



Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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Check out the list of upcoming events offering
"Securing Windows and PowerShell Automation (Security 505)"
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All 90 questions in this section are from book 5.1/5.2/5.3, "Securing Windows NT: Step-By-Step, Parts 1, 2, and 3." The correct answer is marked with emphasized text.

From Page 12

Typical phases of attack include:

- Reconnaissance.
 - Acquiring a user account.
 - Avoiding detection.
 - *All of the above.*
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 14

The Reconnaissance stage of an attack

- Is always followed by either a DoS attack or an attempt at system compromise.
 - Must be done before any other type of attack is possible.
 - *May be either random or specifically targeted.*
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 17

Ping and Tracert are tools commonly used by attackers for

- *Reconnaissance*
 - Denial of Service
 - Port Scanning
 - Social Engineering
-

From Page 17

Port scanning identifies what services are running on a machine, and can also indicate to the attacker

- Which version of a given service is in use.
 - *What operating system a server is running.*
 - The username of the currently logged in user.
 - All of the above
 - None of the above
-

From Page 19

In order to list NetBios services running on a server, the attacker would use:

- Back Orifice
 - L0phtCrack
 - *NBTSTAT.EXE*
 - A 3rd-party Port Scanner
-

From Page 21

NBTSTAT.EXE can be used to reveal

- Whether a server is running Microsoft Exchange.
 - Who is currently logged into a server.
 - Who the master browser for a server is.
 - *All of the above.*
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 25

The single best defense against all attacks is

- The latest service pack
 - Consistently applying hotfixes
 - Choosing secure passwords
 - *A firewall*
-

From Page 28

For security purposes, an organization should permit internet access to:

- *DNS servers only.*
 - WINS servers only.
 - DNS and WINS servers.
 - Neither DNS nor WINS servers.
-

From Page 29

Using DNS forwarding DOES NOT increase security by:

- Simplifying firewall rules.
 - Limiting Internet access to Internal servers.
 - *Encrypting DNS zone transfers.*
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 32

Hackers can find RAS servers by

- Searching publicly available information, such as your website.
 - Using social engineering against your users.
 - *Using wardialers.*
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 34

A personal firewall

- Is plugged in between a PC and the network switch or hub.
 - Is designed to protect information being transmitted by the user.
 - *Is designed to protect only the machine it is installed on.*
 - Can remove the need for a regular corporate firewall.
-

From Page 39

DoS attacks are noticeable because

- Hackers use them to post personal or political messages on your website.
- They cause unusual failure modes, like the Blue Screen of Death.
- Windows NT logs any DoS-related activity to the Event Log.

- *Performance degrades below norms without a reasonable internal explanation.*
-

From Page 42

In order to keep a Windows NT server current,

- *Service Packs must be re-applied whenever the server configuration is changed.*
 - Service packs must be re-applied weekly.
 - Regular backups must be compared against existing system files.
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 45

For security, the POSIX subsystem

- Should be upgraded to the OS/2 subsystem.
 - *Should be removed if not in use.*
 - Should be configured for C2 security.
 - Should be configured to use TCP/IP rather than NetBeui.
-

From Page 46

Microsoft Hotfixes are important because

- They correct stability problems that Service Packs introduce.
 - *They are available before fixes are incorporated into Service Packs.*
 - They target the important problems that Service Packs ignore.
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 49

The most effective way to be aware of NT security issues is to

- Subscribe to commercial Windows NT magazines.
 - Use search engines on a weekly basis to search for security exploits.
 - Spend 2 hours each day on IRC looking for hacker channels.
 - *Subscribe to various Windows NT email security bulletins.*
-

From Page 50

Filling the disks on an NT server may create a DoS if

- *The system runs out of free hard drive space for temporary and paging files.*
 - The network connection is slow enough to be choked by the file transfer.
 - The system is not using RAID disks.
 - The system has more memory than it has hard disk space.
-

From Page 51

To prevent a Blue Screen of Death, administrators should:

- Install a generous amount of physical RAM.
 - Placing a paging file sized at RAM+11MB on the system.
 - Use Performance Monitor to keep tabs on disk usage.
 - *All of the above.*
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 53

To identify a SYN attack in progress, you should

- Unplug the network connection to see if performance improves.
 - *Run NETSTAT.EXE and study how many connections are in a state of SYN.*
 - Run IISYNCR.EXE to clear SYN-only connections.
 - Increase the amount of paging space on the system and see if performance improves.
-

From Page 54

The SynAttackProtect registry value is available as of

- Service Pack 3
 - Service Pack 4
 - *Service Pack 5*
 - Service Pack 6a
-

From Page 55

In order to completely avoid DoS attacks, an administrator should:

- Remove network connections on mission-critical machines.

- Install both a firewall and a packet-filtering router.
 - Stay at the most current Service Pack + Hotfix level
 - *Prepare to recover from DoS because they cannot be completely avoided.*
-

From Page 56

Multiple installations of NT

- Must be installed on distinct partitions.
 - Must be installed on RAID arrays.
 - *Provide a working system for recovery if the first installation is broken.*
 - Provide multiple layers of defense on a single box.
-

From Page 57

Tape backup systems DO NOT

- *Remove the need for emergency repair disks.*
 - Sometimes require an existing OS installation in order to restore.
 - Provide high-availability disk storage.
 - All of the above
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 57

The Emergency Repair Disk can be used to

- Repair essential registry hives.
 - Repair and replace operating system files like BOOT.INI.
 - Compare installed files to original copies from the installation CD.
 - *All of the above.*
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 58

To use an Emergency Repair Disk, the computer should be booted

- Into an existing NT installation.
 - Using the Emergency Repair Disk floppy.
 - Using an MS-DOS boot disk.
 - *Using the original setup disks.*
-

From Page 59

An Emergency Repair Disk is created using

- ERD.EXE
 - ERDISK.EXE
 - *RDISK.EXE*
 - RESCUE.EXE
-

From Page 60

Emergency Repair Disks should be protected

I. Using SYSKEY.EXE

II. Using 3rd-party encryption programs

III. By physically securing them.

IV. They needn't be; they require the Administrator password to be useful.

- I and II
 - II and III
 - III and IV
 - IV and I
 - *I and III*
-

From Page 61

In order to quickly recover a crashed server,

- Backups should be made daily at midnight.
 - The Operating System partition should use RAID-5
 - *Ready-to-go drives or binary images should be prepared beforehand.*
 - Cold spares of complete servers with all installed software should be ready.
-

From Page 63

The best way to stop an existing DoS attack is to

- Shut down the router interfaces that the attack is coming from.
 - *Study the attack using a protocol analyzer to learn how to block it.*
 - Install more firewalls between the source of the attack and the target.
 - Call your local CIRT and ask for assistance.
-

From Page 66

The best tool for identifying the effects of a DoS attack is

- A protocol analyzer.
 - The Windows Event Viewer.
 - *The Windows Performance Monitor.*
 - The Windows Task Manager.
-

From Page 67

The Windows Event Viewer provides access to the logs for

- Only Microsoft Applications.
 - All Microsoft Applications.
 - *Some Microsoft Applications and some 3rd-party Applications.*
 - Only the Windows Operating System.
-

From Page 68

Windows CrashDump files are typically named

- PAGEFILE.SYS
 - CRASH.DMP
 - *MEMORY.DMP*
 - DUMP.MEM
-

From Page 69

Windows CrashDump files are enabled using

- *The Control Panel->System applet.*
 - The Task Manager.
 - The Registry.
 - CONFIG.SYS
-

From Page 71

In order to steal, alter, or destroy data, an attacker generally requires at least the following:

- *A regular user account*

- A local administrator account
 - A domain administrator account
 - Physical access to the machine.
-

From Page 73

When attempting to get in using guessed passwords, an attacker will attack the Administrator account because

- I. It is the most powerful account on the system.
 - II. It cannot be renamed.
 - III. Services access the Administrator account.
 - IV. It cannot be locked out due to bad login attempts
- I and II
 - II and III
 - III and IV
 - *IV and I*
 - IV and II
-

From Page 73

Password guessing programs

- *Are easily available on the Internet.*
 - Are munitions under ITAR and therefore strictly controlled.
 - Are only available via Microsoft pay-per-incident support.
 - Come as part of the Resource Kit.
-

From Page 74

Password-sniffing programs work well because

- Passwords are transmitted in the clear across the network.
 - *The challenge-response protocol used for transmitting passwords* can be broken using reasonably small resources.
 - The encrypted password is all that is required for some forms of access.
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 75

Hackers can acquire the full database of encrypted passwords by gaining access to

- Emergency Repair Disks
 - Tape Backups
 - %SystemRoot%\Repair\Sam._
 - *All of the above.*
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 76

The Security Configuration Editor can NOT be used to:

- Configure the local machine's settings to match a template.
 - Compare the local machine's settings against a template.
 - Define a template of security configuration settings.
 - All of the above.
 - *None of the above.*
-

From Page 78

Security Configuration Editor tasks can be executed from the command line using which utility?

- SCEEDIT.EXE
 - *SECEDIT.EXE*
 - REGEDT32.EXE
 - MSSCE.EXE
-

From Page 80

A "Null Session" is best described as:

- A NETLOGON connection where no data is passed.
 - An IIS connection using "Anonymous Authentication."
 - *A logon to an NT server where both the username and password are a null character.*
 - A logon to an NT server by a user whose password is blank.
-

From Page 81

Null sessions are NOT used

- For administrative purposes when one's user account is unavailable.
 - For cross-network communication by the System account.
 - Between two NT domains.
 - *By IIS "Anonymous Authentication."*
-

From Page 85

To prevent null sessions from listing users and groups from one's domain, a registry change must be made

- On the domain's PDC.
 - *On all the domain's Domain Controllers.*
 - On all the NT Servers in the domain.
 - On all the NT Servers and NT Workstations in the domain.
-

From Page 86

If null session access is restricted using the RestrictAnonymous key, the following is NOT a workaround in a multidomain environment:

- Creating a second account in the trusted domain that is a member of Local Administrators for each system in the trusting domain.
 - Manually entering TRUSTEDDOMAIN\username or TRUSTEDDOMAIN\groupname rather than listing users and groups from TRUSTEDDOMAIN.
 - *Configuring the Administrator and Service accounts in each domain with the exact same usernames and passwords.*
 - Creating a two-way trust between domains.
-

From Page 88

Using extended ASCII characters in a password can cause problems when:

- *Using the password for a web-based application.*
 - Using a laptop which doesn't have a numeric keypad.
 - Configuring the passwords for service accounts.
 - Marking a password as expired.
-

From Page 88

The Administrator account can be locked out locally when

- The PASSPROP.EXE program has been used.

- The Administrator account is used outside of configured logon hours.
 - On any system with Service Pack 5 or greater.
 - *Never.*
-

From Page 90

The Guest account is disabled by default

- On NT Workstation.
 - *On NT Server.*
 - On NT Workstation and NT Server.
 - On any system with Service Pack 5 or greater.
-

From Page 96

The following systems DO NOT accept logins from both Local and (Domain) Global account databases:

- PDCs
 - BDCs
 - Exchange Servers
 - All of the above
 - *None of the above*
-

From Page 99

For Service accounts, the order of preference is to use:

- First local account, then domain account, then system account.
 - First local account, then system account, then domain account.
 - First domain account, then system account, then local account.
 - *First system account, then local account, then domain account.*
-

From Page 101

To filter out weak passwords, Administrators should use

- FPNWCLNT.DLL
 - PASSPROP.DLL
 - *PASSFILT.DLL*
 - L0phtCrack
-

From Page 102

Custom password filters can be created

- By Microsoft on a pay-per-incident basis.
 - *By any administrator with access to the Win32 SDK or MS TechNet.*
 - By any user of the system with the "Modify password properties" right.
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 105

Minimum Password Length can be any number between

- 0 and 8
 - *0 and 14*
 - 1 and 14
 - 1 and 16
-

From Page 109

The Security Accounts Manager contains user passwords hashed with

- I. LanManager
 - II. MD4
 - III. NTLM
 - IV. DES
 - *I and II*
 - II and III
 - III and IV
 - IV and I
 - IV and II
-

From Page 113

NTLMv2 was introduced to Windows NT starting with

- Service Pack 3
 - *Service Pack 4*
 - Service Pack 5
 - Service Pack 6a
-

From Page 117

Directory Services Client for Windows 95/98 upgrades

- SECURE32.DLL
 - VNETSUP.VXD
 - VREDIR.VXD
 - *All of the above*
 - None of the above
-

From Page 118

NetLogon channels can be established

- On a stand-alone NT computer
 - Using a Windows 95/98 computer
 - *Between member machines of two different domains with a one-way trust*
 - All of the above
 - None of the above
-

From Page 120

The ability to secure the NetLogon channel was added with

- *Service pack 4*
 - Service pack 5
 - Service pack 6a
 - It wasn't added; it is part of an unpatched Windows NT installation.
-

From Page 122

Social engineering targets Network Administrators because

- They lack the required social skills to fend off such an attack.
 - They are required to be helpful as part of their job.
 - *They are most likely to possess useful information.*
 - They aren't targeted; company executives are preferred targets.
-

From Page 124

Reverse Social Engineering refers to

- Administrators attempts to deflect attackers.
 - The testing "White Hat" hackers do to help Administrators.
 - *Maneuvering a user or administrator to initiate contact with a hacker.*
 - What hackers do to confuse their trail after a penetration of security.
-

From Page 131

A 1996 FBI report estimated that what percent of security breaches are perpetrated by legitimate internal users?

- 10%
 - 25%
 - 75%
 - 90%
-

From Page 132

The default NTFS and share permissions are

- *Excessively lax*
 - As strong as they can be without inconveniencing users
 - Strong enough to require loosening for many users
 - Specified by the Network Administrator at system install time.
-

From Page 134

Local and Global groups are used as follows:

- Global groups for assigning rights, Local groups for grouping users.
 - *Local groups for assigning rights, Global groups for grouping users.*
 - Local groups within a single domain, Global groups across trusting domains.
 - Local groups on non-Domain NT installations, Global groups in an NT Domain.
-

From Page 136

The most secure filesystem is

- FAT
- FAT32
- *NTFS*
- SMBFS

From Page 141

As a rule of thumb, only the following account(s) should have Full Control permission as their final, effective permission:

- Administrators
 - The System account
 - Creator Owners
 - *All of the above*
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 142

The Everyone group does NOT contain

- Users from untrusted domains
 - Users who have no NT Domain
 - Anonymous Internet users
 - All of the above
 - *None of the above*
-

From Page 146

Members of which group can use DACL/SACL tools to assign ownership of a file?

- Domain Administrators
 - Local Administrators
 - *Backup Operators*
 - Printer Operators
-

From Page 151

To disable Administrative shares on an NT Workstation,

- log in as Administrator and unshare them using Windows Explorer.
 - Manually share the appropriate filesystems with explicit "No Access" for everyone.
 - Create the AutoShareServer registry key.
 - *Create the AutoShareWks registry key.*
-

From Page 152

The HKLM\System portion of the registry is shared by default on

- *NT Workstation only.*
 - NT Server only.
 - NT Workstation and NT Server.
 - Neither NT Workstation nor NT Server.
-

From Page 156

The NullSessionShares registry key has no effect when

- The "Everyone" group has no permissions to a share.
 - RestrictNullSessAccess is set to 0
 - *Both 1 and 2.*
 - Neither 1 nor 2.
-

From Page 157

Which of the following is NOT a filesystem:

- FAT
 - NTFS
 - *FSMO*
 - NPFS
-

From Page 165

The Network Monitor Console can be detected by looking for

- The registered NetBios name "computername[BE]"
 - *The registered NetBios name "computername[BF]"*
 - Lack of response to PING
 - Excessive response to PING
-

From Page 166

SMB sessions send the User ID number in cleartext

- *Always*
- With EnableSecuritySignature set to 1

- With RequireSecuritySignature set to 1
 - Never
-

From Page 175

IIS logging information can be written to

- Windows Event Log
 - ASCII text files
 - An SQL database
 - *All of the above*
 - None of the above
-

From Page 178

Auditing is most effective when

- No events are logged.
 - Only failure events are logged.
 - *Some success and some failure events are logged.*
 - All events are logged.
-

From Page 179

The following tool(s) can be used to manage auditing:

- Windows Explorer
 - REGEDT32.EXE
 - Security Configuration Manager
 - *All of the above*
 - None of the above
-

From Page 180

Custom events cannot use the following severity:

- Success
 - Information
 - Failure
 - *Debug*
-

From Page 181

Event logs are stored

- In the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE registry hive
 - *In the %SystemRoot%\System32\Config folder*
 - In the %SystemRoot%\System32\Logs folder
 - In the %SystemRoot%\Repair folder
-

From Page 187

The maximum size an event log can be configured for is

- 512K
 - 32,768K
 - 1,048,576K
 - 4,194,240K
-

From Page 193

Which of the following cannot be used to archive event logs?

- The Windows Event Viewer
 - DUMPEL.EXE from the Resource Kit
 - SomarSoft DUMPEVT.EXE
 - *The Unix SNMP tools*
-

From Page 195

Automated Event Log Analyzers are also known as

- LIDS (Log Intrusion Detection Systems)
 - *HIDS (Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems)*
 - NIDS (Network-based Intrusion Detection System)
 - AELA (Automated Event Log Analyzers)
-

From Page 197

If you suspect a system compromise, you should

- Immediately format the disk, reinstall the OS, and restore data from tape.

- *Re-install the latest service packs and hotfixes.*
 - Install Netcat to try and track the intruder.
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 201

An Incident Response Plan

- Should be developed during a security incident, since each incident is different
 - Should not be reviewed by management, who might leak it via Social Engineering
 - *Should be reviewed by management, who should authorize action in an emergency.*
 - Should be stored only in paper, which is not available to remote hackers.
-

From Page 203

In NT 4.0, registry changes can be made to many machines automatically using

- REGEDIT.EXE
 - REGEDT32.EXE
 - Group Policy
 - *System Policy*
-

From Page 210

A System Policy file can contain the settings for

- Users
 - Groups
 - Computers
 - *All of the above*
 - None of the above
-

From Page 215

Disabling registry editing tools via System Policy does NOT effect

- .reg file merges
 - REGEDIT.EXE
 - REGEDT32.EXE
 - *POLEDIT.EXE*
-

From Page 218

The Resource Kit utility AUTOLOG.EXE stores passwords

- *In cleartext.*
 - Using a LanManager hash.
 - Using an NTLM hash.
 - It doesn't store passwords.
-

From Page 219

The GetAdmin, SecHole, and SecHoleD system compromise programs are not functional

- If Service Pack 4 is installed.
 - *If Service Pack 6a is installed.*
 - If Null Session access is disabled.
 - When a user is logged on locally.
-

From Page 222

System Policy changes are applied

- Hourly.
 - Daily.
 - *When a user logs on.*
 - When a user logs off.
-

From Page 225

Protocol Analyzers can be rendered less useful by

- *a fully switched network*
 - NTLM authentication
 - Packet-filtering routers
 - All of the above
 - None of the above
-

From Page 230

The threat posed by computer viruses

- Is small and shrinking
 - *Is enormous and growing*
 - Is negated by packet-filtering routers
 - Should only be blocked on incoming traffic
-

From Page 233

Printer drivers run

- As System users
 - With Administrative privileges
 - *In kernel mode*
 - Under DllHost.exe
-

From Page 236

Floppy drives can be disabled

- By nothing short of physically removing them from the system.
 - Using the FloppyLock registry key
 - *Using the system BIOS*
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

All 30 questions in this section are from book 5.4, "Internet Information Server." The correct answer is marked with emphasized text.

From Page 15

In order to map a web site, an attacker might:

- Use the diagrams returned by popular search engines.
 - *Download the entire website for offline study.*
 - Download the sites search engine index.
 - All of the above.
-

From Page 16

Error messages that IIS returns to the browser:

- Discourage the attacker from exploring the web site.
 - Indicate a DoS attack in progress.
 - *Educate the attacker about the way the site works.*
 - Warn administrators that someone is probing their defenses.
-

From Page 18

Attackers try to obtain source code to web site scripts because:

- The source code may reveal existing security holes.
 - The scripts may contain useful usernames or passwords.
 - The scripts may help map out the target network.
 - *All of the above.*
 - e) None of the above
-

From Page 23

Brute force attack tools like Xavior and WebCracker work by:

- Causing repeated requests to computationally-expensive SSL-encrypted links.
 - Sending malformed packets which the operating system can't handle.
 - Encrypting a large dictionary of words and comparing them to the encrypted text retrieved from the web server.
 - *Sending an enormous number of possible usernames and passwords to a server that requires authentication.*
-

From Page 25

Buffer overflows can compromise a server by:

- *Corrupting the running code on the server.*
 - Using up all the memory on the server.
 - Reserving network resources on a server.
 - Exploiting script engines carelessly left in accessible directories.
-

From Page 27

IIS secures data in transit using:

- Base64 encoding
 - NTLM authentication
 - *SSL encryption*
 - NTFS permissions
-

From Page 28

Session hijacking occurs when:

- Browser sessions are not SSL-encrypted.
 - *The server stores session tokens in hidden form values.*
 - The server stores session tokens in an unencrypted database.
 - The client stores tokens on shared filesystems.
-

From Page 47

Static IIS web pages should be stored

- On the system partition.
 - On a read-only tape.
 - On an encrypted filesystem.
 - *On a read-only share on another machine.*
-

From Page 54

IIS communications can be made more secure by using:

- NetBeui
 - IPX/SPX
 - *Both of the above*
 - None of the above
-

From Page 57

The sample pages and scripts that come with IIS

- Enhance security by providing "best practices" examples.
 - Enhance security by ensuring consistent installations.
 - Damage security by lessening free space on the data partition.
 - *Damage security by providing exploitable scripts to attackers.*
-

From Page 57

Users can change their passwords using IIS

- *Under IIS 4.0, but not IIS 5.0.*
 - Under IIS 5.0, but not IIS 4.0.
 - Only when the connection is SSL-encrypted.
 - Only when connected via Local Area Network.
-

From Page 61

"401 Access Denied" can indicate

- The user's browser doesn't support Integrated authentication.
 - The user's browser is not allowing cookies.
 - The server will never allow access to the requested file.
 - *The server requires further authentication before accessing the requested file.*
-

From Page 61

The WWW-Authenticate header

- Is how the client requests the server switch to SSL.
 - Is how the server requests the client switch to SSL.
 - Is how the client indicates what forms of authentication may be used.
 - *Is how the server indicates what forms of authentication may be used.*
-

From Page 62

Anonymous authentication using HTTP

- Is an oxymoron
 - Requires the user's email address as the password.
 - *Is transparent to the user.*
 - Requires a null user connection to the server
-

From Page 65

Basic authentication uses

- SSL

- SMB
 - Base64
 - NTLMv1
-

From Page 68

Digest authentication is used

- For broad support by RFC-compatible clients.
 - When transferring a large number of files.
 - Instead of Basic Authentication whenever both are offered.
 - *Only with IIS 5.0 and Windows 2000.*
-

From Page 77

Certificate authentication is not stronger than

- Integrated Windows authentication.
 - Digest authentication.
 - NTLM + Kerberos authentication.
 - *All of the above.*
 - e) None of the above.
-

From Page 77

The complexity of Certificate authentication

- *Decreases security by complicating management.*
 - Increases security when used to protect Win98 clients.
 - Decreases security because of its weak encryption.
 - All of the above.
 - e) None of the above.
-

From Page 78

Fortezza authentication was developed by

- The Mafia
 - *The NSA*
 - The CIA
 - The Open Source movement
-

From Page 80

Digest authentication uses

- *MD5 encoding*
 - Base64 encoding
 - ROT13 encoding
 - SSL encryption
-

From Page 81

SSL certificates adhere to which standard?

- X.400
 - X.443
 - X.500
 - X.509
-

From Page 81

In order to have two-way encryption, you must have

- A public key and a private key.
 - A Certificate Authority like Verisign.
 - *One key that works for both encoding and decoding.*
 - All of the above.
 - e) None of the above.
-

From Page 100

SSL is an acronym for:

- Server Side Locking
 - *Secure Sockets Layer*
 - Secure Scripting Language
 - Secure Server Logging
-

From Page 100

You can identify an SSL document because:

- *The URL begins with "https://"*
 - *The URL begins with "shttp://"*
 - *The URL ends with ".shtml"*
 - *The URL ends with ".ssl"*
-

From Page 105

Best practices for implementing SSL include:

- Using a trusted Certificate Authority
 - SSL-encrypting both an HTML form and the form submission URL.
 - Not using SSL except where really necessary.
 - *All of the above.*
 - e) None of the above.
-

From Page 107

IIS permissions can control the following:

- CPU throttling
 - IP address blocking
 - Script Source Access
 - *All of the above*
 - e) None of the above
-

From Page 111

The deadliest combination of IIS permissions is:

- Read and Write
 - *Script Source Access and Scripts Only*
 - Write and Execute
 - Directory Browsing and IP Address Blocking
-

From Page 115

IP address restrictions

- Remove the need for SSL
- Protect IIS from DoS attacks
- Require DNS lookups to function properly
- All of the above

e) *None of the above*

From Page 140

ISAPI extensions allow IIS to

- Be used as by ASPs (Application Service Providers)
 - Run CGI programs written for other operating systems
 - Run scripts in an isolated 'sandbox' for security reasons.
 - *Trigger the execution of a program on the server by accessing a file.*
-

From Page 144

IIS 5.0 is to DllHost.exe as IIS 4.0 is to

- cacls.exe
 - mts.exe
 - *mtx.exe*
 - wsh.exe
-

From Page 150

The following extensions are associated with Index Server:

- *.idq*
 - .idc
 - .stm
 - All of the above
 - None of the above
-

All the questions in this file are from book 5.5, "Active Directory for Win2000 in a Nutshell." The correct answer is marked with emphasized text.

<

From Page 108

The 'Computer Configuration->Administrative Templates' section of a GPO is used to modify:

- HKEY_Current_User
 - *HKEY_Local_Machine*
 - The Metabase
 - The Global Catalog
-

From Page 108

The 'User Configuration->Administrative Templates' section of a GPO

is used to modify:

- *HKEY_Current_User*
 - HKEY_Local_Machine
 - The Metabase
 - The Global Catalog
-

From Page 104

Local Policies allow you to

- I. Audit the access of global system objects.
- II. Block access to all but the listed TCP/IP ports.
- III. Restrict floppy access to locally logged-on user only.
- IV. Tag suspicious use of the network in the Domain Controller's event log.

- I and II
 - II and III
 - III and IV
 - *I and IV*
 - e) II and IV f) III and I
-

From Page 102

GPO scripts can be run

- In the order they are listed in the directory.
 - All at the same time.
 - Hidden from the user.
 - *All of the above.*
 - e) None of the above.
-

From Page 98

Group Policy cannot be used to

- Install applications
 - Repair applications
 - Remove applications
 - *Search for applications*
-

From Page 97

In order to place restrictions on one member of a group, you should

- Create a sub-group with the appropriate restrictions.
 - *Deny that member Read and Apply Group Policy permissions.*
 - Disable that member's user account.
 - Assign the group member to a GPO Delegation.
-

From Page 91

A GPO uses loopback mode

- To keep sensitive traffic off the network.
 - To emulate network traffic when off the LAN.
 - *Allow one GPO to override all other GPOs.*
 - For internal verification purposes.
-

From Page 89

4LSDOU

- Is the first virus released that targeted Windows 2000 specifically.
 - *Describes the order of precedence for GPOs.*
 - Is the database technology Active Directory is based on.
 - Describes the Active Directory Object Hierarchy.
-

From Page 86

GPO Links

- *Bind GPOs to containers.*
- Allow GPOs to inherit properties from other GPOs.
- Enable GPOs to be manipulated over the web.

- Allow client workstations to reference AD-based GPOs.
-

From Page 84

Group Policies can be linked to

- I. Sites
 - II. Local Groups
 - III. Global Groups
 - IV. Organizational Units
 - I and II
 - II and III
 - III and IV
 - *IV and I*
 - e) IV and II f) I and III
-

From Page 83

The scripts referred to by Group Policy are stored in:

- Active Directory
 - LDAP
 - *SYSVOL folder*
 - NETLOGON share
-

From Page 81

Group Policy allows you to set policies for:

- Kerberos
 - IPSec
 - PKI
 - *All of the above*
 - e) None of the above
-

From Page 80

The Delegation Wizard is most useful

- *As a learning tool*
- Because it removes the need to work with raw permissions
- Because it makes repairing permissions simpler

- All of the above
 - e) None of the above
-

From Page 77

The precision of delegation is limited only by:

- The free space remaining in the Active Directory.
 - The security-consciousness of the organization.
 - *The flexibility and granularity of Active Directory permissions.*
 - The backwards-compatibility required by downlevel networks.
-

From Page 75

You can get SU.EXE and RUNAS.EXE

- Both as part of Windows 2000.
 - *SU.EXE from the Resource Kit, RUNAS.EXE as part of Windows 2000.*
 - RUNAS.EXE from the Resource Kit, SU.EXE as part of Windows 2000.
 - From Pedestal Software, a third-party vendor.
-

From Page 75

Null user access to Active Directory

- Can be limited using the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurePipeServers\Winreg key.
 - Can be achieved using the CACLS.EXE program
 - *Is dangerous when "Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access" is enabled.*
 - Cannot be scripted using WSH.
-

From Page 72

Active Directory containers and objects should use inherited permissions because

- It reduces the processor overhead of checking permissions.
 - Most containers and objects don't need customized permissions.
 - Orphaned, or non-inheriting, objects don't participate in security.
 - *Orphaned, or non-inheriting, objects make it hard to scan permissions for security holes.*
-

From Page 72

The determining factor in configuring Organization Units is:

- Adherence to the company Organizational chart.
 - *To make the process of assigning permissions more efficient.*
 - The number of domains that exist in the tree.
 - To apply security policies to objects from more than one domain.
-

From Page 68

The DSACLSEXEC utility from the Resource Kit

- Can edit permissions on an item without overwriting the item's other permissions.
 - Can reset permissions back to defaults define in the schema.
 - Uses the RFC1779 naming convention.
 - *All of the above.*
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 62

When an account is trusted for delegation,

- It is eligible to be granted authority for Active Directory administration.
 - *It can take on the identity of a remote user and perform actions on their behalf.*
 - It can be used across two different Domains.
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 60

User passwords may be changed

- By Windows Scripting Host scripts.
 - With the NET USER command.
 - Using the "AD Users and Computers" snap-in.
 - *All of the above.*
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 57

Universal groups, whether for Distribution or Security,

- Are the Windows 2000 version of NT 4.0 Global Groups.
 - Can contain Users, Global Groups, and Local Groups.
 - Are equally available in Native and Mixed mode domains.
 - All of the above.
 - *None of the above.*
-

From Page 52

Windows NT 4 domains are the equivalent of Windows 2000

- *Organizational Units*
 - Sites
 - Domains
 - Trees
 - Forests
-

From Page 51

A "Forest" consists of

- A root domain and a set of subdomains.
 - Two or more subdomains which do not trust each other.
 - Two or more domains which are not subdomains of each other, and which do not trust each other.
 - *Two or more domains which are not subdomains of each other, but which do trust each other.*
-

From Page 48

A Windows 2000 domain might be named

- FOSSEN
 - FOSSEN-NET
 - *fossen.net*
 - fossen_net
-

From Page 46

ADSI can bind to directories using the following ProgIDs:

- I. LDAP://
- II. IIS://
- III. HTTP://
- IV. NETLOGON://

- *I and II*
 - II and III
 - III and IV
 - IV and I
 - I and III
-

From Page 41

Schema changes are most dangerous when

- They are reversed after having been replicated to all controllers.
 - They are reversed during replication to all controllers.
 - *They are used to mark any item "mandatory."*
 - They are implemented without executing "regsvr32 schmmgmt.dll" first.
-

From Page 38

In a Mixed-mode Windows 2000 domain,

- Each domain controller acts as a BDC for NT 4.0 machines.
 - Each domain controller acts as a PDC for NT 4.0 machines.
 - *One and only one domain controller acts as a PDS for NT 4.0 machines.*
 - All of the above.
 - None of the above.
-

From Page 35

How much of the Active Directory is replicated is determined by

- Organizational Units
 - Sites
 - *Domains*
 - Trees
 - Forests
-

From Page 33

If you want to modify the replication transport link between two physical locations that are in the same domain,

- You must put each location in a different Site.
- You must modify the AD Schema.

- You must enable a high-bandwidth link between the two locations.
- All of the above.
- *None of the above*

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