go pretty cheap on a system that can hold 16 ATA100 drives, you can then have over 1TB of traffic storage for roughly a third of its SCSI equivalent. It is a shame that at the time of writing the 3ware Escalade controllers are disappearing from the market. Apparently they were too good to be on the market, 3ware wishes to sell their integrated solutions.



Example of case for ATA100 RAID trafficdumper

One problem with the trafficdumper is that it will not alarm on any intrusion attempts, you have to check on the traffic. You could however use Shadow for going through these logs but this system is more of an evidence collector than an IDS. There exists a product based on FreeBSD and TCPDUMP called NetVCR from NIKSUN. But I prefer to build the solution myself if I were to get this. You will get good performance and notice on dropped packets with FreeBSD (you can replay the dumps into another IDS like snort as well). Of course you cannot IDE disks on the equipment if your internet line is huge, then you have to sort traffic. Filter out e-mail and http traffic. I can recommend having reverse proxies (load balancers) combined with antivirus to handle the serious security issues with protocols involved. My philosophy is that you let the right thing be in the right place and IDS should detect not react. But do not leave content scanning/blocking left out just because you have an IDS.

### Use your spare storage if available

In my environment we will possibly use the spare storage on a SAN for temporary full capture logs. If you have that ability this is a good option! I have no idea why we have so much disk space available but if it's still free I can go back to see every packet from every host in more than 11 months that has come/left our networks. One month should be enough for the "high quality data" and keeping 2+ years of the "low fidelity data transfer logs", I know I can't use that space forever.

### Dual Interface Adapters

When it comes to the interfaces that pick up data on a Fast Ethernet environment the Intel Pro dual server adapter is a single PCI slot for two interfaces. It is good for expanding. In my lab we have plans to test this adapter for redundancy overlaps of the firewalls as well as stateful

inspection with passive taps. Regretfully I have not any completed analysis of this at the time of writing and i have not yet seen much information about it on the internet. This will be covered in the next version of this document ; -) [see above with vendor promises. Seriously I will publish my result in some forum/maillinglist when this brainchild verified of working]

### Getting five times more interfaces for IDS on one RackUnit

One good thing with it is that you can with a 1U rackserver monitor with five interfaces and keep one for management net ( connection to database/logging). The rackserver i mention above is the DELL350. It has good performance (PIII 850MHz) for less then \$2k with two additional dual interfaces (this includes taking out the monitor adapter, using OpenSSH for “direct interaction”).



Picture of a 1U DELL350

Of course other vendors as SUN and HP has solutions aswell, both with SCSI and IDE so my choice of DELL was more a hint i got that OpenBSD runs excellent on these DELL350 machines (and NFR has support for the interfaces mentioned, and it is a OpenBSD based appliance). There are other NIC's aswell, for example 3com982 (but it is out of stock at the moment). But i will leave it up to you and your company to sort things out, i can only say what worked for me. **DISCLAIMER:** Bare in mind that it takes alot of CPU resources if you place such sensors on heavy networks. Only use such sensors on slow connections or segments with limited traffic without bursts that isnt critical at all . **Dedicated sensors are always best** , this is just a way to please your manager of segment coverage... I Hope he doesnt read this...

### Spotting misconfigurations

Everything a IDS picks up isnt evil hacking attempts, its sometimes misconfigurations or equipment failing. Communications equipment are good examples. When calibrating the IDS it's a good thing that this “service” is included. There are plenty of examples of this in submitted works and conversations on the internet.

### When spanning/hubbing is not an option/preferable


In a switched enviroment you sometimes cannot monitor the traffic you wish. Or perhaps for performance reasons you cannot SPAN out another port. Another possibility is that you wish to QUICKLY setup a sensor on a segment/line/interface without any possibilities/credentials other than physical access (no i do not try to give Black Hats new ideas, they already know). Actually i think that if you take money out of the equation hubbing is never a good option. You then place a SPF (single point of failure) infront of your fancy shining \*insert favorite vendor\* server.

The solution could be pas sive taps, again i do not have any relation with any companies mentioned, but Shomiti are world leading when it comes to this. These taps are completely passive and works with FULL DUPLEX when it comes to hubs and spanned ports you are limited to only a total of the combined traffic. I cant tell you how many people i have been forced into this discussion. But trust me, you can at some point have use of passive taps for fullduplex monitoring when resources do not permit it in other ways. I have seen solutions that you can connect interfaces into boxes to make them passive (more or less cutting out the send wires (logical and physical) this aint pretty sight!).



How the tap looks in physical form

One good thing that I have verified with this product is that you can actually remove the power or change around the tap-cables without disrupting the production environment. You can place 3 of these passive taps on a 1U rack.



How it works in logic

Shomiti/Finisar also has a 12port product that lets you switch between the systems you wish to monitor/tap. I had plans to use it in a lab -environment but could not find it that useful in my environment. Just wanted to mention it.

For a more detailed information on how to use this with CISCO Switches you can visit the Metases site mentioned in the sources.

### Where should sensors be placed?

Now when we got some potential hardware extras you can implement, let's get back to the softside of IDS deployment. What about WHAT/WHERE/HOW we should monitor, should we protect us from the internet or the internet from us. Tough question, but most computer crimes are internal (I believe that most network intrusion attempts are external, but most successful are from people that know your organisation). Can we spot them on these sensors? Yes sure you can but that's usually more anomaly detection than stringbased. Don't forget your external connections like VPN and modems/RAS. Of course your mileage may vary, some perhaps only needs a single sensor at the web-dmz because it is the only face out. With many sensors be sure to use an implementation that will support centralized management. Another thing that A LOT of people seem to miss while speaking about IDS is timestamps, the use of NTP is crucial. Don't miss out on it! Another tip if using Snort is to go with OpenBSD on the sensors. For management and databases you can use pretty much "anything" but I do want to know if we are losing packets as well as having a secure installation on the sensor by default. Linux does not have this ability.

## Routines and guidelines of usage

It is important that you do not forget to document how the systems shall be implemented and educating the users and surveillance team. Depending on size of the company i cannot give specific recommendations on how much you should delegate of the process. In smaller companies you have to do it all by your self. You have to sleep some times and the more you can automate the better of you are in a tight human resource situation. For excellent coverage on the usage of systems and further education i recommend you going the GCIA certification track and read Stephen Northcutts books (or maybe you already are taking the track). One thing to really keep in mind is that IDS is not a product it is a process, you will need time to constantly update and maintain this imporant part of your infrastructure.

## Sources / Resources for information used and additional information:

### Internet

[http://www.shmoo.com/mail/ids/nov\\_99/msg00047.html](http://www.shmoo.com/mail/ids/nov_99/msg00047.html) (archived discussion about hardware/ids)  
<http://www.metases.com/files/Shomiti.pdf> (document on Shomiti taps with Cisco2900)  
<http://www.finisar-systems.com/products/index.html> (Ethernet and Fiberchannel taps)  
<http://www.niksun.com/products/netver.html> (if you dont want to build your trafficdumper by yourself)  
[http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Charles\\_Hutson\\_GCIA.doc](http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Charles_Hutson_GCIA.doc) (assignment2 is about outsourcing)  
<http://www.tcpdump.org/> (TCPDUMP)  
<http://www.snort.org/> (Snort IDS) \*no its not spelled Snorth, Mr.Consult -know-it-all\*  
<http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/> (Shadow IDS)  
<http://www.cert.org/kb/acid/> (Analyst Console for Intrusion Databases)  
<http://www.freebsd.org> (Highperformance and stable Operating System)  
<http://www.openbsd.org> (Highly secured and stable Operating System)

### Books & other info

Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst's Handbook: Stephen Northcutt, Judy Novak, Donald McLachlan (2000)  
Manpages from the BSD distributions can learn you alot! Also be sure to check out TCPDUMP

## Assignment2old

### Update of Trojans and worms, correlated with known ports

(replaced by Assignment2new on October 25:th 2001)

#### Background

This update has used Joakim von Brauns list as a base, with modifications and corrections. Updates have been gathered from my lab and from the sources listed below.

#### Overview

Although times are changing and trojanports can be modified the list below can still be used to see potential trojan traffic. The pageformat here restricted me from correlating the ports with the wellknown/regular services. **Please also look in the separate file** included in my submitted work there should be a text file with tabbed separation and a preformatted excelfile. For the known ports the FreeBSD servicelist was used (IANA).

Port	Protocol	Alternative Servicename/Trojan/Activity
	ICMP	Skydance (used to run on TCP 4000)
2	TCP	Death
20	TCP	Senna Spy FTP server
21	TCP	Back Construc tion, Blade Runner, Doly Trojan, Fore, Freddy, Invisible FTP, Juggernaut 42 , Larva, Motlv FTP, Net Administrator, Senna Spy FTP server, Traitor 21, WebEx, WinCrash
22	TCP	Shaft
23	TCP	Fire HackEr, Tiny Telnet Server - TTS, Truva Atl
25	TCP	Ajan, Antigen, BSE Trojan, Email Password Sender - EPS, EPS II, Gip, Gris, Happy99, Hpteam mail, I love you, Kuang2, Magic Horse, MBT (Mail Bombing Trojan), Moscow Email trojan, Naebi, NewApt worm, ProMail trojan, Shtirlitz, Stealth, Tapiras, Terminator, WinPC, W inSp
31	TCP	Agent 31, Hackers Paradise, Masters Paradise
39	TCP	SubSARI
41	TCP	Deep Throat, Foreplay or Reduced Foreplay
44	TCP	Artic
48	TCP	DRAT
50	TCP	DRAT
58	TCP	DMSSetup
59	TCP	DMSSetup
79	TCP	CDK, Firehotcker
80	TCP	AckCmd, Ba ck End, CGI Backdoor, Executor, Hooker, RingZero
81	TCP	RemoConChubo
99	TCP	Hidden
110	TCP	ProMail trojan
113	TCP	Invisible Identd Deamon, Kazimas
119	TCP	Happy99
121	TCP	JammerKillah
123	TCP	Net Controller
133	TCP	Farnaz
142	TCP	NetTaxi
146	TCP	Infector
146	UDP	Infector
170	TCP	A-trojan

334	TCP	Backage
420	TCP	Breach
421	TCP	TCP Wrappers trojan
456	TCP	Hackers Paradise
513	TCP	Grlogin
514	TCP	RPC Backdoor
531	TCP	Rasmin
555	TCP	Ini-Killer , Net Ad ministrator, Phase Zero, Phase -0, Stealth Spy
605	TCP	Secret Service
666	TCP	Attack FTP, Back Construction, Cain & Abel, NokNok, Satans Back Door - SBD, ServU, Shadow Phyre
667	TCP	SniperNet
669	TCP	DP trojan
692	TCP	GayOL
777	TCP	AimSpy, Undetected
808	TCP	WinHole
911	UDP	Dark Shadow
911	TCP	Dark Shadow
999	TCP	Deep Throat, Foreplay or Reduced Foreplay, WinSatan
1000	TCP	Der Späher / Der Spæher
1001	TCP	Data Theef, Der Späher / Der Spæher, Le Gardien, Silencer, WebEx
1010	TCP	Doly Trojan v1.35
1011	TCP	Doly Trojan
1012	TCP	Doly Trojan
1015	TCP	Doly Trojan
1016	TCP	Doly Trojan v1.5
1020	TCP	Vampire
1024	TCP	NetSpy, Latinus
1031	TCP	Xanadu
1042	TCP	BLA trojan
1045	TCP	Rasmin
1049	TCP	/sbin/initd
1050	TCP	MiniCommand
1054	TCP	AckCmd
1080	TCP	WinHole
1081	TCP	WinHole
1082	TCP	WinHole
1083	TCP	WinHole
1090	TCP	Xtreme
1095	TCP	Remote Administration Tool - RAT
1097	TCP	Remote Administration Tool - RAT
1098	TCP	Remote Administration Tool - RAT
1099	TCP	Blood Fest Evolution, Remote Administration Tool - RAT
1170	TCP	Psyber Stream Server - PSS, Streaming Audio Server, Voice
1200	UDP	NoBackO
1201	UDP	NoBackO
1207	TCP	SoftWAR
1212	TCP	Kaos, Stealth Proxy [I] (hidden Socks4/5 Proxy server)
1234	TCP	Ultors Trojan
1243	TCP	BackDoor-G, SubSeven , SubSeven Apocalypse, Tiles
1245	TCP	VooDoo Doll, NetBus, GabanBus
1255	TCP	Scarab
1256	TCP	Project nEXT
1269	TCP	Matrix
1313	TCP	NETrojan
1338	TCP	Millenium Worm
1349	TCP	Bo dll



1386 TCP	Dagger
1492 TCP	FTP99CMP
1509 TCP	Psyber Streaming Server
1524 TCP	Trin00
1600 TCP	Shivka-Burka
1777 TCP	Scarab
1807 TCP	SpySender
1966 TCP	Fake FTP
1969 TCP	OpC BO
1981 TCP	Bowl, Shockrave
1999 TCP	Back Door, TransScout
2000 TCP	Der Späher / Der Spaeher, Insane Network
2001 TCP	Der Späher / Der Spaeher, TrojanCow
2023 TCP	Ripper Pro
2080 TCP	WinHole
2115 TCP	Bugs
2140 TCP	The Invasor
2140 UDP	Deep Throat, Fore play or Reduced Foreplay
2155 TCP	Illusion Mailer
2255 TCP	Nirvana
2283 TCP	HVL RAT5
2300 TCP	Xplorer
2339 TCP	Voice Spy (Contact)
2339 UDP	Voice Spy
2345 TCP	Doly Trojan
2565 TCP	Striker trojan
2583 TCP	WinCrash
2589 TCP	Dagger
2600 TCP	Digital RootBeer
2716 TCP	The Prayer
2773 TCP	SubSeven , SubSeven 2.1 Gold
2801 TCP	Phineas Phucker
2989 UDP	Remote Administration Tool - RAT
3000 TCP	Remote Shut
3024 TCP	WinCrash
3128 TCP	RingZero
3129 TCP	Masters Par adise
3131 TCP	SubSARI
3150 TCP	The Invasor
3150 UDP	Deep Throat, Foreplay or Reduced Foreplay
3456 TCP	Terror trojan
3459 TCP	Eclipse 2000, Sanctuary
3700 TCP	Portal of Doom - POD
3791 TCP	Total Solar Eclypse
3801 TCP	Total Solar Ec lypse
4000 TCP	Skydance (newer versions run ICMP)
4092 TCP	WinCrash
4201 TCP	War Trojan
4242 TCP	Virtual Hacking Machine - VHM
4321 TCP	BoBo
4444 TCP	Prosiak, Swift Remote
4567 TCP	File Nail
4590 TCP	ICQ Trojan
4950 TCP	ICQ Trogen (Lm)
5000 TCP	Back Door Setup, Blazer5, Bubbel, ICKiller, Sockets des Troie, BioNet (lite 1.0)
5001 TCP	Back Door Setup, Sockets des Troie
5002 TCP	cd00r, Shaft

5010	TCP	Solo
5011	TCP	One of the Last Trojans - OOTLT, One of the Last Trojans - OOTLT, modified
5025	TCP	WM Remote KeyLogger
5031	TCP	Net Metropolitan
5032	TCP	Net Metropolitan
5321	TCP	Firehotcker
5343	TCP	WCrat - WC Remote Administration Tool
5400	TCP	Back Construction, Blade Runner
5401	TCP	Back Construction, Blade Runner 1
5402	TCP	Back Construction, Blade Runner 2
5512	TCP	Illusion Mailer
5550	TCP	Xtcp
5555	TCP	ServeMe
5556	TCP	BO Facil
5557	TCP	BO Facil
5569	TCP	Robo-Hack
5637	TCP	PC Crasher
5638	TCP	PC Crasher
5742	TCP	WinCrash
5760	TCP	Portmap Remote Root Linux Exploit
5882	UDP	Y3K RAT
5888	TCP	Y3K RAT
6000	TCP	The Thing
6006	TCP	Bad Blood
6272	TCP	Secret Service
6400	TCP	The Thing
6666	TCP	Dark Connection Inside, NetBus worm
6667	TCP	ScheduleAgent, Trinity, WinSatan
6669	TCP	Host Control, Vampire
6670	TCP	BackWeb Server, Deep Throat, Foreplay or Reduced Foreplay, WinNuke eXtreme
6711	TCP	BackDoor-G, SubSeven, VP Killer, SubSARI
6712	TCP	Funny trojan, SubSeven
6713	TCP	SubSeven
6723	TCP	Mstream
6771	TCP	Deep Throat, Foreplay or Reduced Foreplay
6776	TCP	2000 Cracks, BackDoor -G, SubSeven, VP Killer
6838	UDP	Mstream
6883	TCP	Delta Source DarkStar (??)
6912	TCP	Shit Heep
6939	TCP	Indoctrination
6969	TCP	GateCrasher, IRC3, Net Controller, Priority
6970	TCP	GateCrasher
7000	TCP	Exploit Translation Server, Kazimas, Remote Grab, SubSeven 2.1 Gold
7001	TCP	Freak88
7215	TCP	SubSeven, SubSeven 2.1 Gold
7300	TCP	NetMonitor
7301	TCP	NetMonitor 1
7306	TCP	NetMonitor
7307	TCP	NetMonitor 3
7308	TCP	NetMonitor 4
7424	TCP	Host Control
7424	UDP	Host Control
7597	TCP	Qaz
7626	TCP	Glacier Backdoor
7777	TCP	Tini
7789	TCP	Back Door Setup, ICKiller
7983	TCP	Mstream

8080	TCP	Brown Orifice , Re moConChubo, RingZero
8787	TCP	Back Orifice 2000
8988	TCP	BacHack
8989	TCP	Rcon, Recon, Xcon
9000	TCP	Netministrator
9325	UDP	Mstream
9400	TCP	InCommand
9872	TCP	Portal of Doom - POD
9873	TCP	Portal of Doom - POD 1
9874	TCP	Portal of Doom - POD 2
9875	TCP	Portal of Doom - POD 3
9876	TCP	Cyber Attacker, Rux
9878	TCP	TransScout
9989	TCP	Ini-Killer
9999	TCP	The Prayer
10067	UDP	Portal of Doom - POD 4
10085	TCP	Syphillis
10086	TCP	Syphillis
10100	TCP	Gift
10101	TCP	BrainSpy
10167	UDP	Portal of Doom - POD 5
10520	TCP	Acid Shivers
10528	TCP	Host Control
10607	TCP	Coma
10666	UDP	Ambush
11000	TCP	Senna Spy Trojan Generator
11050	TCP	Host Control
11051	TCP	Host Control
11223	TCP	Progenic trojan, Secret Agent
12076	TCP	Gjamer
12223	TCP	Hack'99 KeyLogger
12310	TCP	Precursor
12345	TCP	Cron / crontab, Fat Bitch trojan, GabanBus, icmp_pipe.c, Mypic , NetBus , NetBus Toy, NetBus worm, Pie Bill Gates, VaLV -N.E.t, Whack Job, X -bill
12346	TCP	Fat Bitch trojan, GabanBus, NetBus , X -bill
12349	TCP	BioNet
12361	TCP	Whack-a-mole
12362	TCP	Whack-a-mole
12623	UDP	DUN Control
12624	TCP	ButtMan
12631	TCP	Whack Job
12754	TCP	Mstream
13000	TCP	Senna Spy Trojan Generator
13010	TCP	Hacker Brasil - HBR
14500	TCP	PC Invader
15092	TCP	Host Control
15104	TCP	Mstream
15382	TCP	Sub7 (old beta)
15858	TCP	CDK
16484	TCP	Mosucker
16660	TCP	Stacheldraht
16772	TCP	ICQ Revenge
16969	TCP	Priority
17166	TCP	Mosaic
17300	TCP	Kuang2 the virus
17449	TCP	Kid Terror
17499	TCP	CrazyNet

17777	TCP	Nephron
18753	UDP	Shaft
19864	TCP	ICQ Revenge
20000	TCP	Millenium
20001	TCP	Millenium, Millenium (Lm)
20002	TCP	AcidkoR
20005	TCP	MoSucker
20023	TCP	VP Killer
20034	TCP	NetBus 2.0 Pro, NetRex, Whack Job
20331	TCP	BLA trojan
20432	TCP	Shaft
20433	UDP	Shaft
21544	TCP	GirlFriend, Kid Terror
21554	TCP	Exploiter, Kid Terror, Schwindler, Winsp00fer, Exploiter, Freddy
22222	TCP	Donald Dick, Prosiak
23005	TCP	NetTrash
23023	TCP	Logged
23032	TCP	Amanda
23432	TCP	Asylum
23456	TCP	Evil FTP, Ugly FTP, Whack Job
23476	TCP	Donald Dick
23476	UDP	Donald Dick
23477	TCP	Donald Dick
26274	UDP	Delta Source
26681	TCP	Voice Spy - OBS!!! namnen har bytt plats
27374	TCP	Bad Blood, DefCon 8, Lion Worm (no trojan it's a worm), Ramen Worm (no trojan it's a worm) Sub7 , Sub7 2.1 Gold, Sub7 2.1.4, Sub7 2.2
27444	UDP	Trin00 master to daemon communication
27573	TCP	SubSeven
27665	TCP	Trin00 attacker to master
29104	TCP	NetTrojan
29891	TCP	The Unexplained
30001	TCP	ErrOr32
30003	TCP	Lamers Death
30029	TCP	AOL trojan
30100	TCP	NetSphere
30101	TCP	NetSphere
30102	TCP	NetSphere
30103	TCP	NetSphere
30103	UDP	NetSphere
30129	TCP	Masters Paradise
30133	TCP	NetSphere
30303	TCP	Sockets des Troie , Socket23
30700	TCP	Mantis by Shaban
30947	TCP	Intruse
30999	TCP	Kuang2
31335	UDP	Trin00 daemon communication to master
31336	TCP	Bo Whack , Butt Funnel
31337	TCP	Back Fire, Back Orifice (Lm), Back Orifice russian, Baron Night, Beone, BO client, BO Facil, BO spy, BO2, cron / crontab, Freak88, icmp_pipe.c, Sockdmini
31337	UDP	Back Orifice, Deep BO
31338	TCP	Back Orifice, Butt Funnel, DK NetSpy
31338	UDP	Deep BO, DK NetSpy
31339	TCP	DK NetSpy
31339	UDP	DK NetSpy
31557	TCP	Xanadu
31666	TCP	BOWhack
31785	TCP	Hack'a'Tack

31788	TCP	Hack'a'Tack
31789	UDP	Hack'a'Tack
31790	TCP	Hack'a'Tack
31791	UDP	Hack'a'Tack
31792	TCP	Hack'a'Tack
32001	TCP	Donald Dick
32100	TCP	Peanut Brittle, Project nEXT
32418	TCP	Acid Battery
33270	TCP	Trinity v.3
33333	TCP	Blakharaz, Prosiak
33567	TCP	Lion Worm backdoor Root Shell
33568	TCP	Lion Worm trojan SSH daem on
33577	TCP	PsychWard
33777	TCP	PsychWard
33911	TCP	Spirit 2000, Spirit 2001
34324	TCP	Big Gluck, TN , Tiny Telnet Server
34444	TCP	Donald Dick
34555	UDP	Trin00 (for Windows)
35555	UDP	Trin00 (for Windows)
37651	TCP	Yet Another Troja n - YAT
39168	TCP	Trinity v.3
40412	TCP	The Spy
40421	TCP	Agent 40421, Masters Paradise
40422	TCP	Masters Paradise 1
40423	TCP	Masters Paradise 2
40426	TCP	Masters Paradise 3
41666	TCP	Remote Boot Tool - RBT, Remote Boot Tool - RBT
44444	TCP	Prosiak
47262	UDP	Delta Source
50000	TCP	SubSARI
50505	TCP	Sockets des Troie
50766	TCP	Fore, Schwindler
51966	TCP	Cafeini
52317	TCP	Acid Battery 2000
53001	TCP	Remote Windows Shutdown - RWS
54283	TCP	SubSeven , SubSeven 2.1 Gol d
54320	TCP	Back Orifice 2000
54321	TCP	Back Orifice 2000, School Bus
55555	TCP	B02k, Eurocalculator
55850	TCP	MyServer DDoS Agent
57341	TCP	NetRaider
58339	TCP	Butt Funnel
60000	TCP	Deep Throat, Foreplay or Reduced Foreplay, Sockets des Troie
60008	TCP	Lion Worm Root Shell (t0rn rootkit)
60068	TCP	Xzip 6000068
60411	TCP	Connection
61348	TCP	Bunker-Hill
61466	TCP	TeleCommando
61603	TCP	Bunker-Hill
63485	TCP	Bunker-Hill
64101	TCP	Taskman / Task Manager
65000	TCP	Devil, Sockets des Troie, Stacheldraht
65432	TCP	The Traitor (= th3tr41t0r)
65432	UDP	The Traitor (= th3tr41t0r)
65534	TCP	/sbin/initd
65535	TCP	RC1 trojan (Remote Control)

**Second reminder: The full Correlation and comparison with well known ports/services is included in the zip file and perhaps edited for webformat at the sans website(?).**

Sources:

[http://www.sys-security.com/html/papers/trojan\\_list.html](http://www.sys-security.com/html/papers/trojan_list.html)  
<http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/IDFAQ/oddports.htm>  
<http://www.simovits.com/trojans/>  
<http://dark-e.com/archive/trojans/>  
<http://www.certcc.or.kr/advisory/>  
<http://www.dark-e.com/cgi-bin/quiz.cgi>  
<http://www.zone-labs.com/knowledgebase/trojanports.html>  
<http://www.multimania.com/cdc/trojanh.htm>

One link that seems to hold additional correlation with other ports is

<http://www.lost.net.au/~ben/ports>

the deadline and me being out of office/labs couldn't make me include any trojans listed there.

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# Assignment 3

## Analyse This

[I am assuming this is a university network]

### Executive Summary:

What you are dealing with here is massive problems and a very open network. The point that is most interesting is the spread of attacks on various networks. Perhaps some institutions still have their own support personal and in some cases there are dorms running wild during times where there are not finals coming up. I have seen this before and at the end you will find some projects recommended. The projects should be **considered** doing already this budget year. Most of the tools needed can be provided with no installation/license costs if Freeware/Open Source is used, other then the time needed.


But before assigning personnel and resources on those projects let me summarize the technical details listed below.

Likely you have been hacked by people from the outside.

Likely your policies are failing in some institutions where malicious activity is originating from. We have various malicious activity inside ranging from Portscanning to Trojans.

Trojans can be used by students to steal/plagiarize other students work and worse!

At the end of the report you will find diagrams and statistics that can be useful for knowing where to start the work. I will include one diagram here for easy viewing of internal hosts as the source of alert.



## Analyze this, findings

Working with a security audit for a university is always a challenge since there is often loose rulesets on the eventual firewalls compared to my own environment. Several of the log files were available for me but not the architecture and layout of the site. However in the previous work on the net did help me out.

The analysis process I used was to combine the strength of UNIX in its places (sorting and getting humanreadable data), while using Microsoft Office for the representation of it. As an attempt to get to know what kind of arena we were talking about here I used the excellent perlscripts by Chris Kuethe (his work is linked from the GCIA Analysts page [http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/chris\\_kuethe\\_gcia.html](http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/chris_kuethe_gcia.html)).

Alerts from 2001-03-01-> 2001-07-13 (redid this procedure on 2001-07-15 for updated analysis)

```
bash-2.05# perl -s /home/my_nick/prog/alertcount.pl -t /home/gcia/alert.*
>./total && sort -nr ./total > ./sorted2
```

Produced this data:

(please also look in the diagram section which has excluded the outside network)

3495193	UDP SRC and DST outside network	83,47365%
229542	Watchlist 000220 IL -ISDNNET -990517	5,48202%
160686	Possible trojan server activity	3,83757%
46046	SYN-FIN scan!	1,09969%
37030	WinGate 1 080 Attempt	0,88437%
33057	High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic	0,78948%
32004	Attempted Sun RPC high port access	0,76433%
31224	Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28 -jul-00	0,74570%
27723	External RPC call	0,66209%
17407	High port 65535 tcp - possible Red Worm - traffic	0,41572%
17144	SMB Name Wildcard	0,40944%
11956	Possible RAMEN server activity	0,28554%
10967	Connect to 515 from outside	0,26192%
9564	Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313 -1	0,22841%
7425	Tiny Fragments - Possible Hostile Activity	0,17733%
6617	Queso fingerprint	0,15803%
4864	Watchlist 000222 NET -NCFC	0,11616%
3029	SUNRPC highport access!	0,07234%
2033	TCP SRC and DST outside network	0,04855%
1696	Back Orifice	0,04050%
920	Null scan!	0,02197%
614	NMAP TCP ping!	0,01466%
196	ICMP SRC and DST outside network	0,00468%
133	Connect to 515 from inside	0,00318%
54	SNMP public access	0,00129%
21	Probable NMAP fingerprint attempt	0,00050%
13	STATDX UDP attack	0,00031%
11	TCP SMTP Source Port traffic	0,00026%
8	SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623	0,00019%
2	Broadcast Ping to subnet 70	0,00005%
1	hax0r boy 010615	0,00002%
1	Happy 99 Virus	0,00002%



As i saw it was a limited inventory of unique kinds of events. My first priority was to analyze the trojans and virus attacks. I did that judgement based on that "we got hackers" possibly inside the network already. That one event of "hax0r boy 010615" got me particularly interested on what it was, its not in the snort rule set.

I made a big logfile of alertfile then substituted My.NET to 192.168 with sed ("cat bigfile | sed s/MY.NET/10.0/g") Redid this to 10.0 after realizing that 192.168.\*\*\*.\*\*\* was in use from another internal network.

**I tried Snortsnarf on the files for further simplified analysis but could not get all days into the same statistics due to snortsnarfs heavy memory usage.** I did however get them in one by one in a browsable directory.

### WinGate 1080 Attempt

A search/connection attempt for WinGate (usually runs on port 1080). If a cracker were to use this, in the victims log the Wingate machine would show up not revealing the crackers true [read: previous] IP-Address.

### High port 65535 udp possible Red Worm - traffic

Red Worm could compromise Linux hosts installing back door access, but this port is also used by Remote Control (RC Trojan).

During April there seems to be alot of traffic being generated from 10.0.253.12 examples below

```
04/04-09:22:26.908922  [**] High port 65535 tcp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.253.12:47193 -> 10.0.59.131:65535
04/04-09:22:30.818622  [**] High port 65535 tcp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.253.12:47196 -> 10.0.59.132:65535
[note that the capture above is TCP based, it could be internal scans for the worm]
```

### Russia Dynamo

Although alittle undocumented this seems to be a trojan/virus with the ability to "phone home".

194.87.6.33 has valid reverse DNS of 33.6.87.194.dynamic.dol.ru

194.87.6.189 has valid reverse DNS of 189.6.87.194.dynamic.dol.ru

194.87.6.21 has valid reverse DNS of 21.6.87.194.dynamic.dol.ru

Using some different ports 1596, 1598, 316, 317 2226 2233, 2234 (and others) but 316-317 seems to be sending/receiving port at the hacked side  
It seems somewhat "crafted"... 10.0.178.42 responds to 194.87.6.21

Example of different ports:

```
04/09-00:22:47.392083  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:2227
04/09-00:22:51.390345  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:317 ->
194.87.6.106:2222
```

```

04/09-00:22:51.418620  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:2229
04/09-00:22:55.980801  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:2231
04/09-00:22:56.518739  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:317 ->
194.87.6.106:2222
04/09-00:23:01.228070  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:2233
04/09-00:23:01.566307  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:2233
04/09-00:23:01.566593  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:2233
04/09-00:23:03.774136  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:317 ->
194.87.6.106:2222
04/09-00:23:05.840195  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:2234

```

### The attacker stops at an earlier point

```

04/06-18:41:08.075705  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1094
04/06-18:41:09.807090  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1094
04/06-18:41:09.809037  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1094
04/06-18:41:09.809247  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1094
04/06-18:41:12.029163  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1094
04/06-18:41:12.029405  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1094
04/06-18:41:12.029694  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1094
04/06-18:41:12.476418  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1094

```

### And resumes again

```

04/06-20:07:58.026064  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1256
04/06-20:07:58.441197  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1256
04/06-20:07:58.441700  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1256
04/06-20:08:00.361982  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.106:1256 ->
10.0.178.42:316
04/06-20:08:01.515631  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1256
04/06-20:08:05.246483  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1256
04/06-20:08:07.950065  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.106:1256 ->
10.0.178.42:316
04/06-20:08:10.065797  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.106:1256 ->
10.0.178.42:316
04/06-20:08:10.339432  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1256
04/06-20:08:12.273942  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.106:1256 ->
10.0.178.42:316
04/06-20:08:14.837635  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1256
04/06-20:08:15.812275  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.106:1256 ->
10.0.178.42:316
04/06-20:08:15.815564  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:316 ->
194.87.6.106:1256

```

### There is a stop over some time aswell

```

04/28-09:01:24.401167  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.144:2074 ->
10.0.218.86:6700
04/28-09:01:32.992812  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.144:2074 ->
10.0.218.86:6700
04/28-09:01:32.992858  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.144:2074 ->
10.0.218.86:6700

```

```

04/28-09:01:32.992904  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.144:2074 ->
10.0.218.86:6700
04/28-09:01:32.992948  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.144:2074 ->
10.0.218.86:6700
04/28-09:01:32.992993  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 194.87.6.144:2074 ->
10.0.218.86:6700
05/16-20:16:08.430781  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:317 ->
194.87.6.45:1551
05/16-20:16:39.746815  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:317 ->
194.87.6.45:1563
05/16-20:16:40.933776  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:317 ->
194.87.6.45:1564
05/16-20:16:44.105137  [**] Russia Dynamo - SANS Flash 28-jul-00 [**] 10.0.178.42:317 ->
194.87.6.45:1565

```

Alot of the activity was under April but i still recommend looking into the above host for furt her analysis.

### External RPC call

Programs using RPC (Remote Procedure Calls) has had a troublesome history and usually they are blocked at firewalls. These connections are not to be taken lightly, because alot of exploit code exist for various platforms. Also see the note about Sun RPC high port access.

### SMB Name Wildcard

On port 137 Windows machines in a network communication is interchanged about machinenames and users. A wildcard could potentially give out everyhost/user on the network in question. This is for recon not intrusion. Not that high risk.

### Possible RAMEN server activity

Ramen is a Worm infecting Red Hat 6.2 and 7.0. It is using vulnerabilities in LPRng, rpc statd and wu-ftp. It leaves a server running on port 27374 distributing itself furt her.

More information available on [www.sans.org/y2k/ramen.htm](http://www.sans.org/y2k/ramen.htm)

### Connect to 515 from outside

Port 515, a well-known port LPRng for printing services, could be used for intruders to exploit this service for information leaks and various denial of service attacks (removing printques for example). If there exist any holes in this service a rootshell could be dropped to the attacker.

There is some strange activity here though that I would advise you to drop at a previous router

```

05/17-14:21:37.151619  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.137.92:515
05/25-00:22:48.795281  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.133.109:515
05/26-22:40:40.877276  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.137.175:515
05/27-06:01:33.056576  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.132.129:515
05/27-11:43:09.224530  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.135.77:515
05/29-05:25:41.292060  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.132.62:515
05/30-11:49:59.466081  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.137.204:515
05/31-02:13:05.254837  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.132.180:515
06/01-03:15:40.778816  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.137.60:515

```

```
06/01-22:48:22.674710  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.132.117:515
06/02-09:03:16.407159  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.137.123:515
06/02-20:45:09.154901  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.132.197:515
06/03-14:36:30.623742  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.132.32:515
06/04-09:56:22.301178  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.132.51:515
06/07-11:08:36.127132  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.137.19:515
06/10-12:15:47.342416  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.133.82:515
06/10-14:38:46.978955  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.133.216:515
06/11-17:34:16.983125  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.133.42:515
```

255.255.255.255 is **NOT** a valid IP address, although scriptkiddies sometimes think it would make a huge ping for the whole internet. (this isn't the case). This is a crafted packet

### **Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1**

Could be a backdoor for Linux systems, shutting down some services and replacing 'ls' and 'ps' with its own versions. I'm honestly not that familiar with it, it is listed in my trojan list on this port. I recommend further reading on the following URL

<http://lists.insecure.org/incidents/2000/Oct/0141.html>

Its purpose should be "a Trinoo -style tool called MyServer on their linux box"

Information from

[http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:d9xVEpq0\\_pc:www.sans.org/y2k/082200.htm++myserver+55850&hl=sv](http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:d9xVEpq0_pc:www.sans.org/y2k/082200.htm++myserver+55850&hl=sv)

### **Tiny Fragments - Possible Hostile Activity**

Many tiny fragments can cause denial of service on some Microsoft Windows machines. These small fragments may also be used to "fool" it to let it pass through firewalls since their length could be below minimum fragment size for certain filters.

### **Queso fingerprint**

A program used for fingerprinting networked machines without the 3-way handshake.

### **Attempted Sun RPC high port access**

This is a scan for ephemeral ports using the direct port instead of via the portmapper to find out the port number (portmapper usually runs on port 111). Although SUN themselves have not released the full information about this issue ("any day now" since a while back). I believe that these ports are primarily used for internal usage. Firewalling them would be recommended.

### **Back Orifice**

Port 31337 is always kind of interesting to look and search for, it is Elite for these crackers to use this port and in several cases I have seen this port being used for various services. In the Snort logs we can see various scans for this port. Back to the subject: Back Orifice much like NetBus

are trojans that can be used for remote administration. It was a popular backdoor in 1998 but nowadays I haven't seen much BO activity. Sub7 is the trojan that gets most attention now. BO is however very potentially dangerous!!! But most Antiviral software can deal with it pretty easily.

Some correlation can however be made....

```
03/13-22:24:56.749614  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 209.112.47.7:31337 ->
10.0.135.120:515
04/14-09:31:24.834984  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 210.61.82.20:31337 ->
10.0.133.194:515
04/23-09:29:14.420358  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 255.255.255.255:31337 ->
10.0.137.174:515
04/27-03:55:03.830585  [**] connect to 515 from outside [**] 207.18.175.10:31337 ->
10.0.134.71:515
```

My question... is it 31337 with print spoolers? the paperless society isn't already here ???

### Null Scan

These are scans (maybe from nmap) with no TCP flags set. See in the detects for a similar practical example. These packages should never exist in the normal communication so they are crafted in some way.

### NMAP TCP ping

Sort of like a ping but using TCP with a ack instead of ICMP Echo. A recon scans for open services. As an example we can see this search for ftp sites:

```
04/03-07:56:46.541493  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.144:21
04/03-07:58:12.029339  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.149:21
04/03-07:58:17.742633  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.149:21
04/03-08:00:25.709372  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.156:21
04/03-08:02:17.099803  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.169:21
04/03-08:03:12.754353  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.172:21
04/03-08:04:01.048707  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.175:21
04/03-08:04:07.628942  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.175:21
04/03-08:05:57.237796  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.181:21
04/03-08:06:42.223664  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.183:21
04/03-08:07:18.570074  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.185:21
04/03-08:07:25.919783  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.185:21
04/03-08:08:01.014153  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.188:21
04/03-08:08:50.611628  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 217.3.182.110:43186 -> 10.0.53.191:21
```

Speaking of scans I have not placed that much energy in the portscans but 211.240.28.66 seems to have scanned quite a bit in beginning of June.

### SNMP public access

Scans against Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), UDP port 161. SNMP is a protocol that is used to pass information about network equipment such as routers switches. An intruder can use this information to gather valuable information about networks, which could be used in an attack at a later date. These should definitely be blocked at a firewall.

### Probable NMAP fingerprint attempt

Nmap as mentioned above can be used as a network fingerprinting program. However, snort can be used as a "nmap fingerprinter program" from its particular habits in scanning. So the 21 detects here are highly likely to have been using nmap as their scanning device.

Just making one example here from internal hosts

```
06/09-17:43:32.486337  [**] Probable NMAP fingerprint attempt [**] 10.0.100.65:62178 ->
10.0.101.141:7
```

### **STATDX UDP attack**

STATDX exploits rpc.statd, statd itself is demanded to get a functioning NFS session and the connections are usually made via the portmapper.

```
04/07-08:34:23.517421  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 212.131.172.130:669 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
04/10-02:44:07.761846  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 24.43.176.96:2099 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
05/13-17:25:23.747462  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 24.12.85.103:1016 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
05/25-13:26:13.548623  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 213.66.5.79:707 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
05/25-21:34:55.164114  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 209.247.88.12:859 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
06/12-19:32:18.546477  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 129.49.65.82:1014 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
06/21-13:00:24.763749  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 139.142.135.118:717 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
06/22-23:44:51.058551  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 210.107.198.164:973 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
06/25-22:53:16.464836  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 212.209.79.162:717 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
06/26-05:14:35.459849  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 212.209.79.162:620 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
06/30-12:17:02.869023  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 210.90.168.5:836 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
07/01-09:00:37.454441  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 211.23.6.234:835 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
07/13-03:50:33.248147  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 210.223.52.151:741 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
```

Looking further from attacks from 24.43.176.96 you see him in some portmapper scannings aswell, example:

```
04/09-16:39:00.095674  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.43.176.96:3438 -> 10.0.134.210:111
04/09-16:39:00.118155  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.43.176.96:3441 -> 10.0.134.213:111
04/09-16:39:00.826378  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.43.176.96:3540 -> 10.0.135.56:111
04/09-16:39:00.883688  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.43.176.96:3548 -> 10.0.135.64:111
```

And some portscans aswell

```
04/09-16:53:48.211369  [**] spp_portscan: portscan status from 24.43.176.96: 15 connections
across 15 hosts: TCP(15), UDP(0) [**]
04/09-16:53:50.734537  [**] spp_portscan: End of portscan from 24.43.176.96 (TOTAL HOSTS:54
TCP:56 UDP:0) [**]
```

I assume that 24.12.85.103 is in some way relating to this individual and look at alerts from this host. He has a similar “trackrecord” the following month

```
05/13-17:26:57.596230  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:2932 -> 10.0.132.22:111
05/13-17:26:57.650085  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:2941 -> 10.0.132.31:111
05/13-17:26:57.878334  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:2977 -> 10.0.132.67:111
05/13-17:26:57.985854  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3103 -> 10.0.132.193:111
05/13-17:26:57.997435  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3105 -> 10.0.132.195:111
05/13-17:26:58.368244  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3293 -> 10.0.133.128:111
05/13-17:26:58.781355  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3406 -> 10.0.133.241:111
05/13-17:41:11.447819  [**] spp_portscan: PORTSCAN DETECTED from 24.12.85.103 (THRESHOLD 7
connections in 2 seconds) [**]
05/13-17:26:58.893185  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3426 -> 10.0.134.6:111
05/13-17:26:58.928998  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3432 -> 10.0.134.12:111
05/13-17:26:59.406011  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3633 -> 10.0.134.213:111
05/13-17:26:59.467621  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3643 -> 10.0.134.223:111
05/13-17:26:59.856202  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3836 -> 10.0.135.161:111
05/13-17:26:59.867819  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3838 -> 10.0.135.163:111
05/13-17:27:00.083553  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3873 -> 10.0.135.198:111
05/13-17:27:00.268393  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3879 -> 10.0.135.204:111
05/13-17:27:00.558761  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:3925 -> 10.0.135.250:111
05/13-17:41:13.373415  [**] spp_portscan: portscan status from 24.12.85.103: 16 connections
across 16 hosts: TCP(16), UDP(0) [**]
05/13-17:27:01.692126  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:4352 -> 10.0.137.167:111
05/13-17:27:01.728228  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:4358 -> 10.0.137.173:111
05/13-17:27:01.756704  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:4362 -> 10.0.137.177:111
05/13-17:27:01.940867  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:4392 -> 10.0.137.207:111
05/13-17:27:01.958587  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:4394 -> 10.0.137.209:111
05/13-17:27:01.981864  [**] External RPC call [**] 24.12.85.103:4398 -> 10.0.137.213:111
05/13-17:41:15.668962  [**] spp_portscan: portscan status from 24.12.85.103: 6 connections across
6 hosts: TCP(6), UDP(0) [**]
```

05/13-17:41:18.196608 [\*\*] spp\_portscan: End of portscan from 24.12.85.103 (TOTAL HOSTS:21  
TCP:22 UDP:0) [\*\*]

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I also assumed that patterns are alike for the other attackers. But here is something interesting!

```
05/25-13:26:13.003934  [**] External RPC call [**] 213.66.5.79:2402 -> 10.0.6.15:111
05/25-13:26:13.548623  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 213.66.5.79:707 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
05/25-13:26:14.095402  [**] External RPC call [**] 213.66.5.79:2402 -> 10.0.6.15:111

05/25-21:34:55.064589  [**] External RPC call [**] 209.247.88.12:2857 -> 10.0.6.15:111
05/25-21:34:55.164114  [**] STATDX UDP attack [**] 209.247.88.12:859 -> 10.0.6.15:32776
```

I highly recommend analyzing this host: 10.0.6.15, also see in the Link Diagram for more information.

### TCP SMTP Source Port traffic

```
03/20-18:35:12.740918  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 207.175.141.6:25 -> 10.0.207.28:522
04/19-10:48:40.446704  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 204.214.6.215:25 ->
10.0.201.32:1004
04/20-02:12:43.373137  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 204.214.6.215:25 ->
10.0.75.134:1018
04/20-04:05:19.987554  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 204.214.6.215:25 ->
10.0.138.120:1003
04/20-05:30:11.331118  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 204.214.6.215:25 ->
10.0.152.179:1014
04/25-14:44:09.628978  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 195.40.27.50:25 ->
10.0.161.125:1011
05/14-04:25:50.665911  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 63.218.225.88:25 ->
10.0.139.54:1007
05/18-10:59:47.340244  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 129.43.100.100:25 ->
10.0.253.53:281
07/03-11:16:43.255384  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 207.88.135.158:25 -> 10.0.5.73:807
07/05-08:45:43.767416  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 129.43.100.100:25 ->
10.0.253.52:583
07/05-08:47:04.770142  [**] TCP SMTP Source Port traffic [**] 129.43.100.100:25 ->
10.0.253.52:583
```

Perhaps I missed the boat [Swedish saying] but i dont understand why this rule alerts on external hosts. However question is why these ports connects to so many different hosts. I would recommend centralizing the smtp mail access points .

### SITE EXEC – Possible wu-ftpd exploit – GIAC000623

```
03/06-16:44:02.658052  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
128.61.136.233:4705 -> 10.0.219.22:21
03/20-09:24:48.607882  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
211.120.49.163:1531 -> 10.0.179.78:21
03/20-09:24:55.961621  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
211.120.49.163:1534 -> 10.0.179.81:21
05/13-00:36:42.038299  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
200.255.65.5:4436 -> 10.0.53.10:21
05/14-09:50:25.626651  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
63.196.54.17:4122 -> 10.0.202.218:21
05/14-09:50:27.665472  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
63.196.54.17:4122 -> 10.0.202.218:21
06/10-14:32:43.133301  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
211.235.241.145:1239 -> 10.0.144.59:21
06/10-15:43:44.943254  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
211.235.241.145:1521 -> 10.0.144.59:21
```

There has been some portscans towards these hosts at port 21 I would advice you to look further into any of the above internal hosts.



One example of this came from 128.61.136.233 that shows the following log

```
03/06-16:26:23.340817  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.15:21
03/06-16:26:23.360557  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.16:21
03/06-16:26:23.620733  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.29:21
03/06-16:26:23.681285  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.32:21
03/06-16:26:24.140511  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.55:21
03/06-16:26:24.239503  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.60:21
03/06-16:26:24.281152  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.62:21
03/06-16:26:24.300564  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.63:21
03/06-16:26:24.320510  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.64:21
03/06-16:26:24.480412  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.72:21
03/06-16:26:24.660842  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.81:21
03/06-16:26:24.739300  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.85:21
03/06-16:26:25.179343  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.107:21
03/06-16:26:25.200333  [**] SYN-FIN scan! [**] 128.61.136.233:21 -> 10.0.219.108:21
03/06-16:44:02.658052  [**] SITE EXEC - Possible wu-ftpd exploit - GIAC000623 [**]
128.61.136.233:4705 -> 10.0.219.22:21
```

### **Broadcast Ping to subnet 70**

This is a very unstealthy recon attempt towards subnet 70. The attacker is trying to see what hosts

```
03/03-06:19:03.144767  [**] Broadcast Ping to subnet 70 [**] 209.196.35.190 -> 10.0.70.255
03/20-21:03:46.441234  [**] Broadcast Ping to subnet 70 [**] 66.27.184.3 -> 10.0.70.255
```

### **Happy 99 Virus:**

From Alertfile:

```
04/27-18:28:10.815753  [**] Happy 99 Virus [**] 216.49.81.253:2877 -> 10.0.6.35:25
```

Analysis:

Did a grep for more alarms from 216.49.81.253, there was none. A dig for 216.49.81.253 reveals that it seems to be a contentscanner for virus from McAfee in Carlifornia. My evidence in this case is that it sends to port 25 at the network (smtp).

Conclusion:

It seems like the University subscribes to **McAfee antivirus** and that it cleaned an incoming mail, sending a varnin g back to the network in mailformat, [its a theory anyway].

### **hax0r boy 010615**

From Alertfile:

```
06/15-18:52:45.704261  [**] hax0r boy 010615 [**] 10.0.60.11:23 -> 24.19.166.5:3862
```

24.19.166.5 is cc72678-a.stanal.occa.home.com

I search for more events from m this "individual" since they seem to have marked him up.

```
03/05-07:47:30.621038  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:30.750675  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:36.239362  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:40.417601  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:40.765805  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:42.307651  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:42.717603  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:43.166873  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
```

```

03/05-07:47:47.745743  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:47.996298  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:48.917667  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:49.011850  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23
03/05-07:47:49.526872  [**] Watchlist 000220 IL-ISDNNET-990517 [**] 212.179.58.12:35757 ->
10.0.60.11:23

```

It seems like its some sort of shellbox (port 23 is telnet) [it could be a UNIXbox with Fakebo or a compromise d Windowsbox with telnet]

It also runs a myServer DDoS Agent (55850/udp) I read further on:  
<http://www.incidents.org/archives/y2k/082200.htm>

cat newbigalert | grep 10.0.60.11 | grep 55850

```

05/09-11:08:49.106525  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
05/09-11:08:49.141924  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
05/09-11:08:49.141982  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
05/09-11:08:49.503345  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
05/09-11:08:51.486648  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
05/09-11:08:56.202690  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
05/09-11:08:57.430746  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
05/09-11:08:58.826008  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
05/09-11:08:58.851851  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:23 -> 148.129.143.2:55850
06/18-13:14:41.825170  [**] Port 55850 tcp - Possible myserver activity - ref. 010313-1 [**]
10.0.60.11:55850 -> 35.10.24.99:31313

```

It seems like a month later the box itself becomes a victim/testbox for myServer. Looking for further trojans

```

03/30-13:15:02.916104  [**] Possible RAMEN server activity [**] 65.27.22.23:2837 ->
10.0.60.11:27374
03/30-13:15:02.916151  [**] Possible RAMEN server activity [**] 10.0.60.11:27374 ->
65.27.22.23:2837
05/19-13:41:22.647703  [**] Possible trojan server activity [**] 24.240.19.143:4348 ->
10.0.60.11:27374
05/19-13:41:22.647796  [**] Possible trojan server activity [**] 10.0.60.11:27374 ->
24.240.19.143:4348
05/19-13:41:24.370135  [**] Possible trojan server activity [**] 24.240.19.143:4348 ->
10.0.60.11:27374
05/19-13:41:24.370178  [**] Possible trojan server activity [**] 10.0.60.11:27374 ->
24.240.19.143:4348

```

Another example is:

```

06/24-19:23:36.904588  [**] Possible trojan server activity [**] 129.170.104.19:1198 ->
10.0.6.15:27374
06/24-19:23:36.904742  [**] Possible trojan server activity [**] 10.0.6.15:27374 ->
129.170.104.19:1198

```

Looking at my updated trojan list I did some random searches for these ports.

## Subseven

```
04/23-04:37:57.021740 10.0.216.220.164.199:1243 10.0.206.242:27374 ->
04/23-17:16:26.124770 10.0.198.92.156.150:1243 ->
04/24-00:19:03.698484 10.0.216.220.164.133:1243 ->
04/24-03:00:23.845762 10.0.216.220.164.133:1243 ->
05/16-18:10:41.718440 10.0.65.32.16.253:1243 ->
05/16-18:19:16.892280 10.0.65.32.16.253:1243 ->
05/18-17:13:06.027822 10.0.24.48.249.61:1243 ->
05/19-13:41:44.730765 10.0.205.245.16.35:1243 ->
05/19-13:41:45.860168 10.0.205.245.16.35:1243 ->
05/24-11:54:11.161796 10.0.202.188.32.234:1243 ->
05/24-11:54:11.385010 10.0.202.188.32.234:1243 ->
05/24-11:54:14.871506 10.0.202.188.32.234:1243 ->
05/24-11:54:15.050804 10.0.202.188.32.234:1243 ->
06/27-10:16:47.346579 10.0.24.169.119.11:1243 ->
06/27-14:54:58.908832 10.0.10.0.3.16:27374 ->
06/27-15:03:24.026584 10.0.10.0.8.19:27374 ->
06/27-21:00:34.863046 10.0.10.0.29.238:27374 ->
06/27-22:25:00.605279 10.0.10.0.41.74:27374 ->
06/28-01:59:11.015849 10.0.10.0.79.2:27374 ->
06/28-02:26:52.296130 10.0.10.0.82.171:27374 ->
06/28-05:11:44.177184 10.0.10.0.125.132:27374 ->
06/28-06:16:22.074954 10.0.10.0.149.236:27374 ->
06/28-06:42:04.044826 10.0.10.0.170.27:27374 ->
06/28-10:28:21.700608 10.0.10.0.237.82:27374 ->
06/28-10:44:05.862137 10.0.10.0.239.75:27374 ->
07/02-19:49:43.330907 10.0.195.84.205.250:1243 ->
07/02-19:49:45.934255 10.0.24.203.179.48:1243 ->
07/02-19:49:52.324678 10.0.195.84.205.250:1243 ->
07/02-19:49:54.543802 10.0.206.74.76.44:1243 ->
07/02-19:50:07.872418 10.0.216.86.90.139:1243 ->
07/02-19:50:17.155783 10.0.24.191.205.218:1243 ->
07/02-19:50:26.143434 10.0.24.191.205.218:1243 ->
07/02-19:50:31.306909 10.0.142.176.72.56:1243 ->
07/02-19:50:54.724659 10.0.193.153.248.195:1243 ->
07/02-19:51:16.004719 10.0.63.10.156.249:1243 ->
10.0.254.83:27374
```

So it seems like there are Sub7 infected machines being exploited from both the inside and outside, noteworthy that there is activity within the network. I also noted some Russian Dynamo activity.

Noteworthy is that communication in some cases is to the inside network as well to the outside.

I really recommend looking into the alert files again for these possibly afflicted hosts:

One easy way to do this is by just “cat’ing” the log files together and then grep for the specific host or ports interesting. For example 10.0.70.38 is likely to be one to look further into.

**Main offender:**

The top talker from the alerts is: 212.179.58.200

212.179.58.200 has badly configured reverse DNS.

The reverse DNS for 212.179.58.200 is pvil -200.photonet.com, but pvil -200.photonet.com doesn't resolve to anything.

Port 3697 from this IP is also one of the heavy talkers. Continued watching is recommended. Also feel free to look at the diagrams for further offenders.

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## Internal hosts

This is a quick sorting for some of the problems with the internal network

```
06/09-17:40:18.996574  [**] SUNRPC highport access! [**] 10.0.100.65:62169 -> 10.0.101.141:32771
06/09-17:40:18.996830  [**] SUNRPC highport access! [**] 10.0.100.65:62169 -> 10.0.101.141:32771
06/09-17:42:08.879148  [**] connect to 515 from inside [**] 10.0.100.65:62169 -> 10.0.101.141:515
06/09-17:42:08.880966  [**] connect to 515 from inside [**] 10.0.100.65:62169 -> 10.0.101.141:515
06/09-17:43:27.608718  [**] Null scan! [**] 10.0.100.65:62177 -> 10.0.101.141:7
06/09-17:43:28.021887  [**] Probable NMAP fingerprint attempt [**] 10.0.100.65:62178 ->
10.0.101.141:7
06/09-17:43:28.436546  [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 10.0.100.65:62179 -> 10.0.101.141:7
06/09-17:43:32.080004  [**] Null scan! [**] 10.0.100.65:62177 -> 10.0.101.141:7
06/09-17:43:32.486337  [**] Probable NMAP fingerprint attempt [**] 10.0.100.65:62178 ->
10.0.101.141:7

06/15-03:01:08.207263  [**] SUNRPC highport access! [**] 10.0.98.217:60850 -> 10.0.14.1:32771
06/15-03:01:35.764352  [**] connect to 515 from inside [**] 10.0.98.217:60850 -> 10.0.14.1:515
06/15-03:01:36.273436  [**] connect to 515 from inside [**] 10.0.98.217:60852 -> 10.0.14.1:515
06/15-03:01:45.768466  [**] WinGate 1080 Attempt [**] 10.0.98.217:60850 -> 10.0.14.1:1080
06/15-03:01:45.927619  [**] WinGate 1080 Attempt [**] 10.0.98.217:60851 -> 10.0.14.1:1080
06/15-03:01:46.248030  [**] WinGate 1080 Attempt [**] 10.0.98.217:60852 -> 10.0.14.1:1080
06/15-03:02:07.759091  [**] Null scan! [**] 10.0.98.217:60858 -> 10.0.14.1:7
06/17-00:01:54.768677  [**] SMB Name Wildcard [**] 10.0.111.156:137 -> 10.0.125.41:137
06/17-00:01:56.267614  [**] SMB Name Wildcard [**] 10.0.111.156:137 -> 10.0.125.41:137
06/17-11:57:35.862689  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
06/17-11:57:35.862797  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**] 10.0.14.1:161
-> 10.0.5.10:65535


07/06-19:22:17.718241  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
07/06-19:22:17.719740  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**] 10.0.14.1:161
-> 10.0.5.10:65535
07/06-19:22:17.739761  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
07/06-19:22:17.741241  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
07/06-19:22:17.742122  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**] 10.0.14.1:161
-> 10.0.5.10:65535
07/06-19:22:17.742360  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
07/06-19:22:17.809133  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
07/06-19:22:17.811381  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**] 10.0.14.1:161
-> 10.0.5.10:65535
07/06-19:22:18.396079  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
07/06-19:22:18.707053  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
07/06-19:22:18.707965  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**] 10.0.14.1:161
-> 10.0.5.10:65535
07/06-19:22:19.342652  [**] High port 65535 udp - possible Red Worm - traffic [**]
10.0.5.10:65535 -> 10.0.14.1:161
```

## Link Diagrams

In the search for potential intruders I took a special look at 10.0.6.15 and 10.0.222.86. The pictures are made with Microsoft Visio.

### Link Diagram1


Looking logs for 10.0.6.15 you see a wide range of exploits and other traffic. With this picture i am trying to show some possible hacks and relations.



This machine is clearly under heavy attack and as mentioned above be looked into.

## Link Diagram2

With 10.0.222.86 it was mostly the strange OOS that caught my eye.



In the picture above you can see some trojan activity and some various scans. The Trojan Activity is coming from the 216.175 network and it seems to be transmitted both ways. Also be sure to check out some oos scans from this host (in the OOS section).

**Please observe that I have not altered the MY.NET.xxx.xxx in the OOS logs.**

## Out of Spec

I have analysed some out of specs from 2001 -04-24 until 2001 -04-29 for abnormal activity. Below I'm showing some examples of my findings . I also noticed that the timestamps are drifting with a few seconds on the various types of scans (when correlating with portscans). Timestamps are also drifting even more on the normal alerts which was confusing at first.

```
=====  
04/24-01:41:57.771452 193.231.42.2:51274 -> MY.NET.253.125:80  
TCP TTL:45 TOS:0x0 ID:0 DF  
21S***** Seq: 0x93BFBE9C Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x16D0  
TCP Options => MSS: 1460  
FE 69 .i
```

```
=====  
04/24-02:00:58.202984 193.231.42.2:54005 -> MY.NET.253.114:80  
TCP TTL:45 TOS:0x0 ID:0 DF  
21S***** Seq: 0xDD5C6264 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x16D0  
TCP Options => MSS: 1460  
08 4B .K
```

Above we see a **potential fingerprinting** of two web servers from a University in Romania (Universitatea "Stefan cel Mare" Suceava). The interesting part is the reserved bits marked up with **fat**. There are much more examples like this one.

The packages shown below are with high probability crafted packets:

```
=====  
04/24-06:30:16.786625 130.239.139.173:6699 -> MY.NET.218.242:1527  
TCP TTL:116 TOS:0x0 ID:14318 DF  
21SFRPA* Seq: 0xC97B78 Ack: 0x4988E6 Win: 0x5010  
TCP Options => EOL EOL  
94 B0 D8 59 25 64 ...Y%d
```

Comment: Well it is atleast not URGeNT, otherwise it has **all the TCP Flags set, it is very crafted**. Its origin is from a Swedish University (Umeå Universitet). Port 6699 tells me its Napster client data but its highly unlikely that it is infact regular Napster traffic.

The following packets seems like **retransmissions**. Their origin can either be of a spoofed nature or some form of communications failure. Their timestamps differs but the sequence number aswell as their source/dest ports are the same in these packets.

```
=====  
04/24-12:17:00.061612 217.96.71.21: 1623 -> MY.NET.229.162: 6346  
TCP TTL:50 TOS:0x0 ID:7177 DF  
21S***** Seq: 0xFA290719 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x16D0  
TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 145336529 0 EOL EOL EOL EOL  
  
=====  
04/24-12:17:03.059963 217.96.71.21 :1623 -> MY.NET.229.162: 6346  
TCP TTL:50 TOS:0x0 ID:7433 DF  
21S***** Seq: 0xFA290719 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x16D0  
TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 145336829 0 EOL EOL EOL EOL  
  
=====  
04/24-12:17:09.058588 217.96.71.21: 1623 -> MY.NET.229.162: 6346  
TCP TTL:50 TOS:0x0 ID:7689 DF
```



```
21S***** Seq: 0xFA290719 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x16D0
TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 145337429 0 EOL EOL EOL EOL
```

There was also some packets involved with other fingerprinting techniques

```
=====  
04/24-17:21:14.478552 193.224.41.14:0 -> MY.NET.218.242:1209  
TCP TTL:117 TOS:0x0 ID:7286 DF  
*1SFR*AU Seq: 0x5001E Ack: 0xABDACF8E Win: 0x5010  
TCP Options => EOL EOL EOL EOL EOL EOL SackOK
```

```
=====  
04/24-17:23:11.058449 193.224.41.14:1210 -> MY.NET.218.242:5  
TCP TTL:117 TOS:0x0 ID:54150 DF  
**SFR**U Seq: 0x86001E Ack: 0xB81BCFBE Win: 0x8010  
C1 6E 3F E9 00 00 01 01 05 0A CF BE 52 DB CF BE .n?.....R...
```

Comment: Syn, Fin & Rst should never appear in a normal packet, this is definitely part of a fingerprinting.

There are much more examples that involves fingerprinting techniques so lets move on to another finding.

Data sent on SYN below is a example of this event

```
=====  
04/29-14:13:32.962440 128.46.156.117:20 -> MY.NET.204.150:4050  
TCP TTL:55 TOS:0x8 ID:13911 DF  
21S***** Seq: 0xD7B3D558 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x16D0  
TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 320271 0 EOL EOL EOL EOL
```

```
=====  
04/29-14:13:36.739622 128.46.156.117:20 -> MY.NET.204.150:4054  
TCP TTL:55 TOS:0x8 ID:63126 DF  
21S***** Seq: 0xD823121F Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x16D0  
TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 320649 0 EOL EOL EOL EOL
```

```
=====  
04/29-14:13:45.333566 128.46.156.117:20 -> MY.NET.204.150:4060  
TCP TTL:55 TOS:0x8 ID:5929 DF  
21S***** Seq: 0xD91CF0CD Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x16D0  
TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 321508 0 EOL EOL EOL EOL
```

```
=====
```

From the SANS conference I learned that this way can be used to fool the detection of the SYN's since they already carry a payload. Well no fooling me ☺

Comparing these OOS with the Scan detects you see that these malformed RESERVED bits gets in the log there aswell.

```
=====  
04/27-16:46:09.062984 212.123.172.102:18245 -> MY.NET.179.77:21536  
TCP TTL:111 TOS:0x0 ID:2137 DF  
2*SFR*AU Seq: 0x2F746573 Ack: 0x742F6272 Win: 0x7365  
54 50 2F 31 2E 31 0D 0A 41 63 TP/1.1..Ac
```

```
=====
```

**The portscan logs has some correlation (in other cases aswell)**

```
Apr 27 16:46:15 212.123.172.102:18245 -> 10.0.179.77:21536 INVALIDACK  
2*SFR*AU RESERVEDBITS  
Apr 27 16:46:15 212.123.172.102:18245 -> MY.NET.179.77:21536 INVALI DACK  
2*SFR*AU RESERVEDBITS
```

The invalid acks are likely part of a nmap scan.

Below we see some more advanced fingerprinting technique from the internal network

```
=====  
04/28-19:03:33.328390 MY.NET.217.182:6346 -> 212.199.23.151:1839  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:23545 DF  
21*F*P** Seq: 0x15A2669D Ack: 0xA1 Win: 0x5010  
TCP Options => EOL
```

```
=====  
04/28-19:14:58.904429 MY.NET.217.182:6346 -> 212.199.23.151:1839  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:46994 DF  
21*FRPA* Seq: 0x15A3 Ack: 0x8F2D00A2 Win: 0x5010  
18 CA 07 2F 00 00 15 A3 8F 2D 00 A2 00 DD 50 10 .../..... -....P.  
1D FA 41 26 00 20 20 20 20 ..A&.
```

This individual machine is also in the port scan logs (see below in the Scans section). So my recommendation is that you look into this host closer.

---

During my search for materials for some link diagrams i came across some more strange activity in the OOS scans.

Port 6688 is associated with Napster, there are some strange flag combinations, Strange that the source port is 0. I am not an expert with Napster so i wouldnt know if this was normal, but based on the OOS above it is not!

```
=====  
04/07-12:45:28.437028 MY.NET.225.42:0 -> 170.140.23.35:6688  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:65319 DF  
21SF***U Seq: 0x7540884 Ack: 0xD45F1017 Win: 0x5010  
TCP Options => EOL EOL
```

```
=====  
04/07-12:45:53.155663 MY.NET.225.42:0 -> 170.140.23.35:6688  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:52018 DF  
**SFRPAU Seq: 0x7550873 Ack: 0x518A1018 Win: 0x5018  
00 00 A3 B9 C3 A5 4B 86 14 5E 2C D4 96 45 .....K..^,..E
```

```
=====  
04/07-12:50:47.590170 MY.NET.225.42:0 -> 170.140.23.35:6688  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:26734 DF  
*1SFR*** Seq: 0x7590886 Ack: 0x7D50101C Win: 0x5010  
TCP Options => EOL EOL
```

```
=====  
04/07-12:51:07.404156 MY.NET.225.42:0 -> 170.140.23.35:6688  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:7284 DF  
*1SFR*** Seq: 0x759089C Ack: 0xFD50101C Win: 0x5010  
TCP Options => EOL EOL Opt 142 (9): A38C 9BF8 4442 57BA
```

```
=====  
04/07-12:51:07.439509 MY.NET.225.42:0 -> 170.140.23.35:6688  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:9588 DF  
*1SFR*** Seq: 0x759089D Ack: 0x1B04101C Win: 0x5018  
TCP Options => EOL EOL
```

Below we see traffic towards port 6346 that can be associated with Gnutella, we have some strange flag combinations, also see the link diagram for this host on the internal network

```
=====  
05/10-03:14:51.621851 MY.NET.222.86:0 -> 205.162.20.161:6346  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:7804 DF  
21S***P** Seq: 0xB0402B8 Ack: 0xCB44014C Win: 0x5018  
TCP Options => EOL EOL  
00 10 ..
```

```
=====  
05/10-03:22:12.194088 MY.NET.222.86:0 -> 24.154.64.190:6346  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:53462 DF  
21SFRP** Seq: 0xCC002D6 Ack: 0xFACF2F9E Win: 0x5018  
TCP Options => EOL EOL
```

```
=====  
05/10-04:15:39.248514 MY.NET.222.86:6346 -> 65.24.54.78:1868  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:21316 DF  
21S**PA* Seq: 0x3002DE0 Ack: 0x8F0C Win: 0x5018  
00 00 69 33 60 2E 63 02 5C 18 07 07 02 1C ..i3`.c.\.....
```

```
=====  
05/10-04:18:12.307129 MY.NET.222.86:0 -> 216.5.125.96:6346  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:28785 DF  
21S**PAU Seq: 0x4A70309 Ack: 0xF278012C Win: 0x5018  
TCP Options => EOL EOL
```

```
=====  
05/10-04:23:25.570248 MY.NET.222.86:0 -> 128.255.140.111:6346  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:54734 DF  
2*SFRP** Seq: 0x8650300 Ack: 0x2DC90148 Win: 0x5018  
TCP Options => EOL EOL
```

Digging further down the OOS logs from 23:th of May is see

```
=====  
05/23-10:43:51.468489 MY.NET.222.86:0 -> 18.245.0.120:6346  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:61696 DF  
21*F*P*U Seq: 0xFFB071A Ack: 0x4ED2D08C Win: 0x5018  
00 00 18 CA 0F FB 07 1A 4E D2 D0 8C 08 E9 50 18 .....N.....P.  
20 6D 44 F1 00 00 20 61 6E 61 6C 20 6C 65 73 62 mD... anal lesb  
69 61 ia
```

from this internal host. Strange flag combo, and not so strange content if you just place that missing 'ns' at the end... (lesbians)

Without much hassle i find another Gnutella friend

```
=====  
04/16-09:34:31.997421 MY.NET.217.182:6346 -> 217.0.50.80:1122  
TCP TTL:126 TOS:0x0 ID:50569 DF  
21SF**AU Seq: 0x22C Ack: 0xA20F004E Win: 0x5018  
A2 0F 00 4E 2C F3 50 18 21 80 81 38 00 00 6E 20 ...N,.P!.8..n  
70 75 73 73 79 20 61 6E 64 20 pussy and
```

-----  
Another pair in the OOS files that seemed strange was:

```
=====  
05/24-11:26:44.242677 62.59.148.34:18245 -> MY.NET.253.125:21536  
TCP TTL:106 TOS:0x0 ID:8035 DF  
**SFRP*U Seq: 0x2F7E6473 Ack: 0x63686D69 Win: 0x736F  
31 2F 73 6F 75 6E 64 73 2F 63 6F 77 2E 77 61 76 1/sounds/cow.wav  
20 48 54 54 50 2F HTTP/
```

```
=====  
05/24-11:26:44.242837 62.59.148.34:18245 -> MY.NET.253.125:21536  
TCP TTL:106 TOS:0x0 ID:8035 DF  
**SFRP*U Seq: 0x2F7E6473 Ack: 0x63686D69 Win: 0x736F  
31 2F 73 6F 75 6E 64 73 2F 63 6F 77 2E 77 61 76 1/sounds/cow.wav  
20 48 54 54 50 2F HTTP/
```

```
=====  
05/24-11:26:44.242999 62.59.148.34:18245 -> MY.NET.253.125:21536  
TCP TTL:106 TOS:0x0 ID:8035 DF  
**SFRP*U Seq: 0x2F7E6473 Ack: 0x63686D69 Win: 0x736F  
31 2F 73 6F 75 6E 64 73 2F 63 6F 77 2E 77 61 76 1/sounds/cow.wav  
20 48 54 54 50 2F HTTP/
```

```
=====  
05/24-11:26:44.243159 62.59.148.34:18245 -> MY.NET.253.125:21536  
TCP TTL:106 TOS:0x0 ID:8035 DF  
**SFRP*U Seq: 0x2F7E6473 Ack: 0x63686D69 Win: 0x736F  
31 2F 73 6F 75 6E 64 73 2F 63 6F 77 2E 77 61 76 1/sounds/cow.wav  
20 48 54 54 50 2F HTTP/
```

```
=====
```

It appears by looking at <http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/incidents/2001-01/0079.html> that it seems to be a Nortel CVX that could be messing up the packets.

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## Scans:

I have analyzed the scans from 2001 -03-01 until 2001-07-13 (and correlation work with the above OOS) for abnormal activity, without knowing what targets are important doing a summary.

**Scanning is being made both to and from the network** . Unknowing of the policy in practice I choose not judge this further. But I would advise to keep such individuals under close surveillance.

An example of this is:

```
Apr 28 20:04:07 10.0.217.182:0 -> 24.94.194.148:6346 INVALIDACK *1SF**AU RESERVEDBITS
Apr 28 20:29:14 10.0.217.182:6346 -> 193.2.68.118:2813 NOACK *1SFR**U RESERVEDBITS
Apr 28 20:42:26 10.0.217.182:0 -> 217.80.252.25:6346 NOACK 2***RP** RESERVEDBITS
```

(where 10.0 is MY.NET)

There seems to be rather big and **repetitive sweeps** . Seems like being part of bigger sweeps. These are really not active targeting but rather inventory of the network. Sometimes these “netmaps” are used at a later time for newer exploits. Could be regarded as highrisk in the long term but lowrisk in the short term.

Some sweeps are targetet for just **certain ports** , looking for services offered. This includes trojans and commonly exploitable ports. Examples are port 53 and 515


```
Jul 12 08:05:35 200.206.165.19:2489 -> 10.0.137.13: 515 SYN **S*****
Jul 12 08:05:35 200.206.165.19:2491 -> 10.0.137.15: 515 SYN **S*****
Jul 12 08:05:35 200.206.165.19:2493 -> 10.0.137.17: 515 SYN **S*****
```

I do recommend that you do internal portscans for an inventory of the services offered within the network!



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## Summarations and diagrams:



All data from these diagrams has been gathered from the alert files from 2001 -03-01 until 2001 -07-13. Excluded in these reports are traffic from outside network. For the data gathering i have used shell commands in BSD and a custom DOS application for statistics (available upon request). The statistics of the alerts should be available when double clicking on the diagrams (I have used Excel).



## Statistics for internal hosts




**Statistics for external hosts.**






## Statistics for ports



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Top destination-ports alerts generated from:



## Recommendations

The following sections can be implemented in project forms either by internal personal or by external consultants. It is however important that the management and technicians work together for a successful Infrastructure and Policy enforcement.

- Firewall/NAT usage for blocking unwanted traffic
- Proxy server, with some form of content filtering for malicious content
- Revision of Policy and enforcing of it.
- Antivirus software for all clients and antivirus/trojan scanning for SMTP level
- Internal/External Security Audit
- NTP usage for synchronized the logs
- Centralize servers such as SMTP and web servers, no need to have them scattered?
- Continued usage of IDS and logging.

For further information about these projects some good information can be found on:

[http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/securitybasics/basics\\_list.htm](http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/securitybasics/basics_list.htm)

[http://www.incidents.org/detect/ih\\_faq.php](http://www.incidents.org/detect/ih_faq.php)

I see no need to explain them in further detail during this report. However if you should find the need to use my expertise in these areas I'm sure I'm going to elaborate on them further in other GIAC certifications.

Further recommendations can be found within the report.

Thank you for your time reading this report!

David Hed in Sweden

References used in this practical assignment either alive or still at this moment available through Google cache.

### Assignment 1

<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-05.html>  
<http://packetdorm.cotse.com/CIE/RFC/1035/59.htm>  
<http://www.sampade.org>  
<http://www.internic.net>  
<http://www.insecure.org/sploits/Microsoft.frontpage.insecurities.html>  
<http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5NP0J0U1FO.html>  
[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/TechNet/prodtechnol/office/reskit/fp98serk/appendixes/A\\_UNPERM.asp](http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/TechNet/prodtechnol/office/reskit/fp98serk/appendixes/A_UNPERM.asp)  
<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1174>  
<http://www.sans.org/y2k/>  
<http://www.insecure.org/sploits/Microsoft.frontpage.insecurities.html>  
<http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5NP0J0U1FO.html>  
[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/TechNet/prodtechnol/office/reskit/fp98serk/appendixes/A\\_UNPERM.asp](http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/TechNet/prodtechnol/office/reskit/fp98serk/appendixes/A_UNPERM.asp)  
<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1174>  
<http://www.sans.org/y2k/062000.htm>  
<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html>  
<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-13.html>  
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-code-red-worm-pub.shtml>  
<http://www.worm.com> \*LOL\*  
<http://www.eeye.com/html/Research/Tools/CodeRedScanner.exe>  
<http://www.incidents.org/diary/diary.php>  
<http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2001-07/0396.html>  
<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html>  
[http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/bsd/2001/04/04/FreeBSD\\_Basics.html](http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/bsd/2001/04/04/FreeBSD_Basics.html)  
[http://www.sys-security.com/archive/papers/ICMP\\_Scanning\\_v3.0.pdf](http://www.sys-security.com/archive/papers/ICMP_Scanning_v3.0.pdf)  
<http://www.whitehats.com/cgi/arachNIDS/Show?id=ids4>  
<http://advice.networkkice.com/Advice/Intrusions/2000309/default.htm>  
[http://www.incidents.org/react/code\\_red.php](http://www.incidents.org/react/code_red.php)

### Assignment 2

#### State of Intrusion Detection (Hardware and planning)

<http://www.shmoo.com/mail/ids/nov99/msg00047.html> (archived discussion about hardware/ids)  
<http://www.metases.com/files/Shomiti.pdf> (document on Shomiti taps with Cisco2900)  
<http://www.finisar-systems.com/products/index.html> (Ethernet and Fiberchannel taps)  
<http://www.niksun.com/products/netvcr.html> (if you dont want to build your trafficdumper by yourself)  
[http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Charles\\_Hutson\\_GCIA.doc](http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Charles_Hutson_GCIA.doc) (assignment2 is about outsourcing)  
<http://www.tcpdump.org/> (TCPDUMP)  
<http://www.snort.org/> (Snort IDS) \*no its not spelled Snorth, Mr.Consult -know-it-all\*  
<http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/> (Shadow IDS)  
<http://www.cert.org/kb/acid/> (Analyst Console for Intrusion Databases)  
<http://www.freebsd.org> (Highperformance and stable Operating System)  
<http://www.openbsd.org> (Highly secured and stable Operating System)

#### Books & other info

Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst's Handbook: Stephen Northcutt, Judy Novak, Donald McLachlan (2000)  
Manpages from the BSD distributions can learn you alot! Also be sure to check out TCPDUMP

## Assignment2old Trojan correlation with known ports

[http://www.sys-security.com/html/papers/trojan\\_list.html](http://www.sys-security.com/html/papers/trojan_list.html)  
<http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/IDFAQ/oddports.htm>  
<http://www.simovits.com/trojans/>  
<http://dark-e.com/archive/trojans/>  
<http://www.certcc.or.kr/advisory/>  
<http://www.dark-e.com/cgi-bin/quiz.cgi>  
<http://www.zone1abs.com/knowledgebase/trojanports.html>  
<http://www.multimania.com/cdc/trojanh.htm>

## Assignment 3

[http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/chris\\_kuethe\\_gcia.html](http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/chris_kuethe_gcia.html)  
<http://lists.insecure.org/incidents/2000/Oct/0141.html>  
[http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:d9xVEpq0\\_pc:www.sans.org/y2k/082200.htm++myserver+55850&hl=sv](http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:d9xVEpq0_pc:www.sans.org/y2k/082200.htm++myserver+55850&hl=sv)  
<http://www.incidents.org/archives/y2k/082200.htm>  
[http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/securitybasics/basics\\_list.htm](http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/securitybasics/basics_list.htm)  
[http://www.incidents.org/detect/ih\\_faq.php](http://www.incidents.org/detect/ih_faq.php)  
<http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/incidents/2001-01/0079.html>

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SANS Abu Dhabi 2018	Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates	Apr 07, 2018 - Apr 12, 2018	Live Event
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SANS Baltimore Spring 2018	Baltimore, MD	Apr 21, 2018 - Apr 28, 2018	Live Event
Baltimore Spring 2018 - SEC503: Intrusion Detection In-Depth	Baltimore, MD	Apr 23, 2018 - Apr 28, 2018	vLive
SANS vLive - SEC503: Intrusion Detection In-Depth	SEC503 - 201805,	May 02, 2018 - Jun 14, 2018	vLive
Community SANS Virginia Beach SEC503	Virginia Beach, VA	May 07, 2018 - May 12, 2018	Community SANS
SANS Security West 2018	San Diego, CA	May 11, 2018 - May 18, 2018	Live Event
Mentor Session - SEC503	Dulles, VA	May 24, 2018 - Jun 28, 2018	Mentor
SANS Oslo June 2018	Oslo, Norway	Jun 18, 2018 - Jun 23, 2018	Live Event
SANS Minneapolis 2018	Minneapolis, MN	Jun 25, 2018 - Jun 30, 2018	Live Event
Minneapolis 2018 - SEC503: Intrusion Detection In-Depth	Minneapolis, MN	Jun 25, 2018 - Jun 30, 2018	vLive
SANS London July 2018	London, United Kingdom	Jul 02, 2018 - Jul 07, 2018	Live Event
SANSFIRE 2018	Washington, DC	Jul 14, 2018 - Jul 21, 2018	Live Event
Security Operations Summit & Training 2018	New Orleans, LA	Jul 30, 2018 - Aug 06, 2018	Live Event
SANS San Antonio 2018	San Antonio, TX	Aug 06, 2018 - Aug 11, 2018	Live Event
Community SANS Columbia SEC503	Columbia, MD	Aug 13, 2018 - Aug 18, 2018	Community SANS
SANS Virginia Beach 2018	Virginia Beach, VA	Aug 20, 2018 - Aug 31, 2018	Live Event
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SANS Amsterdam September 2018	Amsterdam, Netherlands	Sep 03, 2018 - Sep 08, 2018	Live Event
SANS Network Security 2018	Las Vegas, NV	Sep 23, 2018 - Sep 28, 2018	Live Event
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