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*** David presents some interesting patterns. Detect 9 is fun reading, since I'm always at work, guess I can't go there.
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Hi,

It's David Nolan.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	19	11:31:49	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:50	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:50	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:50	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:50	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:50	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:50	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:50	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:50	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:51	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:58	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:31:59	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	80
Apr	19	11:32:00	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	9980
Apr	19	11:33:30	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	146.82.152.9	9980 Scan	9980

I'm calling this the 9980 scan. It is not terribly quick, and it follows this patten in other scans as well. I couldn't find the info for this site, I get a destination unreachable. There is no other traffic from this host, so I'm chalking it up as some kind of portscan.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	15	21:22:28	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:23:42	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:24:28	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:24:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:25:41	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:26:28	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:26:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:27:42	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:28:28	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:28:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:29:42	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:30:28	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:30:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:31:42	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:32:28	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:32:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:33:42	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:34:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:35:42	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:36:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:37:42	for	tcp:good.guys.9-80	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	80
Apr	15	21:38:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:40:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980
Apr	15	21:42:41	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9980	from	24.0.146.115	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	9980

This is another variation of the '9980 scan'. This time it comes from a user at home.com. Again, we see a slow timestamp, and the same pattern of port 80 to .9 and port 9980 to .19. An odd portscan.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	12	0:29:11	for	tcp:good.guys.2-1243	from	209.13.228.40	SubSeven Scan	1243
Apr	12	0:29:11	for	tcp:good.guys.3-1243	from	209.13.228.40	SubSeven Scan	1243
Apr	12	0:29:15	for	tcp:good.guys.10-1243	from	209.13.228.40	SubSeven Scan	1243
Apr	12	0:29:15	for	tcp:good.guys.6-1243	from	209.13.228.40	SubSeven Scan	1243
Apr	12	0:29:15	for	tcp:good.guys.8-1243	from	209.13.228.40	SubSeven Scan	1243
Apr	12	0:29:15	for	tcp:good.guys.9-1243	from	209.13.228.40	SubSeven Scan	1243
Apr	12	0:29:18	for	tcp:good.guys.2-3264	from	209.13.228.40	Another Trojan Scan?	3264
Apr	12	0:29:18	for	tcp:good.guys.3-3264	from	209.13.228.40	Another Trojan Scan?	3264
Apr	12	0:29:18	for	tcp:good.guys.9-3264	from	209.13.228.40	Another Trojan Scan?	3264
Apr	12	0:29:19	for	tcp:good.guys.9-3264	from	209.13.228.40	Another Trojan Scan?	3264
Apr	12	0:29:20	for	tcp:good.guys.9-3264	from	209.13.228.40	Another Trojan Scan?	3264
Apr	12	0:29:21	for	tcp:good.guys.9-3264	from	209.13.228.40	Another Trojan Scan?	3264

This is a basic sub7 scan with an extra scan to port 3264. It's pretty quick. The address belongs to a host from a ISP-type company in Argentina. I couldn't really decipher the web site, as the english link didn't work. The trace has been edited for brevity. There was no other traffic from this host, so I guess they just moved on. Another port scan.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.10-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.2-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.3-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.4-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.5-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.6-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161

Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.7-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.8-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	4	18:23:51	for	udp:good.guys.9-161	from	12.72.202.181	SNMP Scan	161

This scan came in from a dialup user in Phoenix, Arizona on att.net. I didn't see any other traffic from this address, so I'm guessing the user tried "public" and that's about it.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.10-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.19-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.2-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.3-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.4-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.5-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.6-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.7-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.8-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161
Apr	12	12:30:39	for	udp:good.guys.9-161	from	208.148.52.60	SNMP Scan	161

This SNMP scan came in from a node off of the westelcom.com network. They offer DSL, and it looks like a node on their DSL network from the name. I'm guessing from the tight time signatures, that this was another user testing "public". Another host scan.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.2-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.3-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.4-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.5-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.6-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.7-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.8-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.9-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.10-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.3-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.2-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.8-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.10-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.7-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.5-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.9-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.6-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374
Mar	31	1:08:44	for	tcp:good.guys.4-27374	from	12.75.147.219	SubSeven PortScan	27374

Another user from att.net, this time dialing in from Kansas City, MO. It's a pretty quick scan, so I imagine that this was a pretty massive sub7 scan, or at least a scanner that didn't care about being noticed.

In the next section, I group three LinuxConf Scans together, but discuss their attackers separately.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.2-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.3-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.5-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.7-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.10-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.4-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.6-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.8-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.9-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	19	8:06:36	for	tcp:good.guys.19-98	from	202.45.48.86	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:56	for	tcp:good.guys.3-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:56	for	tcp:good.guys.5-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:56	for	tcp:good.guys.7-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:56	for	tcp:good.guys.9-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:56	for	tcp:good.guys.2-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:56	for	tcp:good.guys.4-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:56	for	tcp:good.guys.6-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:56	for	tcp:good.guys.19-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:59	for	tcp:good.guys.2-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:59	for	tcp:good.guys.6-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:59	for	tcp:good.guys.7-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:59	for	tcp:good.guys.8-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:59	for	tcp:good.guys.9-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:59	for	tcp:good.guys.10-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	20	10:09:59	for	tcp:good.guys.19-98	from	203.77.125.54	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	17	9:55:59	for	tcp:good.guys.10-98	from	210.77.145.60	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	17	9:55:59	for	tcp:good.guys.19-98	from	210.77.145.60	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	17	9:56:02	for	tcp:good.guys.2-98	from	210.77.145.60	LinuxConf Scan	98
Apr	17	9:56:02	for	tcp:good.guys.3-98	from	210.77.145.60	LinuxConf Scan	98

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Apr 17 9:56:02 for tcp:good.guys.4-98 from 210.77.145.60 LinuxConf Scan 98
Apr 17 9:56:02 for tcp:good.guys.5-98 from 210.77.145.60 LinuxConf Scan 98
Apr 17 9:56:02 for tcp:good.guys.6-98 from 210.77.145.60 LinuxConf Scan 98
Apr 17 9:56:02 for tcp:good.guys.7-98 from 210.77.145.60 LinuxConf Scan 98
Apr 17 9:56:02 for tcp:good.guys.8-98 from 210.77.145.60 LinuxConf Scan 98
Apr 17 9:56:02 for tcp:good.guys.9-98 from 210.77.145.60 LinuxConf Scan 98

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All three detects are host scans for a machine running LinuxConf. The timestamps are all tight, and they go to each host on our subnet.

The first address comes to us from the Hong Kong institute of Education. Hmm.

The second address comes to us from a host in the gcn.net.tw domain in Taiwan.

The third remains a mystery to me.

All of these were pretty basic LinuxConf scans. Fortunately, there is nothing for them to find.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Mar	30	20:06:30	for	tcp:good.guys.2-1080	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	1080
Mar	30	20:06:32	for	tcp:good.guys.2-1080	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	1080
Mar	30	20:06:33	for	tcp:good.guys.2-1080	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	1080
Mar	30	20:06:34	for	tcp:good.guys.2-1080	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	1080
Mar	30	20:30:05	for	tcp:good.guys.2-3128	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	3128
Mar	30	20:30:06	for	tcp:good.guys.2-3128	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	3128
Mar	30	20:30:07	for	tcp:good.guys.2-3128	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	3128
Mar	30	20:30:08	for	tcp:good.guys.2-3128	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	3128
Mar	30	20:34:56	for	tcp:good.guys.2-8080	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	8080
Mar	30	20:34:57	for	tcp:good.guys.2-8080	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	8080
Mar	30	20:34:58	for	tcp:good.guys.2-8080	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	8080
Mar	30	20:34:59	for	tcp:good.guys.2-8080	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	8080
Mar	30	21:05:13	for	tcp:good.guys.2-80	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	80
Mar	30	21:05:14	for	tcp:good.guys.2-80	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	80
Mar	30	21:05:15	for	tcp:good.guys.2-80	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	80
Mar	30	21:05:16	for	tcp:good.guys.2-80	from	4.54.81.177	Ring0	80

This is a variant on the original Ring0 scan, as you can note the addition of port 1080 to the list of ports scanned. This came from a dial-up node at bbn.com. Oh well, if it was a permanent IP, I could have told them they were infected. A pretty easy to detect port scan.

Here are two Sun RPC detects.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.2-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.3-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.4-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.5-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.6-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.7-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.8-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.9-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Mar	31	8:30:29	for	tcp:good.guys.10-111	from	216.160.126.17	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.10-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.2-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.3-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.4-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.5-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.6-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.7-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.8-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:53	for	tcp:good.guys.9-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111
Apr	15	6:06:58	for	tcp:good.guys.19-111	from	216.160.146.60	Sun RPC Scan	111

Both scans have quick time stamps, so they either come from a massive scan, or someone who doesn't care about being detected, or both.

The first scan comes from a host called juliet.datacurrent.com. The do web design and hosting. They might have been compromised. Regardless, this was a quick scan.

The second comes from mht-inc.com. That's all I can find about them.

Anyway, these were two standard Sun RPC scans. No other traffic came from these hosts, as all the traffic was denied.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.2-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53
Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.3-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53
Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.4-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53
Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.5-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53
Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.7-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53

Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.8-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53
Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.9-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53
Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.10-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53
Apr	19	21:05:28	for	tcp:good.guys.19-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53
Apr	19	21:28:09	for	udp:good.guys.6-53	from	208.180.41.193	DNS Scan	53

This DNS scan came from a node at Cox Internet Services, and it looks like a dialup node. A pretty tight scan on the TCP packets, and then the lone udp packet comes in later. No other traffic from this host was recorded. An odd DNS scan.

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.2-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.2-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.3-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.4-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.5-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.2-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.2-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.3-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.4-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.5-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:32	for	tcp:good.guys.6-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.10-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.6-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.6-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.7-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.7-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.8-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.8-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.9-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.9-1880	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	1880
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.10-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.10-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.7-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.7-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.7-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.8-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.8-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.9-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23
Apr	7	1:30:35	for	tcp:good.guys.9-23	from	24.14.181.235	Home.com/Roadrunner/PSI	23

This scan comes to us from another user at home.com. It has been edited for brevity, but 72 packets were received in 3 seconds. We can see that the scan is to all hosts on my subnet, probing telnet and port 1880. I don't know what the second port is for, but I bet it's not good. Anyway, I saw no other traffic from this host, and all packets were blocked. A funky host/port scan.

These last two detects are my favorites, and the most interesting.

This detect is from the 212.108.4 subnet. As many people have posted detects on this, I thought I would summarize the traffic I've seen from it, and give the background information that I have found so far.

The detects look like this:

Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	14	0:56:17	for	tcp:good.guys.2-38139	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	38139
Apr	17	2:30:16	for	tcp:good.guys.6-41274	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	41274
Apr	12	3:00:07	for	tcp:good.guys.4-27746	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	27746
Apr	14	3:12:26	for	tcp:good.guys.4-38652	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	38652
Apr	19	3:44:34	for	tcp:good.guys.10-32857	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	32857
Apr	17	4:08:57	for	tcp:good.guys.9-16901	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	16901
Apr	19	4:40:06	for	tcp:good.guys.3-33036	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	33036
Apr	13	6:34:39	for	tcp:good.guys.9-37434	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	37434
Apr	17	7:59:51	for	tcp:good.guys.19-9750	from	212.108.4.152	High TCP from Porn site.	9750

The traffic spans from the 4th of April through today (the 21st). It comes from five IP addresses, with the number of packets from each address following the address:

```
212.108.4.152 20
212.108.4.153 11
212.108.4.154 17
212.108.4.178 3
212.108.4.180 7
```

So 58 packets over 17 days isn't a lot, but the traffic looks weird. The place that it comes from is even weirder. 212.108.4.152 is the IP for a server at camsathome.com. 212.108.4.153 gives an error page when it's address is put in, so I'm guessing it is a registered user server. 212.108.4.178 is the IP for the main page of www.amsterdamlivexxx.com, don't go there while you are at work. 212.108.4.180 is the IP for the main page of www.camsathome.com, again, don't go there while you are at work.

The result is that all of these sites are hosted by www.interclimax.com, a dutch adult web hosting and design firm. Right now, I have a sniffer trace running to catch any and all packets that come from there from now on. I want to take a look at the captured packets, and then I plan to have a talk with the good people at interclimax.com.

P.S. please don't think I'm a porn freak for finding this. I just happened to telnet to one of the IP's on port 80, and I

found a IIS4.0 web server running. It went from there. Interesting find, though.

This last detect (yeah! finally!) is what I like to call the Oklahoma state scan. It comes from a machine named dms.av.okstate.edu. The scan included 256 packets all received in less than one second. It went to ports 110, 21, 23, 25, 512, 5556, 79, and 80. Most of the hits were to port 80, but the interesting thing is that each host got a packet on each port, and then 19 packets on port 80. The machines that were running web servers got connections from the source ip on ports 2770 to 2830, with ports being repeated. No other traffic is seen from this host. What I found interesting was the port selection ftp, telnet, smtp, finger, web, pop3, sun login and then port 5556. Port 5556 is listed as a possible BO port, but I don't think that is a BO scan. I can't find any sun based service that runs on this port. I have two theories. One is that port 5556 is for some service that runs on a sun platform that I don't know about. The other is that the traditional ports are used to hide the scan for BO. No matter what it is, though, it is a pretty massive scan. Here are part of the detects:

Denied								
Month	Day	Time	Way	Address	Way	Address	Possible Detect	Port
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.10-110	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	110
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.10-23	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	23
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.10-25	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	25
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.10-512	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	512
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.10-5556	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	5556
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.10-79	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	79
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.10-80	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	80
Apr	1	0:53:47	for	tcp:good.guys.2-110	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	110
Apr	1	0:53:47	for	tcp:good.guys.2-21	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	21
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.2-23	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	23
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.2-25	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	25
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.2-512	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	512
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.2-5556	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	5556
Apr	1	0:53:50	for	tcp:good.guys.2-79	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	79
Apr	1	0:53:47	for	tcp:good.guys.2-80	from	139.78.52.223	Oklahoma State Scan	80

Accepted								
Month	Day	Time	Proto	Way	Address	Way	Address	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2800	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2802	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2801	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2805	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2806	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2807	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2808	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2809	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2810	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2811	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2812	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2813	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2771	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2818	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2819	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2772	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2820	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2821	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2773	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2822	to	good.guys.9-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2774	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2775	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2778	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2779	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2780	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2781	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2782	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2783	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2784	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2785	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2786	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2791	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2792	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2793	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2794	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2795	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2771	to	good.guys.8-80	
Apr	1	0:53:50	tcp	from	139.78.52.223-2772	to	good.guys.8-80	

Anyway, that was my Oklahoma State scan.

David Nolan

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