



# Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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# **W32/Fizzer.A-Analysis and Infection Prevention and Handling**

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**GCIH v2.1 option #1**

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## Introduction

Hello, my name is Colette L'Heureux and I am a GCIH certification candidate. As a systems security specialist for my company I am notified by several different companies when new viruses are found to be in the wild. I'm also notified when new viruses are discovered, even when not in the wild, when they start spreading fast, the pager starts going off.

The W32/fizzer.a virus was first discovered on May 8<sup>th</sup> 2003 by F-secure. It was originally seen spreading rapidly via the Kazaa file sharing network in Asia. By May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2003, it was upgraded to one of the fastest spreading worms and considered a Level 1 security risk by F-secure. Trend Micro systems states they first discovered the worm on May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2003 and upgraded it to medium risk with high damage potential on the same day. Symantec first noticed the worm on May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2003 and listed it as a medium risk on May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

Fizzer is one of the new hybrid viruses that have recently been seen popping up. This virus has its own e-mailer, a method to create IRC and AOL Instant Messenger accounts, to await instructions from its code writer to possibly launch a denial of service attack. It can also update itself by attempting to connect to a geocities website. It also attempts to disable any local anti-virus software it finds and it installs a keystroke logger to gather passwords and credit card numbers

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## Part 1: The Exploit

*Name*

From [http://www.cert.org/current/current\\_activity.html#peido](http://www.cert.org/current/current_activity.html#peido) page

### **Win32/Fizzer Worm**

*added May 12*

The CERT/CC has received reports of a mass-emailing worm known as "Fizzer", "W32.Fizzer", or "Win32/Fizzer". It arrives via an email message in an attachment with an .exe, .pif, .com, or .scr extension. Upon opening the attachment, the worm uses various IRC networks to communicate with a remote attacker. This worm is also reported to contain a keystroke logger.

The CERT/CC strongly encourages users to install anti-virus software, and keep its virus information files up-to-date.

Users may also wish to consider:

- Filtering email attachments with the extensions listed above.
- Monitoring outgoing traffic for unexpected IRC connections

This worm/virus/exploit is known by several other names including but not limited to:

- W32/Fizzer@MM
- W32/Fizzer.A
- Sparky
- Win32.Fizzer
- W32/Fizzer-A
- WORM\_FIZZER.A
- Fizzer
- Win32/Fizzer.A@mm
- I-Worm.Fizzer
- W32.HLLW.Fizzer@mm

The different names are caused by non-standardized naming conventions between the many different anti-virus product makers.

There is currently no CVE number assigned.

### *Vulnerable Operating Systems*

The following operating systems are vulnerable to this virus/worm/exploit:

Windows 9x  
Windows NT  
Windows 2000  
Windows ME  
Windows XP

### *Protocols/Services/Applications*

Fizzer targets many different services. First seen spreading through the Kazaa file sharing service, it then moved to email. When a computer becomes infected it attempts to connect to AOL Instant Messenger.

Fizzer uses the following ports either as method for infection or as a method to contact it's creator for further instructions:

1214 – Kazaa communication port (used to spread infection)  
5190 – AOL Instant Messaging (used to listen for updates or instructions)  
6667 – IRC Port (used to listen for updates or instructions)

Once Fizzer has infected a system it attempts to email itself with its own embedded email program. Fizzer targets the Outlook and Windows address books for address to send itself to.

### *Brief Description*

Fizzer is a very complex hybrid virus with multiple methods of infection via Kazaa peer to peer file sharing and email attachments. It has multiple payloads that it delivers including a keystroke logger, a Trojan horse, several registry setting changes, a backdoor to AOL and several IRC channels. It also has the capability to be used for several other backdoors. It can kill some anti-virus software programs, update itself via the web and it even leaves a method to uninstall itself.

### *Variants*

There are no known variants at the time of this writing.

### *References*

[http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VName=WORM\\_FIZZER.A](http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VName=WORM_FIZZER.A)

<http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/w32fizzera.html>

<http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.hllw.fizzer@mm.html>


[http://www.cert.org/current/current\\_activity.html#peido](http://www.cert.org/current/current_activity.html#peido)

<http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/fizzer.shtml>

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## Part 2: The Attack

### Network Diagram



This diagram was modified from my graded GCFW practical (# 328) and the original can be found at [http://www.giac.org/GCFW\\_400.php](http://www.giac.org/GCFW_400.php).

The end user who is running the Kazaa client is the focus of this attack. With Kazaa being the initial point of infection the virus then uses the user's outlook



address book to send itself through email The virus then drops a copy of itself back into the Kazaa share directories to replicate itself through the Kazaa system and open back doors through the firewall to the IRC channels and AOL instant messenger.

### *Protocol Description*

To spread itself, fizzer uses two protocols. The Kazaa peer to peer file sharing protocol and the SMTP protocol.

According to RFC 821 the purpose of the SMTP (simple mail transport protocol) is to facilitate mail transport and delivery.

Kazaa is a distributed, self-organizing network and it also allows users to share digital media other than music. Peer to Peer protocol allows remote computers to connect to each other and create a shared network for the specific purpose of sharing files.

Fizzer does not use AOL Instant Messenger or IRC to spread infection but rather to update itself and receive instructions from it's creator.

### *How the exploit works*

The Kazaa protocol when installed on a user's computer looks for a "supernode" (computer with the most amount of data to share and the fastest upload/download speed) when it finds that "supernode" it searches the shared files on that users computer and advertises what files are available for sharing on the local computer. All file sharing and finding takes place on port 1214. The Fizzer worm locates the Kazaa shared folder on an infected computer and copies itself there with random names. Any person who connects to an infected computer and executes files downloaded from its shared folder becomes infected with the worm.

When fizzer spreads through email the payload is the same and like all email borne viruses it relies on the user to open an attachment thereby executing the virus. The first infected machine received a copy of the worm via email with a subject line that reads one of the following:

I thought this was interesting...  
rather psychedelic...  
found this on the net, you might like it...  
Damn it feels good to be gangsta.  
The way I feel - Remy Shand  
Paradigm Shift  
WASSUP!  
Know Thyself

I love you  
Please discard if you don't like or agree with our present leadership...  
little popup remover  
B cannot remember  
Yo, WASSUP, B?  
an interesting program...  
You might not appreciate this...  
I think you might find this amusing...  
check this out... hehehe  
question...  
see you tomorrow.  
how are you?  
you need to lose weight.  
kind of simple, but fun nonetheless.  
check it out.  
I wonder what can be so bad  
That it makes you want to die  
I wonder what could be so tragic  
Makes you want to take your life  
You have your savior on the cross  
While you sit on the throne  
Put yourself up on that cross  
Put your savior on the throne  
And I know  
It's hard to take what's happening  
Life is tough sometimes  
It seem like there's no hope for you  
Your life is worth more than you can say  
It's hard to see beyond your pain  
When you feel so dead inside  
It's hard to see what you've been given  
It's hard to find a hope in life

This is not a complete and exhaustive list of subject lines but rather an example of some it could contain.

This mail arrives in the user's mailbox with an attachment with a randomly generated name and an extension of:

.exe  
.com  
.scr  
.pif

The name of the attachment is randomly generated using one of the following two formulas:

%Name%%Number%

%Word%

Fizzer collects e-mail addresses from Windows and Outlook Address Books on an infected computer and from different files in personal folders, cookie folders, the recently opened files folder and Internet cache directories.

The worm fakes sender's e-mail address in infected messages. It randomly composes fake addresses from its rather extensive internal list. The fake sender's e-mail address may be composed with a fake a name, a random number and one of these domains:

msn.com  
hotmail.com  
yahoo.com  
aol.com  
earthlink.net  
gte.net  
juno.com  
netzero.com

The worm sends itself in e-mail messages to all the addresses it finds. The worm randomly selects subjects, bodies and attachment names from its large internal lists. The worm can use the names of innocent files from an infected system's hard disk for its attachment. Attachment extensions can be any .EXE, .PIF, .SCR or .COM.

The most impressive part of this worm is its payload. I have never seen such an extensive payload before. According to F-Secure the following is part of the payload:

### **Key logging Trojan**

The worm records users' keystrokes and writes them into an ISERVC.KLG file located in the Windows folder. This file can be picked by a hacker, so he can get access to users' login names and passwords as well as to their confidential data.

### **AOL backdoor**

The worm connects to AOL server on port 5190 with a random user name creating a bot. A hacker can establish a connection to the bot and control the behavior of the worm remotely.

## IRC backdoor

The worm tries to connect to different IRC servers and create bots in a certain channels there. The author of the worm can use these bots to get limited access to infected systems. The worm has a long list of IRC servers in its resources. Here are some of the IRC server names that the worm uses:

irc.afternet.org  
irc.dal.net  
irc.eu.dal.net  
irc.ablenet.org  
irc.abovenet.org  
irc.accessirc.net  
irc.aceirc.net  
irc.all-defiant.org  
irc.allochat.net  
irc.alphanine.net  
irc.altnet.org  
irc.amcool.net  
irc.amiganet.org  
irc.angeleyez.net  
irc.aniverse.com  
irc.another.net  
irc.arabchat.org  
irc.arabmirc.net  
irc.astrolink.org  
irc.asylum-net.org  
irc.auiirc.net  
irc.aurosoniq.net  
irc.auscape.org  
irc.aussiechat.org  
irc.awesomechat.net  
irc.awesomechristians.com  
irc.axenet.org  
irc.aXpi.net  
irc.ayna.org  
irc.azzurra.org  
irc.bahamutirc.net  
irc.bappy.eu.org  
irc.bdsm-net.com  
irc.beyondirc.net

## Additional backdoor capabilities

The worm has additional backdoor capabilities. It listens to ports 2018-2021 for commands from a remote host (the hacker's computer). The ports are used for the following purposes:

2018 - command port (sending/receiving commands)

2019 - file port (sending/receiving files)

2020 - console port (remote console)

2021 - video port (capturing video and sending it out)

The worm's author can access these ports with a specially made utility (client program of a backdoor), however the console port can be connected to with a Telnet application. A remote console gives a hacker access to an infected computer as if he was using it locally.

The worm can also start an HTTP server on port 81 to provide additional access to an infected computer.

The worm has the ability to kill the tasks of certain anti-virus programs. It kills all processes with the following strings in their names:

NAV  
SCAN  
AVP  
TASKM  
VIRUS  
F-PROT  
VSHW  
ANTIV  
VSS  
NMAIN

The worm can perform a DoS (Denial of Service) attack if it receives a specific command from a remote hacker.

### **Auto updating feature**

The worm has the ability to update itself from a web site. It connects to a web site, downloads an update and saves it as UPD.BIN file in the Windows main folder. However, the web site with the updates for the worm is no longer available.

### **Uninstallation feature**

The current variant of the worm can uninstall itself if a file with the following name is found in the Windows main directory:

Uninstall.pky

When the worm finds a file with this name, it kills all its tasks and removes its registry keys thus disinfecting a system.

Fizzer changes the windows registry setting in the following manner:  
[HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run]  
"SystemInit" = "%windir%\iservc.exe]

where %windir% is the Windows main directory. As a result, the main file of the worm is activated for each Windows session.

Additionally, the worm modifies the text file startup string:

```
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command]
@ = "%windir%\ProgOp.exe 0 7 '%windir%\NOTEPAD.EXE %1'
'%windir%\initbak.dat' '%windir%\iservc.exe'
```

where %windir% is the Windows main directory.

It also drops at least the following 4 files:

```
ISERVC.EXE
INITBAK.DAT
ISERVC.DLL
PROGOP.EXE
```

The ISERVC.DLL file is a key-logging component and the PROGOP.EXE file is a pure dropper code. A dropper code file is code that constructs a multi-file virus into a single file so that it can “dropped” onto another system for execution. Before sending itself out, the worm re-assembles itself into a single file using this dropper.

A Unix “strings” command run against the encrypted source code of the virus comes back with the following recognizable words:

```
Sparky will reign.
mRich8
USER32.dll
WSOCK32.dll
WINMM.dll
AVICAP32.dll
SHLWAPI.dll
SHELL32.dll
FADVAPI32.dll
```

GDI32.dll  
ole32.dll  
IMAGEHLP.dll  
MPR.dll  
OLEAUT32.dll  
WININET.dll  
RASAPI32.dll  
DispatchMessageA  
TranslateMessage  
GetMessageA  
wvsprintfA  
CreateWindowExA  
RegisterClassExA  
UnregisterClassA  
DestroyWindow  
MessageBoxA  
SetWindowPos  
GetDlgItem  
CreateDialogParamA  
GetWindowPlacement  
ShowWindow  
SendMessageA  
SetWindowTextA  
SetForegroundWindow  
SetFocus  
SetWindowLongA  
CallWindowProcA  
PostQuitMessage  
SetTimer  
KillTimer  
SetCursorPos  
GetWindowRect  
GetForegroundWindow  
ExitWindowsEx  
ReleaseDC  
DrawTextExA  
GetDCEX  
GetDesktopWindow  
GetClientRect  
GetDC  
LoadImageA  
GetSystemMetrics  
EnumDisplaySettingsA  
ChangeDisplaySettingsA  
mouse\_event  
PostMessageA

GetWindowThreadProcessId  
WindowFromPoint  
keybd\_event  
BlockInput  
EnumChildWindows  
GetWindowTextA  
GetWindowDC  
IsWindowVisible  
PostThreadMessageA  
PlaySoundA  
mciSendStringA  
mciGetErrorStringA  
capGetDriverDescriptionA  
capCreateCaptureWindowA  
StrToIntA  
StrToIntExA  
SHGetSpecialFolderPathA  
FindExecutableA  
ShellExecuteA  
StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA  
SetServiceStatus  
RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA  
AdjustTokenPrivileges  
OpenProcessToken  
LookupPrivilegeValueA  
GetUserNameA  
CloseServiceHandle  
CreateServiceA  
OpenSCManagerA  
DeleteService  
OpenServiceA  
StartServiceA  
ControlService  
GetServiceDisplayNameA  
RegCloseKey  
RegQueryValueExA  
RegOpenKeyExA  
RegSetValueExA  
RegCreateKeyExA  
RegDeleteValueA  
RegDeleteKeyA  
RegEnumKeyExA  
RegEnumValueA  
SetROP2  
DeleteObject  
DeleteDC




BitBlt  
SelectObject  
CreateCompatibleBitmap  
CreateCompatibleDC  
GetDIBits  
GetDIBColorTable  
GetObjectA  
StretchDIBits  
GetSystemPaletteEntries  
CoCreateInstance  
CLSIDFromProgID  
CoGetClassObject  
CoInitialize  
CoUninitialize  
MakeSureDirectoryPathExists  
SearchTreeForFile  
WNetCloseEnum  
WNetEnumResourceA  
WNetOpenEnumA  
WNetGetLastErrorA  
InternetGetConnectedState  
RasEnumEntriesA  
RasEnumConnectionsA  
RasHangUpA  
RasDialA  
GetProcAddress  
LoadLibraryA  
FreeLibrary  
Sleep  
HeapAlloc  
GetProcessHeap  
HeapFree  
HeapSize  
ExitProcess  
GetModuleHandleA  
GetLastError  
CreateMutexA  
SetLastError  
InterlockedExchange  
LocalAlloc  
LocalFree  
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter  
FormatMessageA  
lstrcmpiA  
lstrcmpA  
MultiByteToWideChar

WideCharToMultiByte  
CreateFileA  
CloseHandle  
GetFileSize  
SetFilePointer  
WriteFile  
ReadFile  
FindClose  
FindFirstFileA  
DeleteFileA  
CopyFileA  
GetDriveTypeA  
GetLogicalDriveStringsA  
FindNextFileA  
LocalUnlock  
LocalLock  
GetCurrentThreadId  
GetLocalTime  
GetSystemTime  
GetCommandLineA  
GetModuleFileNameA  
GetCurrentProcessId  
OpenProcess  
CreateProcessA  
GlobalFree  
GlobalUnlock  
GlobalLock  
GlobalSize  
GetVersionExA  
GetComputerNameA  
GetDateFormatA  
GetTimeFormatA  
GetTickCount  
MoveFileA  
DuplicateHandle  
SetStdHandle  
CreatePipe  
GetStdHandle  
GetCurrentProcess  
SetConsoleCtrlHandler  
SetConsoleTitleA  
AllocConsole  
ResetEvent  
CreateEventA  
WaitForMultipleObjects  
SetEvent

TerminateProcess  
FreeConsole  
ExpandEnvironmentStringsA  
GetCurrentDirectoryA  
FreeResource  
LockResource  
LoadResource  
SizeofResource  
FindResourceA  
EndUpdateResourceA  
UpdateResourceA  
BeginUpdateResourceA  
MoveFileExA  
GetSystemInfo  
ResumeThread  
CreateThread  
TerminateThread  
KERNEL32.dll  
DrawDibClose  
DrawDibDraw  
DrawDibOpen  
ICImageCompress  
ICImageDecompress  
MSVFW32.dll  
RtlZeroMemory  
RtlMoveMemory  
kernel32.dll  
SocketWindow  
Ver: %u.%u, High Ver: %u.%u  
PSAPI.DLL  
KERNEL32.DLL  
%s: %s  
FILE  
Could not update module.  
Could not open file.  
PADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGX

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*Description and diagram of attack*



Joe uses Kazaa at work because the connection speed is better, his network shares have more available space than his computer at home, but most importantly he uses it at work because the firewall is not tightened down properly. Ok, let's face it they really need to do a firewall rule review where Joe works because they have several really big holes and lots of open ports. But that discussion is really for a different practical.

Joe logs into Kazaa and gets connected to the supernode owned by bad guy Bill. Bad guy Bill, hereby referred to as just plain "Bill", is sharing a new file called "Cool Tunes". Joe really likes cool tunes and decides he wants to hear whatever this music maybe so he downloads "Cool Tunes" to his local machine. What Joe does not know is that Bill has placed a super new, extremely harmful virus known as W32/Fizzer on his Kazaa shares and called it "Cool Tunes".

Joe then launches the "Cool Tunes" file he downloaded. Upon launching, Fizzer does the following:

1. Drops 4 files
2. The file containing the instructions executes
3. It deactivates your anti-virus software
4. Installs a key stroke logger
5. Opens a connection to AOL instant messenger
6. Opens a connection to 1 or more IRC channels
7. Mails itself to everyone in the outlook address book
8. Searches the system for other email addresses to mail to
9. Opens a web server connection to the update server
10. Drops a copy of itself in the Kazaa shares
11. Updates the Windows Registry
12. Drops an uninstall program on the system
13. Starts listening on ports 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 for instructions
14. If the virus find a copy of itself on the system already it will execute the uninstall program

With the emailing and placement of itself in the Kazaa shares it has then managed to attempt to spread itself to others.

#### *Signature of attack*

One signature of the virus is if you see an increase or start of traffic on the AOL IM and IRC ports. These ports are 5190 and 6667. Activity on these ports when not expected is a sure sign that one or more of your computer systems have become infected.

The only other thing that could be considered a distinct signature for this virus is that the ISERVC.EXE file contains the 'Sparky will reign.' string in its header, as shown in the screenshot provided by F-secure

<http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/fizzer.shtml>

```

02 00 8B-9E 04 00 B4  H= 0!n nж0 nЮ+ |
00 8B 9E-F0 00 00 00  J=!б, ЙЖ→ nЮЕ
B4 02 CD-21 EB F3 C3  00KПF t+0=!ye+
04 76 05-77 06 3E B1  e0r♥x t♥u♥v♥w♥>|
D7 FF C3-C6 06 00 00  0 u•&|▲||D+ |+▲
6C 6C 20-72 65 69 67  Sparky will reig
B8 22 01-FF D0 B8 00  n. n H| 7"0 47
8C C6 3E-38 ED A8 6D  L=! |M|>8эим
CD AD 6D-3A ED A8 6D  8эим8эим|=nm:эим
ED A9 6D-E5 ED A8 6D  8эим?эим8эимхэим
CE A2 6D-39 ED A8 6D  ZC7m=эим>+vm9эим
EB AE 6D-39 ED A8 6D  >+7gm+эим nom9эим
00 00 00-00 00 00 00  Rich8эим
BA A1 3E-00 00 00 00  Image Copyright © F-Secure Corporation


```

*How to protect against Fizzer*

There are two ways to prevent Fizzer from getting to your company. The first is to not allow the Kazaa protocol through your firewall. In other words block all inbound and outbound traffic on port 1214.

The second way to prevent this virus from entering is to not allow emails with executable attachments in. You could do this by blocking the entire email or simply stripping off the attachment and forwarding the body of the email to the recipient. I have found that the Trend's eManager application can easily be set up to strip attachments by file type as seen in the following screenshot:

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Executable attachment stripping has the added benefit of protecting you from email borne executable virus attachments while waiting for your anti-virus software to update.

You can not completely prevent an infected internal system from spreading this virus unless you do not allow outbound or intra-company mailing. However, you can reduce the risk of this virus by tuning the firewall to not accept traffic on the AOL IM port (5190) and the IRC port (6667). This will prevent the virus from being able to open these channels and reduce your risk of backdoors being available.

## Part 3 The Incident Handling Process

### *Preparation*

Joe's company has a few countermeasures in place but still is extremely unprepared for a true emergency. The most impressive countermeasure they have in place is a very complete and extensive guide to log review.

Every day during working hours there is one person who is dedicated to watching logs such as the system logs and firewall logs for all machines in the DMZ. This person also watches the NIDs device logs. Overnight and on weekends this work is turned over to Symantec's managed security services. This service provides Joe's company with the following services:

- Delivers 24x7, real-time monitoring and management of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, virtual private networks, and other security products
- Enhances an organization's information security posture through continuous monitoring and management, expert analysis of log data, and immediate response to potential security threats
- Provides rapid, cost-effective resolution of security problems from security operations centers around the world
- Uses a proprietary technology platform to aggregate and analyze data from heterogeneous security devices to quickly identify and defend against threats
- Offers organizations a real-time view of their enterprise security posture
- Ensures optimal protection of mission-critical assets by providing analysis and commentary needed to adjust defenses against emerging attacks
- Smooths out the volatility in resource demands and costs typically associated with managing information security
- Protects existing technology investments with broad, vendor-neutral support

More information about this service can be found at:

<http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/SecurityServices>

The company has a network intrusion device (NID) in place in the DMZ but since Kazaa, Instant Messenger and IRC are well know traffic flows and not considered anomalous the device would not have been tripped by the fizzer worm.

The company has a profile of an incident handling team but it has never been tested. The profile for this team consists of two members of the IT security group, senior staff from each of the four technology groups (web, mainframe, windows and Unix), one auditor, one member of the company's legal council and a corporate communications specialist. When an incident does occur all involved parties will report to the Manager of Business Continuity.



For this incident the following people were first to be called: The two IT security people, the window's staff, the web specialist, Unix specialist (they also maintain the firewall software), the communications specialist. The first call came from Symantec alerting the security staff of suspicious traffic approximately 20 minutes after it started. The 20 minute delay occurred when Symantec was verifying that they were seeing anomalous traffic patterns and while they checked their worldwide database for similar patterns.

Joe's company has several policies and procedures in place handling an incident. Following is an excerpt:

### ***Incident handling***

Each incident may require additional treatment and may alter the handling based on its intensity and practice. The steps below create a base containment strategy. It is the Incident Manager's (IM) duty to plan and coordinate accordingly. These steps assume that an incident has been reported and identified.

### ***Point of Contact***

The end user, business partner, external customer, or other means of notification has taken place. An abnormal situation has occurred that raises speculation. The on call engineer is notified using one of the communication mechanisms stated in the Incident Communication portion of this document. Once the point of contact is established the process of combating the particular incident begins.

### ***Identification***

A critical component in the response of any compromise is to identify the systems, which are affected, and the level of priority that needs to be applied.

### ***Containment***

Once the priority level has been established it is critical to reduce the extent of the attack. Systems which have been identified as being compromised or infected must be contained from other systems on the network. This may include the disconnection of the machine from the network or major production services turned off. Rapid response is critical to minimizing the impact of the attack. Physical access should be restricted and audited. Members of the Infrastructure Incident Response Team (IIRT) have full understanding and abilities to shutdown and hardware of software components that they feel has been or is in danger of being compromised.

### ***Eradication***

Knowledge of the level of the attack has been established and the removal process starts. Archive file(s) that pertain to the attack for further examination. Clean and reformat any media that requires attention and insure that the backup media is not affected

## *Identification*

This incident was first seen by Symantec's managed security services at 6 pm. They watched the traffic that suddenly started on ports 6667 and 5190 for 20 minutes while also searching for similar traffic from the corporations they watch. Upon noticing a rise in this type of traffic distributed across several platforms and corporations they contacted the emergency contacts at Joe's company. The new traffic pattern was identified from reports by many anti-virus companies as that of W32/Fizzer.a. The traffic was spotted in the active firewall logs for the company.

At 6:20 pm the two security specialists for the company were paged. Upon notification of the potential problem the security specialists contacted the Manager of Business Continuity. The two security people arrived back in the office within 20 minutes of being paged with the manager arriving 10 minutes later. They assembled in the prearranged location to assess the situation.

Prior to 6 pm that evening the logs showed that port 6667 had never been used before and port 5190 was only used during business hours. Based on what was known about Fizzer the security people looked for traffic on port 1214. They discovered that Joe was processing a lot of traffic through this port and that the increase in traffic to the two other ports could also be traced back to Joe's machine.

At this point, based on the defined procedures, the manager on hand declared a medium incident and called back on site the firewall/Unix, windows/exchange, and web services incident personnel. A phone call was placed to the communications representative and auditors to inform them of the situation since the incident has occurred after hours it was deemed unnecessary for the auditor and communications persons to come on site. Joe's Company defines a medium incident as the following:

### ***Medium***

Production or Development Platform(s) that affect 10 – 50% of the enterprise functions: Development servers, Backup server, Internal web environment, and single user workstation.

Level of support: Incident reported to on call personnel. On call contacts necessary individual(s) pertaining to a specific platform. Situation is confined to a single machine or process, and has little affect on production functions. Situation is eradicated and level of service is returned to normal within 60 minutes. Incident is reported to the IIRP email alias and recorded on the IIRP Incident spreadsheet for historical information.


After the Manager and Security people have assembled, they went to the point of infection, Joe's computer. They explained the situation and told Joe he could go home for the day and that they would need to rebuild his computer before he could get back on the network. They then removed Joe's computer from the network and waited for the rest of the team to assemble.

### Containment

After taking possession of Joe's computer the handling team removed the computer from the network effectively stopped the connections to AOL and IRC and preventing the sending of more infected emails.


To take the computer off the network the following was done:

1. Right click on the "My Network Places" icon on the desktop
2. Click on properties
3. Find the interface in question and right click on it
4. Click on disable




After taking the computer off of the network the handling team would get a spare external drive from the jump kit (all contents will be detailed shortly) attach it to

the computer in question and from the command line copy the infected disk to a backup copy.



Once this is done the handling team will need to take the exchange server off line to prevent the spread of fizzer through emails. This is done through a GUI on the server and it looks like this:

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Once the exchange server has been taken off-line a full level 0 backup is run using Legato Systems backup services. There are no screen prints for this process. For details on this application please see:

<http://portal2.legato.com/products/networker/modules/exchange.cfm>

For this incident the handling team's jump kit includes the following items:

- Note pad and pens
- Tape recorder
- Spare hard drives (internal and external) formatted for both Unix and Windows architectures
- Scsi cables (fast wide and scsi2 both internal and external)
- USB external hard drives and zip drive
- Polaroid camera
- A whiteboard with printing capabilities
- Laptops configured with all flavors of window's and Unix operating systems used by the company


### *Eradication*

As described in an earlier section Joe's computer became infected via the Kazaa P2P file sharing protocol. After he was infected the computer opened several back door connections to outside services and replicated itself via email by sending copies of itself to everyone in Joe's email address book and any other documents Joe may have had with email addresses in them. This means that Joe's machine is infected as well as the company's email server, in this case exchange 2000.

To remove all sources of current infection and potential infection three things must be done. First on Joe's computer a fresh burn of the XP operating system needs to be produced and used to replace his current hard drive. This removed the infection and also removes the Kazaa software Joe should not have been using in the first place. Second the exchange server needs to be searched for all emails with executable attachments. To do this we would use a tool provided by Microsoft called Microsoft Exchange Mailbox Merge program or exmerge. Details about this utility can be found at:

<http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb%3ben-us%3b174197>

The last server that needs to be fixed is the firewall. A new rule needs to be added to block traffic to and from Kazaa, AOL IM and the IRC channels. For a CheckPoint NG firewall that rule would look like this:



A follow up to the eradication process would be for corporate communications to send a notification to all employees that the ports and services used by Kazaa, AOL IM and IRC chat have been blocked. This email should also state that further attempts to use these services will not be allowed.

### *Recovery*

Because this incident occurred after work hours and the actual infection was limited to one machine the only recovery needed was on Joe's desktop machine. This limited recovery was achieved by giving Joe's computer a new hard drive with the standard, base corporate build that all employees start out with.

There was no recovery needed on the exchange server only the removal of the emails with infected attachments and there was no recovery on the firewall just an additional rule that needed to be added.

### *Lessons Learned*

The biggest lesson learned by the company is that they need to do more of everything. They got lucky this time around and the infection and damage was very limited.

The company needs to do tests of the incident handling team and while they did a good job during this incident they need more practice. The company needs to review the posted policies and procedures for what type of traffic will and will not be allowed on their networks. The company needs stated and supported disciplinary actions that will be enforced should the policies and practices not be followed. The company needs to review their firewall rules more frequently.

The company needs to educate the employees on what is and is not company property, including computer hardware, and what are acceptable uses for company assets.

Some positive lessons they learned were that the practice of stringent log review by internal employees and the monitoring 24x7 by an outside company works and that the response team can be put together rapidly if need be and function coherently when they need to.

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