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This is the practical assignment for GIAC Certified UNIX Security Administrator (GCUX) Version 1.9 (revised April 8, 2002), practical 6.52.0. I attended the Track 6 seminar at SANS2002 in Orlando, Florida in April of this year. This step-by-step guide conforms to the instructions as per option 1.

This is a step-by-step guide to securing an IRIX Mediabase video web server. It will present: a description of the system, a risk analysis, the preparation of the hard drives, the installation of the operating system, the removal of unused services, the removal of unused applications, the installation of third party applications, the configuring of logging, monitoring, the ongoing daily maintenance, and how to verify the security of the server. It will not only provide a guide to setting up the server, but explanations why certain actions are performed.

Securing computer systems is a business decision. Security should be an integral part of a company's business plan. Security should not hinder a business. Computers are tools that should help employees work smarter and in turn provide a better product or service for their customers. In most cases, computers do not contribute directly to the bottom line, unless of course your business is selling hardware or software. The success of the IT Department hinges on the idea that management buys into the idea of securing computers. So it is important that a security director have good people skills. It is a tough job to sell management on spending money for security rather than on research and development of new income producing products or some other project that will generate revenue. A good security officer needs to be more than a geek. They need to see the big picture, be a businessman, and to have a little politician in their personality. The security officer needs to know how to convincingly convey the idea that, "bad things happen to good people." Companies should be prepared, expect problems, and protect their vital assets, while at the same time focusing on producing profitable products and services.

Securing computer systems is a never-ending battle that continues to change and evolve everyday. The job of a security administrator (technician, help desk rep, instructor, businessman, politician, expeditor, and still have a life?) is a challenging task. By sharing our experiences and work practices, we hope to make it a little easier for all of us to protect our computer systems.

Step by Step Securing IRIX Mediabase Server

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I. Description of the System

The hardware includes a Silicon Graphics Origin 200. It has 2 180MHz IP27 processors. The CPU is a MIPS R10000 processor chip revision 3.1. There is 256 Megabytes of main memory, 32 Kilobytes of instruction cache, 32 Kilobytes of data cache, and 2 Megabytes of secondary unified instruction/data cache. 4 integral SCSI controllers, version QL1040B revision 2, work with 17, 18 GB hard drives. The integral Fast Ethernet PCI card runs Full-Duplex at 100 Megabits per second. A CDROM and a 4mm tape drive are installed. The Origin 200 will run IRIX 6.5.16 operating software.

The purpose of this server is to provide on-line computer based training. Training and instructional videos will be stored and cataloged via Mediabase 4.01 database software. There are three general categories of training videos. The categories are computers, management, and engineering. Users can access the server from any internal computer system utilizing their Netscape or Microsoft Internet Explorer browser. Mediabase 4.01 will work in conjunction with the Netscape Fasttrack Web Server version 3.03 to provide high quality interactive real time streaming video. Mediabase requires the XFS file system to guarantee a high rate of I/O in order to support web multicasting and video on demand.

II. Concerns

The video server will be connected to the company intranet. The key security concerns are the never-ending buffer overflows and web based exploits. The video server will have educational information only. There will not be any company information, customer information, employee information, or any mission critical information stored on the server. However, any client that has access to the company intranet automatically has access to video server. It only takes one careless user to download a package that contains a Trojan Horse or bad code to put the entire network at risk. With new exploits coming out daily, access to a machine can be used for other malicious purposes other than just stealing information. The resources from your machine could be used in a distributed denial of service attack. A compromised machine may help an attacker mask where the attack is originating. Trust relationships between systems open holes into the network. An attacker needs just one opening to spring all sorts of havoc on your network as well as outside your network. Security is important in keeping your business running efficiently and effectively.

Proper configuration of the perimeter router and the firewall is the first line of defense to stop intrusions. The perimeter firewall will block spoofed addresses, that is packets from outside the company sourced from internal addresses. They will not allow source-routed packets. No login services from outside our network will be allowed, such as Telnet, ftp, rlogin, NetBIOS, or ssh. RPC, NFS, and ICMP incoming echo requests will be blocked. A firewall will be placed after the perimeter router. Egress filtering rules will also be in place to keep an eye on

outgoing traffic. A Shadow intrusion detection system helps the network administrators keep on top of what is coming and going on their network. Although the intrusion detection system does not prevent anything, it does alert the network engineers to anything out of the norm.

Since it takes only one unknowing user to bypass the firewall, user education is a key to intranet safety. The training would include:

1. How to pick a strong password.
2. Why we should have good passwords.
3. What is the purpose of the company owned computers.
4. What is the accepted use of the company owned computers.
5. Why anything done on the company computer can and will be monitored.
6. Where should users go to download software.
7. Why users should not download software from unauthorized sites.
8. What applications are acceptable.
9. Why applications are unacceptable.
10. What to do if something seems out of the ordinary.
11. What information should or should not be given out, either on the phone or in person.
12. What might be expected when dealing with the help desk or a system administrator.
13. Email practices, including: attachments, spam, hoaxes (Microsoft does not send out email for patches), personal and business usage.
14. Role-playing scenarios to help prepare users for an incident.

The training would be ongoing. There should be an initial training and orientation. Initial training and orientation classes will be held as new employees join the company. After the new employee orientation is completed, each employee needs to sign a security statement. The statement would reiterate the purpose of the companies' computer equipment, that computer use will be monitored, that they have attended the training and orientation class. The signed statement would verify that the employee understands and accepts these conditions. The signed form would be kept in the employee's personnel file in the Human Resources department. At least once a year, all employees should attend security-training sessions. There will be three update classes provided each year. Each class will have a sign in sheet. From the sign in sheet, each employee's personnel file will be updated. It is up to the employee to make sure they attend one session per year. During the employee's annual review, this will be checked and discussed. It is important that employees understand that security is important and that the company computers are tools to help the employees succeed at their jobs. In turn the company will also succeed.

Unneeded services will be shut off, Sendmail, Telnet, and ftp to name a few. The Netscape Fasttrack server has access control lists to limit access to the server. Ipfiler will be used on the video server to provide redundancy and access controls to the server. TCP Wrappers will be used to limit access and improve

our logging capability. There are two user accounts for administrators to log in to the server. Logging on to the server is limited to the console and two other clients. The two clients must use OpenSSH to administer the server.

I will be presenting a method to improve the security on a SGI IRIX server, but this is just the beginning of the work. Log files need to be constantly monitored, tweaks need to be made to configuration files, patches and updates must be installed in a timely manner. User education needs to be monitored, improved and conducted routinely.

The Netscape Fasttrack Server 3.03 has been retired. There are some buffer overflow vulnerabilities that Netscape is not going to patch. They did patch it in their Enterprise Server package. The details of the buffer overflows are in the following: CVE 1999-0744, CVE 1999-0752, CVE 1999-0751, and CVE 1999-0853. This exposure will fall into the category of managed risk. The measures taken to limit our exposure will be presented in more detail in the following pages. The recommendation has been submitted to upgrade the Mediabase software so the open source Apache webserver can be used.

Default operating system installations and initial software builds leave many avenues wide open for intruders to easily compromise your system. Initially, the system has not been patched, software programs may be using default, or even worse, no passwords, well known insecure services like time, chargen, rlogin, and Telnet are running, just to name a few threats. Therefore, the system will not be connected to the network until all the software and configuration hardening is complete.

III. Step by Step Securing IRIX

Here are some conventions that will be followed in the hardening of the video server:

Log in to the console as root to install and configure the video server. After the initial install of the operating system, log in as a regular user and then su to root.

/sbin/su – (Use the full path to su to help prevent someone from placing a bogus su in root's current directory or changing root's path). Using su gives the administrator some accountability as to who did what, when they were logged in as root. This becomes more of an issue when there are numerous administrators. The system will be configured to prevent root logins from anywhere except the console.

IP addresses will not be shown only xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx. Each site would need to use their own addressing scheme.

To secure our UNIX server, some open source applications need to be downloaded from the web. Download software from approved sites. Use MD5 checksums if possible, to assure ourselves that the packages have not been tampered with. Download the applications to an existing system that has already been locked down. Never connect to the web with an open, unpatched, and/or unsecured system! Tar the package up to a 4mm tape. Take the tape over to the new video server and insert it into the 4mm tape drive.

The process would flow as follows:

Log on to your workstation.

Open a browser.

Go to the desired site.

Select the package.

Download it to your home directory.

Close the browser.

```
cd /home/jsmith
```

```
tar cvf /dev/tape openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape rewind
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape offline
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape unload
```

Insert the tape into the 4mm on the new video server

Log in to the new server.

Go to your home directory.

```
cd /home/jsmith
```

```
tar xvf /dev/tape
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape rewind
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape offline
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape unload
```

Move the file from your home directory to the installation directory.

We will be using /disk2/admin for many of these freeware utilities.

```
mv /home/jsmith/openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz /disk2/admin
```

Follow the usual instructions to unpack the file and read the README and INSTALL files. It is important to read these files to prevent errors, wasting time, and possibly installing it incorrectly, possibly resulting in even more vulnerabilities. The following directions will state where to download the software and then it will start by saying to move the software from your home directory to the installation directory. So the above-mentioned steps will not be repeated each time, but they are necessary.

A. Install Operating System

The current major release of the IRIX operating system is 6.5. SGI releases quarterly updates. The updates ensure stability, reliability, and compatibility. The updates include bug fixes as well as software enhancements. The latest update, IRIX 6.5.16 has four Overlay CD's and one Applications CD.

The CD's are packaged with two manuals, the IRIX 6.5 Installation Instructions and IRIX 6.5.16 Update Guide. It is always a good idea to review these manuals prior to installing the software. This may save you time in the long run by avoiding known "gotchas" or caveats during the install. Don't fall into the trap of, "there is always time to redo something rather, than doing it right the first time!"

1. Partition the Root Disk

We want to partition the disk and then install the operating system.

Turn the power on to the system.

Hit Escape to get the PROM Menu.

The PROM Menu has the following options:

Start System

Install System Software

Run Diagnostics

Recover System

Enter Command Monitor

Insert the IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays [1 of 4] in the CDROM drive.

Select Enter Command Monitor

Enter the command:

Hinv

This will allow us to record the CD-ROM's controller number, "CDctrl", the CD-ROM's unit number "Cdunit", the system disk's controller number "SYSctrl", and the system disk's unit number "SYSunit". The video server has the CD-ROM controller as 1 and a unit number of 6.

Enter the command:

```
boot -f dksc(1,6,8)sash64 dksc(1,6,7)stand/fx.64
```

The fx disk utility program will be launched.

```
fx: "device-name" = (dksc) enter
```

```
fx: ctrl# = 0 enter
```

```
fx: drive# = 1 enter
```

```
fx: lun# = 0 enter
```

```
fx> repartition
```

```
fx/repartition> rootdrive
```

```
fx/repartition/rootdrive: type of data partition = (xfs) enter
```

```
Continue? Yes
```

```
fx/repartition> exit
```

Upon exiting the fx program, you will be returned to the PROM Menu

The drive is ready to put a file system on it.

Select Install System Software

Select Local CD-ROM

A message will display there is no valid file system.
Answer yes to create a file system.
Select a block size of 4096.
Once it completes you will be returned to an Inst> (prompt).

We need to create and mount the /var partition.

```
Inst>
Enter 11
Admin>
Admin> mkfs /dev/dsk/dks0d1s4 (Creates the file system).
Admin>
Admin> sh (Shell Prompt).
#
# mkdir /root/var (Mount point).
# mount /dev/dsk/dks0d1s4 /root/var
exit
Enter quit.
Reboot the system.
```

2. Install Operating System

We need to install the IRIX Operating System Software.
The system will come up and display the PROM Menu.
Select Install System Software.
Select Local CD-ROM.
The INST menu opens up.
Inst>

We need to open up the distribution and overlay CD's. The distribution CD's include:

- IRIX 6.5 Foundations 1
- IRIX 6.5 Foundations 2
- IRIX 6.5 Development Foundations
- IRIX 6.5 Development Libraries

The overlay CD's include:

- IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays Disk1
- IRIX 6.5.16 Overlays Disk2
- IRIX 6.5.16 Overlays Disk3
- IRIX 6.5.16 Overlays Disk4
- IRIX 6.5.16 Applications Disk

The IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays Disk 1 is already in the CD-ROM drive. Perform the following commands:

```
Inst> from /CDROM/dist/
```

This will load the Overlays Disk 1 into memory. When it completes loading, you will be prompted to load another disk or quit.

Press the eject button on the CD-ROM drive and then insert Overlays Disk 2.

Select /CDROM/dist/

When it completes loading, you will be prompted to load another disk or quit. Press the eject button on the CD-ROM drive and then insert Overlays Disk 3.

Select /CDROM/dist/

When it completes loading, you will be prompted to load another disk or quit. Press the eject button on the CD-ROM drive and then insert Overlays Disk 4.

Select /CDROM/dist/

When it completes loading, you will be prompted to load another disk or quit. Press the eject button on the CD-ROM drive and then insert the Applications Disk.

Select /CDROM/dist/

When it completes loading, you will be prompted to load another disk or quit. Press the eject button on the CD-ROM drive and then insert the Foundations 1 Disk.

Select /CDROM/dist/

When it completes loading, you will be prompted to load another disk or quit. Press the eject button on the CD-ROM drive and then insert the Foundations 2 Disk.

Select /CDROM/dist/

When it completes loading, you will be prompted to load another disk or quit. Press the eject button on the CD-ROM drive and then insert the Development Foundations Disk.

Select /CDROM/dist/dist6.5

When it completes loading, you will be prompted to load another disk or quit. Press the eject button on the CD-ROM drive and then insert the Development Libraries Disk.

Select /CDROM/dist/

Select quit.

This will return you to the Inst >.

Inst>

Enter close at the prompt. This will display all the CD's that were opened. Review the list to make sure we have opened all the required CD's. We will not actually close or exit the menu at this time. Instead, at the prompt we will keep all of the opened CD's.

Inst> keep *

Inst> install standard

Inst> conflicts

This should return, No Conflicts.

Inst> go

The installation starts. Once the software has been installed the Inst prompt will be returned.

Inst quit

It will ask if you want to reboot. Answer yes to reboot.

3. Create Logical Volumes

The system will boot up into multiuser (init 2) mode. We need to prepare the other disks so we can store videos on them. The disks need to be partitioned, a file system needs to be installed, and logical volumes created. Three logical volumes need to be created using 4 disks on each volume. The logical volumes will be called rtmovie2, rtmovie3, and rtmovie4. Two partitions will be created for miscellaneous applications and data storage. They will be called disk2 and opt.

Here are the steps to create logical volume rtmovie2.

Open a terminal window and as root, switch to single user mode.

init 1

Enter the following:

fx -x

The fx disk utility program will be launched.

fx version 6.5, Jul 22, 1998

fx: "device-name" = (dksc)

Select the default (dksc) enter

fx: ctrl# = (0)

Select the default (0) enter

fx: drive# = (1)

Select 6 enter

...opening dksc(0,6,0)

...drive selftest... OK

Select r to repartition the drive

Select o to partition the drive as an optiondrive or a data drive

Select xfs for the partition type

Select /exit

fx -x

The fx disk utility program will be launched.

fx version 6.5, Jul 22, 1998

fx: "device-name" = (dksc)

Select the default (dksc) enter

fx: ctrl# = (0)

Select 2 enter

fx: drive# = (1)

Select 6 enter

...opening dksc(2,6,0)

...drive selftest... OK

Select r to repartition the drive

Select o to partition the drive as an optiondrive or a data drive

Select xfs for the partition type
Select /exit

fx -x

The fx disk utility program will be launched.

fx version 6.5, Jul 22, 1998

fx: "device-name" = (dksc)

Select the default (dksc) enter

fx: ctrl# = (0)

Select 3 enter

fx: drive# = (1)

Select 6 enter

...opening dksc(3,6,0)

...drive selftest... OK

Select r to repartition the drive

Select o to partition the drive as an optiondrive or a data drive

Select xfs for the partition type

Select /exit

fx -x

The fx disk utility program will be launched.

fx version 6.5, Jul 22, 1998

fx: "device-name" = (dksc)

Select the default (dksc) enter

fx: ctrl# = (0)

Select 3 enter

fx: drive# = (1)

Select 3 enter

...opening dksc(3,3,0)

...drive selftest... OK

Select r to repartition the drive

Select o to partition the drive as an optiondrive or a data drive

Select xfs for the partition type

Select /exit

The file system needs to be installed on the partitioned disks.

mkfs /dev/dsk/dks0d6s7

mkfs /dev/dsk/dks2d6s7

mkfs /dev/dsk/dks3d6s7

mkfs /dev/dsk/dks3d3s7

Create a new XLV object using the xlv_make utility.

xlw_make

xlw_make> vol rtmovie2

xlw_make> data

xlw_make> rt

```
xl_v_make> plex
xl_v_make> ve dks0d6s7
xl_v_make> ve dks2d6s7
xl_v_make> ve dks3d6s7
xl_v_make> ve dks3d3s7
xl_v_make> show
xl_v_make> end
xl_v_make> exit
Newly created objects will be written to disk.
Is this what you want? (yes)
Enter yes
```

The above steps need to be repeated for logical volumes, rtmovie3 and rtmovie4.

Logical volume rtmovie3 contains the following:

```
/dev/rdisk/dks0d5s7
/dev/rdisk/dks2d5s7
/dev/rdisk/dks3d2s7
/dev/rdisk/dks3d5s7
```

Logical volume rtmovie4 contains the following:

```
/dev/rdisk/dks0d3s7
/dev/rdisk/dks2d4s7
/dev/rdisk/dks3d1s7
/dev/rdisk/dks3d4s7
```

4. Create Partition on Data Disk

Create partition disk2.

```
fx -x
```

The fx disk utility program will be launched.

```
fx version 6.5, Jul 22, 1998
```

```
fx: "device-name" = (dksc)
```

```
Select the default (dksc) enter
```

```
fx: ctrl# = (0)
```

```
Select default 0 enter
```

```
fx: drive# = (1)
```

```
Select 2 enter
```

```
...opening dksc(0,2,0)
```

```
...drive selftest... OK
```

```
Select r to repartition the drive
```

```
Select o to partition the drive as an optiondrive or a data drive
```

```
Select xfs for the partition type
```

```
Select /exit
```

Create partition opt.

```
fx -x
```

The fx disk utility program will be launched.
 fx version 6.5, Jul 22, 1998
 fx: "device-name" = (dksc)
 Select the default (dksc) enter
 fx: ctrl# = (0)
 Select 2 enter
 fx: drive# = (1)
 Select 3 enter
 ...opening dksc(2,3,0)
 ...drive selftest... OK
 Select r to repartition the drive
 Select o to partition the drive as an optiondrive or a data drive
 Select xfs for the partition type
 Select /exit

The file system needs to be installed on the partitioned disks.
 mkfs /dev/dsk/dks2d3s7
 mkfs /dev/dsk/dks0d2s7

Create mount points.
 mkdir /disk2
 mkdir /opt
 mkdir /rtmovie2
 mkdir /rtmovie3
 mkdir /rtmovie4

5. Mount Filesystems Automatically

We want the file systems to be mounted automatically, so add the mounts to the /etc/fstab file. To protect the binaries in /usr we mount this partition as read only. This could help prevent an intruder from installing a Trojan Horse binary in /usr. Mount /var with the nosuid option set to prevent applications can not change the UID.

```
vi /etc/fstab
/dev/dsk/dks0d1s0 / xfs rw,raw=/dev/rdisk/dks0d1s0 0 0
/SWAP750 swap swap pri=3 0 0
/dev/dsk/dks0d1s4 /var xfs nosuid,rw,raw=/dev/rdisk/dks0d1s4 0 0
/dev/dsk/dks0d1s6 /usr xfs ro,raw=/dev/rdisk/dks0d1s4 0 0
/dev/dsk/dks0d2s6 /disk2 xfs rw,raw=/dev/rdisk/dks0d2s6 0 0
/dev/xlv/rtmovie2 /rtmovie2 xfs rw 0 0
/dev/xlv/rtmovie3 /rtmovie3 xfs rw 0 0
/dev/xlv/rtmovie4 /rtmovie4 xfs rw 0 0
/dev/dsk/dks2d3s2 /opt xfs rw 0 0
wq!
```

Shutdown the system.
 shutdown -y -g0
 The PROM Menu will be displayed.

Start System
Install System Software
Run Diagnostics
Recover System
Enter Command Monitor

Select Start System
The system will boot into multiuser mode.

6. Install Security Patches

Check the SGI website for any security or recommended patches to IRIX 6.5.16. The packages usually come in a tardist format which can be installed from the Inst > prompt.

<http://support.sgi.com/support/security/index.html>

As of this writing there are some snmp and ftp vulnerabilities. We are running neither of these services, so we will not install any patches.

The steps to install a patch is as follows:

```
mkdir /tmp/download  
mv patch.tardist /tmp/download  
cd /tmp/download  
tar xvf patch.tardist  
inst -f .
```

```
Inst> go
```

On completion, enter quit.

```
Inst> quit
```

Remove the files from the temporary download directory.

```
cd /tmp/download  
rm *
```

B. Configure System

Shutdown the system.

```
shutdown -y -g0
```

The PROM Menu will be displayed.

Start System
Install System Software
Run Diagnostics
Recover System
Enter Command Monitor

1. Set IP Address

Select Enter Command Monitor

```
>
```

> printenv (Displays the PROM environment variables).
> setenv netaddr xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx (Ensure the video server's ip address is set).

2. Create PROM Password

For added security, there is a PROM password that can be set. It restricts anyone from accessing any of the PROM menu selections except Start System, unless they know the password. From the PROM menu a user could use the fx utility and destroy all the data on the system. Since the system has not booted up, there would not be any logging going on to help see who was on the system. Accessing the cat command in sash, any file on the system could be read. Using miniroot avoids password protection. The user could change the root password without giving it the original password. He could takeover the entire machine and prevent root access even from the administrators. This is the reason a password should be set on the PROM menu. Without knowing the PROM password the user could only start the system up in multiuser mode.

>
> passwd (Enter the password).
> exit (Returns to the PROM menu).
Select Start System.
The system will boot up in multiuser mode.

3. Set resolv.conf

Add domain name and name server to the /etc/resolv.conf file.

```
vi /etc/resolv.conf
nameserver xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
domain trainingcompany
Save the file.
chmod 644 /etc/resolv.conf
```

4. Set sys_id

Save the system name to a file.

```
videoserver > /etc/sys_id
```

5. Set nsswitch.conf

Edit the /etc/nsswitch.conf file and set the hosts entry to check files and then dns. Remove all entries with nis. NIS is not used on this system.

```
vi /etc/nsswitch.conf
hosts: files dns
```

6. Set hosts file

Edit the /etc/hosts file. The default Internet address is 192.0.2.1 using the hostname IRIS. This will be changed to xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx with the name of

videosever. Add the two workstations that administration tasks will be performed from. The loopback address must also be in the file.

```
vi /etc/hosts
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx learning1 learning1.trainingcompany.com
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx pc1 pc1.trainingcompany.com
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx videosever videosever.trainingcompany.com
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx learningcentral \ learningcentral.trainingcompany.com
127.0.0.1 localhost
```

7. Passwords & User Accounts

Since root can access and do anything on the system, it is extremely important to protect this account with a good password. Select a password that cannot be found in a dictionary, and contains a combination of 8 letters, numbers, and/or characters. Before getting too carried away with a bizzare password, keep in mind you must be able to remember it! Only the administrators for this server as well as the department manager should know the password. The password should be recorded on paper, put in an envelope and stored in a safe. The safe should not be in the same room as the server. The redundancy of people guarantees if the administrator quits, gets injured, or even worse dies, the system is still accessible. Keeping the password in the safe, gives the administrator a back up plan in case he does forget the password. It keeps others from learning the root password. A minimum of people should be able to open the safe. A safe will protect the password in case of a fire. However, if the server burns up, you won't need the password anymore. The password should be changed at 6-month intervals or if one of the users who has been given the password leaves. To change the password for root, enter passwd when logged in as root.

```
passwd
Enter a password
Re-enter the password
```

By default passwords are stored in the /etc/passwd file. This is a world readable file. A malicious user could copy the file. The user could take the file to another machine and use a password cracking utility such as "Crack" or "John the Ripper" to reveal the passwords. An administrator would never know that the file was ever copied. Since the cracking would be done elsewhere, the admin would not see any crack processes running. The ps -ef lists all the running processes.

To help prevent this from happening, Shadow Passwords are used. The encrypted passwords are stored in the /etc/shadow file. The pwconv utility is used to initialize shadow passwords. This will start the process of using the /etc/shadow password file. Now the /etc/passwd file only has an X where the password should be. The system knows to search in the /etc/shadow file for password authentication. The shadow file is only readable by root. It will not help

a malicious user if they do make a copy of the /etc/passwd file. They do not have any passwords to crack. The remaining information in the /etc/passwd file however still could provide an intruder with valuable information as to who logs in, what shell, and possibly department names, and phone numbers.

```
/sbin/pwconv
```

```
Create two user accounts for the administrator of the video server.
passmgmt -a -g 20 -s /bin/tcsh jsmith ( creates an account in group 20,
using T-shell )
/usr/bin/passwd -x 180 -w 10 jsmith ( sets password life for 180 days with
a 10 day warning to change the password )
mkdir /home/jsmith ( create a home directory )
cp /etc/stdlogin /home/jsmith/.login ( standard login configuration file for C
& T shells )
cp /etc/stdcshrc /home/jsmith/.cshrc ( standard csh initialization command
for C & T shells )
cp /etc/stdprofile /home/jsmith/.profile ( standard login configuration file for
Bourne & Korn shells )
chown -R jsmith:user /home/jsmith ( change owner from root )
passwd jsmith ( give the account a password so the system is not
exposed with no password )
New password:
Re-enter new password:
/bin/passwd -f jsmith ( forces jsmith to change his password on the next
login. )
```

Do the same for the other administrator account tolover. Do not put "." anywhere in root's or any user's path statement. A Trojan Horse could be placed there and get executed in place of the real command.

Remove unneeded default user accounts. Remove the following from /etc/passwd, /etc/group, and /etc/shadow files:

```
cmwlogin, diag, uucp, nuucp, Ezsetup, Demos, OutOfBox, 4Dgifts, lp
vi /etc/passwd
go to the line with each of the accounts and enter dd, this deletes the
entire line
wq!
```

Do the same for /etc/group and /etc/shadow.

Set the shell for the following accounts to /dev/null to prevent interactive logins using the following accounts:

```
daemon
bin
posuser
```

Use the pwck command to check for incorrect entries in the /etc/passwd file.

```
/usr/sbin/pwck
```

If everything checks out OK, nothing should be returned. Correct the error if one does occur.

Passwords are a major form of defense for the video server. One account with a weak or non-existent password not only jeopardizes the video server but every system on the entire network. This is an important topic to be discussed and explained during the user training and orientation sessions.

There are problems with UNIX passwords. The encrypted passwords are stored on the system. Some systems store them in a world readable file others in a file readable only by root. Passwords can be stolen via shoulder surfing. When companies have numerous servers to login to, all requiring different passwords, and some may even force the user to accept automatically generated passwords, this creates another security weakness. One might think that a computer-generated password would fit the bill for a non-dictionary, difficult to crack password. That is true. But it often becomes a problem to the user to remember this password. By the time the user gets familiar with this password it is time to change it again. So what does the user do? They write it down and put it on the bottom of their keyboard, or on the wall, or maybe in the desk drawer. Well so much for good password security. Passwords should be 8 characters in length. The computing power of today's machines doesn't make this length long enough.

The administrator can configure the password length in /etc/default/passwd file.

```
vi /etc/default/passwd
PASSLENGTH=8
wq!
```

Although user passwords are a minor issue on the video server, since there will be just two administrator accounts, they are an important issue in securing UNIX boxes. An alternative method is to use one-time passwords. There is a new password every time. So if a hacker were able to determine your password it would only be good for a short period of time. Some of the drawbacks are implementation issues, user acceptance problems, and operating system upgrades can cause the one time implementation to be overwritten.

There are two freeware products available. They are S/Key and OPIE. They can be downloaded from:

```
ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/nmh S/Key
http://www.inner.net/opie OPIE
```

Commercial packages are also available. They are:
SecurID

Defender
SafeWord
CryptoCard
ActivCard

The video server will not use one-time passwords. The administrators should be using strong passwords and following good password etiquette. There will not be any remote logins over unsecured networks outside of the Training Company intranet. Again this falls into the category of managed risk.

8. Set Login Parameters

In the `/etc/default/login` file we can set the root login option to allow root logins only from the console. Set mandatory passwords for all users to be able to login. Set the maximum tries to prevent someone from guessing at a password indefinitely. We will log to syslog, all login successes and failures (`SYSLOG=ALL`). We definitely want to know if someone is trying to login as well as anyone who does login. The time to lock out an account if the login failures is reached should be set to 30 minutes. The default umask for regular users will be 022. There is a SGI Security Advisory number 20020902-01-I, that references the default umask for root and coredumps. We will set the umask for root to be 077. The root user uses the `tcsh` shell, so we will modify root's `.cshrc` file. To check what the root umask is, run the following command:

```
$ su -  
# umask
```

The system should return "022".

Changing the root user's umask to something that will not allow unprivileged users to read files created by root will result in an extra step to change the permissions (`chmod`) on files for regular users. Since the only two normal users are administrators, this should not be too much of an inconvenience.

The `sysctl` variable is set to 177 for corefiles which prevents regular users from reading core files. We will also be preventing core files from being created when we configure the kernel in the next step (9).

```
vi /etc/default/login  
CONSOLE=/dev/console  
MANDPASS=YES  
MAXTRIES=3  
LOGFAILURES=3  
SYSLOG=ALL  
DISABLETIME=1800  
UMASK=022
```

wq!

Add the line `umask 077` in root's `.cshrc` file.

```
vi /.cshrc
umask 077
wq!
```

9. Kernel Tuning

Some kernel parameters can be set to help secure our server. Core files can be used to analyze system failures. Core files are generated when an application tries to do something that it is not allowed to do. The operating system sends the application a signal, to kill it. When this occurs the application will create a core file. A core file is an image of the application from memory, and an appropriate identifier, saved to a file named `core`. Core files are normally world readable and most often take up a large amount of disk space. As of IRIX 6.5.15 a new kernel parameter is set so core files can have a different `umask` than the default `umask` of root. This helps to prevent core files from being world readable. The default setting for the `systune` variable called `coremask` is 177. Since we set the `umask` for root to 077, we prevent core files from being read by a regular user. We have covered both bases. The kernel parameter and the `umask` both prevent world readable core files. They might contain passwords, sensitive information, file contents, and directory structures. An intruder may find lots of valuable information, if he retrieves a core file. A hacker may even attempt to create a core file for the sole purpose of filling up all the available disk space on a file system. This creates a denial of service. Since there is no development going on, on the video server, we are going to limit the size of core files. Developers use core files to understand what happened when an application failed. If the operating system starts crashing, we can always reset this setting until the problem is cleared up and then return it to the restricted setting. Siding with security in mind, we have built in redundancy against core files, zero size, a kernel parameter and an `umask` preventing users from reading them.

We will set the max size of a core file to 0. It is an extremely large value by default. The initial value was 9223372036854775807.

```
/usr/sbin/systune rlimit_core_max 0
```

Eliminate the server from responding to pings sent to the LAN broadcast address. Responding to broadcast pings can be helpful to the network engineers, but it allows a malicious user to use the server as an amplifier in a denial of service attack. The most common broadcast attack is the Smurf attack. The broadcasts are used to map the network. Pings should not be allowed in from outside the firewall.

```
/usr/sbin/systune ipdirected_broadcast 0
```

Turn off IP forwarding. This prevents the server from accepting and forwarding packets that are not destined for their local interface address. This turned on; attackers can get around network security measures.

```
/usr/sbin/sysctl ipforwarding 0
```

Turn off ipseendirects to prevent ICMP redirect packets from redirecting traffic from the server out a different gateway. The ICMP redirect can be used to intercept traffic or to create a denial of service attack.

```
/usr/sbin/sysctl ipseendirects 0
```

Prevent users from giving away file ownership. Set the restricted_chown parameter to 1. Root should be the only one capable of changing ownership of files.

```
/usr/sbin/sysctl restricted_chown 1
```

The kernel parameters have been changed; now the kernel needs to be reconfigured. After that completes, shutdown and restart the server again.

```
/etc/autoconfig -f  
/etc/shutdown -y -g0
```

The PROM Menu will be displayed.

```
Start System  
Install System Software  
Run Diagnostics  
Recover System  
Enter Command Monitor
```

Select Start System

The system will boot up in multiuser mode with the new kernel parameters in effect.

10. Warning Banners

Place a warning banner in the /etc/motd and in /etc/issue. It will also be used in our TCP Wrappers banners.allow file. This will alert anyone who accesses this server that they can be monitored and they should be using the system for company business. A warning banner will help in such cases where termination or prosecution is needed. Besides being included in user training, a user is alerted every time they attempt to log in to the server. A deny banner should also be created to warn anyone trying to logon to the system (TCP Wrappers banners.deny).

Here is the warning banner:

```
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS COMPUTER SYSTEM AND/OR  
SOFTWARE IS PROHIBITED.
```


THE SYSTEM AND DATA CONTAINED THEREIN IS FOR OFFICIAL COMPANY USE ONLY.

The Training Company's video server and related equipment are intended for the communication, transmission, processing and storage of official Training Company information. These systems and equipment are subject to monitoring to ensure proper functioning, to protect against improper or unauthorized use or access, and to verify the presence or performance of applicable security features or procedures, and for other like purposes. Such monitoring may result in the acquisition, recording, and analysis of all data being communicated, transmitted, processed or stored in this system by a user. If monitoring reveals evidence of possible criminal activity, such evidence may be provided to law enforcement personnel. Use of this system constitutes consent to such monitoring. REPORT ALL UNAUTHORIZED USE OR ACCESS TO THE SYSTEM SECURITY OFFICER, (555)666-7777.

Here is the deny banner:

UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS TRAINING COMPANY COMPUTER SYSTEM AND/OR SOFTWARE IS PROHIBITED. THIS SYSTEM AND THE DATA CONTAINED THEREIN IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

Only registered Training Company machines may access this system. Please contact (555)666-7777 if you feel you have received this message in error.

11. Shut Off Services

Running services that are not required increases the chances of your server being exploited. Unneeded services use up memory and disk space. For example, if the snmp service is not used for network administration, remove it. There have been a few snmp exploits over the past year. Exploits are usually published on the internet with the step by step details on how to execute them. This allows even the most novice user to launch an attack on your system. So as long as the service is on the system, there is a chance of it getting exploited. So, shut off unused services and if possible remove the product from the server entirely. The following command will prevent the service from starting. Once the desired services are turned off, the server should be rebooted to allow the new settings to take effect.

```
chkconfig service off
```

Autofs, automount, pcnfsd, and nfs are NFS services that should be turned off. NFS is a distributed network file sharing protocol developed by Sun Microsystems. It has a history of security problems. NFS is not secure as a default installation. It requires an experienced administrator to configure it correctly. We are not exporting or mounting any directories via NFS. Therefore, all NFS related services should be off.

No printers are attached to the video server so the lp service is off.

Esp is a service that allows remote diagnostics. This is off we do not want anyone to remotely connect to our server. Logins by external vendors or users opens up a whole new avenue of security problems. In most cases you as the administrator, do not have any control over the box that is connecting to your server. Their security policy and procedures may be more lax than what your system is. They may not enforce their policy or they may not even have a policy. This creates a huge hole in your server and network. This should be avoided.

Fontserver, windowssystem, visuallogin, noiconlogin, and xdm are off. X sessions have had numerous exploits and has weak authentication. There are no users, so no one needs to log into an Xsession.

Informix, mediabase, mediad, ns_admin, nss_fasttrack, routed, and xlv are all services that are needed to run Mediabase. These should be set to on.

Ipfilerd allows IP layer packet filtering. Ipfiler demonstrates defense in depth. Although certain traffic should be caught by the firewall, adding additional restrictions at the server may prevent a compromise. The firewall could get compromised. The firewall may get misconfigured after an upgrade. The firewall could fail in an "allow all" state instead of a deny all state. So Ipfiler would be part of our backup plan in case something happens elsewhere on the network. Ipfiler rules can be created in a text based configuration file called ipfilerd.conf.

Savecore allows core files to be saved if the system reboots unexpectedly. This will be set to off. There are no programmers working on this server, which might have a need for core files. We do not want someone who might hack into the system and create a core file to fill up the file system. Core files could contain passwords, file contents, and directory structures. A core file could also use up the disk space causing a denial of service. This is another calculated risk to have core file or not. If the system experiences problems resulting in core files, we would not have them to analyze. If the problem persists, it is easy enough to turn savecore back on. So, we will err in favor of security and set savecore off.

Sshd is on. We will turn this on so the administrators can connect to the video server to do, day-to-day operations. In the ipfilter.conf file we will allow port 22 from the two IP addresses of the administrator's workstations. OpenSSH uses port 22. Any other attempt to ssh to the video server will be rejected. Fw_sshd will be off preventing IP forwarding to be used.

NIS or NIS+ is not being used so yp, ypmaster, and ypserv are off. NIS has had security issues. It is difficult to manage and configure. Interoperability is a problem. NIS+ is unavailable for IRIX.

Run chkconfig and configure the server as shown below and reboot.

The following is the output of the chkconfig command. This is the output after unneeded services are shutdown.

Flag	State
====	=====
acct	off
array	off
autoconfig_ipaddress	off
autofs	off
automount	off
cleanpowerdown	on
cpumeter	off
desktop	off
esp	off
fcagent	off
fontserver	off
fw_sshd	off
gated	off
informix	on
ipaliases	off
ipfilterd	on
lockd	off
lp	off
mediabase	on
mediad	on
miser	off
mkpd	on
mmscd	off
mrouted	off
named	off
nds	off
network	on
netwr_client	off
nfs	off
noiconlogin	off
nostickytmp	off
ns_admin	on
nsd	on
nss_fasttrack	on
pcnfsd	off
pmcd	off
privileges	off
proclaim_relayagent	off
proclaim_server	off
proxymngr	off
quickpage	off
quotacheck	off
quotas	off
rarpd	off
routed	on
rsvpd	off
rtmond	on
rwhod	off
sar	off

savecore	off
sdpd	off
sendmail	off
sendmail_cf	off
sesdaemon	on
sgi_apache	off
snetd	on
soundscheme	on
ssh	on
sysevent	on
timed	off
timeslave	off
ts	off
verbose	on
videod	off
visuallogin	off
vswap	off
windowssystem	off
xdm	off
xlw	on
yp	off
yppmaster	off
yppserv	off

The Internet Daemon, inetd, is the single point of contact for different network services. Since the video server will not have users logging in or accessing files most of the services listed in the /etc/inetd.conf can be removed or commented out.

Services like chargen, discard, daytime, time, and echo are not needed. There are exploits that can cause a denial of service when abusing these services. Telnet, ftp, shell, login, rlogin, and exec are unsecured to run. They allow authentication to go in the clear or to rely on .rhosts or hosts.equiv files to log in. .rhosts files can provide additional machines to attack. Telnet and ftp also provide the operating system version. This could help an attacker focus his attack on exploits known for the newly discovered operating system. Tftpd allows users to transfer files without a password. The administrators to access the server will use OpenSSH. This will encrypt the user name and password as well all data transferred. The OpenSSH configuration file can disable .rhosts support. Finger and rwho can be used to gain user information. The attacker may be able to determine when a user normally is on the system. Rstatd and identd allow users to gain system data. An attacker could find out how a daemon is running, such as root. Ttdbsererd is the tooltalk daemon. It has been plagued with security breaches. It is not used. Remove all the lines from /etc/inetd.conf except the lines starting with sgi_videod and sgi_fam. The file should look like the following:

```
# Internet server configuration database
# $Revision: 1.78 $
sgi_videod/1 stream rpc/tcp wait root ?/usr/etc/videod videod
sgi_fam/1-2 stream rpc/tcp wait root ?/usr/etc/fam fam
```

Comment out unneeded services from the /etc/services file.

vi /etc/services

```
#
# Network services, Internet style
#
# $Revision: 1.44 $
#
tcpmux      1/tcp          # TCP port multiplexer (RFC 1078)
#echo       7/tcp
#echo       7/udp
#discard    9/tcp          sink null
#discard    9/udp          sink null
#sysstat    11/tcp         users
#daytime    13/tcp
#daytime    13/udp
#netstat    15/tcp
#qotd       17/tcp          quote
#chargen    19/tcp         ttytst source
#chargen    19/udp         ttytst source
#ftp-data   20/tcp
#ftp        21/tcp
ssh         22/tcp
#telnet     23/tcp
smtp        25/tcp          mail
#time       37/tcp          timserver
#time       37/udp         timserver
rtp         39/udp          resource # resource location
#name       42/tcp          # IEN 116
#whois      43/tcp          nicname
#domain     53/tcp          nameserver # name-domain server
#domain     53/udp         nameserver
#mtp        57/tcp          # deprecated
#bootp      67/udp          bootps # bootp server
#bootpc     68/udp          # bootp client
#tftp       69/udp
#rje        77/tcp          netrjs
#finger     79/tcp
http        80/tcp          # World-Wide-Web protocol
#link       87/tcp          ttylink
#supdup     95/tcp
#hostnames  101/tcp         hostname # usually from sri-nic
#iso-tsap   102/tcp
#x400       103/tcp         # ISO mail
#x400-snd   104/tcp
#csnet-ns   105/tcp
#pop-2      109/tcp         # Post Office
pop-3       110/tcp
#sunrpc     111/tcp         rpcbind
#sunrpc     111/udp         rpcbind
auth        113/tcp         authentication
#sftp       115/tcp
#uucp-path  117/tcp
#nntp       119/tcp         readnews untp # USENET News Transfer Protocol
#erpc       121/udp
```

```

ntp                123/udp                # Network Time Protocol
#loc-srv           135/tcp                # NCS local location broker
#loc-srv           135/udp
#imap2             143/tcp
#NeWS              144/tcp                news                # Network extensible Window Sys
#snmp              161/udp
#snmp-trap         162/udp                snmptrap
xdmcp              177/udp                # X Display Mgr. Control Prot.
#
# UNIX specific services
#
#exec              512/tcp
#biff              512/udp                comsat
#login             513/tcp
#who               513/udp                whod
#shell             514/tcp                cmd                 # no passwords used
syslog             514/udp                spooler             # line printer spooler
#printer           515/tcp
#talk              517/udp
#ntalk             518/udp
#route             520/udp                router routed
#timed             525/udp                timeserver
#tempo             526/tcp                newdate
#courier           530/tcp                rpc
#conference        531/tcp                chat
#netnews           532/tcp                readnews
#netwall           533/udp                # -for emergency broadcasts
#uucp              540/tcp                uucpd               # uucp daemon
#remotefs          556/tcp                rfs_server rfs      # Brunhoff remote filesystem
#ingreslock        1524/tcp
#
# ClearCase services
#
#albd              371/udp                # location broker
# AFS remote authentication
#
ta-rauth601/tcp    rauth
#
# Kerberos (Project Athena/MIT) services
#
#kerberos          750/udp                kdc                 # Kerberos (server) udp
#kerberos          750/tcp                kdc                 # Kerberos (server) tcp
#krbupdate         760/tcp                kreg                # Kerberos registration
#kpasswd           761/tcp                kpwd                # Kerberos "passwd"
#klogin            543/tcp                # Kerberos rlogin
#nfs                2049/udp                nfs                 # Sun NFS
#nfs                2049/tcp                nfs                 # Sun NFS
#eklogin           2105/tcp                # Kerberos encrypted rlogin
#kshell            544/tcp                krcmd               # Kerberos remote shell
#x-server          6000/tcp                # X11 window system
#
# The following are not official, so be careful.
#
# SGI demo programs
#sgi-dogfight      5130/udp
#sgi-arena         5131/udp

```

```

#sgi-bznet      5133/udp      # For the BZ demo port
#sgi-objectserver 5135/udp      # SGI Object Server
#sgi-directoryserver 5136/udp      # SGI Directory Server
#sgi-oortnet    5137/udp      # Oort port
#sgi-vroom-server 5138/udp      # SGI Vroom Server
#sgi-vroom-client 5139/udp      # SGI Vroom Client
#sgi-mekton0    5140/udp      # mekton port
#sgi-mekton1    5141/udp      # mekton port
#sgi-mekton2    5142/udp      # mekton port
#sgi-mekton3    5143/udp      # mekton port
#sgi-mekton4    5144/udp      # mekton port
#sgi-mekton5    5145/udp      # mekton port
#sgi-mekton6    5146/udp      # mekton port
#sgi-mekton7    5147/udp      # mekton port
#sgi-pointblank 5150/udp      # pointblank port
#sbm-comm       5555/udp      # Space Boulders port
sgi-dgl         5232/tcp      # SGI Distributed Graphics Lib.
sgi-arrayd     5434/tcp      # SGI array services daemon
realaudio      7070/tcp      ra # Progr. Tech. RealAudio
wn-http        8778/tcp      # WhatsNew http protocol
#sgi_iphone     32769/tcp     # InPerson phone
sgi_online     1527/tcp      # SGI MediaBase
#xinet-jgui     5969/tcp      # Xinet Java GUI
wq!

```

```

shutdown -y -g0
At the Prom Monitor select Start System.

```

12. Remove Files

In addition to stopping services, removing files or entire products from the system, reduces the number of products that could be exploited. It makes the job a little harder for a unwanted user to run a start up script and turn a service back on. A hacker is a determined person. They usually have more time to plan and break into systems than an administrator has administering a system. The intruder can be more focused whereas an administrator always has something else that needs to be done. The administrator should try to make it as difficult as possible for an intruder to get into a system. Quite often a hacker will give up and go on to easier targets, if he runs into too much resistance. Depending on what kind of business you are in, an attacker may not give up easily. It really depends on the motives and objectives of the attacker.

Remove the following packages: snmp, pcnfsd, lp, roboinst, pmie, apache, esp, availmon, and netware. The versions command followed by the product name will show if the product is installed. To remove a product, use the versions command followed by the product name, and remove.

Snmp is not used. It has had numerous vulnerabilities over the years. One of the latest vulnerabilities was reported in SGI Security Advisory, 20020201-010-P, CAN-2002-0013.

versions remove snmp

Pcnfsd allows nfs connections from PC's. NFS is not used. There has been a recent SGI Security Advisory, 20020802-01-I, CERT Advisory CA-1996-08, CAN-1999-0078 on pcnfsd.

versions remove pcnfsd

There are no printers attached to this server.

versions remove lp

Roboinst is an automated package installation tool that is not used.

versions remove roboinst

versions remove pmie

We are not using the Apache webserver.

versions remove apache

Esp is not running, nor do we want any avenue open to allow remote access to the video server.

versions remove esp

Availmon is a set of programs integrated with ESP the system diagnostic software. Since ESP has been removed availmon is not needed.

versions remove availmon

Novell Netware is not run on the video server, so the netware client can be removed.

versions remove netware

The above mentioned products are now uninstalled and removed from the system. Make sure that the start up files are removed from /etc/rc2.d.

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*sgi_apache
```

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*esp
```

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*availmon
```

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*lp
```

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*roboinst
```

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*snmp
```

We do not allow any modems to connect to the video server, so the ppp protocol is not needed.

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*pppstartup
```

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*netwr_client
```

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*pcnfsd
```

```
/bin/rm /etc/rc2.d/*pmie
```

```
mv /usr/etc/fingerd /usr/etc/fingerd.orig ( We do not want the finger daemon running)
```

```
mv /bin/login /bin/login.orig (We allow ssh connections)
```

```
mv /etc/exports /etc/exports.orig ( We do not allow any NFS mounts)
```

```
touch /etc/exports (Empty exports file)
```

```
rm /usr/bsd/rsh (removes the executable for logging in remotely using rsh)
```

```
rm /usr/bsd/rcp (removes the executable for copying files using the r commands)
```


Using xhost and .Xauthority opens up a machine to buffer overflows, denial of service attacks, intruders capturing key strokes, and video output. Although X connections coming from outside our intranet should be blocked at the firewall, we are using the defense in depth strategy. IP Filter should block the IP address. The xdm service is shut off. A X session generally requires a user name and password. There are only two user accounts. X sessions are not needed, so remove the xhost executable.

```
rm /usr/bin/X11/xhost ( Help prevent X server connections via xhost )
```

13. Configure CRON

Cron allows users to schedule jobs on the system. We do not want anyone except root to be able to do this. Make sure /etc/cron.d/cron.allow and /etc/cron.d/cron.deny do not exist. This configuration allows only the root user to create cron files.

```
/bin/rm /etc/cron.d/cron.allow  
/bin/rm /etc/cron.d/cron.deny
```

The root crontab uses a umask of 033, which creates log files that are group and other readable. Change all occurrences of 033 to 077.

```
crontab -e  
enter /  
enter 033 (this is the text we want to find and replace)  
replace 033 with 077  
enter n to find the next occurrence  
When all the entries have been changed, save the file.  
wq!
```

14. Access Control & IP Filtering

The ipfilter daemon (ipfilterd) filters packets based on their source or destination IP address, the network interface they arrive on, their IP protocol number, their source or destination TCP/UDP port number, or any combination of the above. We will allow SSH traffic on port 22 from two clients: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx and xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx. All http traffic will be allowed. The RFC 1918 addresses will be blocked: 10.0.0.0, 172.16.0.0, and 192.168.0.0. TCP destination ports 6000 to 6025 are blocked to help prevent X server connections. Other ports are blocked (tcp ports 23, 22, 20, 21, 161, 162, 199, 391, 705, 1993, 6112, udp ports 161, 162 199, 391, 1993, and 6112) based on reports from <http://www.incidents.org/> about the top 10 ports being exploited. We have also explicitly rejected ten network addresses of the top ten attackers as per incidents.org. Although these addresses should not be able to reach our server, defense in depth is the best strategy. If an address is not specifically allowed the final rule will reject all tcp traffic. This stance allows just what is needed and rejects the rest. Configure the /etc/ipfilterd.conf file as follows:

```

#
# ipfilterd.conf
# $Revision: 1.3 $
#
# Configuration file for ipfilterd(1M) IP layer packet filtering.
# Lines that begin with # are comments and are ignored.
# Lines begin with a keyword, followed either by a macro definition or
# by an optional interface filter, which may be followed by a protocol filter.
# Both macros and filters use SGI's netsnoop(1M) filter syntax.
#
# The currently supported keywords are:
# accept      : accept all packets matching this filter
# reject     : silently discard packets matching this filter
# define:     define a new macro to add to the standard netsnoop macros
#
# See the ipfilterd(1M) man page for examples of filters and macros.
#
# The network administrator may find the following macros useful:
#
define ip.netAsrc (src&0xff000000)=$1
define ip.netAdst (dst&0xff000000)=$1
define ip.netBsrc (src&0xffff0000)=$1
define ip.netBdst (dst&0xffff0000)=$1
define ip.netCsrc (src&0xfffff00)=$1
define ip.netCdst (dst&0xfffff00)=$1
define ip.notnetAsrc not((src&0xff000000)=$1)
define ip.notnetAdst not((dst&0xff000000)=$1)
define ip.notnetBsrc not((src&0xffff0000)=$1)
define ip.notnetBdst not((dst&0xffff0000)=$1)
define ip.notnetCsrc not((src&0xfffff00)=$1)
define ip.notnetCdst not((dst&0xfffff00)=$1)
#
# Additional macros:
#
# Filters follow:
#
accept ip.src xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx tcp.dport 22 # administrator's workstation
accept ip.src xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx tcp.dport 22 # administrator's second workstation
reject tcp.dport=23 #rejects all requests going to port 23
reject tcp.dport=22 # ssh cve-2001-0144
reject tcp.dport=20 # ftp data
reject tcp.dport=21 # ftp
reject tcp.dport=161 # snmp cve-2000-0221
reject tcp.dport=162 # snmp trap
reject tcp.dport=199 # smux
reject tcp.dport=391 # snmp
reject tcp.dport=705 # agentx
reject tcp.dport=1993 # Cisco snmp port
reject tcp.dport=6112 # CDE subprocess control cve-2001-0803
reject tcp.dport=6000 # Block X Server Connections
reject tcp.dport=6001 # Block X Server Connections
reject tcp.dport=6002 # Block X Server Connections
reject tcp.dport=6003 # Block X Server Connections
reject tcp.dport=6004 # Block X Server Connections
reject tcp.dport=6005 # Block X Server Connections

```

```

reject udp.dport=161 # snmp cve-2000-0221
reject udp.dport=162 # snmp trap
reject udp.dport=199 # smux
reject udp.dport=391 # snmp
reject udp.dport=1993 # Cisco snmp port
reject udp.dport=6112 # CDE subprocess control cve-2001-0803
accept tcp.dport=http
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=xxx.xxx.0.0
reject (src&0xFF000000)=10.0.0.0
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=192.168.0.0
reject (src&0xFF000000)=172.16.0.0
# The following are the top 10 offenders as of Aug. 8 2002
# http://www.dshield.org/top10.html
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=210.90.32.240
reject (src&0xFF000000)=210.3.205.65
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=195.170.78.147
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=211.169.240.62
reject (src&0xFF000000)=80.138.8.192
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=66.250.62.5
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=62.138.192.246
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=64.1.227.131
reject (src&0xFFFF0000)=61.102.171.225
reject (src&0xFF000000)=151.200.221.13
reject tcp

```

Filtering can be configured through Access Control Lists in the Netscape Fasttrack Server. There is an ACL (Access Control List) file that limits the access to the video server. It allows any user from the Training Company's intranet to view media from the video server. It allows the mbase user to administer the Fasttrack Server. It denies anyone from connecting from our intranet from the dial in address (xxx.xxx.xxx.*). It denies all other connections from addresses other than xxx.xxx.*. The following is the ACL file (/var/netscape/fasttrack/httpacl/generated.httpd-videoserver.acl) that controls access to the video server:

```

version 3.0;
acl "path=/var/www/htdocs/mbase/admin";
authenticate (user,group) {
    prompt = "Mediabase Administrator";
};
deny (all)
    user = "anyone";
allow absolute (all)
    user = "mbase";
acl "default";
authenticate (user,group) {
    prompt = "FastTrack Server";
};
deny (all)
    (user = "anyone");

allow (read,execute,info)
    (user = "anyone") and
    (ip = "xxx.xxx.*");

```

```
deny (all)
(user = "anyone") and
(ip = "xxx.xxx.xxx.*");
```

```
deny (all)
(user = "anyone") and
(ip = "193.*");
```

```
deny (all)
(user = "anyone") and
(ip = "61.*");
```

```
deny (all)
(user = "anyone") and
(ip = "192.*");
```

```
deny (all)
(user = "anyone") and
(ip = "195.*");
```

```
deny absolute (all)
(user = "anyone") and
(ip = "65.*");
```

15. Logging

By default not all logging is turned on. Add the auth.info line to `/etc/syslog.conf`. Create the `/var/adm/loginlog` file to capture failed login attempts. Scripts running under cron rotate log files. The daily security script parses some of the log files, compiles the results, saves the results, and mails the results to the root account. Logging information also get sent to the central logging server, learningcentral. By storing log files and the output from security scripts on the local server, the remote server, and via email to another workstation, it becomes very difficult for an intruder to cover his tracks. An intruder may be able to remove some log files on the local host, but he has to dig to find out where everything else is going. These scripts will be discussed later in this paper. The permission of 600 allows read and write access to the root user. Other users do not have a need to know.

```
vi /etc/syslog.conf
auth.info    /var/adm/auth.log
wq!
touch /var/adm/auth.log
chown root:sys /var/adm/auth.log
chmod 600 /var/adm/auth.log
touch /var/adm/loginlog
chown root:sys /var/adm/loginlog
chmod 600 /var/adm/loginlog
```

Here is `/etc/syslog.conf`

```

# Configuration file for syslogd(1M)
# $Revision: 1.18 $
#
# Formats: selector<TAB>action
#         selector<TAB>filter<TAB>action
kern.debug      |/usr/sbin/klogpp      /var/adm/SYSLOG
*.debug;kern.none /var/adm/SYSLOG
# Root runs a cron job to rotate the system log file,
# which is very dependent on the format of the following line.
# Therefore, additional loggings at the 'crit' level should only
# be added AFTER the following 'crit' level system logging,
# or the cron job will not work properly.
*.crit          |/usr/sbin/sysmonpp    /var/adm/SYSLOG
# Enable forwarding to eventmon daemon (UNIX socket)
*.debug        @@@/tmp/.eventmond.events.sock
kern.debug     /usr/adm/kern.log
mail.debug     /usr/spool/mqueue/syslog
mail.debug     /usr/adm/mail.log
daemon.debug   /usr/adm/daemon.log
auth.debug     /usr/adm/auth.log
lpr.debug      /usr/adm/lpr.log
kern.debug     /dev/console
*.debug        /usr/adm/syslog
*.debug        /usr/adm/log/syslog
*.info;mail.none /usr/adm/log/syslog
*.debug        /usr/adm/messages
*.info;mail.none /usr/adm/syslog
*.alert        /dev/console
*.alert        root
*.emerg        *
*.debug        @learningcentral.trainingcompany.com

```

Here is a copy of the root cron file.

```

# $Revision: 1.48 $
#
# The root crontab can be used to perform accounting data collection
# and cleanup.
#
# Format of lines:
#min hour daymo month daywk cmd
#
#
# General SGI practice
#
# Remove old trash
0 5 * * * find / -local -type f '(' -name core -o -name dead.letter ')' -atime +7 -mtime +7 -
exec rm -f '{} ' ;'
#
# Remove old vi/ex 'preserved' files
3 5 * * * find /var/preserve -local -type f -atime +30 -mtime +30 -exec rm -f '{} ' ;'
#
# Rotate the logs
1 1 * * 0 umask 077;cd /var/cron;if test -s log && test ""/sbin/stat -
qs log`" -ge 10240; then mv -f log OLDlog;touch log; killall 1 cron; fi

```

```

1      1      *      *      0      umask 077;cd /var/adm;if test -s sulog && test
"/sbin/stat -qs sulog" -ge 10240; then mv -f sulog OLDSulog;touch sulog; fi
# In order to accept other system loggings at the 'crit' level,
# use only the first 'crit' entry found for log file rotation.
# This works only if system default log file is found first and
# additional 'crit' level logging are added later.
1      1      *      *      0      umask 077;SYSLOGFILE=`grep "*"*.crit" /etc/syslog.conf
| awk '$1 != "#" && done == 0 {done =1; print $NF}'; if test -f $SYSLOGFILE ; then ;; else
SYSLOGFILE=/var/adm/SYSLOG; fi;OSYSLOGFILE=`dirname $SYSLOGFILE`\Vo`basename
$SYSLOGFILE`;if test -s $SYSLOGFILE && test "/sbin/stat -qs $SYSLOGFILE" -ge 10240; then
mv -f $SYSLOGFILE $OSYSLOGFILE;touch $SYSLOGFILE; killall 1 syslogd; fi
#
# If accounting is on it will handle wtmp rotating.
# wtmp and wtmpx are always kept in sync by libc/getut so we should
# always do things to them together
#
2      1      *      *      0      if /etc/chkconfig acct; then ;; else umask 077;cd
/var/adm; if test -s wtmp && test "/sbin/stat -qs wtmp" -ge 10240; then mv -f wtmp OLDWtmp; mv
-f wtmpx OLDWtmpx; touch wtmp wtmpx; chown adm.adm wtmp wtmpx; fi; fi
# dodisk does the disk accounting
0      2      *      *      4      if /etc/chkconfig acct; then /usr/lib/acct/dodisk >
/var/adm/acct/nite/disklog; fi
#
# Reorganize file systems
#
0 3 *      * 0 if test -x /usr/etc/fsr; then (cd /usr/tmp; /usr/etc/fsr) fi
#
# Repair mangled utmp/wtmp entries
#
1 0      *      *      *      /usr/sbin/chkutent
#
# fsdump updates the local rfind database
#
3 0-3,5-23 * * * /etc/chkconfig rfindd && cd /var/rfindd && exec ./runfsdump
#
# Rotate log file related to amfilter
#
1      1      *      *      0,4      umask 077;SYSLOGFILE=`grep -v "^#" /etc/syslog.conf |
grep amfilter | awk '{print $NF}' 2>/dev/null`; if test "z$SYSLOGFILE" != "z" && test -s
$SYSLOGFILE && test "/sbin/stat -qs $SYSLOGFILE" -ge 10240; then
OSYSLOGFILE=`dirname $SYSLOGFILE`\Vo`basename $SYSLOGFILE`; mv -f $SYSLOGFILE
$OSYSLOGFILE; touch $SYSLOGFILE; killall 1 syslogd; fi
# MediaBase Services
#
# Rotate /usr/ocs/logs/mbaselog.local files.
1      2      *      *      *      /usr/ocs/sbin/rotatelogs
1      2      *      *      *      /usr/ocs/sbin/rotatelogs -b playlog -p
#
# Back up /usr/sgi/informix/online.log files.
# 0      2      *      *      *      /usr/sgi/informix/bin/backupmsglog
#
# Try to recover shared memory from Informix.
# 0 *      *      *      *      /usr/sgi/informix/bin/shmrecover
# MediaBase Services End
#
# Run John the Ripper quarterly to check for weak passwords

```

```

# runjohn.sh formats the /etc/passwd & /etc/shadow files into a new file
# Testfile
# The /bin/gzcat line takes a pre-computed permuted dictionary and runs
# it against the new Testfile
30 1 1 3,6,9,12 * /sbin/sh /opt/john-1.6/run/runjohn.sh.sh
#
30 23 * * * /bin/sh /disk2/admin/scripts/daily.script.sh
20 23 * * * /bin/sh /disk2/admin/scripts/chkrootkit.sh
00 * * * * /usr/lib/sendmail -q

```

16. File & Directory Permissions

File permissions should be changed in some cases to restrict users from accessing or viewing files that they do not have a need to know. Programs like TARA, which we will install and run through cron help administrators with this task. The Solaris Security Step by Step version 2.0 guide also gives guidance to accomplishing this task. Care should be taken when changing directory permissions, applications may cease to work. Be sure to test after making changes.

Change the following:

```

chmod 600 /etc/fstab
chmod 644 /etc/group
chmod 444 /etc/default/login
chmod 400 /usr/bin/snoop
chmod 400 /var/spoolcron/crontabs/*

```

Set UID and set GID allows a user to run a file with the permissions of the owner of the file. So this is very risky when this is done with files owned by root. The command: `find / -user root -perm -4000 -print` will list all set UID files owned by root. Files should be examined closely to see if they are required or not.

Remove the set UID and set GID on the following:

```

chmod u-s /usr/bin/mail
chmod g-s /usr/bin/mail
chmod u-s /usr/lib/sendmail
chmod g-s /usr/etc/nfsstat
chmod g-s /usr/etc/netstat
chmod g-s /usr/sbin/ipcs
chmod g-s /usr/sbin/movemail
chmod g-s /usr/sbin/mailx

```

C. Install Software

Installing some applications may requires the ability to write to /usr which is currently mounted as read only. Unmount /usr, install the software, and then reboot the server so that /usr will be mounted as read only again.

```
umount /usr  
mount /dev/dsk/dks0d1/s6 /usr
```

1. C Compiler

Install a C compiler. We will be installing and using applications on the video server that require building, compiling and configuring. Install the SGI MIPSpro C Compiler 7.3. Having compilers on a machine adds to the security exposure. If a hacker gets access to the server, he may be able to download some code, and use the on board compilers to compile the application. It might make the task a little more work for the hacker if he has to download and install a compiler to the box. On the other hand, if he has access, and he has downloaded some software already, what is one more package? The more steps the hacker has to take, the more chances there are to slip up. We will be installing the GNC GCC compiler, which includes C and C++. We need the MIPSpro compiler to get the GCC compiler installed. Once this is completed, we could remove the MIPSpro compiler. The GCC compiler will make the job easier for the administrator when compiling other programs such as OpenSSH and SSL. Most freeware programs are written to use the GCC compiler. The caveat here is the tools that make the administrator's life easier can also make the hackers' life easier. Tools can be used for good as well as bad.

```
Inst  
Insert Compiler Execution Environment 7.3 CD  
Inst> open from /CDROM/dist/dist6.5  
Inst> keep *  
Inst> install Default  
Inst> sh eject  
Insert IRIX Development Foundation 1.2  
Inst> open from /CDROM/dist/dist6.5  
Inst> keep *  
Inst> install Default  
Inst> sh eject  
Insert IRIX 6.5 Development Libraries CD  
Inst> open from /CDROM/dist  
Inst> keep *  
Inst> install Default  
Inst> sh eject  
Insert the MIPSPro C Compiler 7.3 CD  
Inst> open from /CDROM/dist/dist6.5  
Inst> keep *  
Inst> install Default  
Inst> sh eject
```



```
Insert IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays 1 of 4
Inst> open from /CDROM/dist
Inst> keep *
Inst> install Default
Inst> sh eject
Insert IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays 2 of 4
Inst> open from /CDROM/dist
Inst> sh eject
Insert IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays 3 of 4
Inst> open from /CDROM/dist
Inst> sh eject
Insert IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays 4 of 4
Inst> open from /CDROM/dist
Inst> sh eject
Done
Inst> conflicts
Inst> go
Inst> quit
```

Download the GCC compiler from the SGI freeware site. The download should be performed from another workstation since the video server is not completely configured and locked down.

<http://freeware.sgi.com/index-by-alpha.html>

This will provide a tardist file that can be installed from the Inst > prompt. The file is fw_gcc-3.0.4.tardist.

```
mkdir /tmp/download
mv fw_gcc-3.0.4.tardist /tmp/download
cd /tmp/download
tar xvf fw_gcc-3.0.4.tardist
inst -f .
Inst> go
On completion, enter quit.
Inst> quit
```

Remove the files from the temporary download directory.

```
cd /tmp/download
rm *
```

2. Sendmail

Download the Sendmail source code from:

<ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.6.tar.gz>

We will not start the Sendmail daemon. A null client configuration will forward mail to a central server for processing. The central mail server is named

letters. This will limit our exposure to vulnerabilities that have plagued the Sendmail application over the years.

```
mv sendmail.8.12.6.tar.gz /disk2/admin
cd /disk2/admin
/usr/sbin/gzcat sendmail.8.12.6.tar.gz | tar xvf -
cd sendmail-8.12.6
Edit the IRIX.6.5 file to use the GCC compiler
cd devtools/OS
vi IRIX.6.5
Change the line define confCC cc to define confCC gcc.
# define confCC cc
define confCC gcc
wq!
cd /disk2/admin/ sendmail-8.12.6
build
cd cf/cf
cp clientproto.mc videosever.mc
Set the Ostype and Feature parameters in videosever.mc
vi videosever.mc
OSTYPE(IRIX6)
FEATURE(nullclient, letters.$m)
/sbin/m4 ../m4/cf.m4 letters.mc > sendmail.cf
cp sendmail.cf /etc/mail
chown root:sys /etc/mail/sendmail.cf
chmod 644 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf
ln -s /etc/mail/sendmail.cf /etc/sendmail.cf
cd ../../obj.IRIX.6.5.IP22/sendmail
cp sendmail /usr/lib
chown root:sys /usr/lib/sendmail
chmod 4555 /usr/lib/sendmail
Verify that sendmail is off.
The chkconfig command will display the service settings.
chkconfig sendmail off
chkconfig sendmail_cf off
```

Periodically the mail queue should be cleaned of any messages that were not delivered immediately. This should be done through cron. Add the following line to

```
/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root:
```

```
crontab -e
00 * * * * /usr/lib/sendmail -q
wq!

ps -ef | grep cron
kill -HUP <cron's ID>
```

```
cd /etc/rc2.d
mv S50mail s50mail
```

3. TCP Wrappers

Download TCP Wrappers from Weiste Venema's FTP site.
ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/tcp_wrappers_7.6.tar.gz

Access to services can be filtered by using TCP Wrappers. Two files control the access, `hosts.allow` and `hosts.deny`. The administrator specifies what services can be used and by whom. The `/etc/hosts.allow` is read first to see what is allowed. If it can not find a match the `/etc/hosts.deny` is consulted. If there is no match in either file access is granted. We should only allow just what is needed by the user community to do their job. So, to accomplish this deny stance, we should allow specific services from specified addresses and deny the rest.

```
mv tcp_wrappers_7.6.tar.gz /disk2/admin
cd /disk2/admin
gzcat tcp_wrappers_7.6.tar.gz | tar xvf -
cd tcp_wrappers_7.6
chmod 644 Makefile
vi Makefile
Set the Real Daemon Directory, change the FACILITY variable from
LOG_MAIL to LOG_AUTH, and set the CC variable to the GCC compiler.
REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
FACILITY=LOG_AUTH
CC=/usr/freeware/bin/gcc
make irix6
mkdir /usr/local/sbin
mkdir /usr/local/include
cp safe_finger tcpd tcpdchk try-from /usr/local/sbin
chmod 555 /usr/local/sbin/*
chown root:daemon /usr/local/sbin/*
cp libwrap.a /usr/local/lib
chmod 555 /usr/local/lib/libwrap.a
chown root:daemon /usr/local/lib/libwrap.a
cp tcpd.h /usr/local/include
chmod 444 /usr/local/include/tcpd.h
chown root:daemon /usr/local/include/tcpd.h
```

Add the services and the hosts to be allowed access. We are only allowing ssh connections from two hosts.

```
vi /etc/hosts.allow
sshd: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: banners /etc/banners.allow
sshd: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: banners /etc/banners.allow
wq!
```

Make the hosts.allow file readable only by root. This would make it harder for unauthorized users to gain information about what network access is granted.

```
chmod 600 /etc/hosts.allow
chown root /etc/hosts.allow
```

Create the deny all statement in the /etc/hosts.deny. We use safe_finger, which comes with TCP Wrappers, instead of the default safefinger. It has been audited for security. Safe_finger attempts to get a long listing of the users who are currently logged in on the source of the connection (@%a) and mails the information to root.

```
vi /etc/hosts.deny
ALL EXCEPT in.fingerd : ALL: spawn (/usr/bin/safe_finger -l @%a |
/usr/bin/mail -s '%s (%p): connection from %a (%n) '
root@trainingcompany.com) &
wq!
```

Make the hosts.deny file readable only by root. This would make it harder for unauthorized users to gain information about what network access is granted.

```
chmod 600 /etc/hosts.deny
chown root /etc/hosts.deny
```

4. OpenSSH & Prerequisites

OpenSSH will be used to administer the video server from the administrator's workstation. All communications will be encrypted including passwords and data. We will be able to use SCP, a secure way to copy files, and SFTP to securely ftp files to the video server. Telnet and ftp have been disabled due to their inherent security weaknesses, (everything sent in the clear). There are two prerequisites to building OpenSSH. They are OpenSSL and Zlib. Both packages are open source freeware packages. OpenSSL requires Perl to be installed. Perl comes with the default IRIX installation.

Download the OpenSSL source from [openssl.org](http://www.openssl.org). Revision e corrects the buffer overflow vulnerability reported by CERT, CA-2002-23.
<http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-0.9.6e.tar.gz>

```
mv openssl-0.9.6e.tar.gz /disk2/admin
cd /disk2/admin
gzcat openssl-0.9.6e.tar.gz | tar xvf -
cd openssl-0.9.6e
./Configure irix-gcc
make
make test
```

```
make install
```

Download the Zlib source from freesoftware.com. A double free vulnerability exists in previous versions of zlib. Version 1.1.4 prevents this vulnerability which can cause a denial of service attack. See CERT Advisory CA-2002-07 for further details on this exploit.

```
ftp://ftp.freesoftware.com/pub/infozip/zlib/zlib-1.1.4.tar.gz
```

```
mv zlib.tar.gz /disk2/admin
cd /disk2/admin
gzcat zlib.tar.gz | tar xvf -
cd zlib-1.1.4
./configure
vi Makefile
cc=/usr/freeware/bin/gcc
wq!
make
make install
```

Download OpenSSH from www.openssh.com. This version corrects vulnerabilities detailed in CERT Advisory CA-2002-18. The vulnerability allows a user to run arbitrary code as the user running the sshd daemon, most often root. The second vulnerability affects the PAM modules using interactive keyboard authentication. It ignores the challenge response option setting.

```
mv openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz /disk2/admin
cd /disk2/admin
zcat openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz | tar xvf -
cd openssh-3.4p1
./configure
make
make install
```

Edit the configuration files, `sshd_config` and `ssh_config`. We will not allow ssh protocol 1 to connect to the video server since it has security holes. We will not allow `.rhosts` or `RhostsRSAAuthentication`. We will only allow two users to ssh, `jsmith` and `toliver`. No one can log in as root. The two users should login as regular users and then `su` to root. This provides trace ability in case of a compromise.

```
vi /etc/sshd_config
```

```
# This is ssh server systemwide configuration file.
#
Port 22
Protocol 2
ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
```

```
#ListenAddress ::
HostKey /etc/ssh_host_key
ServerKeyBits 768
LoginGraceTime 600
KeyRegenerationInterval 3600
PermitRootLogin no
#
Don't read ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
IgnoreRhosts yes
Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for RhostsRSAAuthentication
IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes
StrictModes yes
X11Forwarding no
X11DisplayOffset 10
PrintMotd no
KeepAlive yes

AllowUsers jsmith tolover
# Logging
SyslogFacility DAEMON
LogLevel INFO
#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging

RhostsAuthentication no
#
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh_known_hosts
RhostsRSAAuthentication no
#
RSAAuthentication yes

# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
PasswordAuthentication no
PermitEmptyPasswords no
# Uncomment to disable s/key passwords
#SkeyAuthentication no
#KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes

# To change Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
#AFSTokenPassing no
#KerberosTicketCleanup no

# Kerberos TGT Passing does only work with the AFS kserver
#KerberosTgtPassing yes

CheckMail no
UseLogin no

# Uncomment if you want to enable sftp
Subsystem sftp /etc/libexec/sftp-server
MaxStartups 10:30:60
wq!
```

Make the `sshd_config` file readable only by root. This would make it harder for unauthorized users to gain information about what network access is granted.

```
chmod 600 /etc/sshd_config
chown root /etc/sshd_config
```

Edit the `/etc/ssh_config` file. We want to prevent rsh and RhostsAuthentication due to it's security breeches. Allow protocol 2 only. Protocol 1 has been proven to be insecure.

```
vi /etc/ssh_config
```

```
# This is ssh client systemwide configuration file. This file provides
# defaults for users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration
# files or on the command line.
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
# 1. command line options
# 2. user-specific file
# 3. system-wide file
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
# Site-wide defaults for various options
Host *
ForwardAgent no
ForwardX11 no
RhostsAuthentication no
RhostsRSAAuthentication no
RSAAuthentication yes
PasswordAuthentication yes
FallbackToRsh no
UseRsh no
BatchMode no
CheckHostIP yes
StrictHostKeyChecking yes
# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
Port 22
Protocol 2
Cipher blowfish
EscapeChar ~
    wq!
```

Create a start up script so the ssh daemon starts on boot up. This file should be in the `/etc/init.d` directory. It should be linked to the `/etc/rc2.d` directory.

```
cd /etc/init.d
vi ssh
#!/bin/sh
case "$1" in
'start')
    if [ -x /usr/local/sbin/sshd -a -f /etc/sshd_config ]; then
```

```

        /usr/local/sbin/sshd -f /etc/sshd_config
    fi
    ;;
'stop')
    kill `cat /etc/sshd.pid`
    ;;
*)
    echo "Usage: $0 { start | stop }"
    ;;
esac
exit 0

wq!

chown root:sys /etc/init.d/ssh
chmod 744 /etc/init.d/ssh
ln -s /etc/init.d/ssh /etc/rc2.d/S72ssh

```

Each of the administrators should generate a DSA personal key pair. When creating the public/private key pair, the user is prompted for a passphrase. The phrase should be long to help prevent shoulder surfing. This phrase protects your private key. If someone gets the private key they can masquerade as that user. The private key is never transmitted over the network. It would be a good idea to store the private key on removable media if possible. Copy the public key to the systems that are going to be connecting with. The public key will be named `id_dsa` and it will be copied into the `authorized_keys2` file on the remote host in the user's `.ssh` directory under the user's home directory.

Generate a DSA key pair. The user will type the following command and when prompted enter a long passphrase. Make it something you can remember.

```
ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -f ~/.ssh/id_dsa
```

Copy the public key to the remote system in the `.ssh` directory under your home directory.

```
scp ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub remotehost:~/.ssh/authorized_keys2
```

5. Fcheck

Download FCheck file integrity program. This is similar to Tripwire. It will check if files have been changed. It can use MD5 checksums. It can be configured to watch specific directories and files. It will be configured to check changes against an original copy stored on a read only CD-ROM disk. The FCheck program is a set of Perl scripts. Once they are unpacked they can be run. No compiling is necessary.

```

mv Fcheck_2.07.59.tar.gz /disk2/admin/scripts
cd /disk2/admin/scripts
gzcat Fcheck_2.07.59.tar.gz | tar xvf -

```

Modify the `fcheck` program to tell `fcheck` where the configuration file is.


```
vi /usr/local/fcheck/fcheck
$config="/usr/local/fcheck/fcheck.cfg";
wq!
```

```
mkdir /usr/local/fcheck
mv fcheck /usr/local/fcheck
mv fcheck.cfg /usr/local/fcheck
```

Here is a copy of the configuration file that fcheck references when running.

```
/usr/local/fcheck/fcheck.cfg
```

```
# FCheck.cfg
#
# Directories to be monitored are shown below. Multiple entries may be used
# by using the following 'keyword=variable' format:
#
# [Directory=(path/name)]
# [Directory=(path/name)]
# ...
# If you want recursive directory monitoring, place a / at the end of
# the directory name, otherwise the script will interpret the entry as a
# single file or single directory to monitor.
#
# For example the entry "Directory=/usr"
#   will watch everything in the /usr directory
#
# and the entry "Directory=/etc/passwd"
#   will monitor only the password file.
#
# while the entry "Directory=/usr/"
#   will watch everything in the /usr directory, and everything
#   recursively under it, (I.E. /usr/bin..., /usr/local/..., etc.)
Directory      = /tmp
#Directory     = /home/root/scripts/fcheck/
Directory      = /
Directory      = /etc/
Directory      = /bin
Directory      = /opt
Directory      = /opt/MD5/
Directory      = /opt/MIPSPRO/
Directory      = /opt/john-1.6/
Directory      = /opt/fcheck/
Directory      = /opt/gzip-1.2.4/
Directory      = /opt/logdaemon-5.6/
Directory      = /opt/modulefiles/
Directory      = /opt/modules/
Directory      = /opt/scripts/
Directory      = /opt/tcp_wrappers_7.6/
Directory      = /lib
Directory      = /sbin/
Directory      = /usr/
Directory      = /var/
```

```
Directory = /disk2/admin
Directory = /disk2/admin/tools/
Directory = /disk2/admin/scripts/
```

WARNING

```
# Use the following exclusions with care,
# only include log files that are constantly updating and are known to
# be written to frequently otherwise you can defeat the purpose of fcheck
# by excluding too much...
#
# Specific files, and/or directories can be excluded.
#
# If used, configure them as full paths and their filenames. Directory
# names must have a "/" appended to the end of its filename in the exclude
# section.
#
Exclusion = /etc/utmp
Exclusion = /etc/wtmp
Exclusion = /rtmovies/
Exclusion = /rtmovie2/
Exclusion = /rtmovie3/
Exclusion = /rtmovie4/
Exclusion = /disk2/admin/reports/
Exclusion = /usr/sgi/
Exclusion = /usr/mbase/
# Miscellaneous settings are passed to fcheck from here.
#
# The "DataBase" keyword points to the absolute path/filename of the baseline
# database file, and is defined next.
#
DataBase = /usr/local/data/fcheck.dbf
# If you are using a read-only location. You can write the database files to
# one location, and read from an alternate read-only (CD-ROM?) location.
ReadDB = /cdrom/fcheck.dbf
WriteDB = /usr/local/data/fcheck.dbf
# Your systems interface for passing messages to its log files, UNIX systems
# are typically found as "/usr/bin/logger".
#
# You could also send messages directly to a line printer if desired.
#
# Win32 platforms are forced to use line printers for now until a error
# logging module is created for NT platforms.
#
#Logger = /usr/bin/lpr
#
# As of version 2.7.50, you pass logger taglines (-t) options through here.
# Any other options can now be passed to third party loggers, scripts, etc.
Logger = /usr/bin/logger -tfcheck -hello -w
#AuthLogger = /usr/bin/logger -tfcheck -pauth.info
#AuthLogger = /usr/bin/logger -tfcheck -pauth.notice
# This is the system command to determine a files type. Used to determine
# pipes, major/minor numbers.
#
# Only useful on Unix platforms, not portable to Windows (yet?!?!).
FileType = /bin/file
# You may optionally set your hostname from the configuration file if FCheck
```

```

# is unable to determine it on its own.
#
HostName      = "videoserver"
# You may optionally set the system type from the configuration file if
# FCheck is unable to determine it on its own.
# Currently the only accepted option here is "System = DOS", otherwise FCheck
# will default to a UNIX system.
#
#System       = Dos
# This must be set only for readability by you. It in no way effects the scan
# function of FCheck. It only changes what is presented to the end user, so
# the times that are presented to you may not be accurate if not set.
TimeZone     = EST5EDT
# This is used only if you require/desire a hash signature to also be generated
# for each file by use of the '-s' flag. If you do not use the (s)ignature
# flag, then the following variable setting will not impact fcheck in any way.
#$Signature  = /usr/bin/sum
#$Signature  = /usr/bin/cksum
$Signature   = /usr/bin/md5sum
# Include an optional configuration file.
# [CFInclude = (path/config_file_name)]
#CFInclude
# Used for individual file checking (I.E. Possibly FCheck databases!)
#
File        = /usr/local/data/sol.dbf
#
# End of FCheck.cfg file
#

```

6. Cops

Download cops.

<http://www.fish.com/cops/cops104+.tar.Z>

```

cd /disk2/admin
uncompress cops104+.tar.Z
tar xvf cops104+.tar
cd cops104
./reconfig
make
./cops -v -s . -b bit_bucket

```

7. Network Time Protocol

The NTP (Network Time Protocol) allows the network to keep the system clocks in synch. It is important for numerous reasons such as: scheduling backups, using time based security products, and log file timestamps, possibly for prosecution of intruders.

Download NTP source files from:

<http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~ntp/ntp-4.1.1a.tar.gz>

```
mv ntp-4.1.1a.tar.gz /disk2/admin
cd /disk2/admin
gzcat ntp-4.1.1a.tar.gz | tar xvf -
cd ntp-4.1.1a
./configure
make
make install
```

We will be running as a client machine.

```
vi /etc/ntp.conf
driftfile /etc/ntp.drift
server xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
server xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
server xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
restrict default nomodify
wq!
```

Create a NTP startup script.

Cd /etc/init.d

```
vi ntp
```

```
#!/bin/sh
```

```
CONFFILE=/etc/ntp.conf
```

```
if [ -f $CONFFILE ] ; then
    if [ -x /usr/local/bin/ntpdate ] ; then
        SERVERS=`awk '/^server|peer/ { print $2 }' \
        $CONFFILE | grep -v ^127`
        /usr/local/bin/ntpdate $SERVERS
    fi
    if [ -x /usr/local/bin/ntpd ] ; then
        echo "Starting NTP."
        /usr/local/bin/ntpd -c $CONFFILE
    fi
fi
wq!
```

```
chmod 744 /etc/init.d/ntp
```

```
chown root:sys /etc/init.d/ntp
```

```
ln -s /etc/init.d/ntp /etc/rc2.d/S90ntp
```

```
/etc/init.d/ntp
```

Attach the network cable.

Shutdown the system.

```
shutdown -y -g0
```

Start the system back up into multiuser mode.

8. TARA

TARA is a freeware host based vulnerability scanner. It checks for vulnerabilities and configuration errors.

Download from: <http://ww-arc.com/tara/index.shtml>

```
mv /disk2/admin/tara-2.0.9
```

```
vi Makefile
```

```
TIGERHOME=/usr/local/tiger
```

```
TIGERBIN=/usr/spool/tiger/bin
```

```
TIGERWORK=/usr/spool/tiger/work
```

```
TIGERLOGS=/usr/spool/tiger/logs
```

```
wq!
```

```
make install
```

```
cp scripts/check_* /disk2/admin/tara-2.0.9
```

Edit the scan configuration file tigerrc. The signature database is not up to date so do not run this check. The check embedded script finds too many false positives. Do not run this test either. Do not run crack. We run crack through cron. We only have two user accounts. Turn on the check for world writeable directories.

```
vi /disk2/admin/tara-2.0.9/tigerrc
```

```
Tiger_Check_Signatures=N
```

```
Tiger_Check_Embedded=N
```

```
Tiger_Run_Crack=N
```

```
Tiger_FSScan_WDIR=Y
```

```
wq!
```

9. Chkrootkit

The chkrootkit script is a freeware program that checks for root kits.

Download: <http://www.chkrootkit.org/>

```
cp chkrootkit.tar.gz /disk2/admin/scripts
```

```
cd /disk2/admin/scripts
```

```
gunzip chkrootkit.tar.gz
```

```
tar xvf chkrootkit.tar
```

```
cd chkrootkit-0.35
```

```
make sense
```

10. John the Ripper Password Checking Tool

Download: <http://www.openwall.com/john/>

```
cp john-1.6.tar.gz /opt
```

```
cd /opt
```

```
gunzip john-1.6.tar.gz
```

```
tar xvf john-1.6.tar
```

```
cd john-1.6/src
```

```
make
```

```
make IRIX-gcc
```

D. Post Installation Tasks

1. Create Backups

Backups are important to ensure the availability of the training materials stored on the videosever. The entire system should be backed up once a week on Saturday. This will include a full backup as well as a root file system backup. Since the material stored on the videosever does not change constantly, the once a week schedule should work out fine. Other production systems like development systems need to have their data backed up daily. This would require a different backup plan. A plan would include a full backup once a week, followed by incremental backups each night until the day that full backups are done. A backup would be performed after the quarterly update and any other time the administrator might deem appropriate.

Do not skimp on tapes. You do not want to wear out a tape, only to find out it is not backing up your data when you really need to perform a recovery. To help avoid this, use a different tape for each full backup for the first 10 backups. After the tenth backup reuse the first backup and overwrite the contents. Purchase new tapes at the beginning of each year (January time frame). The same rotation scheme should be used for the root file system backups. The tapes should have a label showing the date of the backup. Tapes should not be left lying around. Once the backup is performed, they should be checked into the media library. This prevents someone from walking by and picking up a copy of your entire system. By storing the tapes elsewhere, you do not keep all your eggs in one basket. If physical damage such as fire or flooding occurs where the server is, it will not affect the backups and vice versa. Checking the tapes into the media library also provides trace ability and accountability.

Log in as a regular user and su to root.

Backup the root file system.

Insert a 4mm tape into the 4mm tape drive.

Enter the following:

```
xfsdump -f /dev/tape -l 0 -v silent /
```

Enter a session label. Example: root514 – This will be a root backup from May 14.

```
root514
```

When it completes, rewind the tape and eject it.

```
mt -t /dev/tape rewind
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape offline
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape unload
```

Next a full backup is needed. A full backup needs to be run in single user mode.

Enter the following:

```
init 1
```

Insert a 4mm tape into the 4mm tape drive.

Enter:

Backup /

On completion, rewind the tape and eject it.

mt -t /dev/tape rewind

mt -t /dev/tape offline

mt -t /dev/tape unload

Bring the system back up to multiuser mode.

Enter:

init 2

Users should be able to connect to the video server at:

<http://videoserver/mbase>

2. Create a CD-ROM Disk Toolkit

This CD will contain known good binaries. This can be used if a system has been compromised or thought to have been compromised. Quite often when a system is broken into, a rootkit is installed. The rootkit is a custom piece of software that hides the presence of malicious activity. Common commands like ls, ps, df, netstat, and who are replaced with versions that output results that prevent the administrator from seeing what really is transpiring on the system. The administrator can use the commands from the CD rather than the system ones. Now, the administrator can see who is logged in, see if the network interface is in promiscuous mode, or if there are any connections trying to connect to outside sites. The CD can also be used as a comparison. The administrator can use the diff command to see if the commands on the system are the same as what is on the CD. Beware that the quarterly update can cause the system commands to change, so after an update, the administrator should create a new toolkit CD.

The disk should include:

netstat, lsof, top, ps, ls, diff, su, passwd, netcat, md5checksum, who, w, find, df, rm, mv, cp, chown, chgrp, chmod, tar dd, sh, csh, compress, uncompress, gzip, gunzip, shared libraries, and gcc.

3. Document the Server

After the system has been configured, a binder should be created to document what is installed, how settings are set, and what procedures are used. This can be useful if the system has to be rebuilt or duplicated. If a new administrator is hired, he can get an idea of how the system operates.

Commands can be run to obtain some parameters. The output of the commands can be saved to a file. The files would be collected and printed. Although there is no printer attached to the video server, the results can be moved to another system using a 4mm tape.

Information to be gathered includes:

`uname -aR` Provides IRIX operating system revision, system name, and processor version.

`chkconfig` Displays the services that are on and off.

`hinvt` Displays the contents of the system hardware inventory table.

`printenv` Displays all PROM variables. Once the system is booted up it displays the user's environment.

`nvrnm` Displays a list of commands available at PROM.

`showprods` lists all installed software (installed through the `Inst` command).

`devnm /` Displays which disk is the system disk.

`prtvtoc -a` Displays the partition information for all disks.

`/etc/fstab` The file lists the automatically mounted filesystems.

`df -k` Lists the mounted filesystems and their disk usage.

`ifconfig -v -a` Lists the network interface settings.

`ls /etc/rc2.d` Lists the start up scripts when booting to multiuser mode.

`ls /etc/init.d` Lists the start up scripts.

`ls -la /dev/dsk` Lists the contents of the `/dev/dsk` directory.

`ls -la /dev/rdisk` Lists the contents of the `/dev/rdisk` directory.

`/etc/hosts` File shows the IP address-hostname database.

`/etc/group` File shows the groups on the system.

`/etc/passwd` File shows users, ID, GID, shell, home directory, and information.

`/etc/inetd.conf` File shows services started by the `inetd` daemon.

`/var/netscape/fasttrack/httpacl/generated.httppd-videoserver.acl` ACL for the Netscape Fasttrack Server.

`/etc/ipfilterd.conf` File contains the ipfiltering rules.

`/etc/sshd_config` OpenSSH configuration file.

`/etc/ssh_config` OpenSSH configuration file.

Detail how the system can be accessed. Clients can connect to the videoserver and view instructional videos using their browser logged in on any system in the intranet. The administrators can only log in using SSH.

Detail how and when backups should be performed. See section above on backups for details.

Detail how a restore should be performed. See Appendix B.

Detail how the daily security scripts are run and reviewed. See the next section Maintaining Security part 1, Daily Security check of videoserver.

Detail how material to be placed on the video server is approved. See Appendix B.

IV. Maintaining Security

Once a server is configured and hardened, the fun really begins. Activity on the server needs to be monitored. Applications need to be updated or removed depending on the usage. Patches must be kept up to date.

Performance tuning is a never-ending battle. Log files need to be monitored, rotated, and moved offline.

A. Daily Security Check

A daily security script is run through cron every night. The results are saved to files as well as mailed to root. The mail is sent to another system. The script runs several other scripts and then puts the results in one main report. Three other reports are mailed separately from the one total report to the administrator to his workstation. The reports are stored on the server and on the administrator's workstation to provide redundancy. In case of a break in, the intruder might not be able to find all the report files as well as the original log files. The daily reports help the administrator understand what is happening on his system and to spot when things are not right. The scripts show different styles of writing scripts. Numerous people have contributed to the maintenance of the scripts. Also as a good UNIX administrator you should follow the mantra of, reuse existing code and modify the code to meet your requirements. Do not reinvent the wheel. Administrators should keep a directory of scripts that they have written or used to accomplish admin tasks, so as new tasks come up, there is a central repository to start from. The following scripts parse log files looking for successful and unsuccessful login attempts, su attempts both successful and unsuccessful, looks for authorization violations, looks at the webserver error logs, looks for .rhosts and hosts.equiv files, looks for changes to files and directories, and looks for root shell scripts. A listing of the scripts is located in Appendix C.

/disk2/admin/scripts/daily.script.sh is the script that gets run by cron. In turn this script calls the following scripts:

/disk2/admin/scripts/su.fails.sh (checks for failed su attempts) You want to know if someone is trying to su to root. Sample output:

```
-----  
Begin report for failed su attempts for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002
```

```
-----  
End report for failed su attempts for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002  
-----
```

/disk2/admin/scripts/su.success.sh (checks for successful su attempts) You want to document who is running as root. If something gets changed or misconfigured, you can see which root user did it. It makes it easier to undo the changes, rather than going down some other path looking for the problem.

Sample output:

```
-----  
Begin report for successful su attempts on videosever for Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002
```

```
SU 09/16 12:54 + ttyq0 tolover-root
```

```
-----  
End report for successful su attempts on videosever for Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002
```

/disk2/admin/scripts/logins.sh (checks for successful login attempts) You want to know who logs in to the videosever. It should only have two user accounts. Sample output:

Begin report of valid logins for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002

toliver ttyq0 learning1 Mon Sep 16 12:54 - 15:07 (02:12)

End report of valid logins for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002

/disk2/admin/scripts/login.fails.sh (checks for failed login attempts) You want to know if someone is trying to guess usernames and passwords.

Begin report of failed login attempts (5 conseq) for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002

End report of failed login attempts for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002

/disk2/admin/scripts/find_rhosts.sh (checks for .rhosts files) .rhosts files should be removed from the system. They are a security threat, in that they allow a user to log on without a password. OpenSSH is available, so there is no reason to use .rhosts files. This removes any.rhosts files. Sample output:

Begin report of find_rhosts for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002

End report of find_rhosts for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:30:07 EDT 2002

/disk2/admin/scripts/find_hostsequiv.sh (checks for hosts.equiv files)
Hosts.equiv files are basically the same as .rhosts files. This removes any hosts.equiv files.

Begin report of /etc/hosts.equiv for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:31:01 EDT 2002

End report of /etc/hosts.equiv for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:31:01 EDT 2002

/disk2/admin/scripts/find_root_sh_scripts.sh (checks for root shell scripts) You do not want to find any root kits on your system. Root kits normally have programs to hide processes, clean log files, ftp or even worse ssh out to malicious sites. If you find a root kit it is time to follow the Computer Security Incident Handling Step-by-Step book from SANS.

Begin report of find_root_sh_scripts for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:31:01 EDT 2002

End report of find_root_sh_scripts for videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:31:01 EDT 2002

/disk2/admin/scripts/auth.log.sh (checks /var/adm/auth.log file) Sample output:

Begin report for auth.log on videosever for Mon Sep 16 23:31:58 EDT 2002

Sep 16 12:54:24 6E:videosever sshd[1595977]: Accepted password for tolover from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx port 1139 ssh2
Sep 16 12:54:24 6E:videosever sshd(pam_unix)[1599042]: session opened for user tolover by (uid=11111)
Sep 16 12:54:36 5E:videosever su[1598609]: succeeded: ttyq0 changing from tolover to root
Sep 16 12:59:19 6E:videosever sshd[1599072]: Accepted password for tolover from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx port 1146
Sep 16 12:59:19 6E:videosever sshd(pam_unix)[1599063]: session opened for user tolover by (uid=11111)
Sep 16 13:00:30 6E:videosever sshd(pam_unix)[1599063]: session closed for user tolover
Sep 16 15:07:21 6E:videosever sshd[1599042]: Received disconnect from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: 11: All open channels closed
Sep 16 15:07:21 6E:videosever sshd(pam_unix)[1599042]: session closed for user tolover

End report for auth.log on videosever for Mon Sep 16 23:31:58 EDT 2002

/disk2/admin/scripts/webserver.error.log.sh (checks the error log file for the webserver) This looks for intruders trying to exploit your webserver. Sample output from a saint scan of the videosever:

Begin report of Webserver Errors for videosever on Thu Sep 5 23:31:59 EDT 2002

[05/Sep/2002:11:08:46] warning: for host xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx trying to GET /cgi-bin/n0nexi5tent_f1e.pl, send-cgi reports: cannot find CGI program /var/www/cgi-bin/n0nexi5tent_f1e.pl (No such file or directory)

[05/Sep/2002:11:08:46] warning: for host xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx trying to GET /cgi-bin/n0nexi5tent CGI, send-cgi reports: cannot find CGI program /var/www/cgi-bin/n0nexi5tent CGI (No such file or directory)

End report of File Structures on videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:31:59 EDT 2002

/disk2/admin/scripts/finduid.pl (checks for any UID's of 0 besides the root account) You want to know if someone has added a user account with UID 0, which would make the user in effect root! Sample output:

Begin report for UID 0 on videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:31:59 EDT 2002

End report for UID 0 on videosever on Mon Sep 16 23:31:59 EDT 2002

/usr/local/fcheck/fcheck (checks for changes to specified files & directories) It uses MD5 checksums. It also stores a copy of the original checksums on a CD-ROM disk. You can always run a diff from the original CD and what is currently installed. The daily script does store a copy of the original on the server. Sample output:

/usr/local/fcheck/fcheck.cfg

PROGRESS: validating integrity of Files
STATUS: No changes on "videosever" to: /usr/local/data/sol.dbf
passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /tmp
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /
STATUS:No changes on "videosever" to: /
passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /etc/banners.deny/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /etc/config/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /etc/default/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /etc/init.d/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /etc/net/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /etc/rc0.d/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /etc/rc2.d/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /etc/tt/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /bin
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt/MD5/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt/MIPSPRO/

STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt/john-1.6/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt/fcheck/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt/gzip-1.2.4/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt/logdaemon-5.6/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt/modulefiles/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /opt/modules/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /lib/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /sbin/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/Cadmin/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/CaseVision/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/CosmoPlayer/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/Imgctl/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/Motif-1.2/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/Motif-2.1/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/NetVis/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/SVP/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/SpeedShop/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/ToolTalk/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/WebFace/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/WorkShop/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/WorkShopMPF/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/adobe/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/bin/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/bsd/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/cpu/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/custlink/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/diags/

STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/disktest/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/etc/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/freeware/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/gfx/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/include/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/info/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/java/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/lib/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/lib32/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/lib64/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/local/
STATUS:
 WARNING: ["videosever"] /usr/local/data/fcheck.dbf
 [Sizes: 2113536 - 5111717, Times: Sep 19 00:26 2002 - Sep 19 00:41 2002]
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/nds/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/ns-home/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/pcp/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/people/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/relnotes/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/sbin/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/sgitcl/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/share/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/sitemgr/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/sysadm/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/var/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /usr/webdocs/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /var
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /disk2/admin
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /disk2/admin/tools/
STATUS:passed...
PROGRESS: validating integrity of /disk2/admin/scripts/

STATUS:passed...

/disk2/admin/cops_104/cops (runs daily cops report) This is an old program but still can provide some redundancy. Sample output:

ATTENTION:

Security Report for Thu Sep 19 00:12:03 EDT 2002
from host videosever

```
**** root.chk ****
**** dev.chk ****
**** is_able.chk ****
**** rc.chk ****
**** cron.chk ****
**** group.chk ****
**** home.chk ****
**** passwd.chk ****
```

Warning! Password file, line 16, invalid login directory:
posuser:x:55555:20:::/dev/null

```
**** user.chk ****
**** misc.chk ****
**** ftp.chk ****
**** pass.chk ****
**** kuang ****
**** bug.chk ****
```

/disk2/admin/tara/tiger Looks for vulnerabilities and configuration errors, it is good for finding world writeable directories. Sample output:

Security scripts *** 2.0.9 ARC, 1999.0907.2100 ***
Tue May 28 11:24:05 EDT 2002

11:24> Beginning security report for videosever (IP27 IRIX 6.5).

Performing check of passwd files...

Performing check of group files...

Performing check of user accounts...

Checking accounts from /etc/passwd.

Performing check of /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts files...

Checking accounts from /etc/passwd...

Performing check of .netrc files...

Checking accounts from /etc/passwd...

Performing check of /etc/default/login, /securetty, and /etc/ttytab...

Performing check of PATH components...

Only checking user 'root'

Performing check of anonymous FTP...

Performing checks of mail aliases...


```

# Checking aliases from /usr/lib/aliases.

# Performing check of `cron' entries...
--WARN-- CRON file `` is owned by adm.
--WARN-- CRON file `` is owned by sys.
--WARN-- CRON file `` is owned by sys.
--WARN-- CRON file `` is owned by sys.
--WARN-- CRON file `` is owned by sys.

# Performing check of 'services' and 'inetd'...
# Checking services from /etc/services.
# Checking inetd entries from /usr/etc/inetd.conf

# Performing NFS exports check...

# Performing check of system file permissions...
--WARN-- [perm001w] The owner of /var/tmp should be root (owned by sys).
--WARN-- [perm001w] /dev/vme should not have owner search.
--WARN-- [perm001w] /dev/vme should not have group read.
--WARN-- [perm001w] /dev/vme should not have group write.
--WARN-- [perm001w] /dev/vme should not have group search.
--WARN-- [perm001w] /dev/vme should not have world read.
--WARN-- [perm001w] /dev/vme should not have world search.
# Checking for known intrusion signs...

# Performing check of files in system mail spool...

# Performing system specific checks...
# Running './scripts/check_sendmail'...

# Checking sendmail...

# Checking unusual file names...

# Looking for unusual device files...

# Checking symbolic links...
/dev/vme must keep the permission of 755 for Mediabase to function correctly.

/disk2/admin/scripts/chkrootkit.sh The chkrootkit script is a freeware program that
checks for root kits. It is not executed from the daily security script, but the output
of the script is Emailed to root via the daily security script. chkrootkit.sh is started
daily from cron. Sample output:
ROOTDIR is `/
Checking `amd'... not found
Checking `basename'... not infected
Checking `biff'... not found
Checking `chfn'... not infected
Checking `chsh'... not infected
Checking `cron'... not infected
Checking `date'... not infected
Checking `du'... not infected
Checking `dirname'... not infected
Checking `echo'... not infected
Checking `egrep'... not infected

```

Checking `env'... not infected
Checking `find'... not infected
Checking `fingerd'... not infected
Checking `gpm'... not found
Checking `grep'... not infected
Checking `hdparm'... not found
Checking `su'... not infected
Checking `ifconfig'... not infected
Checking `inetd'... not infected
Checking `inetdconf'... not infected
Checking `identd'... not found
Checking `killall'... not infected
Checking `ldsopreload'... not tested
Checking `ls'... not infected
Checking `lsof'... not found
Checking `mingetty'... not found
Checking `netstat'... not infected
Checking `named'... not found
Checking `passwd'... not infected
Checking `pidof'... not found
Checking `pop2'... not found
Checking `pop3'... not found
Checking `ps'... not infected
Checking `pstree'... not found
Checking `rpcinfo'... not infected
Checking `rlogind'... not infected
Checking `rshd'... not infected
Checking `slogin'... not found
Checking `sendmail'... not infected
Checking `sshd'... not infected
Checking `syslogd'... not infected
Checking `tar'... not infected
Checking `tcpd'... not infected
Checking `top'... not infected
Checking `telnetd'... not infected
Checking `timed'... not infected
Checking `traceroute'... not infected
Checking `write'... not infected
Checking `aliens'... no suspect files
Searching for sniffer's logs, it may take a while... nothing found
Searching for HiDrootkit's default dir... nothing found
Searching for t0rn's default files and dirs... nothing found
Searching for t0rn's v8 defaults... nothing found
Searching for Lion Worm default files and dirs... nothing found
Searching for RSHA's default files and dir... nothing found
Searching for RH-Sharpe's default files... nothing found
Searching for Ambient's rootkit (ark) default files and dirs... nothing found
Searching for suspicious files and dirs, it may take a while...
Searching for LPD Worm files and dirs... nothing found
Searching for Ramen Worm files and dirs... nothing found
Searching for Maniac files and dirs... nothing found
Searching for RK17 files and dirs... nothing found
Searching for Ducoci rootkit... nothing found
Searching for Adore Worm... nothing found
Searching for ShitC Worm... nothing found
Searching for Omega Worm... nothing found

```
Searching for Sadmin/IIS Worm... nothing found
Searching for MonKit... nothing found
Searching for anomalies in shell history files... nothing found
Checking `asp'... not infected
Checking `bindshell'... not infected
Checking `lkm'... not tested
Checking `rexedcs'... not found
Checking `sniffer'... not tested: can't exec ./ifpromisc
Checking `wted'... not tested: can't exec ./chkwtmp
```

The reports from each script, other than fcheck and cops, are appended to that month's total. The filename designates the script name, month, and year that the script generated the report. The log files are saved in /disk2/admin/reports/logs.videoserver.

For example:

login.fails.01.02 (contains all the reports for January 2002 of failed logins)

The fcheck file integrity checker reports are saved in /disk2/admin/reports/fcheck_report.

For example:

02.06.02 (contains the fcheck report for February 6, 2002)

The cops reports are saved in /disk2/admin/cops_104/videoserver.

For example:

2002_Jun_26 (contains the cops report for June 26, 2002)

The reports should be kept for a minimum of one year and then archived to 4mm tape.

B. Quarterly Security Check

1. Run John the Ripper. Execute the following script via cron.

```
/opt/john-1.6/run/runjohn.sh
```

The script combines the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files. The new file (Testfile) is formatted so John the Ripper can crack the encrypted passwords. A dictionary has been pre-computed to create all permutations of words and removed the duplicates. It is gzipped. We will unzip and feed it the formatted password file Testfile.

```
#!/bin/sh
# Shell script to combine the /etc/passwd and
# /etc/shadow files.
# Then run a dictionary check with rules
# against the newly created password file.
# May 9, 2002
/opt/john-1.6/run/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow >/opt/john-1.6/run/Testfile
/bin/gzcat /opt/john-1.6/run/MYDICT2.out.gz | /opt/john-1.6/run/john \
- stdin /opt/john-1.6/run/Testfile
```

2. Request a Saint scan. Contact the network security administrator. Make corrections as needed.

3. Remove the Report Files from /disk2/admin/reports directory. Tar them up, save to tape, and store them in the media library. Delete report files. These are just like log files, they grow rapidly.

```
cd /disk2/admin/reports
```

Insert a 4mm tape into the 4mm tape drive.

```
tar cvf /dev/tape *
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape rewind
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape offline
```

```
mt -t /dev/tape unload
```

pwd (Make sure you know where you are, you do not want to test your restore procedures unless you have to. However, it is a good habit to get into, to be able to perform a restore and to know your restore tapes are valid).

```
rm *
```

C. Content Approval

All training content will be submitted to the training department director. The director will review the material for suitable content and need. The software quality control group will evaluate any software to be loaded for malicious code, errors, or viruses.

The administrator will encode any video material and install it on the videosever. The administrator would also install any training software on the vidosever.

Webserver useage logs should be reviewed to monitor the useage of the applications loaded on the video server. Although logs will be continually monitored, the systems administrator will submit a quarterly report of content useage to the training department director. Content that has not been accessed in the past 6 months will be highlighted. It will be up to the department director to decide if the application is still applicable, needed, or required. The director will reply to the administrator, addressing any concerns or changes that should be made to the video server as a result of the quarterly report. The systems administrator would make the necessary changes.

D. Physical Security

If a user has physical access to the server new problems arise that the operating system cannot protect. A disk can be mounted or stolen. A tape can be used to restore data to any system. It would be easier for someone to steal the backup tapes than it would be to break into the system. After backing up the system, backup tapes should not be left out, where someone could casually walk by and pickup the tapes. A user could shutdown the server and boot to a CD-ROM assuming the PROM password is not set. Sniffers could be attached to the

system. Removing the power cord or the network cable could create a simple denial of service. To combat some of these threats, we will perform the following:

The computer room where the video server is located has a badge access card reader. The department manager and the two administrators are coded to have access to the room. The IRIX 6.5 disks and all update releases of the operating system software are cataloged and kept in the media library. To check media out of the library, the user's badge must be coded to allow access to specific classes of media. All software and backup tapes are cataloged and stored in the media library.

A Halon fire detection system is installed. Although Halon is not environmentally friendly, it is a better choice than a water based system.

An analog phone line and phone is installed incase the phone switchboard goes down in a power outage. A backup power generator is provided to the building in the event of power failure.

V. Testing the Setup of the Server

1. Try to telnet to the videosever from a Windows 98 client with an address within the intranet.

Log in to a Windows 98 client.

Open a DOS Prompt window.

```
telnet xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
```

A telnet screen opens up with nothing on it. Eventually, the attempt times out. It returns an error message saying: Could not open a connection to xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

Try to use the hostname to connect.

```
telnet videosever
```

The same thing happened.

2. Try to telnet to the videosever from a UNIX client with an address within the intranet.

Log in to a UNIX client.

Open a terminal window.

```
telnet xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
```

Telnet: unable to connect to remote host: Connection timed out

Try to use the hostname.

```
telnet videosever
```

The same thing happened.

Tried as user root to telnet to the videosever from a UNIX client with an address within the intranet.

```
/sbin/su - ( It is a good idea to use the full path to the su executable just in case someone has fooled with root's path statement, to read a trojaned su from some other directory or the current directory. )
```

entered the root password

```
telnet xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
```

```
Telnet: unable to connect to remote host: Connection timed out
```

3. Try to ftp to the videosever from a Windows 98 client with an address within the intranet.

Log in to a Windows 98 client.

Open a DOS Prompt window.

```
ftp xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
```

```
FTP: Connect: 10060
```

```
ftp>
```

It did not display any warning or ask for a username and password. I tried ls command. I received the not connected message.

```
not connected
```

```
bye
```

Try to use the hostname.

```
ftp videosever
```

The same thing happened.

4. Try to ftp to the videosever from a UNIX client with an address within the intranet.

Log in to a UNIX client.

Open a terminal window.

```
ftp xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
```

```
FTP: Connect: Connection timed out
```

On both the telnet and ftp attempts, no information was sent back to the user. Information sent back even when an error occurs can sometimes aid the attacker. Depending on the response certain systems exhibit specific behaviors in a given situation. By observing this response an attacker may be able to identify the operating system or the type of web server. With specific information in hand an attacker can look for specific vulnerabilities against the discovered operating system or web server. It appeared as if the server was down or none existed.

5. Try to ssh to the videosever from a UNIX client, other than the two allowed hosts.

Logged in to a UNIX client.

Opened a terminal window.

```
ssh videosever
```

```
connection timed out
```

```
ssh xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
```

```
connection timed out
```

6. Try to ssh to the videosever from a Windows 98 client running PuTTY other than the two allowed hosts.

Logged in to a Windows 98 client.

Double clicked on the PuTTY icon.

Selected SSH

Entered videosever in the hostname

Selected Connection

Selected Preferred Protocol 2

Selected Blowfish

Selected Load

Selected Open

Fatal Error Network Connection Timed Out.

7. Try to connect to <http://videosever/mbase> from an address outside the intranet subnet.

Logged on to a Windows XP Professional system.

Opened a browser.

Entered the address <http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/mbase>

HTTP 404 Not Found. Page Cannot be Found.

8. Try to connect to <http://videosever/mbase> from the dial in network address.

We do not want the employees or anyone else to dial into the network and connect to the video server. This address is blocked by an ACL from the Fasttrack server.

Dialed into the intranet.

Opened a browser.

Entered the address <http://videosever/mbase>

HTTP 404 Not Found. Page Cannot be Found.

This was the error that /disk2/admin/scripts/webserver.error.log.sh recorded and was included in the total daily report sent to the root user:

```
[10/Sep/2002:09:54:50] security: for host xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx trying to GET /mbase/,  
acl-state reports: access of /var/www/htdocs/mbase/index.cgi denied by ACL  
default directive 3
```

9. Try to get a directory listing of the videosever by entering <http://videosever> in the address bar of the browser from an address within the intranet. If the server is misconfigured, a listing of the files will be displayed.

Log in to a Windows 98 client.

Opened a browser.

Entered the address <http://videosever>

The page cannot be displayed.

10. Test the backup and restore procedures. Delete some files from the root disk.

Follow these steps to restore the root file system: Retrieve the xfsdump 4mm tape session label root514. (The date is just an example. Full backups and root file system backups should be performed weekly. The backups need to be current so you do not lose any data). Retrieve the latest quarterly update disks (IRIX 6.5.16 disks). Shutdown the system.

```
shutdown -y -g0
```

The PROM Menu will be displayed.

Select Install System Software

Select the local CD-ROM

Insert the IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays [1 of 4] in the CD-ROM drive.

Insert the 4mm xfsdump tape into the 4mm tape drive.

Click on Install

Miniroot is loaded

The inst menu comes up.

Enter shroot

```
xfsrestore -f /dev/tape /
```

When it completes enter exit.

type quit

y to Reboot

The system will come back up into multiuser mode. Check to see if the deleted files have been restored.

11. Test the backup and restore procedures. Delete some files from anywhere on the system. We will perform a total system restore. Retrieve the latest full backup tape or tapes. (Depending on how much data is on the system, there may be more than one backup tape). Retrieve the latest quarterly update disks (IRIX 6.5.16 disks). Shutdown the system

```
shutdown -y -g0
```

The PROM Menu will be displayed.

Select Recover System

Select the source of recovery.

Select CD-ROM

Insert the IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays [1 of 4] in the CD-ROM drive.

Insert the 4mm backup tape into the 4mm tape drive.

When the first tape is complete, it will prompt for the next tape or no to stop restoring.

On our system there is just one backup tape.

Answer no

Reboot

The system will come back up into multiuser mode. Check to see if the deleted files have been restored.

12. Contact the network security administrator. Request a Saint scan. The Saint scanner is a network based vulnerability scanner. It does more than just scan ports. It looks for vulnerabilities in services that are running on a server. The results give the administrator on what is going on, on their system. The administrator has more information to make educated decisions on how to configure the server.

Extreme care must be taken when running a vulnerability scanner. A Denial of Service can be created. The network can be slowed down. Depending on how the network is configured, traffic and ports could get shutdown. The system can lock up. It is important to get prior authorization from the Director of security to run a scan. You should notify the system administrators and network administrators of the systems and networks involved, that a scan is going to be run. You do not want to conflict with someone else's work.

The scan report should only be readable as root. If the report is printed out, do not leave them laying out where someone may pick it up or just read it.

The scan triggered many errors trying to get certain pages from the webserver. The `webserver.error.log.sh` script caught these attempts. It saved it in the report log, it saved it in the webserver error logs, and sent a report to the administrator.

The Saint scan did alert us to the Netscape Fasttrack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-1999-0744, CVE-1999-0751, CVE-1999-0752, CVE-1999-0758, CVE-1999-0853). This is a calculated risk to continue to run with a known vulnerability. The risk is minimized by firewall rules preventing addresses outside of our intranet to be dropped. Source port routing is prevented from entering our network. Outgoing connections are monitored and filtered by the network security administrators. Users must have an account on a server on the intranet. There are additional ACL rules in the Fasttrack server restricting access. Ipfiltering is being used. The plan is to upgrade to the Apache server which would eliminate the vulnerability altogether. It is important to keep up with vulnerabilities and patch systems as soon as possible.

There was a caution about snmp. There should not be any exposure here, since the snmp package was removed from the system. The ports involved with snmp have also been blocked. This is an example of analyzing the report to see if there really is a problem. It is not always black and white.

13. Try to write in `/usr`. This should not work since `/usr` is mounted ro read only. It would require root to unmount `/usr` and then mount it as rw (read write). Log in to a UNIX client as a regular user.

```
touch /usr/bin/test
touch: /usr/bin/test cannot create
```

Appendix A - Security References

1. Security Alerts

Sign up for security alerts from the following:

CERT <http://www.cert.org> Send an email to majordomo@cert.org

SGI <http://www.sgi.com> sign up for email alerts at

<http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html>

SANS Alert Consensus sans@sans.org

SANS Newsbites sans@sans.org

BUGTRAQ <http://www.securityfocus.com/>

2. Good Security Web Sites

<http://www.sans.org/>

<http://www.securityportal.com/>

<http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/coast/>

<http://www.securityfocus.com>

<http://www.nsi.org/compsec.html>

<http://www.CISecurity.org>

Appendix B - Procedures

1. Full Restore Procedure

Retrieve the latest full backup tape or tapes. (Depending on how much data is on the system, there may be more than one backup tape). Retrieve the latest quarterly update disks (IRIX 6.5.16 disks). Shutdown the system.

```
shutdown -y -g0
```

The PROM Menu will be displayed.

Select Recover System

Select the source of recovery.

Select CD-ROM

Insert the IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays [1 of 4] in the CD-ROM drive.

Insert the 4mm backup tape into the 4mm tape drive.

When the first tape is complete, it will prompt for the next tape or no to stop restoring.

On our system there is just one backup tape.

Answer no

Reboot

The system will come back up into multiuser mode. Check to see if the deleted files have been restored.

2. Restore the Root Drive

Retrieve the xfsdump 4mm tape session label root514. (The date is just an example. The backups need to be current so you do not lose any data). Retrieve the latest quarterly update disks (IRIX 6.5.16 disks). Shutdown the system.

```
shutdown -y -g0
```

The PROM Menu will be displayed.

Select Install System Software

Select the local CD-ROM

Insert the IRIX 6.5.16 Installation Tools and Overlays [1 of 4] in the CD-ROM drive.

Insert the 4mm xfsdump tape into the 4mm tape drive.

Click on Install

Miniroot is loaded

The inst menu comes up.

Enter shroot

```
xfsrestore -f /dev/tape /
```

When it completes enter exit.

type quit

y to Reboot

The system will come back up into multiuser mode. Check to see if the deleted files have been restored.

3. Content Approval

All training content will be submitted to the training department director. The director will review the material for suitable content and need.

The software quality control group will evaluate any software to be loaded for malicious code, errors, or viruses.

The administrator will encode any video material and install it on the videosever. The administrator would also install any training software on the vidosever.

Webserver usage logs should be reviewed to monitor the usage of the applications loaded on the video server. Although logs will be continually monitored, the systems administrator will submit a quarterly report of content usage to the training department director. Content that has not been accessed in the past 6 months will be highlighted. It will be up to the department director to decide if the application is still applicable, needed, or required. The director will reply to the administrator, addressing any concerns or changes that should be made to the video server as a result of the quarterly report. The systems administrator would make the necessary changes.

Appendix C - List of Security Scripts

```
1. /disk2/admin/scripts/daily.script.sh
```

```
#!/bin/sh
```

```

# This script should be run every night.
# It calls several other report programs.
# This script has been modified over the years by
# numerous admins. There names have been removed
# to protect their privacy
#
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
node=`uname -n`
date=`date`
SYSTEM_LOGS=/disk2/admin/reports
SYSTEM_SCRIPTS=/disk2/admin/scripts
cd $SYSTEM_LOGS

exec > $SYSTEM_LOGS/report.stdout
exec 2> $SYSTEM_LOGS/report.stderr

MONTH=`date "+%m"`
YEAR=`date "+%y"`
DATE_NAME=`date "+%m.%d.%y"`
MAIL_DATE=`date "+%Y_%b_%d"`
export MONTH YEAR DATE_NAME MAIL_DATE

# Run the scripts
cd $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS

/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/su.fails.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/su.success.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/logins.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/login.fails.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/find_rhosts.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/find_hostsequiv.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/find_root_sh_scripts.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/auth.log.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/webserver.error.log.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/md5binchk.sh
/bin/sh $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/dfout.sh

# run FCHECK file integrity and COPS
/usr/local/fcheck/fcheck -ars | cat >
$SYSTEM_LOGS/fcheck_report/$DATE_NAME
/disk2/admin/cops_104/cops -v

# Put all the reports into one big report

cd $SYSTEM_LOGS

```

```

cat $$SYSTEM_LOGS/su.fail.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/su.success.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/logins.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/login.fail.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/find_hostsequiv.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/find_rhosts.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/find_root_sh_scripts.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/auth.log.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/webserver.errors.report.$node \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/md5binchk.report.$node.out1 \
  $$SYSTEM_LOGS/$node.dfout
    > $$SYSTEM_LOGS/logs.$node/total.report.$node

# mail total report to root account
cat $$SYSTEM_LOGS/logs.$node/total.report.$node | /usr/bin/mail -s "Daily
security report for $node on $date" root@videosever.trainingcompany.com

cat $$SYSTEM_LOGS/fcheck_report/$DATE_NAME | /usr/bin/mail -s "DAILY
FCHECK REPORT for $node on $date" root@videosever.trainingcompany.com

cat $$SYSTEM_LOGS/chkrootkit.report.$node/$DATE_NAME | /usr/bin/mail -s
"DAILY Check Root Kit Report for $node on $date"
root@videosever.trainingcompany.com

cat /disk2/admin/cops_104/videosever/$MAIL_DATE | /usr/bin/mail -s "DAILY
COPS REPORT for $node on $date" root@videosever.trainingcompany.com

/usr/local/fcheck/fcheck -cas
/bin/sh $$SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/newlogs.sh
exit 0

```

2. /disk2/admin/scripts/su.fail.sh

```
#!/bin/sh
```

```

# Authors have been removed for privacy reasons.
date=`date`
name=`uname -n`
md=`date +%m/%d`
my=`date +%m.%y`
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports

exec > $$SYSTEM_REPORTS/su.fail.report.$name
echo "          "
echo "-----"
echo "Begin report for failed su attempts for $name on $date"
echo "          "

```

```
cat /usr/adm/sulog | grep $md | grep " - "  
echo "  
echo "End report for failed su attempts for $name on $date"  
echo "-----"  
echo "
```

```
# Keep a running log of this report
```

```
cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/su.fail.report.$name >>  
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$name/su.fail.$my
```

```
exit 0
```

3. /disk2/admin/scripts/su.success.sh

```
#!/bin/sh
```

```
# Authors removed for privacy reasons.  
#
```

```
name=`uname -n`  
date=`date`  
md=`date +%m/%d`  
my=`date +%m.%y`  
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports
```

```
exec > $SYSTEM_REPORTS/su.success.report.$name  
echo "  
echo "-----"  
echo "Begin report for successful su attempts on $name for $date "  
echo "  
cat /usr/adm/sulog | grep $md | grep " + "  
echo "  
echo "End report for successful su attempts on $name for $date"  
echo "-----"  
echo "  
# Keep a running log of this report  
cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/su.success.report.$name >>  
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$name/su.success.$my
```

```
exit 0
```

4. /disk2/admin/scripts/logins.sh

```
#!/bin/sh -v
```

```
# logins.sh
```

```

# Authors removed for privacy reasons.
#
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/etc
ECHO=/bin/echo
DATE=`date`
REPDATE=`date`
node=`uname -n`
my=`date +%m.%y`
echo $my
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports

exec > $SYSTEM_REPORTS/logins.report.$node
exec 2> $SYSTEM_REPORTS/logins.errors.$node

$ECHO ""
$ECHO "-----"
$ECHO "Begin report of valid logins for $node on $DATE\n"

search=`echo "$DATE" | cut -c1-10`
/usr/bsd/last | grep "$search"

case "$?" in
  1) $ECHO "No valid logins to report";;
  2) $ECHO "Error with grep command in logins.sh";;
  *) ;;
esac

$ECHO "\nEnd report of valid logins for $node on $DATE"
$ECHO "-----"

# Keep a running log of this report

cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/logins.report.$node >>
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$node/logins.$my

exit 0

5. /disk2/admin/scripts/login.fails.sh
#!/bin/sh

# login.fails.sh
# Authors removed for privacy reasons.

DATE=`date`
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
ECHO=/bin/echo

```

```

node=`uname -n`
my=`date +%m.%y`
echo $my
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports

exec > $SYSTEM_REPORTS/login.fails.report.$node
$ECHO ""
$ECHO "-----"
$ECHO "Begin report of failed login attempts (5 conseq) for $node on $DATE\n"
cat /usr/adm/loginlog

# reset loginlog
cp /dev/null /usr/adm/loginlog

case "$?" in
  1) $ECHO "No failed attempts to report";;
  2) $ECHO "Error with cat command in login.fails.sh";;
  *) ;;
esac

$ECHO "\nEnd report of failed login attempts for $node on $DATE"
$ECHO "-----"
# Keep a running log of this report
cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/login.fails.report.$node >>
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$node/login.fails.$my

exit 0

```

6. /disk2/admin/scripts/find_rhosts.sh

```

#!/bin/sh
# Script to find and report any *.rhosts files
# Authors removed for privacy reasons.
#
rm /.rhosts
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/etc
ECHO=/bin/echo
DATE=`date`
REPDATE=`date`
node=`uname -n`
my=`date +%m.%y`
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports

exec > $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_rhosts.report.$node
exec 2> $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_rhosts.report.$node

$ECHO ""

```



```

$ECHO "-----"
$ECHO "Begin report of find_rhosts for $node on $DATE\n"

find / -name "*.rhosts" -print -exec rm {} \;

$ECHO "\nEnd report of find_rhosts for $node on $DATE"
$ECHO "-----"

# Keep a running log of this report

cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_rhosts.report.$node >>
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$node/find_rhosts.$my

exit 0

```

7. /disk2/admin/scripts/find_hostsequiv.sh

```

#!/bin/sh
# Script to find /etc/hosts.equiv and remove it.
# Authors removed for privacy reasons.
#
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/etc
ECHO=/bin/echo
DATE=`date`
REPDATE=`date`
node=`uname -n`
my=`date +%m.%y`
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports

exec > $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_hostsequiv.report.$node
exec 2> $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_hostsequiv.report.$node

$ECHO ""
$ECHO "-----"
$ECHO "Begin report of /etc/hosts.equiv for $node on $DATE\n"

find /etc -name "hosts.equiv" -print -exec rm {} \;

$ECHO "\nEnd report of /etc/hosts.equiv for $node on $DATE"
$ECHO "-----"

# Keep a running log of this report

cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_hostsequiv.report.$node >>
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$node/find_hostsequiv.$my

exit 0

```

8. /disk2/admin/scripts/find_root_sh_scripts.sh

```
#!/bin/sh
# Script to find and report any setuid root shell scripts
# This script is called by /disk2/admin/scripts/daily.scripts.sh
# Authors removed for privacy reasons.
#
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/etc
ECHO=/bin/echo
DATE=`date`
REPDATE=`date`
node=`uname -n`
my=`date +%m.%y`
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports

exec > $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_root_sh_scripts.report.$node
exec 2> $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_root_sh_scripts.report.$node

$ECHO ""
$ECHO "-----"
$ECHO "Begin report of find_root_sh_scripts for $node on $DATE\n"

find / -user root -perm 4000 -print

$ECHO "\nEnd report of find_root_sh_scripts for $node on $DATE"
$ECHO "-----"

# Keep a running log of this report

cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/find_root_sh_scripts.report.$node >>
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$node/find_root_sh_scripts.$my

exit 0
```

9. /disk2/admin/scripts/auth.log.sh

```
#!/bin/sh

# Authors removed for privacy reasons.
# Called by /disk2/admin/scripts/daily.scripts.sh
# Checks /var/adm/auth.log for that days activity.

name=`uname -n`
date=`date`
md=`date +%m/%d`
my=`date +%m.%y`
#month_day_date=""date +%b\ &d`"
```

```

SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports

exec > $$SYSTEM_REPORTS/auth.log.report.$name
echo "
echo "-----"
echo "Begin report for auth.log on $name for $date "
echo "
cat /var/adm/auth.log | grep "`date +%b\ %d`"
echo "
echo "End report for auth.log on $name for $date"
echo "-----"
echo "
# Keep a running log of this report
cat $$SYSTEM_REPORTS/auth.log.report.$name >>
$$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$name/auth.log.$my

exit 0

```

10. /disk2/admin/scripts/webserver.error.log.sh

```
#!/bin/sh
```

```

# Webserver error log
# It should be executed by the /disk2/admin/scripts/daily.scripts.sh
# program.

```

```
# Authors removed for privacy reasons.
```

```

DATE=`date`
SEARCH_DATE=`date +%d/%h/%Y`
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
ECHO=/bin/echo
node=`uname -n`
my=`date +%m.%y`
echo $my
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports

```

```

exec > $$SYSTEM_REPORTS/webserver.errors.report.$node
$ECHO ""
$ECHO "-----"
$ECHO "Begin report of Webserver Errors for $node on $DATE\n"
/usr/bin/cat /var/netscape/fasttrack/httpd-videoserver/logs/errors | grep
"$SEARCH_DATE"

```

```
/usr/bin/cat $$SYSTEM_REPORTS/webserver.errors.report.$node
```

```
$ECHO "\nEnd report of Webserver Errors $node on $DATE"
```

```

$ECHO "-----"

# Keep a running log of this report

/usr/bin/cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/webserver.errors.report.$node >>
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$node/webserver.errors.$my

exit 0

11. /disk2/admin/scripts/md5binchk.sh
#!/bin/sh -v

# md5binchk.sh
# Calls md5binchk.pl which checks for changes to /usr/bin directory.
# It creates checksums for selected files. It compares yesterday's
# and today's. The original is stored offline.
# Authors removed for privacy reasons.
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/etc
ECHO=/bin/echo
DATE=`date`
REPDATE=`date`
node=`uname -n`
my=`date +%m.%y`
echo $my
SYSTEM_REPORTS=/disk2/admin/reports
SYSTEM_SCRIPTS=/disk2/admin/scripts

exec > $SYSTEM_REPORTS/md5binchk.report.$node.out1

$ECHO ""
$ECHO "-----"
$ECHO "Begin report of MD5 Checksum Check for $node on $DATE\n"
/usr/bin/perl $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/md5chk.pl
/usr/bin/cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/md5binchk.report.videoserver.out

$ECHO "\nEnd report of MD5 Checksums for $node on $DATE"
$ECHO "-----"

# Keep a running log of this report

cat $SYSTEM_REPORTS/md5binchk.report.$node.out1 >>
$SYSTEM_REPORTS/logs.$node/md5binchk.$my

exit 0

12. /disk2/admin/scripts/md5chk.pl

```

```
#!/usr/bin/perl
rename ("/disk2/admin/reports/md5binchk.report.videoserver",
"/disk2/admin/reports/md5binchk.report.videoserver.old");
@files = ("/usr/bin/chgrp", "/usr/bin/chmod", "/usr/bin/chown", "/usr/bin/cp",
"/usr/bin/csh", "/usr/bin/dd", "/usr/bin/df", "/usr/bin/diff", "/usr/bin/du",
"/usr/bin/find", "/usr/bin/ls", "/usr/bin/mv", "/usr/bin/nm", "/usr/bin/ps", "/usr/bin/rm",
"/usr/bin/script", "/usr/bin/sh", "/usr/bin/su", "/usr/bin/tar", "/usr/bin/who");
foreach $f (@files) {
`/usr/bin/md5sum $f | cat >> /disk2/admin/reports/md5binchk.report.videoserver`;
}
`/usr/bin/diff /disk2/admin/reports/md5binchk.report.videoserver
/disk2/admin/reports/md5binchk.report.videoserver.old | cat >
/disk2/admin/reports/md5binchk.report.videoserver.out`;
```

13. /disk2/admin/scripts/dfout.sh

```
#!/bin/sh
# Purpose: This script lists all files structures on videoserver
# This script is called by /disk2/admin/scripts/daily.scripts.sh
# Who Should receive a copy = group
```

```
group="root"
SYSTEM_LOGS=/disk2/admin/reports
SYSTEM_SCRIPTS=/disk2/admin/scripts
NODE=`uname -n`
exec > $SYSTEM_LOGS/$NODE.dfout
echo ""
echo ""
echo "-----"
echo " ##### "
echo " FILE STRUCTURES ON `hostname` "
echo " ##### "
echo ""
echo ""
# (1) ** df will list all file strucures **
df -k
echo ""
echo ""
echo " ##### "
echo " END OF REPORT "
echo "-----"
echo ""
echo ""
```

14. /disk2/admin/scripts/chkrootkit.sh

The chkrootkit script is a freeware program that checks for root kits. This is run as part of the daily security script. The package can be downloaded from: <http://www.chkrootkit.org/>

The following shell script takes the output from the chkrootkit program, formats, and stores the results in a file. Tdaily security script adds the output to the Email to root.

```
chkrootkit.sh
#!/bin/sh
node=`uname -n`
date=`date`
SYSTEM_LOGS=/disk2/admin/reports
SYSTEM_SCRIPTS=/disk2/admin/scripts
cd $SYSTEM_LOGS

exec > $SYSTEM_LOGS/report.stdout
exec 2> $SYSTEM_LOGS/report.stderr

MONTH=`date "+%m"`
YEAR=`date "+%y"`
DATE_NAME=`date "+%m.%d.%y"`
MAIL_DATE=`date "+%Y_%b_%e"`
export MONTH YEAR DATE_NAME MAIL_DATE

cd $SYSTEM_SCRIPTS
$SYSTEM_SCRIPTS/chkrootkit-0.35/chkrootkit | cat >
$SYSTEM_LOGS/chkrootkit.report.$node/$DATE_NAME
exit 0
```

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