

# Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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## Checklist For Installing A Secure Irix 6.5 Workstation

#### **GARYSAMUEL**

This is an account of the steps that an administrator should take to secure an SGI Indigo2 workstation from out-of-the-box to an "Internet ready" state. The specifications of the system are as follows:

System: SGI Indigo2

Hardware: MIPS IP22, 250 MHz, R4400 processor

192 MB RAM

4 GB SCSI system drive 4 GB SCSI option drive

SCSI CD-ROM

Operating System: SGI IRIX 6.5.10

This machine will be installed as a developer's workstation capable of developing and compiling software using both SGI's native MIPSpro compilers and the GNU compilers. Other system requirements are:

- Access to the Internet for the purpose of general web browsing etc.
- Access other hosts on the company's network for the purpose of shell sessions and file transfers.
- Ability to send email.
- Function as a DNS client.
- Do not use NFS, NIS or RPC service.

#### Command (PROM) Monitor

To get into the PROM on an SGI system, turn the system on and use the mouse to click the System Maintenance icon displayed during the boot sequence. Enter the Command Monitor by clicking the similarly labeled icon. On machines without graphics capability a text menu maps to the numeric keys.

At the Command Monitor prompt (>>), issue the "**pass wd**" command and set your PROM pass word. Please ensure that you enter the password properly and remember it since the only way to reset a forgotten PROM pass word is to remove a jumper on the CPU main board.

Setting this pass word provides a measure of physical security, as the machine will not boot to miniroot from CD-ROM or perform any Command Monitor mode commands and diagnostics without it. While in the Command Monitor, type "**printenv**" and ensure that the AutoLoad variable is set to yes, the OSLoadPartition variable is set to scsi(0)disk(1)rdisk(0)partition(0) and the OSLoadFilename is /unix

#### PROM Checklist

1.	Pass word set with passwd command
2.	AutoLoad variable set to yes
3.	OSLoadPartition variable set to root partition of the first SCSI disk
4.	OSLoadFilename variable set to /unix (the kernel)

#### IRIX 6.5.10 Media

As of the writing of this document, IRIX 6.5.10 is the latest Quarterly Update released by SGI. This release contains updates for both the maintenance and feature streams. Approximately 156 customer reported bugs are fixed in this release. IRIX 6.5.11 is in development and planned for release late February 2001.

The 6.5.10 update consists of 4 CD-ROMs;

- IRIX Installation Tools and Overlays [1 of 3]
- IRIX Overlays [2 of 3]
- IRIX Overlays [3 of 3]
- IRIX Applications

In addition, the following CD-ROMs from the IRIX 6.5 base release will also be needed.

- IRIX 6.5 Installation (original dated June 1998)
- IRIX 6.5 Foundation 1
- IRIX 6.5 Foundation 2
- IRIX 6.5 Development Foundation
- IRIX 6.5 Development Libraries

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1. Do you have all the necessary CD-ROMs?

## **Partition the File System**

Load the original 6.5 Installation tools CD into the CD-ROM drive and boot the machine. Enter the Command Monitor mode, type the "hinv" command and make note of the SCSI ID and controller of the CD-ROM drive. Using that information, type the following command. (My examples below assume the CD-ROM SCSI ID is 3, controller is 0 and the disk SCSI ID is 1 and the controller is 0)

### boot -f dksc(0,3,8)sashARCS dksc(0,3,7)stand/fx.ARCS --x

This command (specific for the IP22, IP20 and IP19 CPUs) loads the stand-alone shell and starts up the format application in the expert mode. Please see SGI documentation for other CPU types. Rather than use the single root partition that IRIX creates by default, partition the file system as follows:

Partition $0 = /$	MB		
Partition $1 = s$ wap	MB	(at least as much as R	AM)
Partition 4 = /var _	MB		
Partition $6 = /usr_{}$	MB		

After partitioning, exit the Command Monitor and load the 6.5.10 Installation CD. Select Install System Software menu item and boot to miniroot. As the machine boots to miniroot it automatically creates the /, swap and /usr file systems because the 0, 1 and 6

partitions are so defined by IRIX. The admin subprogram must be used to create and mount the /var file system.

#### Partitions Checklist

- 1. \_\_\_\_ At the Inst>prompt type "13" to get to the Admin>prompt.
- 2. \_\_\_\_ At the Admin> prompt type "mk is /dev/ds k/dks0d1s4" to create the file system.
- 3. \_\_\_\_ At the Admin> prompt type "**sh**" to get a shell prompt.
- 4. \_\_\_\_ At the # prompt type "mk dir /root/var" to create a mount point.
- 5. \_\_\_\_ At the # prompt type "mount /dev/dsk/dks0dls4/root/var" to mount it.

#### **Installing IRIX 6.5.10**

Exit up to the Inst menu and load each of the OS CDs in the order listed below.

- IRIX 6.5.10 Installation Tools 1
- IRIX 6.5.10 Installation Tools 2
- IRIX 6.5.10 Installation Tools 3
- IRIX Applications
- IRIX Foundation 1
- IRIX Foundation 2
- IRIX Development Foundation
- IRIX Development Libraries

After loading the last CD, select the software subsystems to install. SGI selects several unnecessary products as part of its default/standard installation package. These should not be installed.

#### **Installation Checklist**

- 1. \_\_\_\_ At the Inst>prompt type "from /CDROM/dist" and continue to load CDs.
- 2. \_\_\_\_ After the last CD, type "done".
- 3. \_\_\_\_ At the Inst>prompt type "keep \*"
- 4. \_\_\_\_ At the Inst prompt type "install standard"
- 5. \_\_\_\_ At the Inst>prompt type "**keep<items in do\_not\_install list>**" See Appendix A
- 6. \_\_\_\_ At the Inst>prompt type "install eoe.s w.acct eoe.s w.audit" to install the auditing and accounting software that are not loaded by default.
- 7. \_\_\_\_At the Inst>prompt type "go" and replace CDs as requested by the program.

Following the completion of the install, use the admin submenu to edit the /etc/fstab file so that the /var/partition will be mounted at boot time.

8. \_\_\_\_ Add the following line to /etc/fstab:

/dev/dsk/dks0d1s4 /var xfs rw,raw=/dev/rdsk/dks0d1s400

Exit Inst and allow the machine to reboot as prompted by the install program. The machine reboots to an "icon login screen" which displays icons for all current users of the

system. This is somewhat unnerving for an administrator and will be fixed later on in the process.

### **Installing Additional Software**

SGI maintains a freeware distribution on the web at <a href="http://freeware.sgi.com">http://freeware.sgi.com</a>. It contains useful third-party packages such as gcc, openssh, tripwire and many others. They are all in SGI's instable format and provide the option of downloading and installing as opposed to building them. Since this machine will be a developer's system, I suggest installing just the gcc compiler and use it to build all the additional packages. Administrators who build software can manipulate just about anything and set whatever features they wish rather than having to guess what the original builder of the SGI freeware did!

A good idea is to bum a CD containing the gcc software in tardist format. Place the CD in the CD-ROM drive.

Additiona	1 Software	Checklist
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l.	mkdir /tmp/sware
2.	cd/tmp/s ware
3.	cp/CDROM/fw_gcc-2.95.2-sgipl1.tardist.
1.	tar xvf fw_gcc-2.95.2-sgipl1.tardist
5.	$\_$ inst-f.

This installs a fully functional g++/gcc compiler suite in /usr/freeware, which we will later use to build and install the following security related packages:

- Sendmail
- Network Time Protocol (xntp)
- TCP Wrappers
- Tripwire
- OpenSSL
- OpenSSH

#### **Check and Install Current Recommended Patches**

SGI also maintains a security advisory/patches website at <a href="http://www.sgi.com/support/security">http://www.sgi.com/support/security</a>. Check advisories and download any 6.5.10 patches for installation on the system. Administrators should also get regular security updates from a variety of sources including CERT and SANS, which keep a very close watch on OS vulnerabilities.

The current advisory (at the time of this writing) contains two possible security concems.

- InPerson, which was not install.
- Telnetd daemon that is installed by default, but is not vulnerable in 6.5.10. In any event telnetd will be disabled later on.

#### Patches Checklist

1.	Check current advisories at website
2.	Create CD with necessary patches/fixes for IRIX OS and applications
3.	Install if necessary.

## **Configure Administrative and Users Accounts** Accounts Checklist 1. \_\_\_ Type "pass wd" to assign root pass word. 2. \_\_\_ Do not allow direct root logins. To improve the root auditing process, all direct root logins should be denied. A user should be forced to login as a nonprivileged user, then use /bin/su to gain root access. Before this is done, a regular user account should be created. 3. \_\_\_ Add a new non-privileged user. 4. \_\_\_ Open /etc/default/login and look for the line **CONSLOE=/dev/CONSOLE** It will be commented out. Uncomment it and set it to read **CONSOLE=**"". Also in /etc/default/login, find the line MANPASS=NO and change it to MANPASS=YES. This causes the system to lock out each account that does not have a pass word. 6. \_\_\_ To ensure that root does not inadvertently execute Trojan horse programs placed by hackers, root's PATH environmental variable should not include the current directory (.). Check root's .cshrc, .login and .profile to verify this. 7. \_\_\_ To guard against race conditions exploits, make sure that there are no world writable directories in root's PATH. Check root's .cshrc and .profile to verify this. 8. \_\_\_ Set restrictive umask for all users and an even more restrictive one for root. In /etc/default/login find the line **UMASK**=<###> and ensure that it is set to UMASK=022. Edit root's .cshrc and .profile and set umask 027. Also set umask 022 in /etc/profile and /etc/cshrc. All files created by root will now have rw-r---and directories will have rwxr-x--- permissions. Any special needs can be addressed on an individual basis. 9. \_\_\_ Check root's .cshrc and .profile to ensure that root does not source non rootowned files or files that are group and world writable at login. A newly installed SGI has several accounts with no pass word and these should be locked. In addition there are a number of special accounts whose home directories do not exist and should also be disabled by locking. 1. Issue /usr/s bin/pwck which checks the /etc/passwd file for inconsistencies. It should report that the sysadm, cmwlogin, nuucp, auditor, dbadmin, rfndd, demos, OutOfBox and 4Dgifts accounts do not have home directories. Proceed to lock them. Issue /usr/bin/pass wd -l <account name> for all of the above accounts as well as the lp, Ezsetup and guest accounts which do not have password. 3. Edit/etc/pass wd to assign each disabled account an invalid shell by making /dev/null the default shell. Earlier we said that by default IRIX presents an "icon login screen" containing an icon for each valid user account on the system. For obvious security reason it is not a good idea to announce a list of accounts, so this feature should be turned off. 4. \_\_\_/s bin/chkconfig noiconlogin on

5. \_\_\_/s bin /chkconfig visuallogin off

Every entry in the /etc/pass wd file should now be a valid account with a password or a locked account with an invalid login shell. Now convert to the shadow pass word system.

6. \_\_\_/s bin/pwcon v

### File System Setup

Earlier the /, /usr and /var partitions were defined. To prevent setuid scripts from executing on /var mount it with the nosuid switch. To prevent hackers from installing Trojan horse replacement of system binaries in /usr mount it with the read-only switch. File System Checklist

- 1. \_\_\_ Edit the /etc/fstab file to replace rw with ro for the /usr entry.
- 2. \_\_\_ Edit the /etc/fstab file to add the nosuid option for the /var entry.

These entries should look like this:

/dev/usr /usr xfs ro,raw=/dev/rusr 0 0

/dev/dsk/dks0d1s4 /var xfs nosuid,rw,raw=/dev/rdsk/dks0d1s400 N.B. While we are installing the system, mount /usr read-write. Revert to read-only when finished.

## **Customizing Boot Services**

IRIX provides a means to turn individual services on or off at boot time. Chkconfig is a configuration state checker which examines configuration flags found in the /etc/config file. If a flag is on, the service will be started at boot time. Since the ONC/NFS software is not installed, there are no flags for nfsd, biod, cachefs or autofs. Also NIS is not to be used, so the nsd service (which has replaced ypserv and ypbind) will not be started. These are the services that should be turned off.

**Boot Services Checklist** 

1.	/s bin/chkconfig nsd off	Tums off the name service daemon
2.	/s bin/chkconfig ipaliases off	Tums off multiple network interface support
3.	/s bin/chkconfig esp off	Tums off SGI embedded support
4.	/s bin/chkconfig timed off	BSD time syncro daemon. We will use NTP
5.	/s bin/chkconfig sendmail off	We will build and install nullclient version
6.	/sbin/chkconfig sendmail_cf o	<b>ff</b> Do not generate sendmail config file

We should also create a script to set the default umask for system processes. [1]

- 1. \_\_\_ echo 'umask 022' > /etc/init.d/umask.sh
- 2. \_\_\_/sbin/chmod 744 /etc/init.d/umask.sh
- 3. \_\_\_/sbin/ln -s /etc/init.d/umask sh /etc/rc0.d/S00umask sh
- 4. /sbin/ln -s /etc/init.d/umask.sh /etc/rc2.d/S00umask.sh

#### Streamline /etc/inetd.conf

Inetd allows a lot of insecure and unnecessary services by default. Some of the services started by inetd are ftp, telnet, shell, login, exec, finger, http, wn\_http, bootp, tftp, tcpmux, echo, chargen, sgi\_videod and sgi\_fam. When pruning is finished, only day-to-day services necessary for IRIX should remain. The only really necessary service is sgi\_fam (the File Alteration Monitor). This server tracks changes to the filesystem and relays them to applications such as the file manager and mailbox. When fam is run from inetd, a security weakness is introduced where it is possible for rouge clients to obtain

names of all the files and directories on the system. Create a script to run fam in the local\_only mode and modify the /etc/config/inetd.options file so that inetd just checks for the config file, but does not startup at boot time.

```
Inetd Checklist
   1. ___/sbin/rm/etc/inetd.conf /usr/etc/inetd.conf
   2. ___echo'-s'>/etc/config/inetd.options
   3. ___ Edit /etc/fam.conf to replace the line "local_only = fake" with "local_only =
      true".
   4. ___/sbin/touch/etc/init.d/network.local
   5. ___/sbin/ln -s /etc/init.d/network.local /etc/rc2.d/S31network
   6. ___ Edit/etc/init.d/network.local to add the following script:
             #!/bin/sh
             # Local networking things
             case $1 in
                'start')
                    if [-x/usr/etc/fam-a-f/etc/fam.conf]; then
                       /usr/etc/fam-c /etc/fam.conf
                    fi
                'stop')
                    killall fam
                     echo "Usage: $0 {start | stop}"
              esac
              exit 0
   7. ___/s bin/chmod 744 /etc/init.d/network.local
   8. /etc/reboot
Setup Networking and Hostname Resolution
Networking Checklist
Create the /etc/resolv.conf
   1. ___/s bin/touch/etc/resolv.conf
   2. ___echo'domain <DOMAINNAME>' >/etc/resolv.conf
   3. ___echo 'names erver <IP ADDRESS OF NAMES ERVER>' >>
      /etc/resolv.conf
   4. /sbin/chmod 644 /etc/resolv.conf
Edit /etc/nsswitch.conf, /etc/sys id, /etc/hosts and other network files.
   1. Edit/etc/nsswitch.conf to replace the line "hosts: nis dns files" with "hosts:
      files dns". Remove all other occurrences of the word "nis" from this file.
   2. echo '$ROUTE$QUIET add net default <IP ADDRESS OF
      GATEWAY>'>>/ etc/config/static-route.options
   3. echo'<HOSTNAME>'>/etc/sys id
```

4 e	cho '< IP ADDRESS> <	HOSTNAME.DO MAINNAM	E> <alias>'</alias>
	tc/hos ts		
		dicate the correct time zone for	your location.
	us Network and System I	Modifications	
Cron	. 1 1 1 1 (00)	) 1:1 / / 1 /GXGI	00 1 1 1
		3) which causes /var/adm/SYSL	DG and other log
1 E 2 E		o/root to replace each 033 entry cron/crontab directory contains of	
Statutory Wa	rninos		
Post your site	e's customstatutory wami	ng message in the /etc/motd and e to include warning message.	l /etc/issue files.
V1 D	4		
then read data service attack core file and generation of use took such	are generally world readab a such as the /etc/shadow as. The rlimit_core_max ko is set to a large value by d		e used in denial of aximum size of a ill restrict the
1/(	us 1/s Di 11/s ys tu ne ru 1111_c	ore_max v	
giveaway file several recen- only allows n	ownership System V styl	ed_chown is set to 0, which allowed. This is a security risk that have ue to 1 to enforce the BSD style ed_chown 1	s resulted in
•	warding to prevent broadd usr/sbin/systune ipforwan	easting of sensitive system inforeding 0	mation.
Disable ipsen	dredirects		
	usr/sbin/systune ipsendro	edirects 0	
	ected_broadcast us r/s bin/s ys tune i pdirect	ed_broadcast 0	
6/6	the kemel and reboot etc/autoconfig etc/reboot		
The nfs_ports	man parameter is not an is	sue here since the NFS subsyste	em is not installed.

Note also that there is no kernel parameter in the current IRIX 6.5.10 kernel for

preventing execution of the stack. As a result of my research, this issue was raised with SGI who has since initiated a RFE (request for enhancement) to solve this in a future upgrade release of the OS.

## Robust System Logging

As initially configured, IRIX does not log authorization information to /var/adm/SYSLOG via syslogd. Su attempts are logged in /var/adm/sulog, but other important information such as failed login, xdm, ssh, getty, ftpd and rshd attempts are not. To setup authorization logging;

important information such as falled login, xam, ssn, getty, ftpd and isnd attempts are
not. To setup authorization logging;
1 Edit /etc/syslog.conf to add the line auth.info <tab> /var/adm/authlog</tab>
2/sbin/touch/var/adm/authlog
3/sbin/chown root:sys /var/adm/authlog
4/sbin/chmod 600 /var/adm/authlog
Also log unsuccess ful login attempts at the console.
1/sbin/touch/var/adm/loginlog
2/sbin/chown root:sys /var/adm/loginlog
3/sbin/chmod 600 /var/adm/loginlog
IRIX includes log rotation as part of the /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root cron file.  1 Edit the file to add a line similar to the one below for each new log file.
# Rotate the logs
1 1 * * 0 umask 077; cd/var/adm; if test -s authlog && test "'/sbin/sta
-qs authlog" -ge 10240; then mv-f authlog OLDauthlog; touch authlog; killall
1 syslogd: fi

## **Setup Process Accounting**

IRIX process accounting provides information the administrator can use to determine resource usage and track system events on a process-by-process basis. Both of these functions are critical if ever there is a need for computer forensics. The /var/adm/pact file (to which the kemel writes its information) can grow quickly depending upon the system usage, so when accounting is on the size of the /var partition should be monitored closely. If space is limited, turn accounting on to gather specific data only if something suspicious warrants it.

To tum accounting on:

Ensure that the accounting subsystem is installed.

1. \_\_\_/usr/sbin/versions | grep eoe.sw.acct

Tum on the chkconfig flag for startup at boot time.

2. \_\_\_/s bin/chkconfig acct on

Start the kernel writing to /var/adm/pact

3. /usr/lib/acct/startup

To turn accounting off:

4/s bin/chkconfig acct off
5/usr/lib/acct/shutacct
Setup The System Audit Trail
The IRIX auditing system features a number of commands and switches which allow
the administrator to review all system activities such as trends in system usage,
unsuccessful attempts to use system resources, attempts at guessing root password
and attempts to access files owned by other users. Because auditing has the potential
to use large amounts of disk space, It is recommended that it be implemented on a
"need" basis on systems where disk space is limited.
To turn auditing on:
Ensure that the eoe.sw.audit subsystem is installed.
1/usr/sbin/versions   grep eoe.s w.au dit
<ul><li>2/s bin/chkconfig audit on</li><li>3. /etc/init.d/audit start</li></ul>
3/etc/int.cv/audit start
IRIX has a preconfigured auditing environment and begins to write auditing
information on these events immediately. See Appendix B [2] for a list of events
IRIX audits by default.
To tum auditing off:
1/sbin/chkconfig audit off
2/etc/init.d/audit stop
Puilding and Installing Condmail
Building and Installing Sendmail By default, IRIX installs sendmail 8.9.3 as part of the eoe.sw.base software
subsystem. Although this is secure, build and install the latest version which includes
several bug fixes. There will be no local delivery of mail to this machine therefore the
sendmail daemon should not be started. Configure sendmail to run in the "nullclient"
mode where all mail is forwarded to a central mailhub for delivery.
Sendmail Checklist
1 Get the 8.11.0 source from
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.11.0.tar.gz
2/usr/sbin/gzcat sendmail.8.11.0.tar.gz   tar xvf –
3 cd sendmail-8.11.0
4 Read the README files in the toplevel, devtools, sendmail and cf
directories.
5. If you wish to use gcc to perform the build then edit the "IRIX.6.5" file in
the devtools/OS directory and replace the line "define confCC cc" with
"define confCC gcc".
6/bin/sh Build
7 After the build is successfully completed, you will have a sendmail binary in the chi IRIX 6.5 IR22/sendmail directory.
in the obj.IRIX.6.5.IP22/sendmail directory.  8 cd cf/cf
9 cp clientproto.mc <hostname>.mc</hostname>
/ cp charp ownic \1100 114AMP. iic

OSTYPE(IRIX6) FEATURE(nullclient, <mailhub>.\$m)  Note that <mailhub> is the hostname of the mailhub on your local network.  11/sbin/m4/m4/cf.m4 <mailhub>.mc &gt; sendmail.cf  12 cp sendmail.cf /etc/mail  13/sbin/chown root:sys /etc/mail/sendmail.cf  14/sbin/chmod 644 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf  15/sbin/ln -s /etc/mail/sendmail.cf  16 cd//obj.IRIX.6.5.IP22/sendmail  17 cp sendmail /usr/lib [replacing IRIX,s binary]  18/sbin/chown root:sys /usr/lib/sendmail  19/sbin/chmod 4555 /usr/lib/sendmail  This completes the installation of the daemon and configuration file. Configure the</mailhub></mailhub></mailhub>
11/sbin/m4/m4/cf.m4 <mailhub>.mc &gt; sendmail.cf  12 cp sendmail.cf /etc/mail  13/sbin/chown root:sys /etc/mail/sendmail.cf  14/sbin/chmod 644 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf  15/sbin/ln -s /etc/mail/sendmail.cf /etc/sendmail.cf  16 cd//obj.IRIX.6.5.IP22/sendmail  17 cp sendmail /usr/lib [replacing IRIX,s binary]  18/sbin/chown root:sys /usr/lib/sendmail  19/sbin/chmod 4555 /usr/lib/sendmail</mailhub>
This completes the installation of the daemon and configuration file. Configure the
startup environment so that the sendmail daemon is not started at boot time.  20/sbin/chkconfig sendmail off
Since sendmail is not running in daemon mode, there is a chance that mail that is not forwarded immediately to the mailhub (due to unavailability or network congestion) may remain in the queue indefinitely. To solve this problem, set up a cron job to flush the mail queue intermittently. The following line when added to the /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root file, will flush the queue every fifteen minutes:  21 0,15,30,45 * * * * /usr/lib/sendmail -q > /dev/null 2>&1  22 kill -HUP <cron pid=""></cron>
22 KIII—HOI COULT ID>
Building and Installing TCP Wrappers
TCP Wrappers Checklist
1. Get the source from
ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/tcp_wrappers 7.6.tar.gz
2/usr/sbin/gzcat tcp_wrappers_7.6.tar.gz   tar xvf =
3cd tcp_wrappers_7.6
4 Read the README.IRIX document.
5/s bin/chmod 644 Makefile
6 Edit Makefile to include the following lines:
# IRIX  DEAL DAEMON DID - /ug r/ohin
REAL_DAEMON_DIR = /usr/sbin
CC = /usr/freeware/bin/gcc #The location of gcc FACILITY = LOG AUTH

7.	/s bin/make irix6
	d have successfully built the software and produced related binaries, header
	e files in the tcp_wrappers_7.6 directory. Proceed to install the software.
8.	/s bin/mk dir _p/usr/local/s bin/usr/local/include
9.	cp safe_finger tcpd tcpdchk tcpmatch try-from /usr/local/sbin
	/s bin/chmod 0555 /usr/local/s bin/*
11.	/s bin/chown root:daemon /usr/s bin/*
	cp libwrap.a /usr/local/lib [directory exists by default]
	/s bin/chown root:daemon /usr/local/lib/libwrap.a
14.	/s bin/chmod 0555 /usr/local/lib/libwrap.a
	cp tcpd.h /usr/local/include
	/sbin/chown root:daemon /usr/local/include/tcpd.h
	/s bin/chmod 0444 /usr/local/include/tcpd.h
Secure Shell	Requirements
Because rlogin	n, telnet, ftp and other clear text protocols were disabled, install SSH as the
means of remo	otely accessing the system and transferring file to and from it securely.
Build and inst	all OpenSSH 2.5.1p1, which is the latest opensource version as of this
writing. To su	ccess fully build it, working installations of OpenSSL and the Zlib
compression 1	ibrary are needed.
Building Oper	nSSL
	Download openss l-0.9.6.tar.gz from <a href="http://www.openssl.org">http://www.openssl.org</a>
2.	/usr/sbin/gzcat openssl-0.9.6.tar.gz   tar xvf –
3.	cd openssl-0.9.6
4.	Read INSTALL file and note the requirements. Note Perl5 which is
	installed by default at /usr/sbin/perl.
5.	/Configure irix-gcc
6.	Edit Makefile to set the proper location of gcc.
7.	/s bin/make
8.	/s bin/make test
9.	/s bin/make install [Installs the software to /usr/local/ssl]
Building zlib	
1.	Download zlib.tar.gz from <a href="http://www.freesoft.com/pub/infozip/zlib">http://www.freesoft.com/pub/infozip/zlib</a>
2.	/usr/sbin/gzcat zlib.tar.gz  tar xvf —
3.	cd zlib-1.13
4.	setenv CC gcc; ./configure

## **Building and Installing SSH**

5. \_\_\_/sbin/make test 6. \_\_\_/sbin/make install

- Having satisfied the prerequisites, proceed to build OpenSSH.

  1. \_\_\_ Download openssh-2.5.1p1.tar.gz from <a href="http://www.openssh.com">http://www.openssh.com</a>
  - 2. \_\_\_/usr/sbin/gzcat openssh-2.5.1p1.tar.gz | tar xvf -

3.	cd openssh-2.5.1p1
4.	setenv CFLAGS –I/usr/local/include
5.	setenv LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib
5.	
	rshdisable-suid-ssh
7.	/sbin/make
3.	/sbin/make install

The sshd daemon is now installed in /usr/local/sbin and ssh, scp, sftp, ssh-keygen, etc are installed at /usr/local/bin. The ssh\_config, sshd\_config and public/private key files are installed in /etc/ssh.

## **Configuring Secure Shell with TCP Wrappers**

Because SSH was built with tcp-wrappers support, all that needs to be done is to construct the /etc/hosts.allow and /etc/hosts.deny files.

\_\_/sbin/touch/etc/hosts.allow
 \_\_/sbin/chown root:sys /etc/hosts.allow
 \_\_/sbin/chmod 600 /etc/hosts.allow
 \_\_echo 'ssh: <IP ADDRESS>' > /etc/hosts.allow
 \_\_echo '# Comment: This entry added <DATE> for <NAME>' >> /etc/hosts.allow. For auditing purposes it is always a good idea to document reasons for entries in this file.
 \_\_/sbin/touch/etc/hosts.deny
 \_\_/sbin/chown root:sys /etc/hosts.deny
 \_\_/sbin/chmod 600 /etc/hosts.deny

9. \_\_\_echo'ALL: ALL: /usr/bin/mail -s % d-% a root' > /etc/hosts.deny

%d refers to the application name and %a refers to the client's IP address. To further explain refusal or to snap a warning back at the offending client, the banner option can be included in the line. The line in the deny file would then read:

ALL: ALL: /usr/bin/mail -s % d-% a root: banners /etc/banners/deny Create the /etc/banners/deny directory with a message file named sshd.

## Configuring SSHD

To prepare the machine to accept connections from ssh clients, the /etc/ssh/sshd config file must be modified.

Edit /etc/ssh/sshd config as follows:

1 X11Forwarding yes				
2 PermitRootLogin no				
3 PrintMotd no				
4 KeepAlive no				
To start sshd at boot time create a script.				
5 Save the following script as /etc/init.d/sshd. [3]				
#!/bin/sh				
case \$1 in				
'start')				

Remote clients listed in the /etc/hosts.allow file can now connect to this machine.

## **Building and Configuring XNTP**

Having the machine display the correct date and time at all occasions is extremely important. This feature is useful during forensic investigations where time correlation is critical in determining the flow of data between machines. XNTP is an implementation of the Network Time Protocol that synchronizes time between computers on the Internet.

\_\_\_\_ Download xntp3-5.93.tar.gz from http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~ntp
 \_\_\_\_ /usr/s bin/gzcat xntp3-5.93.tar.gz |tar xvf \_\_\_\_ cd xntp3-5.93
 \_\_\_\_ Read the README and INSTALL files
 \_\_\_\_ /configure
 \_\_\_\_ /s bin/make
 \_\_\_\_ /s bin/make check
 \_\_\_\_ /s bin/make install [Installs the package in/usr/local/bin]

Next build the /etc/ntp.conf file which xntpd reads at startup.

- 9. \_\_\_ Select three stratum 2 time servers from the public NTP server list at <a href="http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/ntp/clock2.htm">http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/ntp/clock2.htm</a>.
- 10. \_\_\_ Contact the administrator for each and request permission to suck clock form them. It is important to ask because their servers may already be heavily loaded.
- 11. \_\_\_ Add the lines to /etc/ntp.conf. Most servers use DNS aliases for real machine names. It is recommended that the alias be used rather than the real name to prevent disconnection in the event that the clock is moved to another machine later on. Here is the format of the /etc/ntp.conf file:

```
server<ALIAS>
   server<ALIAS>
   server<ALIAS>
   driftfile /etc/ntp.drift
12. ___/sbin/chkconfig timed off [Turn off IRIX timed daemon]
13. ___/sbin/touch/etc/init.d/xntp
       Edit the file to add the following script: [4]
       #!/bin/sh
       NTPDATE=/usr/local/bin/ntpdate
       XNTP=/usr/local/bin/xntpd
       case $1 in
          'start')
                if test - x $NTPDATE; then
                  $NTPDATE-s <ALIAS>
                fi
                if test -x $XNTP; then
                  $XNTP && echo `Starting xntp`
                fi
           'stop')
                /sbin/killall –k 10 –TERM xntpd
           *)
                echo "Usage: /etc/init.d/xntp {start | stop}"
         es ac
14. ___/sbin/chmod 744 /etc/init.d/xntp
15. ___/sbin/chown root:sys /etc/init.d/xntp
16. ___ ln -s /etc/init.d/xntp/etc/rc3.d/S90xntp
17. ___ ln -s /etc/init.d/xntp/etc/rc2.d/K90xntp
18. ____/etc/init.d/xntp start [startup the xntp daemon]
```

#### **Building and Configuring Tripwire**

Tripwire is a host-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that uses cryptographic signatures of key system files to determine unauthorized modification or access. Tripwire is most effective if installed just after the machine is fully prepared and just before it is ready to be integrated into the network.

```
    ___ Download Tripwire-1.3.1-1.tar.gz from 
http://www.tripwiresecurity.com
    ___/usr/sbin/gzcat Tripwire-1.3.1-1.tar.gz | tar xvf –
    ___ cd tw_ASR_1.3.1_src
    ___ Edit include/config h and set the CONFIG_PATH variable to /usr/tripwire and DATABASE_PATH to /usr/tripwire/databases.
```

Remember that /usr is our read-only file system, which has been				
temporarily configured read-write for software installation.				
5/sbin/make				
6/sbin/make test				
7 cp src/tripwire /usr/local/bin				
8 cp scr/siggen /usr/local/bin				
9/sbin/chown root:sys /usr/local/bin/tripwire				
10/sbin/chmod 0500 /usr/local/bin/tripwire				
11 <b>cd configs</b>				
12 cp tw.conf.irix /usr/tripwire/tw.config				
13/sbin/chmod 600 /usr/tripwire/tw.config				
14 The administrator should customize this file to suit the software				
installation at her site, as well as include all setuid and setgid files.				
However, this default configuration file provides checking for system				
configuration and binary files.				
15cd/usr/tripwire				
16/usr/local/bin/tripwire –initialize [To create the database file at				
\$DATABASE_PATH specified in the config.h file]				
17 Add the following line to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root to automate				
an integrity check at 0500 hrs daily and mail root the results:				
0 5 * * * if test –x /usr/local/bin/tripwire; then /usr/local/bin/tripwire				
2>1&  /usr/s bin/Mail -s Tripwire_result root; fi				
2/10  / 051/5 bill 1/mil   5   111pmile_1 coult 1 000; 11				
Data Integrity and Recovery				
Two additional steps should be taken to ensure data integrity and data recovery in case of				
system breech or failure.				
Clone System Disk				
After installing all software, the system disk should be cloned.				
1 Install a second disk of similar size to the system disk, bring the machine up				
and execute " <b>hinv</b> " to note SCSI ID and controller information.				
2 Partition the second disk in the same way as the system disk, i.e. with /, /usr and /var partitions similarly sized.				
1 3				
3 Use /s bin/dvhtool to copy the contents of the volume header of the system				
disk as well as the fx and sash programs to the new disk. See Appendix C for details on how this is done. [5]				
4 Make new filesystems on each partition of the new disk using /sbin/mkfs. To				
make the new filesystem on the /, /usr and /var partitions of a disk with SCSI ID 2				
on controller 0, the commands would be:				
5/s bin/mk fs /dev/ds k/dks0d2s0				
6/s bin/mkfs /dev/ds k/dks0d2s 6				
7/sbin/mkfs /dev/dsk/dks0d2s4				
8/s bin/mk dir /clone [Create a temporary mount point for the new disk]				
9/sbin/mount/dev/dsk/dks0d2s0/clone [Mount the root partition at /clone]				
10 <b>cd/clone</b>				

11/usr/sbin/xfsdump-l 0 - /   /sbin/xfsrestore [Level 0 dump of / to new
disk]
12 <b>cd</b>
13/s bin/umount /clone
14/s bin/mount /dev/ds k/dks0d2s6 /clone
15 cd/clone
16/usr/sbin/xfsdump-l 0 - /usr   /sbin/xfsrestore [Dump /usr to new disk]
17 Repeat procedure for /var partition.
18 cd [When finished dumping /var, unmount and delete the mount point]
19/s bin/umount /clone
20 rm –rf/clone
The resulting disk is now an exact replica of the system disk prior to being placed into
service. To verify this backup, replace the original system disk with the cloned disk and
restart the system. After the machine has started, run Tripwire in the integrity checking
mode to verify that the disk is identical to the original. Tripwire should not report any
additions or changes! Shutdown the machine, reinstall the original disk and store the
clone for future use. Whenever the machine is updated in the future, this backup disk
should be kept up-to-date by cloning.
and the start of t
Regular Full and Incremental Backups
1 Include this machine in the daily tape backup program at your site.
Physical Security
Having done all to stand against the hackers, do not forget to secure the machine from
unnecessary and unauthorized physical access.
1 All SGI workstations are equip with a metal locking bar that extends from the
front to the rear. This should be fitted with a padlock to prevent unauthorized
opening of the machine to reset jumpers or to remove and install disks or CD-
ROM drives. Use it!
2 Machines located in public areas should be monitored for excessive reboots
that may indicate an attempt to gain root access.
3 Users should be reminded not to leave their workstations unattended without
first logging off or using the xlock feature.
4 Users should be made aware of site's security policy in writing at the time the
account is issued. They should be required to express their agreement with such
by signing and dating a specially prepared and authorized form. A copy should be
kept in their file.
5 Physically secure all backup-media in a locked safe or its equivalent. In
addition, a copy of a recent full backup should be kept safely offsite in the event
of some catastrophic act of Godor man.

#### TESTING

The proof of the pudding is in the eating! To prove that this machine will not be just another "road-kill" on the information superhighway, it must be tested. 1. \_\_\_ If the site has a security department, have them point their ISS, CyberCop or Nessus at this host and fire away. If not, you may have to run the scanner your self. If there are remaining vulnerabilities they should be found. At the machine, there are several tests that should be performed. 2. \_\_\_ Power cycle the machine repeatedly and try to access single-user access without supplying the PROM pass word. [You should not be able to] 3. \_\_\_ Try to login as root at the console or from a remote station using telnet, ftp, rsh, rlogin and ssh. [You should not be able to] 4. \_\_\_ Try to ssh into the machine as a non-privileged user. [You should succeed] 5. \_\_\_ Try to ssh out to another machine. [You should succeed] 6. \_\_\_ Try to send mail out. [You should succeed] \_\_\_ Try to access the Internet. [You should succeed] 8. \_\_\_ Try to create a core file with "kill –QUIT <PID>". [You should not be able to] 9. \_\_\_ Try to write to /usr. [You should not be able to] 10. \_\_\_ Try to execute a setuid script on /var. [You should not be able to] 11. \_\_\_ Check/var/adm/authlog and /var/adm/loginlog for relevant entries. [Should

After confirmation from the security department that the machine was found roadworthy, setup a regular testing schedule and bring the machine online.

integrity-checking mode. [It should report the addition and change]

13. \_\_\_ Edit and copy one of the system configuration files and run Tripwire in the

14. Try to access system logs as non-privileged user. [You should not be able to]

12. \_\_\_ Verify that no NFS, NIS or RPC services are running.

be recording login info]

# APPENDIX A do not install list

IRIX products that are selected by default, but should not be installed.

Welcome Customer Welcome, August 2000

Register On-Line Registration, 2.1

roboinst Robolnst Took for Automatic Installations 1.2

pcp\_eoe PCP EOE Software

performer\_demo Performer2.2.6 Demos and Demo Data

InPerson Desktop Conferencing Software

appletalk Xinet Macintosh Connectivity 10.02

demos Demonstration Programs, 6.5

macromedia Macromedia Movie Player, 1.4.1

netwr\_client NetWare Client 1.1

nss-fasttrack Netscape Fasttrack Server, 3.03

outbox OutBox Personal Web Site, 1.6

sgimeeting SGImeeting Collaboration Environment, 1.2

sitemgr SiteMgr - Web Content Administration, 1.1

websetup Web Setup and Administration, 3.1.1

infosearch Information Searching Software

## APPENDIX B Default Audited Events

sat\_access\_denied Access to the file or some element of the path was denied

due to enforcement of MAC or DAC permissions.

sat\_domainname\_set The domain name was set.

sat\_mount A filesystem was mounted or unmounted.

sat\_ae\_custom An application-defined event occurred. Application

developers can engineer their applications to generate this

event.

sat\_exec A new process has been introduced by exec.

sat\_open A file was opened with write permission.

sat\_ae\_dbedit A file was modified using the dbedit utility. (This utility is

available only with the Trusted IRIX/B optional product.)

sat\_exit The user ended the current process.

sat\_proc\_attr\_write The user finalized a change to a process's attributes.

sat\_ae\_identity A login- or logout- related event occurred

sat fchdir The user changed from the current working directory to the

directory "pointed" to by the given open descriptor.

sat\_ae\_mount An NFS filesystem was mounted.

sat\_fd\_attr\_write The user changed the attributes of the file "pointed" to by

the given file descriptor using fchmod.

sat\_bsdipc\_create The user created a socket.

sat file attr write The attributes of a file were written by chmod.

sat\_proc\_read The user read from a process's address space using ptrace.

## APPENDIX B continued

sat\_bsdipc\_create\_pair The user created a socket pair.

sat\_file\_crt\_del A file was added or removed from a directory.

sat\_proc\_write The user finalized a changes to a process's address space

using ptrace.

sat\_file\_crt\_del2 This is the same as sat\_file\_crt\_del, but reports that two

files (perhaps a link) were removed.

sat\_svipc\_change The user set some attribute of a System V IPC data

structure.

sat\_bsdipc\_mac\_change The user changed the MAC label on a socket.

sat\_file\_write The data in a file was modified by truncate.

sat\_svipc\_create The user created a System V IPC data structure.

sat\_bsdipc\_shutdown The user shut down a socket.

sat\_fork The user duplicated the current process (thereby creating a

new process).

sat\_svipc\_remove The user removed a System V IPC data structure.

sat\_chdir Current working directory was changed with chdir.

sat\_hostid\_set The host ID was set.

sat\_sysacct System accounting has been turned on or off.

sat\_chroot Current root directory was changed with chroot.

sat hostname set The hostname was set.

sat\_tty\_setlabel The user set the label of a port via ioctl.

sat\_clock\_set The system clock was set.

## APPENDIX C Adding Files to the Volume Header With dyhtool

The volume header of system disks must contain a copy of the programs ash. The procedure in this section explains how to put sash or other programs into a volume header.

When programs are added to the volume header of a disk, there are two sources for those programs. One is the /stand directory of the system and the other is the /stand directory on an IRIX software release CD. The /stand directory on a CD (usually /CDROM/stand after the CD is mounted) contains copies of sash, fx, and ide that are processor-specific. As superuser, perform this procedure to add programs to a volume header:

1. Invoke dvhtool with the raw device name of the volume header of the disk as an argument; for example:

# dvhtool/dev/rdsk/dks0d2vh

2. Display the volume directory portion of the volume header by using the vd (volume directory) and 1 (list) commands:

```
Command? (read, vd, pt, dp, write, bootfile, or quit): vd (d FILE, a UNIX_FILE FILE, c UNIX_FILE FILE, g FILE UNIX_FILE or l)?
```

#### Current contents:

File name	Length	Block#
sgilabel	512	2
sash	159232	3

3. For each program that you want to copy to the volume header, use the a (add) command. For example, to copy sash from the /stand directory to sash in the volume header, use this command:

```
(d FILE, a UNIX_FILE FILE, c UNIX_FILE FILE, g FILE UNIX_FILE or l)? a /stand/s ash sash
```

As another example, to copy sash from a CD to an IP20 or IP22 system use this command:

```
(d FILE, a UNIX_FILE FILE, c UNIX_FILE FILE, g FILE UNIX_FILE or l)? a /CDROM/stand/sashARCS sash
```

4. Confirm your changes by listing the contents of the volume with the l (list) command: (d FILE, a UNIX\_FILE FILE, c UNIX\_FILE FILE, g FILE UNIX\_FILE or l)?

#### Current contents:

```
File name Length Block # sgilabel 512 2 sash 159232 3
```

5. Make the changes permanent by writing the changes to the volume header using the quit command to exit this "submenu" and the write command:

```
(d FILE, a UNIX_FILE FILE, c UNIX_FILE FILE, g FILE UNIX_FILE or l)? quit
```

Command? (read, vd, pt, dp, write, bootfile, or quit): write

Quit dvhtool by giving the quit command:

Command? (read, vd, pt, dp, write, bootfile, or quit): quit

### **REFERENCES**

- [1] Pomeranz, Hal (ed), "Step-by-Step Solaris Security Version 2.0", SANS Institute, 2001.
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- [5] Ellis, Susan & Lavine, Steven, "<u>IRIX Admin: Disks and File Systems (document: 007-2825-007)</u>", Silicon Graphics Inc., 1999-2000.