



# Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

Copyright SANS Institute  
Author Retains Full Rights

This paper is taken from the GIAC directory of certified professionals. Reposting is not permitted without express written permission.

## Interested in learning more?

Check out the list of upcoming events offering  
"Securing Windows and PowerShell Automation (Security 505)"  
at <http://www.giac.org/registration/gcwn>

# Creating a Certificate-Enabled Public Web Site With Windows 2000

Michael Reiter

<b>THE SCENARIO</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>CREATING THE CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>INTERNET INFORMATION SERVER</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>ENROLLING FOR A CERTIFICATE</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>APPROVING THE CERTIFICATE REQUEST</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>DOWNLOADING THE CERTIFICATE TO A BROWSER</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>ACCESSING THE SECURED WEB PAGE</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>SUCCESS</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>42</b>

© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002, Author retains full rights.

## The Scenario

A system administrator is told by his boss, “Change our Web site. I want selected outsiders to have access to special information. Make sure it’s secure – I want the users to authenticate their identity with digital certificates.” The sysadmin, a Windows NT guru not yet fully introduced to the world of Windows 2000, has heard good things and decides to press ahead with a Win2K Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). He creates a test home page for a secured site he will call “ironclaw”. It’s now time to configure the Win2K box. Hardening of the Certificate Authority (CA) and web server boxes is assumed to be done in general accordance with the procedures outlined in *A Step-by-Step Guide to Securing Windows 2000 for Use as an Internet Server*<sup>1</sup>; however, the sysadmin knows from hard experience that checklists like this frequently break vital services, and he will test each step on a pilot box before going live. The actual testing is beyond the scope of this paper.

Note: For the purposes of this paper, not to mention economy and space restrictions, a single PC was used for both the web server and the CA server. In reality, these would be separate machines, for security and for load distribution.

## Creating the Certificate Authority

Our sysadmin decides to create a self-signed CA. He does this primarily for cost reasons (and because it is more illustrative for this paper). The relatively low per-unit costs associated with self-issued certificates is attractive; however, he does not consider the longer term cost of ownership. When purchasing a managed CA service from an outside source, licensing is often done on a per-certificate basis. A typical cost for a population of 100,000 users might be \$5.00 each per year. According to a paper published on the VeriSign website<sup>2</sup>, three-year cost of ownership for three different public key infrastructures ranged from \$256,894 to \$993,602 for 5000 seats, and \$1,276,904 to \$11,093,098 for 500,000 seats. Even for a very large company, this is a substantial cost. With a self-signed, self-managed CA, there is no additional cost per certificate. However, there are also no support services, and the cost of support staff might well rival the cost of managed services. Windows 2000 allows you to create the following types of CA’s<sup>3</sup>:

Enterprise Root CA	Enterprise Subordinate CA
Stand-Alone Root CA	Stand-Alone Subordinate CA

---

<sup>1</sup> “A Step-by-Step Guide to Securing Windows 2000 for Use as an Internet Server”; David S. Courington, March 29, 2001; [http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/win2000/win2000\\_list.htm](http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/win2000/win2000_list.htm)

<sup>2</sup> “Evaluating the Cost of Ownership for Digital Certificate Projects”; The Aberdeen Group; July, 1998; <http://www.verisign.com/library/reports/aberdeen/cost/index.html>

<sup>3</sup> “Step-by-Step Guide to Setting up a Certification Authority”; Microsoft Corporation; February 16, 2000

An Enterprise CA would normally be installed as part of a corporate CA hierarchy, issuing certificates to subordinate CA's which in turn would issue certificates either to end-users or to further subordinate CA's. Enterprise root and subordinate CA's need Active Directory and DNS installed as well. Typically, you would use this when you expect that all of your PKI users will also be registered in the Active Directory of your Windows 2000 domain – as employees, for instance. In this case, an employee who registered would provide a shared secret – for instance, a Social Security Number – which would be compared to data in the Active Directory, and a certificate issued automatically. The shared secret is important – the certificate issued represents identity, and there must be some way to reasonably establish the identity of the certificate applicant. With any system that automatically issues a certificate, this will be problematic.

A stand-alone CA is typically used when certificates will be issued outside the enterprise. In this case, you would not expect to give each certificate holder an account in the Active Directory. However, if Active Directory is available, the stand-alone CA will make use of it. Since our sysadmin envisions issuing certificates outside the enterprise, and because this is still an NT shop with no Active Directory structure, he decides to go with the stand-alone CA.


Should the sysadmin create a root CA only, or subordinate CA's as well? This depends on the vision of the future the sysadmin maintains. If substantial growth is in the picture, a single CA will not scale. Multiple subordinate CA's must be used to segment the population, and each of these CA's must trust the others' certificates (in most scenarios). In this case, a root CA would be created and used to issue certificates for a number of subordinate CA's. These, in turn, might issue certificates for another layer of subordinate CA's, if the enterprise was very large; alternatively, they could begin issuing end-user certificates. As a general rule, one should assume growth, and create a root CA and a subordinate CA. In this way, additional subordinate CA's could be created as needed, without disrupting the existing infrastructure. The root CA would be taken offline and stored somewhere very secure in the interim. Again, for the purposes of this paper, in reality only a single root CA was created.



**Figure 1: The Windows 2000 Component Wizard Splash Page**

Windows 2000 offers a convenient way to add services to a new server. In this case, we are interested in turning this box into a Certification Authority.


© SANS Institute 2000-2002



**Figure 2: Adding Certificate Services**

Adding Certificate Services is simply a matter of checking the appropriate box in the Component Wizard. However, failing to do your homework in advance will probably mean starting from scratch – possibly a disaster if you have already issued many certificates. Among the many pitfalls – after installing Certificate Services, you cannot change the domain or computer name without first uninstalling Certificate Services.

© SANS Institute 2000-2002



**Figure 3: Choosing the CSP**

Unless there is a pressing reason to do otherwise, most sysadmins will want to choose the default Microsoft Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP). This is the component that does the actual encryption/decryption. This will provide the greatest interoperability and is not subject to government export restrictions<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Windows 2000 Security, by Roberta Bragg; pp 448-450. 2001, New Riders Publishing

**Windows Components Wizard**

**CA Identifying Information**  
Enter information to identify this CA

CA name: IntranetWeb

Organization: HomeNet

Organizational unit: Office

City: Anytown

State or province: WA Country/region: US

E-mail: mreiter6@home.com

CA description: Internal private CA for Intranet

Valid for: 2 Years Expires: 4/7/2003 11:34 AM

< Back Next > Cancel

**Figure 4: CA Data**

This data should be given careful thought – more careful, in fact, than was given to the window shown above. The categories listed above actually form X.509 fields in the root certificate and every certificate it issues. One thing that every sysadmin may take for granted is that most if not all of the original assumptions made at the beginning of the planning process will change at some point. Therefore, the fields – which are modeled after and designed to fit into an LDAP schema – should be as broad and generic as possible, without being completely meaningless. This way, when those assumptions change, the certificate fields will still be valid. Changing these fields after issuing certificates is impractical at best. In this case, the initial assumption was that this site was going to be solely an intranet site; hence the CA name and description above.

At this point the CA's public/private key pair was generated.






Figure 5: Default Data Storage Location




Figure 6: Windows Does Its Thing



**Figure 7: Success!**


Certificate Services is now installed, as well as a root CA certificate. The next step is to take a look at that certificate.

© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002




**Figure 8: The Certificate Information**

This window tells us what the new certificate can do. Essentially, any function a certificate can do, this one can do. As a root CA, it would make no sense to limit the capabilities. New possibilities may arise overnight, causing major shifts in direction that require new functions. Best to have all possible capabilities.



**Figure 9: The Policy Module**

Here, the sysadmin has to make a major decision: does the newly created CA issue a certificate automatically to all comers, or should it wait for manual approval?



**Figure 10: Certificate Request Status**

The sysadmin makes the decision to set the certificate request to “pending”, requiring the administrator to manually issue the certificate. This is a decision with far-reaching consequences. Manual issuance does not scale. If this site became popular on the scale of something like Amazon.com or Ebay, the number of certificate requests would quickly overwhelm the sysadmin’s capability to verify the identity of the applicant and issue the certificate. And yet, if the option “Always issue the certificate” is set, there is no identity verification at all. In other words, the certificate provides no effective client authentication. Therefore, why have it?


All vendors of PKI’s face this issue. There must be a scalable way for an individual to prove his or her identity prior to receiving a certificate. Ultimately, the only way for someone to truly prove identity is to physically go to another, trusted person who verifies identity based on driver’s license, military ID, or some other document that provides reasonable assurance. Many other schemes have been devised to automate the process, usually involving a shared secret such as a Social Security Number or mother’s maiden name. This data is now obtainable by anyone with a bit of savvy and perseverance. Therefore, a criminal could spoof another person’s identity to get a certificate. Dumpster divers could easily gain the personal, confidential data most online identity verifiers require. Further, the online identity verifiers may access databases not generally

available to the public, such as credit bureaus. How many people want to provide increasingly private and sensitive information to a web site – even a trusted web site – to prove their identity?

An alternative is a service bureau that manually calls the applicant and verifies identity based on other data. In the case of a physician, this might be data such as medical license number, year of graduation, or other data.

Biometrics also provide an alternative, one that can provide high assurance of an individual's identity (although not yet absolute). However, this would require that the CA has a copy of the identifying characteristic in some form (usually a hash). How does it get there? We are back at the beginning of the problem.

This is not a Windows 2000 problem, but a PKI problem. We can issue certificates, but it is difficult to truly prove the identity of the end user. Since digital signatures are now legal signatures, the risks to an individual may actually rise substantially in the event of a compromise. These risks are discussed in some detail in *Ten Risks of PKI: What You're Not Being Told About Public Key Infrastructure*, By Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier<sup>5</sup>.



**Figure 11: Permissions**

These are the defaults; they are reasonable, and the sysadmin (and most others) should


<sup>5</sup> “Ten Risks of PKI: What You’re not Being Told about Public Key Infrastructure”; Computer Security Journal, Volume XVI, Number 1, 2000; Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier

have no reason to change them.

© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002, Author retains full rights.

## Internet Information Server

A certificate authority may issue unlimited numbers of certificates, but there must be an application to take advantage of their capabilities. In this case, the certificate-aware application is Internet Information Server 5. IIS 5 is integrated into Windows 2000, but only if it is installed in the Windows Configuration tool. IIS appears as a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) snap-in or as a stand-alone. IIS 5 security is assumed to be configured in accordance with the procedures detailed in *Securing IIS on Windows 2000*<sup>6</sup> and *Securing Windows 2000 running IIS5*<sup>7</sup>; the actual details are beyond the scope of this paper, and it is assumed to be configured correctly.



**Figure 12: Internet Information Server Web Site Properties**


The Directory Security tab holds most of the configurable parameters for a certificate

<sup>6</sup> Securing IIS on Windows 2000; Carl Denowh; March 6, 2001;  
[http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/win2000/win2000\\_list.htm](http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/win2000/win2000_list.htm)

<sup>7</sup> Securing Windows 2000 running IIS5; Alan McClelland;  
[http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Alan\\_McClelland\\_GCNT.doc](http://www.sans.org/y2k/practical/Alan_McClelland_GCNT.doc)




authenticated web site. The sysadmin wants to create a certificate enrollment page that anyone can reach, and a protected page or set of pages that can only be accessed with a client certificate. So, under “Secure Communications” he clicks on “Server Certificate” to associate his web server with a CA.



**Figure 13: The IIS Certificate Wizard**


The sysadmin decides to assign the certificate he just created to his new web site.

© SANS Institute




**Figure 14: The Store of Certificates**

He has only one to choose.




**Figure 15: Certificate Summary**



**Figure 16: Web Server Certificate Complete**


© SANS Institute 2000



**Figure 17: Setting Up the Secure, Authenticated Connection**


Here the sysadmin gets into the meat of the matter. Who actually gets into the site, and how? With the Configuration above, he expects to get an encrypted, authenticated connection. Note that this is still for the entire web site – the certificate enrollment pages will have to be reconfigured later to allow regular access to new users. He is not requiring 128 bit encryption because he does not yet plan to carry truly sensitive data, and many browsers still do not support 128 bit SSL out of the box. In fact, much to his surprise, he found that even after loading Service Pack 1 onto his Windows 2000 Server, he still had to go to the Microsoft site to download the High Encryption Pack separately. While 40 bit encryption has proven vulnerable to cracking, he does not consider this a significant issue. To require 128 bit SSL later would be relatively easy.

He also decides to enable client certificate mapping. This allows him to add an additional layer of security to the system. He clicks on the “Edit” button.




**Figure 18: Building a Mapping Rule**

The sysadmin elects to use many-to-one mapping, which will allow him to assign multiple end users to a small number of accounts based on data contained in their certificates. For instance, he can break users down by their organizational unit (OU), which equates to their company department. Different departments might have differing levels of access.




**Figure 19: Setting the Rule Parameters**

The Office department or OU will be the initial criterion. Others can be defined at later dates. Further, additional fields (extensions) can be added to the certificates later if required; older users would simply exchange their existing certificates for the new ones.




**Figure 20: Setting the Rule**



**Figure 21: Mapping the Rule to an Account and an Action**

The sysadmin selects the default anonymous IIS user account for now. Again, the mapping can be changed later. If the Windows 2000 environment expands, he may add Active Directory to the mix. After migrating his existing users and certificates to the Active Directory, he can take advantage of Group Policies and Group Policy Objects, thus implementing a form of Role-Based Access Control<sup>8</sup>.


<sup>8</sup> Implementing Password Controls and Account Policies Using Windows 2000 Group Policy, Carlo Scannella; February 15, 2001; [http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/win2000/win2000\\_list.htm](http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/win2000/win2000_list.htm)



**Figure 22: Apply the Rule**

There is a potentially huge security hole here. As it is currently configured, any certificate presented to server with a subject OU of “Office” may be granted access<sup>9</sup>. This is regardless of the originating CA. Now, there is no way for an intruder to find this out from an external probe; however, an administrator-level compromise of the web server would reveal it. Alternatively, someone might discover this by accident or industrial espionage. In any case, the sysadmin wants to close this hole. Fortunately, this is almost as easily said as done.

<sup>9</sup> “So You Want to Build a Win2K PKI”, by Curtis Dalton; Information Security Magazine, May 2000; [http://infosecuritymag.com/articles/may00/cover\\_a.shtml](http://infosecuritymag.com/articles/may00/cover_a.shtml)




**Figure 23: The Certificate Trust List**

Going back to the Secure Communications window, the sysadmin enables the Certificate Trust List, and specifies his CA. Now, only certificates that he issues – regardless of the OU – will have access to the secured site. Should the shop ever go to a Windows 2000 native environment and build an internal PKI integrated with Active Directory, he could simply create a certificate trust list that included both his internet users and his internal users. This would have the same effect as cross-certifying multiple CA's<sup>10</sup>


<sup>10</sup> Windows 2000 PKI, Smart Cards, and the Encrypting File System, by Jason Fossen; sans.org, 2001





**Figure 24: Altering the Access Rules for Certificate Enrollment**

The certificate authority now protects the entire web site. So, how does a user get to the enrollment pages? These pages, which are found in the CertSrv virtual directory, must be removed from certificate-based authentication so that unregistered users can access them. The first step is to check and ensure that anonymous access is enabled.




### **Figure 25: Accessing the CertSrv Virtual Directory**

Going into the “Secure Communications...Edit” function for the CertSrv virtual directory, the sysadmin selects “Ignore Client Certificates”. This makes them ordinary web pages. Contrary to the illustration above, the sysadmin should also have chosen “Require secure channel (SSL)” and (in some cases) “Require 128-bit encryption”, so that the data used to fill the X.509 fields is transmitted encrypted.


© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002, Author retains full rights

## Enrolling for a Certificate



**Figure 26: The Certificate Enrollment Page**


Using the IP address of the site (he has not registered the domain with DNS yet; obviously, in this example, we are using a non-routable IP due to the real-world limitations of building this system on a home network), the sysadmin goes to the CertSrv virtual directory to begin the enrollment process. These pages are created by default in IIS. A company that wanted more personalized pages could easily go in and alter the HTML to customize them as desired.



**Figure 27: Requesting a Browser Certificate**

The end user also has the option to get a certificate for e-mail; e-mail encryption and signing is outside the scope of this paper. Assuming a compatible browser, the configuration process is reasonably simple, and encryption/decryption of email is simple, if not quite transparent.


© SANS Institute



**Figure 28: Certificate Data**

In this default form there is nothing to restrict the end user from inserting illegal or unusable data. Again, the page is configurable. For the production system, the sysadmin would alter the Department field to be a pull-down menu with choices limited to actual departments; an error checking script would prevent other data from being uploaded.


© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002



**Figure 29: Advanced Options**

These options are accessible via the “More Options” button. In most cases, it would be advisable to disable this function, as the majority of users will use these options to misconfigure their certificate, causing additional admin overhead. Set the defaults, and remove these pages for production.

© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002



**Figure 30: Generating the Public-Private Key Pair**

This function is handled by the browser. A Netscape browser goes through an analogous process. Microsoft gives the end user a choice of three security levels: High, Medium, and Low, with Medium the default. In Low security, the browser selects whatever certificate has the highest priority when challenged by the web server. This is transparent to the user. Medium security presents the end user with a popup window with a list of the available certificates and allows the user to pick one, without supplying a password. In a Windows NT or 2000 environment, where each person has an account and the individual's certificate only shows up when the end user is logged in, this does not present a problem. However, in a less secure environment – one where multiple users are on one machine, and there is no individual logon – this provides no security at all. Only the High security option, which prompts the user for a Private Key Container password each time the key is accessed, gives this environment any security. There are still many facilities where the desktops are primarily Windows 9x. There is a hitch here, however. An undocumented “feature” found in Windows 9x and Windows NT is that the password popup window will show and require a password each time the key is accessed within a single session – depending on the type of session, potentially dozens or even hundreds of times. The average end user will balk at this. End user acceptance is critical to many applications, and certainly a web site that requires unending passwords will quickly be abandoned. The author contacted Microsoft about this issue (in relation to another PKI implementation) and was told that this was not a bug but a security feature, and that they had fixed it in Windows Millennium and Windows 2000, which cache the password during the session. Their response is below:

It is not possible to configure your clients so that the password would only prompt once. The option "strong private key protection" selection prompts for a password continuously. Your only other option would be to upgrade

the clients to Windows 2000.

This behavior you describe is actually by design. When the feature to password encrypt the certificate locally was implemented, it was done so that each request would require the password to be retyped. In Windows 2000 the implementation was changed.

The reason it is saved in Windows 2000 is because subsequent calls (calls after the first request for the cert password) to CryptSignHash use a cached private key in Windows 2000 and does not in the down-level clients.

Your only options are to disable the "strong private key encryption" or upgrade the clients to Windows 2000<sup>11</sup>.

Netscape, on the other hand, allows the end user to decide how often to be prompted for the private key password: once per session, once per transaction, or once every x minutes.

Screen captures of key generation pages were skipped due to problems with interruptions during public/private key generation


---

<sup>11</sup> Personal Communication with Microsoft Support, March, 2001






## Approving the Certificate Request



**Figure 32: The Certification Authority Window**

Checking the Pending Certificates folder, the sysadmin sees his certificate request. He approves his request – identity verification is not an issue here.

© SANS Institute




**Figure 33: Approved**

The certificate now moves to the Issued Certificates folder.


© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002

## Downloading the Certificate to a Browser



**Figure 34: Checking Pending Requests**


The end user (here, the sysadmin) begins the process of downloading a certificate to his browser. Again, there is a usability issue here. How does the end user know when to check back? Presumably, there is a script triggered by approval that sends an email to the end user notifying him or her to come to this URL and begin the process. This script must be custom written to suit the site.



**Figure 35: The Request**

It is possible for one individual to have more than one certificate; in fact, in many environments it would be unusual to have only one certificate. Each certificate might cover a different aspect of the user's identity. Of course, having too many certificates would quickly become cumbersome. In this case, the use of tokens or smart cards might become necessary.


© SANS Institute 2000 - 2002



**Figure 36: Downloading the Certificate**


The end user must install the certificate, and the root CA as well, since this is self-signed. The browser will guide the user through this process.

© SANS Institute 2000-2002



**Figure 37: The Unverified Certificate**


Because the root CA has not yet been designated as trusted, we must install the certificate in the browser's root store.



**Figure 38: Installing the Root CA**

The browser presents the user with all the public certificate information. It is up to the user to decide to accept or reject the certificate. Most users will not have the necessary

information to make an informed decision; they will either accept or decline it blindly, or call the help desk to ask what they should do. The sysadmin should add explicit instructions to the certificate download page explaining exactly what to do, and why.



**Figure 39: Checking the Root Store**

Here we see that the end user has successfully installed the CA certificate as a root CA. At this point, it is as trusted as any other root CA.

© SANS INSTITUTE



## Accessing the Secured Web Page

So, now it's time for all this hard work to pay off. The sysadmin confidently types the web site IP into the address line of his browser and gets.....Page Not Found. Why? He trouble shoots, turning services on and off, reconfiguring, and finally discovers that SSL is the cause of the issue. No SSL connection is established, and since he has required SSL, there is no web site access. Unchecking the "Require SSL" box brings back access to the site. After a great deal of soul searching, web browsing, and hair pulling, the sysadmin finds that many people have had a similar problem, but that there is no single answer – and none of the answers he found were solutions to his problem. In other words, there are many places to make a mistake that will have the same result. A scan of the web server reveals that it is listening on port 443, the default SSL port, so that is not the problem. Days of troubleshooting do not bring resolution; however, he believes he has discovered the problem – although he has enabled the root CA to carry out all of the available functions, it is not, in fact, acting as an SSL server certificate. So, he stops the default web site, which he had been working with, and copies all of his HTML files and his scripts to another web site which he has just created with IIS. Using the Certificate Wizard accessed through IIS, he goes through a slightly different process. This time, he creates a request for a new certificate. This results in a simple text file, labeled cert.cer, as below:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIICWTCCAgMCEA7xjOHavxZ009CQO6TTaKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgaxFjAU
BgNVBAoTDVZlcm1TaWduLCBjb250OTYyOTYyOTYyOTYyOTYyOTYyOTYyOTYyOTYy
cmVwb3NpdG9yeS9UZXR0b3R1eS9yY29yY29yY29yY29yY29yY29yY29yY29yY29y
RAYDVQQLZ1G3IjVmaVyaVnNpZ24gYXV0aG9yaXplZCB0ZXN0aW5nIG9ubHkuIE5v
IGFzc3VyYW5jZXMgKEMpV1MxOTk3MB4XDTAxMDQxMzAwMDAwMFoXDTAxMDQyNzIz
NTk1OVowcjlELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAGTC1dhc2hpbmd0b24xEDA0BgNV
BAcUB0FueXRvd24xGDAWBgNVBAoUD01yb25jbGF3SG9tZU5ldDEPMA0GA1UECzQGG
T2ZmaWNlMREwDwYDVQQDFAhjC2N3aW4yazCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAw
gYkCgYEApNnimyQ8kPCAuhZvcPIUDoqsRKF5Mhf0iPCdkDI+oYSu/9tsypnOOo1X
OosixZ3MSDuHmhCf2BtowNU7nDk+1GjvLyMwE+T2aNVmbvS1+P79oTsNZR16ePSB
CnzFh3wR3i05QDv+2YHkLRnwUi4ODmvlaelmmxjhp5n7QdfGtQ8CAWEAATANBgkq
hkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAH3OLzhC9cVRNoQjSnChUPeFWZK63EcRblZc8y8ReWLji9Ln
zSUKtJc3LR7jtzer82/mzqSL5TqdxIWKV/b3hw=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

This is uploaded to the VeriSign site, which conveniently contains a function to create SSL server certificates. The cost of a VeriSign SSL certificate is nominal, and has the added benefit of being recognized by all standard browsers. The VeriSign SSL certificate arrives via a URL in an e-mail, and he goes through the installation function on their web site. With the new SSL certificate installed, he again tries to access his web site.

## Success





Figure 40: Challenged for a Valid Certificate;



## Figure 41 The Secure, Encrypted, Certificate Protected Web Page

It is important to note that the client certificate comes from the original root CA generated by the sysadmin with the Windows 2000 Certificate Authority, not from the VeriSign SSL certificate. These are two separate entities.

## Conclusion

Creating a certificate enabled web site with a self-signed Certificate Authority under Windows 2000 is not exactly straightforward, but is not overly complicated either. Building the site itself is only part of the work – there must be security policies to go along with it, especially a Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) which documents the responsibilities associated with issuing and having certificates. There are step-by-step guides available from Microsoft for individual procedures, but they generally focus on the trees, not the forest. In other words, I have a CA to accomplish a certain task, not to brag to my buddies. I run SSL to secure data, not because I am enamored of encryption. I want to accomplish certain business objectives, and these are tools to reach a goal, not ends in themselves. Further, the variety of answers found to a given CA or SSL question on the newsgroups indicates that there is still a fair amount of confusion out there. This tends to point out the importance of piloting any project before production. This is complicated somewhat by the nature of PKI; without careful planning, the pilot and production networks may be cryptographically incompatible. Public key cryptography has been around since the 1970's<sup>12</sup>; however, the implementing technology is more recent, and in many cases may charitably be described as “immature”. Undoubtedly the leading companies in the field will continue to improve the technology; ultimately, from the end user perspective, it should become almost completely transparent. There is some distance to go before this goal is reached.

---

<sup>12</sup> Diffie-Hellman Public Key Distribution Scheme: A Complete Overview; Hamid Pirooz; December 4, 2000; <http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/encryption/diffie.htm>

# Upcoming Training

Click Here to  
**{Get CERTIFIED!}**



SANS Cyber Defence Canberra 2017	Canberra, Australia	Jun 26, 2017 - Jul 08, 2017	Live Event
SANSFIRE 2017	Washington, DC	Jul 22, 2017 - Jul 29, 2017	Live Event
SANS Virginia Beach 2017	Virginia Beach, VA	Aug 21, 2017 - Sep 01, 2017	Live Event
SANS Network Security 2017	Las Vegas, NV	Sep 10, 2017 - Sep 17, 2017	Live Event
SANS vLive - SEC505: Securing Windows and PowerShell Automation	SEC505 - 201709,	Sep 18, 2017 - Nov 06, 2017	vLive
Secure DevOps Summit & Training	Denver, CO	Oct 10, 2017 - Oct 17, 2017	Live Event
SANS San Francisco Winter 2017	San Francisco, CA	Nov 27, 2017 - Dec 02, 2017	Live Event
San Francisco Winter 2017 - SEC505: Securing Windows and PowerShell Automation	San Francisco, CA	Nov 27, 2017 - Dec 02, 2017	vLive
SANS Cyber Defense Initiative 2017	Washington, DC	Dec 12, 2017 - Dec 19, 2017	Live Event
SANS OnDemand	Online	Anytime	Self Paced
SANS SelfStudy	Books & MP3s Only	Anytime	Self Paced