Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

Copyright SANS Institute
Author Retains Full Rights

Interested in learning more?

Check out the list of upcoming events offering
"Security Essentials: Network, Endpoint, and Cloud (Security 401)"
at http://www.giac.org/registration/gsec

Terrence K Hudgen
GSEC Version 1.3

Network Security: Authentication Applications Kerberos and
Public Key Infrastructure

Abstract

Networks that are used to store, process, or transmit
sensitive information must provide appropriate protection
to prevent undesirable events such as compromise of
information or denial of service. This document will show
how to improve the security of a network through the use of
authentication applications. Kerberos and Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) are the two applications that will be
examined. The pros and cons of each application will be
discussed. Solutions to overcome the limitations of each
application will be identified.

Network Security: Authentication Applications Kerberos and
Public Key Infrastructure

INTRODUCTION

The most commonly known network is the Intranet, which
is made up of hundreds of thousands of smaller networks.
Other networks, such as local area networks (LANs) and wide
area networks (WANs) can also be connected to the outside
world. Once a computer is hooked up to devices outside of
your office walls, you and your data become vulnerable.
People may try to steal data, use your accounts for
inappropriate purposes, or simply damage your system
because they can. The same can be said for internal
networks, such as Intranets, and semi-internal networks,
such as Extranets, although to a somewhat lesser degree due
to their limited public exposure.

The effects of a security compromise, whether by
interception of sensitive transactions, information being
modified in transit, or transmissions being fabricated
could devastate an organization. As long as organizations
rely upon public networks to support transactions without a
widely adopted, open, and interoperable security solution,
any transaction is susceptible to security breaches.

Security solutions for distributed networks are ever
changing; the most discussed solutions in the network
security field are: Kerberos and PKI. They both have their
strengths and weaknesses. They both rely upon a
centralized trust figure: the Key Distribution Center (KDC)
for Kerberos and the Certificate Authority (CA) for PKI,
and both use the application of cryptographic algorithms to
secure network-based communications. They also differ from
one another in numerous ways, both in the way they secure
communications and the capabilities they bring to the
table. This paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses
of each technology and will provide solutions to their
limitations.

INTRODUCTION TO KERBEROS

Kerberos is an authentication protocol that lets
clients and servers reliably verify each other's identity
before establishing a network connection. Developed at MIT
in the late 1980s, Kerberos takes its name from the three-
headed dog on Greek mythology that guards the entrance of

Hades.   Instead of guarding the underworld, today's
Kerberos brings a measure of security to a distributed
computer environment, where one computer can access the
resources of any other machine on a network.   [Tipton,
1999]   Like Kerberos the dog, Kerberos the protocol has
three heads; two principals and one trusted third party.
[Conray 2001]

A distributed security system provides a wide range of
security services for distributed environments.   Those
services include authentication and message protection, as
well as providing the ability to securely carry
authorization information needed by applications, operating
systems, and networks.   Kerberos also provides the
facilities necessary for delegation, where limited-trust
intermediaries perform operations on behalf of a client.

Kerberos differs from many other distributed security
systems in its ability to incorporate a very wide range of
security technologies and mechanisms.   That flexibility
allows a mixture of security technologies and mechanisms to
be used, as narrowly or broadly as required, while
providing the economies of scale that a common, reusable,
and technology-neutral Kerberos security infrastructure.

The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as
follows: A client sends a request to the authentication
server (AS) requesting 'credentials' for a given server.
The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the
client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for
the server and 2) a temporary encryption key (often called
a "session key"). The client transmits the ticket (which
contains the client's identity and a copy of the session
key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The
session key (now shared by the client and server) is used
to authenticate the client, and may optionally be used to
authenticate the server. It may also be used to encrypt
further communication between the two parties or to
exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt
further communication. [Neuman 2000]

The implementation can consist of one or more
authentication servers running on physically secure hosts.
The authentication servers maintain a database of
principals (i.e., users and servers) and their secret keys.
Code libraries provide encryption and implement the
Kerberos protocol.   In order to add authentication to its
transactions, a typical network application adds one or two
calls to the Kerberos library, which results in the

transmission of the necessary messages to achieve
authentication.

The Kerberos protocol consists of several exchanges.
A client can ask a Kerberos server for credentials by two
methods. In the first approach, the client sends a clear
text request for a ticket for the desired server to the AS.
The reply is sent encrypted in the client's secret key.
Usually this request is for a ticket-granting ticket (TGT)
that can later be used with the ticket-granting server
(TGS). In the second method, the client sends a request to
the TGS. The client sends the TGT to the TGS in the same
manner as if it were contacting any other application
server that requires Kerberos credentials. The reply is
encrypted in the session key from the TGT.

Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the
identity of the principals in transaction, to ensure the
integrity of messages exchanged between them, or to
preserve privacy of the messages. The application is free
to choose whatever protection may be necessary.

To verify the identities of the principals in a
transaction, the client transmits the ticket to the server.
Since the ticket is sent in the clear and might be
intercepted and reused by an attacker, additional
information is sent to prove that the message was
originated by the principal to whom the ticket was issued.
This information is encrypted in the session key, and
includes a timestamp. The timestamp proves that the
message was recently generated and is not a replay.
Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that
a party possessing the session key generated it. Since no
one except the requesting principal and the server know the
session key this guarantees the identity of the client.

The integrity of the messages exchanged between
principals can also be guaranteed using the session key.
This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and
message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by
generating and transmitting a hash function of the client's
message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and integrity
of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured
by encrypting the data to be passed using the session key
passed in the ticket, and contained in the credentials.

ADVANTAGES OF KERBEROS

As a distributed security service, Kerberos provides authentication, confidentiality, and integrity security capabilities. Those three elements of security are essential to any organization that wants to operate a secure environment. Kerberos uses encryption to provide each of these three security services and supports both public key cryptography (asymmetric) and secret key (symmetric) encryption for authentication; however, the core functionality of any Kerberos implementation relies on secret key encryption. [Hynes 2001] As a side-effect of the dual-key encryption scheme employed in the Kerberos model, a service-session key is generated which constitutes a shared secret between a particular client system and a particular service. This shared secret may be used as a key for encrypting the conversation between the client and the target service, further enhancing the security of Kerberized transactions.

One of the most significant benefits of using Kerberos is its standing as a relatively mature, IETF standards-based protocol (RFC 1510) supported by Windows 2000, Linux, and Windows platforms. Unlike many of its proprietary counterparts, Kerberos has been scrutinized by many of the top programmers, cryptologists and security experts in the industry. This public scrutiny has ensured and continues to ensure that any new weaknesses discovered in the protocol or its underlying security model will be quickly analyzed and corrected.

Another advantage is the tickets passed between clients and servers in the Kerberos authentication model include timestamp and lifetime information. This allows Kerberos clients and Kerberized servers to limit the duration of their users' authentication. While the specific length of time for which a user's authentication remains valid after his initial ticket issued is implementation dependent, Kerberos systems typically use small enough ticket lifetimes to prevent brute-force and replay attacks. In general, no authentication ticket should have a lifetime longer than the expected time required to crack the encryption of the ticket.

DISADVANTAGES OF KERBEROS

Kerberos was designed for use with single-user client systems. In the more general case, where a client system may itself be a multi-user system, the Kerberos authentication scheme can fall prey to a variety of ticket-stealing and replay attacks. The overall security of multi-user Kerberos client systems (file system security, memory protection, etc.) is therefore a limiting factor in the security of Kerberos authentication. No amount of cleverness in the implementation of a Kerberos authentication system can replace good system administration practices on Kerberos client and server machines.

Because Kerberos uses a mutual authentication model, it is necessary for both client machines and service providers (servers) to be designed with Kerberos authentication in mind. Many proprietary applications already provide support for Kerberos or will be providing Kerberos support in the near future. Some legacy systems and many locally-written and maintained packages, however, were not designed with *any* third-party authentication mechanism in mind, and would have to be re-written (possibly extensively) to support Kerberos authentication.

The Kerberos authentication model is vulnerable to brute-force attacks against the KDC (the initial ticketing service and the ticket-granting service). The entire authentication system depends on the trust ability of the KDC(s), so anyone who can compromise system security on a KDC system can theoretically compromise the authentication of all users of systems depending on the KDC. Again, no amount of cleverness in the design of the Kerberos system can take the place of solid system administration practices employed in managing the Kerberos KDC(s).

INTRODUCTION TO PKI

A PKI (public key infrastructure) enables users of an insecure public network such as the Internet to securely and privately exchange data using a public and a private cryptographic key pair that is obtained and shared through a trusted authority. The public key infrastructure provides for digital certificates that can identify individuals or organizations and directory services that can store and, when necessary, revoke them. PKI is the underlying

technology that provides security for the SSL and HTTPS protocols, which are used extensively to conduct secure eBusiness over the Internet.

The public key infrastructure assumes the use of public key cryptography, which is the most common method on the Internet for authentication of a message sender or encryption of a message. Traditional cryptography involves the creation and sharing of a secret key for the encryption and decryption of messages. This secret key system has the significant flaw that if the key is discovered or intercepted by someone else, messages can easily be decrypted.

For this reason, public key cryptography and the public key infrastructure is the preferred approach on the Internet. A public key infrastructure consists of:

    1. A certificate authority that issues and verifies digital certificates.
    2. A registration authority that acts as the verifier for the certificate authority before a digital certificate is issued to a requestor.
    3. One or more directories where the certificates (with their public keys) are held.
    4. A certificate management system

In public key cryptography, a public and private key are created simultaneously by a certificate authority (CA). The private key is given only to the requesting party and the public key is made publicly available in a directory that all parties can access. The private key is never shared with anyone or sent across the Internet. By first encrypting data using an organization's or individual's public key it is possible to safely send the data across an insecure network such as the internet since only the holder of the associated private key will be able to decrypt it.

In addition to decrypting messages, private keys may also be used to digitally sign data as a way of both authenticating its origin and proving that data has not been tampered with. To create a digital signature the sender passes the data through a "hashing" algorithm, which returns a value known as a one-way hash. The one-way hash is unique to the data, but cannot be used to reproduce it. The sender encrypts the one-way hash using their private key to create a digital signature. The digital signature is sent in addition to the data.

The digital signature can be decrypted to obtain the one-way hash using the sender's public key (available from

a global directory of public keys). By passing the data through the same hashing algorithm and comparing the result with the one-way hash extracted from the digital signature the recipient can prove that the data was sent by the owner of the public key and has not been tampered with.

This dual use of keys leads to a conflict of interest in terms of key lifetime. For example if a private key used for digital signatures were stolen it could be used to forge the owner's identity and so should be destroyed as soon as its active life is over. In contrast, with a key pair used for encryption the private key should be archived for as long as possible, because if the private key were ever lost it would be impossible to retrieve messages encrypted with its public counterpart. It is therefore sensible to keep multiple copies of this private key.

ADVANTAGES OF PKI

The PKI approach to security does not take the place of all other security technologies; rather, it is an alternative means of achieving security. The following advantages of PKI have led to its emergence as an industry standard for securing Internet and e-commerce applications. PKI is a standards-based technology and it allows the choice of trust provider. It is highly scaleable. Users maintain their own certificates, and certificate authentication involves exchange of data between client and server only. This means that no third party authentication server needs to be online. There is thus no limit to the number of users who can be supported using PKI.

PKI allows delegated trust. That is, a user who has obtained a certificate from a recognized and trusted certificate authority can authenticate himself to a server the very first time he connects to that server, without having previously been registered with the system.

Another advantage of PKI is it offers non-repudiation whereas Kerberos does not. Non-repudiation ensures that strong and substantial evidence is available to the sender of message that the message has been delivered, and to the recipient, of the sender's identity, sufficient to prevent either from successfully denying having sent or received the message. This includes the ability of a third party to verify the integrity and origin of the message.

DISADVANTAGES OF PKI

PKI acceptance is a controversial issue. As explained by cryptography expert Bruce Schneier [2000], PKI increases some risks and fails to address some others. Drawbacks to implementing PKI include: client software trust, private key safekeeping and abuse, very high security requirements for verification servers, unclear certificate use guidelines, etc. If a user's private key is compromised, the user can reject transactions signed by it. Thus, the burden of protecting user private keys is the full responsibility of the user.

As stated earlier PKI is not a technology solution in and of itself. It is an enabling technology. It is also an investment, and the benefits of it do not immediately out weigh the cost of deployment. Because of this PKI deployment is a slow task and the number of fully functioning PKIs in existence today is quite small. While the early bird may catch the worm, it is usually not the first person through the mine field that survives, and that sentiment is seen in PKI development. PKIs are complex, and many thorny issues arise when they are built.

An additional disadvantage of PKI is that the standards supporting PKI are still developing. While a number of standards have distinguished themselves as the standards that will be used going forward, namely the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) and Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) standards, there are still too many being followed, with no single set achieving universal acceptance and application. The lack of approved standards could negatively affect the ability of organizations with a different interpretation of the standards to interoperate with other PKI implementations. Solutions

SOLUTION

A way to overcome the limitations of Kerberos and PKI are to combine the two services. The new service will be bases on the PKI structure. The PKI structure would be used because the main disadvantage of Kerberos is the difficulty in administering and maintaining a Kerberos implementation; the entire idea behind PKI is to enable easier management of an organization's cryptographic keys.

In addition, PKI can thrive in a widely distributed environment such as the Internet or Extranets due to cross-

certification and its design flexibility. PKI uses a distributed trust so that the day-to-day distribution of keys is conducted from a publicly accessible certificate repository. Whereas in a Kerberos implementation all the keys are stored on the KDC server (or set of KDC servers) and the KDC must always be available for authentication. The risk of compromise of the private key can be mitigated through the use of token or smart card-based technology, which recently has been made available for Kerberos implementations.

CONCLUSION

The need for an open and interoperable distributed network security "solution" is evident in today's computing environment. While a number of alternative solutions have been considered over the years, none appear as ready to address this need as Public Key Infrastructure and Kerberos do today.

While this paper has outlined the strengths and weaknesses of both PKI and Kerberos for internal use, and provided a solution those limitations. As shown, the two technologies are not mutually exclusive. Recent implementations of Kerberos, specifically the Windows 2000 implementation, support authentication via PKI-based digital certificates.

While Kerberos and PKI share some of the same advantages, each falls prey to some of the same disadvantages as well. Neither password-based authentication (Kerberos) nor certificate-based authentication (PKI) addresses security issues surrounding physical access to individual machines or passwords. Public-key Cryptography can verify that a private key used to sign some data corresponds to the public key in the certificate, but is unable to always maintain a tight association between the user and their certificate. [Hynes, 2001] The two technologies should be combined in order to take advantage of the advantages of each technology and reduce their limitations.

REFERENCES

[Bradsheer 1995]   Bradshear, K. (1995, May) Kerberos
                    Reference Page. Retrieved March 1,
                    2001, from Carnegie Mellon University
                    Web site:
                    http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu/~shad
                    ow/kerberos.html.

[Conroy 2001J]   Conray-Murray, A. (2001, July).
                    Kerberos: Computer Security's
                    Hellhound. Network Magazine, Vol. 16
                    No. 7, 40-45.

[Conray 2001N]   Conray-Murray, A. (2001, November).
                    Strategies & Issues: Public Key
                    Infrastructure Nuts and Bolts.
                    Retrieved April 5, 2001 from Network
                    Magazine website:
                    http://www.networkmagazine.com/article/
                    NMG20011102S0008.

[Ellison 2000]   Ellison, C. & Schneier. (2000). Ten
                    Risks of PKI: What You're Not Being
                    Told About Public Key Infrastructure.
                    Retrieved March 3, 2001 from
                    Counterpane website:
                    http://www.counterpane.com/pki-
                    risks.html.

[Hynes 2001]   Hynes, M. (2001, April). Analyzing
                    Kerberos and Public Key Infrastructure
                    (PKI). Retrieved March 1, 2001 from
                    CISCO World Magazine website:
                    http://www.ciscoworldmagazine.com/webpa
                    pers/2001/04_guardent.shtml.

[PKI]   Introduction to PKI. Retrieved March
                    1, 2001, from Baltimore Technologies
                    website:
                    http://www.baltimore.com/library/pki/in
                    dex.html.

[Kerberos]   Kerberos: The Network Authentication
                      Protocol. Retrieved March 1, 2001,
                      from Massachusetts Institute of
                      Technology website:
                      http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/.

[Kohl 1993]   Kohl, J. & Neuman, C. (1993,
                      September). The Kerberos Network
                      Authentication Service (V5). Retrieved
                      March 1, 2001 from Information Science
                      Institute Web site:
                      FTP://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1510.txt.

[Neuman 2000]   Neuman, Clifford (2000, August).
                      Section 1 Kerberos Revisions for
                      comment. Retrieved April 2, 2002 from
                      Massachusetts Institute of Technology
                      website:
                      http://diswww.mit.edu:8008/menelaus.mit
                      .edu/kprot/487.

[Schneier 200]   Schneier, Bruce, (2000). Secrets &
                      Lies. Wiley Computer Publishing.

[Tipton 1999]   Tipton, H. F. & Krause, M. (1999).
                      Information Security Management
                      Handbook 4th Edition. CRC Press LLC.

[TUNG 1996]   Tung, B., (1996, December). The
                      Moron's Guide to Kerberos, Version
                      1.2.2. Retrieved March 1, 2001 from
                      Information Science Institute Web site:
                      http://www.isi.edu/gost/brian/security/
                      kerberos.html.