



Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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Rinaldo Ribeiro

1/17/2005

*** Northcutt, I should probably recuse myself, I know Rinaldo, he was an IDNET winner for one thing. He must of put a tremendous effort into the writeup since English is a second language for him so I am giving full credit for clarity. Good research into the source addresses. Analysis shows solid depth of knowledge, this is another example of the look and feel of a process, but the intuitive leaps of someone in the trade. Took some easy ones though. 88 **

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Background:

All detects were retrieved from a network with two OpenBSD boxes: one running IPF - firewall and the other running Snort as our IDS. This site was installed at november/99 and all its logs were used whenever the "history" was necessary. There are only servers (web servers mainly) behind the firewall and all the expected traffic was not "user generated" leaving our network.

Only the destination network address has been sanitized.

Whenever possible, I used both traces (FW and IDS) to illustrate what were the "attacker" intents.

Severity is calculated using:

Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + network countermeasures)

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Detect #01

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the firewall.

Apr 10 02:07:51 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:07:50.594491	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.160,2900 -> x.y.z..33,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 02:07:51 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:07:50.595656	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.160,2901 -> x.y.z..33,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 02:07:51 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:07:50.595771	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.160,2902 -> x.y.z..33,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 03:02:28 kundun ipmon[1594]: 03:02:28.320739	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.160,3800 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 03:02:28 kundun ipmon[1594]: 03:02:28.320848	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.160,3801 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 03:02:28 kundun ipmon[1594]: 03:02:28.320952	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.160,3802 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 03:13:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 03:13:13.266251	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.148,3000 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 03:13:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 03:13:13.266858	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.148,3001 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 03:13:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 03:13:13.267027	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.148,3002 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 05:24:49 kundun ipmon[1594]: 05:24:48.811312	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.185,2900 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 05:24:49 kundun ipmon[1594]: 05:24:48.812251	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.185,2901 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN
Apr 10 05:24:49 kundun ipmon[1594]: 05:24:48.812369	ep1 @0:80 b 209.67.42.185,2902 -> x.y.z..12,53 PR tcp len 20 104 -S IN

Existence: Packets from net 209.67.42 are being sent to our servers' TCP 53 port.

History: Our firewall has been blocking packets sent from this network to port TCP 53 since the end of last year. It has been identified also packets sent to high udp ports, seeming to be originated by a "unix like" traceroute program.

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Intent: The intent is collect RTT – “round trip time” information about how long it takes traffic to move between “client” and “server”.

Technique: Three SYN packets are sent always in less than one second by a automated tool to TCP 53 port. The source port always increments by one and it starts between 2000 and 4000.

Analysis: This traffic is generated by a “global load-balancing system” called 3DNS, manufactured by F5 labs. In this case, everytime ours servers tried to resolve www.starmedia.com, some systems determine what is the closest server to my site sending packets as seen in this detect. It was considered by me, some time ago, as a “zone transfer” attempt and it could be done by another analyst if we had only a single packet. Some research was done to figure out all the picture:

1) who is 209.67.42.160?

By accessing www.registro.br, maintained by FAPESP, the organization responsible for the domains in Brazil, we could find that the network 209.67.42 was registered in some starmedia.com’s name servers.

2) getting in touch!

The adminstrator of this domain was notified by e-mail and few days later I received a huge and complete answer about the “probe”. It said “the traffic you’re seeing can safely be ignored” and “if it’s a real problem for you, I can hard-code your netblocks to our Brazil datacenter”... “that’ll stop the probes”.

3) looking at our logs again!

After this was much easier to find another “probe”, done by another “RTT collect” tool and usually trying to access our server by a “unix like” traceroute before sending “TCP 53” packets.

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Severity:

Criticality	5	Web servers
Lethality	1	Just getting the RTT.
System Countermeasures	5	All operating systems are running the latest patches and don't allow "zone transfers" from a name server that isn't a secondary.
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-3	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

Detect #02

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the firewall.

```
Apr 11 08:59:10 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:59:10.153493 ep1 @0:82 b 200.215.4.161,3130 -> x.y.z.11,7 PR udp len 20 82 IN
Apr 11 08:59:11 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:59:10.891487 5x ep1 @0:82 b 200.215.4.161,3130 -> x.y.z.11,7 PR udp len 20 102 IN
Apr 11 08:59:12 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:59:11.577640 4x ep1 @0:82 b 200.215.4.161,3130 -> x.y.z.11,7 PR udp len 20 100 IN
Apr 11 08:59:13 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:59:12.511945 6x ep1 @0:82 b 200.215.4.161,3130 -> x.y.z.11,7 PR udp len 20 92 IN
Apr 11 08:59:14 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:59:13.517143 2x ep1 @0:82 b 200.215.4.161,3130 -> x.y.z.11,7 PR udp len 20 97 IN
Apr 11 08:59:15 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:59:14.669449 3x ep1 @0:82 b 200.215.4.161,3130 -> x.y.z.11,7 PR udp len 20 94 IN
Apr 11 08:59:16 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:59:15.698395 3x ep1 @0:82 b 200.215.4.161,3130 -> x.y.z.11,7 PR udp len 20 93 IN
Apr 11 08:59:17 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:59:16.641983 2x ep1 @0:82 b 200.215.4.161,3130 -> x.y.z.11,7 PR udp len 20 106 IN
```

Existence: UDP packets are being sent to echo port of our main web server.

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History: We have been seeing these packets claiming to be sent by 200.215.4 network since the end of last year, when I sent some traces to GIAC. No other hostile traffic has been identified from this network in our firewall or IDS.

Intent: Collect information to populate a web proxy cache.

Technique: UDP packets are sent to port 7 (echo) with a fixed source port -3130 - to our main web server. The header length is always 20 bytes and the payload is variable. It's done by an automated tool that sends even 6 packets per second.

Analysis: Some research was necessary to comprehend this traffic. These packets are from ICP protocol – Internet Cache Protocol – and they were sent by a proxy server, trying to populate its database. The source port used –3130 – is the default port and recommended on the RFC 2186/2187. Because this protocol deals with web access, it must be fast and that's the reason of 6 packets in less than one second. The RFC says that if a proxy server using ICP can't find a record in its own database or in its neighbor's, it's possible to access directly the origin server. And that's what is represented in this detect. The fixed 20 bytes of header and the variable payload is the “signature” of this protocol. Notice that each packet has a different payload. Again, it was necessary to get in touch with a system admin by e-mail to notify them and ask for stopping the “probe”.

Some parts of the RFC that prove what I am saying:

RFC 2186

ICP is a message format used for communicating between Web caches.

ICP is implemented on top of UDP

An ICP query/reply exchange needs to occur quickly, typically within a second or two. (*6 packets per second is fast, uh?*)

The ICP message format consists of a 20-octet fixed header plus a **variable sized payload** (*bingo!*).

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RFC2187

ICP may be a "net win" in some situations, and a "net loss" in others. We recognize that certain practices described in this document are suboptimal. (*maybe that's my case.. :-)*)

When a cache does not hold a requested object, it may ask via ICP whether any of its neighbor caches has the object. If any of the neighbors does have the requested object (i.e., a "neighbor hit"), then the cache will request it from them. If none of the neighbors has the object (a "neighbor miss"), then the cache must forward the request either to a parent, or **directly to the origin server**.

Severity:

Criticality	5	Our main web server.
Lethality	2	Udp packets to echo port.
System Countermeasures	5	All the servers behind the firewall don't listen to this port and they have the latest patches.
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-2	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

Detect #03

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the firewall and on the IDS.

Apr 10 23:24:01 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:01.230185
Apr 10 23:24:01 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:01.956161

ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.1,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN
ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.4,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN

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```
Apr 10 23:24:01 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:01.956191 ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.5,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN
Apr 10 23:24:01 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:01.956788 ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.2,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN
Apr 10 23:24:01 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:01.956816 ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.3,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN
Apr 10 23:24:02 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:02.925654 ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.6,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN
Apr 10 23:24:03 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:03.332320 ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.10,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN
Apr 10 23:24:03 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:03.332349 ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.12,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN
Apr 10 23:24:03 kundun ipmon[1594]: 23:24:03.332375 ep1 @0:82 b 171.209.161.198,31338 -> x.y.z.8,31337 PR udp len 20 47 IN
...
```

```
Apr 10 23:24:01 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.1:31337
Apr 10 23:24:01 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.4:31337
Apr 10 23:24:01 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.5:31337
Apr 10 23:24:01 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.2:31337
Apr 10 23:24:01 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.3:31337
Apr 10 23:24:02 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.6:31337
Apr 10 23:24:03 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.10:31337
Apr 10 23:24:03 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.12:31337
Apr 10 23:24:03 IDS snort: Back Orifice: 171.209.161.198:31338 -> x.y.z.8:31337
```

Existence: Someone claiming to be from 171.209.161.198 (ABD1A1C6.ipt.aol.com) is visiting us.

History: No history is available. No previous traffic was identified on our firewall or IDS from this host or from its network.

Intent: Host scan looking for a trojan horse – back orifice.

Technique: A automated tool is sending udp packets to port 31337 with a fixed source port – 31338.. Sometimes 5 packets are sent in less then one second. The packets are not arriving out or order, they have been sent out of order.

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Analysis: This is a classic example of a back orifice client looking for a server in our address space. These packets are probably not spoofed. With a fixed source port (31338) this was definitely generated by an automated tool.

Severity:

Criticality	3	All my address space, not a specific target.
Lethality	4	Back Orifice is a lethal tool.
System Countermeasures	5	All the servers behind the firewall don't listen to this port and they have the latest patches.
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-2	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

Detect #04

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the firewall.

```
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.409212      ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40239-> x.y.z.1,81 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
...
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.428789      ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40250-> x.y.z.12,81 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.459482      ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40239-> x.y.z.1,81 PR tcp len 20 40 -R IN
...
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.477595      ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40250-> x.y.z.12,81 PR tcp len 20 40 -R IN
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.478668      ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40251-> x.y.z.13,81 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.480074      ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40252-> x.y.z.14,81 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.482111      ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40253-> x.y.z.15,81 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
...
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.513918      ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40251-> x.y.z.13,81 PR tcp len 20 40 -R IN
```

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```
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.514346 ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40254 -> x.y.z.16,81 PR tcp len 20 40 -R IN
Apr 9 15:18:13 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:13.514375 ep1 @0:80 b 141.30.122.20,40255 -> x.y.z.17,81 PR tcp len 20 40 -R IN
...
Apr 9 15:18:23 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:23.275571 ep1 @0:44 b 141.30.122.20,48153 -> k.l.m.254,81 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 15:18:23 kundun ipmon[1594]: 15:18:23.301630 ep1 @0:44 b 141.30.122.20,48153 -> k.l.m.254,81 PR tcp len 20 40 -R IN
```

Existence: Someone claiming to be from 141.30.122.20 (eiet20.et.tu-dresden.de) is visiting us.

History: No history is available. No previous traffic was identified on our firewall or IDS from this host or from its network.

Intent: There are at least two possibilities: 1) trying to find hosts running a service on 81 TCP, maybe a trojan horse 2) a recon probe. If someone was just looking for a “TCP 81 service”, why send crafted RESET packets? So my guess is the second option.

Technique: A automated tool is doing a very very fast host scan on TCP 81. Only 12 hosts are probed on the first “phase”, sending 12 SYN followed by 12 RESET packets. After this, all the address space is probed. After trying to open a connection sending a SYN packet, approximately half second later a RESET packet is sent using the same source port used in the SYN packet.

Analysis: The first observation is that about the speed. The last two packets were targeting another network, and they arrive only 10 seconds after the last packet in our net x.y.z. It shows how fast the scan is. The “attacker” doesn’t know my address space but he can target at least two entire class C network in less than 10 seconds. Its really fast. We see RESET after SYN packets using the same source port. Its looking for something at the probable SYN/ACK response, like the TCP sequence number for example, or its maybe trying to make a recon scan , looking for “unreachable” or “admin-prohibited” messages from a router/firewall, to figure out how are my networks. But it seems that some oracle web servers run at 81 TCP by default, maybe he is looking for one to exploit. Definitely its done by an automated tool that crafts the packets. Every connection is closed sending a RESET after half second. This could be done (specially the “first phase”) easily by a tool like hping2.

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Severity:

Criticality	3	All my address space, not a specific target.
Lethality	4	Fast scan can be dangerous and sometimes interpreted as a DoS attack.
System Countermeasures	5	All the servers behind the firewall don't listen to this port and they have the latest patches.
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-2	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

Detect #05

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the firewall.

```
Apr 10 21:40:37 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:40:36.918363 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:40:43 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:40:42.953649 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:40:55 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:40:54.951133 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:41:19 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:41:18.917114 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:45:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:45:42.713330 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:49:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:49:42.528964 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:51:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:51:42.539338 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:53:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:53:42.570069 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:55:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:55:42.454746 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
```

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```
Apr 10 21:57:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:57:42.439387 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 21:59:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 21:59:42.597223 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 22:01:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 22:01:42.424332 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
Apr 10 22:03:42 kundun ipmon[1594]: 22:03:42.436523 ep1 @0:81 b 200.231.55.10 -> x.y.z.11 PR tcp len 20 (64) frag 44@456 IN
```

Existence: Many fragments from 200.231.55.10 (sjclp05.valley-bbs.com.br) sent to our main web server.

History: Many fragmented packets were blocked and logged in our firewall since March/99 coming from the same network – (200.231.55.0/32).

Intent: A normal connection trying to access our main web server.

Technique: Repeated fragmented packets were sent to our main web server. The firewall is blocking some data causing timeout to the application, that is re-transmitting the packets.

Analysis: Since these packets are not the first fragment we can't see much about the header and possible flags. We can't see also if this is the last fragment, with the DF flag set. All packets were sent to our main web server and they have the same offset and data. They are not overlapping previous data... The IP filter firewall has an feature that we are not using: "keep frags". It means that fragments are not welcome...

So its totally possible that these packets are coming from a normal connection to our web server and probably have the DF set, as a last normal fragment. In fact in this case, the second and last packet... My guess is a router in the middle with a misconfigured MTU, making disnecessary fragmentation.

Notice that the fragments are coming from the client to the server and to be part of a normal connection we must check if it was possible to make a request that could be fragmented. Using tcpdump (tcpdump -n -l -x -s 1500 -i ep1 'tcp[13] &

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0x08 != 0 and src net ournet.com and port = 80' | tcpdecode.pl') I realized that the requests to our main web server (x.y.z.11) has approximately 550 bytes because of large URLs and cookies.

The time between the packets after the fifth one is 2 minutes exactly. This could be sent by the application, resending the packet after a timeout.

A e-mail message was sent to valley-bbs' system administrator alerting the possible mistake but no answer yet.

* After sending this e-mail message, the valley-bbs' sys admin answered telling that they are really having problems with their "radio link" and many "bizarre" fragmentation problems have been observed. They are working hard to solve this problem. ;)

Severity:

Criticality	5	My main web server.
Lethality	1	Normal connections!
System Countermeasures	4	All the servers behind the firewall have the latest patches.
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-2	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

Detect #06

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the firewall.

Apr 11 04:27:52 kundun ipmon[1594]: 04:27:51.909708 ep1 @0:81 b 210.102.139.1,53 -> x.y.z.20,111 PR tcp len 20 40 -S IN

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```
Apr 11 05:06:14 kundun ipmon[1594]: 05:06:14.072829 ep1 @0:81 b 208.243.231.9,53 -> x.y.z.1,111 PR tcp len 20 40 -S IN
Apr 11 09:28:00 kundun ipmon[9669]: 09:28:00.528732 ep1 @0:81 b 210.102.139.1,53 -> x.y.z.21,111 PR tcp len 20 40 -S IN
Apr 11 09:58:05 kundun ipmon[9669]: 09:58:05.894213 ep1 @0:81 b 208.243.231.9,53 -> x.y.z.2,111 PR tcp len 20 40 -S IN
Apr 11 14:22:39 kundun ipmon[9669]: 14:22:38.728581 ep1 @0:81 b 210.102.139.1,53 -> x.y.z.22,111 PR tcp len 20 40 -S IN
Apr 11 14:58:59 kundun ipmon[9669]: 14:58:59.260734 ep1 @0:81 b 208.243.231.9,53 -> x.y.z.3,111 PR tcp len 20 40 -S IN
Apr 11 19:06:11 kundun ipmon[9669]: 19:06:11.024305 ep1 @0:81 b 210.102.139.1,53 -> x.y.z.23,111 PR tcp len 20 40 -S IN
Apr 11 19:52:43 kundun ipmon[9669]: 19:52:42.482054 ep1 @0:81 b 208.243.231.9,53 -> x.y.z.4,111 PR tcp len 20 40 -S IN
...
```

Existence: Probes to portmapper are coming from two different hosts from different networks.

History: Our firewall was blocking tcp packets to portmapper firstly only from 210.102.139.1 (April, 9th) and then both hosts started sending this packets together.

Intent: Find a server with portmapper enabled as part of a recon probe to find out which remote procedures call services are available and then maybe try to exploit someone.

Technique: Each packet is sent sometimes in 4 hour intervals. One starts scanning host from .1 and up and the other from .20 . The source port used is TCP 53 in both cases.

Analysis: This is a slow and slow coordinated scan made by two different hosts. Its trying to elude us by sending packets slowly. While one starts scanning from .1 host the other one starts from .20. Probably the hosts used in this scan were "Own3d" by the same person who is controlling the probe and dealing with the answers.

Severity:

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Criticality	3	All my address space, not a specific target.
Lethality	4	Coordinated scans preparing a future attack.
System Countermeasures	4	All the servers have the latest patches.
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-1	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

Detect #07

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the firewall and on the IDS.

```
Apr 9 02:26:46 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:26:46.337414 ep1 @0:80 b 200.203.184.163,0 -> x.y.z.25,1592 PR tcp len 20 40 -FUP IN
Apr 10 10:29:01 kundun ipmon[1594]: 10:29:00.213698 ep1 @0:80 b 150.162.110.68,0 -> x.y.z.11,1321 PR tcp len 20 40 -RSUP IN
Apr 11 07:51:06 kundun ipmon[9669]: 07:51:06.420108 ep1 @0:81 b 200.213.105.162,0 -> x.y.z.25,1080 PR tcp len 20 40 -RSF IN
Apr 11 10:28:50 kundun ipmon[9669]: 10:28:49.903834 ep1 @0:81 b 200.137.194.49,0 -> x.y.z.11,1157 PR tcp len 20 48 - IN
Apr 11 12:55:31 kundun ipmon[9669]: 12:55:30.326333 ep1 @0:81 b 200.194.103.59,0 -> x.y.z.11,1159 PR tcp len 20 40 -ARSFP IN
Apr 11 21:02:51 kundun ipmon[9669]: 21:02:50.922102 ep1 @0:81 b 200.205.95.5,0 -> x.y.z.11,3894 PR tcp len 20 40 -SFU IN
Apr 11 21:25:12 kundun ipmon[9669]: 21:25:11.782818 ep1 @0:81 b 200.205.95.5,0 -> x.y.z.11,4317 PR tcp len 20 40 -SF IN
Apr 12 08:08:05 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:08:05.344596 ep1 @0:81 b 200.145.78.101,0 -> x.y.z.11,1113 PR tcp len 20 478 -RS IN
Apr 12 08:11:41 kundun ipmon[9669]: 08:11:41.124480 ep1 @0:81 b 200.145.78.101,0 -> x.y.z.11,1155 PR tcp len 20 543 -RFP IN
```

Apr 11 10:28:05 **IDS** snort: NULL Scan: 200.137.194.49:0 -> x.y.z.11:1157

Existence: Many different hosts are sending packets with source port 0 (zero) and bogus TCP flags to our web servers.

History: No history available.

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Intent: These packets are part of a recon probe, trying a OS identification or a recon scan.

Technique: Crafted packets are being sent with bogus TCP flags for days to our web servers. The source port used is zero and the destination port is random. There is no relation between the time stamps.

Analysis: By sending packets with bogus flags someone is trying to make a recon scan. Since all the packets are sent to unknown services, except socks – 1080, the main goal is probably make a recon scan taking advantage of a packet filter that sometimes can send back a “unreachable” message revealing information about the network and about the implemented filters. Or maybe the attacker is trying to evade defenses...

Certainly these packets are not from a normal connection, since there is no reason to a packet come with a source port equal to zero and weird flag combinations like SYN and FIN together on the same packet.

Severity:

Criticality	4	Web servers.
Lethality	2	Recon probe.
System Countermeasures	5	All the servers behind the firewall don't listen to these ports and they have the latest patches.
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-3	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

Detect #08

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Detect Information: This trace was captured on the firewall and on the IDS.

```
Apr 9 02:16:37 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:16:37.067357 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,1999 -> x.y.z.1,5742 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 02:16:37 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:16:37.136755 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2000 -> x.y.z.2,5742 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 02:16:37 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:16:37.243485 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2001 -> x.y.z.3,5742 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 02:16:37 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:16:37.328398 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2002 -> x.y.z.4,5742 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 02:16:37 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:16:37.405075 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2003 -> x.y.z.5,5742 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
...
Apr 9 02:17:34 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:17:34.628558 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2258 -> x.y.z.1,2583 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 02:17:35 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:17:34.833286 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2259 -> x.y.z.2,2583 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 02:17:35 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:17:34.967248 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2260 -> x.y.z.3,2583 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 02:17:35 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:17:35.048405 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2261 -> x.y.z.4,2583 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
Apr 9 02:17:35 kundun ipmon[1594]: 02:17:35.123960 ep1 @0:80 b 200.192.100.170,2262 -> x.y.z.5,2583 PR tcp len 20 44 -S IN
...
Apr 9 02:16:37 IDS snort: BACKDOOR ATTEMPT-WinCrash: 200.192.100.170:1999 -> x.y.z.1:5742
Apr 9 02:16:37 IDS snort: BACKDOOR ATTEMPT-WinCrash: 200.192.100.170:2000 -> x.y.z.2:5742
Apr 9 02:16:37 IDS snort: BACKDOOR ATTEMPT-WinCrash: 200.192.100.170:2001 -> x.y.z.3:5742
...
Apr 9 02:17:34 IDS snort: BACKDOOR ATTEMPT-WinCrash2: 200.192.100.170:2258 -> x.y.z.1:2583
Apr 9 02:17:35 IDS snort: BACKDOOR ATTEMPT-WinCrash2: 200.192.100.170:2259 -> x.y.z.2:2583
Apr 9 02:17:35 IDS snort: BACKDOOR ATTEMPT-WinCrash2: 200.192.100.170:2260 -> x.y.z.3:2583
...
```

Existence: Someone claiming to be from 200.192.100.170 (modem140-pgo.convoy.com.br) is looking for opened 5742 and 2583 TCP ports.

History: No previous attempt is available from this host in our firewall or IDS logs.

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Intent: Find a machine infected with trojan horses, WinCrash1 or WinCrash2.

Technique: Packets are being sent to our address space looking for a infected machine running WinCrash. The source port is always incremented by one and the destination port is the default port of WinCrash1 and WinCrash2.

Analysis: A automated tool is making a fast and noisy scan in our address space looking for WinCrash1 and WinCrash2. After looking for WinCrash1 a new scan was made trying to find WinCrash2. Since the "attacker" is probably not worried about being discovered there are 3 options: 1) The machine that is originating these packets was "owned" by some "hacker" 2) All the packets were spoofed 3) This guy is really a newbie or a real lamer.

Severity:

Criticality	3	All my address space, not a specific target.
Lethality	4	WinCrash is a lethal tool.
System Countermeasures	4	All the servers behind the firewall don't listen to these ports
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-1	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

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Detect #09

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the IDS.

Apr 11 15:42:09 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.0:161
Apr 11 16:25:03 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.1:161
Apr 11 17:13:38 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.2:161
Apr 11 18:00:31 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.3:161
Apr 11 18:47:57 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.4:161
Apr 11 19:34:56 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.5:161
Apr 11 20:22:01 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.6:161
Apr 11 21:08:52 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.7:161
Apr 11 21:54:27 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.8:161
Apr 11 22:41:08 IDS snort: SNMP public access: 206.77.145.97:2200 -> x.y.z.9:161

...

Existence: Someone claiming to be from 206.77.145.97(m20677145097.austin.cc.tx.us) is visiting us.

History: No previous attempt is available from this host in our firewall or IDS logs.

Intent: Access an snmp agent using the default community string "public".

Technique: Using the same source port, 2200, many packets are being sent to our address space looking for a snmp agent. There is approximately 47 minutes between each time stamp.

Analysis: It starts sending a packet to x.y.z.0, the old BSD's style of broadcast address, maybe waiting for a response from all alive hosts and perhaps all the subsequent packets are sent because no answer is given to the first packet. Certainly an automated tool is sending these packets expecting to find a device using the default snmp community

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“public”. If any access is possible using at least a read only community many useful information can be obtained to a future “attack”. Since this traffic is coming from austin.cc.tx.us and we not accept access to port udp 161 the possibility of a misconfigured SNMP manager is not being considered.

Severity:

Criticality	3	All my address space, not a specific target.
Lethality	3	“Read only” snmp access attempt.
System Countermeasures	4	All the servers behind the firewall don't listen to these ports
Network Countermeasures	4	Firewall blocks this traffic.
Severity Score	-2	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

Detect #10

Detect Information: This trace was captured on the IDS.

Mar 12 16:23:29 IDS snort: FrontPage Author PWD Scan: 200.245.108.150:3232 -> x.y.z.11:80
Mar 12 16:23:44 IDS snort: FrontPage-shtml.dll: 200.245.108.150:3249 -> x.y.z.11:80
Mar 12 16:23:46 IDS snort: FrontPage-shtml.exe: 200.245.108.150:3252 -> x.y.z.11:80
Mar 12 16:24:08 IDS snort: FrontPage Service PWD Scan: 200.245.108.150:3269 -> x.y.z.11:80
Mar 12 16:24:10 IDS snort: FrontPage User PWD Scan: 200.245.108.150:3271 -> x.y.z.11:80
Mar 12 16:24:14 IDS snort: FrontPage Admin PWD Scan: 200.245.108.150:3275 -> x.y.z.11:80

Existence: Someone claiming to be from 200.245.108.150 (ita11149.itanet.com.br) is sending hostile traffic to our main web server.

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History: No previous attempt is available from this host in our firewall or IDS logs.

Intent: Find FrontPage server extensions installed in our main web server and access it through "FP client".

Technique: Someone is trying to access some default files in a server with FrontPage extensions installed. All attempts are made to our main web server and looking at the source ports we could say that isn't a busy machine.

Analysis: Accessing a server with FP extensions installed, someone could at least modify the main web page. When someone tries to access a server with FP extensions a request is made to "/_vti_bin/shtml.dll", what was reported by the IDS. All the other logs were generated because someone is trying to access default files like "service.pwd", looking for a server to exploit.

The firewall is not "context based" and all these packets are interpreted as a legitimated and normal connection to the web server. The IDS alerts us. This was probably made by an automated tool or script from a ppp dial-up connection, since there is sometimes 2 seconds between 2 attempts, that is too fast for a manual process and too slow for an automated one.

Severity:

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Criticality	5	Main web server
Lethality	4	FrontPage extensions exploit.
System Countermeasures	4	All the servers don't have FP extensions installed.
Network Countermeasures	3	This traffic is not blocked by the firewall that isn't a "context based" tool but at least an IDS can identify the attempt.
Severity Score	2	Severity = (Criticality + Lethality) – (system countermeasures + net countermeasures)

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