

# **Global Information Assurance Certification Paper**

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## Network Security Assessment Performed for Singing Beagle Productions By Melete Security Association

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#### **Executive Summary:**

At the request of the customer, Singing Beagle Productions ("SB" or "the customer" hereafter), an internal audit was conducted of a single server, identified by the customer as their single most critical information asset and single greatest point of exposure to external network traffic. This was done as a proof-of-concept audit, meant to determine whether further auditing of corporate resources would be required.

The host known as "kumo.singingbeagle.org" (172.16.2.1) was examined thoroughly by a security engineer, Joseph Purvis, on 17 through 20 November, 2000. Thorough network scans and assessments were performed from the same network segment as the host (to assess actual security), and scans were performed through the firewall to assess the security of the firewall protection. The engineer also performed a hostbased assessment to examine the operating system's configuration and overall security, and conducted interviews with key systems administration personnel to assess policies and procedures governing the day-to-day administration of the host.

When initially installed, some steps appear to have been taken to secure the host for public access, however such steps were insufficient even at the time; since no little to no ongoing maintenance has been provided for the host since then, the once "not-quite-secure" configuration has slipped entirely to a dangerously insecure configuration. Although the risk of compromise is mitigated by the firewalling and network address translation provided, the services available through the firewall would provide a determined attacker with a basic toolkit sufficient toeholds to compromise the server and gain access to the internal network.

In the short term, therefore, it is the recommendation of the engineer and Melete that the host be replaced as soon as possible; preferably, the host should be immediately decommissioned and rebuilt from scratch or replaced with a different server which has been thoroughly hardened by trained professionals. If the host cannot be decommissioned due to the criticality of applications running on it, a replacement host should be built as soon as possible, and the current host should be secured as best as time and resources will allow.

In the longer term, while the security knowledge of staff is deemed more than sufficient in general, Unix-specific security training should be provided for any staff responsible for maintaining the host. In addition, the development of clear policies and procedures for providing maintenance, upgrades, and monitoring of the host must be developed as soon as possible, and staff members must be given clear-cut lists of tasks and responsibilities to guarantee that necessary maintenance is performed in a timely and accurate manner. A set of configuration and deployment guidelines, written with security as a foremost goal, must be developed as soon as possible to govern the deployment of future hosts: some good guides for getting started with this are provided in Appendix A.

As for the possibility of further auditing, the engineer and Melete certainly would recommend it, whether conducted internally by the customer or by Melete. The problems uncovered here are sufficient to warrant investigation of the entire enterprise to examine larger issues of policy and procedure as well as examining other hosts: many issues of policy have not been focused on as significantly here because the scope of the investigation was directed solely at a single host.

The rest of this document will provide a more in-depth discussion of each of these points, including tools and methods used to gather data; an analysis of the vulnerabilities discovered, organized by category and priority/risk level; conclusions drawn from the data received, and specific recommendations for improving the security of the system, including a rough costs estimate for implementing such recommendations.

#### **Detailed Findings and Analysis**

<u>Background:</u> With the recent shift in internal staffing and a significant turnover of staff to a competitor, the management team at Singing Beagle Productions requested Melete Security Association to conduct an audit to define the company's current information security posture, and determine whether it required shoring up in any areas.

In order to determine initial areas requiring further focus, a single server was identified for a "proof of concept" audit: the server "kumo.singingbeagle.org" (172.16.2.1) was identified as the company's single greatest information security asset and the single point of greatest exposure to external network traffic on the company's network.

The host chosen, a Sun Ultra/1 running Solaris version 2.6, serves as the primary webserver for the company, including a support center for tracking trouble tickets regarding the company's products, an information distribution center for releasing new information about company products, and an FTP server to offer patches and upgrades for products sold and resold by the firm. The server sits on a DMZ (172.16.2.0 / 24) with several other corporate servers, including the company email server and an internal webserver; connectivity to the outside world is offered through a Check Point firewall in front of the network, performing Network Address Translation (NAT) to statically-defined external addresses. This means that customers connecting to the webserver do so through the firewall, but talk directly to the webserver: only the source and destination addresses of packets are altered in the course of a network transaction--no content is changed or scanned.

The following diagram is offered to illustrate the placement of the host assessed relative to the network on which it is installed.



<u>Conventions:</u> Within this document, a number of typographical conventions have been employed to ensure differentiation of instructions and clarity of meaning. Instructions provided in regular-weight monospaced font are commands to be performed on a Unix host, or listings of files on a Unix host; in large blocks or scripts such instructions will be interspersed with annotations from the engineer, provided in *italic monospaced font*.

In addition, to ensure the safety of the Singing Beagle Productions network and the hosts mentioned herein, certain steps have been taken to sanitize the data presented. In particular, certain network numbers have been replaced: while the internal network (172.16.2.0 / 24) remains the same, the initial three octets of external network addresses have been edited as if the host actually were on the 192.168.X.X network. Thus, a host which might actually possess the address 1.2.3.4 would be noted herein as 192.168.3.4. In addition, usernames and GECOS entries have been replaced with sanitized values to protect the identity of users, although the UIDs and GIDs have not been cleaned, to allow the customer to back trace information presented to the actual files resident on the hosts in question.

Endnotes have been employed throughout, and can be found before the appendices at the end of the document; any questions regarding the information offered herein or the presentation thereof may be referred by email to <a href="mailto:auditor@melete.org">auditor@melete.org</a> .

## Auditing Methodology:

## I. General Methodology

Inspection of the host was conducted in three phases. Phase one consisted of network port sweeps and vulnerability scans, performed using a variety of publiclyavailable tools to assess which network services were running on the host, how much information could be gained from those services, and what vulnerabilities the daemons themselves or the services they offer might present to the host. This portion of the assessment was carried out from a laptop installed on the same network segment as the target host, in order to examine the security of the host itself. A scan of the host through the firewall, performed from the external network segment, was also conducted, to assess what services the firewall would allow through to the host.

The second phase of the assessment was host-based: the engineer was granted an unprivileged account and the root password to the host, which he used to login to the host from the internal network segment. Once logged in, the engineer accessed the root account and performed a thorough assessment of the host's configuration, including operating system version and patch level, daemons running and their configuration, and a limited assessment of the webserver running on the host. This was done both to examine the general security of the host's configuration and to verify that the host's setup matched its profile on the network: no ports were open from the network that did not appear open from the host, configuration files matched the actual behavior of the daemons they governed and so forth, as disjuncts between the two profiles might present evidence that a system compromise had occurred.

Finally, once the inspections of the host itself had concluded, the engineer conducted an inspection of the host's environment, including network layout, physical security measures, and interviews with systems administration personnel responsible for the server, to examine policies and procedures.

## II. Tools Employed

a. Phase One: Network Security

Tools employed during this phase were publicly-available, open-source security scanners run from a Linux platform. A list of websites for downloading and obtaining more information about these tools is provided in Appendix B.

i. Nmap: nmap is a port scanner, used for obtaining a list of open ports on a target system. Scans performed obtained complete lists of open TCP and UDP ports (i.e. covering the complete range of port numbers from 1 to 65535), and connected to the RPC portmapper server and Ident daemon on the host to gather additional information about any open ports discovered. Additional plugins were utilized which obtained banners<sup>1</sup> from well-known services, reporting the banners for FTP, HTTP, SMTP, SSH and SunRPC services. In addition to standard full-connect TCP scanning (completing the SYN-SYN/ACK-ACK handshake and then tearing down the connection with FIN packets), a "half-open" TCP scan was performed (sending a SYN, receiving a SYN/ACK on an open port, and tearing down the connection immediately with a RST), both to ensure that the lists of open ports were the same and for later correlation against system logs to examine how much activity was successfully logged.

- ii. Nessus: To quote the website of the Nessus project, "The 'Nessus' Project aims to provide to the internet community a free, powerful, up-to-date and easy to use remote security scanner." Utilizing a built-in database of several hundred (543 at last count) known vulnerabilities, it performs a series of scans and attacks against the target host to see which attacks succeed, producing at the end a report of attacks to which the host is vulnerable. Since the target host is a production server identified as a critical asset, the most dangerous attacks, designed to verify the vulnerability of the host to a variety of denial of service attacks, were disabled to prevent loss of service.
- iii. SAINT: Like Nessus, SAINT (System Administrator's Integrated Network Tool, according to its creators) is a network-based vulnerability scanner, descended from the popular SATAN network scanning tool. Although its database of known vulnerabilities is smaller than that of Nessus, it is broader, and covers specific, high-risk vulnerabilities (such as the SANS "Top Ten Internet Security Vulnerabilities") that can pose grave risk to a host. In addition, the reports generated by SAINT can be easier to comprehend, and the practice of running multiple vulnerability scanners can serve as a cross-check for vulnerabilities identified, as well as providing additional sources of information.
- iv. Whisker and Malice: Since the customer identified the server in question as offering web services as part of its function, a pair of webserver vulnerability scanners were utilized to check for obvious risks. Whisker, written by rain forest puppy [sic], is a Perl-based scanner that employs a database of known webserver holes to scan a host, focusing on CGI vulnerabilities, and offers command-line switches to avoid Intrusion Detection Systems<sup>ii</sup>; Malice, authored by Natas, is similarly Perl-based but utilizes a larger database of both CGI and webserver configuration vulnerabilities.
- b. Phase Two: Host Security

Assessing the security of a host from the "inside" (i.e. by directly logging in to it) poses a significant challenge to the responsible assessor. In order to obtain a clear picture of the operating environment of the host, the auditor must treat the host like a crime scene and disturb it as little as possible while observing and examining it: changes to the host will make it difficult to impossible to clearly define the state of the host's security, since it will be unclear what effect the auditor's changes have made to the host. Any changes which are made to the host's environment (and some, such as log entries, are inevitable), must be carefully noted, for liability's sake, if nothing else. Proceeding with that in mind, all login sessions on the host were performed utilizing the "script" program, which spawns a subshell and logs all data printed to the screen during that shell session to a text file. This meant that any commands issued by the auditor could be allowed to print their output directly to the screen instead of being redirected to a file to be pushed back to the auditor's machine later, following the same principle of creating as little new data on the host as possible. In addition, the tools and programs used in this phase of the assessment were only those which existed on the host prior to examination: no new data was transferred to the host during the assessment. The list of commands below is truncated to include the most significant commands issued: a complete log of all sessions on the host can be found in Appendix C, "Raw Data".

- i. 'ps -elf': Lists all running processes on the host
- ii. 'uname -a': Prints the OS version and physical architecture of the machine
- iii. 'eeprom security-mode': Reports the current settings for the passwordprotection feature of the Sparc hardware PROM.
- iv. 'last': Prints a list of all the users who logged into the machine through remote login utilities such as ssh, telnet or rsh, on the physical console or through ftp
- v. 'netstat -a': Reports the list of network ports in "listening" state (i.e. a daemon has bound to that port to offer a network service) and the list of established network connections, including TCP and UDP connections as well as local Unix domain sockets.
- vi. 'rpcinfo -p': Lists information about RPC (Remote Procedure Call) daemons running and the ports to which they are bound.
- vii. 'showrev -a': Prints out basic information about the host, including OS version, architecture version, and a list of patched to the OS installed, if any.
- viii. 'dmesg': Prints the list of output produced by the system's last boot; performed principally to look for reported errors or misconfigurations.
- ix. 'pkginfo': Prints out the list of software packages installed using Solaris' built-in software package system. This would not catch any software installed by hand-compiling it, such as the Apache webserver, but would catch software such as Check Point's firewall software, or the OpenWindows suite of graphical interface software.
- x. A large number of files were opened and their contents printed using the 'cat' utility; these included a significant portion of the boot scripts and configuration files in /etc, as well as various other configuration and log files scattered throughout the filesystem.
- c. Phase III: Environmental and Systemic Inspection

The "tools" used for this portion of the assessment were far more abstract. An inspection of the server room in which the host resides was carried out, followed by interviews with the administrators identified by the customer as responsible for the upkeep on the server. Although legal constraints prevent the inclusion of a verbatim transcript of these interviews, the list below should serve as a guide to what was inspected; a checklist, completed by the auditor during the interview, provides the data examined for each point.

- i. Physical Security:
- 1. Does the server reside in a server room with a generally clean (uncluttered, organized) and stable, climate-controlled environment, with temperature and humidity kept at constant, controlled levels?
- 2. Is access to the server room limited to a known number of people, and controlled through the use of a cipher-lock or badge reader at all access points?
- 3. Is there a computer-safe fire suppression system in place such as Halon-2 or similar systems?
- 4. Is the server stored securely in a rack and not stacked on a shelf underneath other units?
- 5. Is the server's CPU kept in a locked cabinet to control access to removable media drives?
  - ii. Systems Administrators: What is the overall level of Unix knowledge among those responsible for the administration of the server? What is their level of security knowledge? What are their specific responsibilities with regards to the host, and are those personally-developed or handed to them from company policy and standard procedure?
- iii. Host Knowledge: Are the administrators able to list the services which should be/are running on the box without logging in to look? Is there a document stating the host's function made available and kept up to date? Is there an installation and configuration history document kept by the systems administrators to record changes to the host? What is the administrator's general impression of the security level and overall configuration of the host?

## Analysis of Vulnerability:

- I. <u>Operating System Vulnerabilities</u>
  - a. Unnecessary Software Installed: When building and installing a host which will act as a server, it is important to define the list of functions that host will perform, and then install only the software required to perform those functions. Installing additional software only offers attackers greater opportunity for mischief, and leads to greater administrative workload trying to keep all software on the server patched up to date, as the list of things to patch is proportionally longer. The simplest solution is to start from the basic set of packages, defined as the "Core Utilities", and install other packages on top of that as they are needed (some packages can and should be removed from Core Utilities as well on servers requiring higher levels of security, such as firewalls).

The list of packages installed on Kumo is extensive, and includes a number of software packages which are unnecessary. If the host is to stay in service as it is for any length of time, Melete would strongly recommend the removal of the following groups of packages post-haste if they are not performing integral functions on the server:

[It is important to note that this is only a partial list, which includes many packages with known vulnerabilities. The customer is strongly urged to review the list of packages installed manually (using the "pkginfo" command) and uninstall any which do not meet the list of approved functions for the server. An entry followed by an asterisk (\*) denotes a group of packages which match that expression.]

NSCPNav (Netscape Navigator)	SUNWdt* (CDE packages)
SUNWeu* (European locales for	SUNWi*of and SUNWi*rf (X11
CDE)	fonts)
SUNWjv* (Java packages)	SUNWol* (OpenLook packages)
SUNWpcelx, SUNWpcm*,	SUNWplow* (OpenWindows
SUNWpcser (PCMCIA drivers)	Locales)
SUNWpm* (Power Management)	SUNWtltk* (ToolTalk)
SUNWxw* (X-Windows packages)	SUNWypr and SUNWypu (NIS
	packages)

b. Operating System Version: Although running the very latest version of an operating system can pose as many or more problems as a well-supported, slightly older revision, it is important to develop a policy for reviewing new releases and gradually moving older servers up to them or replacing them with units running newer versions. Newer versions of an OS can provide new security and auditing tools, fixes for problems in previous releases, and so forth; Melete recommends in general that customers stay no more than one major revision behind their software vendor, to avoid being caught by end-of-lifecycle problems and forced into premature upgrades.

While Solaris 2.6 continues to be supported by Sun, two major revisions of Solaris (7 and 8) have since been released and are in production in many facilities. Kumo continues to run version 2.6, and given the nonexistent list of patches installed (cf. "Security Patches" section below), is likely running an early version as well. The customer is strongly encouraged either to look at replacing Kumo with a new server running a fully-patched version of Solaris 7 or to schedule a time to upgrade Kumo at least to version 7; in addition, steps should be taken to begin reviewing Solaris 8 to see if it will meet the customer's needs, and testing it in a lab to make sure it will function as the customer requires.

- II. Configuration Vulnerabilities
  - a. <u>Sparc PROM Access Control:</u> The Sparc platform for Solaris offers a command-line interactive PROM, used to configure hardware and select boot devices. The PROM offers three security levels, 'full', in which a password is required to be typed on the console in order to boot, reboot or reconfigure the machine through the PROM; 'command', in which the system will boot and reboot without prompting for the password, but will require the password for booting off of alternate media or using the

interactive PROM environment; and 'none', in which no password is required for any action. 'Command' mode is the recommended setting, which allows hosts to reboot unattended in emergencies, but keeps an attacker with console access from booting the system off of alternate media.

Currently, the PROM security mode is set to 'none', which means a determined attacker can boot the system off of alternate media, alter hardware settings and boot devices, and even render the host useless by changing the PROM password to an unknown setting and rebooting the machine. Since the PROM password and security mode can be set while the machine is booted (using the 'eeprom' command), this poses a significant risk to the system. The customer is urged to determine a PROM password for the system, set the password and security-mode, and consider disabling the 'eeprom' command on the host by removing or altering the permissions on it.

b. <u>ToolTalk Database Server (rpc.ttdbserver)</u>: The ToolTalk database server, activated by default on Solaris, contains a known buffer overflow for which exploits have been widely distributed. On any secure system, it is generally an unwise idea to run any sort of RPC service at all; this service should be patched regardless, and either deactivated or very carefully monitored and firewalled.

This service was found running on Kumo, and has a widely-known and recently-publicized exploit. The customer is strongly urged to apply the latest patch cluster for Solaris, or, if a single fix is needed, to apply the appropriate Sun patch to fix the exploit (105802), available from <a href="http://sunsolve.sun.com">http://sunsolve.sun.com</a>. To disable the service entirely, edit the <a href="http://sunsolve.sun.com">/etc/inetd.conf</a> file, and insert a # at the beginning of the line which begins "100083/1 tli rpc/tcp", then restart the inetd server by obtaining its PID ("ps -elf | grep inetd") and issuing a "kill - HUP <PID>" as root.

c. <u>Direct Root Login</u>: Many Unix systems offer the ability for users to login to the system directly as root from the network. Although Solaris does not offer this feature by default, it can be activated; Melete strongly recommends that it be left deactivated, and that users be actively prevented from logging in over the network, being forced instead to login as an unprivileged user and use a utility such as the built-in 'su' program to access the root account. Allowing direct root logins over the network allows an attacker a single point on which to concentrate her efforts: she need only break or guess the password for the root account, and she has gained access to the system, without needing to guess the username or the password of any unprivileged accounts. From a practical standpoint as well, forcing users to login with their own account first lends a measure of change control and auditing to the system, since any disastrous change can likely be back-traced to the user who executed 'su' last, simply by

reading the system logs.

Although Kumo has been configured not to allow direct root logins over ssh, root is still allowed to connect to the system through ftp, which would enable an attacker with the root password to alter files on the system, upload new files, and so forth. The customer is strongly urged to create an /etc/ftpusers file: any account names placed in this file will be prevented from logging in via FTP. It should contain "root", plus the names of any disabled or non-interactive accounts on the system, such as bin, dev, lp, and so forth.

d. <u>TCP Wrappers:</u> The TCP Wrappers package, authored by Wietse Venema, provides an additional layer of auditing and sanity checking for software such as telnet or ftp (TCP-based connection software). It offers granular access controls by IP address, and significant audit trails of what IPs connected to a server when and with what service, offering systems administrators a greater degree of security, especially when running services such as a public FTP server. This software is not installed by default on Solaris, but must be compiled on a secure system and distributed to servers, which must then have the /etc/inetd.conf file modified to use it.

This package was not installed on Kumo, and definitely should be. Without it, administrators have no way to block out known wrongdoers, and a significantly reduced degree of auditing of FTP and login sessions. To install, download the software (URL is given in Appendix B) to a secure, non-production server, and compile it. Copy the resulting binaries to the production server, and then edit the /etc/inet/inetd.conf file to use the new "tcpd" server instead of any services, so a line that originally read ftp stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/in.ftpd in.ftpd

```
-1 -a
```

would now read

```
ftp stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/tcpd in.ftpd -l
-a
```

e. <u>Logging of Failed Logins</u>: Although by default, Solaris' syslog configuration will log failed logins, the log to which it should write this information (/var/adm/loginlog) is not created by default, and so it will throw away information about failed logins with creating an audit trail. Creating such an audit trail is an integral part of a responsible system security policy, since without it, an attacker can attempt to break logins and passwords by brute-force without the systems administrators being aware of his activities.

The necessary logfile for auditing failed logins on Solaris did not exist on Kumo, and the customer is strongly advised to create it and set it up in the log rotation scheme as soon as possible. To create the file, execute the following commands as root:

/bin/touch /var/adm/loginlog

#### /bin/chown root:sys /var/adm/loginlog /bin/chmod 0600 /var/adm/loginlog

f. Log Review: The most valuable tool an administrator has in keeping her system secure is the system logs, which inform her of what connections were made, which users logged in, and so forth. It is vital to the security of a server that these logs be reviewed by hand periodically to search for anomalies; there is a wide variety of software available such as swatch or logcheck (URLs for both are in Appendix B) which will gather up logs and help sort out information before mailing the rest to systems admins for review.

Although webserver logs from Kumo are being parsed daily by a script and mailed to administrators, the system logs are not. This means that no one is examining who logs in to the system, what FTP sessions are conducted, and so forth. The customer is strongly urged to install one of the suggested log-checking packages such as swatch or logcheck and configure it to email its output to a systems administrator daily.

g. <u>Central Log Host:</u> One of the first actions an intruder will take upon successfully breaking into a system is to erase the logs, removing traces of the attack and the intruder's actions. One of the easiest ways to prevent this is to have the syslog daemon log additional copies of system log entries to another host on the network, which has been highly secured beforehand to prevent tampering, or to a lineprinter or similar device. In the event of a log anomaly, there is now a tamper-proof copy of system logs which will aid systems administrators in identifying the intruder and cleaning up the system.

No external logging was being performed on Kumo, which would leave systems administrators with much less information to work with in the case of a security incident. The customer is strongly encouraged to deploy either a network-based centralized log host, or else configure and attach a line-printer or similar device to Kumo for storing logs, and configure syslog to copy system log entries to it as appropriate.

- III. Risks from Third-Party Software
  - a. <u>FTP Server Version</u>: Some effort appears to have been put into installing and configuring a copy of the Washington University FTP Server (wuftpd), which offers a significantly greater degree of control over FTP sessions, including locking off anonymous and guest sessions into chroot-ed jails, and automatically altering file permissions on uploaded files to prevent mischief. The version of the wu-ftpd server on Kumo, however, is version 2.4.1, which is many revisions behind the current version, 2.6.1. Versions prior to 2.6.1, in particular the 2.4.x series, contained numerous buffer overflow and string-format attacks which would give an attacker a root shell on the system or allow her to overwrite files on the disk; these attacks are well-known, and exploits to take advantage of them are widely distributed. The customer is strongly

encouraged, if further FTP service on this host serves their purpose, to upgrade the FTP server as soon as possible to the latest version, and keep track of development of the wu-ftpd server, to ensure that new versions are tested soon after they are released and installed on Kumo as soon as is practically possible.

b. <u>Apache Server Version</u>: Apache has had a generally good history from a security standpoint: a significant number of the previous releases of Apache have been issued to fix stability problems rather than actively exploitable security holes. Nonetheless, for a production webserver, stability can be as big an issue as security, and just as important (if not more so) a reason to perform regular upgrades.

The version of Apache currently running on Kumo is XXXX, which is significantly behind the current stable version, 1.3.14. Moreover, version 1.3.14 was released to fix actively-exploitable security holes in the immediately-prior release (1.3.13), to which the version on Kumo is presently vulnerable. Melete recommends that the webserver on Kumo be upgraded to the latest stable version of Apache as soon as possible, to prevent attacks being perpetrated against the server.

- c. <u>Vulnerable CGI Scripts:</u> One of the most prevalent vulnerabilities to which webservers are prone is badly coded CGI scripting, which can open enormous holes in a site's security easily, even through heavy firewalling. Although no formal code review was conducted, four separate security scanners run against Kumo produced no vulnerable CGI scripts. Melete would recommend that the customer perform an internal code audit of the CGI scripts on Kumo to ensure good programming practices have been followed.
- d. <u>SSH Server:</u> Kumo employs Secure Shell (SSH) exclusively for remote administrative access, which is a good step and much to be commended. However, there are two flaws with the current SSH setup which put the system at risk, both of which are relatively simple fixes.

First, the version of SSH running on Kumo is the "commercial" (www.ssh.com) version, rev. 1.2.21: this is significantly behind the current release, 1.2.30. Several of the intervening releases of SSH have been issued to fix known, exploitable security holes; the customer is strongly advised to upgrade to the latest version as soon as possible. Secondly, the server is currently configured to recognize and accept the use of .shosts files as an authentication method, which is significantly less secure than the use of RSA-style public/private keypairs. In the same spirit as deactivating .rhosts authentication on the host, .shosts should in a truly secure configuration be deactivated completely in favor of RSA keypairs (change the options "Rhosts Authentication" and "RhostsRSA Authentication" to "no" and "RSAAuthentication" to "yes" in the /etc/sshd\_config file).

IV. Administrative Practices

a. <u>Lack of Specific Administration</u>: At the moment, no administrator is specifically tasked with maintenance on Kumo: the task falls to a group of individuals "as they get time". This poses a significant risk, paired with the lack of specific policy surrounding Kumo. Without specific policy dictating the actions administrators are responsible for performing and who is responsible for performing them, it is simply too easy for more clearly-defined priorities to overrule the periodic maintenance and upkeep of this system.

To remedy this, a specific list of responsibilities for Kumo and the periodic dates on which they need to be performed (first of the month, once per week, &c.) must be generated. This information must then be doled out to the appropriate administrative personnel so that an individual or (preferably) an individual with several backups and cross-checks is responsible for each item on the list.

- V. Security Patches and so forth
  - a. <u>No System Patches:</u> Following the release of a version of Solaris, Sun will periodically distribute additional system patches which are meant to fix security vulnerabilities and correct program errors to improve the functionality of the system. These patches are distributed through <a href="http://sunsolve.sun.com">http://sunsolve.sun.com</a>, and are freely available to all. Especially given that many patches fix well-known security holes with widely-distributed exploits, keeping a system up to the latest patch revision level is part of the scope of any reasonable security program. This involves developing a policy that mandates keeping hosts up-to-date, and a set of procedures that dictate who is responsible for keeping track of new patches as they are released, and how those new patches will be downloaded, installed and tested on a non-production system, and then rolled out to a production environment in a timely and responsible fashion.

Kumo has no software patches installed, meaning the system was installed as is from the distribution media and put out on the network. This is highly dangerous: many of the other vulnerabilities to which Kumo is vulnerable would be solved if the appropriate patches were installed. Systems administrators should schedule downtime on Kumo as soon as possible, download the latest patch cluster for Solaris 2.6, and install it in single user mode.

- VI. Data Handling
  - a. <u>Insecure Data Handling</u>: Given the sensitivity of the data stored on system backup tapes, it is absolutely imperative that backups be made using a strong encryption system with limited key access. Many commercial backup solutions will provide this with minimal reduction in performance, and the security of the resulting backups is well worth it. Especially when performing offsite backups, or in situations where backup tapes must be stored in insecure areas (i.e. not in a locked cabinet), utilization of encryption is a vital part of an enterprise backup scheme.

Kumo's backups are currently being written out without encryption, which would allow any attacker who obtained a system backup tape to read it, giving him access to sensitive company data and opportunities for system access through cracking passwords and obtaining valid usernames. As the customer develops their backup procedures and policies, encryption of backups must be an integral part of that design.

b. <u>Insecure Media Handling</u>: In addition to encryption of data stored on backup media, it is imperative that other avenues and channels of information outflow be carefully and rigorously controlled and sanitized. Hard drives sent to manufacturers for repair, system drives and tapes reused in new machines and systems re-purposed or re-leased must all be carefully scrutinized by administrators and returned to a sterile state.

Backup tapes from Kumo are routinely used in other systems through the Singing Beagle Productions enterprise, and on two occasions, disks from Kumo have been re-purposed into other systems without being purged, following upgrades. Singing Beagle Productions is urged to develop a secure media handling policy that mandates the erasure of all media being re-purposed or re-used, and the manual sanitization of all leased or re-purposed systems coming in or out of the enterprise.

c. <u>File Integrity Checking</u>: Given the prevalence of "rootkits" which will replace system binaries and libraries with booby-trapped or trojaned copies, it is absolutely vital that a baseline file integrity check be performed with software such as Tripwire, and that regular checks of the filesystem be performed against this baseline, to ensure no system files have been tampered with.

At present, no such file integrity software is in use on Kumo; it should be a priority to implement such a system as soon as possible. Since no baseline was taken of Kumo prior to putting it into production, any current filesystem baseline must be considered no more than marginally trusted, however at least a current baseline would ensure that no files have changed from this point forward.

- VII. Data Encryption
  - a. Login and System Remote Access: Despite their apparent usefulness for remote systems administration, remote access services such as telnet and the "r-commands" (rlogin, rsh, and rexec) suffer from the flaw of passing usernames, passwords, and all data during transactions in the clear over intervening networks. The Secure Shell (SSH) suite of software offers a drop-in replacement for all of these commands, and pipes all session data over an encrypted tunnel between client and server. In addition, stronger authentication mechanisms are provided for offering passwordless access or integration with one-time password schemes such as S/Key and OPIE.

Kumo employs SSH exclusively, without offering telnet or r-services (all of which have been disabled to prevent bypassing SSH). Aside from software upgrades (cf. "Risks from Third-Party Software", above), no further recommendations need be made here.

b. <u>Secure Data on Insecure Protocols</u>: The webserver on Kumo serves, among other functions, as a point for tracking customer information and trouble tickets, any or all of which could be considered sensitive data. While this data is protected with a reasonably well-designed password scheme, all usernames, passwords and transferred data pass in cleartext over the Internet between client and server.

Given the sensitivity of the data stored on the server and the client's expressed desire to run a tightly-secured system, it is Melete's recommendation that the existing Apache server be replaced with a server capable of running SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) transactions. The Apache + mod\_ssl project distributes a freeware Apache version with SSL plugins; commercial variants from Covalent and C2 are also recommended, as is the Netscape iPlanet server.

- VIII. Appropriate Access Restrictions
  - a. <u>Physical Access</u>: Despite all attempts to secure the console against malicious intrusions, the simple fact remains that a determined, skilled intruder with enough time and access to the physical console of a machine can gain access to the data on the disks, almost no matter what preventative measures are taken. To prevent this, it is imperative to store the CPU of the system in a secure facility: in a server room which offers badge-controlled access or cipherlocks, and preferably locked racks or cabinets inside for storing the CPU itself.

The physical access surrounding the console for Kumo was entirely unacceptable. Although inside an office with both access points controlled by cipherlocks, the door to the server room is right next to an entrance point, which would make it easy for an intruder to slip in after an employee. The door to the server room is unlocked and remains constantly open; there are no physical locks on the racks or the console itself to prevent physical tampering. All of this needs to be corrected as soon as possible: given the constant throughput of visitors, office staff and building workers, the protection of the physical console cannot be guaranteed, putting the entire system in jeopardy.

- b. <u>Electronic Access</u>: Just as restricting the physical console of a server to a known set of trusted users increases the security of the system, so, too, does taking the same measures to protect access to the root account.
  - A. <u>Legacy Accounts:</u> One important step in retaining control of the root account on a system is user account lifecycle maintenance: removing old and legacy logins, locking unused user accounts and so forth. Kumo displayed a number of accounts from former employees which were not disabled, potentially leaving doors into the system for attacks both from disgruntled employees and from clever attackers breaking unwatched system accounts. The

removal of these accounts will greatly increase the security of the system, along with an immediate change of the root password to ensure former admins will not be able to gain access.

B. <u>Granular Admin Restrictions:</u> Not all administrators have the same level of knowledge, or require the same level of access, and by the same token, neither do all users. At the moment, the permissions on the /sbin/su file on Kumo are set to the default, which allows anyone on the system to access the root account if she knows the password. A first step towards reducing access to this would be to add known administrative accounts to an admin group such as "wheel", and change the permissions on the file to remove universal access. To do this, edit the /etc/group file and add known admin account names to the line which begins "wheel", separated by commas, then execute the following commands as root, which will restrict access appropriately:

/bin/chown root:wheel /sbin/su /bin/chmod 4750 /sbin/su

[Note that if you later install the SUNWsutl package, which contains statically-linked binaries of system commands, you will need to perform the same restriction on /sbin/su.static.]

- IX. Backup policies, disaster preparedness, &c.
  - a. <u>No Backup Procedures:</u> In order to protect both against malicious actions by intruders and hardware failures that could render a system unusable, it is essential for an organization to develop a firm backup policy and set of accompanying procedures that dictate how backups will be performed and when. This task must be handed to a systems administrator or group of administrators whose explicit responsibility it will be not only to perform the backups regularly, but to test the quality of the backups by attempting partial and full restores from backup tapes on a regular basis.

While there is a local tape drive on Kumo and associated scripts for performing backups, it is not the explicit responsibility of any administrator to perform this task; rather, it is performed "whenever significant change is made to the host", according to the administrators interviewed. In addition, there is no testing of backups, periodic or otherwise. These could leave the host in a disastrously vulnerable state should a hard drive fail or an intruder wipe the disks to prevent discovery. Melete's strong recommendation is that the customer perform an immediate review of backup policy and procedure, and begin implementing a sound backup strategy as soon as possible.

b. <u>No Hardware Failure Provisions:</u> Especially for systems defined as highprofile or mission-critical to a company, it is vital to have spare hardware onsite, preferably kept in warm standby (e.g. a spare host with dailysynchronized disks, ready to be substituted should the live host fail for any reason). This includes not just spare hard drives and memory DIMMs, but also a spare system and potentially may extend to spare network hardware.

While spare hard drives could likely be scrounged from the lab in which Kumo is installed, such a procedure would be time-consuming, and would risk installing a piece of equipment with unknown filesystems on it and a potential for rapid failure. It is imperative that the customer purchase sufficient spare hardware for Kumo that a total systems failure could be sustained and the system would be back online rapidly. Should this prove difficult to budget for in the short term, there are companies such as Comdisco which will keep a copy of system backups and bring a copy of your host online within a short time should a failure occur.

## X. Other issues

a. <u>Firewalling</u>: The importance of good firewalling cannot overshadow the importance of host-based security; a good firewall, however, can help supplement a site's security significantly.

After scanning Kumo through the site firewall (a Check Point Firewall-1 implementation), no unfiltered ports were discovered. This means the firewall is stateful, and is successfully checking each inbound connection against the state table to ensure that attackers may not bypass the firewall rulebase. The rulebase, however, includes a number of open ports which are not secure and should not be required for production service on Kumo. Open ports are listed below: ports surrounded with brackets ([]) should definitely be closed, and ports surrounded with parentheses () should be reviewed and closed if they are not required for the services Kumo provides.

Service Name		
FTP		
SSH		
(SMTP)		
HTTP		
[SunRPC / Portmapper]		
[NetBIOS]		
[X-Windows]		
[DTSPC]		
[Font-service]		
[RPC]		
2773] [RPC]		
[Unknown]		
(Unknown)		

## b.

## **Prioritized Risks:**

Two lists of prioritized risks have been presented here: the first is the list which should be followed if Kumo is to be maintained online it its present state for any length

of time; the second is the list of errors to ensure are avoided should the customer opt to build a replacement server for Kumo. Obviously, building a secure replacement should start from a well-written and tested secure configuration document: good starting points are the Solaris Security FAQ, the "Hardening Solaris for Firewall-1" document online by Lance Spitzner, and of course the SANS <u>Step-by-Step Guide to</u> <u>Securing Solaris</u>. Items below have been annotated where needed; unannotated items are believed to be self-explanatory.

List 1: Risks in Current Configuration

- 1. No System Patches: Given the sheer number of security issues and stability fixes these provide, scheduling time to install the latest complete patch cluster from Sun must be the customer's first priority.
- 2. RPC ToolTalk Server: Apply the patch for this vulnerability and (preferably) disable the service entirely.
- 3. FTP and Apache Version Upgrades: Since these are public services offered through the firewall with known security exploits, these must be the next point of attack on the part of the customer. While upgrading Apache, the customer would be well-advised to install a webserver with SSL capabilities, either the freeware Apache+mod\_ssl package or a similar commercial package. While upgrading the FTP software, the creation and stocking of an /etc/ftpusers file should be considered mandatory.
- 4. Legacy Accounts: Several of these are former systems administrators, who may have backdoors in the system. Locking off their accounts and renaming their home directories should be a sufficient step to keep them out until a new, clean system can be installed.
- 5. SSH Version: This is only marginally lower on the list, and should be considered a high priority, especially since upgrading to the latest version will require little more than compiling a new binary and installing it: the configuration files have not changed between 1.2.21 and 1.2.30.
- 6. TCP Wrappers: Especially given that the system is a public FTP server, installing TCP wrappers will be an important step to controlling access to resources and generating good logs of FTP sessions. As a bonus, SSH can be compiled with the TCP Wrapper libraries, allowing admins to control access to SSH as well through the same interface.
- 7. Log Review and Configuring Centralized Logging: These two go hand in hand--logs are currently not being reviewed, and will be much easier to review on a regular basis when they are concatenated to a single secure point, which will, in turn, ensure that the logs remain tamper-proof.
- 8. Filesystem Integrity Checking: Under any newly-implemented server, the use of filesystem integrity checking would be an absolute imperative early on in the implementation, then frequently and regularly thereafter. Since Kumo has already existed for some time without such software, any integrity checking software will only ensure that no changes are made from this point forward, which will provide some degree of security but is not quite as high on the list of priorities.

- 9. Physical Security: Since the outside perimeter of the office is at least partially secured, this will likely not prove a first avenue of attack on Kumo. Nonetheless, this issue needs to be dealt with in short order; this should include the configuration of secure console settings such as the PROM password and security mode.
- 10. Unecessary Software Installed: Although not currently posing active remote security risks, the list of software currently installed includes a number of packages with known local root exploits, which could hand control of the box over to a malicious trusted user. The customer would be well-advised to review the list of installed software as soon as possible, and test removing packages during maintenance windows until only required packages are installed.
- 11. Backup Procedures and Policies: A full backup of the system should be taken as soon as possible, and another one when the system has been more significantly secured. Singing Beagle Productions needs to institute a firm backup plan, as discussed above, and ensure that system backups are being carried out on a regular basis.
- 12. Granular Administration: Given the small number of actual administrators, this is not a high priority, but should definitely be an item on the list to complete. Administration of any server by more than one administrator is much easier when there are good records of what changed on a host and who changed it: mandating these log entries through the use of software such as sudo will improve the situation considerably.
- 13. Hardware Failure Preparedness / Disaster Preparedness
- 14. Specific Systems Administration Procedures and Policies; Determination of Responsibility for Enforcing Policy and Procedure
- List 2: Risks to Avoid for Replacement Units:
  - 1. OS Version: Any new implementation of this server configuration should definitely employ at least Solaris version 7, and version 8 should be considered (although it is not a requirement).
  - 2. Unnecessary Software Installed: As stated above, beginning with a minimal configuration and adding onto it anything further which is required will ultimately result in a far more secure server than starting from too much software and paring things down.
  - 3. No Software Patches: Immediately following a successful installation, the latest patch cluster from Sun must be installed for the host to be considered production-ready.
  - 4. FTP/Apache/SSH Software Versions: Obviously, any new server installed should use the latest versions of this software; with the recent demise of the RSA Patent, Melete can find no reason not to recommend that any new Apache version installed be SSL-capable, even if such functionality is not immediately implemented.
  - 5. TCP Wrappers

- 6. Centralized Logging and Log Review
- 7. Granular Administration Setup
- 8. Backups and Filesystem Integrity Checks: Immediately following the final configuration of the server but prior to putting it into production (preferably while not connected to any network), a "gold" backup must be performed on the new host. This backup should be retained through the life of the host and tested thoroughly: no matter what may occur to the rest of the backups or the host itself, this backup will provide a safe fallback to the initial implementation baseline. Hand in hand with this is a baseline using Tripwire or similar software: performing this baseline prior to connecting the host to a network will provide an absolute standard against which future filesystem checks can be verified to be sure no changes have been made.
- 9. Physical Security
- 10. Disaster Preparedness / Hardware Failure Preparedness
- 11. Specific Systems Administration Procedures and Policies; Determination of Responsibility for Enforcing Policy and Procedure

## **Costs Estimate**

It is vital to remember that the following are purely estimates, and should be considered neither actual estimates or price quotes for services rendered by Melete nor anything more than conjecture.

Complete Repairs to Existing System:

piece Repairs to Existing System.	
\$200 x 16 hours = \$3200	Engineer billable time for repairs
\$150 x 8 hours = \$1200	Tech Writer billable time: document new
	system as installed and repaired
\$150 x 40 hours = \$6000	Tech Writer billable time: generate policy
	and procedure documents for new
NO NO	system
\$10400	Total tangible expense for system repairs
2.5 - 3 hours	Total required system downtime for
5	repairs, subdividable into smaller
	chunks:
Ś	1-1.5 hours - Install latest patch cluster
	1-1.5 hours - Perform system level-0
	"gold" backup and perform Tripwire
5	integrity check
$\bigcirc$	.05 hours - Install latest Apache
	version <sup>iii</sup>
	.05 hours - Install latest wu-ftpd
	version <sup>iv</sup>
	.05 hours - Install latest SSH daemon <sup>v</sup>
	.05 hours - Install TCP Wrappers <sup>vi</sup>

## Develop and Implement New System:

\$2	200 x 24	hours = \$4800	Engineer billable time for implementation

\$150 x 4 hours = \$600	Tech Writer billable time: document new system as installed <sup>vii</sup>
\$150 x 40 hours = \$6000	Tech Writer billable time: generate policy and procedure documents for new system
\$11400	Total tangible expense for system repairs

## Appendices

Appendix A: Suggested References in Print

1. <u>Practical Unix and Internet Security</u> (Garfinkel, Spafford. c. 1995 by O'Reilly and Associates, Inc., ISBN 1565921488)

Although becoming somewhat dated, this is still one of the canonical guides to Unix security, and is worth every system administrator and security engineer's time.

2. <u>Unix Systems Administration Handbook</u> (Nemeth, & al. c. 2000 by Prentice Hall, ISBN 0130206016)

Now in its third printing, this multi-platform guide to the world of systems administration offers, among other things, fantastic chapters on general system security, developing good systems administration policies and procedures, and maintaining good political relations as systems administrators dealing with the rest of the world.

3. <u>Solaris Security: Step by Step</u> (Pomeranz, & al. Published by the SANS Institute, <u>www.sans.org</u>)

Written by the consensus of a large group of Solaris administrators and gurus, this is not only an excellent guide to creating a secure baseline Solaris install, but an excellent starting point for adapting to other Unix flavors.

4. <u>Linux System Security: The Administrator's Guide to Open Source Security Tools</u> (Mann, Mitchell. c. 1999 by Prentice Hall, ISBN 0130158070)

A recent work, this serves as a good guide to implementing tools such as SSH and Tripwire, as well as tips for secure NFS implementations, general system security, and advanced topics such as varieties of the cryptographic filesystem and using ipchains for firewalling. Although Linux-focused, many of the tools quoted here will be readily adaptable to other platforms with little trouble; the guide is worth purchasing for the chapter on SSH alone (although it does not cover OpenSSH).

5. <u>Hacking Exposed</u> (Scambray, McClure, Kurtz. c. 2000 by Osborne/McGraw-Hill, ISBN 0072127481)

Now in its second edition, this is a terrific guide to getting inside the mind of the average system intruder, which will in turn guide administrators towards finding the holes in their own networks. This is a good guide for more advanced, security-focused administrators, since it focuses less on simply probing the local network for vulnerabilities, and more on the skills of profiling networks and penetrating systems.

6. <u>Essential System Administration</u> (Frisch, Loukides (editor). c. 1995, O'Reilly and Associates, Inc., ISBN 1565921275)

A bit due for a second edition, this is the other "bible" for systems administrators: an excellent guide to Unix in general.

7. <u>Building Internet Firewalls</u> (Zwicky, Cooper, Chapman. c. 2000, O'Reilly and Associates, Inc., ISBN 1565928717)

Once the hosts are all secured, the next step is to work on firewalling to protect the entries and exits on the network, and take some of the load of

repelling intruders off of the servers. This is an excellent guide to firewalls, especially in it's new edition. Check out also the older <u>Firewalls and Internet</u> <u>Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker</u> (Cheswick, Bellovin, c. 1994 Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., ISBN 0201633574) and the newer <u>Building Linux and OpenBSD</u> <u>Firewalls</u> (Sonnenreich, Yates. c. 1999 Wiley, John and Sons, Inc., ISBN 0471353663), both excellent guides to furthering one's firewall education.

 Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst's Handbook (Northcutt, Novak, McLachlan. c. 2000, New Riders Publishing, ISBN 0735710082) For the advanced security-minded administrator, the next step is to begin watching the network proactively for attack, and there is no better guide to digging into that than this book. Can't be recommended highly enough.

## Appendix B: Online Resources and Tools

URLs for further security information

- <u>http://www.securityfocus.com</u>: Home to the Bugtraq vulnerability discussion list and database, this has become one of the places to visit for security news, vulnerability information, tools, product guides and articles on Internet security and related topics.
- <u>http://www.sans.org</u> : Systems Administration and Network Security (SANS) Institute hosts periodic conferences throughout the U.S. and internationally, offering education and discussion of varied Internet security topics.
- <u>http://www.cerias.purdue.edu</u>: Although perhaps not as loudly thriving as their predecessor, COAST, the Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS) continues to offer an excellent FTP archive of security tools and a wide variety of whitepapers, research projects, and interesting discussion on various topics within Internet security.
- <u>http://www.cert.org</u>: Somewhat overshadowed by Bugtraq these days because of their more conservative timeline for releasing security alerts, the CERT Coordination Center is nonetheless doing some excellent work concatenating cross-platform security vulnerabilities, educating administrators about trends in vulnerabilities, and encouraging the free flow of information about security and the threat from network attackers.

URLs for Unix Security and Systems Administration Tools:

- <u>http://www.apache.org</u> : Home of development on the Apache webserver; be sure also to visit <u>www.modssl.org</u> and <u>www.openssl.org</u> for information on building free, SSL-enabled Apache implementations.
- <u>http://www.wu-ftpd.org</u> : Site for development of the Washington University FTP daemon (wu-ftpd).
- <u>http://www.psionic.com/abacus/logcheck</u> : Site to visit for information about logcheck, a freeware log parser. Logcheck will parse through system logs, collect any information that does not match a set of known acceptable information, and mail the output to a systems administrator for review, thus significantly easing the job of periodic log review. An excellent tool.

- <u>http://www.stanford.edu/~atkins/swatch</u>: Swatch is the opposite of logcheck, although the two perform similar functions. Rather than discarding known goodness, swatch parses logs looking for predefined triggers, and sends alerts when it finds them. More flexible than logwatch, Swatch is capable of taking a number of different actions based on the triggers it finds and the configuration it has been given.
- <u>http://www.insecure.org/nmap</u>: Site for Nmap, the freeware Network Mapper written by Fyodor. A Swiss Army Knife of network scanning, nmap has plugins for TCP and UDP scanning, OS fingerprinting and detection, and further plugins from other authors offer version and vulnerability checking to boot.
- <u>http://www.nessus.org</u> : Site for the Nessus security scanner, used in this assessment (see discussion under "Tools" section of "Methodology").
- <u>http://www.wwdsi.com</u>: Home of the SAINT vulnerability scanner, also used in this assessment
- <u>http://packetstorm.securify.com</u>: Spanning the bridge between the "white hat" world of security professionals and the "black hat" world of intruders, PacketStorm offers a significant collection of "hacker tools", including the Malice and Whisker tools used in this assessment. The collection also includes a number of actual system exploits, useful for examination and comparison during a forensic examination.
- <u>http://freshmeat.net</u> : An excellent site for open-source (and some non-opensource) code of all kinds, Freshmeat offers a vast library of software, with a significant focus on Linux.
- <u>ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security</u> : Site to download Wietse Venema's TCP Wrappers program, mentioned several times in this document.
- <u>http://www.enteract.com/~lspitz</u>: Site of Lance Spitzner, a consultant and engineer for Sun Microsystems. Lance's pages contain a terrific collection of whitepapers on system security and checklists and hardening documents for Solaris and Linux.
- http://www.sunworld.com/sunworldonline/common/security-faq.html : The Solaris Security FAQ, while somewhat dated in places, is an excellent resource for shoring up the security of Solaris servers.

## Appendix C: Raw Data Gathered

[ Additional Note about Data Sanitation: In order to facilitate the processing of certain large collections of usernames, some usernames from accounts no longer present but verified as once having existed have been replaced as well. The logins on the system have been checked: no logins appeared in any system logs which had no corresponding entries at some point in the system configuration (which would indicate an intrusion). ]

```
# nmap (V. 2.54BETA4) scan initiated Fri Nov 17 17:31:02 2000 as:
/usr/local/bin/nmap -sS -O -p 1-65535 -vv -oN nmap-synOS.log 172.16.2.1
Interesting ports on (172.16.2.1):
```

..... (The 65523 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) Port State Service 21/tcp open ftp 22/tcp open 22/tcp open 25/tcp open 80/tcp open 111/tcp open ssh smtp smtp http sunrpc X11 dtspc font-service sometimes-rpc7 sometimes-rpc9 unknown 6000/tcp open 6112/tcp open 7100/tcp open 32772/tcp open 32773/tcp open 33285/tcp open 33313/tcp open unknown TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=random positive increments Difficulty=39423 (Worthy challenge) Sequence numbers: A89A690A A89AAB3E A89AE1D9 A89BA327 A89D77EB A89E9B59 Remote operating system guess: Solaris 2.6 - 2.7 OS Fingerprint: TSeq(Class=RI%qcd=1%SI=99FF) T1 (Resp=Y%DF=Y%W=2297%ACK=S++%Flags=AS%Ops=NNTNWME) T2 (Resp=N) T3(Resp=N) T4 (Resp=Y%DF=Y%W=0%ACK=0%Flags=R%Ops=) T5 (Resp=Y%DF=Y%W=0%ACK=S++%Flags=AR%Ops=) T6 (Resp=Y%DF=Y%W=0%ACK=0%Flags=R%Ops=) T7 (Resp=Y%DF=Y%W=0%ACK=S%Flags=AR%Ops=) PU (Resp=Y%DF=Y%TOS=0%IPLEN=70%RIPTL=148%RID=E%RIPCK=E%UCK=E%ULEN=134%DAT=E) # Nmap run completed at Fri Nov 17 17:31:41 2000 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 38 seconds # nmap (V. 2.54BETA4) scan initiated Fri Nov 17 17:32:43 2000 as: /usr/local/bin/nmap -sT -sR -I -p 1-65535 -vv -oN nmap-connectRPCIdent.log 172.16.2.1 Interesting ports on (172.16.2.1): (The 65523 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) PortStateService (RPC)Owner21/tcpopenftp22/tcpopenssh25/tcpopensmtp80/tcpopenhttp 111/tcp open sunrpc (rpcbind V2-4) 6000/tcp open X11 dtspc 6112/tcp open font-service sometimes-rpc7 (ttdbserverd V1) sometimes-rpc9 7100/tcp open 32772/tcpopensometimes-rpc732773/tcpopensometimes-rpc933285/tcpopen(ttsession V1-4)33313/tcpopen(kcms\_server V1) 32772/tcp open # Nmap run completed at Fri Nov 17 17:33:05 2000 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 21 seconds

# nmap (V. 2.54BETA4) scan initiated Fri Nov 17 17:34:12 2000 as: /usr/local/bin/nmap -sT -sV -FV -oN nmap-version.log 172.16.2.1 Interesting ports on (172.16.2.1): (The 23 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) State Service Protocol Version Port 21/tcp FTP wu-2.4.2-academ[BETAopen ftp 16](1) 22/tcp open ssh 25/tcp open smtp 80/tcp open http SSH 1.5-1.2.21 SMTP HTTP Apache/1.2.6 mod perl/1.10 111/tcp open sunrpc RPC # Nmap run completed at Fri Nov 17 17:34:29 2000 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 17 seconds # nmap (V. 2.54BETA4) scan initiated Wed Nov 22 10:44:58 2000 as: nmap -sA -p 1-65535 -vv -oN nmap-ACK.log 192.168.56.129 All 65535 scanned ports on (192.168.56.129) are: filtered # Nmap run completed at Wed Nov 22 11:39:22 2000 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 3264 seconds # nmap (V. 2.54BETA4) scan initiated Wed Nov 22 11:47:17 2000 as: /usr/local/bin/nmap -sT -p 1-65535 -oN nmap-TCPthroughfire.log -vv kumo.singingbeagle.org Interesting ports on (192.168.56.129) : (The 65522 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) (The 65522 ports scanned but not shown<br/>PortStateService21/tcpopenftp22/tcpopenssh25/tcpopensmtp80/tcpopenhttp111/tcpopensunrpc139/tcpfilterednetbios-ssn6000/tcpopenX116112/tcpopendtspc7100/tcpopenfont-service32772/tcpopensometimes-rpc732773/tcpopensometimes-rpc9 sometimes-rpc9 unknown 32773/tcp open 33285/tcp open 33313/tcp open unknown # Nmap run completed at Wed Nov 22 11:56:21 2000 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 543 seconds Nessus Scan Report \_\_\_\_\_ SUMMARY - Number of hosts which were alive during the test : 1

- Number of security holes found : 0
- Number of security warnings found : 1
- Number of security notes found : 0

TESTED HOSTS

172.16.2.1 (Security warnings found)

DETAILS

- + 172.16.2.1 :
  . List of open ports :
   o unknown (32772/tcp) (Security warnings found)
  - . Warning found on port unknown (32772/tcp)

The tooltalk RPC service is running. An possible implementation fault in the ToolTalk object database server may allow a cracker to execute arbitrary commands as root.

\*\* This warning may be a false
 positive since the presence
 of the bug was not tested \*\*

Solution : Disable this service. See also : CERT Advisory CA-98.11

Risk factor : High CVE : CVE-1999-0003

Engineer's Note: Owing to the difficulties converting HTML into a Word doc, I have condensed the SAINT output page into plain text below, word-for-word. The EXPN and VRFY commands showed as activated, but in fact were not: the host runs SMAP from the Firewall Toolkit, which will respond positively to any EXPN or VRFY request whether the user account in question actually exists or not (thus giving out no information).

Results - 172.16.2.1

General Host Information Host type: Solaris 2.6 - 2.7 Subnet 172.16.2 Scanning level: heavyplus Last scan: Fri Nov 17 18:04:42 2000

Network Services: FTP server SMTP server SSH server WWW server X Windows server XDM (X login) server 1/UDP server 6112/TCP server 7100/TCP server sunrpc server

```
Vulnerable Services:
      Sendmail command EXPN is enabled
      Sendmail command VRFY is enabled
      SSH-1.2.21\n is vulnerable
      [ Top 10 ] tooltalk version may be vulnerable to a buffer overflow (CVE
1999 - 0003)
Engineer's Note: This is the output from running the Whisker tool against
172.16.2.1. I also ran "Malice", which ran for a minute and a half, then
returned that the site's security was such that it could find nothing wrong.
-- whisker / v1.4.0+SSL / rain forest puppy / www.wiretrip.net --
- Loaded script database of 2124 lines
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
= Host: 172.16.2.1
= Server: Apache/1.2.6 mod perl/1.10
+ 404 File Not Found: GET /cfdocs/
+ 404 File Not Found: GET /scripts/
+ 404 File Not Found: GET /cfcache.map
+ 404 File Not Found: GET /cfide/Administrator/startstop.html
+ 404 File Not Found: GET /cfappman/index.cfm
+ 403 Forbidden: GET /cgi-bin/
+ 403 Forbidden: GET /cgi-bin/dbmlparser.exe
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD / vti inf.html
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD / vti pvt/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/webdist.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/handler
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wrap
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pfdisplay.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/MachineInfo
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /mall log files/order.log
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD / PDG Cart/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /quikstore.cfg
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /orders/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /Admin files/order.log
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /WebShop/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pw/storemgr.pw
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /bigconf.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /icat
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/icat
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /cgi-local/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /htbin/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /cgibin/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /cgis/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /cgi/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /cgi-csc/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /bin/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /apps/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/flexform.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/flexform
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/LWGate
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/lwgate
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/LWGate.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/lwgate.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /cgi-win/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pu3.pl
```

```
.....
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/meta.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/day5datacopier.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/webutils.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/tigvote.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/tpgnrock
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/webwho.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/form.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/message.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/.cobalt/siteUserMod/siteUserMod.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/.fhp
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/htsearch
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/plusmail
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /manage/cgi/cgiproc
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ultraboard.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ultraboard.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/perlshop.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/download.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/bnbform.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/bnbform
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/cgi-lib.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/post query
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/upload.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/rwwwshell.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/nlog-smb.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/nlog-smb.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwboard/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /wwwboard/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwboard.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwboard/wwwboard.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwboard.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwboard/wwwboard.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logs/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /database/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /databases/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/cachemgr.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /.htaccess
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/.htaccess
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /docs/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /~root/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/htgrep.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/htgrep
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ws ftp.ini
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ws ftp.ini
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /WS FTP.ini
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/WS FTP.ini
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ax-admin.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/axs.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/responder.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/w3-sql
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /search97.vts
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /search.vts
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /search97cgi/s97 cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/unlg1.1
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/unlg1.2
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/gH.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/test-cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/campas
```

```
.....
                       + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/www-sgl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/w3-msql
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/view-source
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/add ftp.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/cgiwrap
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/guestbook.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/guestbook.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/edit.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/webbbs.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/whois raw.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /webcart/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /webcart-lite/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/AnyBoard.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.php
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/code.php
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/dumpenv.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.php3
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/code.php3
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.pl
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /reviews/newpro.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /piranha/secure/passwd.php3
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/sojourn.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/dfire.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/spin client.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/Count.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/stats.prf
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/statsconfig
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /srchadm
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/count.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users/scripts/submit.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/nph-test-cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/webgais
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/websendmail
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/bb-hist.sh
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /bb-dnbd/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/faxsurvey
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/htmlscript
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/aglimpse
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/glimpse
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/man.sh
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/architext query.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/architext query.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/excite
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/webplus
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/bizdb1-search.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/cart.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/filemail.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/filemail
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/php.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/jj
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/info2www
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/nph-publish
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ax.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /session/admnlogin
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/rpm query
```

```
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/AnyForm2
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/AnyForm
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/textcounter.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwthreads/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /wwwthreads/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwthreads/w3tvars.pm
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwthreads/3tvars.pm
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/classified.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/classifieds.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/classifieds
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ss.cfg
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ncl items.html
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/survey.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/survey
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /test/test.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/search.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/c download.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ntitar.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/enter.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/dig.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/tidfinder.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/displayTC.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/dasp/fm shell.asp
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/printenv
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/environ.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/session/adminlogin
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/finger
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/finger.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/finger.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/maillist.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/maillist.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/sh
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/bash
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ash
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/tcsh
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ksh
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/csh
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/rksh
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/rsh
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/zsh
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/perl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/test-cgi.tcl
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /php/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /mlog.phtml
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/mlog.phtml
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /mylog.phtml
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/mylog.phtml
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /HyperStat/stat what.log
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /Stats/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /WebTrend/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /analog/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /cache-stats/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /easylog/easylog.html
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /hit tracker/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /hitmatic/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /hitmatic/analyse.cgi
```

```
.....
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /hyperstat/stat what.log
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /log/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logfile/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logfiles/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logger/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logging/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logs/access log
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ministats/admin.cgi
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /scripts/weblog
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /server stats/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /stat/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /statistics/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /stats/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /super stats/access logs
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /trafficlog/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ustats/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /w3perl/admin
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /webaccess/access-options.txt
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /weblog/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /weblogs/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /webstats/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /wstats/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /wusage/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /wwwlog/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /www.stats/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /access-log
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /access.log
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /awebvisit.stat
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /dan o.dat
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /hits.txt
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /log.htm
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /log.html
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /log.txt
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logfile
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logfile.htm
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logfile.html
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logfile.txt
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /logger.html
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /stat.htm
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /stats.htm
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /stats.html
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /stats.txt
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /webaccess.htm
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /www.stats.html
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/log/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/log/nether-log.pl?checkit
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/logs/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/stat/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/stats.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/stats/
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clickcount.pl?view=test
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/cstat.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ex-logger.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/hitview.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/log-reader.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/logit.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/logs.pl
```

```
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/lookwho.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/mini logger.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/ratlog.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/robadmin.cgi
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/show.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/stats-bin-p/reports/index.html
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/statview.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/viewlogs.pl
+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/wwwstats.pl
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /Admin files/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /DMR/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /StoreDB/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /Web store/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /access/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /account/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /accounting/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /administrator/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /app/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /archive/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /asp/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /atc/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /backup/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /bak/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /beta/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /buy/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /buynow/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /c/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /cart/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ccard/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /config/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /counter/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /credit/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /customers/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /dat/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /data/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /db/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /dbase/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /doc-html/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /down/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /download/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /downloads/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /employees/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /exe/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /file/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /files/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /forum/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD / fpadmin/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ftp/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /questbook/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /guests/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /home/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /htdocs/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /html/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ibill/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /idea/
+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /ideas/
```
..... + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /incoming/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /info/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /install/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /intranet/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /jave/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /jdbc/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /lib/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /library/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /mail/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /mall log files/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /manual/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /marketing/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /msql/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /new/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /odbc/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /old/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /oracle/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /order/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /outgoing/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pages/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /perl/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /private/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pub/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /public/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /purchase/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /purchases/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pw/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /register/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /registered/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /reseller/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /retail/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /root/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /sales/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /search/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /sell/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /setup/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /shop/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD / shopper/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /site/iissamples/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /software/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /source/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /sql/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /support/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /temp/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /test/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /test-cgi/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /tmp/ + 200 OK: HEAD /tools/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /tree/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /updates/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /usage/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /user/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /web/

+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /web800fo/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /webadmin/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /webboard/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /webdata/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /website/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /www/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /www-sql/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /wwwjoin/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /import/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /zipfiles/ + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.htm + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.htm + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.html + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.html + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.dat + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.dat + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.data + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.data + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.asp + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.asp + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.dbf + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.dbf + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.ini + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.ini + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.db + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.db + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.cfg + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.cfg + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.exe + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.exe + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.htx + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.htx + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.lst + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.lst + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.cgi + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.cgi + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.pl + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.pl + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password.php3 + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password.php3 + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.htm + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.htm + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.html + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.html + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.dat + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.dat + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.data + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.data + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.asp + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.asp + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.dbf + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.dbf + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.ini

+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.ini + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.db + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.db + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.cfg + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.cfg + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.exe + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.exe + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.htx + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.htx + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.lst + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.lst + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.cgi + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.cgi + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.pl + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.pl + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwords.php3 + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwords.php3 + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.htm + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.htm + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.html + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.html + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.dat + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.dat + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.data + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.data + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.asp + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.asp + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.dbf + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.dbf + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.ini + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.ini + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.db + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.db + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.cfg + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.cfg + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.exe + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.exe + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.htx + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.htx + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.lst + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.lst + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.cgi + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.cgi + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.pl + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.pl + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /pass.php3 + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/pass.php3 + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.htm + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.htm + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.html + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.html + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.dat + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.dat + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.data + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.data

+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.asp + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.asp + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.dbf + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.dbf + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.ini + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.ini + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.db + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.db + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.cfg + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.cfg + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.exe + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.exe + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.htx + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.htx + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.lst + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.lst + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.cgi + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.cgi + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.pl + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.pl + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /users.php3 + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/users.php3 + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.htm + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.htm + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.html + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.html + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.dat + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.dat + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.data + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.data + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.asp + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.asp + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.dbf + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.dbf + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.ini + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.ini + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.db + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.db + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.cfg + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.cfg + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.exe + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.exe + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.htx + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.htx + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.lst + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.lst + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.cgi + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.cgi + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.pl + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.pl + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /clients.php3 + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/clients.php3 + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.htm

+ 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.htm + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.html + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.html + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.dat + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.dat + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.data + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.data + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.asp + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.asp + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.dbf + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.dbf + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.ini + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.ini + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.db + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.db + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.cfg + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.cfg + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.exe + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.exe + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.htx + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.htx + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.lst + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.lst + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.cgi + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.pl + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /login.php3 + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/login.php3 + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.htm + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.htm + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.html + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.html + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.dat + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.dat + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.data + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.data + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.asp + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.asp + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.dbf + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.dbf + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.ini + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.ini + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.db + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.db + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.cfg + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.cfg + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.exe + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.exe + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.htx + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.htx + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.lst + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.lst + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.cgi + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.cgi

+ 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.pl + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/admin.pl + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /admin.php3 + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.htm + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.htm + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.html + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.html + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.dat + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.dat + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.data + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.data + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.asp + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.asp + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.dbf + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.dbf + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.ini + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.ini + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.db + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.db + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.cfg + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.cfg + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.exe + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.exe + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.htx + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.htx + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.lst + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.lst + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.cgi + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.cgi + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.pl + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.pl + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /store.php3 + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/store.php3 + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwd + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwd + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /passwd.txt + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/passwd.txt + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /password + 403 Forbidden: HEAD /cgi-bin/password + 404 File Not Found: HEAD /status/

Engineer's Note: The remainder of the data are the script outputs from logging into the machine to perform a host-based assessment. Unless you're really curious, there's not much down there of particular note.

jpurvis@172.16.2.1's password: Last login: Fri Nov 17 15:22:47 2000 from cerberus.XXX.XXX Sun Microsystems Inc. SunOS 5.6 Generic August 1997 Sun Microsystems Inc. SunOS 5.6 Generic August 1997 kumo\$ uname -a kumo\$ kumo\$ uname -a SunOS kumo 5.6 Generic sun4u sparc SUNW,Ultra-1 kumo\$ su -Password:

..... Sun Microsystems Inc. SunOS 5.6 Generic August 1997 You have mail. # /usr/sbin/arp -a Net to Media Table Mask Flags Phys Addr Device IP Address \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ 255.255.255.25508:00:20:9a:25:78255.255.255.25500:10:a4:ed:86:f4255.255.255.255SP08:00:20:7c:50:84 le0 kuko-dmz 172.16.2.47 le0 le0 kumo le0 BASE-ADDRESS.MCAST.NET 240.0.0.0 SM 01:00:5e:00:00:00 # /usr/sbin/auditconfig -chkconf auditconfig: auditon(2) failed. auditconfig: error = Invalid argument(22) # /usr/sbin/auditconfig -getcond auditconfig: auditon(2) failed. auditconfig: error = Invalid argument(22) # /usr/sbin/auditconfig -getpolicy auditconfig: auditon(2) failed. auditconfig: error = Invalid argument(22) # df / (/dev/dsk/c0t0d0s0 ): 108886 blocks 44142 files /usr (/dev/dsk/c0t0d0s6): 209144 blocks 252689 files (/dev/dsk/c0t0d0s1): 522956 blocks 916 files (/dev/dsk/c0t0d0s1): 522956 blocks 146224 files /proc /dev/fd /var (/dev/dsk/c0t0d0s5): 666556 blocks 384353 files /opt (/dev/dsk/c0t1d0s6): 425766 blocks 489123 files /ftp02 /ftp01 (/dev/dsk/c0t1d0s7 ): 122018 blocks 489071 files (/dev/dsk/c0t2d0s7): 600688 blocks 483972 files /data ): 541232 blocks 9598 files /tmp (swap # eeprom security-mode security-mode=none # env HOME=/ HZ =LOGNAME=root PATH=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/ucb:/etc SHELL=/sbin/sh TERM=xterm-color TZ=US/Pacific # ifconfig -a lo0: flags=849<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 8232 inet 127.0.0.1 netmask ff000000 le0: flags=863<UP,BROADCAST,NOTRAILERS,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 inet 172.16.2.1 netmask ffffff00 broadcast 172.16.2.255 ether 8:0:20:7c:50:84 # last jpurvis pts/3 172.16.2.47 Fri Nov 17 15:43 still logged in cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Nov 17 15:22 - 15:24 (00:01) jpurvis pts/3

xz /l 1	fter	aankamaa XXX XXX		Nerr	1 /	15.50	1 5 . 5 4	(00.02)
X41	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
X41	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
X41	ftp	thorn.brooks.X41						
X41	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:01)
jpurvis	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(01:28)
internal	ftp	fw.XXXXXXXXXX.c						(00:02)
internal	ftp	fw.XXXXXXXXXX.c						(00:01)
internal	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
internal	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
internal	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	24	12:35 -	- 12:35	(00:00)
jpurvis	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	24	12:25 -	- 14:47	(02:21)
root	console	:0	Tue	Oct	24	12:07	still	logged in
root	console		Fri	Aug	18	09:25 -	09:33	(00:08)
root	console	:0	Fri	Aug	18	09:12 -	09:13	(00:00)
root	console	:0	Mon	Jul	10	15:09 -	- 15:12	(00:02)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Sat	May	6	15:59 -	- 16:01	(00:02)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	May	5	12:51 -	- 16:09	(03:18)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:02)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:20)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:09)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:01)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:04)
root	console					09:21 -		(00:38)
root	console	:0				09:20 -		(00:00)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-				(00:11)
reboot	system boot					21:44		
root	console	:0				16:54 -	- 16:57	(00:03)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:25)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:03)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(02:23)
XXXXX40	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(01:45)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(02:04)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(02:46)
XXXXX40	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(01:30)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(03:14)
XXXXX40	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:17)
XXXXX40	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(01:45)
XXXXX40	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXX40	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:16)
XXXXX40	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:01)
reboot	system boot					16:51		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
reboot	system boot					16:16		
XXXXX40	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX					- 09:58	(00:21)
XXXXX40	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXX40	pts/4	kuko-dmz				11:46 -		
XXXXX40	pts/4	kuko-dmz				11:39 -		
XXXXX40	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXX40	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
	±							. ,

VVVVVVC	~+~/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	End	Tan		00.24		00.22	(00.00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:08)
XXXXX31	ftp								(00:10)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:31)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164				20:32			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:11)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
testacct	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:39)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164				11:42			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:42)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:43)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX			-				(00:08)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:23)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164				12:27			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164				12:25			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:07)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:38)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.165				16:03			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164				16:02			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:09)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.165				15:45			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.165				15:45			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164				15:45			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.195				15:05			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164				15:03			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:11)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	MOU	JUDII	ΤŢ	17:00	-	12:23	(00:16)

XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(04:42)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:05)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:19)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX			11	08:41	-	09:47	(01:05)
XXXXXX12	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Jan		14:18			(00:05)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164		Jan		14:04	-	14:05	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				13:35			(00:07)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Jan					(00:24)
XXXXXX12	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Jan	8	12:27	-	12:32	(00:04)
XXXXXX12	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Jan	8	12:27	_	12:27	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Jan	8	12:24	9	12:27	(00:02)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jan	7	09:58	-	10:07	(00:09)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jan	7	09:24	-	09:35	(00:11)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jan	6	16:41	-	16:44	(00:02)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jan		16:02			(00:01)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jan	6	11:31	_	11:44	(00:13)
asdfXXX1	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jan	6	08:25	_	08:27	(00:02)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jan	5	14:06	_	14:11	(00:05)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.173.3	Tue	Jan	5	08:28	_	08:54	(00:26)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.173.3	Tue	Jan	5	08:18	_	08:27	(00:08)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jan	5	00:39	-	00:46	(00:07)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jan	5	00:37	-	00:46	(00:08)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jan	4	22:06	-	22:10	(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Mon	Jan	4	15:41	_	15:41	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Mon	Jan	4	15:40	_	15:40	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Mon	Jan	4	15:23	_	15:23	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuki-dmz	Mon	Jan	4	15:22	-	15:22	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jan	4	15:03	-	15:03	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jan	4	14:02	_	16:41	(02:39)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jan	4	10:39	_	12:54	(02:14)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jan	4	10:19	-	12:53	(02:33)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Dec	24	13:43	-	13:45	(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164	Thu	Dec	24	13:37	_	13:37	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164	Thu	Dec	24	13:29	-	13:29	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Dec	24	13:29	_	13:29	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164	Thu	Dec	24	13:25	-	13:25	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Dec	24	13:24	_	13:24	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Dec	24	13:24	-	13:24	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.164	Thu	Dec	24	11:39	_	11:40	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Dec	24	11 <b>:</b> 37	-	11:38	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.196	Thu	Dec	24	09:25	-	09:25	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Dec	24	09:07	-	09:07	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Dec	24	09:05	_	09:07	(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Dec	23	09:58	_	11:07	(01:08)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Dec	23	09:29	_	09:45	(00:16)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Dec	22	15:06	_	15:06	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuki-dmz	Tue	Dec	22	15:04	-	15:05	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Dec	22	14:55	-	14:55	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Dec	22	13:11	-	13:11	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuki-dmz	Tue	Dec	22	13:09	-	13:09	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Dec	22	12:28	-	12:30	(00:02)
asdfXXX1	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Dec	21	08:00	-	08:00	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Sat	Dec	19	08:33	-	08:46	(00:13)
XXXXXXX5	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Dec	18	14:05	-	14:12	(00:07)

asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:21)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:05)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:05)
asdfXXX1	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:57)
asdfXXX1	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:19)
asdfXXX1	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Dec	18	07:16	-	07:18	(00:01)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
asdfXXX1	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Dec	17	12:59	-	15:03	(02:03)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	192.168.84.163				11:07			(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	XXXXX31.XXX.XXX				15 <b>:</b> 57			(00:02)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	XXXXX31.XXX.XXX				15:46			(00:08)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:07)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:24)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX4	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:24)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:07)
XXXXXXX4	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX4	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:41)
XXXXXXX4	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:32)
XXXXXXX5	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX				13:11			(00:09)
XXXXXXX5	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:32			(00:54)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:47			(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX			9	09:32			(00:01)
XXXXXXX5	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX				07:56			(00:25)
root	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:23			(00:00)
root	ftp	10k.singingbeagl			9	00:10			(00:00)
root	ftp	10k.singingbeagl			9	00:10			(00:00)
root	ftp	10k.singingbeagl			9	00:02			(00:00)
root	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:00			(00:00)
root	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				23:56			(00:00)
root	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				23:53			(00:00)
root	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				23:47			(00:00)
root	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				23:43			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX				23:15			(01:42)
	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX				21:04			(00:12)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.195						08:23	
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.195				08:17			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
root	console	:0							(42+01:50)
root	console	:0				16:05	_	10:10	(00:11)
reboot	system boot					15:26			
reboot	system boot					15:22			
reboot	system boot					15:18			
reboot XXXXXXX5	system boot pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX				15:10	_	13.20	(00:00)
	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6 ftp	172.16.1.100						23:07	
XXXXXXX6 XXXXXXX6		cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
asdfXXX1	ftp pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	172.16.1.253				14:08			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
	TCP	CCIDCIUS.AAA.AAA	IUC	TAO A	27	10.00		10.00	(00.00)

XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuki-dmz	T110	Nov	24	10:48	· ·	10.48	(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:01)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
	-								
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:12)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:47)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:04)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:06)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:13)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.170.227				11:05			(00:01)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.170.227	Thu	Nov	12	11:04	-	11:05	(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.170.227	Thu	Nov	12	11:00	-	11:02	(00:02)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.170.227	Thu	Nov	12	11:00	-	11:02	(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Nov	12	00:03	-	00:04	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Nov	11	15:24	_	15:56	(00:31)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki	Wed	Nov	11	14:59	_	15:00	(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki	Wed	Nov	11	14:58	_	14:59	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Nov	11	10:27	_	10:39	(00:12)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Nov	10	11:18	_	11:47	(00:28)
XXXXXXX5	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX				08:29			(00:04)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Sat	Nov	7	11:05	_	11:07	(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Nov		09:34			(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuki-dmz		Nov	5	17:50	_	17:50	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Nov	5	17:49	_	17:49	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/8	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Nov		12:02			(01:52)
XXXXXXX5	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:38			(00:38)
XXXXXXX5	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Nov		10:31			(02:11)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Nov		09:24			(00:45)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Nov	4	17:47	_	17:58	(00:11)
XXXXXXX6	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Nov		16:41			(00:08)
XXXXXXX5	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Nov	4	16:39	_	16:50	(00:11)
XXXXXXX5	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Nov	4	11:59	_	12:01	(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:07)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuki-dmz				11:02			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:00			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:55)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:04)
XXXXX31	pts/6	XXXXX31.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXX31	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:06)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:25)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:11)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:19)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	seki				17:04			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	gatekeeper.ce9.u							(00:27)
XXXXX31	ftp	gatekeeper.ce9.u							(00:13)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
-	± ·				-			-	. /

XXXXX31	ftp	gatekeeper.ce9.u	Mon	Oct	19	11•/3	· · · ·	12.04	(00:20)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:57)
	_	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6								
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:09)
XXXXX31	ftp	208.202.157.62				09:59			(00:19)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:06)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:13)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:13)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:16)
XXXXX31	ftp	we-192-168-2-117				19:15			(00:05)
XXXXX31	ftp	we-192-168-2-117							(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	we-192-168-2-117	Wed	Oct	7	12:21	-	12:24	(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed			11:37			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuki-dmz	Wed	Oct	7	11:36	-	11:36	(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	6	14:34	-	14:36	(00:02)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	6	09:20	_	09:38	(00:18)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	6	09:15	_	09:20	(00:04)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	6	09:13	_	09:14	(00:01)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	6	09:10	_	09:12	(00:02)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	6	09:09	_	09:10	(00:01)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Oct	6	09:03	_	09:08	(00:05)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:01			(00:01)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				07:51			(00:15)
asdfXXX1	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX				07:32			(02:05)
XXXXXXX6	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX				01:18			(02:12)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				01:17			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX				01:15			(02:17)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				13:03			(00:45)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX				22:45			(00:09)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX				23:33			(00:14)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:16)
ftp	ftp	ns.texlab.XXX.XX							(01:54)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.148.2				14:25			(00:12)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.148.2				14:14			(00:02)
XXXXXX31	ftp	192.168.148.2				14:11			(00:02)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.37.68		-					(00:01)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:48)
	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:08)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:10)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:33)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:36)
XXXXXXXX6		cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:08)
XXXXX31	pts/5			-					
	ftp ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX ns.texlab.XXX.XX							(00:01) (00:10)
ftp	ftp								
ftp ftp	ftp ftp	ns.texlab.XXX.XX							(00:02)
ftp ftp	ftp ftp	ns.texlab.XXX.XX							
ftp ftp	ftp ftp	ns.texlab.XXX.XX							(00:02)
ftp vvvvvvv6	ftp pts/6	ns.texlab.XXX.XX							(00:02)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/6 pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	MOU	sep	$\angle \bot$	10:48	-	TO:TQ	(02:24)

ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:24)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:30)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.37.70	Fri	Sep 1	18	15:35	-	15 <b>:</b> 35	(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.37.68	Fri	Sep 1	18	13:27	-	13:27	(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.37.68	Fri	Sep 1	18	12:46	-	12:49	(00:02)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.120.21	Fri	Sep 1	18	11:16	-	11:21	(00:04)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Sep 1	18	08:09	-	09:48	(01:38)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Sep 1	18	01:57	-	02:06	(00:08)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Sep 1	18	01:55	-	01:57	(00:01)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Sep 1	18	00:26	_	01:55	(01:29)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.37.68	Thu	Sep 1	17	11:34	-	11:35	(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	192.168.37.68		-		11:13			(00:15)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:02)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
XXXXX31	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(04:28)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:06)
spear21	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX		V =					(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
ftp	ftp	192.168.51.254		-		12:50			(00:16)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:02)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuko-dmz				10:15			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	-								
	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00) (00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
spear21	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5			-		11:22			
XXXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				17:38			(00:15)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				17:37			(00:00)
root	console	:0		-		16:44			(82+21:46)
asdfXXX1	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		06:56			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		22:53			(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				13:34			(00:01)
spear21	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		13:33			(00:00)
spear21	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		13:32			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				10:02			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		10:01			(03:03)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		21:44			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				21:24			(00:45)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	'I'ue	sep	Ţ	21:24	-	21:24	(00:00)

XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:50)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:53)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXX11	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Sep	1	20:21	-	20:23	(00:02)
XXXXXX11	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:11)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Sep	1	19:56	-	20:10	(00:14)
asdfXXX1	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Sep	1	07:31	-	08:01	(00:29)
XXXXXX11	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Aug	31	17:00	-	17:01	(00:00)
XXXXXX11	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Aug	31	16:04	-	16:23	(00:18)
XXXXXX11	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Aug	31	15:13	-	15:42	(00:28)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Aug	31	14:38	-	16:54	(02:15)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Sun	Aug	30	02:09	-	02:13	(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Sat	Aug	29	08:52	-	09:21	(00:29)
spear21	ftp	192.168.235.252	Fri	Aug	28	13:31	9	13:31	(00:00)
spear21	ftp	192.168.235.252	Fri	Aug	28	11:19	-	11:25	(00:05)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Aug	28	10:12	-	10:15	(00:03)
ftp	ftp	unogate.unocal.c	Thu	Aug	27	11:14	-	11:14	(00:00)
ftp	ftp	unogate.unocal.c	Wed	Aug	26	13:51	-	14:17	(00:26)
ftp	ftp	unogate.unocal.c							(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Aug	26	09:37	-	09:38	(00:01)
asdfXXX1	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Aug	25	11:21	-	11:21	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Aug	24	00:41	-	00:44	(00:02)
spear21	ftp	seki	Fri	Aug	21	10:00	-	10:08	(00:07)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130	Thu	Aug	20	14:34	-	14:36	(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130	Thu	Aug	20	14:32	-	14:32	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki	Thu	Aug	20	14:21	-	14:22	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Aug	20	14:20	-	16:50	(02:29)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Aug	20	14:04	-	14:05	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130	Thu	Aug	20	13:06	-	13:06	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Aug	20	13:02	-	16:40	(03:37)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130	Thu	Aug	20	13:00	-	13:02	(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130				16:38			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130				16:37			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:23)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(01:28)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki				16:35			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuko-dmz				15:19			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:20)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130				15 <b>:</b> 17			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130				15:09			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	192.168.84.130				15:04			(00:08)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130		-		15:03			(00:03)
ftp	ftp	192.168.84.130				15:02			(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	192.168.84.130				11:48			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.130				11:19			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:06)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:09)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:25)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:07)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:20)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:26)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Aug	17	11:05	-	11:27	(00:21)

XXXXXXX6 pts/1 192.168.51.254 Thu Aug 13 16:32 - 16:38 (00:0	161
spear21 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Thu Aug 13 11:01 - 11:02 (00:0	
spear21 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Thu Aug 13 10:50 - 10:57 (00:0	
XXXXXXX6 pts/1 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Aug 12 00:22 - 00:57 (00:3	
XXXXXXX6         pts/1         Cerberus.XXX.XXX         wed Aug 12         00.22         00.37         (00.37           XXXXXXX6         pts/1         cerberus.XXX.XXX         Fri Aug 7         16:13         -         18:24         (02:13)	
XXXXXX6 pts/1 cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Aug 7 15:57 - 15:58 (00:0	
XXXXXX6 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Aug 7 15:57 - 15:57 (00:0	
XXXXXXX6 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Aug 7 15:54 - 15:56 (00:0	
root console :0 Fri Aug 7 13:05 - 14:42 (01:3	
spear21 ftp 192.168.51.76 Fri Aug 7 10:44 - 11:01 (00:1	
spear21 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Aug 7 07:49 - 08:34 (00:4	
XXXXXXX4 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Aug 7 07:48 - 07:49 (00:0	)))
spear21 ftp 192.168.119.171 Thu Aug 6 16:05 - 16:22 (00:1	
ftp ftp 192.168.119.171 Thu Aug 6 15:39 - 15:40 (00:0	01)
spear21 ftp 192.168.51.76 Thu Aug 6 14:56 - 14:58 (00:0	)2)
spear21 ftp 192.168.119.171 Thu Aug 6 14:50 - 14:56 (00:0	)5)
spear21 ftp 192.168.119.171 Thu Aug 6 14:41 - 14:42 (00:0	01)
spear21 ftp 192.168.119.171 Thu Aug 6 14:33 - 14:40 (00:0	06)
ftp ftp 192.168.119.171 Thu Aug 6 14:33 - 14:33 (00:0	00)
spear21 ftp 192.168.192.157 Thu Aug 6 10:47 - 10:50 (00:0	
spear21 ftp 192.168.192.157 Thu Aug 6 09:48 - 09:51 (00:0	
XXXXXX11 pts/0 cerberus.XXX.XXX Thu Aug 6 08:30 - 08:33 (00:0	
XXXXXX6 pts/2 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Aug 5 22:24 - 22:58 (00:3	
XXXXXXX6 pts/0 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Aug 5 22:19 - 00:30 (02:1	
spear21 ftp 192.168.192.148 Wed Aug 5 11:45 - 11:46 (00:0	
spear21 ftp 192.168.192.148 Wed Aug 5 11:37 - 11:39 (00:0	
asdfXXX1 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Aug 5 07:13 - 07:18 (00:0	
spear21 ftp 192.168.192.145 Tue Aug 4 10:01 - 10:03 (00:0	
spear21 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Mon Aug 3 15:05 - 15:07 (00:0	
spear21         ftp         cerberus.XXX.Mon Aug         3 15:05 - 15:07         (00:00)           spear21         ftp         cerberus.XXX.XXX Mon Aug         3 15:05 - 15:05         (00:00)	
Spearzi       icp       Cerberus.XXX.Mon Aug       5 15.05       15.05       (00.0         XXXXXXX4       pts/2       cerberus.XXX.XXX       Thu Jul       30 15:19       - 17:28       (02:0	
XXXXXXX4       pts/2       cerberus.XXX.XXX       filu out out out out out out out out out ou	
XXXXXXX4 pts/0 cerberus.XXX.XXX Thu Jul 30 10:45 - 13:16 (02:3	
XXXXXXX4       pts/0       cerberus.XXX.XXX       filu 5ul 50       fol.45       15.16       (02.1         XXXXXXX4       pts/0       cerberus.XXX.XXX       Thu Jul 30       09:09       -       10:34       (01:2	
-	
-	
±	
-	
XXXXXX4 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Jul 29 17:47 - 17:48 (00:0	
XXXXXX4 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Jul 29 17:27 - 17:28 (00:0	
XXXXXX4 pts/4 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Jul 29 16:31 - 18:31 (01:5	
XXXXXX4 pts/3 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Jul 29 16:09 - 18:31 (02:2	
XXXXXX4 pts/2 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Jul 29 14:38 - 17:29 (02:5	
XXXXXX4 pts/0 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Jul 29 13:14 - 17:21 (04:0	
XXXXXX4 pts/0 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Jul 29 12:49 - 12:59 (00:0	
XXXXXX2 pts/0 cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Jul 29 10:50 - 10:50 (00:0	
XXXXXXX4 ftp cobalt.foobar.as Wed Jul 29 10:44 - 10:44 (00:0	
spear21 ftp pna-169.kla-ten- Wed Jul 29 10:32 - 10:32 (00:0	
XXXXXXX4 pts/0 cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Jul 28 18:15 - 18:32 (00:1	
XXXXXXX4 pts/0 cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Jul 28 14:24 - 16:41 (02:1	
XXXXXX6 ftp pna-169.kla-ten- Tue Jul 28 11:13 - 11:20 (00:0	
XXXXXX4 pts/2 cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Jul 28 10:32 - 14:34 (04:0	
spear21 ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Jul 28 09:12 - 09:20 (00:0	
ftp ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Jul 28 09:11 - 09:12 (00:0	
ftp ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Jul 28 09:11 - 09:11 (00:0	
ftp ftp cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Jul 28 09:10 - 09:11 (00:0	)))

XXXXXXX4	pts/0	cerberus.XXX.XXX	T110	.T11 ]	28	08•41	· ·	10.52	(02:10)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
root	console	:0				11:57			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/0	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:20)
	-	Cerberus.xxx.xxx				11:49		14.11	(02.20)
reboot	system boot	- 0						11.40	(0.0 - 1.0)
root	console	:0				11:07			(00:40)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:17)
asdfXXX1	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX					-	11:06	(00:53)
reboot	system boot					13:24			0
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:17)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	gateway.bar.foob							(00:01)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	23	15:56	9	16:03	(00:07)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	23	15:49	Υ.	15:55	(00:06)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	23	15:24	-	17:51	(02:26)
asdfXXX1	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	23	13:33	_	13:33	(00:00)
asdfXXX1	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	23	12:51	_	13:29	(00:37)
asdfXXX1	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	23	10:51	_	11:25	(00:34)
asdfXXX1	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:10)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:22)
spear21	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:39)
spear21	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:05)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:10)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:27)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:11)
XXXXXXXX5	pts/5 pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:22)
	-	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:11)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5								
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:48)
ftp	ftp	foo0-119.bar-baz							(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	mailman.XXX.XXX				10:48			(00:14)
ftp	ftp	mailman.XXX.XXX				10:47			(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:05)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:23)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	mailman.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
XXXXXXX6	pts/9	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(9+21:27)
XXXXXXX4	pts/8	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:28)
XXXXXXX6	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:11)
XXXXXXX6	pts/8	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:10)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:47)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX4	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:11)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:10)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(05:37)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:54)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:05)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:13)
XXXXXXX4	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX2	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:06)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	15	17:11	-	17:12	(00:00)

XXXXXXX4	ftp	gateway.pub.foob					(00:00)
XXXXXXX2	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:11)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:03)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:29)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(02:47)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
ftp	ftp	pix3-112.kla-ten					(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
ftp	ftp	pix3-112.kla-ten					(01:49)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:05)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:18)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:17)
asdfXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:03)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	gateway.pub.gett					(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:48)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:25)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(01:07)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:07)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	kuko-dmz			16:52 -		(02:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	kuko-dmz			15:19 -		(01:33)
root	console	:0			12:47 -		(13+00:37)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:06)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
jjXXXXX3	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:02)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	209.60.58.129			12:05 -		(00:05)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(02:58)
jjXXXXX3	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
jjXXXXX3	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
jjXXXXX3	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
jjXXXXX3	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
jjXXXXX3	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
jjXXXXX3	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:00)
jjXXXXX3	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:39)
jjXXXXX3	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:30)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:03)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:08)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:05)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX					(00:09)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX			15:24 -		(00:04)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	192.168.58.5	Thu Ji			- 15:23	(00:04)
jjXXXXX3	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				12:21	(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	192.168.58.5	Thu Ji			- 11:13	(00:05)
XXXXXXX4	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX			11:07 -		(00:09)
jjXXXXX3	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX			10:47 -		(02:38)
jjXXXXX3	console	:0	Thu Ju		10:35 -		(00:04)
jjXXXXX3	console	:0	Thu Ju		10:33 -		(00:01)
jjXXXXX3	pts/5	localhost	Thu Ju.		10:31 -		(00:00)
root	console	:0	Thu Ju.		10:24 -		(00:08)
spear21	ftp ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX			09:51 - 09:50 -		(00:01) (00:00)
spear21	ftp ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX cerberus.XXX.XXX			09:50 -		(00:00)
spear21	ftp	CEIDEIUS, XXX, XXX	IIIU JU.	± 9	09.42 -	09.40	(00.02)

XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				14:35			(00:06)
XXXXXXX2	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX				14:31			(00:03)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	192.168.58.5		Jul		14:27			(00:01)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX				14:25			(00:04)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	14:24	-	14:25	(00:00)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX			8	14:01	-	14:04	(00:02)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul		13:34			(00:04)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	13:27	-	13:31	(00:03)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	13:21	-	13:24	(00:03)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	13:19	-	13:20	(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	192.168.58.5	Wed	Jul		13:11			(00:07)
XXXXXXX2	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	13:11	-	15:39	(02:28)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	13:07	-	13:09	(00:01)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	12:57	G	14:17	(01:19)
XXXXXXX2	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	10:43	-	11:05	(00:22)
XXXXXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul	8	10:38	-	10:42	(00:04)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jul	6	10:36	_	10:36	(00:00)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	14:38	-	14:52	(00:13)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	14:33	_	14:38	(00:05)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	14:05	_	14:33	(00:27)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	13:57	_	13:59	(00:01)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	13:38	_	13:53	(00:15)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	13:31	_	13:33	(00:02)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	13:30	_	13:31	(00:01)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	13:26	_	13:29	(00:02)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX			2	13:22	_	13:26	(00:04)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				13:18			(00:02)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul		13:12			(00:04)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul		12:52			(00:15)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				12:45			(00:02)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				12:41			(00:01)
XXXXXXX9	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				12:24			(00:09)
XXXXXXX9	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul		12:10			(02:30)
XXXXXXX2	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:58			(02:02)
spear21	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul		11:57			(00:00)
XXXXXXX2	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:57			(00:00)
spear21	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul		11:41			(00:00)
spear21	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:41			(00:00)
	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul		11:39			(00:00)
spear21	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul	2	11:36	_	11:36	(00:00)
spear21	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:32			(00:00)
spear21	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:31			(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jul		11:23			(02:54)
asdfXXX3	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jul		10:37			(00:14)
asdfXXX3	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				10:26			(00:04)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
spear21	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz				09:33			(00:03)
asdfXXX3	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:31			(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:31			(00:01)
spear21	ftp	pix0-81.kla-tenc							(00:03)
XXXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
spear21	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:05)
XXXXXXXX4	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
spear21	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:06)
22002727	- 010		- 40	0 411	00				(00.00)

cno2r <sup>21</sup>	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz		Tun	20	11.16	• • •	11.17	(00:00)
spear21	ftp nto/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXXXXX6	pts/1								(00:01)
spear21	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:00)
spear21	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:01)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:05)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki				09:59			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki				09:58			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	30	09 <b>:</b> 57	-	09:59	(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jun	29	15:54	-	15:54	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki	Mon	Jun	29	15:53	-	15:53	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jun	29	15:50	_	15:54	(00:03)
ftp	ftp	192.168.220.249	Mon	Jun	29	11:16	Ġ,	11:26	(00:10)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Sun	Jun	28	16:15	-	16:22	(00:07)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	192.168.249.130	Sun	Jun	28	16:14	-	16:20	(00:06)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	192.168.249.130				16:09			(00:02)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1					16:07			(00:04)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	mailman.XXX.XXX				16:06			(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:23)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	pix3-130.foo-bar							(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
	-								
XXX33	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXX33	ftp	seki				11:10			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki				10:54			(00:15)
XXX33	ftp	seki				10:24			(00:01)
XXX33	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki				16:47			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:42)
ftp	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:03)
XXX33	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki				14:24			(00:02)
XXX33	ftp	seki				14:24			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	23	14:08	-	15:20	(01:12)
XXX33	ftp	seki	Tue	Jun	23	13:33	-	13:40	(00:07)
XXX33	ftp	seki	Tue	Jun	23	13:24	-	13:26	(00:02)
XXXXXXX4	pts/3	mailman.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	23	12:40	_	12:42	(00:01)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	192.168.112.2	Tue	Jun	23	12:39	_	12:42	(00:02)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	192.168.112.2	Tue	Jun	23	12:36	_	12:36	(00:00)
spear21	ftp	192.168.112.2	Tue	Jun	23	11:06	_	11:19	(00:12)
XXXXXXX4	pts/3	mailman.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	23	11:00	_	11:19	(00:19)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:22)
XXX33	ftp	seki				17:56			(00:02)
XXX33	ftp	pix1-112.foo-bar							(00:03)
XXX33	ftp	pix1-112.foo-bar							(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	pix1-112.foo-bar							(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	foo0-249.bar-baz							(00:03)
XXX33		seki				15:14			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1 ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:29)
XXX33	ftp	seki				14:42			(00:01)
spear21	ftp	seki				14:42			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki				14:37			(00:01)
spear21	ftp	seki				14:25			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jun	22	⊥3:43	-	14:25	(00:42)

spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki				13:26			(00:00)
spear21	ftp	seki				13:25			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki				13:24			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jun	22	12:22	-	13:38	(01:16)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:05)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:25)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jun	22	11 <b>:</b> 43	-	13:53	(02:10)
ftp	ftp	pix2-201.foo-bar	Fri	Jun	19	14:38	-	14:39	(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Jun	19	14:37	-	14:38	(00:01)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Jun	19	14:30	-	14:30	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Jun	19	14:29	-	15:12	(00:42)
ftp	ftp	pix1-46.foo-bar.	Fri	Jun	19	14:28	_	14:30	(00:02)
ftp	ftp	pix1-218.foo-bar	Wed	Jun	17	17:48	È	17:48	(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	192.168.115.11	Wed	Jun	17	11:11	-	11:42	(00:31)
XXX33	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Jun	17	10:22	-	10:47	(00:24)
XXX33	ftp	192.168.115.11	Wed	Jun	17	09:03	_	09:33	(00:30)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	16	18:52	_	18:52	(00:00)
ftp	ftp	pix3-67.foo-barc	Tue	Jun	16	18:42	_	18:48	(00:06)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	16	18:40	_	18:51	(00:11)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	16	18:39	_	18:40	(00:00)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	16	18:39	_	18:39	(00:00)
spear21	ftp	pix3-67.foo-barc	Tue	Jun	16	10:38	_	10:41	(00:02)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	mailman.XXX.XXX				10:35			(00:02)
spear21	ftp	seki				10:33			(00:02)
XXX33	ftp	seki				10:23			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
XXX33	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:10)
XXX33	ftp	192.168.115.11				08:59			(00:06)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:09)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	seki				00:46			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	seki				00:45			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:11)
XXXXXXX6	-	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		0 0.11				0 - 0 /	(02:20)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
XXXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:24)
XXXXXXXX4 XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:05)
XXXXXXXXX6	pts/1	mailman.XXX.XXX				15:21			(00:01)
XXX33	ftp	seki				15:19			(00:01)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	mailman.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXX33		yadayadal.nashua							(00:02)
XXX33	ftp ftp	foobar.bazquux.a							(00:02)
XXX33	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				17:46			(00:01)
XXX33 XXX33	ftp ftp	seki seki		Jun		17:43 15:56			(00:00) (00:00)
XXX33 XXX33	ftp								
XXX33	ftp	seki				15:53			(00:00)
asdfXXX1 vvv22	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				07:45			(00:02)
XXX33	ftp	seki		Jun		18:59			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki	MOU	Jun	Ø	18:38	-	T0:30	(00:00)

XXX33	ftp	seki	Mon	Jun	8	18:12	•	18:13	(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki		Jun		18:11			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki		Jun		18:10			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki		Jun		18:09			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	kuko-dmz		Jun		17:21			(00:00)
	-	kuko-dmz				17:07			
XXXXXXX6	pts/1			Jun					(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	kuko-dmz		Jun		16:56			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	dargghasd.nashua				15:47			(00:15)
XXX33	ftp	seki		Jun		15:44			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki	-	Jun		14:45			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki		Jun		14:38			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki		Jun		14:02			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki		Jun		13:36			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	dargghasd.nashua	Mon	Jun		13:35			(00:01)
XXX33	ftp	seki	Mon	Jun	8	13:04	-	13:04	(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki	Mon	Jun		12:54			(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	dargghasd.nashua	Mon	Jun	8	12:39	-	12:40	(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	seki	Mon	Jun	8	10:57	_	10:58	(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	dargghasd.nashua	Mon	Jun	8	10:57	_	10:57	(00:00)
XXX33	ftp	mailman.XXX.XXX		Jun		10:51			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	mailman.XXX.XXX		Jun		10:47			(00:03)
spear21	ftp	localhost		Jun		19:39			(00:00)
spear21	ftp	localhost		Jun		19:38			(00:00)
spear21	ftp	localhost		Jun		19:36			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	pts/1	mailman.XXX.XXX		Jun		19:19			(00:21)
	ftp	seki		Jun		18:11			(00:00)
spear21									
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	seki		Jun		17:29			(00:02)
dfXX12	ftp	meihost.goaway.y				10:26			(00:05)
dfXX12	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:42			(00:11)
XXXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:35			(00:19)
dfXX12	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX			5	08:04			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX			5	01:30			(01:04)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	-			15:01			(00:00)
dfXX12	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				14 <b>:</b> 57			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX				14:56			(00:06)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX				14:49			(00:07)
fdXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jun	4	14:43	-	14:44	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX			-	14:40			(00:13)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:16)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX				14:19	-	14:41	(00:21)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				11:46			(00:04)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jun	4	00:23	-	00:43	(00:19)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Jun	4	00:12	-	00:23	(00:11)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Jun	2	23:11	_	23:14	(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jun	1	16:33	_	16:33	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Jun	1	08:55	_	09:41	(00:46)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	seki				10:08			(00:02)
XXXXXXXX4	ftp	seki		_		10:08			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX4	ftp	seki						10:08	(00:00)
XXXXXXXX4	ftp	seki				10:05			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	seki						11:34	(00:00)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(03:52)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
ΛΛΛΛΛΛΛΟ	τcb	CEINEINS.VVV.VVV	тиe	na y	20	1 ک و ن	-	07.21	(00.00)

XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	<b>T</b> 110	Matz	26	09.25	· · · ·	13.10	(03:53)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:02)
-									
spear21	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		_					(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:04)
XXXXXXX6	ftp			_		09:17			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:13)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:22)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	pix2-22.foo-barc							(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	May	15	17:55	9	18:00	(00:05)
spear21	ftp	seki	Fri	May	15	16:41	-	16:42	(00:00)
spear21	ftp	seki	Fri	May	15	16:38	-	16 <b>:</b> 39	(00:01)
spear21	ftp	seki	Fri	May	15	16:36	-	16:37	(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	May	15	15:16	-	15 <b>:</b> 16	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	May	15	13:57	_	14:44	(00:47)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	May	15	03:16	_	04:06	(00:49)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	May	14	23:52	_	03:25	(03:32)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	May	14	23:52	_	23:52	(00:00)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	May	14	16:06	_	16:22	(00:15)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:20)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:26)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:03)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:15)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
spear21	ftp					14:58			(00:08)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		10:01			(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:20			(00:07)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		_		11:20			(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	-	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:31)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:06)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:02)
asdfXXX1	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:16)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX				08:41			(00:12)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		15:41			(00:16)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		15:40			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX				13:51			(00:00)
XXXXXXXX5	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX		_		11:16			(02:34)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		10:38			(00:15)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		10:30			(00:01)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				10:02			(00:10)
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:33			(00:00)
javelin	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:17			(00:15)
XXXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				09:13			(00:04)
XXXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX				08:54			(02:22)
	r 00/ 0			1 104 Y	-	50.01			(02.22)

1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1		1				07 50		00 07	(00.00)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
spear21	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:04)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:02)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:29)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(04:32)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:11)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:01)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Apr	28	13:06	-	13:42	(00:35)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Apr	28	11:18	-	11:25	(00:07)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Apr	28	11:10	-	11:18	(00:08)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	mailman.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	15:13	-	15:29	(00:15)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki 💦	Mon	Apr	27	12:24	-	12:26	(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	12:09	-	14:26	(02:16)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	08:38	-	08:38	(00:00)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	08:16	-	08:17	(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	08:07	-	08:09	(00:01)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	07:42	-	08:07	(00:25)
asdfXXX1	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	07:40	-	08:00	(00:19)
asdfXXX1	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	07:05	-	07:11	(00:06)
asdfXXX1	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	06:47	-	07:15	(00:27)
asdfXXX1	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr	27	06:44	-	06:47	(00:02)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Sat	Apr	25	01:52	-	01:52	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Sat	Apr	25	01:41	-	02:09	(00:28)
root	console	:0	Fri	Apr	24	13:46	-	09:36	(13+19:49)
asdfXXX1	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Apr	24	07:58	-	07:59	(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr	23	13:03	-	13:04	(00:01)
XXXXXXX5	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr	22	15:54	-	18:03	(02:09)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr	22	15 <b>:</b> 53	-	15:54	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr	22	15:46	-	15:47	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr	22	15:45	-	18:16	(02:31)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr	22	15:36	_	15:38	(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr	22	15:35	_	15:36	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:07)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:41)
XXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					
XXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					
XXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							
XXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
	- <b>T</b>		2.54	T	_				/

XXXX2	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr 2	2 13:07		13:08	(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
root	console	:0			2 11:09			(00:02)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(02:01)
XXXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:01)
XXXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:01)
	-							
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(01:39)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	seki			1 14:10			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	asdfasd.w00t.org						(00:11)
root	console	:0			1 10:04			(00:07)
XXXXX32	ftp	kuko-dmz			1 09:38			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	kuko-dmz			1 09:11			(00:26)
XXXXX32	ftp	kuko-dmz			1 09:10			(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	kuko-dmz			1 09:07			(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	SECURE8.foob.edu		-				(00:08)
XXXXX32	ftp	SECUREj.foob.edu						(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	SECURE4.foob.edu						(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	SECURE5.foob.edu						(00:00)
ftp	ftp	SECURE2.foob.edu	Mon	Apr 2	0 14:33	-	14:35	(00:01)
XXXXX32	ftp	SECURE8.foob.edu	Mon	Apr 2	0 14:32	-	14:32	(00:00)
ftp	ftp	SECUREj.foob.edu	Mon	Apr 2	0 14:24	-	14:24	(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	SECURE2.foob.edu	Mon	Apr 2	0 14:11	_	14:24	(00:13)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr 2	0 10:07	' -	10:08	(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Mon	Apr 2	0 10:07	-	10:08	(00:01)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:03)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:41)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Fri	Apr 1	7 08:58	3 —	11:11	(02:13)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:16)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:05)
XXXXXXX4	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr 1	6 11:16	5 –	11:45	(00:29)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:16)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr 1	5 17:56	5 –	18:09	(00:12)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr 1	5 11:05	5 —	11:34	(00:29)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Apr 1	5 11:04	-	11:05	(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp						07:39	
ftp	ftp	192.168.77.226						(00:07)
asdfXXX1	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:01)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:03)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-				(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:13)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-				(02:48)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(01:14)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
asdfXXX1	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX						
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX						(01:50)

XXXXX32	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Anr	g	17:43		17•45	(00:02)
XXXXX32				-		17:07			(00:35)
	ftp nta/2	-		Apr		16:53			
XXXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	10k.singingbeagl 5				01:42			(02:27)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX W		-		17:02			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX W				16:59			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX V				15:23			(01:40)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX V				10:55			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX V				10:13			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX W		-		09:28			(02:09)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX V				02:59			(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX V				02:53			(00:08)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX V				01:16			(00:45)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX V	Wed	Apr	8	01:12	9	02:45	(01:32)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX V	Wed	Apr	8	01:08	-	02:45	(01:37)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX V	Wed	Apr		00:59			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX V	Wed	Apr	8	00:58	-	00:58	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX V	Wed	Apr	8	00:52	-	02:53	(02:00)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	mailman.XXX.XXX	Tue	Apr	7	15:56	-	15:57	(00:01)
XXXXXXX4	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Tue	Apr	7	15:34	-	16:25	(00:51)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	mailman.XXX.XXX	Tue	Apr	7	14:15	_	14:20	(00:04)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX			7	14:09	_	14:15	(00:05)
milhaton	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX			7	13:59	_	14:00	(00:00)
root	console			Apr	7	13:51	_	16:54	(03:03)
XXXXXXX4	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX				12:20			(00:52)
XXXXXXX4	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-		11:32			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX M		-		18:15			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX N		-		17:34			(00:38)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX N				17:05			(00:17)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX S		-		18:24			(02:42)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX S				18:06			(00:16)
XXXXXXX4	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H		-		10:25			(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX H		-		10:23			(02:39)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H				09:51			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H		-		09:51			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H		-		09:51			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H				09:51			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H		-		09:51			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H				09:50			(00:00)
XXXXXXX4	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX H		-		08:58			(00:22)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX H				08:42			(00:14)
milhaton	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX H		-		08:42			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H		-		08:18			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H				07:42			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX H				07:29			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX H				07:09			(01:10)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H		-		01:32			(00:16)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H				01:30			(00:01)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H				01:27			(00:02)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H				01:25			(00:02)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H		-		01:23			(00:01)
XXXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H				01:23			(00:01)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H				01:04			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H				00:57			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H				00:56			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H		-		00:50			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl H				00:53			(00:00)
	- °P			* 'P' +	5				(00.00)

XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:43			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl		-		00:43			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:34			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:26			(00:08)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:21			(00:04)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:19			(00:02)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Fri	Apr	3	00:17	-	00:17	(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Fri	Apr	3	00:12			(00:01)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Fri	Apr	3	00:11			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:10			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:09			(00:00)
XXXXX32	ftp	10k.singingbeagl		-		00:09			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Fri	Apr		00:08			(00:00)
milhaton	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:06			(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Fri	Apr		00:01			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				00:00			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				23:59			(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr		23:46			(03:53)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Thu	Apr		23:38			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				23:37			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr		23:36			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr		23:35			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl				23:13			(00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr		23:07			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr		23:06			(00:00)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Thu	Apr	2	22:51	-	22 <b>:</b> 51	(00:00)
ftp	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Thu	Apr		22:32			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	10k.singingbeagl	Thu	Apr		22:27			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr		22:18			(03:33)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	10k.singingbeagl	Thu	Apr	2	22:14	-	22:15	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	10k.singingbeagl	Thu	Apr	2	22:09	-	22:14	(00:04)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	10k.singingbeagl	Thu	Apr		22:07			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr	2	21:52	-	21:53	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuko-dmz	Thu	Apr	2	14:18	-	14:18	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	kuko-dmz	Thu	Apr		14:18			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	kuko-dmz	Thu	Apr		14:16			(02:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr		13:36			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Thu	Apr		13:34			(02:39)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	192.168.84.66	Wed	Apr		18:50			(00:02)
root	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX				18:03			(00:00)
root	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX		-					(00:00)
root	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:47)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:07)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:20)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.66	Wed	Apr		14:28			(00:00)
root	console	:0		Apr		14:21			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:06)
root	console	:0				10:32			(01:15)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:08)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:58)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:32)
root	console	:0	Fri	Mar	27	13:45	-	13:48	(00:02)

171717171717171717	ftee	cerberus.XXX.XXX	End	Mere		11.10		11.40	(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp								
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:10)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:33)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:49)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:19)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:03)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:17)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:43)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:15)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	14:45	-	15:23	(00:37)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	14:45	-	14:45	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	14:21	-	14:21	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	14:21	-	14:21	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	13:28	-	15:40	(02:11)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	12:42	_	13:18	(00:35)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	12:15	_	12:16	(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	10:03	_	10:03	(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	10:01	_	10:02	(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	09:55	_	12:23	(02:28)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	09:54	_	09:54	(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	25	09:25	_	09:52	(00:27)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
root	console	:0	Tue	Mar	24	17:38	_	09:49	(16:10)
root	console	:0	Mon	Mar	23	18:50	_	19:03	(00:12)
root	console	:0	Mon	Mar	23	18:47	_	18:48	(00:00)
reboot	system boot		Thu	Mar	19	12:45			
root	console	:0	Thu	Mar	19	12:15	_	12:16	(00:01)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	192.168.84.65	Thu	Mar	19	11:10	_	11:13	(00:02)
XXXXXXX5	console		Thu	Mar	19	11:06	_	11:11	(00:04)
XXXXXXX5	console	:0	Thu	Mar	19	11:05	_	11:06	(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	console	:0				11:05			(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	console	: 0	Thu	Mar	19	11:05	_	11:05	(00:00)
XXXXXXX5	console	:0	Thu	Mar	19	11:04	_	11:04	(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX	Wed	Mar	11	16:26	_	17:56	(01:30)
root	console	:0				14:41			(00:09)
root	console	:0				12:37			(00:01)
root	console	:0	Wed	Mar	11	12:29	_	12:34	(00:04)
root	console	:0				10:38			(00:04)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	192.168.84.200				19:01			(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(01:10)
root	console	:0	Tue	Mar	10	15:33	_	15:57	(00:23)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:11)
XXXXXXX5	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:16)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:10)
XXXXXXX5	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(00:09)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:10)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX							(02:10)
	-								

XXXXX32	ftn	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 18:07 - 18:08 (00:00)
	ftp ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:57 - 17:58 (00:00)
ftp	ftp ptp//	
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:57 - 18:08 (00:11)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:46 - 17:48 (00:01)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:46 - 17:46 (00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:41 - 17:43 (00:02)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:33 - 17:35 (00:01)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:32 - 17:32 (00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:31 - 17:32 (00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:28 - 17:31 (00:03)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:26 - 17:28 (00:01)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:25 - 17:26 (00:00)
ftp	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:17 - 17:25 (00:07)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:17 - 17:17 (00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:16 - 20:01 (02:45)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 17:04 - 17:17 (00:13)
XXXXXXX6	pts/8	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 16:27 - 19:22 (02:55)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 16:26 - 16:41 (00:15)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 16:24 - 16:24 (00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/7	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 16:21 - 18:35 (02:13)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 16:20 - 16:20 (00:00)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 15:50 - 16:06 (00:15)
XXXXXXX6	pts/6	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 15:02 - 18:18 (03:16)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 14:55 - 17:06 (02:10)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 14:41 - 16:53 (02:11)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 14:24 - 16:50 (02:25)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 14:20 - 14:36 (00:15)
XXXXXXX6	pts/5	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 11:25 - 13:38 (02:13)
XXXXXXX6	pts/4	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 11:09 - 13:29 (02:20)
XXXXXXX6	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 11:08 - 11:08 (00:00)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 24 11:06 - 13:15 (02:08)
XXXXXXX6	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX Sun Feb 22 15:16 - 17:29 (02:13)
XXXXXXX5	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 17 14:05 - 14:09 (00:03)
XXXXXXX5	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX Tue Feb 17 13:50 - 13:54 (00:04)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 14:29 - 14:31 (00:02)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 14:29 - 14:29 (00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 12:07 - 14:22 (02:15)
XXXXXXX5	pts/3	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 10:45 - 13:01 (02:15)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 10:38 - 10:38 (00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 10:34 - 10:45 (00:10)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 10:33 - 10:33 (00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 10:11 - 10:34 (00:23)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 10:00 - 10:11 (00:10)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 10:00 - 10:00 (00:00)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 09:45 - 10:01 (00:15)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 09:37 - 09:45 (00:08)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 09:34 - 09:35 (00:01)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 09:30 - 09:33 (00:03)
XXXXXXX5	ftp	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 09:16 - 09:21 (00:05)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Fri Feb 13 09:15 - 09:35 (00:19)
XXXXXXX6	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX Thu Feb 12 16:04 - 18:23 (02:18)
XXXXXXX2	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Thu Feb 12 15:49 - 18:05 (02:16)
XXXXXXX2	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Feb 11 16:57 - 16:58 (00:00)
XXXXXXX2	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Feb 11 16:56 - 16:57 (00:01)
XXXXXXX5	pts/2	cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Feb 11 16:48 - 16:49 (00:01)
XXXXXXX2	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Feb 11 16:47 - 16:51 (00:03)
XXXXXXX5	pts/1	cerberus.XXX.XXX Wed Feb 11 16:18 - 16:18 (00:00)

XXXXXXX2	pts/4	localhost	Wed Feb	) 11 16:15 - 16:15 (00:00)
root	console	:0		b 11 16:07 - 16:17 (00:10)
root	console	:0		5 11 10:18 - 10:22 (00:04)
reboot	system boot	• 0		o 9 15:19
root	console	:0		o 2 09:19 - down (7+06:00)
root	console	:0		2 09:19 - 00:10 (700:00)
				$30 \ 13:38 \ - \ 14:24 \ (00:46)$
root	console	:0		
root	console	:0		1 30 13:01 - 13:31 (00:29)
root	console	:0		129 09:08 - 10:02 (00:53)
root	console	:0		n 28 16:08 - 16:24 (00:16)
reboot	system boot			n 28 16:06
root	console	:0		128 16:03 - 16:06 (00:02)
root	console	:0		n 28 16:02 - 16:03 (00:01)
reboot	system boot			n 28 15:56
root	console	:0	Wed Jar	n 28 15:19 - 15:56 (00:37)
root	ftp	192.168.84.65	Wed Jar	n 28 15:13 - 15:16 (00:02)
root	console	:0	Tue Jar	n 27 18:00 - 18:03 (00:02)
reboot	system boot			1 27 17:59
root	ftp	192.168.84.65	Tue Jar	127 17:27 - 17:32 (00:04)
root	console	:0		n 27 17:26 - 17:58 (00:32)
root	console	:0		126 17:51 - 17:54 (00:02)
reboot	system boot			1 26 17:49
root	console	:0		126 17:31 - 17:49 (00:17)
reboot	system boot	• 0		26 17:25
ICDOOC	System boot		Hon our	1 20 17.23
wtmp begi	ns Mon Jan 26	17:25		
# logins	-x			
root	0	other	1	Super-User
1000	0	/	-	Super Ober
		/ /sbin/sh		
		PS 120699 -1 -1	_1	
smtp	0	root	0	Mail Daemon User
ыпер	0	/	0	Hall Daemon 0501
		/ /sbin/sh		
		LK 082587 -1 -1	1	
-1	1			
daemon	1	other	1	
		/sbin/sh	1	
, ·		LK 082587 -1 -1		
bin	2	bin	2	
		/usr/bin		
		/sbin/sh		
		LK 082587 -1 -1	-1	
sys	3	sys	3	
		/sbin/sh		
		LK 082587 -1 -1	-1	
adm	4	adm	4	Admin
		/var/adm		
		/sbin/sh		
		LK 082587 -1 -1	-1	
uucp	5	uucp	5	uucp Admin
		/usr/lib/uucp		
		/sbin/sh		
		LK 082587 -1 -1	-1	
smap	6	LK 082587 -1 -1 mail	-1 6	SMAP Daemon User

		/var/spool/smap	
		/sbin/sh	
	_	LK 082587 -1 -1 -1	
nuucp	9	nuucp 9	uucp Admin
		/var/spool/uucppublic	
		/usr/lib/uucp/uucico	
		LK 082587 -1 -1 -1	
listen	37	adm 4	Network Admin
		/usr/net/nls	
		/sbin/sh	
		LK 000000 -1 -1 -1	
lp	71	lp 8	Line Printer Admin
		/usr/spool/lp	
		/sbin/sh	
		LK 082587 -1 -1 -1	
oracle	100	dba 100	Oracle User
		/u01/app/oracle/product	2/7.3.3
		/usr/bin/csh	
		PS 040198 -1 -1 -1	
web	1001	webusers 1001	Web user
		/data/home/web	
		/bin/sh	
		PS 021398 -1 -1 -1 🔷	
XXXXXXX2	1002	staff 10	Disabled - Ray Arriaza
		/data/home/XXXXXXX2	-
		/bin/false	
		LK 021298 -1 -1 -1	
XXXXXXX3	1003	staff 10	Disabled - Bob Herrman
		/data/home/XXXXXXX3	
		/bin/false	
		LK 112498 -1 -1 -1	
XXXXXXX4	1004	staff 10	Disabled - Robert Armstrong
		/data/home/XXXXXXX4	5
		/bin/false	
		LK 022599 -1 -1 -1	
XXXXXXX5	1005	staff 10	Disabled - Lance Kurisaki
		/data/home/XXXXXXX5	
		/bin/false	
		LK 092999 -1 -1 -1	
XXXXXXX6	1006	staff 10	Disabled - Anthony Van Damme
		/data/home/XXXXXXX6	
		/bin/false	
		LK 011499 -1 -1 -1	
XXXXXXX7	1007	staff 10	MaryAnn Van Damme
		/data/home/XXXXXXX7	
		/usr/bin/csh	
		PS 021298 -1 -1 -1	
XXXXX8	1008	webusers 1001	Rocky Weber
		/data/home/asdfXXX1	
		/bin/csh	
		PS 110599 -1 -1 -1	
XXXXXXX9	1009	staff 10	Andre Jackson
		/data/home/XXXXXXX9	
		/usr/bin/csh	
		PS 022399 -1 -1 -1	
XXXXXX11	1011	staff 10	Disabled - Todd Allaria
		/data/home/XXXXXX11	

		/bin/false
XXXXXX12	1012	LK 080698 -1 -1 -1 staff 10 Sean Bridgewater
MMMMIL	1012	/data/home/XXXXXX12
		/usr/bin/csh
		PS 010899 -1 -1 -1
XXXXX13	1013	staff 10 Disabled - Richard Jensen
		/data/home/XXXXX13
		/bin/false
		LK 032399 -1 -1 -1
XXXXXX14	1014	staff 10 Disabled - Jeff Thomas
		/data/home/XXXXX14 /bin/false
		LK 081399 -1 -1 -1
XXXXXX15	1015	webusers 1001 Disabled - Teresa Mulvihill
		/data/home/XXXXXX15
		/bin/false
		LK 092199 -1 -1 -1
XXXXX40	1016	staff 10 Mark Graves
		/data/home/XXXXX40
		/usr/bin/csh PS 042800 -1 -1 -1
ftp	30000	ftp 30000 Anonymous FTP
тср	50000	/ftp/home/ftp/./
		/bin/false
		LK 083099 -1 -1 -1
XXXXX31	30001	ftp 30000 IP Team
		/ftp01/home/XXXX31/./distribution
		/bin/false
XXXXX32	30002	PS 121799 -1 -1 -1 ftp 30000 Checkpoint
λλλλλοζ	30002	ftp 30000 Checkpoint /ftp02/home/vendors/XXXX32/./incoming
		/bin/false
		LK 110598 -1 -1 -1
XXX33	30003	ftp 30000 Axent
		/ftp02/home/vendors/XXX33/./incoming
		/bin/false
37.2.4	20004	LK 110598 -1 -1 -1
X34	30004	ftp 30000 KLA Tencor /ftp02/home/customers/X34/./incoming
		/bin/false
		LK 022399 -1 -1 -1
XXXX35	30005	ftp 30000 Alteon
		/ftp02/home/vendors/XXXX35/./incoming
		/bin/false
$\bigcirc$		PS 040699 -1 -1 -1
XXXX36	30006	ftp 30000 Boeing
		/ftp02/home/customers/XXXX36/./outgoing /bin/false
		PS 050699 $-1 -1 -1$
X37	30007	ftp 30000 Apt Search
		/ftp02/home/customers/X37/./outgoing
		/bin/false
		PS 042999 -1 -1 -1
XXXXXX38	30008	ftp 30000 Princess Cruise
		/ftp02/home/customers/XXXXX38/./incoming /bin/false
		\DTII\T9796

internal	30009	PS 090199 -1 -1 -1 ftp 30000
Incernar	30009	/ftp02/home/customers/internal/./incoming
		/dev/null
		PS 102400 -1 -1 -1
X41	30010	ftp 30000
		/ftp02/home/customers/X41/./outgoing
		/dev/null
	20500	PS 111400 -1 -1 -1
patches	30500	ftp 30000 Support
		<pre>/ftp02/home/customers/patches/./distribution /bin/false</pre>
		PS 083099 -1 -1 -1
XXXXX40	30501	other 1
	00001	/home/XXXXX40
		/bin/sh
		PS 050500 -1 -1 -1
jpurvis	30502	sysadmin 14 🖉
		/data/home/jpurvis
		/bin/ksh
nchody	60001	PS 102400 -1 -1 -1 nobody 60001 Nobody
nobody	00001	nobody 60001 Nobody
		/sbin/sh
		LK 082587 -1 -1 -1
noaccess	60002	noaccess 60002 No Access User
		/sbin/sh
		LK 082587 -1 -1 -1
nobody4	65534	nogroup 65534 SunOS 4.x Nobody
		/ /sbin/sh
		LK 082587 -1 -1 -1
# mount		
/ on /dev/dsk/c	0t0d0s0	read/write/setuid/largefiles on Tue Apr 25 21:44:28
2000		
	k/c0t0d0	s6 read/write/setuid/largefiles on Tue Apr 25 21:44:28
2000		
		te/setuid on Tue Apr 25 21:44:28 2000 e/setuid on Tue Apr 25 21:44:28 2000
		s1 read/write/setuid/largefiles on Tue Apr 25 21:44:28
2000	K/CULUUU	ST read/write/secura/rangerries on rae Apr 25 21.44.20
	k/c0t0d0	s5 setuid/read/write/largefiles on Tue Apr 25 21:44:29
2000		
/ftp02 on /dev/	dsk/c0t1	d0s6 setuid/read/write/largefiles on Tue Apr 25
21:44:29 2000		
	dsk/c0t1	d0s7 setuid/read/write/largefiles on Tue Apr 25
21:44:29 2000	-1-/ 0:0:	
/data on /dev/d 21:44:29 2000	sk/cUt2d	0s7 setuid/read/write/largefiles on Tue Apr 25
	ad/write	on Tue Apr 25 21:44:29 2000
# netstat		
man		
TCP	~	Demote Jelenese Quinel Const O Desired Deser O. C.
Local Addres	5	Remote Address Swind Send-Q Rwind Recv-Q State

localhost.33287 ESTABLISHED	localhost.32772	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.32772 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33287	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33290 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33285	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33285 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33290	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33293 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33292	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33292 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33293	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33296 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33285	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33285 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33296	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33299 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33298	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33298 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33299	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33302 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33285	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33285 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33302	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33305 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33304	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33304 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33305	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.41708 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33285	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.33285 ESTABLISHED	localhost.41708	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.41711 ESTABLISHED	localhost.41710	32768	0 32768	0
localhost.41710 ESTABLISHED	localhost.41711	32768	0 32768	0
kumo.22 ESTABLISHED	172.16.2.47.756	32120	0 8760	0
Active UNIX domain Address Type		local Addr	Remote Add	lr
6032f210 stream-ord 6032fe10 stream-ord		.mp/.X11-unix	x/X0	
# netstat -a				
UDP				
Local Address	Remote Address	State		
*.sunrpc		Idle		
*•* *.32771		Unbound Idle		
*.177		Idle		
*.syslog *.*		Idle Unbound		
TCP				

Local Address	Remote Address	Swind	Send-Q	Rwind	Recv-Q	State
*.*	*.*	0	0	0	0	IDLE
*.sunrpc	* • *	0	0	0	0	LISTEN
* *	* *	0	0	0		IDLE
*.smtp	* *	0	0	0		LISTEN
*.fs	* *	0	0	0		LISTEN
*.dtspc	* *	0	0	0		LISTEN
*.32772	*_*	0	0	0		LISTEN
*.22	• *_*	0	0	0		LISTEN
*.32773	* *	0	0	0		LISTEN
*.80	*_*	0	0	0		LISTEN
*.6000	*_*	0	0			LISTEN
*.33285	*_*	0	0	6		LISTEN
Localhost.33287 ESTABLISHED	localhost.32772	32768	-	32768	0	LISIEN
Localhost.32772 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33287	32768	0	32768	0	
Localhost.33290 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33285	32768	0	32768	0	
Localhost.33285 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33290	32768	0	32768	0	
localhost.33293 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33292	32768	0	32768	0	
localhost.33292 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33293	32768	0	32768	0	
localhost.33296 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33285	32768	0	32768	0	
localhost.33285 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33296	32768	0	32768	0	
localhost.33299 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33298	32768	0	32768	0	
localhost.33298 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33299	32768		32768	0	
localhost.33302 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33285	32768	0	32768	0	
Localhost.33285 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33302	32768		32768	0	
Localhost.33305 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33304	32768		32768		
Localhost.33304 ESTABLISHED	localhost.33305	32768		32768		
*.ftp	× • *	0	0	0		LISTEN
*.33313	*•*	0	0	0		LISTEN
Localhost.41708	localhost.33285	32768		32768	0	
Localhost.33285 ESTABLISHED	localhost.41708	32768		32768	0	
Localhost.41711 ESTABLISHED	localhost.41710	32768		32768	0	
Localhost.41710 ESTABLISHED	localhost.41711	32768		32768	0	
kumo.ftp	172.16.2.47.59512	0	0			LISTEN
kumo.22	172.16.2.47.756	32120	0	8760	0	
ESTABLISHED *.*	* *	0	0	0	0	IDLE

Address Type Vnode Conn Local Addr Remote Addr 6032f210 stream-ord 0 0 Address TypeVnodeConnLocal AddrRemote Addr6032f210 stream-ord006032fe10 stream-ord600574700 /tmp/.X11-unix/X0 # netstat -i Name Mtu Net/Dest Address Ipkts Ierrs Opkts Oerrs Collis Queue localhost 71164 0 71164 0 0 316698 0 313156 1 619 lo0 8232 loopback 0 le0 1500 kumo kumo 0 # netstat -1 usage: netstat [ -adgimnprsDMv ] [-I interface] [interval] [system] [core] # netstat -p Net to Media Table Mask Flags Phys Addr Device IP Address \_\_\_\_\_ \_ \_\_\_\_ kuko-dmz255.255.255.25508:00:20:9a:25:78172.16.2.47255.255.255.25500:10:a4:ed:86:f4 le0 172.16.2.47255.255.255.25500:10:a4:ed:86:f4kumo255.255.255.25508:00:20:7c:50:84BASE-ADDRESS.MCAST.NET240.0.0.0SM01:00:5e:00:00:00 le0 172.16.2.47 le0 kumo le0 # netstat -rn Routing Table: Destination Gateway Flags Ref Use Interface \_\_\_\_\_\_ U 3 5163 le0 U 3 0 le0 UG 0 51268 UH 0 71131 lo0 

 172.16.2.0
 172.16.2.1

 224.0.0.0
 172.16.2.1

 172.16.2.1
 172.16.2.1

 172.16.2.254 127.0.0.1 default 127.0.0.1 # ps -elf F S UID PID PPID C PRI NI ADDR SZ WCHAN STIME TTY TIME CMD 19 T root 0 0 0 SY 10416f88 0 Apr 25 ? 0:00 sched 1 🔊 0 41 20 60333608 165 60333800 Apr 25 ? 8 S root 0:03 /etc/init -2 🔨 0 0 0 SY 60332f48 0 10432c34 Apr 25 ? 19 S root 0:00 pageout 3 19 S root 0 0 0 SY 60332888 0 10435cdc Apr 25 ? 176:28 fsflush 🛌 8 S root 196 1 0 41 20 60331448 184 60029c78 Apr 25 ? 0:00 /usr/lib/saf/sac -t 300 8 S root 172 1 0 41 20 603306c8 281 600a4d46 Apr 25 ? 0:01 /usr/sbin/vold 8 S root 9967 1 0 61 20 60331b08 192 600a5a16 Aug 18 console 0:00 /usr/lib/saf/ttymon -g -h -p kumo c 8 S root 107 1 0 41 20 604761d0 236 600a5016 Apr 25 ? 0:01 /usr/sbin/rpcbind 8 S root 157 1 0 41 20 60476f50 299 60477148 Apr 25 ? 0:32 /usr/sbin/nscd 8 S smap 163 1 0 41 20 60330008 188 60330200 Apr 25 ? 0:00 /usr/local/etc/smapd 8 S root 151 1 0 51 20 60477610 189 60029eb8 Apr 25 ? 0:12 /usr/sbin/cron
8 S root 137 1 0 41 20 60476890 400 60476f38 Apr 25 ? ..... 0:03 /usr/sbin/syslogd -n -z 14 8 S root 109 1 0 89 20 60330d88 248 600a5066 Apr 25 ? 0:00 /usr/sbin/keyserv 8 S root 134 1 0 41 20 603321c8 218 600a4ed6 Apr 25 ? 0:00 /usr/sbin/inetd -s 8 S root 3368 3323 0 40 20 6060a8a0 622 600a41b6 Oct 24 pts/2 0:00 [ sdt shel ] 1 0 40 20 60475450 8 S root 170 112 600a4e36 Apr 25 ? 0:00 /usr/lib/utmpd 8 S root 3385 1 0 40 20 605a8898 504 600a42a6 Oct 24 pts/2 0:26 /usr/dt/bin/ttsession 8 S root 3408 3405 0 40 20 60609b20 849 60354d38 Oct 24 pts/2 0:00 dtfile -noview root 3394 1 0 79 20 60660f68 8 S 200 60660fd8 Oct 24 ? 0:00 /bin/ksh /usr/dt/bin/sdtvolcheck -d 8 S root 183 1 0 51 20 605a9618 212 600a508e Apr 25 ? 2:19 /usr/local/sbin/sshd root 189 1 0 51 20 605a8f58 724 600a4936 8 S Apr 25 ? 0:00 /usr/dt/bin/dtlogin -daemon 8 S root 3404 3385 0 47 20 6065f468 113 6065f4d8 Oct 24 pts/2 0:00 /bin/sh -c dtfile -noview 8 S root 193 1 0 40 20 605a7b18 🔍 370 605a7d10 Apr 25 ? 0:01 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f / 8 S root 200 196 0 41 20 605a7458 193 605a7650 Apr 25 ? 0:00 /usr/lib/saf/ttymon 183 4 41 20 6085edc8 222 604bec2e 15:43:11 ? 8 S root 25931 0:02 /usr/local/sbin/sshd 8 S root 3333 3323 0 40 20 60661628 245 600a4666 Oct 24 ? 0:00 /usr/openwin/bin/fbconsole 8 S root 3386 3371 0 50 20 6065eda8 772 600a4706 Oct 24 pts/2 0:12 /usr/dt/bin/dtsession 1 0 40 20 604746d0 245 600a4346 8 S root 9972 Aug 18 ? 0:00 /usr/openwin/bin/fbconsole -d :0 8 S web 17661 193 0 41 20 60609460 377 6072bdec Nov 07 ? 0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f / 36 605a8248 Oct 24 pts/2 8 S root 3371 3368 0 43 20 605a81d8 0:00 [ sh ] 8 S root 9969 189 0 40 20 60474d90 2062 600a41de Aug 18 ? 0:57 /usr/openwin/bin/Xsun :0 -nobanner 8 R root 25940 25934 0 78 20 6060ale0 36 15:43:32 pts/3 0:00 -sh 8 S root 3392 3386 0 40 20 606086e0 865 600a4616 Oct 24 ? 0:01 dtwm 8 S root 9970 189 0 64 20 60608da0 736 60608e10 Aug 18 ? 0:00 /usr/dt/bin/dtlogin -daemon 8 S web 18600 193 0 41 20 6085a040 374 604bf03e Nov 08 ? 0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f / 8 S web 17675 193 0 41 20 60861648 377 601b7e8c Nov 07 ? 0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f / 8 S root 3403 3394 0 69 20 60608020 102 60029138 Oct 24 ? 0:00 /bin/cat /tmp/.removable/notify0 8 S root 3405 3404 0 50 20 6060b620 854 600a5796 Oct 24 pts/2 0:05 dtfile -noview 1 0 40 20 60475b10 246 600a4206 Oct 24 ? 8 S root 3370 0:00 /usr/dt/bin/dsdm

8 S root 3323 9970 0 40 20 605a6018	202 605a6088	Oct 24 ?	
0:00 /bin/ksh /usr/dt/bin/Xsession		05.0	
8 S root 3620 134 0 51 20 606601e8 0:00 /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd	348 604bffde	May 05 ?	
8 S web 18597 193 0 41 20 6085bb40	376 601bb20c	Nov 08 ?	
0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f /	570 00100200	NOV 00 :	
8 S web 18598 193 0 41 20 606608a8	377 601ba76c	Nov 08 ?	
0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f /			
8 S web 19195 193 0 41 20 6085c8c0	375 6072bf2c	Nov 09 ?	
0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f /			
8 S root 3337 1 0 40 10 60474010	503 600a42f6	Oct 24 ?	
0:00 /usr/openwin/bin/speckeysd 8 S root 8744 3386 0 51 20 6085c200	335 604bedbe	Oct 27 ?	
0:00 /usr/dt/bin/dtexec -open 0 -ttproci	555 004Deabe	000 27 :	
8 S web 18601 193 0 41 20 6065e6e8	375 6072be8c	Nov 08 ?	
0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f /	68		
8 S web 17677 193 0 41 20 6060af60	377 601ba6cc	Nov 07 ?	
0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f /			
8 S web 18599 193 0 41 20 605a66d8	376 600b43ac	Nov 08 ?	
0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f /	275 (01) 4	N 07 0	
8 S web 17676 193 0 41 20 608608c8	375 601ba4ec	Nov 07 ?	
0:00 /usr/local/etc/httpd/bin/httpd -f / 8 S jpurvis 25934 25931 0 51 20 6065fb28	199 6065 FH 98	15:43:12 pts/3	
0:00 -ksh	199 00001090	10.40.12 pc3/5	
8 S nobody 17669 134 0 40 20 6085cf80	344 600a495e	Nov 07 ?	
0:00 fs			
8 S root 8745 8744 0 80 30 60860f88	629 600a42ce	Oct 27 ?	
0:00 /usr/dt/bin/dtscreen -mode blank			
8 0 root 25963 25940 1 78 20 6085a700	106	15:43:49 pts/3	
0:00 ps -elf			
# rpcinfo -p			
program vers proto port service			
100000 4 tcp 111 rpcbind			
100000 3 tcp 111 rpcbind			
100000 2 tcp 111 rpcbind			
100000 4 udp 111 rpcbind			
100000 3 udp 111 rpcbind			
100000 2 udp 111 rpcbind			
100083 1 tcp 32772 1342177279 4 tcp 33285			
1342177279 1 tcp 33285			
1342177279 3 tcp 33285			
1342177279 2 tcp 33285			
100221 1 tcp 33313			
# showrev -a			
Hostname: kumo Hostid: 807c5084			
Release: 5.6			
Kernel architecture: sun4u			
Application architecture: sparc			
Hardware provider: Sun_Microsystems			
Domain:			
Kernel version: SunOS 5.6 Generic August 1997			

```
OpenWindows Version 3.6 7 July 1997
No patches are installed
# dmesq
Nov 17 15:46
cpu0: SUNW,UltraSPARC (upaid 0 impl 0x10 ver 0x22 clock 143 MHz)
SunOS Release 5.6 Version Generic [UNIX(R) System V Release 4.0]
Copyright (c) 1983-1997, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
mem = 65536K (0x400000)
avail mem = 60874752
Ethernet address = 8:0:20:7c:50:84
root nexus = Sun Ultra 1 SBus (UltraSPARC 143MHz)
sbus0 at root: UPA 0x1f 0x0 ...
espdma0 at sbus0: SBus0 slot 0xe offset 0x8400000
esp0: esp-options=0x46
esp0 at espdma0: SBus0 slot 0xe offset 0x8800000 Onboard device sparc9 ipl 4
sd0 at esp0: target 0 lun 0
sd0 is /sbus@lf,0/espdma@e,8400000/esp@e,8800000/sd@0,0
        <SUN2.1G cyl 2733 alt 2 hd 19 sec 80>
sd1 at esp0: target 1 lun 0
sd1 is /sbus@1f,0/espdma@e,8400000/esp@e,8800000/sd@1,0
       <SUN2.1G cyl 2733 alt 2 hd 19 sec 80>
sd2 at esp0: target 2 lun 0
sd2 is /sbus@lf,0/espdma@e,8400000/esp@e,8800000/sd@2,0
       <SUN2.1G cyl 2733 alt 2 hd 19 sec 80>
sd6 at esp0: target 6 lun 0
sd6 is /sbus@lf,0/espdma@e,8400000/esp@e,8800000/sd@6,0
root on /sbus@1f,0/espdma@e,8400000/esp@e,8800000/sd@0,0:a fstype ufs
zs0 at sbus0: SBus0 slot 0xf offset 0x1100000 Onboard device sparc9 ipl 12
zs0 is /sbus01f,0/zs0f,1100000
zs1 at sbus0: SBus0 slot 0xf offset 0x1000000 Onboard device sparc9 ipl 12
zs1 is /sbus@1f,0/zs@f,1000000
keyboard is </sbus@lf,0/zs@f,1000000> major <29> minor <2>
mouse is </sbus@1f,0/zs@f,1000000:b> major <29> minor <3>
stdin is </sbus@1f,0/zs@f,1000000> major <29> minor <2>
cqsix0 at sbus0: SBus0 slot 0x2 offset 0x0 SBus level 5 sparc9 ipl 9
cqsix0 is /sbus@1f,0/cqsix@2,0
cgsix0: screen 1152x900, double buffered, 4M mappable, rev 11
stdout is </sbus@lf,0/cgsix@2,0> major <39> minor <0>
ledma0 at sbus0: SBus0 slot 0xe offset 0x8400010
le0 at ledma0: SBus0 slot 0xe offset 0x8c00000 Onboard device sparc9 ipl 6
le0 is /sbus@lf,0/ledma@e,8400010/le@e,8c00000
dump on /dev/dsk/c0t0d0s3 size 262176K
# cat /.dtprofile
**
###
###
     .dtprofile
###
###
     user personal environment variables
###
###
     Common Desktop Environment (CDE)
###
###
      (c) Copyright 1993-1997 Sun Microsystems, Inc.
     (c) Copyright 1993, 1994 Hewlett-Packard Company
###
```

(c) Copyright 1993,1994 International Business Machines Corp. ### ### (c) Copyright 1993,1994 Novell, Inc. ### ### ### @(#)dtprofile.src 1.10 97/05/20 ### \*\*\*\*\*\*\* ### ### Your \$HOME/.dtprofile is read each time you login to the Common Desktop Environment (CDE) and is the place to set or override desktop ### environment variables for your session. Environment variables set in ### ### \$HOME/.dtprofile are made available to all applications on the desktop. ### The desktop will accept either sh or ksh syntax for the commands in ### \$HOME/.dtprofile. ### \*\*\*\* ### ### Random stdout and stderr output from the desktop Session Mgr can be ### directed into user's \$HOME/.dt/sessionlogs directory. By default this ### output is not recorded. Instead it is sent off to /dev/null (Unix's ### "nothing" device). ### ### If this random dtsession output is wanted (usually only wanted for debugging purposes), commenting out following "dtstart sessionlogfile" ### ### lines will send output to your \$HOME/.dt/sessionlogs directory. ### Alternatively, can change "/dev/null" to "/dev/console" to see this ### debugging output on your console device. Can start a console via the ### ### Workspace programs menu or via Application Mgr's Desktop Tools ### "Terminal Console" icon. ### echo "This session log file is currently disabled." \$dtstart sessionlogfile echo "To enable logging, edit \$HOME/.dtprofile and" >> \$dtstart sessionlogfile echo "remove dtstart sessionlogfile=/dev/null line." >> \$dtstart sessionlogfile export dtstart sessionlogfile="/dev/null" \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* ### ### By default, the desktop will read your standard \$HOME/.profile ### or \$HOME/.login files. This can be changed commenting out the DTSOURCEPROFILE variable assignment at the end of this file. The ### desktop reads .profile if your \$SHELL is "sh" or "ksh", or .login ### if your \$SHELL is "csh". ### ###

```
.....
###
     The desktop reads the .dtprofile and .profile/.login with a simulated
###
     terminal via the sdt shell program. The sdt shell program will create
###
     a controlling terminal. Shell output will be logged to the location
###
     $HOME/.dt/startlog. Any shell requested input will receive an end
###
     of file character (Control-D).
###
###
     This being the case .profile/.login should avoid requiring interaction
     with the user at login time. Any messages printed in these scripts will
###
###
     not be seen when you log in and any prompts such as by the "read"
###
     command will return an end-of-file to the calling script.
###
###
     With minor editing, it is possible to adapt your .profile or .login
###
     for use both with and without the desktop. Group user interaction
     statements not appropriate for your desktop session into one section
###
     and enclose them with an "if" statement that checks for absence of
###
     of the "DT" environment variable. When the desktop reads your .profile
###
###
     or .login file, it will set "DT" to a non-empty value for which your
###
     .profile or .login can test.
###
###
     example for sh/ksh
###
        if [ ! "$DT" ]; then
###
###
         #
###
          # commands and environment variables not appropriate for desktop
###
          #
###
         echo "Please enter some data:"/
###
         read data
###
          . . .
###
        fi
###
###
        #
###
        # environment variables common to both desktop and non-desktop
###
###
       PATH=$HOME/bin:$PATH
###
       MYVAR=value
###
       export MYVAR
###
        . . .
###
###
    example for csh
###
        if ( ! ${?DT} ) then
###
###
          #
###
          # commands and environment variables not appropriate for desktop
###
###
         echo "Please enter some data:"
###
         read data
###
         . . .
###
       endif
###
###
        #
###
        # environment variables common to both desktop and non-desktop
###
        #
###
       setenv PATH $HOME/bin:$PATH
###
       setenv MYVAR value
###
        . . .
###
```

```
### Errors in .dtprofile/.profile/.login are logged to
                              .....
"$HOME/.dt/startlog".
### If after you login, an environment they should have set and exported is
    not present and this $HOME/.dtprofile file has set
###
"DTSOURCEPROFILE=true"
    check $HOME/.dt/startlog for possible .profile/.login script error
###
###
     output.
###
***********
#
DTSOURCEPROFILE=true
# cat /.login
# @(#)local.login 1.3 93/09/15 SMI
stty -istrip
# setenv TERM `tset -Q -`
# cat /.profile
#
# @(#)local.profile 1.4 93/09/15 SMI
#
umask 077
stty istrip
PATH=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/ucb:/etc
export PATH
# cat /data/home/XXXXXX3/.login
# @(#)local.login 1.3 93/09/15 SMI
stty -istrip
# setenv TERM `tset -Q -`
# cat /data/home/XXXXXX3/.profile
#
# @(#)local.profile 1.4 93/09/15 SMI
#
umask 077
stty istrip
PATH=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/usr/ucb:/etc:/usr/ccs/bin:.
export PATH
# cat /data/home/asdfXXX1/.login
# @(#)local.login 1.3 93/09/15 SMI
stty -istrip
# setenv TERM `tset -Q -`
# cat /data/home/XXXXX32/etc/group
root::0:root
other::1:
bin::2:root, bin, daemon
sys::3:root, bin, sys, adm
adm::4:root,adm,daemon
uucp::5:root,uucp
mail::6:root
tty::7:root,tty,adm
```

. . . . . . . . . . . lp::8:root,lp,adm nuucp::9:root, nuucp staff::10: daemon::12:root, daemon sysadmin::14: nobody::60001: noaccess::60002: nogroup::65534: ftp::30000:ftp # cat /data/home/XXXXXX6/.shosts 192.168.61.1 web # cat /data/home/XXXXXX6/.ssh/known hosts 10k.singingbeagle.org 1024 35 13275539567091527588162470426171709799610233092456282301373614356489649559710 57639292324064169301351140585872853726824839454640532691121109099121079152017 71689659816915734421099030536665696189467530573954070311977616428938167747306 1 192.168.84.195 1024 33 1122676193186874748117218832351865803566151072816466627367078708166144431932563853108882750922901251689820872249117553369338435329092332605158650688917550 69055295735792246473767774899150400932673874139029428993902222164739079163002 7 # cat /data/home/XXXXXX6/known hosts cerberus.XXX.XXX 1024 37 16049639826343881599260485653817118975869289396617828645422116435577238205785 24285632625966897455097670315147440269448490890580530337928659197287510663586 1683643575613299778420278259081689882623194093723651694808391483093607735896533275068086292444041014866736824431344172345407998736782406099248366129863856 1 192.168.51.4 1024 35 40597973658790894250809851845213432350954516451201964390830596847211963039753 58828385220870261708735985757718491880747764394797878816344368489156382964260 7 192.168.84.66 1024 35 1327553956709152758816247042617170979961023309245628230137361435648964955971012653031973148159741706911884959800068697838408228703820421995213272487394016 57639292324064169301351140585872853726824839454640532691121109099121079152017 71689659816915734421099030536665696189467530573954070311977616428938167747306 1 192.168.51.10 1024 35 06850860608038132123081045142485328565437104540500423190789500968026760774024 78897106068023746394850660380682096857213156780438066609217588841075450771599 3 # cat /etc/cron.d/at.deny daemon bin

smtp

```
nuucp
listen
nobody
noaccess
# cat /etc/cron.d/cron.deny
daemon
bin
smtp
nuucp
listen
nobody
noaccess
# cat /etc/default/inetinit
# @(#)inetinit.dfl 1.2 97/05/08
# TCP STRONG ISS sets the TCP initial sequence number generation parameters.
# Set TCP STRONG ISS to be:
        0 = 0ld-fashioned sequential initial sequence number generation.
#
        1 = Improved sequential generation, with random variance in
#
increment.
        2 = RFC 1948 sequence number generation, unique-per-connection-ID.
#
#
TCP STRONG ISS=1
# cat /etc/default/init
# @(#)init.dfl 1.2 92/11/26
# This file is /etc/default/init. /etc/TIMEZONE is a symlink to this file.
# This file looks like a shell script, but it is not. To maintain
# compatibility with old versions of /etc/TIMEZONE, some shell constructs
# (i.e., export commands) are allowed in this file, but are ignored.
#
# Lines of this file should be of the form VAR=value, where VAR is one of
# TZ, LANG, or any of the LC_* environment variables.
#
TZ=US/Pacific
# cat /etc/default/kbd
#pragma ident "@(#)kbd.dfl 1.2 96/06/07 SMI"
# Copyright 1996, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
# All Rights Reserved.
# /etc/default/kbd
#
# kbd default settings processed via kbd(1).
#
# KEYBOARD ABORT affects the default behavior of the keyboard abort
# sequence, see kbd(1) for details. The default value is "enable".
# The optional value is "disable". Any other value is ignored.
# KEYCLICK affects the default keyclick behavior. Possible values are
# 'on' and 'off'. Any other value is ignored. The default behavior is
# to leave the current keyclick setting unchanged.
#
```

```
.....
# Uncomment the following lines to change the default values.
#
#KEYBOARD ABORT=enable
#KEYCLICK=off
# cat /etc/default/login
#ident "@(#)login.dfl 1.8
                             96/10/18 SMI" /* SVr4.0 1.1.1.1
                                                                    */
# Set the TZ environment variable of the shell.
#
#TIMEZONE=EST5EDT
# ULIMIT sets the file size limit for the login. Units are disk blocks.
# The default of zero means no limit.
#
#ULIMIT=0
# If CONSOLE is set, root can only login on that device.
# Comment this line out to allow remote login by root.
#
CONSOLE=/dev/console
# PASSREQ determines if login requires a password.
#
PASSREQ=YES
# ALTSHELL determines if the SHELL environment variable should be set
#
ALTSHELL=YES
# PATH sets the initial shell PATH variable
#
#PATH=/usr/bin:
# SUPATH sets the initial shell PATH variable for root
#
#SUPATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
# TIMEOUT sets the number of seconds (between 0 and 900) to wait before
# abandoning a login session.
#
#TIMEOUT=300
# UMASK sets the initial shell file creation mode mask. See umask(1).
#
#UMASK=022
# SYSLOG determines whether the syslog(3) LOG AUTH facility should be used
# to log all root logins at level LOG NOTICE and multiple failed login
# attempts at LOG CRIT.
#
SYSLOG=YES
# cat /etc/default/passwd
#ident "@(#)passwd.dfl 1.3 92/07/14 SMI"
MAXWEEKS=
MINWEEKS=
```

PASSLENGTH=6 # cat /etc/default/su #ident "@(#)su.dfl 1.6 93/08/14 SMI" /\* SVr4.0 1.2 \*/ # SULOG determines the location of the file used to log all su attempts # SULOG=/var/adm/sulog # CONSOLE determines whether attempts to su to root should be logged # to the named device # #CONSOLE=/dev/console # PATH sets the initial shell PATH variable #PATH=/usr/bin: # SUPATH sets the initial shell PATH variable for root # #SUPATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin # SYSLOG determines whether the syslog(3) LOG AUTH facility should be used # to log all su attempts. LOG NOTICE messages are generated for su's to # root, LOG INFO messages are generated for su's to other users, and LOG CRIT # messages are generated for failed su attempts. # SYSLOG=YES # cat /etc/defaultrouter #192.168.84.158 172.16.2.254 # cat /etc/dfs/dfstab # Place share(1M) commands here for automatic execution # on entering init state 3. # # Issue the command '/etc/init.d/nfs.server start' to run the NFS # daemon processes and the share commands, after adding the very # first entry to this file. # # share [-F fstype] [ -o options] [-d "<text>"] <pathname> [resource] # .e.g, # share -F nfs -o rw=engineering -d "home dirs" /export/home2 # cat /etc/ftpaccess loginfails 2 questgroup ftponly noretrieve /etc/passwd /etc/group core class local real,guest,anonymous \*.domain 0.0.0.0 class remote real, guest, anonymous \* limit local 100 Any /etc/msgs/msg.toomany

..... limit remote 100 Any /etc/msqs/msq.toomany readme README\* login readme README\* cwd=\* message /welcome.msg login message .message cwd=\* compress no local remote local remote tar no # allow use of private file for SITE GROUP and SITE GPASS? private yes # passwd-check <none|trivial|rfc822> [<enforce|warn>] passwd-check rfc822 warn log commands anonymous, quest log transfers anonymous, guest, real inbound, outbound shutdown /etc/msgs/shutmsg # all the following default to "yes" for everybody delete no anonymous 💎 # delete permission? no noanonymous# overwrite permission?noanonymous# rename permission?noreal,guest,anonymous# chmod permission?noreal,guest,anonymous# umask permission? overwrite rename chmod umask # specify the upload directory information upload /ftp/home/ftp \* no upload /ftp/home/ftp /incoming yes upload /ftp/home/ftp \* yes ftp ftp 0666 dirs upload /ftp/home/ftp /bin no upload /ftp/home/ftp /etc 🖉 no # directory aliases... [note, the ":" is not required] alias inc: /incoming # cdpath cdpath /incoming cdpath /pub cdpath / # path-filter... path-filter anonymous /etc/pathmsg ^[-A-Za-z0-9 \.]\*\$ ^\. ^path-filter(guest /etc/pathmsg ^[-A-Za-z0-9\_\.]\*\$ ^\. ^-# specify which group of users will be treated as "guests". guestgroup ftponly email XXXXX15@singingbeagle.org # cat /etc/ftphosts # Example host access file # Everything after a '#' is treated as comment, # empty lines are ignored

```
# cat /etc/group
root::0:root,XXXXX40
other::1:jpurvis
bin::2:root, bin, daemon
sys::3:root,bin,sys,adm
adm::4:root,adm,daemon
uucp::5:root,uucp
mail::6:root
tty::7:root,tty,adm
lp::8:root,lp,adm
nuucp::9:root,nuucp
staff::10:XXXX8,XXXX11,jpurvis
daemon::12:root,daemon
sysadmin::14:
nobody::60001:
noaccess::60002:
nogroup::65534:
webusers::1001:web,XXXXXX5,XXXX8,XXXXX6,XXXXX15
ftp::30000:ftp
ftponly::30001:ftp,XXXXX32,XXXX31,XXX33,X34,XXXX35,XXXX36,X37,XXXXX38,patch
es
dba::100:
# cat /etc/inet/hosts
#
#
 Internet host table
#
127.0.0.1 localhost
#192.168.84.129 kumo kumo.singingbeagle.org loghost
172.16.2.1 kumo kumo.singingbeagle.org loghost
#
#192.168.84.65 toomi
172.16.1.30 10k.singingbeagle.org
#192.168.84.66 10k.singingbeagle.org
#192.168.84.67 enchi-in
172.16.1.0 seki-int
#192.168.84.94 seki-int
172.16.2.254 kuko-dmz
#192.168.84.158 kuko-dmz
#
192.168.84.193 seki
192.168.84.194 enchi-out
192.168.84.200 prowler
# cat /etc/inet/inetd.conf
#
#ident "@(#)inetd.conf 1.27
                               96/09/24 SMI" /* SVr4.0 1.5 */
#
#
# Configuration file for inetd(1M). See inetd.conf(4).
# To re-configure the running inetd process, edit this file, then
# send the inetd process a SIGHUP.
#
```

..... # Syntax for socket-based Internet services: # <service name> <socket type> <proto> <flags> <user> <server pathname> <args> # # Syntax for TLI-based Internet services: <service name> tli <proto> <flags> <user> <server pathname> <args> # # # Ftp and telnet are standard Internet services. # nowait root /usr/sbin/in.ftpd < in.ftpd -l -a ftp stream tcp #telnet stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/in.telnetd in.telnetd nowait root /usr/local/etc/smap smtp stream tcp smap # Tnamed serves the obsolete IEN-116 name server protocol. ##name dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/in.tnamed in.tnamed # # Shell, login, exec, comsat and talk are BSD protocols. ##shell stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/in.rshd in.rshd ##login stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/in.rlogind in.rlogind ##exec stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/in.rexecd in.rexecd in.rlogind ##comsat dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/in.comsat in.comsat ##talk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/in.talkd in.talkd # Must run as root (to read /etc/shadow); "-n" turns off logging in utmp/wtmp. # ##uucp stream tcp /usr/sbin/in.uucpd nowait root in.uucpd # Tftp service is provided primarily for booting. Most sites run this # only on machines acting as "boot servers." #tftp dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/in.tftpd in.tftpd -s /tftpboot # Finger, systat and netstat give out user information which may be # valuable to potential "system crackers." Many sites choose to disable # some or all of these services to improve security. ##finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/in.fingerd in.fingerd #systat stream tcp nowait root /usr/bin/ps ps -ef #netstat stream tcp nowait root /usr/bin/netstat netstat -f inet # Time service is used for clock synchronization. ##time stream tcp nowait root internal ##time dgram udp wait root internal # Echo, discard, daytime, and chargen are used primarily for testing. ##echo stream tcp nowait root internal ##echo dgram udp wait root internal

```
.....
##discard stream tcp nowait root internal
##discard dgram udp wait root internal
##discard
##daytime
                          stream tcp
                                                        nowait root internal
##daytime
                                                         wait root
                          dgram udp
                                                                                      internal
##chargen
                                                         nowait root
                          stream tcp
                                                                                       internal
                           dgram udp
##chargen
                                                          wait root
                                                                                       internal
# RPC services syntax:
# <rpc prog>/<vers> <endpoint-type> rpc/<proto> <flags> <user></proto> </proto> </proto>
# <pathname> <args>
#
# <endpoint-type> can be either "tli" or "stream" or "dgram".
# For "stream" and "dgram" assume that the endpoint is a socket descriptor.
# <proto> can be either a nettype or a netid or a "*". The value is
# first treated as a nettype. If it is not a valid nettype then it is
# treated as a netid. The "*" is a short-hand way of saying all the
# transports supported by this system, ie. it equates to the "visible"
# nettype. The syntax for <proto> is:
              * <nettype | netid> | <nettype | netid> { [, <nettype | netid>] }
#
# For example:
                                          rpc/circuit v,udp
# dummy/1
                             tli
                                                                                                                     /tmp/test svc
                                                                                     wait
                                                                                                        root
test svc
# Solstice system and network administration class agent server
##100232/10 tli rpc/udp wait root /usr/sbin/sadmind sadmind
# Rquotad supports UFS disk quotas for NFS clients
##rquotad/1
                                         rpc/datagram v wait root /usr/lib/nfs/rquotad
                             tli
rquotad
#
# The rusers service gives out user information. Sites concerned
# with security may choose to disable it.
##rusersd/2-3 tli
                                          rpc/datagram_v,circuit_v
                                                                                                      wait root
/usr/lib/netsvc/rusers/rpc.rusersd rpc.rusersd
# The spray server is used primarily for testing.
##sprayd/1
                       tli_____rpc/datagram v wait root
/usr/lib/netsvc/spray/rpc.sprayd rpc.sprayd
# The rwall server allows others to post messages to users on this machine.
##walld/1
                                                          rpc/datagram v wait root
                                            tli
/usr/lib/netsvc/rwall/rpc.rwalld
                                                                 rpc.rwalld
# Rstatd is used by programs such as perfmeter.
#
##rstatd/2-4
                          tli rpc/datagram v wait root
/usr/lib/netsvc/rstat/rpc.rstatd rpc.rstatd
# The rexd server provides only minimal authentication and is often not run
#
                   tli rpc/tcp wait root /usr/sbin/rpc.rexd rpc.rexd
#rexd/1
```

```
.....
# rpc.cmsd is a data base daemon which manages calendar data backed
# by files in /var/spool/calendar
#
#
 Sun ToolTalk Database Server
#
# UFS-aware service daemon
#
               rpc/* wait
                                       /usr/lib/fs/ufs/ufsd
#ufsd/1 tli
                              root
                                                               ufsd -p
#
#
 Sun KCMS Profile Server
#
100221/1
                      rpc/tcp wait root /usr/openwin/bin/kcms server
               tli
kcms server
#
# Sun Font Server
#
fs
                              wait nobody /usr/openwin/lib/fs.auto
               stream tcp
                                                                      fs
#
# CacheFS Daemon
#
##100235/1 tli rpc/tcp wait root /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd cachefsd
#
# Kerbd Daemon
##kerbd/4
                 tli
                         rpc/ticlts
                                         wait
                                                 root
                                                         /usr/sbin/kerbd
kerbd
#
# Print Protocol Adaptor - BSD listener
##printer
                       stream tcp
                                      nowait root /usr/lib/print/in.lpd
in.lpd
dtspc stream tcp nowait root /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd
##xaudio stream tcp wait root /usr/openwin/bin/Xaserver Xaserver -noauth
-inetd
##100068/2-5 dgram rpc/udp wait root /usr/dt/bin/rpc.cmsd rpc.cmsd
100083/1 tli rpc/tcp wait root /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd
/usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd
# cat /etc/inet/netmasks
# The netmasks file associates Internet Protocol (IP) address
# masks with IP network numbers.
#
       network-number netmask
#
# The term network-number refers to a number obtained from the Internet
Network
# Information Center. Currently this number is restricted to being a class
# A, B, or C network number. In the future we should be able to support
# arbitrary network numbers per the Classless Internet Domain Routing
# quidelines.
#
# Both the network-number and the netmasks are specified in
# "decimal dot" notation, e.g:
#
```

. . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 128.32.0.0 255.255.255.0 # #192.168.84.0 255.255.255.224 172.16.2.0 255.255.255.0 # cat /etc/mail/aliases \*/ #ident "@(#)aliases 1.13 92/07/14 SMI" /\* SVr4.0 1.1 ## # Aliases can have any mix of upper and lower case on the left-hand side, # but the right-hand side should be proper case (usually lower) # The program "newaliases" will need to be run after # >> NOTE >> this file is updated for any changes to # show through to sendmail. # # # @(#)aliases 1.8 86/07/16 SMI ## # Following alias is required by the mail protocol, RFC 822 # Set it to the address of a HUMAN who deals with this system's mail problems. Postmaster: root # Alias for mailer daemon; returned messages from our MAILER-DAEMON # should be routed to our local Postmaster. MAILER-DAEMON: postmaster # Aliases to handle mail to programs or files, eg news or vacation # decode: "|/usr/bin/uudecode" nobody: /dev/null # Sample aliases: # Alias for distribution list, members specified here: #staff:wnj,mosher,sam,ecc,mckusick,sklower,olson,rwh@ernie # Alias for distribution list, members specified elsewhere: #keyboards: :include:/usr/jfarrell/keyboards.list # Alias for a person, so they can receive mail by several names: #epa:eric # cat /etc/mnttab /dev/dsk/c0t0d0s0 / ufs rw,suid,dev=800000,largefiles 956724268 /dev/dsk/c0t0d0s6 /usr ufs rw,suid,dev=800006,largefiles 956724268 956724268 956724268 /dev/dsk/c0t0d0s1 /var ufs rw,suid,dev=800001,largefiles 956724268 /opt ufs suid,rw,largefiles,dev=800005 /dev/dsk/c0t0d0s5 956724269 /dev/dsk/c0t1d0s6 /ftp02 ufs suid,rw,largefiles,dev=80000e 956724269

```
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
/dev/dsk/c0t1d0s7 /ftp01 ufs suid,rw,largefiles,dev=80000f
956724269
/dev/dsk/c0t2d0s7 /data ufs suid,rw,largefiles,dev=800017
956724269
       /tmp tmpfs dev=1 956724269
swap
                      /vol
kumo:vold(pid172)
                              nfs ignore, noquota, dev=2b00001
956724295
# cat /etc/motd
Sun Microsystems Inc. SunOS 5.6
                                     Generic August 1997
# cat /etc/nsswitch.conf
#
#
 /etc/nsswitch.files:
# An example file that could be copied over to /etc/nsswitch.conf; it
# does not use any naming service.
# "hosts:" and "services:" in this file are used only if the
# /etc/netconfig file has a "-" for nametoaddr libs of "inet" transports.
passwa.
group: files
insts: files dns
passwd: files
protocols: files
           files
rpc:
ethers: files
netmasks: files
bootparams: files
publickey: files
# At present there isn't a 'files' backend for netgroup; the system will
  figure it out pretty quickly, and won't use netgroups at all.
netgroup: files
automount: files
aliases: files
services: files
sendmailvars: files
# cat /etc/pam.conf
#ident "@(#)pam.conf 1.19 95/11/30 SMI"
# PAM configuration
# Authentication management
login auth required /usr/lib/security/pam unix.so.1
login auth required /usr/lib/security/pam dial auth.so.1
rlogin auth sufficient /usr/lib/security/pam rhosts auth.so.1
rlogin auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1
#
dtlogin auth required /usr/lib/security/pam unix.so.1
#
rsh auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_rhosts_auth.so.1
other auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1
#
```

```
# Account management
#
login account required
                                /usr/lib/security/pam unix.so.1
dtlogin account required
                               /usr/lib/security/pam unix.so.1
#
other account required
                                /usr/lib/security/pam unix.so.1
#
#
 Session management
#
                                /usr/lib/security/pam unix.so.1
      session required
other
#
#
 Password management
#
                                /usr/lib/security/pam unix.so.1
other
      password required
# cat /etc/passwd
root::0:1:Super-User:/:/sbin/sh
daemon:x:1:1::/:
bin:x:2:2::/usr/bin:
sys:x:3:3::/:
adm:x:4:4:Admin:/var/adm:
lp:x:71:8:Line Printer Admin:/usr/spool/lp:
smap:x:6:6:SMAP Daemon User:/var/spool/smap:
smtp:x:0:0:Mail Daemon User:/:
uucp:x:5:5:uucp Admin:/usr/lib/uucp:
nuucp:x:9:9:uucp Admin:/var/spool/uucppublic:/usr/lib/uucp/uucico
listen:x:37:4:Network Admin:/usr/net/nls:
nobody:x:60001:60001:Nobody:/:
noaccess:x:60002:60002:No Access User:/:
nobody4:x:65534:65534:SunOS 4.x Nobody:/:
oracle:x:100:100:Oracle User:/u01/app/oracle/product/7.3.3:/usr/bin/csh
web:x:1001:1001:Web user:/data/home/web:/bin/sh
XXXXXX2:x:1002:10:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX2:/bin/false
XXXXXX3:x:1003:10:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX3:/bin/false
XXXXXX4:x:1004:10:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX4:/bin/false
XXXXXX5:x:1005:10:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX5:/bin/false
XXXXXXX6:x:1006:10:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXXX6:/bin/false
XXXXXXX7:x:1007:10:XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX7:/usr/bin/csh
XXXXX8:x:1008:1001:XXXX:/data/home/asdfXXX1:/bin/csh
XXXXXX9:x:1009:10:XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX9:/usr/bin/csh
XXXXXX11:x:1011:10:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX11:/bin/false
XXXXXX12:x:1012:10:XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX12:/usr/bin/csh
XXXXX13:x:1013:10:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXX13:/bin/false
XXXXXX14:x:1014:10:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX14:/bin/false
ftp:x:30000:30000:Anonymous FTP:/ftp/home/ftp/./:/bin/false
XXXXX31:x:30001:30000:XXXX:/ftp01/home/XXXXX31/./distribution:/bin/false
XXXXX32:x:30002:30000:XXXX:/ftp02/home/vendors/XXXXX32/./incoming:/bin/false
XXX33:x:30003:30000:XXXX:/ftp02/home/vendors/XXX33/./incoming:/bin/false
X34:x:30004:30000:XXXX:/ftp02/home/customers/X34/./incoming:/bin/false
XXXX35:x:30005:30000:Alteon:/ftp02/home/vendors/XXXX35/./incoming:/bin/false
XXXX36:x:30006:30000:Boeing:/ftp02/home/customers/XXXX36/./outgoing:/bin/fals
X37:x:30007:30000:XXXX:/ftp02/home/customers/X37/./outgoing:/bin/false
XXXXXX38:x:30008:30000:XXXX:/ftp02/home/customers/XXXXX38/./incoming:/bin/fa
lse
patches:x:30500:30000:Support:/ftp02/home/customers/patches/./distribution:/b
in/false
```

```
XXXXXX15:x:1015:1001:Disabled - XXXX:/data/home/XXXXXX15:/bin/false
XXXXX40:x:1016:10:XXXX:/data/home/XXXXX40:/usr/bin/csh
XXXXX40:x:30501:1::/home/XXXXX40:/bin/sh
jpurvis:x:30502:14::/data/home/jpurvis:/bin/ksh
internal:x:30009:30000::/ftp02/home/customers/internal/./incoming:/dev/null
X41:x:30010:30000::/ftp02/home/customers/X41/./outgoing:/dev/null
# cat /etc/resolv.conf
domain XXX.XXX
nameserver 192.168.62.2
nameserver 192.168.62.11
# cat /etc/rpc
#ident "@(#)rpc
                       1.11 95/07/14 SMI"
                                                SVr4.0 1.2
#
#
       rpc
#
rpcbind
               100000 portmap sunrpc rpcbind
               100001 rstat rup perfmeter
rstatd
              100002 rusers
rusersd
              100003 nfsprog
nfs
               100004 ypprog
ypserv
mountd
              100005 mount showmount
              100007
ypbind
walld
              100008 rwall shutdown
              100009 yppasswd
yppasswdd
              100010 etherstat
etherstatd
              100011 rquotaprog quota rquota
rquotad
               100012 spray
sprayd
              100013
3270 mapper
              100014
rje mapper
selection svc 100015 selnsvc
database_svc 100016
rexd 100017
                       rex
alis
               100018
sched
               100019
               100020
llockmgr
nlockmgr
              100021
x25.inr
              100022
statmon
              100023
status
               100024
ypupdated
               100028
                      ypupdate
keyserv
               100029 keyserver
bootparam
             100026
sunlink mapper 100033
tfsd () 100037
nsed
               100038
nsemntd
               100039
showfhd
               100043 showfh
ioadmd
               100055 rpc.ioadmd
NETlicense
               100062
               100065
sunisamd
               100066 dbsrv
debug svc
               100071
bugtraqd
kerbd
               100078
event
               100101 na.event
                                      # SunNet Manager
               100102 na.logger
logger
                                      # SunNet Manager
```

sync 100104 na.sync hostperf 100107 na.hostperf ..... 100109 na.activity # SunNet Manager activity 100112 na.hostmem hostmem 100112 na.nostilen 100113 na.sample 100114 na.x25 100115 na.ping 100116 na.rpcnfs 100117 na.hostif sample x25 ping rpcnfs hostif etherif 100118 na.etherif 100120 na.iproutes 100121 na.layers iproutes layers 100122 na.snmp snmp-cmc snmp-synoptics snmp-unisys snmp-utk snmp 100123 na.traffic traffic nfs acl 100227 sadmind 100232 nisd 100300 rpc.nisd nispasswd 100303 rpc.nispasswdd 100233 ufsd ufsd 150001 pcnfsd # cat /etc/shadow root:HYG9nQWtJnEDw:10931::::: daemon:NP:6445::::: bin:NP:6445::::: sys:NP:6445::::: adm:NP:6445::::: lp:NP:6445::::: smap:NP:6445::::: smtp:NP:6445::::: uucp:NP:6445::::: nuucp:NP:6445::::: listen:\*LK\*:::::: nobody:NP:6445::::: noaccess:NP:6445::::: nobody4:NP:6445::::: oracle:9HYdoknN7Qm6M:10317::::: web:1kvYWejMEpt9E:10270:::::: XXXXXXX2:\*LK\*:10269:::::: XXXXXXX3:\*LK\*:10554::::: XXXXXXX4:\*LK\*:10647:::::: XXXXXXX5:\*LK\*:10863:::::: XXXXXXX6:\*LK\*:10605:::::: XXXXXX7:hGM121Hd6Xrec:10269::::: XXXXX8:mklnKXczA7QvE:10900:::::: XXXXXXX9:CSsbIoaAtdPNs:10645::::: XXXXXX11:\*LK\*:10444:::::: XXXXXX12:FmCFTMIy.6KB.:10599:::::: XXXXX13:\*LK\*:10673:::::: ftp:NP:10833:::::: XXXXX31:u7eqNokeHteUg:10942::::: XXXXX32:\*LK\*:10535:::::: XXX33:\*LK\*:10535::::: X34:\*LK\*:10645::::: XXXX35:ySrf71BYBST0c:10687::::: XXXX36:tJIpQM2WK4NIM:10717::::: X37:gQaPh02A7ppOc:10710:::::

```
patches:u7eqNokeHteUq:10833::::::
XXXXXX14:*LK*:10816:::::
XXXXXX38:rYY19HbnWuFh.:10835:::::
XXXXXX15:*LK*:10855::::::
XXXXX40:elASNDmu5tRcM:11075:::::
XXXXX40:8mqEBt/uy0Fzs:11082:::::
jpurvis:/wLYcqbzd7VG2:11254:::::
internal:L5W9mxQPNe5.k:11254:::::
X41:8KgpAGkUgfkQA:11275:::::
# cat /etc/skel/.profile
        This is the default standard profile provided to a user.
#
#
        They are expected to edit it to meet their own needs.
MAIL=/usr/mail/${LOGNAME:?}
# cat /etc/skel/local.profile
#
# @(#)local.profile 1.4 93/09/15 SMI
#
stty istrip
PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/etc:.
export PATH
#
 If possible, start the windows system
#
if [ `tty` = "/dev/console" ] ; then
        if [ "$TERM" = "sun" -o "$TERM" = "AT386" ] ; then
                if [ ${OPENWINHOME:-""} = "" ] ; then
                        OPENWINHOME=/usr/openwin
                        export OPENWINHOME
                fi
                echo ""
                echo "Starting OpenWindows in 5 seconds (type Control-C to
interrupt)"
                sleep 5
                echo ""
                $OPENWINHOME/bin/openwin
                clear
                                # get rid of annoying cursor rectangle
                exit
                                # logout after leaving windows system
        fi
fi
# cat /etc/ssh config
# This is ssh client systemwide configuration file. This file provides
# defaults for users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration
# files or on the command line.
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
# 1. command line options
# 2. user-specific file
```

# 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Site-wide defaults for various options # Host \* # ForwardAgent yes # ForwardX11 yes # RhostsAuthentication yes # RhostsRSAAuthentication yes # RSAAuthentication yes # TISAuthentication no # PasswordAuthentication yes FallBackToRsh yes # # UseRsh no # BatchMode no StrictHostKeyChecking no # # IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity Port 22 # # Cipher idea # EscapeChar ~ # cat /etc/sshd config # This is ssh server systemwide configuration file. Port 22 ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 HostKey /etc/ssh host key RandomSeed /etc/ssh random seed ServerKeyBits 768 LoginGraceTime 600 KeyRegenerationInterval 3600 PermitRootLogin no IgnoreRhosts no StrictModes yes QuietMode no X11Forwarding yes X11DisplayOffset 10 FascistLogging no 🦢 PrintMotd yes KeepAlive yes SyslogFacility DAEMON RhostsAuthentication no RhostsRSAAuthentication yes RSAAuthentication yes PasswordAuthentication yes PermitEmptyPasswords yes UseLogin no # PidFile /u/zappa/.ssh/pid # AllowHosts \*.our.com friend.other.com # DenyHosts lowsecurity.theirs.com \*.evil.org evil.org # Umask 022 # SilentDeny on

# cat /etc/syslog.conf

..... #ident "@(#)syslog.conf 1.4 96/10/11 SMI" /\* SunOS 5.0 \*/ . . . . . . . . . . . . # # Copyright (c) 1991-1993, by Sun Microsystems, Inc. # # syslog configuration file. # # This file is processed by m4 so be careful to quote (`') names # that match m4 reserved words. Also, within ifdef's, arguments # containing commas must be quoted. \*.err;kern.notice;auth.notice /dev/console \*.err;kern.debug;mail.crit /var/adm/messages # added for wu-ftpd & sshd daemon.info /var/adm/messages \*.alert;kern.err;daemon.err operator \*.alert root \* \*.emerg # if a non-loghost machine chooses to have authentication messages # sent to the loghost machine, un-comment out the following line: auth.notice ifdef(`LOGHOST', /var/log/authlog, @loghost) mail.debug ifdef(`LOGHOST', /var/log/syslog, @loghost) # # non-loghost machines will use the following lines to cause "user" # log messages to be logged locally. ifdef(`LOGHOST', , /dev/console user.err /var/adm/messages user.err user.alert `root, operator' user.emerg ) # cat /ftp01/home/XXXXX31/etc/group root::0:root other::1: bin::2:root, bin, daemon sys::3:root,bin,sys,adm adm::4:root,adm,daemon uucp::5:root,uucp mail::6:root tty::7:root,tty,adm lp::8:root,lp,adm nuucp::9:root, nuucp staff::10: daemon::12:root,daemon sysadmin::14: nobody::60001: noaccess::60002: nogroup::65534: ftp::30000:ftp

Script started on Fri Nov 17 18:17:20 2000 1000 [18:17:20 -!R!- kumo] ssh jpurvis@172.16.2.1 jpurvis@172.16.2.1's password: Last login: Fri Nov 17 15:43:12 2000 from 172.16.2.47 Sun Microsystems Inc. SunOS 5.6 Generic August 1997 Sun Microsystems Inc. SunOS 5.6 Generic August 1997 kumo\$ su -Password: Generic August 1997 Sun Microsystems Inc. SunOS 5.6 You have mail. # showrev -p No patches are installed # pkginfo application FSFgzip gzip Netscape Navigator (export) Solaris Documentation Server Lookup application NSCPnav SUNWab2m system System Accounting, (Root) SUNWaccr system SUNWadmapSystem Accounting, (Usr)SUNWadmapSystem administration applicationsSUNWadmcSystem administration core librariesSUNWadmfwSystem & Network Administration FrameworkSUNWadmrSystem & Network Administration RootSUNWappprPPP/IP Asynchronous PPP daemon configuration filesSUNWapppuPPP/IP Asynchronous PPP daemon and PPP locit system system system system system system system service SUNWarc SUNWast SUNWatfsr SUNWatfsu SUNWaudio Archive Libraries system Automated Security Enhancement Tools system SUNWastAutomated Security ISUNWatfsrAutoFS, (Root)SUNWatfsuAutoFS, (Usr)SUNWaudioAudio applicationsSUNWaudmoAudio demo programsSUNWappenSunos 4 u Binaru Gas system system system system SUNWaudmo SUNWbcpSunOS 4.x Binary CompatibilitySUNWbnurNetworking UUCP Utilities, (Root)SUNWbnuuNetworking UUCP Utilities, (Usr)SUNWbtoolCCS tools bundled with SunOSSUNWcarCore Prebiterty SUNWbcp SUNWbnur system system SUNWBHUI SUNWbtool SUNWcar SUNWcg6 SUNWcg6h system system Core Architecture, (Root) GX (cg6) Device Driver GX (cg6) Header Files Chinese/PRC iconv modules for UTF-8 system system system SUNWciu8CHINESE, ISUNWcprSuspend, Resume packageSUNWcsdCore Solaris DevicesSUNWcsrCore Solaris, (Root)SUNWcsuCore Solaris, (Usr)SUNWdfbDumb Frame Buffer Device DriversSUNWdfbhDumb Frame Buffer Header FilesSUNWdhcsrBOOTP/DHCP Server Services, (Root)SUNWdhcsuBOOTP/DHCP Server Services, (Usr)SUNWdialButtons/Dials (bd) Streams ModulecionSUNWdialhSUNWdocDocumentation ToolsCUNWdtabCDE DTBUILDER SUNWciu8 ALE system system system system system system system system system application SUNWdialh system SUNWdoc SUNWACCDocumentation ToolsSUNWdtabCDE DTBUILDERSUNWdtbasCDE application basic runtime environmentSUNWdtcorSolaris Desktop /usr/dt filesystem anchorSUNWdtdemCDE DEMOSSUNWdtdstCDE daemonsSUNWdtdstCDE Desktop ApplicationsSUNWdtdteSolaris Desktop Login Environment system system system system system system system

system	SUNWdthe	CDE HELP RUNTIME
system	SUNWdthed	CDE HELP DEVELOPER ENVIRONMENT
system	SUNWdthev	CDE HELP VOLUMES
system	SUNWdthj	HotJava Browser for Solaris
system	SUNWdticn	CDE icons
system	SUNWdtim	Solaris CDE Image Viewer
system	SUNWdtinc	CDE Includes
-	SUNWdtlog	System boot for Desktop Login
system system	SUNWdtma	
-	SUNWdtmad	CDE man pages CDE developer man pages
system		CDE Release Documentation
system	SUNWdtrme SUNWdtwm	CDE RETEASE DOCUMENTATION CDE DESKTOP WINDOW MANAGER
system		
system	SUNWenise	Base Partial Locales
system	SUNWesu	Extended System Utilities
system	SUNWeudba	UTF-8 L10N for CDE Base
system	SUNWeudbd	UTF-8 L10N for CDE Dtbuilder
system	SUNWeudda	UTF-8 L10N For CDE Desktop Applications
system	SUNWeudhr	UTF-8 L10N For CDE Help Runtime
system	SUNWeudhs	UTF-8 L10N For CDE Help Runtime
system	SUNWeudis	UTF-8 L10N For CDE Icons
system	SUNWeudiv	UTF-8 L10N For Desktop Imagetool
system	SUNWeudlg	UTF-8 L10N For CDE Desktop Login
system	SUNWeudmg	UTF-8 L10N For Desktop Window Manager
system	SUNWeuise	European Partial Locales
system	SUNWeuluf	UTF-8 L10N For Language Environment User Files
system	SUNWeuodf	UTF-8 Core OPENLOOK Desktop Files
system	SUNWeuxwe	UTF-8 X Window Environment
system	SUNWfac	Framed Access Command Environment
system	SUNWfns	Federated Naming System
system	SUNWfnsx5	FNS Support For X.500 Directory Context
system	SUNWhea	SunOS Header Files
ALE	SUNWhiu8	Chinese/Taiwan iconv modules for UTF-8
system	SUNWhmd	SunSwift SBus Adapter Drivers
system	SUNWhmdu	SunSwift SBus Adapter Headers
system	SUNWilof	ISO-8859-1 (Latin-1) Optional Fonts
system	SUNWi2of	X11 ISO-8859-2 optional fonts
system	SUNWi2rf	X11 ISO-8859-2 required fonts
system	SUNWi4of	X11 ISO-8859-4 optional fonts
system	SUNWi4rf	X11 ISO-8859-4 required fonts
system	SUNWi5of	X11 ISO-8859-5 optional fonts
system	SUNWi5rf	X11 ISO-8859-5 required fonts
system	SUNWi7of	X11 ISO-8859-7 optional fonts
system	SUNWi7rf	X11 ISO-8859-7 required fonts
system	SUNWi9of	X11 ISO-8859-9 optional fonts
system	SUNWi9rf	X11 ISO-8859-9 required fonts
system	SUNWinst	Install Software
system	SUNWipc	Interprocess Communications
system	SUNWislcc	XSH4 conversion for Eastern European locales
system	SUNWisolc	XSH4 conversion for ISO Latin character sets
system	SUNWjiu8	Japanese iconv modules for UTF-8
system	SUNWjvdem	JavaVM demo programs
system	SUNWjvdev	JavaVM developers packages, includes javac, javah,
and javap	CUNM	Town TIM compiler
system	SUNWjvjit	Java JIT compiler
system	SUNWjvman	JavaVM man pages
system application	SUNWjvrt	JavaVM run time environment KCMS Optional Profiles
apprication	DOIMWYCSDT	None optional liolites

application	1 5	KCMS Programmers Environment
application	SUNWkcsrt	KCMS Runtime Environment
system	SUNWkey	Keyboard configuration tables
ALE	SUNWkiu8	Korean UTF-8 iconv modules for UTF-8
system	SUNWkvm	Core Architecture, (Kvm)
system	SUNWleo	ZX System Software (Device Driver) 💦 👝
application	SUNWleoo	ZX XGL support
system	SUNWleor	ZX System Software (Root)
application	SUNWleow	ZX Window System Support
system	SUNWlibC	SPARCompilers Bundled libC
system	SUNWlibCf	SunSoft WorkShop Bundled libC (cfront version)
system	SUNWlibm	Sun WorkShop Bundled libm
system	SUNWlibms	Sun WorkShop Bundled shared libm
system	SUNWloc	System Localization
system	SUNWlpmsg	LP Alerts
system	SUNWluxal	Sun Enterprise Network Array socal Device Driver
system	SUNWluxdv	Sun Enterprise Network Array sf Device Driver
system	SUNWluxop	Sun Enterprise Network Array firmware and
utilities	-	-
system	SUNWman	On-Line Manual Pages న
system	SUNWmfdev	Motif UIL Compiler
system	SUNWmfman	CDE Motif Manuals
system	SUNWmfrun	Motif RunTime Kit
system	SUNWmibii	Solstice Enterprise Agent SNMP daemon
system	SUNWnisr	Network Information System, (Root)
system	SUNWnisu	Network Information System, (Usr)
system	SUNWntpr	NTP, (Root)
system	SUNWntpu	NTP, (Usr)
system	SUNWoladd	OPEN LOOK Alternate Desktop Demos
system	SUNWolaud	OPEN LOOK Audio applications
system	SUNWolbk	OpenWindows online handbooks
system	SUNWoldcv	OPEN LOOK document and help viewer applications
system	SUNWoldem	OPEN LOOK demo programs
system	SUNWoldim	OPEN LOOK demo images
system	SUNWoldst	OPEN LOOK deskset tools
system	SUNWoldte	OPEN LOOK Desktop Environment
system	SUNWolimt	OPEN LOOK imagetool
system	SUNWOLINC	OPEN LOOK include files
system	SUNWolman	OPEN LOOK toolkit/desktop users man pages
system	SUNWolrte	OPEN LOOK toolkits runtime environment
system	SUNWolslb	OPEN LOOK toolkit/desktop static/lint libraries
system	SUNWolsrc	OPEN LOOK sample source
system	SUNWOS86u	Platform Support, OS Functionality (Usr)
system	SUNWosdem	OS demo source
system	SUNWOSCEM	OpenWindows binary compatibility
system	SUNWowrqd	OpenWindows required core package
-	SUNWpcelx	3COM EtherLink III PCMCIA Ethernet Driver
system	-	PCMCIA Card Services, (Root)
system	SUNWpcmci SUNWpcmcu	PCMCIA Card Services, (Usr)
system	-	
system	SUNWpcmem	PCMCIA memory card driver
system	SUNWpor	SunSoft Print - Client, (root)
system	SUNWpcser	PCMCIA serial card driver
system	SUNWpcu	SunSoft Print - Client, (usr)
application	-	PEX Runtime Client Library
application		PEX Client Developer Files
application		PEX Runtime Server Extension
system	SUNWpldte	Eastern European locale support

system	SUNWploc	Partial Locales
system	SUNWploc1	Supplementary Partial Locales
system	SUNWplow	OpenWindows enabling for Partial Locales
system	SUNWplow1	OpenWindows enabling for Supplementary Partial
Locales	-	
system	SUNWpmowm	Power Management OW Utilities Man Pages 👝
system	SUNWpmowr	Power Management OW Utilities, (Root)
system	SUNWpmowu	Power Management OW Utilities, (Usr)
system	SUNWpmr	Power Management config file and rc script
system	SUNWpmu	Power Management binaries
system	SUNWpppk	PPP/IP and IPdialup Device Drivers
system	SUNWpsdpr	PCMCIA ATA card driver
system	SUNWpsf	PostScript filters - (Usr)
system	SUNWpsr	SunSoft Print - LP Server, (root)
system	SUNWpsu	SunSoft Print - LP Server, (usr)
system	SUNWrdm	On-Line Open Issues ReadMe
system	SUNWrtvc	SunVideo Device Driver
application		SunVideo XIL library support
application		SunVideo Runtime Support Software
system	SUNWsacom	Solstice Enterprise Agent files for root file
system		Calatica Enternaise Areat Dealter Management
system	SUNWsadmi	Solstice Enterprise Agent Desktop Management
Interface	OTINET los l	Onlating Jawashaw
system	SUNWsadml	Solstice Launcher.
system	SUNWsasnm	Solstice Enterprise Agent Simple Network
Management		
system	SUNWscbcp	SPARCompilers Binary Compatibility Libraries
system	SUNWscplp	SunSoft Print - Source Compatibility, (Usr)
system	SUNWscpr	Source Compatibility, (Root)
system	SUNWscpu	Source Compatibility, (Usr)
system	SUNWses	SCSI Enclosure Services Device Driver
system	SUNWsolnm	Solaris Naming Enabler
system	SUNWspl	Spell Checking Engine - Base Release (English)
system	SUNWsprot	Solaris Bundled tools
system	SUNWsra	Source Compatibility Archive Libraries
system	SUNWsregu	Solaris User Registration
system	SUNWsrh	Source Compatibility Header Files
system	SUNWssadv	SPARCstorage Array Drivers
system	SUNWssaop	SPARCstorage Array Utility
system	SUNWsutl	Static Utilities
system	SUNWswmt	Patch Utilities
application		SX Shareable Library
application		SX Window System Support
application		SX XGL Support
application		TCX Window System Support
application	SUNWtcxu	TCX XGL Support
system	SUNWter	Terminal Information
system	SUNWtltk	ToolTalk runtime
system	SUNWtltkd	ToolTalk developer support
system	SUNWtltkm	ToolTalk manual pages
system	SUNWtnfc	TNF Core Components
system	SUNWtnfd	TNF Developer Components
system	SUNWtoo	Programming Tools
system	SUNWuiu8	Iconv modules for UTF-8 Locale
system	SUNWuium	Iconv Man Pages for UTF-8 Locale
system	SUNWulcf	UTF-8 Locale Environment Common Files
system	SUNWuxlcf	UTF-8 X Locale Environment Common Files

system	SUNWvolg	Volume Management Graphical User Interface
system	SUNWvolr	Volume Management, (Root)
system	SUNWvolu	Volume Management, (Usr)
system	SUNWxcu4	XCU4 Utilities
system	SUNWxcu4t	XCU4 make and sccs utilities
application		XGL Generic Loadable Libraries
application		XGL English Localization
application		XGL Stroke Fonts
application		XGL Include Files
application		XGL Runtime Environment
system	SUNWxi18n	X Window System I18N Common Package
application		CG14 XIL Support
application		XIL Loadable Pipeline Libraries
application		XIL API Header Files
application		XIL man pages and demos
application		XIL Deskset Loadable Pipeline Libraries
application		XIL Runtime Environment
application		VIS/XIL Support
system	SUNWxim	X Window System X Input Method Server Package
system	SUNWxwacx	AccessX client program
system	SUNWxwcft	X Window System common (not required) fonts
system	SUNWxwdem	X Window System demo programs
system	SUNWxwdim	X Window System demo images
system	SUNWxwdv	X Windows System Window Drivers
system	SUNWxwdxm	DPS motif library
system	SUNWxwfa	X Window System Font Administrator
system	SUNWxwfnt	X Window System platform required fonts
system	SUNWxwfs	Font server
system	SUNWxwhl	X Window System & Graphics Header links in
/usr/include		
system	SUNWxwice	ICE components
system	SUNWxwinc	X Window System include files
system	SUNWxwman	X Window System online user man pages
system	SUNWxwmod	OpenWindows kernel modules
system	SUNWxwoft	X Window System optional fonts
system	SUNWxwopt	nonessential MIT core clients and server
extensions		
system	SUNWxwplt	X Window System platform software
system	SUNWxwpmn	X Window System online programmers man pages
system	SUNWxwpsr	Sun4u-platform specific X server auxiliary filter
modules		
system	SUNWxwrtl	X Window System & Graphics Runtime Library Links
in /usr/lib		
system	SUNWxwslb	X Window System static/lint libraries
system	SUNWxwsrc	X Window System sample source
system	SUNWypr	NIS Server for Solaris (root)
system	SUNWypu	NIS Server for Solaris (usr)
utility	md5sum	md5sum 1.00 SPARC Solaris 2.6
	r/log/syslog	
-rw-rr		ther 6054 Nov 17 05:00 /var/log/syslog
	r/adm/messages	
-rw-rr		ther 7809 Nov 17 16:44 /var/adm/messages
# ls -1 /va:	r/adm	
total 6436	- ·	
drwxrwxr-x		dm 512 Jan 26 1998 acct
-rw	-	in 0 Jan 26 1998 aculog
drwx	2 root o	ther 512 May 5 2000 backup

-rw-rr	1 root	root	4096 Apr 2 1998 ftp.pids-all
-rw-rr	1 root	root	4096 Nov 17 16:31 ftp.pids-remote
drwxr-xr-x	2 root	other	512 Dec 1 1999 fw
-rrr	1 root	root	854084 Nov 17 16:44 lastlog
drwxrwxr-x	2 adm	adm	512 Jan 26 1998 log
-rw-rr	1 root	other	7809 Nov 17 16:44 messages 🛛 👝
-rw-rr	1 root	other	2638 Nov 7 14:58 messages.0
-rw-rr	1 root	other	525 Nov 4 23:50 messages.1
-rw-rr	1 root	other	2911 Oct 24 15:25 messages.2
-rw-rr	1 root	other	0 Oct 15 03:10 messages.3
-rw-rr	1 root	other	0 Oct 8 03:10 messages.4
-rw-rr	1 root	other	0 Oct 1 03:10 messages.5
-rw	1 root	other	1601 Dec 30 1999 nohup.out
drwxrwxr-x	2 adm	adm	512 Jan 26 1998 passwd
drwxrwxr-x	2 adm	sys	512 Jan 26 1998 sa
-rw-rw-rw-	1 bin	bin	0 Jan 26 1998 spellhist
-rw	1 root	root	17135 Nov 17 16:45 sulog
-rw-rr	1 root	bin	432 Nov 17 16:44 utmp
-rw-rr	1 root	bin	4464 Nov 17 16:44 utmpx
-rw-rw-rw-	1 root	root	3904 Apr 25 2000 vold.log
-rw-rw-r	1 adm	adm	218016 Nov 17 16:44 wtmp
-rw-rw-r	1 adm	adm	2252088 Nov 17 16:44 wtmpx
-rw-rw	1 root	other	694845 Nov 14 15:57 xferlog
# exit			
kumo\$ exit			
Connection t	:0 172.16.2	2.1 closed	
1001 [18:21:	24 -!R!- }	cumo]#	
Script done			:25 2000

## **End Notes**

<sup>i</sup> The "banner" on a service is the initial greeting string put out by the daemon when a client connects to it, either as a greeting message or in response to a client's request for the server's version information. Banners frequently include the name and version number of the software used, and may also include the architecture of the system they are employed upon, the current date and time according to the system, and so forth. Such information is of great use to an intruder, since it provides clues to what attacks will work against a host.

<sup>ii</sup> These switches were not utilized here, as no intrusion detection was in place on the internal network, and using them slows down the scan significantly.

<sup>®</sup> Only includes stopping the old daemon and starting new, not compiling and testing new version

<sup>w</sup> Only includes stopping the old daemon and starting new, not compiling and testing new version

<sup>v</sup> Only includes stopping the old daemon and starting new, not compiling and testing new version

<sup>vi</sup> Only includes stopping the old daemon and starting new, not compiling and testing new version <sup>vii</sup> Time here has been reduced, since any competent tech writer will take less time to document a clean, secure new installation he/she can document as the installation proceeds than learn a currentlyconfigured one and document it after the fact.