

# **Global Information Assurance Certification Paper**

## Copyright SANS Institute Author Retains Full Rights

This paper is taken from the GIAC directory of certified professionals. Reposting is not permited without express written permission.

## Auditing a Cisco A Cisco 1721 Router: An Auditor's Perspective

## Ray Welshman February 18, 2004 GSNA Practical Assignment 3.0

© SANS Institute 2004,

Author retains full rights.

#### Abstract/Summary

This paper deals with a comprehensive audit of a typical small office/home office environment that purchased their internet connection from an ISP. The company in this instance is a small law firm (fictitious name of XYZ Law). The service purchased from the ISP is a 1721 Router connected to the internet via DSL connection. The configuration and management of the router is outsourced to the ISP. This audit deals with the router only and it's associated risks, not the IT infrastructure behind it. Research has been conducted on the recommended security of Cisco routers in general and has been applied in this case.

The audit contains the following as pertaining to the Cisco 1721 Router:

- System Identification
- Risks to the router
- Research References
- A checklist to identify possible weaknesses and exposures
- Audit results and recommendations

Although this paper is concerned with a 1721 device it can be used as a basis to help conduct an audit on similar routers with Cisco IOS in similar scenarios

© SANS Institute 2004,

## **Table of Content**

ASSIGNMENT 1: RESEARCH IN AUDIT, MEASUREMENT, PRAC	FICE AND CONTROL 4
INTRODUCTION	
1.1 System to Be Audited	
1.2 Risk Assessment/Evaluation	
1.2.1 Company Practices	
1.2.2 Technical Risk Assessment/Evaluation	
1.2.3 Current State of Practice	
2. CREATE AN AUDIT CHECKLIST	
2.1 General Checklist	15
2.2 CISCO SPECIFIC CHECKLIST	
3. CONDUCT THE AUDIT	
3.1 Audit – General Checklist	
2.2 CISCO SPECIFIC CHECKLIST	
PART 4 – AUDIT REPORT	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
4.1 Audit Findings	
4.2 AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS	
4.2.2 General Recommendations	
4.2.3 Exception Specific Recommendations	
4.2.4 Summary	
5. REFERENCES	
APPENDIXES	
Appendix A – Nessus Scan Results	
APPENDIX B – ROUTER AUDITING TOOL (RAT) RESULTS	
APPENDIX C – SHOW TECH-SUPPORT RESULT	

## Tables

Table 1 - Cisco 1721 Router Specifications	6
--	---

## **Table of Figures**

Figure 1: Office Network	5
Figure 2 - Cisco 1721 (copied from Cisco Website)	6
Figure 3: Rear View of Cisco 1721 (copied from Cisco)	7

# Assignment 1: Research in Audit, Measurement, Practice and Control

#### Introduction

Company XYZ(fictitious name) is a law firm. The firm consists of four lawyers with one administrative assistant. Each lawyer has a private office and the administrative assistant is in the reception area. There is one Windows 2000 server that provides file and print capabilities. The firm utilizes a Cisco 1721 router as its primary perimeter defense device. The primary and only connection to the internet is a DSL connection. The IT infrastructure of this law firm is outsourced to a consultant firm, including the configuration and management of the 1721 router. XYZ Law has requested an independent audit of the Cisco 1721 to ensure that the perimeter of their IT infrastructure is protected.





#### 1.1 System to Be Audited

I am auditing a Cisco 1721 Router that is running Cisco IOS 12.2 The Router is the primary perimeter defence to protect XYZ Law's server, PC's, and the sensitive client files from possible internet intrusion. The Router is meant to perform traffic/packet filtering and as a gateway to the public internet.

XYZ Law has no security policy written or verbal so the 1721 Router will be audited against industry best practices.

This audit is to investigate the Cisco 1721 only. The assessment will cover the following:

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective<br/>Ray Welshman 19 February 2004© SANS Institute 2004,As part of the Information Security Reading RoomAuthor

Author retains full rights.

- physical security
- Configuration review
- Penetration Tests
- Change management/System Administrator procedures

Table 1 - Cisco 1721 Router Specifications	Table 1 -	Cisco	1721	Router	Specifications
--	-----------	-------	------	--------	----------------

Manufacturer	Cisco
Name of Device	Cisco 1721 Series Router
Intended Market	Small/Medium Business
Software	Software on this router IOS Version 12.2(15)T9, System Bootstrap, Version 12.2(7r) Software Features supported Supports IP, IPX, AppleTalk, IBM, Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), NetWare Link Services Protocol (NLSP), Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP), encryption, network address translation, and the Cisco IOS Router Feature Set.
Processor	MCP860P
Memory	64MB Ram , 16 MB Flash
Interfaces	1 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s) 1 FastEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)

Figure 2 - Cisco 1721 (copied from Cisco Website)



GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective<br/>Ray Welshman 19 February 2004e 2004,As part of the Information Security Reading RoomAut

#### Figure 3: Rear View of Cisco 1721 (copied from Cisco)



For further information on the Cisco 1721 Router products please refer to the following website:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/products\_installation\_gui de\_book09186a008007e585.html

#### 1.2 Risk Assessment/Evaluation

A risk assessment is to determine the **threat** to the system being audited.

The following definition of a threat was taken from the course material of SANS course ILOT Track VII – Auditing Networks file: audit\_day4\_0403.pdf Slide 2-9

"A threat is a circumstance, condition, or event with the potential to cause harm to personnel and/or network resources in the form of destruction, disclosure, and modification of data, denial of service, and/or fraud, waste, and abuse"

Karen Olsen, NIST Special Publication 800-7July 1914

In this particular scenario I will be looking at the risks associated to the Cisco 1721 router. If the router is compromised in any way it could lead to serious consequences to XYZ Law. The files and information the router is protecting are very sensitive and hold important information about clients and law cases from the past and current ongoing projects.

The risk assessment will be divided into two categories:

Company Practices – this is described as how the company utilizes the router and how it is managed

Author retains full rights.

Technical – this is described as the technical use of the device and how it is deployed.

Each risk will be evaluated by utilizing the following criteria:

- Type of Risk (Control)
- Possibility of Event Occurring
- Risk Level
- i. Low – Will affect operations but not put the company out of business
- Medium Will affect day to day operations but the company will ii. continue to operate but at a less efficient rate.
- High This will affect the company is a very severe way i.e. loss of iii. business or significant loss efficiency.
- Result (Possible result of the perceived risk) -

### **1.2.1 Company Practices**

This is described as the daily work operations of the company whose activities may affect the Router operation.

1. Physical Location – Where and how the device is stored and how it is accessed		
Risk	Location of the device will determine physical security in the sense on how easy it is to access the device(s) Temperature and Humidity control will determine working conditions for the device(s)	
Possibility	Medium – The office environment is generally kept to comfort zones which the router can operate. The router is a small device and can be easily secured.	
Risk Level	High	
Result	If device is stolen all relevant configuration information such as IP addresses (private and public) information flow can be obtained. Cost of replacing the device which would also include professional service cost to configure and install the device	

2. System Administration – Personnel that manages/configure the Router		
Risk	Router configuration/management is outsourced to	
	a local consultant company. Personnel in XYZ Law	
	have put total trust in this company. XYZ Law has	
	little or no knowledge of Router operations	
Possibility	Low – Consultant Firms generally have trained and	

	trustworthy employees
Risk Level	High
Result	<ul> <li>The sys admin is not a member of XYZ Law and he/she has the ability to open a door to all sensitive client information stored on local PC's and file server.</li> <li>If the sensitive files of XYZ Law are compromised it may lead to legal action against the firm.</li> <li>This may also result in loss of Client trust which may lead to significant loss of business.</li> </ul>

3. Internal Personnel – The end users in XYZ Law		
Risk	Administrative Assistant and the Law Partners have very little knowledge of IT operations and may unknowingly while surfing the internet download malicious software which may result in the corruption or loss of sensitive data. Malicious software may also damage PC's and servers which may put XYZ Law out of commission.	
Possibility	Medium – Although the use of PC software is generally well known individuals constantly through unknown acts infect their PC's	
Risk Level	Medium	
Result	Destruction or loss of sensitive files may lead to loss of client trust which may lead to significant loss of business. Time and effort to replace or reacquire this information may be costly and time consuming which may result in XYZ Law missing required	
	deadlines which in turn may lead to significant loss of business.	

4. Disgruntled Employee(s) – Administrative Assistant and Partner Lawyers		
Risk	Employee(s) may be disgruntled and purposely damage the router or allow individuals with malicious intent access to the router	
Possibility	Low – XYZ Law is a small company with a small amount of employees that generally work well together	
Risk Level	High	
Result	This could lead to a compromise of the internal network resulting in compromise of sensitive client files which in turn would result of possible legal action and/or loss of customer confidence. This	

will damage the Firm's reputation and result in loss of business. If the router device is damaged there is a cost of
replacing and also professional services cost to install and configure the device.

5. Lack of Security Policy to	o control Router Activities
Risk	Lack of direction for company internet activities
	may lead to mis-configuration of the router which
	in turn may compromise the intended intent of the
	router
Possibility	Medium – The default configuration of the Cisco
	1721 has known openings. The consultant who
	manages this router should be competent enough
	to adequately configure the Router.
Risk Level	High
Result	Possible compromise or the perimeter defence
	may result in exposing sensitive client files which
	may result in legal action or loss or customer
	confidence which in turn may result in loss of
	business.

## 1.2.2 Technical Risk Assessment/Evaluation

This is described as the risk to the Router device from a technical outlook. This will look at hardware/software configuration of the 1721 router.

1. Router May be open to In	ternet Scans (i.e. port scans, ping sweeps etc)
Risk	Through these scans hackers (professionals and scrip kiddies) may discover the XYZ Law Network.
Possibility	High – The Hacker community is constantly scanning the public internet looking for responses
Risk Level	High
Result	If the router is discovered any inquisitive individual will or may try to test the defences of the router and exploit it. If the attack is successful then XYZ Law and their sensitive client documentation may be compromised. Once past the Router the hacker may destroy information or make the PC's/servers unusable resulting in a shutdown of all operations

2. Denial of Service Attack	
Risk	Hackers through malicious activity may attack the router and through common known tools and techniques may bring down the router and make it unusable
Possibility	High – Denial of Service can come in many forms viruses, worms, or direct attacks such as ping or tcp attacks.
Risk Level	Medium – although the router is out of commission XYZ Law would still be able to function without internet activity
Result	There may be a cost to bring the router back online through professional services.

3. Configuration Errors	
Risk	System Admin may mis-configure the router resulting in allowing individuals with malicious intent to bypass the router security.
Possibility	Low – The router is outsourced to a competent consultant firm
Risk Level	High – If the router has an opening it may allow access to sensitive client information
Result	Possible compromise or the perimeter defence may result in exposing sensitive client files which may result in legal action or loss or customer confidence which in turn may result in loss of business.

4. Router Upgrades – Softw	vare or hardware upgrade (i.e. patches/bugs etc)
Risk 🤍	Router is upgraded without proper testing in a
	safe environment
Possibility	High – May upgrade procedures are not fully
	tested when released by the vendor and my have
$\bigcirc$	adverse results on a production device
Risk level	High – an untested upgrade procedure may either
	damage the router or leave substantial security
	flaws in the router
Result	Possible compromise or the perimeter defence
	may result in exposing sensitive client files which
	may result in legal action or loss or customer
	confidence which in turn may result in loss of
	business.

There may be a cost to bring the Router back
online through professional services.

5. Hardware Failure	
Risk	Device Fails
Possibility	Low – Cisco routers are very reliable
Risk Level	Low – XYZ Law can continue to operate without
	internet access
Result	Router will have to replaced or repaired. If under warranty this will be replaced. If the device is supplied by the consultant firm then it should be replaced as well. There may be a replacement cost if XYZ Law actually owns the device.

#### **1.2.3 Current State of Practice**

The Cisco router product line has been available for some time and is a popular choice among Service Providers, Enterprise Networks, and small office/home office users. The following is a list of resources used to perform research on this audit and to compile a checklist:

- www.cisco.com
- <u>www.cisecurity.com</u>
- http://www.isecom.org/projects/osstmm.shtml
- http://nsa2.www.conxion.com/cisco/download.htm
- www.sans.org
- ILOT TRACK VII Course Material
- https://cassandra.cerias.purdue.edu/main/index.html
- "Auditing a Cisco Pix Firewall: An Auditor Perspective" Rick W Yuen April 2003 GSNA Assignment Version 2.1 <u>http://www.giac.org/practical/GSNA/Rick\_Yuen\_GSNA.pdf</u>
- SANS ILOT Track VII Course Material
- "Firewall Checklist" by Krishni Naidu <u>http://www.sans.org/score/checklists/RouterChecklist.doc</u>
- <u>http://www.spitzner.net/audit.html</u> Lance Spitzner online white paper
- www.nessus.org
- http://www.insecure.org
- <u>http://www.hping.org/</u>

Cisco systems have a very intuitive website with a wealth of information about their products. They will provide white papers, product information, upgrade procedures, software, technical support, known bugs, and suggested sample configurations. To access some of this information an online account is required. Through my search on the Cisco Website I was unable to discover if a vulnerability/security checklist was available for the Cisco 1721 Router. For an up to date list of security advisories please check here:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod\_security\_advisories\_ list.html

The Center for Internet Security offer methods and tools to test several devices against a benchmark. These benchmarks are very thorough and in the interests of this document CIS offers a benchmark for Cisco routers. The tool provided is the Router Auditing Tool or RAT. This is an automated tool that can be used to determine a routers current security level. The router in this particular audit was tested to match CIS Router Benchmark 1. The benchmark document "Center for Internet Security Benchmark for Cisco IOS – Level 1 and 2 Benchmarks Version 2.0" provides a very detailed audit checklist for Cisco IOS routers.

The Institute for Security and Open Methodologies provide an excellent document "OSSTMM 2.1" Open-Source Security Testing Methodology Manual created by Pete Herzog. This is a very comprehensive manual that can be used as a guideline to conduct a security audit. It has checklists, procedures, and sample reports.

The National Security Agency has excellent reference material for securing Cisco Routers.

The SANS site and its list of top 20 vulnerabilities is valuable tool for security audits. It is also a central point for a vast amount of information in the form of white papers and online seminars.

The course material is the backbone and guideline for preparing this paper.

The Cassandra site is used to look for updated vendor/system vulnerabilities. A logon account is required and you can set up a profile on certain products if you like.

Mr. Yeun's GSNA paper is very helpful to get started with regarding to getting started on an IOS checklist and points of his paper may be adapted to many perimeter scenarios.

Mr. Naidu's paper as stated in Mr.Yeun's GSNA practical is a neutral checklist that can be applied to any perimeter scenario.

The final websites mentioned are examples of tools used to carry out the technical portion of the checklist. Nessus is an industry recognized vulnerability scanner, Nmap is a tool used to map out networks, and Hping is another tool used to run icmp scans on a host.

## 2. Create an Audit Checklist

The following checklist is designed to audit the Cisco 1721 at XYZ Law. This checklist can apply to other similar scenarios. The checklist will correlate with the risks laid out in Section 1.2 in this document. XYZ Law has no Security Policy so the checklist will outline Industry Best Practices and vulnerabilities common to all Routers.

Any penetration tests in this audit require the written permission of XZY Law. It is recommended that the checklist be reviewed with the System Administrator responsible for the Cisco 1721 Router. The local ISP will be contacted to inform them that I will be conducting an audit on one of their customer's router.

The checklist will be divided into two categories:

General – this is a checklist designed to test general deployment of routers.

Cisco Specific – this checklist is based on Cisco published security advisories of the 1700 series routers and their IOS.

#### 2.1 General Checklist

V Yuen 2003
V Yuen 2003
V Yuen 2003
ed by the Auditor
he router
can access the
afe
nd humidity
tem
5

Checklist Item 2	the second se
Reference	Personal Experience
Objective	Determine Process and Ability of Outsourced System Admin
Risk	2. System Administration Section 1.2.1
	Section 1.2.2 5 Hardware/Software upgrades
Test	This test is conducted in the form of an interview with the System
	Administrator

°.S.	<ol> <li>What is your experience with the Cisco IOS Software?</li> <li>Is there proactive management of the router</li> <li>Are configuration changes done remotely or on site</li> <li>Are configuration changes confirmed with XYZ Law</li> <li>Are configuration changes, hardware/software changes tested in a safe environment first before going to Production</li> </ol>
Objective/Subjective	Subjective
Oh a chilict lite or 0	Sx.
Checklist Item 3	
Reference	Personal Experience, OSSTM Manual P.41 ( <b>Note</b> in this manual the purpose of the test it try and get information from trusted employees, I feel that is not necessary here in that just the router is being audited so I've taken the idea and modified the direction determine how the employee can adversely affect the router)
Objective	Determine possible affects employees will have on router Operation
Risk	Section 1.2.1 (3) and (4)
Test	This test will be conducted in the form of a personal interview with XYZ law's Employees
	<ol> <li>How long have you been with the company?</li> <li>What is your position</li> <li>What is your general use of the internet (i.e. downloads, email, chats, etc)</li> <li>Do you know what the router is and what it is used for?</li> <li>What is your general overall feeling about the company?</li> </ol>
Objective/Subjective	Subjective

Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.47/55 Section 8	
	www.cisco.com – 1700 Series Router quick installation guide and	ł
	configuration guides	
	Own experience	
Objective	Verify the router type and Software Version	
Risk	No Risk associated – Information Gathering and confirmation	
Test	<ul> <li>1. Connect the RJ-45 end of the console cable to the CONSC on the back panel of the router,</li> <li>2. Connect the DB-9 end of the console cable to the console called the <i>serial port</i>) on your PC. If this adapter does not f PC console port, you must provide an adapter that fits.</li> <li>3. Open a HyperTerminal Session to the router. Ensure the for settings are set: <ol> <li>connect using com ports usually Com1</li> <li>terminal keys is checked</li> <li>Ctrl-H is checked</li> <li>Emulation is Auto detect</li> <li>Terminal ID is ANSI</li> <li>Port settings are: 9600,databits 8, parity none, stop bits control none</li> </ol> </li> <li>4. Login to the router (note this may be done with the system administrator). To accomplish this: <ol> <li>Hit enter once session starts the following prompt appe</li> <li>Router&gt;</li> <li>You then type enable you will then be prompted for a p enter the password. The following is how it will look on router</li> </ol> </li> </ul>	port (also fit your ollowing s 1, flow ears:

Press RETURN to get started. xxxxx Internet IISP You must agree to the following before using this system Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of xxxxx Inc. and authorized contractors. Only authorized work using company-supplied programs may be done on this system. Use of this system is an agreement to monitoring. **User Access Verification** Password: xxxxxxxxxxx xyzlaw>en Password: xxxxxxxxxxx xyzlaw# Type **show version** this will supply the software and firmware iv. version An example of this layout is: xyzlaw#show version Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) TAC Support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1986-2003 by cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Sat 01-Nov-03 06:24 by ccai

Image text-base: 0x80008120, data-base: 0x81207F5C ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 12.2(7r)XM1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) ROM: C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) xyzlaw uptime is 1 day, 43 minutes System returned to ROM by power-on System image file is "flash:c1700-bk8no3r2sy7-mz.122-15.T9.bin" cisco 1721 (MPC860P) processor (revision 0x100) with 58002K/7534K bytes of memory. Processor board ID FOC07010MUR (2301023196), with hardware revision 0000 MPC860P processor: part number 5, mask 2 Bridging software. X.25 software, Version 3.0.0. 1 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s) 1 FastEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s) 32K bytes of non-volatile configuration memory. 16384K bytes of processor board System flash (Read/Write) Configuration register is 0x2142 xyzlaw# Type show **running- config** this will display the current running ν. configuration on the device. An example of this layout is:

xyzlaw# <b>show running-config</b>
Building configuration
Current configuration : 1481 bytes
Iversion 12.2
service timestamps debug datetime localtime
service timestamps log datetime localtime
service password-encryption
hostname xxxx
logging queue-limit 100
logging buffered 4096 debugging
enable password 7 xxxxxxxxxx
ip subnet-zero
no ip domain lookup
ip audit notify log
ip audit po max-events 100
interface Ethernet0
description Customer LAN Segment
ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.248
shutdown
half-duplex
no cdp enable
interface FastEthernet0
description Connection to ISP
ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.252
shutdown
speed auto
no cdp enable
ip classless
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 xxx.xxx.xxx
no ip http server

As part of the Information Security Reading Room

no ip http secure-server access-list 10 permit xxx.xxx.xxx no cdp run snmp-server location xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx snmp-server contact xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxnmp-server enable traps tty banner motd ^C xxxxx Internet IISP You must agree to the following before using this system Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of xxxxx Inc. and authorized contractors. Only authorized work using company-supplied programs may be done on this system. Use of this system is an agreement to monitoring. line con 0 exec-timeout 0 0 password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx login line aux 0 line vtv 0 4 access-class 10 in exec-timeout 30 0 password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx login no scheduler allocate end xyzlaw# 5. Save information gathered in a text file. Go to the transfer option on top of the session page i. chose "capture text"





	🔊 gsnapractical - Microsoft Word
	Eile Edit View Insert Format Iools Table Window Help Type a question for help - ×
	🗋 😂 🖬 🖨 🔃 🗳 🔍 🖑 🐰 🐘 🕲 🍼 🌣 수 수 수 🍓 📅 🗔 🖼 🖉 🖾 🦿 100% - 오 (?), And
	Final Showing Markup 🔹 Show 🔹 🖗 🚯 🕗 🗧 🏠 🖕 🏠 🛓
	Reprinted The State Stat
	L · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	🗞 Cisco - HyperTerminal
	File Edit View Call Transfer Help
	🗅 🚅 🍘 🌋 💷 Send File
	Rective File      Conture Text      Stop
	Q Send Text File. Parks
	X Unknown (Capture to Printer Resume ame, or unable to find computer address
	×y21aw#
	xyzlaw#_
	Dijective/Subje
	Drew + & AutoShare top capturing
	Page 23 Sec 3 23/29 At 1.2 Ln 1 Col 1 REC TRK EXT OVR English (U.S )
	6. For a full comprehensive view of the router configuration at the
	router prompt type:
	······ Frenche Ales
	Router#show tech-support
	Touler#show tech-support
	This is quite a large file and passwords are left out by default. An
	example of the print out of the results of this are in Appendix C of
	this document.
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 5	
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.47 Section 3
Objective	Utilize Nessus Vulnerability Scanner to determine vulnerabilities from the internet.
Risk	Section 1.2 (1) router may be open to internet scans
Test	Section 12 (1) fourier may be open to internet starts To be performed by the Nessus Port Scanner. This assumes that Nessus is already installed. If it is not please refer to www.nessus.org for installation instructions 1. Start Nessus Server daemon command is nessusd <b>Toto Provide Start Resource Control Scanner Toto Provide Scanner T</b>



	root's Home	<b>V</b> mware	Ness	Nessus Setup	Prefs. Scan options Target selection User	KB Credits		
°S <sub>A</sub>				New session setup —	Nessusd Host : localhost			
					Port : 1241			
					Login : rayw			
					Password : ********			
					Log in			
				Start the scan	Load report	Quit		
	<b>≜</b> ∳(	<u>}</u>	<b></b>		Nessus Setup	[root@localhost:/usr	/local/sbin]	Thu Feb 12 3:27 PM
	4. In the	Target	optic	on apply IP or	IP address range to be	e scanned		

© SANS Institute 2004,

	<ol> <li>Enable all Plugins</li> <li>In the preferences section- nmap options check "syn scan,ping the remote host, identify the remote host, fragment ip packets, and get ident info</li> <li>Bottem left hand corner click "start scan"</li> <li>Run a network sniffer (I use ethereal but tcpdump or windump are other examples). For instructions on how to use any of the sniffers mentioned check the following urls</li> </ol>
	http://www.ethereal.com/ http://www.tcpdump.org/
	<ol><li>Follow the same order and scan the internal IP's to determine if the router will allow traffic to the internal network</li></ol>
	<ul> <li>10. On the private side of the router set up ethereal sniffer to capture any data that may be allowed through (see beginning of section for description of ethereal sniffer)</li> <li>11. On the router use a console connection to determine if the router will log anything also from the router prompt</li> </ul>
	Router#show log
	12. Scan the internal IP's as well in the same manner as mentioned above with the exception do not enable all plugins
Objective/Subjectiv	Objective
е	S-97-

Checklist Item 6	
Reference	Center for Internet Security <u>www.cisecurity.org</u>
Objective	Run Router Auditing Tool (RAT) Benchmark 1 to get a snapshot of the router's overall security
Risk	Section 1.2 (1) router may be open to internet scans



Objective/Subjectiv Objective е

Checklist Item 7	
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.55 Section 6
Objective	Determine if Router is configured to provide Network Address Translation (NAT)
Risk	Section 1.2 (1) router may be open to internet scans
Test	<ul> <li>NAT or Network Address Translator (RFC 1631) is basically the router's ability to translate internal IP addresses to outside public addresses and vice versa. NAT can be used to ensure the inside network is not broadcasted.</li> <li>1.Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4</li> <li>2. router#show ip nat translations</li> </ul>
	or router#show ip nat statistics
	This will show if there are any NAT activity on the router
	3. Ping from inside the network to a host outside and redo the above to determine if the count goes up
	4. router#show run
	This will show if there are any NAT configurations on the router
Objective/Subjective	Objective

As part of the Information Security Reading Room

NS Institute	
	Checklist Item 8
2004,	Reference
	Objective

Test the ACL against the written security policy or against the "Deny All" rule		
configured		
•		
-		

Checklist Item 9	CITY CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR OF TONTON OF TONTON OF TONTON OF
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.55
Objective	Verify the router is egress filtering local network traffic and the outbound capabilities of the router
Risk	Section 1.2.1 3 Internal Use of the network
	Section 1.2.1.4 Disgruntled Employees
	Section 1.2.1.5 lack of Security Policy to control router activites
Test	This test is to determine if any traffic is being filtered from the inside network to the outside network.
	<ol> <li>Using the configuration file obtained in checklist Item 4 and information gathered from Checklist Item 7 determine if there are any access lists on the outgoing public interface.</li> <li>Result – there are no access lists applied to the LAN or WAN ports so as a result there is no filtering from the internal network to the external</li> </ol>

© SANS Institute		
€ 2004,		

O SANS	<ul> <li>network.</li> <li>2. From a PC within the organization conduct the following tests <ul> <li>i. Ping an outside internet address</li> <li>ii. Ping one of the internal PC's address from the test laptop on the internet</li> <li>iii. From an internal PC determine what access is allowed to the public internet</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 10	
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.55
Objective	Verify that the router is performing address spoof detection
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Router is Open to internet scans
Test	Using Hping attempt to spoof a trusted address to the router to determine if the router responds 1. hping2 –a xxx.xxx.xxx (source IP Spoofed) xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx (destination IP)
Objective/Subjective	Objective
	ally a
Checklist Item 11	

Checklist Item 11	4477
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS
	page 1, Page 23 Section 3.1.4
	Section 3.1.22 P.15
	Section 3.1.23 P.15
	Section 3.1.24 P.15
	Own expérience
Objective	Check Local authentication of Username and passwords
Risk	Section 1.2.1.2 System Administration – Personnel that manages and

	configures the router
	Section 1.2.1.5 Lack of Security Policy to control Router Activities
	Section 1.2.1.3 XYZ Law may unknowingly damage the router
Test	<ul> <li>Section 1.2.1.3 X12 Law may unknowingly damage the router</li> <li>1. From the configuration gathered in General Checklist litem 4 determine if there are any user account created on the router and if passwords are assigned. The information to look for is as follows:</li> <li>user-id privilege 15 password 7 (encrypted)</li> <li>enable password and encrypted</li> <li>2. Telnet to the router, to do this from a dos or Unix prompt</li> <li>C:\telnet xxx.xxx.xxx (ip address)</li> <li>3. Try cisco common username and passwords</li> <li>Username : enter as in enter key Password : enter as in enter key</li> <li>Username : cisco</li> <li>Username : cisco</li> </ul>
Objective/Subjective	Objective
Objective/Subjective	

Checklist Item 12	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS

<u>Objective</u> Risk Test	SANS L	Check to see if SNMP is enabled         Section 1.2.2 .1 Router may be Open to Internet Scans         1. Connect to the router as described in Checklist Item 4         2. from the prompt         i. show config         ii. Look for the following:         snmp-server community (password) RW 12         snmp-server community (password) RO 12         snmp-server location (server location)         snmp-server contact (contact information)         snmp-server host
Objective/Subjective		2. Run Objective

Checklist Item 13	C7
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 8
	Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Section 3.1 Starting Page 13
Objective	Check to determine if Telnet is enabled
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans
Test	<ol> <li>From an outside device (internet connected test PC) attempt to telnet to the router.</li> <li>from the prompt (DOS or Unix) c:\telnet xxx.xxx.xxx (destination IP)</li> </ol>

O Sta	<ol> <li>Once connected you will be presented a login prompt</li> <li>If the connection is refused you will get a "connection refused by host" error message</li> </ol>
Objective/Subjective	Objective
Checklist Item 14	
	O enten Fan Internet O exurity Oald Oten dead Denshmady fan Oisse 100
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 8
Objective	Determine if the exec timeout is enabled and actual configured time. This prevents unauthorized users from taking advantage of unused sessions.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans
Test	<ol> <li>Determine exec timeout is configured on the router. Use the configuration obtained from Checklist Item 4 or connect directly to the router as outlined in Checklist Item 4 and type:</li> <li>Show config Result –</li> </ol>
	line con 0 exec-timeout 0 0
	There is no timeout on the direct connection.
	line vty 0 4 access-class 10 in
	exec-timeout 30 0
	On the telnet connection there is an timeout of 30 minutes
----------------------	---
	2. Connect to the router with telnet and conduct no activity, time to see how long the router times you out and compare with configuration information above.
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 15	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 8
Objective	Determine if the AUX port is enabled and if any modems are attached
Risk	Section 1.2.1.3 Disgruntled Employees Section 1.2.2.1 Router open to outside scans
Test	<ol> <li>Physical inspection of the router to determine if there are any modems attached</li> <li>Login to the router as laid out in Checklist Item 4 and perform the following commands from the router prompt         <ol> <li>router#show line aux 0</li> <li>The following should show up</li> <li>router#sho line aux 0</li> <li>Tty Typ Tx/Rx A Modem Roty AccO AccI Uses Noise</li> <li>Overruns Int</li> <li>5 AUX 9600/9600 0 0 0/0 -</li> </ol> </li> <li>Line 5, Location: "", Type: ""         Length: 24 lines, Width: 80 columns         </li> </ol>

36

OSANS,	Baud rate (TX/RX) is 9600/9600, no parity, 2 stopbits, 8 databits Status: Ready Capabilities: none Modem state: Ready Modem hardware state: noCTS noDSR DTR RTS Special Chars: Escape Hold Stop Start Disconnect Activation
	^^x none none
	Timeouts: Idle EXEC Idle Session Modem Answer Session Dispatch
	00:10:00 never none not set
	Idle Session Disconnect Warning
	never
	Login-sequence User Response
	00:00:30
	Autoselect Initial Wait
	not set
	Modem type is unknown.
	Session limit is not set.
	Time since activation: never
	Editing is enabled.
	History is enabled, history size is 20.
	DNS resolution in show commands is enabled
	Full user help is disabled
	Allowed input transports are none.
	Allowed output transports are pad telnet rlogin ssh.
	Preferred transport is telnet.
	No output characters are padded
	No special data dispatching characters
	ii. This is a view of when the aux port has been disabled, refer to
	bold type below this is an indication of a disabled aux port.

Author retains full rights.

SANS	router#sho line aux 0 Tty Typ Tx/Rx A Modem Roty AccO AccI Uses Noise Overruns Int 5 AUX 9600/9600 0 0 0/0 - Line 5, Location: "", Type: "" Length: 24 lines, Width: 80 columns Baud rate (TX/RX) is 9600/9600, no parity, 2 stopbits, 8 databits Status: Ready <b>Capabilities: EXEC Suppressed</b> Modem state: Ready Modem hardware state: noCTS noDSR DTR RTS Special Chars: Escape Hold Stop Start Disconnect Activation ^^x none none Timeouts: Idle EXEC Idle Session Modem Answer Session Dispatch 0:10:00 never none not set Idle Session Disconnect Warning never Login-sequence User Response
	3
	00:00:30
	Autoselect Initial Wait not set
	Modem type is unknown.
	Session limit is not set.
	Time since activation: never
	Editing is enabled.
	History is enabled, history size is 20.
	DNS resolution in show commands is enabled

OSANS,	Full user help is disabled Allowed input transports are none. Allowed output transports are pad telnet rlogin ssh. Preferred transport is telnet. No output characters are padded No special data dispatching characters
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 16	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS
Objective	Determine Configuration of the TTY Lines (passwords and ACLs)
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router May be open to internet scans which may result in
	attempts to breach router defences to infiltrate XYZ Law's internal network
Test	<ul> <li>1. Login into the router as laid out in Checklist Item 4 or view the configuration file. If choosing to login in once connected type the following at the router prompt:         <ul> <li>I. router#show config</li> <li>II. Once the config is shown look for the following:</li> </ul> </li> <li>line vty 0 4 (actual connection line)         <ul> <li>access-class 10 in (access list attached to interface)</li> <li>exec-timeout 30 0 (timeout for unused session 30minutes)</li> <li>password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (password assigned to interface)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	this is near the end of the configuration file
	2. Look at Access List assigned to interface

Objective/Subjective	Router#show access-list (access list number) 3. Once the information is gathered above prove it's worth by doing the following: <ul> <li>attempt to telnet to the router</li> <li>if connect attempt to login</li> <li>on the router do a "show access-list" to see if there are numbers increasing to determine hits on the access list</li> </ul> <li>Objective</li>
Checklist Item 17	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 9 Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 3.1.59/60 Page 20
Objective	Determine if unused Services are enabled HTTP Finger Service CDP BOOTp Config Server TFTP Small TCP Services Small UDP Services
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
Test	<ol> <li>HTTP – Connect to the router as described in Checklist Item 4, once logged in type :</li> <li>Router#show run</li> </ol>

40

ok for the following in the configuration:
o ip http server
this is not in the config HTTP server is enabled this the default setting
r Cisco routers
<ul> <li>Cisco routers</li> <li>ii. From a web browser attempt to connect to the router by putting the IP address in the browser if HTTP is enabled the browser will connect you to the router. If HTTP is disabled then the connection will be refused.</li> <li>iii. And/or inspect results from General Checklist Item 6</li> <li>2. Finger Service – To determine if this service is running login in the router as in Check List Item 4. Perform a "show run" if the finger service is running you will see in the global config</li> <li>Ip finger service</li> <li>If this is not there then finger service is disabled.</li> <li>And/or inspect results from General Checklist Item 6</li> <li>3. CDP – Cisco Discovery Protocol. This protocol is meant for cisco devices to discover each other for troubleshooting purposes. If this</li> </ul>
is not utilized then it should be disabled. There are known denial of service attacks that utilize CDP.
CDP is enabled by default to determine if CDP is enabled login to the router as laid out in Checklist Item 4 and perform the "show run" command. In the global config if you see the following :
no cdp run

<ol> <li>This insures that CDP is disabled. CDP is enabled by default and will have to be manually disabled.</li> </ol>
II. Also in the configuration file on the individual interfaces that are used the following should be there to ensure CDP is disabled
no cdp enable
This ensures CDP is disabled on the interface.
III. and/or inspect results from Checklist Item 6
4. Bootp – There are known DOS attacks utilizing bootp on cisco routers and is enabled by default. Login to the router as laid out in check list Item 4 and type a "show run" at the router prompt. In the Global config if Bootp is disabled you should see the following:
i. no ip bootp server
If this is not there then bootp services are enabled.
ii. Inspect results from General Checklist Item 6
<ol> <li>Config Server – this allows a router to load its startup configuration from remote devices.</li> </ol>
<ol> <li>TFTP Server – enabled by default an access list has to be utilized to restrict TFTP.</li> </ol>
7. tcp-keepalives – Inspect results from General Checklist Item 6

	<ol> <li>8. Small TCP Service – Inspect results from General Checklist item 6</li> <li>9. Small UDP Service – Inspect results from General Checklist Item 6</li> </ol>
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 18	<u></u>
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS
	Benchmark for Cisco IOS page 10
	Section 3.1.69 Page 22
Objective	Determine if Directed Broadcast is enabled
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
	Router Interfaces that allow directed broadcasts can be open to "smurf"
	attacks
Test	1. Login to the router as describe in Checklist Item 4.
	2. Do the "show run" command from the router prompt
	3. Inspect each interface for the following:
	ip directed-broadcast
	If this is there directed-broadcast is enabled if not it is disabled
	4. Inpect Results of RAT from General Checklist Item 6
	Pass – Directed Broadcast disabled
	Fail – Directed Broadcast enabled
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 19	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS
Objective	Determine if IP source routing enabled
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router is open to internet scans
	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
Test	1. Run Router Auditing Tool and determine from the results
	Pass – IP Source Routing is disabled

	Fail - IP Source Routing in enabled
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 20	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 and 2 Benchmarks page 24
Objective	Determine IP Proxy Arp Enabled Proxy Arp breaks the LAN security perimeter effectively extending a LAN at layer 2 across multiple segments
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router Open to internet Scans Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
Test	<ol> <li>Login to the router as laid out in General Checklist Item 4</li> <li>Do a "show run" to bring up the configuration</li> <li>inspect the interfaces and determine if this is included</li> <li>no ip proxy-arp</li> <li>Proxy arp is enabled by default if this line is not there then proxy arp is enabled</li> </ol>
Objective/Subjective	Objective

#### 2.2 Cisco Specific Checklist

This checklist is specific to security warnings released by Cisco. It is based on information provided on Cisco's Website located at:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod\_security\_advisories\_list.html

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Cisco Security Advisory Check Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software Multiple SNMP Community String Vulnerabilities The following is a description of the impact from Cisco's website
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13b5.shtml#softwar
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	Knowledge of read-only community strings allows read access to information stored on an affected device, leading to a failure of confidentiality. Knowledge of read-write community strings allows remote configuration of affected devices without authorization, possibly without the awareness of the administrators of the device and resulting in a failure of integrity and a possible failure of availability.
	These vulnerabilities could be exploited separately or in combination to gain access to or modify the configuration and operation of any affected devices without authorization. Customers are urged to upgrade affected systems to fixed releases of software, or to apply measures to protect such system against unauthorized use by restricting access to SNMP services until such time as the devices can be upgraded.
	<ul> <li>IOS software Major Release version 12.0 and IOS releases based on 11.x or earlier are not affected by the vulnerabilities described in this notice. All other releases of 12.0, such as 12.0DA, 12.0S or 12.0T, may be affected.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>CSCdr59314 is only present in certain 12.1(3) releases and does not affect any other IOS releases.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Fixes for all six defects have been integrated into 12.2 prior to its initial availability, and therefore all releases based on 12.2 and all later versions are not vulnerable to the defects</li> </ul>

45

	described in this advisory.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans and weaknesses exploited Section 1.2.2.5 Hardware/Software upgrades – if the version of code is deficient then a possible upgrade may be required.
Test	Determine if software version of router is affected 1. Login to the router as described in Checklist Item 4 and at the router prompt type Router#show version Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), <b>Version 12.2(15)T9</b> , RELEASE
	SOFTWARE (fc2) TAC Support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1986-2003 by cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Sat 01-Nov-03 06:24 by ccai Image text-base: 0x80008120, data-base: 0x81207F5C
	ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 12.2(7r)XM1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) ROM: C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2)
	xyzlaw uptime is 2 days, 19 hours, 47 minutes System returned to ROM by power-on System image file is "flash:c1700-bk8no3r2sy7-mz.122-15.T9.bin"
	This product contains cryptographic features and is subject to United States and local country laws governing import, export, transfer and use. Delivery of Cisco cryptographic products does not imply

© SANS	
Institute	
2004,	

	third-party authority to import, export, distribute or use encryption.
	Importers, exporters, distributors and users are responsible for
	compliance with U.S. and local country laws. By using this product you
	agree to comply with applicable laws and regulations. If you are unable
	Cto comply with U.S. and local laws, return this product immediately.
	A summary of U.S. laws governing Cisco cryptographic products may be found at:
	http://www.cisco.com/wwl/export/crypto/tool/stqrg.html
	If you require further assistance please contact us by sending email to
	export@cisco.com.
	cisco 1721 (MPC860P) processor (revision 0x100) with 58002K/7534K bytes of memory.
	Processor board ID FOC07010MUR (2301023196), with hardware revision 0000
	MPC860P processor: part number 5, mask 2
	Bridging software.
	X.25 software, Version 3.0.0.
	1 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
	1 FastEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
	32K bytes of non-volatile configuration memory.
	16384K bytes of processor board System flash (Read/Write)
	Configuration register is 0x142
	2. From this information determine the IOS version.
Objective/Subjective	Objective
	•

Checklist Item 2	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html

Objective	Cisco Security Advisory Check
	Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS ARP Table Overwrite Vulnerability
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b113c.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	It is possible to send an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packet on a local broadcast interface (for example, Ethernet, cable, Token Ring, FDDI) which could cause a router or switch running specific versions of Cisco IOS® Software Release to stop sending and receiving ARP packets on the local router interface. This will in a short time cause the router and local hosts to be unable to send packets to each other. ARP packets received by the router for the router's own interface address but a different Media Access Control (MAC) address will overwrite the router's MAC address in the ARP table with the one from the received ARP packet. This was demonstrated to attendees of the Black Hat conference and should be considered to be public knowledge. This attack is only successful against devices on the segment local to the attacker or attacking host.
	<b>Impact</b> This issue can cause a Cisco Router to be vulnerable to a Denial-of-Service attack, once the ARP table entries time out. This defect does not result in a failure of confidentiality of information stored on the unit, nor does this defect allow hostile code to be loaded onto a Cisco device. This defect may cause a Denial-of-Service on the management functions of a Cisco Layer 2 Switch, but does not affect traffic through the device
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attack
Test	determine if the router is running an affected IOS,
	<ol> <li>log in to the device as laid out in checklist item 4</li> </ol>

	<ol> <li>And issue the command show version command at the router prompt. Inspect the configuration for the following:</li> </ol>
	Internetwork Operating System Software" or "IOS (tm
	3) If this found compare the software version number with the table on this website from Cisco
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b113c.shtml
	This will provide upgrade information if required
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 3	2 U 7 1
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the router is affected by the following advisory
	Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Syslog Crash
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13a7.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	Certain versions of Cisco IOS software may crash or hang when they receive invalid user datagram protocol (UDP) packets sent to their "syslog" ports (port 514). At least one commonly-used Internet scanning tool generates packets which can cause such crashes and hangs. This fact has been announced on public Internet mailing lists which are widely read both by security professionals and by security "crackers", and should be considered public

information.
This vulnerability affects devices running Cisco IOS software version 11.3AA, version 11.3DB, or any 12.0-based version (including 12.0 mainline, 12.0S, 12.0T, and any other regular released version whose number starts with "12.0"). The vulnerability has been corrected in certain special releases, and will be corrected in maintenance and interim releases which will be issued in the future; see the section on "Software Versions and Fixes" for details on which versions are affected, and on which versions are, or will be, fixed. Cisco intends to provide fixes for all affected IOS variants.
Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attack
1. Login to the router as described in Checklist Item 4
2. Do a "show version" as described in the previous Cisco Checklist
3. Go to table on the above webpage at Cisco to determine if the current IOS is affected.
Objective

Checklist Item 4	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the router is affected by the following Security Advisory
	Cisco Security Notice: MS SQL Worm Mitigation Recommendations
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a0080133399.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective Ray Welshman 19 February 2004 Г

Author retains full rights.

	Cisco customers are currently experiencing attacks due to a new worm that has hit the Internet. The signature of this worm appears as high volumes of UDP traffic to port 1434. Affected customers have been experiencing high volumes of traffic from both internal and external systems. Symptoms on Cisco devices include, but are not limited to high CPU and traffic drops on the input interfaces.
	The worm has been referenced by several names, including "Slammer", "Sapphire" as well as "MS SQL worm".
	Cisco has a companion document detailing Cisco products which are affected directly by this worm:
	http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20030126-ms02-061.shtml
	The current recommended fix for IOS is to apply an ACL to block traffic on port 1443
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
Test	1. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4.
	2. At the prompt do a "show run"
	3. Inspect the configuration and determine if the following access list has been applied
	access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 1434 access-list 115 permit ip any any
	4. Determine if the access list has been applied to the public interface
	int <interface> ip access-group 115 in</interface>

	ip access-group 115 out	
Objective/Subjective	Objective	

Checklist Item 5	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the router is affected by the following Security Advisory Cisco IOS HTTP Server Query Vulnerability
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13b6.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	defect in multiple releases of Cisco IOS software will cause a Cisco router or switch to halt and reload if the IOS HTTP service is enabled, browsing to "http://router-ip/anytext?/" is attempted, and the enable password is supplied when requested. This defect can be exploited to produce a denial of service (DoS) attack.
	The vulnerability, identified as Cisco bug ID <b>CSCdr91706</b> , affects virtually all mainstream Cisco routers and switches running Cisco IOS software releases 12.0 through 12.1, inclusive. This is <b>not</b> the same defect as <b>CSCdr36952</b> .
	The vulnerability has been corrected and Cisco is making fixed releases available for free to replace all affected IOS releases. Customers are urged to upgrade to releases that are not vulnerable to this defect as shown in detail <u>below</u> .

As part of the Information Security Reading Room

S Institut		
nstitute 2004,		This vulnerabili
	Risk	Section 1.2.2.2
	Test	1. Login to
		2. at the ro

	This vulnerability can only be exploited if the enable password is known or not set.
Risk Test	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks           1. Login to the router as laid out in General Checklist Item 4
	<ol> <li>at the router prompt do a "show version"</li> <li>Inspect the information for the IOS version</li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Go to the table on the cisco website (Link above) and determine if the current version of IOS is affected</li> </ol>
Objective/Subjective	Objective

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Determine if the router is affected by the following Security Advisory
Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Remote Router Crash
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b139d.shtml
The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
An error in Cisco IOS software makes it possible for untrusted, unauthenticated users who can
gain access to the login prompt of a router or other Cisco IOS device, via any means, to cause that device to crash and reload.
This applies only to devices running classic Cisco IOS software, including most, but not all, Cisco router products. The easiest way to determine whether your device is running classic Cisco IOS software is to use
-

	the show version command to determine who is affected.
	If attackers know the details of the Cisco IOS software error they will be able to cause the router to crash and reload <i>without having to log in to the router</i> . Because this problem involves damage to an internal data struture, it is possible that other, more subtle or targeted effects on system operation could also be induced by proper exploitation. Such exploitation, if it is possible at all, would require significant engineering skill and a thorough knowledge of the internal operation of Cisco IOS software, including Cisco trade secret information Affected IOS Versions • 11.3(1), 11.3(1)ED, 11.3(1)T • 11.2(10), 11.2(9)P, 11.2(9)XA, 11.2(10)BC, 11.2(8)SA3 • 11.1(15)CA, 11.1(16), 11.1(16)IA, 11.1(16)AA, 11.1(17)CC, 11.1(17)CT
	• 11.0(20.3)
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service
Test	1. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4
	2. At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.
	Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1
	3. Determine if the IOS version matches with the list mentioned above.

As part of the Information Security Reading Room

© SANS Institute 2004		
2002	Objective/Subjective	Objective
÷+,		

Checklist Item 7	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the Router is vulnerable to the following Cisco Advisory
	Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software Input Access List Leakage with NAT
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13a8.shtm
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	A group of related software bugs (bug IDs given under " <u>Software Versions and Fixes</u> ") create an undesired interaction between network address translation (NAT) and input access list processing in certain Cisco routers running 12.0-based versions of Cisco IOS software (including 12.0, 12.0S, and 12.0T, in all versions up to, but not including, 12.0(4), 12(4)S, and 12.0(4)T, as well as other 12.0 releases). Non-12.0 releases are not affected.
	This may cause input access list filters to "leak" packets in certain NAT configurations, creating a security exposure. Configurations without NAT are not affected.
	The failure does not happen at all times, and is less likely under laboratory conditions than in installed networks. This may cause administrators to believe that filtering is working when it is not.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service
Test	1. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4
	2. At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current

As
part of
<u>of</u>
the
Information Security
Security
Reading Roor
Room

	router.
	3. Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1
	IOS version is 12.2(15)T9
	<ol> <li>Determine if the IOS version matches those found on the table on the Cisco Website mentioned above.</li> </ol>
	LDIST
Objective/Subjective	Objective
Checklist Item 8	O <sub>T</sub>
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the Router is vulnerable to the following Cisco Advisory
	Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Interface Blocked by IPv4 Packets
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00801a34c2.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	routers and switches running Cisco IOS <sup>®</sup> software and configured to process Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) packets are vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Multiple IPv4 packets with specific protocol fields sent directly to the device may cause the input interface to stop processing traffic once the input queue is full. Traffic passing through the device cannot block the input queue. No authentication is required to process the inbound packet. Processing of IPv4 packets is enabled by default. Devices running

practices for situations where software upgrades are not currently feasible.

only IP version 6 (IPv6) are not affected. Multiple valid workarounds are available in the form of best

	If the software version is not on the router the current ACL workaround should be applied
	access-list 101 permit tcp any any access-list 101 permit udp any any access-list 101 deny 53 any any access-list 101 deny 55 any any access-list 101 deny 77 any any access-list 101 deny 103 any any ! insert any other previously applied ACL entries here ! you must permit other protocols through to allow normal ! traffic previously defined permit lists will work ! or you may use the permit ip any any shown here access-list 101 permit ip any any
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service
Test	<ol> <li>Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4</li> <li>At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.</li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1</li> <li>Determine if the IOS version matches those found on the table on the Cisco Website mentioned above.</li> <li>If the IOS version does not match do a "show run" and determine if the above mentioned access list is configured and applied to the public interface.</li> </ol>

© SANS	
S Institute 2004	Obj
<u>4</u>	

Objective/Subjective	Objective
----------------------	-----------

Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html	
Objective	Determine if the Router is vulnerable to the following Cisco Advisory	
	Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Command History Release at Login Prompt	
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13aa.shtm	
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website	
	An error in Cisco IOS® software makes it possible for untrusted, unauthenticated users who can gain access to the login prompt of a router or other Cisco IOS device, via any means, to obtain fragments of text entered by prior interactive users of the device. This text may contain sensitive information, possibly including passwords. This vulnerability exposes only text entered at prompts issued by the IOS device itself; the contents of data packets forwarded by IOS devices are not exposed, nor are data entered as part of outgoing interactive connections, such as TELNET connections, from the IOS device to other network nodes.	
	<u> </u>	
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans	
Test	1. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4	
	<ol><li>At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.</li></ol>	
	3. Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1	
	4. Determine if the IOS version matches those found on the table on the Cisco Website	

	mentioned above.
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 10	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the Router is vulnerable to the following Cisco Advisory
	Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software TCP Initial Sequence Number Randomization Improvements
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b1396.shtml
	Cisco IOS® Software contains a flaw that permits the successful prediction of TCP Initial Sequence Numbers.
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	This vulnerability is present in all released versions of Cisco IOS software running on Cisco routers and switches. It only affects the security of TCP connections that originate or terminate on the affected Cisco device itself; it does not apply to TCP traffic forwarded through the affected device in transit between two other hosts.
	To remove the vulnerability, Cisco is offering free software upgrades for all affected platforms. The defect is described in DDTS record CSCds04747.
	Workarounds are available that limit or deny successful exploitation of the vulnerability by filtering traffic containing forged IP source addresses at the perimeter of a network or directly on individual

	devices.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans
Test	<ol> <li>Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4</li> <li>At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.</li> <li>Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1</li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Determine if the IOS version matches those found on the table on the Cisco Website mentioned above.</li> </ol>
Objective/Subjective	Objective
	retains full rights

# 3. Conduct the Audit

This audit was conducted with the written permission of XYZ Law. Coordination was completed with the system admin and the local ISP. External penetration testing was accomplished with a Toshiba Satellite Pro Laptop and a Compag EVO N600C. Specifications of the laptops and tools used are as follows:

Toshiba Satellite Pro

- Linux Redhat 9.0
- Pentium III 733
- 20 Gigabit Hard Drive
- 512 Megs Ram
- Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 2.0.10
- Hping 2

Compag EVO N600c

- Windows XP
- Pentium III 1.2
- 20 Gig Hard Drive
- 512 Megs Ram
- Ethereal Network Analyzer 3.13.0
- CRT 3.0 (used to connect to the router)

The audit is divided as before into two sections:

General – this is a common checklist Cisco Specific – Based on latest Cisco Security advisories

The audit of the router can be accomplished two ways and each will be explored in this document. I have decided to complete both methods to ensure that false positives did not provide incorrect information for the audit. The two methods are:

Manual Checks – This is accomplished by manually connecting to the router and logging in. Cisco "show" commands are used to determine the outcome of the checklist.

Automatic Checks – This is accomplished by automatic tools such as Nessus. Hping2, and CIS's Router Audit Tool (RAT)

#### 3.1 Audit – General Checklist

OSSTMM 2.1 Manual Page 87-92 Personal Experience,
Personal Experience.
,
Physical Security
Physical Location Section 1.2.1
This is test is in the form of an office inspection conducted by the Auditor with the permission of XYZ Law
<ol> <li>Is the router locked in a secure area:         Answer – Yes, the router is locked in a wiring closet within the confines of XYZ Law Office. The router is also securely tethered with the cable mechanism supplied by Cisco.         Is the access controlled to the location of the router:         Answer – Yes, all access to XYZ Law Office is controlled by the Administrative Assistant. The office is locked after hours and a security guard is employed to monitor the building.         Is there an authorized list of persons who can access the router?         Answer – Yes, although there is not a formal list the administrative assistant controls all access to the wiring closet and she controls the key.         In the location of the router does it meet environmental conditions i.e. temperature and humidity?         Answer – Yes, the room temperature is controlled and the wiring closet does not reach high temperatures.         Does the area have an intrusion alarm system?         Answer – Yes, as mentioned there is also a security guard employed to monitor the building.         Answer – Yes, as mentioned there is also a security guard         Example to monitor the building.         Answer – Yes, as mentioned there is also a security guard         Example to monitor the building.         Example to monito</li></ol>

	Result – the router is secured sufficiently
Objective/Subjective	Subjective

Checklist Item 2	
Reference	Personal Experience
Objective	Determine Process and Ability of Outsourced System Admin
Risk	2. System Administration Section 1.2.1 Section 1.2.2 5 Hardware/Software upgrades
Test	This test is conducted in the form of an interview with the System Administrator         1. What is your experience with the Cisco IOS Software?         Answer – 3 years configuring routers and providing support         2. Is there proactive management of the router         Answer – No         3. Are configuration changes done remotely or on site         Answer - Both         4. Are configuration changes confirmed with XYZ Law         Answer – No, XYZ is just informed of the change with little detail         5. Are configuration changes, hardware/software changes tested in a safe environment first before going to Production         Answer – Yes it is completed by the Engineering department and passed on to support.         Result – the support and knowledge of the sys admin is up to the task of supporting this router for XYZ Law.
Objective/Subjective	Subjective

Checklist Item 3	
Reference	Personal Experience, OSSTM Manual P.41 ( <b>Note</b> in this manual the purpose of the test it try and get information from trusted employees, I feel that is not necessary here in that just the router is being audited so I've taken the idea and modified the direction determine how the employee can adversely affect the router)
Objective	Determine possible affects employees will have on router Operation
Risk	Section 1.2.1 (3) and (4)
Test	This test will be conducted in the form of a personal interview with XYZ law's Employees
	First Employee Interview - Administrative Assistant
	1. How long have you been with the company?
	Answer – Since the firm started 10 years
	2. What is your position
	Answer – Administrative Assistant and book keeper
	<ol> <li>What is your general use of the internet (i.e. downloads, email, chats, etc)</li> </ol>
	Answer – Just email and general surfing of sites for information such as world news and such
	4. Do you know what the router is and what it is used for?
	Answer – Not really just that its used for the internet
	5. What is your general overall feeling about the company?
	Answer – Generally overall very good
	Note: The Lawyers of the firm were founding members and declined the offer for an interview
	Result – the members and employees have no ill will towards XYZ Law and

	wish the best for the firm.
Objective/Subjective	Subjective

Checklist Item 4	
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.47/55 Section 8 <u>www.cisco.com</u> – 1700 Series Router quick installation guide and configuration guides
Objective	Verify the router type and Software Version
Risk	No Risk associated – Information Gathering and confirmation
Test	<ol> <li>Connect the RJ-45 end of the console cable to the CONSOLE port on the back panel of the router, Completed</li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Connect the DB-9 end of the console cable to the console port (also called the <i>serial port</i>) on your PC. If this adapter does not fit your PC console port, you must provide an adapter that fits.</li> <li>Completed</li> </ol>
	<ul> <li>3. Open a HyperTerminal Session to the router. Ensure the following settings are set:</li> <li>vii. connect using com ports usually Com1</li> <li>viii. terminal keys is checked</li> <li>ix. Ctrl-H is checked</li> <li>x. Emulation is Auto detect</li> <li>xi. Terminal ID is ANSI</li> <li>xii. Port settings are: 9600,databits 8, parity none, stop bits 1, flow control none</li> <li>Completed</li> </ul>

65

As part of the Information Security Reading Room

O SANO	<ul> <li>4. Login to the router (note this may be done with the system administrator). To accomplish this:</li> <li>vi. Hit enter once session starts the following prompt appears:</li> <li>vii. xyzlaw</li> <li>viii. You then type enable you will then be prompted for a password, enter the password. The following is how it will look on a Cisco router</li> </ul>
	Press RETURN to get started.
	CILUT
	xxxxx Internet IISP You must agree to the following before using this system
	Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of xxxxx Inc. and authorized contractors. Only authorized work using company-supplied programs may be done on this system.Use of this system is an agreement to monitoring.
	User Access Verification
	Password: xxxxxxxxxx xyzlaw>en Password: xxxxxxxxxx xyzlaw#
	ix. Type <b>show version</b> this will supply the software and firmware version
	An example of this layout is:

xyzlaw#show version xyzlaw#sho version **Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software** IOS (tm) C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, RELEASE SOFT WARE (fc2) TAC Support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1986-2003 by cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Sat 01-Nov-03 06:24 by ccai Image text-base: 0x80008120, data-base: 0x81207F5C ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 12.2(7r)XM1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) ROM: C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, **RELEASE SOFTWARE** (fc2) xyzlaw uptime is 6 minutes System returned to ROM by power-on System image file is "flash:c1700-bk8no3r2sy7-mz.122-15.T9.bin" This product contains cryptographic features and is subject to United States and local country laws governing import, export, transfer and use. Delivery of Cisco cryptographic products does not imply third-party authority to import, export, distribute or use encryption. Importers, exporters, distributors and users are responsible for compliance with U.S. and local country laws. By using this product vou

	agree to comply with applicable laws and regulations. If you are unable to comply with U.S. and local laws, return this product immediately.
Ô	A summary of U.S. laws governing Cisco cryptographic products may be found at:
S.A.	http://www.cisco.com/wwl/export/crypto/tool/stqrg.html
S L	If you require further assistance please contact us by sending email to export@cisco.com.
	cisco 1721 (MPC860P) processor (revision 0x100) with 58002K/7534K bytes of memor
	y. Processor board ID FOC07010MUR (2301023196), with hardware revision 0000
	MPC860P processor: part number 5, mask 2
	Bridging software. X.25 software, Version 3.0.0.
	1 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
	1 FastEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
	32K bytes of non-volatile configuration memory. 16384K bytes of processor board System flash (Read/Write)
	rooutin bytes of processor board bystem hash (Read/Write)
	Configuration register is 0x142
	xyzlaw#
	NOTE: This router is running cryptographic IOS
	x. Type show running- config this will display the current running configuration on the device.

	An example of this layout is: xyzlaw# <b>show running-config</b>
OS ANG	xyzlaw#show running-config
	Building configuration
	Current configuration : 1395 bytes ! version 12.2
	service timestamps debug datetime localtime service timestamps log datetime localtime
	service password-encryption ! hostname xyzlaw
	logging queue-limit 100
	logging buffered 4096 debugging enable password 7 14141B180F0B
	! ip subnet-zero
	i I no ip domain lookup
	! ip audit notify log
	ip audit po max-events 100 ! !

interface Ethernet0 description Customer LAN Segment ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.248 half-duplex no cdp enable interface FastEthernet0 description Connection to ISP ip address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.252 speed auto no cdp enable ip classless ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 xxx.xxx.xxx no ip http server no ip http secure-server access-list 10 permit xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx L snmp-server location xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx snmp-server contact xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx snmp-server enable traps tty banner motd ^C xxxxx Internet IISP




As part of the Information Security Reading Room

My Documents     Rest     Path     Path     Pathwork     Netscape     PowerDVD     Internet       My Documents     NBmet     NetMeeting     My Computer     My Network     Netscape     Recycle Bin     PowerDVD     Internet       Microsoft     Cisco     cisco2     RealPlayer     Sam Spade     Sam Spade     Sam Spade     Sam Spade	
Book       Lit       Expose         Image: Construction of the second of the s	
<ul> <li>iii. perform the above mentioned show commands</li> <li>Completed</li> <li>iv. Go to transfer again, choose capture text and then choor "stop" at the dropdown menu.</li> <li>Completed</li> </ul>	)SE



	this document.
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Reference		OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.47 Section 3
Objective	S.	Utilize Nessus Vulnerability Scanner to determine vulnerabilities from the internet.
Risk		Section 1.2 (1) router may be open to internet scans
Test		<ul> <li>To be performed by the Nessus Port Scanner. This assumes that Nessus is already installed. If it is not please refer to www.nessus.org for installation instructions</li> <li>1. Start Nessus Server daemon command is nessusd</li> <li>2. Start the nessus client software command is nessus or just click nessus icon on the gnome or KDE desktop</li> <li>3. In the Target option apply IP or IP address range to be scanned</li> <li>4. In the preferences section- nmap options check syn</li> <li>5. Enable all Plugins</li> <li>6. In the preferences section- nmap options check "syn scan,ping the remote host,identify the remote host, fragment ip packets, and get ident info</li> <li>7. Bottem left hand corner click "start scan"</li> <li>8. run a network sniffer (I use ethereal but tcpdump or windump are other examples). For instructions on how to use any of the sniffers mentioned check the following urls</li> <li><u>http://www.ethereal.com/</u></li> <li><u>http://www.tcpdump.org/</u></li> </ul>



*Mar 3 19:04:17: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
*Mar 3 19:07:18: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 19:07:18: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 19:15:44: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
*Mar 3 19:16:14: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by console
*Mar 3 19:17:56: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 19:17:56: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 19:19:31: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 19:19:34: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 19:43:34: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 19:43:34: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 19:44:46: %CRYPTO-6-IKMP_UNK_EXCHANGE: IKE peer at
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx sent a message with unknown exchange 1
*Mar 3 20:54:20: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 20:54:20: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 20:54:24: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 20:54:24: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 20:56:00: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

*Mar 3 20:56:03: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 21:20:05: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 21:20:05: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 3 21:21:18: %CRYPTO-6-IKMP_UNK_EXCHANGE: IKE peer at
xxx.xxx.xxx sent a message with unknown exchange 1
*Mar 4 04:38:56: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 04:38:56: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 04:39:02: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 04:39:02: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 04:39:09: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 04:39:09: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 04:40:43: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 04:40:46: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 05:04:45: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 05:04:45: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 05:08:25: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
*Mar 4 05:08:25: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to

	RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
	*Mar 4 05:43:56: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
	RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
	*Mar 4 05:43:56: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
	•
	RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
	*Mar 4 05:45:31: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
	RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
	*Mar 4 05:45:34: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
	RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
	*Mar 4 06:09:37: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
	-
	RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx
	*Mar 4 06:09:37: %RCMD-4-RSHPORTATTEMPT: Attempted to connect to
	RSHELL from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
	*Mar 4 06:10:53: %CRYPTO-6-IKMP_UNK_EXCHANGE: IKE peer at
	xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx sent a message with unknown exchange 1
	Scan the internal IP's as well in the same manner as mentioned
	above with the exception do not enable all plugins
	* Cr
	Result Nessus was able to detect PC's behind the router and
	determine OS.
	line in the second s
	Result telnet and icmp ports were open
	Nessus was able to detect type of router and version of IOS
	For full report see appendix A of the final report
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 6	
Reference	Center for Internet Security <u>www.cisecurity.org</u>
Objective	Run Router Auditing Tool (RAT) Benchmark 1 to get a snapshot of the router's overall security

Risk	Section 1.2 (1) router may be open to internet scans
Test	1. Assumption is RAT has been downloaded and installed, if not refer to the
	www.cisecurity.org for information in doing so.
	<ol><li>Save the router configuration as laid out in General Checklist Item 4</li></ol>
	3. Copy the file to the RAT directory default for a Windows install is c:\cis\rat\bin
	4. run RAT – to do so simply run the rat.exe against the text file
	rat xyzlaw.txt
	My Documents NBnet NetMeeting My Computer My Network Netscape Recycle Bin PowerDVD Internet Places Communicator Explorer
	i 🌮 🏀 🎭 🌮 🚓 🍇 🌜
	Microsoft Cisco cisco2 RealPlayer Sam Spade WS_FTP Pro Baseli 1.14 Explorer
	C:W/INDOWS\System32\cmd.exe 02/12/2004 05:39 PM 178,784 rules.html 09/04/2003 08:52 PM 569,344 snarf.exe 02/21/2/2004 10:10 AM 11,608 xy2law.txt
	17 File(s> 3.116,851 bytes 2 Dir(s> 5.509.264.48 bytes free
	C:\CIS\RAI\bin>rat xyzlaw.txt auditing xyzlaw.txt Pars ing: /C:\CIS\RMI/tcc/configs/cisco-ios/common.conf/ Pars ing: /C:\CIS\RMI/tcc/configs/cisco-ios/cis-level-1.conf/ Pars ing: /C:\CIS\RMI/tcc/configs/cisco-ios/cis-level-2.conf/
	Farsing: /C:\CIS\RMI/etc/configs/cisco-ios/common.conf/         Parsing: /C:\CIS\RMI/etc/configs/cisco-ios/cis-level-1.conf/         SmartFlow         Checking: xyzlaw.txt         Checking: xyzlaw.txt         Checking: xyzlaw.txt
	SmartFlow       Parsing: /C:\Cls\RhT/stc/configs/cisco-ias/cis-level-2.conf/         SmartFlow       Checking: xyzlaw.txt         done checking: xyzlaw.txt       done checking: xyzlaw.txt         ASE2000 User       ncat_peport: writing xyzlaw.txt.ncat_peport.txt.         ncat_peport: writing xyzlaw.txt.ncat_peport.txt.       ncat_peport: writing all.ncst_fix.txt.         ncat_peport: writing all.ncst_fix.txt.       ncat_peport: writing all.ncst_fix.txt.         ncat_peport: writing all.ncst_fix.txt.       ncat_peport: writing all.ncst_fix.txt.         ncat_peport: writing all.ncst_fix.txt.       ncat_peport: txt.         ncat_peport: writing all.ncst_fix.txt.       ncat_peport.txt.         ncat_peport: writing all.ncst_fix.txt.       ncat_peport.txt.
	ASE2000 User ncat_report: writing xyzlaw.txt.ncat_fix.txt. Guide 2.2 ncat_report: writing xyzlaw.txt.ncat_report.txt.
	ncat_report: writing all.ncat_report.txt. ncat_report: writing all.ncat_report.txt. ncat_report: writing all.ncat_report.txt.
	Allant VPN Client Client C:\CIS\RAT\bin>
	CRT 3.0
	TalkShow     Palm Desktop     Chapura     Acrobat     Sybex Virtual     QuickTime       Client     Settings     Reader 4.0     Lab     Plaver
	Client Settings Reader 4.0 Lab Player

	Result – Router came back as a fail with a score of 14 out of 40. To see the output see appendix in final report section 3
Objective/Subjectiv	Objective
e	

Checklist Item 7	
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.55 Section 6
Objective	Determine if Router is configured to provide Network Address Translation (NAT)
Risk	Section 1.2 (1) router may be open to internet scans
Test	<ul> <li>NAT or Network Address Translator (RFC 1631) is basically the router's ability to translate internal IP addresses to outside public addresses and vice versa. NAT can be used to ensure the inside network is not broadcasted.</li> <li>1.Login to the router as described in Checklist Item 5.4</li> <li>2. xyzlaw#show ip nat trans</li> <li>xyzlaw#</li> <li>Ye viewed the config copy from checklist item 4 and also determined there is no NAT configured on this router</li> </ul>
	Result – There is no NAT configured on this router and all IP's are

	publicly routed. This potentially opens the internal network of XYZ Law open.
Objective/Subjective	Objective
Checklist Item 8	
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.55, Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS
Objective	Test the ACL against the written security policy or against the "Deny All" rule
Risk	Section 1.2.1 Company Practices
	Section 1.2.2.1 Router May be Open to internet Scans
	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attack
Test	1. Login into the router as described in Checklist Item 4 xyzlaw#show access-list xyzlaw#sho access-list Standard IP access list 10 10 permit xxx.xxx.xxx Result – the only IP that has access to this router is stated above. The implicit deny rule is enforced automatically in a Cisco ACL.
	<ol> <li>Review company security policy and determine if the configured router ACL is enforcing the security policy</li> <li>XYZ Law has no current security policy</li> </ol>
	3. Determine which interface the Access List is applied

	line vty 0 4 access-class 10 in Result - There are no other access lists and none are applied to any other interface
Objective/Subjective	Objective
Checklist Item 9	
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.55
Objective	Verify the router is egress filtering local network traffic and the outbound capabilities of the router
Risk	Section 1.2.1 3 Internal Use of the network Section 1.2.1.4 Disgruntled Employees Section 1.2.1.5 lack of Security Policy to control router activites
Test	This test is to determine if any traffic is being filtered from the inside network to the outside network.
	<ol> <li>Using the configuration file obtained in checklist Item 4 and information gathered from Checklist Item 7 determine if there are any access lists on the outgoing public interface.</li> </ol>
	Result – there are no access lists applied to the LAN or WAN ports so as a result there is no filtering from the internal network to the external network.
	2. From a PC within the organization conduct the following tests
	Ping an outside internet address
	Result – was successful in pinging the router gateway and the

	next hop router on the internet.
	Ping one of the internal PC's address from the test laptop on the internet
SANS	Result – this was successful from a device on the internet (in this case my Toshiba laptop I was able to ping the public IP's assigned to the internal PC's. This proves that the internal PC's will respond to requests and the router is not filtering outbound
	From an internal PC determine what access is allowed to the public internet
	Result – The users from XYZ has full access to all services on the internet, POP Mail, IRC/MSN chats rooms, ftp, HTML, etc.
Objective/Subjective	Objective
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Checklist Item 10	
Reference	OSSTMM 2.1 Manual P.55
Objective	Verify that the router is performing address spoof detection
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans
	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
Test	<ol> <li>From a PC on the internet use Hping to spoof the IP</li> <li>Run a sniffer to determine if the host responds to the pings</li> </ol>
	Result – the router is open to normal pings and the ethereal sniffer captured this Hping2 was used with the –a option and as a result the router did not detect that the ip was being spoofed

	First ping with no spoofing
	root@localhost root]# ping xxx.xxx.xxx
C a	PING xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx (xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx) 56(84) bytes of data.
S	64 bytes from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=1.09 ms
	64 bytes from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: icmp_seq=2 ttl=255 time=0.793 ms
	64 bytes from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: icmp_seq=3 ttl=255 time=0.803 ms
	64 bytes from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: icmp_seq=4 ttl=255 time=1.08 ms
	64 bytes from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: icmp_seq=5 ttl=255 time=0.846 ms
	64 bytes from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx: icmp_seq=6 ttl=255 time=0.771 ms
	Second ping with IP Spoofed
	[root@localhost root]# hping -a xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
	HPING xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx (eth0 xxx.xxx.xxx): NO FLAGS are set, 40
	headers + 0 data bytes
	len=46 ip=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx ttl=255 id=20405 sport=0 flags=RA seq=0 win=0 rtt=1.0
	ms
	len=46 ip=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx ttl=255 id=20406 sport=0 flags=RA seq=1 win=0 rtt=0.9
	ms
	len=46 ip=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx ttl=255 id=20407 sport=0 flags=RA seq=2 win=0 rtt=0.9
	ms
	len=46 ip=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx ttl=255 id=20408 sport=0 flags=RA seq=3 win=0 rtt=1.0
	ms
	len=46 ip=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx ttl=255 id=20409 sport=0 flags=RA seq=4 win=0 rtt=0.9

	ethereal re	sults show	that the host	respo	onded to the spoofed IP's
	Here is a p	aste of the	race		
	© spoofip - Ethereal				
		oture Analyze Help			
	No Time 1 0.000000	Source 142.163.235.193	Destination 142.163.235.194	Protocol	Info 2086 > 0 ] Seg=2129918781 Ack=1597167476 win=512 Le
	2 0.000217 3 0.999808 4 1.000691 5 2.003724 6 2.003732 7 3.000521 8 3.000529 9 3.678320 10 4.000472 11 4.000480 12 4.000484 13 4.000480 12 4.000481 13 4.000480 14 4.000080 14 4.000080 14 4.000080 14 4.000080 14 4.000080	142.163.235.194 142.163.235.193 142.163.235.194 142.163.235.194 142.163.235.194 142.163.235.194 142.163.235.194 142.163.224.22 Intel_01:13:2c 142.163.224.22 Intel_01:13:2c 142.163.235.193 C15cc_70:ec:34	142.163.235.193 142.163.235.194 142.163.235.193 142.163.235.193 142.163.235.193 142.163.235.193 142.163.235.193 198.165.71.163 cfscc_70:ec:3a 142.163.235.194 Intel_01:13:2c	TCP TCP TCP TCP TCP TCP TCP ARP TCP ARP	0 > 2086 [RST, ACK] seq=1597167476 ACk=2129918781 wi 2087 > 0 [] seq=709532439 ACk=98668779 win=512 Len= 0 > 2087 [RST, ACK] seq=968668779 Ack=790532439 win= 2088 > 0 [] seq=115435038 ACk=381690205 win=512 Len= 0 > 2088 [RST, ACK] seq=381690205 Ack=115435038 win= 2089 > 0 [] seq=830684816 ACk=1948172895 Ack=830664846 win Standard guery A nbavms01.allant.icn.newtel.com who has 142.163.235.1947 Tell 142.163.235.190 2090 > 0 [] seq=820741110 Ack=1672299888 win=512 Len 142.163.235.194 is at 00:0b:5f:70:ec:3a 0 > 2089 [RST, ACK] seq=19427299898 Ack=820741110 win
	13 4.001175 14 4.036163 15 5.000118	142.163.235.194 Cisco_70:ec:3a 142.163.235.193	142.163.235.193 Cisco_70:ec:3a 142.163.235.194	TCP LOOP TCP	Loopback 2091 > 0 [] Seq=1455061405 Ack=350315608 win=512 Len
	16.5.001006	147 162 725 104	1/7 162 725 102	тсе	0 < 2001 [DST ACK] Sen=250315608 ACK-1455061405 Win /
	⊞ Ethernet II, Sro ⊞ Internet Protoco	ol, Src Addr: 142.163.	Dst: 00:0b:5f:70:ec:3a 235.193 (142.163.235.1	193), Dst A	ddr: 142.163.235.194 (142.163.235.194) , Seq: 2129918781, Ack: 1597167476, Len: 0
	0010 00 28 b4 91 0020 eb c2 08 26	ec 3a 00 00 39 01 1 00 00 40 06 d1 73 8 00 00 7e f3 fb 3d 5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	a a3 eb c1 8e a3 .( ∃ 32 d7 74 50 00a	0.:9 @s §~=_2.	
	Filter:			/ Reset App	Ity  File: spoofip
Objective/Subjective	Objective				

Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS page 1
	Page 23 Section 3.1.4
	Section 3.1.22 P.15
	Section 3.1.23 P.15
	Section 3.1.24 P.15
	Own experience
Objective 🔨	Check Local authentication of Username and passwords
Risk	Section 1.2.1 .2 System Administration
	Section 1.2.1. 5 Lack of Security Policy to control Router Activities
	Section 1.2.2.3 Configuration Errors
Test	1. From the configuration gathered in Checklist Item 4 Determine if there
	are any users accounts created on the router and if passwords are
	enabled. The information you are looking for is as follows:
	<ul> <li>user-ID privilege 15 password 7 encryptyed</li> </ul>
	- enable password
	Result – from the information in the configuration file there are no
	usernames configured however the enable password has been configured
	enable password 7 14141B180F0B
	Passwords has also been applied to aux and tty ports
	line con 0
	exec-timeout 0 0
	password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
	login
	line aux 0
	line vty 0 4
	access-class 10 in
	exec-timeout 30 0



	Password:
	Password:
	Password:
	% Bad passwords
	Connection closed by foreign host.
	[root@localhost root]#
	[root@localhost root]#
	[root@localhost root]# telnet xxx.xxx.xxx
	Trying xxx.xxx.xxx
Ó. Y	Connected to xxx.xxx.xxx (xxx.xxx.xxx).
	Escape character is '^]'.
	xxxxx Internet IISP
	You must agree to the following before using this system
	Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of
	Aliant Inc. and authorized contractors.Only authorized work using
	company-supplied programs may be done on this system.Use of this
	system is an agreement to monitoring.
	bybeen ib an agreement to monitoring.
	User Access Verification
	USEL ACCESS VEHILLATION
	Password:
	Password:
	Password:
	% Bad passwords
	Connection closed by foreign host.
	i contra de la c
Objective/Subjective	Objective
<u> </u>	· · · · · ·

Checklist Item 12

Reference		Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 8 Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Section 3.1 Starting Page 13
Objective		Check to see if SNMP is enabled
Risk	0	Section 1.2.2 .1 Router may be Open to Internet Scans
Test		<ul> <li>3. Connect to the router as described in Checklist Item 4</li> <li>4. from the prompt</li> <li>iii. show config</li> <li>iv. Look for the following:</li> <li>snmp-server community (password) RW 12</li> <li>snmp-server community (password) RO 12</li> <li>snmp-server location (server location)</li> <li>snmp-server contact (contact information)</li> <li>snmp-server host</li> <li>Result –</li> <li>snmp-server location XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</li> <li>snmp-server contact Blair XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</li> <li>snmp-server enable traps tty</li> <li>The router has SNMP enables but only enable traps through the TTY port. The TTY port has an ACL on it that only allows the following IP xxx.xxx.xxxx</li> <li>The acl is as follows:</li> <li>access-list 10 permit xxx.xxx.xxx</li> <li>The acl does not specify anything else on the port and it does not have an explicit deny any any so everything is open on the vty port for IP xxX.XXX.XXX</li> </ul>

Objective/Subjective	ive Objective		
Checklist Item 13			
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS		
	Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 8		
04	Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Section 3.1 Starting Page 13		
Objective	Check to determine if Telnet is enabled		
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans		
Test	1. From an outside device (internet connected test PC) attempt to telnet to		
	the router.		
	2. from the prompt (DOS or Unix)		
	3. c:\telnet xxx.xxx.xxx (destination IP)		
	xxxxx Internet IISP		
	You must agree to the following before using this system		
	Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of xxxxxxxx. and authorized contractors.Only authorized work using		
	company-supplied programs may be done on this system.Use of this		
	system is an agreement to monitoring.		
	Sh-		
	User Access Verification		
	Password:		
	4. Once connected you will be presented a login prompt		

OSANS IN	5. If the connection is refused you will get a "connection refused by host" area message          Service Configuration         Service Configu
	Trying 142.163.235.194 telnet: Unable to connect to remote host: Connection refused
	If the IP is spoofed then telnet will be available to anyone attempting connection to XYZ 's Router

	See Results of Nessus Scan which also confirms telnet is open
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 14	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 8
Objective	Determine if the exec timeout is enabled and actual configured time. This prevents unauthorized users from taking advantage of unused sessions.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans
Test	<ul> <li>2. Determine exec timeout is configured on the router. Use the configuration obtained from Checklist Item 4 or connect directly to the router as outlined in Checklist Item 4 and type: Show config Result –</li> <li>line con 0 exec-timeout 0 0</li> <li>There is no timeout on the direct connection.</li> <li>line vty 0 4 access-class 10 in exec-timeout 30 0</li> <li>On the telnet connection there is an timeout of 30 seconds</li> <li>3. Connect to the router with telnet and conduct no activity, time to see how long the router times you out and compare with configuration information above.</li> </ul>

	🗖 root@localhost:~ 📲	
	<u>File Edit View Terminal Go Help</u>	
	Password:	
	% Bad passwords	
	Connection closed by foreign host.	
	[root@localhost_root]#_telnet	
	Trying	
	Connected t	
	Escape character is '^j'.	
	xxxxx Internet IISP	
	You must agree to the following before using this system	
	Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of	
	Aliant Inc. and authorized contractors.Only authorized work using	
	company-supplied programs may be done on this system.Use of this	
	system is an agreement to monitoring.	
	User Access Verification	
	Password:	
	xyzlaw>en	
	Password:	
	xyzlaw#Connection closed by foreign host.	
	[root@localhost root]#	
	👝 🗥 🍋 🚑 🚰 🚔 💶 🗌 [Nessus Setup] 💷 root@localhost:~	
	10:15	- M
Objective/Subjective	Objective	

Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS
	Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 8
Objective	Determine if the AUX port is enabled and if any modems are attached
Risk	
Test	<ol> <li>Physical inspection of the router to determine if there are any modems attached</li> <li>Login to the router as laid out in Checklist Item 4 and perform the following commands from the router prompt</li> <li>router#show line aux 0</li> <li>The following should show up</li> <li>router#sho line aux 0</li> <li>Tty Typ Tx/Rx A Modem Roty AccO AccI Uses Noise Overruns Int</li> <li>5 AUX 9600/9600 0 0 0/0 -</li> <li>Line 5, Location: "", Type: ""</li> <li>Length: 24 lines, Width: 80 columns</li> <li>Baud rate (TX/RX) is 9600/9600, no parity, 2 stopbits, 8 databits Status: Ready</li> <li>Capabilities: none</li> <li>Modem state: Ready</li> <li>Modem hardware state: noCTS noDSR DTR RTS</li> <li>Special Chars: Escape Hold Stop Start Disconnect Activation</li> </ol>

	00:10:00	never	none not set
	Idle	e Session Disc	onnect Warning
	n	ever	
	Log	gin-seguence l	Jser Response
$(\bigcirc$		.00:30	
OSANS X		toselect Initial	Wait
		ot set	
	Modem type is unkn		
	Session limit is not s		
	Time since activation	i. never	
	Editing is enabled.		2
	History is enabled, h		
	DNS resolution in sh		s is enabled
	Full user help is disa		
	Allowed input transp		
	Allowed output trans	ports are pad t	elnet rlogin ssh.
	Preferred transport is	s telnet.	
	No output characters	s are padded	
	No special data disp	atching charac	ters
	iv. This is a view	of when the au	ux port has been disabled, refer to bold
			on of a disabled aux port.
	21		
	router#sho line aux (	ו	
			ty AccO AccI Uses Noise Overruns
	Int		
	5 AUX 9600/960	0	0 0 0/0 -
	3 404 9000/900		0 0 0/0 -
	Line 5. Location: ""	Tupo: ""	
	Line 5, Location: "",	• •	
	Length: 24 lines, Wid	ani: 80 columns	5

Baud rate (TX/RX) is 9600/9600, no parity, 2 stopbits, 8 databits Status: Ready **Capabilities: EXEC Suppressed** Modem state: Ready Modem hardware state: noCTS noDSR DTR RTS Special Chars: Escape Hold Stop Start Disconnect Activation ^^x none - none Timeouts: Idle EXEC Idle Session Modem Answer Session Dispatch 00:10:00 never not set none Idle Session Disconnect Warning never Login-sequence User Response 00:00:30 Autoselect Initial Wait not set Modem type is unknown. Session limit is not set. Time since activation: never Editing is enabled. History is enabled, history size is 20. DNS resolution in show commands is enabled Full user help is disabled Allowed input transports are none. Allowed output transports are pad telnet rlogin ssh. Preferred transport is telnet. No output characters are padded No special data dispatching characters Result – the aux port on this router is enabled but there are no modems attached. The following is a result of the cli show command:

OSANS,	YZLaw#sho line aux 0 Tty Typ Tx/Rx A Modem Roty AccO AccI Uses Noise Overruns Int 5 AUX 9600/9600 0 0 0/0 - Line 5, Location: "", Type: "" Length: 24 lines, Width: 80 columns
	Baud rate (TX/RX) is 9600/9600, no parity, 2 stopbits, 8 databits
	Status: Ready
	Capabilities: none
	Modem state: Ready
	Modem hardware state: noCTS noDSR_DTR RTS
	Special Chars: Escape Hold Stop Start Disconnect Activation
	^^x none none Timeouts: Idle EXEC Idle Session Modem Answer Session Dispatch
	00:10:00 never none not set
	Idle Session Disconnect Warning
	never
	Login-sequence User Response
	00:00:30
	Autoselect Initial Wait
	not set
	Modem type is unknown. Session limit is not set.
	Time since activation: never
	Editing is enabled.
	History is enabled, history size is 20.
	DNS resolution in show commands is enabled
	Full user help is disabled
	Allowed input transports are none.
	Allowed output transports are pad telnet rlogin ssh.

	Preferred transport is telnet. No output characters are padded No special data dispatching characters
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 16	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS
Objective	Determine Configuration of the TTY Lines (passwords and ACLs)
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router May be open to internet scans which may result in attempts to breach router defences to infiltrate XYZ Law's internal network
Test	<ul> <li>1. Login into the router as laid out in Checklist Item 4 or view the configuration file. If choosing to login in once connected type the following at the router prompt: <ul> <li>i. router#show config</li> <li>ii. Once the config is shown look for the following</li> </ul> </li> <li>line vty 0 4 (actual connection line) <ul> <li>access-class 10 in (access list attached to interface)</li> <li>exec-timeout 30 0 (timeout for unused session 30minutes)</li> <li>password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (password assigned to interface)</li> <li>this is near the end of the configuration file</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. Look at Access List assigned to interface <ul> <li>Router#show access-list 10</li> <li>Standard IP access list 10</li> <li>10 permit xxx.xxx.xxxx</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<ol> <li>Once the information is gathered above prove it's worth by doing the following:</li> <li>attempt to telnet to the router</li> </ol>
Õ	Connection refused which proves the access list is working
	Service Configuration
	V. if connect attempt to login

	I had to use the only IP that the access list allowed once connected a login prompt came up which proves a password is required. vi. on the router do a "show access-list" to see if there are numbers increasing to determine hits on the access list how access-list 10 Standard IP access list 10 10 permit xxx.xxx.xxx (12 matches)
Objective/Subjective Ob	ojective
Checklist Item 17	e a la companya de la
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 2.1 Page 9 Level 1 Benchmark Version 2.0 Sections 3.1.59/60 Page 20
Objective	Determine if unused Services are enabled HTTP Finger Service CDP BOOTp Config Server TFTP Small UDP Service Small TCP Services
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
Test	<ol> <li>HTTP – Connect to the router as described in Checklist Item 4, once logged in type :</li> </ol>

OS SALS	Router#show run Look for the following in the configuration: no ip http server If this is not in the config HTTP server is enab Cisco routers Result – this statement is found on the cor disabled	
	From a web browser attempt to connect address in the browser if HTTP is enabled the router. If HTTP is disabled then the cor	d the browser will connect you to
	Result – I was unable to connect with a received a "connection refused"	a browser. I used Mozilla and
	RAT Scan report	
	10 pass IOS - no ip http server	xyzlaw.txt
	<ol> <li>Finger Service – To determine if this router as in Check List Item 4. Perform is running you will see in the global con</li> </ol>	a "show run" if the finger service
	Ip finger service	Setts.
	If this is not there then finger service is	disabled.
	Result – Finger service did not command so therefore it is not ena	-

	file in Checklist Item 4 for confirmati	on.
	RAT Scan Report	
°.S.	5 pass IOS 12.1,2,3 - no finger service	xyzlaw.txt
NS In	<ol> <li>CDP – Cisco Discovery Protocol. T devices to discover each other for troul utilized then it should be disabled. Th attacks that utilize CDP.</li> </ol>	pleshooting purposes. If this is not
	CDP is enabled by default to determin router as laid out in Checklist Item command. In the global config if you se	4 and perform the "show run"
	no cdp run	
	This insures that CDP is disabled. CE have to manually disabled.	OP is enabled by default and will
	Also in the configuration file on the ir the following should be there to ensure	
	no cdp enable	
	this ensures CDP is disabled on the int	erface.
	Result - no cdp run CDP is disabled Globally	

OS ANS IN	d ip h in d s s n CI	terface Ethernet0 escription Customer LAN Segment o address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.25 alf-duplex o cdp enable terface FastEthernet0 escription Connection to ISP o address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.25 peed auto o cdp enable DP is disabled on the interface AT Scan Report	
	7 pass	IOS - no cdp run	xyzlaw.txt
	an Ite	botp – There are known DOS attacks nd is enabled by default. Login to the em 4 and type a "show run" at the route botp is disabled you should see the follo	router as laid out in check list er prompt. In the Global config if
	nc	o ip bootp server	Shis
	lft	this is not there then bootp services are	e enabled.
	er	esult – bootp is not found in the nabled. If this service is not used th onfirmation please refer to the config	en it should be disabled. For

	RAT Scan Report	
	5 FAIL IOS - no ip bootp server	xyzlaw.txt n/a 2
SA	5. TFTP – No ACL Restricting	J TFTP
SI	<ol> <li>Config Server – this allows a remote devices.</li> </ol>	a router to load its startup configuration from
	Result from RAT Scan confirm	ns config server is disabled
	7 pass IOS - no service config	xyzlaw.txt
	<ol> <li>tcp-keepalives – stale connection be used to gain access.</li> </ol>	ections use resources and could potentially
	Result from RAT Scan Report	confirms TCP Keep alives are enabled
	5 FAIL IOS - tcp keepalive servi	ce <mark>xyzlaw.txt</mark> n/a 2
	8. Small TCP Service	
	Results from RAT Scan repor	t small tcp services are disabled
	7 pass IOS 12 - no udp-small-serv	vers xyzlaw.txt
	9. Small UDP Services	
	Results from RAT Scan repor	t Small UDP services are disabled

	7 pass IOS 12 - no tcp-small-servers xyzlaw.txt
Objective/Subjective	Objective
Checklist Item 18	
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Benchmark for Cisco IOS page 10
Objective	Section 3.1.69 Page 22 Determine if Directed Broadcast is enabled
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks Router Interfaces that allow directed broadcasts can be open to "smurf" attacks
Test	<ol> <li>Login to the router as describe in Checklist Item 4.</li> <li>Completed</li> <li>Do the "show run" command from the router prompt</li> <li>Completed</li> <li>Inspect each interface for the following:         <ul> <li>ip directed-broadcast</li> </ul> </li> <li>interface Ethernet0             description Customer LAN Segment             ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.248             half-duplex</li> </ol>
	no cdp enable ! interface FastEthernet0 description Connection to ISP ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.252

speed auto

	no cdp enable 4. If this is there directed-broadcast is enabled if not it is disabled Result directed broadcast is not enabled		
	Result from RAT Scan confirms		
	7 pass IOS 12 - no directed broadcast	xyzlaw.txt	
Objective/Subjective	Objective		

Checklist Item 19	$\leq 0_{\Omega}$			
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchm	nark for Cisco IO	S	
Objective	Is IP source routing enabled			
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks			
	Source routing is a feature of IP whereby individual			
	This feature is used in several kinds of attacks. Cisc			
		and process source routes. Unless required this feature should be turned off.		
Test	Run Router Auditing Tool as described in General (	Checklist Item 6 a	and	
	determine from the results			
	Pass – IP Source Routing is disabled			
	Fail - IP Source Routing in enabled			
	Result from RAT Scans			
	7 FAIL IOS - no ip source-route	xyzlaw.txt	n/a 2	
	IP Source Routing is enabled			
Objective/Subjective	Objective			
Checklist Item 20				
-------------------	--			
Reference	Center For Internet Security Gold Standard Benchmark for Cisco IOS Level 1 and 2 Benchmarks page 24			
Objective	Determine IP Proxy Arp Enabled Proxy Arp breaks the LAN security perimeter effectively extending a LAN at layer 2 across multiple segments			
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router Open to internet Scans Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks			
Test	<ul> <li>a. Login to the router as laid out in General Checklist Item 4</li> <li>b. Do a "show run" to bring up the configuration</li> <li>c. inspect the interfaces and determine if this is included</li> <li>no ip proxy-arp</li> <li>4. Proxy arp is enabled by default if this line is not there then proxy arp is enabled</li> </ul>			
	Result interface Ethernet0			
	description Customer LAN Segment ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.248 half-duplex no cdp enable !			
	interface FastEthernet0 description Connection to ISP ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.252 speed auto			

	no cdp enable
	Proxy arp is enabled on both interfaces
Objective/Subjective	Objective

### 2.2 Cisco Specific Checklist

This checklist is specific to security warnings released by Cisco. It is based on information provided on Cisco's Website located at:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps22	21/prod security advisories list.htm

Checklist Item 1	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Cisco Security Advisory Check Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software Multiple SNMP Community String Vulnerabilities The following is a description of the impact from Cisco's website <u>http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13b5.shtml#software</u>
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	Knowledge of read-only community strings allows read access to information stored on an affected device, leading to a failure of confidentiality. Knowledge of read-write community strings allows remote configuration of affected devices without authorization, possibly without the awareness of

© SANS	
Institute	
2004,	

	the administrators of the device and resulting in a failure of integrity and a possible failure of availability.
	These vulnerabilities could be exploited separately or in combination to gain access to or modify the configuration and operation of any affected devices without authorization. Customers are urged to upgrade affected systems to fixed releases of software, or to apply measures to protect such systems against unauthorized use by restricting access to SNMP services until such time as the devices can be upgraded.
	<ul> <li>IOS software Major Release version 12.0 and IOS releases based on 11.x or earlier are not affected by the vulnerabilities described in this notice. All other releases of 12.0, such as 12.0DA, 12.0S or 12.0T, may be affected.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>CSCdr59314 is only present in certain 12.1(3) releases and does not affect any other IOS releases.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Fixes for all six defects have been integrated into 12.2 prior to its initial availability, and therefore all releases based on 12.2 and all later versions are not vulnerable to the defects described in this advisory.</li> </ul>
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans and weaknesses exploited Section 1.2.2.5 Hardware/Software upgrades – if the version of code is deficent then a possible upgrade may be required.
Test	Determine if software version of router is affected 3. Login to the router as described in Checklist Item 4 and at the router prompt type
	Router#show version
	Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2)

© SANS
Institute
2004,

TAC Support: http://www.cisco.com	
Copyright (c) 1986-2003 by cisco S	
Compiled Sat 01-Nov-03 06:24 by c	
Image text-base: 0x80008120, data	-base: 0x81207F5C
	2.2(7r)XM1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) 3NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, RELEASE
xyzlaw uptime is 2 days, 19 hours,	17 minutes
System returned to ROM by power-	
System image file is "flash:c1700-b	
Contraction of the second s	
This product contains cryptographic	features and is subject to United
States and local country laws gover	ning import, export, transfer and
use. Delivery of Cisco cryptographic	c products does not imply
third-party authority to import, expo	
Importers, exporters, distributors an	
compliance with U.S. and local court	
	s and regulations. If you are unable
to comply with U.S. and local laws,	return this product immediately.
A summary of U.S. laws governing http://www.cisco.com/wwl/export/cr	Cisco cryptographic products may be found at: ypto/tool/stqrg.html
If you require further assistance ple export@cisco.com.	ase contact us by sending email to
	rovicion (v100) with E8002K/ZE24K butco of momory
	revision 0x100) with 58002K/7534K bytes of memory. R (2301023196), with hardware revision 0000

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

	MPC860P processor: part number 5, mask 2 Bridging software. X.25 software, Version 3.0.0.
	1 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s) 1 FastEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s) 32K bytes of non-volatile configuration memory. 16384K bytes of processor board System flash (Read/Write)
	Configuration register is 0x142
	<ol> <li>From this information determine the IOS version.</li> <li>Result – IOS Version 12.2(15)T9 is not affected by this security advisory</li> </ol>
Objective/Subjectiv e	Objective

Checklist Item 2	C/
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod security advisories list.html
Objective	Cisco Security Advisory Check
-	Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS ARP Table Overwrite Vulnerability
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b113c.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	It is possible to send an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packet on a local broadcast interface (for example, Ethernet, cable, Token Ring, FDDI) which could cause a router or switch running specific versions of Cisco IOS® Software Release to stop sending and receiving ARP packets on

	the local router interface. This will in a short time cause the router and local hosts to be unable to send packets to each other. ARP packets received by the router for the router's own interface address but a different Media Access Control (MAC) address will overwrite the router's MAC address in the ARP table with the one from the received ARP packet. This was demonstrated to attendees of the Black Hat conference and should be considered to be public knowledge. This attack is only successful against devices on the segment local to the attacker or attacking host. Impact This issue can cause a Cisco Router to be vulnerable to a Denial-of-Service attack, once the ARP table entries time out. This defect does not result in a failure of confidentiality of information stored on the unit, nor does this defect allow hostile code to be loaded onto a Cisco device. This defect may cause a Denial-of-Service on the management functions o a Cisco Layer 2 Switch, but does not affect traffic through the device
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attack
Test	determine if the router is running an affected IOS,
	4) log in to the device as laid out in checklist item 4
	5) and issue the command show version command at the router prompt. Inspect the configuration for the following:
	Internetwork Operating System Software" or "IOS (tm
	6) If this found compare the software version number with the table on this website from Cisco
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b113c.shtml
	7) This will provide upgrade information if required
	Result – Based on the show version information found in the previous checklist I was able to determine

that the current version of code is not affected by this advisory.

Objective

Objective/Subjective

Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the router is affected by the following advisory
	Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Syslog Crash
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13a7.shtm
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	Certain versions of Cisco IOS software may crash or hang when they receive invalid user datagram protocol (UDP) packets sent to their "syslog" ports (port 514). At least one commonly-used Internet scanning tool generates packets which can cause such crashes and hangs. This fact has been announced on public Internet mailing lists which are widely read both by security professionals and by security "crackers", and should be considered public information.
	This vulnerability affects devices running Cisco IOS software version 11.3AA, version 11.3DB, or any 12.0-based version (including 12.0 mainline, 12.0S, 12.0T, and any other regular released version whose number starts with "12.0"). The vulnerability has been corrected in certain special releases, and will be corrected in maintenance and interim releases which will be issued in the future; see the section on "Software Versions and Fixes" for details on which versions are affected, and on which versions are, or will be, fixed. Cisco intends to provide fixes for all affected IOS variants.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attack

Test	4. Login to the router as described in Checklist Item 4
°,	5. Do a "show version" as described in the previous Cisco Checklist
	6. Go to table on the above webpage at Cisco to determine if the current IOS is affected.
	Result – IOS Version 12.2(15)T9 is not affected by this security advisory
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 4	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the router is affected by the following Security Advisory
	Cisco Security Notice: MS SQL Worm Mitigation Recommendations
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a0080133399.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	Cisco customers are currently experiencing attacks due to a new worm that has hit the Internet. The signature of this worm appears as high volumes of UDP traffic to port 1434. Affected customers have been experiencing high volumes of traffic from both internal and external systems. Symptoms on Cisco devices include, but are not limited to high CPU and traffic drops on the input interfaces.
	The worm has been referenced by several names, including "Slammer", "Sapphire" as well as

	"MS SQL worm".
	Cisco has a companion document detailing Cisco products which are affected directly by this worm:
	http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20030126-ms02-061.shtml
	The current recommended fix for IOS is to apply an ACL to block traffic on port 1443
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
Test	1. login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4.
	2. At the prompt do a "show run"
	3. Inspect the configuration and determine if the following access list has been applied
	4. access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 1434 ccess-list 115 permit ip any any
	5. Determine if the access list has been applied to the public interface
	int <interface> ip access-group 115 in ip access-group 115 out</interface>
	Tiop.
	Result – This has not been applied to XYZ Router
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the router is affected by the following Security Advisory
	Cisco IOS HTTP Server Query Vulnerability
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13b6.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	defect in multiple releases of Cisco IOS software will cause a Cisco router or switch to halt and reload if the IOS HTTP service is enabled, browsing to "http://router-ip/anytext?/" is attempted, and the enable password is supplied when requested. This defect can be exploited to produce a denial of service (DoS) attack.
	The vulnerability, identified as Cisco bug ID <b>CSCdr91706</b> , affects virtually all mainstream Cisco routers and switches running Cisco IOS software releases 12.0 through 12.1, inclusive. This is <b>not</b> the same defect as <b>CSCdr36952</b> .
	The vulnerability has been corrected and Cisco is making fixed releases available for free to replace all affected IOS releases. Customers are urged to upgrade to releases that are not vulnerable to this defect as shown in detail <u>below</u> .
	This vulnerability can only be exploited if the enable password is known or not set.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service Attacks
Test	5. Login to the router as laid out in General Checklist Item 4
	6. at the router prompt do a "show version"
	7. Inspect the information for the IOS version

	8. Go to the table on the cisco website (Link above) and determine if the current version of IOS is affected
C	Result – IOS Version 12.2(15)T9 is not affected by this security advisory
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 6	Street Street
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the router is affected by the following Security Advisory
	Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Remote Router Crash
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products security advisory09186a00800b139d.shtml The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	An error in Cisco IOS software makes it possible for untrusted, unauthenticated users who can gain access to the login prompt of a router or other Cisco IOS device, via any means, to cause that device to crash and reload.
	This applies only to devices running classic Cisco IOS software, including most, but not all, Cisco router products. The easiest way to determine whether your device is running classic Cisco IOS software is to use the <b>show version</b> command to determine who is affected.
	If attackers know the details of the Cisco IOS software error they will be able to cause the router to crash and reload <i>without having to log in to the router</i> . Because this problem involves damage to an internal data struture, it is possible that other, more subtle or targeted effects on system operation could also be induced by proper exploitation. Such exploitation, if it is possible at all, would require significant engineering skill and a thorough knowledge of the internal operation of Cisco IOS software, including Cisco trade secret

	information
	Affected IOS Versions
	• 11.3(1), 11.3(1)ED, 11.3(1)T
	<ul> <li>11.2(10), 11.2(9)P, 11.2(9)XA, 11.2(10)BC, 11.2(8)SA3</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>11.1(15)CA, 11.1(16), 11.1(16)IA, 11.1(16)AA, 11.1(17)CC, 11.1(17)CT</li> </ul>
	• 11.0(20.3)
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service
Test	4. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4
	<ol><li>At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.</li></ol>
	Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1
	IOS version is 12.2(15)T9
	6. Determine if the IOS version matches with the list mentioned above.
	Result – IOS Version 12.2(15)T9 is not affected by this security advisory
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 7	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the Router is vulnerable to the following Cisco Advisory

	Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software Input Access List Leakage with NAT
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13a8.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	A group of related software bugs (bug IDs given under " <u>Software Versions and Fixes</u> ") create an undesired interaction between network address translation (NAT) and input access list processing in certain Cisco routers running 12.0-based versions of Cisco IOS software (including 12.0, 12.0S, and 12.0T, in all versions up to, but not including, 12.0(4), 12(4)S, and 12.0(4)T, as well as other 12.0 releases). Non-12.0 releases are not affected.
	This may cause input access list filters to "leak" packets in certain NAT configurations, creating a security exposure. Configurations without NAT are not affected.
	The failure does not happen at all times, and is less likely under laboratory conditions than in installed networks. This may cause administrators to believe that filtering is working when it is not.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service
Test	5. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4
	<ol><li>At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.</li></ol>
	7. Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1
	IOS version is 12.2(15)T9
	8. Determine if the IOS version matches those found on the table on the Cisco Website

	mentioned above.
	Result – IOS Version 12.2(15)T9 is not affected by this security advisory
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Checklist Item 8	
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the Router is vulnerable to the following Cisco Advisory
	Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Interface Blocked by IPv4 Packets
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00801a34c2.shtml
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	routers and switches running Cisco IOS <sup>®</sup> software and configured to process Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) packets are vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Multiple IPv4 packets with specific protocol fields sent directly to the device may cause the input interface to stop processing traffic once the input queue is full. Traffic passing through the device cannot block the input queue. No authentication is required to process the inbound packet. Processing of IPv4 packets is enabled by default. Devices running only IP version 6 (IPv6) are not affected. Multiple valid workarounds are available in the form of best practices for situations where software upgrades are not currently feasible.
	If the software version is not on the router the current ACL workaround should be applied
	access-list 101 permit tcp any any access-list 101 permit udp any any access-list 101 deny 53 any any
	access-list 101 deny 55 any any

	access-list 101 deny 77 any any
	access-list 101 deny 103 any any
	! insert any other previously applied ACL entries here
	! you must permit other protocols through to allow normal
	! traffic previously defined permit lists will work
	! or you may use the permit ip any any shown here
	access-list 101 permit ip any any
Risk	Section 1.2.2.2 Denial of Service
Test	6. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4
	7. At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.
	8. Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1
	IOS version is 12.2(15)T9
	<ol> <li>Determine if the IOS version matches those found on the table on the Cisco Website mentioned above.</li> </ol>
	This version of code is susceptible to this attack
	10. If the IOS version does not match do a "show run" and determine if the above mentioned access list is configured and applied to the public interface.
	Using the information gathered in General Checklist Item 1 it was determined that the required access list is not configured and that this router is open to this attack
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the Router is vulnerable to the following Cisco Advisory
	Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Command History Release at Login Prompt
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00800b13aa.shtm
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	An error in Cisco IOS® software makes it possible for untrusted, unauthenticated users who can gain access to the login prompt of a router or other Cisco IOS device, via any means, to obtain fragments of text entered by prior interactive users of the device. This text may contain sensitive information, possibly including passwords. This vulnerability exposes only text entered at prompts issued by the IOS device itself; the contents of data packets forwarded by IOS devices are not exposed, nor are data entered as part of outgoing interactive connections, such as TELNET connections, from the IOS device to other network nodes.
Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans
Test	5. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4
	<ol><li>At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.</li></ol>
	7. Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1
	IOS version is 12.2(15)T9
	<ol> <li>Determine if the IOS version matches those found on the table on the Cisco Website mentioned above.</li> </ol>

	Result – IOS Version 12.2(15)T9 is not affected by this security advisory
Objective/Subjective	Objective
Checklist Item 10	S.
Reference	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/routers/ps221/prod_security_advisories_list.html
Objective	Determine if the Router is vulnerable to the following Cisco Advisory
	Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software TCP Initial Sequence Number Randomization Improvements
	http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products security advisory09186a00800b1396.shtm
	Cisco IOS® Software contains a flaw that permits the successful prediction of TCP Initial Sequence Numbers.
	The following information is from the url above obtained form Cisco's website
	This vulnerability is present in all released versions of Cisco IOS software running on Cisco routers and switches. It only affects the security of TCP connections that originate or terminate or the affected Cisco device itself; it does not apply to TCP traffic forwarded through the affected device in transit between two other hosts.
	To remove the vulnerability, Cisco is offering free software upgrades for all affected platforms. Th defect is described in DDTS record CSCds04747.
	Workarounds are available that limit or deny successful exploitation of the vulnerability by filtering traffic containing forged IP source addresses at the perimeter of a network or directly on individua devices.

Risk	Section 1.2.2.1 Router may be open to internet scans
Test	<ul> <li>5. Login to the router as described in General Checklist Item 4</li> <li>6. At the router prompt do a "show version" and determine the IOS Version on the current router.</li> </ul>
	<ol> <li>Utilize the results from show version in Cisco checklist item 1</li> <li>IOS version is 12.2(15)T9</li> </ol>
	<ol> <li>Determine if the IOS version matches those found on the table on the Cisco Website mentioned above.</li> <li>Result – IOS Version 12.2(15)T9 is not affected by this security advisory</li> </ol>
	Result – IOS version 12.2(13)19 is not affected by this security advisory
Objective/Subjective	Objective

Dr. Petains full rights.

# Part 4 – Audit Report

### **Executive Summary**

The goal of the audit has been achieved. The Cisco 1721 router has been analyzed to determine its vulnerabilities and strengths is association to XYZ Law. XYZ Law has requested an independent audit of their primary perimeter device and all objectives were met.

This audit has determined that the Cisco 1721 router is doing little to protect the information assets of XYZ Law from internet penetration and possible loss. There were a total of 12 exceptions found in the audit. The advantages each are fairly easy to fix and would require coordination with XYZ's IT partner.

### 4.1 Audit Findings

The audit findings will correlate the checklist item that found the exception, the risk associated prioritized by level and severity. The detailed findings of each item can be found in Section 3 of this document. The risk levels are as follows:

High – May affect the company is a very severe way i.e. loss of business or significant loss of efficiency.

Medium – May affect day to day operations. The company will continue to operate but at a less efficient rate.

Low – May affect operations in a small way.

1. General Check List Item 5 Section 3 Page 75 – Nessus Vulnerability Scan		
For Nessus	For Nessus Results see Appendix A	
Risk	XYZ Router is open to Internet scans and possible exploitation of vulnerabilities	
Risk Level	High	
Exception	<ul> <li>Nessus was able to discover open ports such as telnet (port 23)</li> <li>Nessus Determined that the router is open to ICMP Ping discovery</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Nessus was able to determine IOS and type if router. This can be used to determine exploits against the router</li> <li>By scanning the internal IP space which is public routable IPS Nessus was able to determine OS and port openings of</li> </ul>	

	the internal XYZ PC's
Summary	The XYZ Law router is dangerously open to any type of internet
	discovery scans and as a result sensitive information on XYZ Law's
	personal computers is at risk.

2. General Checklist Item 8 Section 3 Page 82 - Test the ACL against the written		
	security policy or against the "Deny All" rule	
Section 3 pa	•	
Risk	XYZ Law is open to internet scans, possible perimeter penetration,	
	and denial of service attacks	
Risk Level	High	
Exception	There are no access list of any kind on the primary interfaces. There	
	is an access list on the tty o4 port allowing everything from one IP	
	address	
Summary	Access Lists on a router are the primary protection against internet scans and denial of service attacks. Access lists are used to filter any unwanted traffic that passes through the router. By not applying access lists the primary interface on the router XYZ is open to attack from the internet which in turn may compromise sensitive information such as client data or affect operations through denial of	
	service attacks	
3 General	Checklist Item 9 Section 3 Page - Verify the router is egress filtering	

3. General	Checklist Item 9 Section 3 Page - Verify the router is egress filtering	
local networ	local network traffic and the outbound capabilities of the router	
Risk	The internal network has full access to the outside internet. There	
	are no egress filters in place.	
Risk Level	High	
Exception	There are no access list on the egress Ethernet interface. The	
	internal network PC's has full access to the public internet.	
Summary	Egress filters can be used to for two reasons:	
	Protect the internal network from being used as malicious	
	tools against other networks. It is responsible to keep the	
	internal network from being broadcast out and not allow it to	
C	be used in a malicious way. It can damage the reputation of	
0	XYZ Law if its network was used as a weapon against other networks.	
	<ul> <li>Protect the internal network from themselves. By restricting</li> </ul>	
	certain functionality it can prevent damaging viruses, denial of	
	service attacks caused by Trojans and worms from ever	
	entering the private network. This could cause exposure and damage to XYZ's sensitive information and operations.	

4. General	Checklist Item 7 Section 3 page 82 - Determine if Router is
configured t	to provide Network Address Translation (NAT)
Risk	Router may be open to internet scans
Risk Level	High
Exception	NAT is not enabled
Summary	NAT or Network Address Translator (RFC 1631) is basically the router's ability to translate internal IP addresses to outside public addresses and vice versa. NAT can be used to ensure the inside network is not broadcasted. This ties into exception number 3 by enabling NAT the internal network IP's will not be broadcasted to the public internet. Scans cannot penetrate through NAT to discover the network behind it.

5. General Checklist Item 10 Section 3 page 85 - Determine if Router is able to do IP Address Spoof detection		
Risk	Router may be open to internet scans	
Risk Level	High	
Exception	Router unable to detect IP Address Spoof Detection	
Summary	Routers generally don't do IP address spoof detection in its default configuration. Although the tty 04 port has an access list applied that only allows one IP, that IP can be spoofed (the attacker can make their IP address look like the trusted IP) so that the access list and the router sees it as a trusted device. This can be used to penetrate the XYZ network and either damage or compromise sensitive information.	

6. General Checklist Item 11 Section 3 Page 88 also see RAT Output Appendix		
B - Check L	B - Check Local authentication of Username and passwords	
Risk	System Administration	
	Lack of Security Policy to control Router Activities	
	Configuration Errors	
Risk Level	High	
Exception	No usernames on the router	
e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	All ports does have passwords applied	
Summary	Usernames are a level of Security to authenticate anybody to connect to the router. The primary connection ports only require a	
	password to connect. The username not only provides another level	
	of security (i.e. username and password must match) but will also keep a record on who is supposed to have access to the router.	

7. Cisco Checklist Item 4 Section 3 Page 113 - Cisco Security Notice: MS SQL Worm Mitigation Recommendations

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective 128 Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

Risk	Router open to Denial of Service Attack
Risk Level	High
Exception	Required fix of applying the Cisco Recommended access list is not
	in place or code upgrade
Summary	Cisco Advisories are meant to warn their customers of potential risks to Cisco products. This particular advisory warns of a vulnerability that can cause a denial of service attack. The recommended fix is an access list of code upgrade. Neither has been applied to XYZ law's router. This can cause the router to be compromised and rendered useless. This access list can also stop the internal PC's from being affected by the same attack.

8. Cisco Checklist Item 8 Section 3 Page 119 - Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco		
IOS Interfac	IOS Interface Blocked by IPv4 Packets	
Risk	Router open to Denial of Service Attack	
Risk Level	High	
Exception	Required fix of applying the Cisco Recommended access list is not	
	in place or code upgrade	
Summary	Cisco Advisories are meant to warn their customers of potential risks to Cisco products. This particular advisory warns of a vulnerability that can cause a denial of service attack. The recommended fix is an access list of code upgrade. Neither has been applied to XYZ law's router. This can cause the router to be compromised and rendered useless. This access list can also stop the internal PC's from being affected by the same attack.	

9. General Checklist Item 19 Section 3 Page 105 – Determine if IP Source		
Routing is e	Routing is enabled	
Risk	Risk Router open to Denial of Service Attack and possible compromise	
Risk Level	High	
Exception	Exception IP Source routing is enabled	
Summary	Cisco routers accept source route requests by default. A popular form of attack would be to use this in conjunction with a spoofed IP. The attacker will spoof an IP and send a source route to the router; the router will then see the attackers host as trusted and forward all packets to the attacker's host. The information gathered can then be used to compromise the router and use it for Denial of Service or as a stepping stone into XYZ Law's internal network.	

10. General Checklist Item 20 Section 3 Page 105 – Determine if Proxy Arp is enabled		
Risk	Router open to internet scans	
	Router open to Denial of Service Attack and possible compromise	
Risk Level	High	
Exception	otion IP Proxy Arp is enabled	
Summary	The following is a excerpt from CIS Level 1 Benchmark 2.1 page 24	

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective 129 Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

Section 3.2.47
"Network hosts use the Address Resolution Protocol (arp) to translate network addresses into media addresses. Normally, ARP transactions are confined to a particular LAN segment. A Cisco Router can act as an intermediary for ARP, responding to ARP queries on selected interfaces and thus enabling transparent access between multiple LAN segments. Because it breaks the LAN security perimeter, effectively extending a LAN at layer 2 across multiple segments, proxy arp should only be used between two LAN segments at the same trust level, and only when absolutely necessary to support legacy network architectures. Cisco routers perform proxy arp by default on all IP interfaces."
This can open XYZ Law open to internet scans and possible denial of service attacks that utilize arp as a weapon.

11. General Checklist Item 17 Section 3 Page 98 – Determine if bootp is enabled		
Risk Router open to Denial of Service Attack and possible compromise		
Risk Level	Medium	
Exception	Bootp is enabled	
Summary	Cisco recommends that if bootp is not being used then should be disabled and if enabled can result in a denial of service attack.	

12. General Checklist Item 15Section 3 Page 98 – Determine if the aux port is enabled		
Risk Router open to Denial of Service Attack and possible compromise		
Risk Level	Medium 🚬 💟	
Exception	Aux port is enabled	
Summary In order for the aux port to be accessed it requires a physical connection such as a modem. The router is secured with limited access.		

### 4.2 Audit Recommendations

The recommendations are based on the specific findings of the audit and the overall outlook of XYZ Law firm. The recommendations will be divided into specific exceptions and more general which are both intended to make XYZ Law's network and internet activities more secure. Each recommendation will be accompanied an estimated cost to implement.

# 4.2.2 General Recommendations

The following are general recommendations that should help XYZ Law secure their network and operations

- Security Policy It is a misconceived belief that only large organizations require a security policy. This is not so. XYZ Law should implement a formal Security Policy aimed at protecting their sensitive assets. This can be accomplished by coordinating with their ISP/Consultant Company to give and take direction. The policy can be simple to easier design and implement. Sample security policies can be found at <u>www.sans.org</u>
  - i. Time to design and implement 5 business days Approximate
  - ii. Cost to design and implement this will be based on individual time of XYZ Law personnel but it outsourced average professional services cost is \$125 US an hour or \$1050 US a day. Outsource cost would be \$5250 US
- 2. Arrange a review with the Consultant firm The consultant firm who is responsible for the Cisco Router at XYZ Law should be consulted as the results of this audit. The router is not secure and XYZ Law should consult with the firm to determine why.
  - i. Time One day discussion
  - ii. Cost should be no cost associated
- Enable software features on the existing router Upon investigation of the router it was determined the version of code has the Cisco IOS Feature IOS Firewall. XYZ Law can enable this feature to better protect their perimeter. Some of the enhance features that may be enabled are Context-Based Access Control (the firewall), Authentication Proxy, and limited intrusion detection.
  - i. Time to Design and implement 1 day
  - ii. Cost to design and implement One day professional services \$1050

# 4.2.3 Exception Specific Recommendations

The following are recommendations to fix the existing exceptions that have been reported in this audit. If any or all of the recommendations in the previous section are implemented it may take care of some of the individual exceptions listed here. The time and cost will be associated with each exception.

1. General Check List Item 5 Section 3 Page 75 – Nessus Vulnerability Scan

For Nessus Results see Appendix	
Recommendation	fulfill recommendation 3 in section
	4.2.2
Time	I Business Day
Cost	\$1050 US

2. General Checklist Item 8 Section 3 Page 82 - Test the ACL against the written security policy or against the "Deny All" rule Section 3 page		
Recommendation Have Access List to filter unwanted		
	traffic applied to interfaces	
Time	This will take approximately one day to	
	design against requirements and	
	implement	
Cost	\$1050 US	

3. General Checklist Item 9 Section 3 Page - Verify the router is egress filtering		
local network traffic and the outbound capabilities of the router		
Recommendation Have Access List to filter unwanted		
	traffic applied to egress interface	
Time	This will take approximately one day to	
	design against requirements and	
	implement	
Cost	\$1050 US	

3. General Checklist Item 9 Section 3 Page - Verify the router is egress filtering local network traffic and the outbound capabilities of the router	
Recommendation Have Access List to filter unwanted	
	traffic applied to egress interface
Time	This will take approximately one day to
	design against requirements and
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	implement
Cost	\$1050 US

4. General Checklist Item 7 Section 3 page 82 - Determine if Router is configured to provide Network Address Translation (NAT)	
Recommendation	Apply Network address translation to ensure the private network is not broadcasted to the internet
Time	One hour to implement
Cost	\$125 US

5. General Checklist Item 10 Section 3 page 85 - Determine if Router is able to do IP Address Spoof detection

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective 132 Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

Recommendation	fulfill recommendation 3 in section
	4.2.2
Time	1 Business day
Cost	\$1050 US
6. General Checklist Item 11 Section 3 F	Page 88 also see RAT Output Appendix
B - Check Local authentication of Userna	ame and passwords
Recommendation	Have usernames and passwords
	implemented. Determine a list of
	system admins and have each user ID
	correlate with each system admin.
	Each system admin each should have
	a different password.
Time	1 hour
Cost	\$125 US

7. Cisco Checklist Item 4 Section 3 Page 113 - Cisco Security Notice: MS SQL Worm Mitigation Recommendations	
Recommendation	Implement the Cisco Recommended Access List
Time	1 hour
Cost \$125 US	

8. Cisco Checklist Item 8 Section 3 Page 119 - Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco				
IOS Interface Blocked by IPv4 Packets				
Recommendation Implement the Cisco Recommended				
	Access List			
Time	1 hour			
Cost 🖉 \$125 US				

9. General Checklist Item 19 Section 3 Page 105 – Determine if IP Source				
Routing is enabled				
Recommendation	Disable IP Source Routing			
Time	5 minutes			
Cost	\$125 US (Note charge may still be for			
an hour or there may be a configuration				
<b>9</b> ′	charge)			

10. General Checklist Item 20 Section 3 Page 105 – Determine if Proxy Arp is enabled				
Recommendation	Disable IP proxy Arp			
Time	5 minutes			
Cost	\$125 US (Note charge may still be for an hour or there may be a configuration charge)			

11. General Checklist Item 17 Section 3 Page 98 – Determine if bootp is enabled		
Recommendation	Disable bootp	
Time	5 minutes	
Cost	\$125 US (Note charge may still be for	
	an hour or there may be a configuration	
	charge)	

 12. General Checklist Item 15Section 3 Page 98 – Determine if the aux port is enabled

 Recommendation
 Disable the AUX port

 Time
 5 minutes

 Cost
 \$125 US (Note charge may still be for an hour or there may be a configuration charge)

# 4.2.4 Summary

In its current state XYZ Law and it perimeter router is very open to the public internet. The current router can easily be safer guarded with a few configuration additions. The implementation of a security policy will also put in important guidelines to further enhance XYZ Law's network security

# 5. References

See Section 1.2.3

# Appendixes

#### Appendix A – Nessus Scan Results

						N	essus Scan Rej
			hosts that we adicate these t		ested and issues that were f ats.	ound. Please foll	ow the recommende
					Scan Details		
Hosts which test	were	e alive and	responding du	uring	9 <sub>1</sub>		
Number of s	ecuri	ty holes fo	und		0		
Number of s	ecuri	ity warning	s found		4		
					Host List		
Host(s)				P	ossible Issue		
<u>xxx.xxx.xxx.</u>	<u>xxx</u>			S	ecurity warning(s) found		
return to top	2]						
					Analysis of Host		
Address Host	of	Port/S	ervice		Issue regarding Port		
xxx.xxx.xxx.	xxx	general/t	<u>ср</u>		Security warning(s) found		
XXX.XXX.XXX.	XXX	telnet (23			Security warning(s) found		
XXX.XXX.XXX.	XXX	telnet (23			No Information		
XXX.XXX.XXX.		<u>general/i</u>	·		Security warning(s) found		
XXX.XXX.XXX.	XXX	<u>general/</u>	<u>idp</u>		Security notes found		
			Security	Iss	sues and Fixes: xxx.		< Comparison of the second sec
Туре	P	ort	Issue and	d Fi	ix		
Warning	ge	neral/tcp	The remote h have the FIN		does not discard TCP SYN p set.	backets which	
					e kind of firewall you are us this flaw to bypass its rules		
			See also : http://archive		eohapsis.com/archives/bugt	raq/2002-	

10/0266.html http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/464113

Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch

© SANS Institute 2004,

		Risk factor : Medium BID : <u>7487</u> Nessus ID : <u>11618</u>
Warning	general/tcp	The remote host uses non-random IP IDs, that is, it is possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of the ip packets sent by this host.
		An attacker may use this feature to determine traffic patterns within your network. A few examples (not at all exhaustive) are:
		1. A remote attacker can determine if the remote host sent a packet in reply to another request. Specifically, an attacker can use
		your server as an unwilling participant in a blind portscan of another network.
		2. A remote attacker can roughly determine server requests
		at certain times of the day. For instance, if the server is sending much
		more traffic after business hours, the server may be a reverse
		proxy or other remote access device. An attacker can use this
		information to concentrate his/her efforts on the more critical machines.
		3. A remote attacker can roughly estimate the number of requests that
		a web server processes over a period of time.
		Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch Risk factor : Low Nessus ID : <u>10201</u>
Informational	general/tcp	The remote host is up Nessus ID : 10180
Informational	general/tcp	Nmap found that this host is running Cisco 801/1720 running 12.2.8
		Nessus ID : <u>10336</u>
Informational	general/tcp	The remote host is running CISCO IOS 12.0 Nessus ID : <u>11936</u>
Warning	telnet (23/tcp)	The Telnet service is running. This service is dangerous in the sense that it is not ciphered - that is,
		everyone can sniff the data that passes between the telnet client
		and the telnet server. This includes logins and passwords.
		Solution: If you are running a Unix-type system, OpenSSH can be used
		instead of telnet. For Unix systems, you can comment out the 'telnet' line in
		/etc/inetd.conf. For Unix systems which use xinetd, you will need to modify
		the telnet services file in the /etc/xinetd.d folder. After making any changes to xinetd or
		inetd configuration files, you must restart the service in order

			1
		for the changes to take affect.	
		In addition, many different router and switch manufacturers support SSH as a telnet replacement. You should contact your vendor for a	
		solution which uses an encrypted session.	
		Risk factor : Low CVE : <u>CAN-1999-0619</u> Nessus ID : <u>10280</u>	
Informational		Remote telnet banner :	
	(23/tcp)	xxxxx Internet IISP You must agree to the following before using this system	90
		Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of Aliant Inc. and authorized contractors.Only authorized work	
		using company-supplied programs may be done on this system.Use	
		of this system is an agreement to monitoring.	
		User Access Verification	
		Password: Nessus ID : <u>10281</u>	
Informational	telnet (23/tcp)	Remote telnet banner :	
(25/104)	(23/10)	xxxxx Internet IISP You must agree to the following before using this system	
		Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of Aliant Inc. and authorized contractors.Only authorized work using	
		company-supplied programs may be done on this system.Use of this	
		system is an agreement to monitoring.	
		User Access Verification	
	_	Password: Nessus ID : <u>10281</u>	
Warning	general/icmp	The remote host answers to an ICMP timestamp request. This allows an attacker to know the date which is set on your machine.	
		This may help him to defeat all your time based authentication protocols.	
		Solution : filter out the ICMP timestamp requests (13), and the outgoing ICMP timestamp replies (14).	
		Risk factor : Low CVE : <u>CAN-1999-0524</u>	
Informational	general/udp	Nessus ID : <u>10114</u> For your information, here is the traceroute to	

Author retains full rights.

? xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

Nessus ID : 10287

This file was generated by <u>Nessus</u>, the open-sourced security scanner.

			Nessus Scan Report
This report gives details of steps and procedures to			ound. Please follow the recommended
			~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
		Scan Details	
Hosts which were alive a test	nd responding du	ring 1	
Number of security holes	found	0	
Number of security warn	ings found	0	
			a de la calencia de la ca encia de la calencia de l
		Host List	
Host(s)		Possible Issue	
<u>142.163.224.22</u>		Security note(s) found	
return to top ]		and the second s	
		Analysis of Host	
Address of Host Port,	/Service	Issue regarding Port	
142.163.224.22 genera	I <u>/tcp</u>	Security notes found	
142.163.224.22 finger	(79/tcp)	No Information	
142.163.224.22 netbios	s-ssn (139/tcp)	No Information	
142.163.224.22 unknow	wn (2702/tcp)	No Information	
142.163.224.22 unknow	wn (2701/tcp)	No Information	
	e de la companya de l		
	Security	Issues and Fixes: xxx	.xxx.xxx.xxx
Type Port	Issue and I	Fix	
Informational general/tc	The remote hos Nessus ID : <u>101</u>		
Informational general/tc		at this host is running Turtle Be Vindows NT4 or 95/98/98SE	each AudioTron
	Nessus ID : 103		

This file was generated by <u>Nessus</u>, the open-sourced security scanner.

#### Appendix B – Router Auditing Tool (RAT) Results

# Router Audit Tool report for <u>xyzlaw.txt</u>

Audit Date: Tue Feb 17 13:41:05 2004 GMT

Sort Order: importance,passfail,rule,device,instance,line

Importanc	ePass/Fa	ilRule Name	Device	Instance	Line Number.
10	pass	<u>IOS - no ip http</u>	xyzlaw.tz		
10 10	pass pass	server IOS - login default IOS - forbid SNMP	-		
10	pass	community public IOS - forbid SNMP community private	xyzlaw.tz	xt	
10	FAIL	IOS - require line	xyzlaw.tz	xtaux 0	68
10	FAIL	passwords 10S - no snmp- server	xyzlaw.t:	xtsnmp-server location Con Bay Hwy, Bay Roberts, Newfoundland	2
10	FAIL	<u>IOS - no snmp-</u> server	xyzlaw.t	tty	2
10	FAIL	IOS - no snmp- server	xyzlaw.t.	ktsnmp-server contact Blair Morgan 709-786-9720	2
10	FAIL	IOS - enable secret	xyzlaw.tz		2
10	FAIL	<u>IOS - apply VTY</u> <u>ACL</u>	xyzlaw.tz	ktvty 0 4	69
10	FAIL	IOS - Use local authentication	xyzlaw.t	ktn/a	2
10	FAIL	IOS - Define VTY ACL	xyzlaw.t	ktn/a	2
10	FAIL	<u>IOS - Create local</u> users	xyzlaw.t	ktn/a	2
7	pass	<u>IOS 12 - no udp-</u> small-servers	xyzlaw.tz	xt	
7	pass	<u>IOS 12 - no tcp-</u> small-servers	xyzlaw.tz	ĸt	
7	pass	<u>IOS 12 - no</u>	xyzlaw.tz	xt	

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective139Ray Welshman 19 February 200404,As part of the Information Security Reading RoomAuthor retains full rights.

		directed broadcast		
7	pass	IOS - no service	xyzlaw.txt	
	1	config	5	
7	pass	IOS - no cdp run	xyzlaw.txt	
7	pass	IOS - encrypt	xyzlaw.txt	
	-	passwords	-	
7	FAIL	IOS - no ip source-	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
		route		
7	FAIL	IOS - exec-timeout	xyzlaw.txtvty 0 4	0
5	pass	<u>IOS 12.1,2,3 - no</u>	xyzlaw.txt	
		finger service		
5	pass	IOS - forbid clock	xyzlaw.txt	
		<u>summer-time -</u>		
_		<u>GMT</u>		
5	pass	<u>IOS - enable</u>	xyzlaw.txt	
_		logging		2
5	FAIL	IOS - tcp keepalive	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
_	T A II	service	1	2
2	FAIL	<u>IOS - set syslog</u>	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
5	FAIL	server LOS convice	vyzlovy tyty /o	2
5	ГАIL	<u>IOS - service</u> timestamps logging	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
5	FAIL	<u>IOS - service</u>	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
5	PAIL	timestamps debug	xyziaw.txtii/a	2
5	FAIL	IOS - ntp server 3	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
5	FAIL	IOS - ntp server 2	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
5	FAIL	<u>IOS - ntp server</u>	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
5	FAIL	<u>IOS - no ip bootp</u>	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
		server		
5	FAIL	IOS - logging	xyzlaw.txtn/a	12
		buffered		
5	FAIL	IOS - line password	xyzlaw.txtcon 0	66
		quality		
5	FAIL	IOS - line password	xyzlaw.txtaux 0	68
		quality		
5	FAIL	<u>IOS - VTY</u>	xyzlaw.txtvty 0 4	69
		transport telnet		
3	pass	<u>IOS - logging trap</u>	xyzlaw.txt	
		<u>info or higher</u>		
3	FAIL	IOS - logging	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
		console critical		
3	FAIL	IOS - disable aux	xyzlaw.txtaux 0	68
3	FAIL	<u>IOS - clock</u>	xyzlaw.txtn/a	2
		<u>timezone - GMT</u>		

### Summary for xyzlaw.txt

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective140Ray Welshman 19 February 200404,As part of the Information Security Reading RoomAuthor ref

#Checks	<b>#Passed</b>		# <b>Failed</b>	%Passed
40	14		26	35
<b>Perfect Weighted Sc</b> 273	ore	Actual Wei 100	ighted Score	%Weighted Score 36

### **Ovarall Score (0-10)**

3.6

Note: PerfectWeightedScore is the sum of the importance value of all rules. ActualWeightedScore is the sum of the importance value of all rules passed, minus the sum of the importance each instance of a rule failed.

#### Fix Script for xyzlaw.txt

! The following commands may be entered into the router to fix ! problems found. They must be entered in config mode (IOS). Fixes ! which require specific information (such as uplink interface device ! name) are listed but commented out. Examine them, edit and uncomment. 1 ! THESE CHANGES ARE ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS. 1 ! CHECK THESE COMMANDS BY HAND BEFORE EXECUTING. THEY MAY BE WRONG. ! THEY MAY BREAK YOUR ROUTER. YOU ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ! APPLICATION OF THESE CHANGES. ! enter configuration mode configure terminal ! RULE: IOS - require line passwords 1 ! This fix is commented out because you have to supply a sensitive value. ! To apply this rule, uncomment (remove the leading "!" on the commands below) ! and replace "LINE PASSWORD" with the value you have chosen. ! Do not use "LINE PASSWORD". !line aux 0 !password LINE PASSWORD !exit ! RULE: IOS - no snmp-server no snmp-server ! RULE: IOS - no snmp-server no snmp-server ! RULE: IOS - no snmp-server no snmp-server ! RULE: IOS - enable secret

Author retains full rights.

1 ! This fix is commented out because you have to supply a sensitive value. ! To apply this rule, uncomment (remove the leading "!" on the commands below) ! and replace "ENABLE SECRET" with the value you have chosen. ! Do not use "ENABLE SECRET". 1 !enable secret ENABLE SECRET ! RULE: IOS - apply VTY ACL line vty 0 4 access-class 182 in exit ! RULE: IOS - Use local authentication aaa new-model aaa authentication login default local aaa authentication enable default enable ! RULE: IOS - Define VTY ACL no access-list 182 access-list 182 permit tcp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 any access-list 182 permit tcp host 192.168.1.254 any access-list 182 deny ip any any log ! RULE: IOS - Create local users 1 ! This fix is commented out because you have to supply a sensitive value. ! To apply this rule, uncomment (remove the leading "!" on the commands below) ! and replace "LOCAL PASSWORD" with the value you have chosen. ! Do not use "LOCAL PASSWORD". ! !username username1 password LOCAL PASSWORD ! RULE: IOS - no ip source-route no ip source-route ! RULE: IOS - exec-timeout line vty 0 4 exec-timeout 10 0 exit ! RULE: IOS - tcp keepalive service service tcp-keepalives-in ! RULE: IOS - set syslog server

logging 13.14.15.16 ! RULE: IOS - service timestamps logging service timestamps log datetime show-timezone msec ! RULE: IOS - service timestamps debug service timestamps debug datetime show-timezone msec ! RULE: IOS - ntp server 3 ntp server 9.10.11.12 ! RULE: IOS - ntp server 2 ntp server 5.6.7.8 ! RULE: IOS - ntp server ntp server 1.2.3.4 ! RULE: IOS - no ip bootp server no ip bootp server ! RULE: IOS - logging buffered logging buffered 16000 ! RULE: IOS - line password quality 1 ! This fix is commented out because you have to supply a sensitive value. ! To apply this rule, uncomment (remove the leading "!" on the commands below) ! and replace "LINE\_PASSWORD" with the value you have chosen. ! Do not use "LINE PASSWORD". Instead, choose a value that is longer ! than seven characters, and contains upper- and lower-case letters, ! digits, and punctuation. ! !line con 0 !password LINE PASSWORD !exit ! RULE: IOS - line password quality 1 ! This fix is commented out because you have to supply a sensitive value. ! To apply this rule, uncomment (remove the leading "!" on the commands below) ! and replace "LINE PASSWORD" with the value you have chosen. ! Do not use "LINE PASSWORD". Instead, choose a value that is longer ! than seven characters, and contains upper- and lower-case letters, ! digits, and punctuation. !line aux 0 !password LINE PASSWORD !exit ! RULE: IOS - VTY transport telnet line vty 0 4

As part of the Information Security Reading Room
```
!transport input telnet
exit
! RULE: IOS - logging console critical
logging console critical
! RULE: IOS - disable aux
line aux 0
no exec
transport input none
exit
! RULE: IOS - clock timezone - GMT
clock timezone GMT 0
! Save running configuration so that it will be used each time
! the router is reset/powercycled. Only do this after you are
! SURE everything is correct
! copy running-config startup-config
```

### Appendix C – Show Tech-support result

sho tech xyzlaw#sho tech-support

----- show version ---

**Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software** IOS (tm) C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) TAC Support: http://www.cisco.com/tac Copyright (c) 1986-2003 by cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Sat 01-Nov-03 06:24 by ccai Image text-base: 0x80008120, data-base: 0x81207F5C

ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 12.2(7r)XM1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) ROM: C1700 Software (C1700-BK8NO3R2SY7-M), Version 12.2(15)T9, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2)

xyzlaw uptime is 5 days, 16 hours, 55 minutes System returned to ROM by power-on System image file is "flash:c1700-bk8no3r2sy7-mz.122-15.T9.bin"

# **GSNA** Practical 3.0

This product contains cryptographic features and is subject to United States and local country laws governing import, export, transfer and use. Delivery of Cisco cryptographic products does not imply third-party authority to import, export, distribute or use encryption. Importers, exporters, distributors and users are responsible for compliance with U.S. and local country laws. By using this product you agree to comply with applicable laws and regulations. If you are unable to comply with U.S. and local laws, return this product immediately.

A summary of U.S. laws governing Cisco cryptographic products may be found at: http://www.cisco.com/wwl/export/crypto/tool/stqrg.html

If you require further assistance please contact us by sending email to export@cisco.com.

cisco 1721 (MPC860P) processor (revision 0x100) with 58002K/7534K bytes of memory.
Processor board ID FOC07010MUR (2301023196), with hardware revision 0000 MPC860P processor: part number 5, mask 2
Bridging software.
X.25 software, Version 3.0.0.
1 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
1 FastEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
32K bytes of non-volatile configuration memory.
16384K bytes of processor board System flash (Read/Write)

Configuration register is 0x142

------ show running-config ------

Building configuration...

Current configuration : 1475 bytes !

version 12.2

service timestamps debug datetime localtime service timestamps log datetime localtime service password-encryption

hostname xyzlaw

logging queue-limit 100 logging buffered 4096 debugging enable password 7 <removed>

```
۱
ip subnet-zero
ip tftp source-interface Ethernet0
no ip domain lookup
ip audit notify log
ip audit po max-events 100
interface Ethernet0
description Customer LAN Segment
ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.258.248
half-duplex
no cdp enable
interface FastEthernet0
description Connection to ISP
ip address xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.252
speed auto
no cdp enable
ip classless
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
no ip http server
no ip http secure-server
!
access-list 10 permit xxx.xxx.xxx
no cdp run
!
snmp-server location aaaa,bbbb,bbbbb
snmp-server contact xxxx,xxxx,xxxx,xxxx,xxxx
snmp-server enable traps tty
banner motd ^C
          xxxxx Internet IISP
  You must agree to the following before using this system
```

Use of this system is restricted to authorized employees of

Aliant Inc. and authorized contractors.Only authorized work using company-supplied programs may be done on this system.Use of this

system is an agreement to monitoring.

```
^C
!
line con 0
exec-timeout 0 0
password 7 <removed>
login
line aux 0
line vty 0 4
access-class 10 in
exec-timeout 30 0
password 7 <removed>
login
!
no scheduler allocate
end
```

----- show stacks ------

Minimum process stacks: Free/Size Name 9252/12000 Init 5448/6000 PostOfficeNet 5444/6000 RADIUS INITCONFIG 9720/12000 Exec 5492/6000 CDP Protocol 10616/12000 Virtual Exec

Interrupt level stacks: Level Called Unused/Size Name 3 0 9000/9000 PA Management Int Handler 4 1766205 7360/9000 Network interfaces 5 0 9000/9000 Timebase Reference Interrupt 6 25424 8880/9000 16552 Con/Aux Interrupt 7 123237223 8920/9000 MPC860P TIMER INTERRUPT

----- show interfaces -----

Ethernet0 is up, line protocol is down Hardware is PQUICC Ethernet, address is 0004.dd0d.280c (bia 0004.dd0d.280c) Description: Customer LAN Segment

```
GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective147Ray Welshman 19 February 200404,As part of the Information Security Reading RoomAuthor re
```

Author retains full rights.

Internet address is xxx.xxx.xxx/29 MTU 1500 bytes, BW 10000 Kbit, DLY 1000 usec, reliability 128/255, txload 1/255, rxload 1/255 Encapsulation ARPA, loopback not set Keepalive set (10 sec) Half-duplex, 10BaseT ARP type: ARPA, ARP Timeout 04:00:00 Last input 11:34:31, output 00:00:09, output hang never Last clearing of "show interface" counters never Input queue: 0/75/0/0 (size/max/drops/flushes); Total output drops: 0 Queueing strategy: fifo Output queue: 0/40 (size/max) 5 minute input rate 0 bits/sec, 0 packets/sec 5 minute output rate 0 bits/sec, 0 packets/sec 112245 packets input, 7222854 bytes, 0 no buffer Received 5318 broadcasts, 0 runts, 0 giants, 0 throttles 4160 input errors, 0 CRC, 0 frame, 0 overrun, 4160 ignored 0 input packets with dribble condition detected 136322 packets output, 8168373 bytes, 0 underruns 4160 output errors, 13960 collisions, 1 interface resets 0 babbles, 0 late collision, 215 deferred 4160 lost carrier, 0 no carrier 0 output buffer failures, 0 output buffers swapped out FastEthernet0 is up, line protocol is up Hardware is PQUICC FEC, address is 000b.5f70.ec3a (bia 000b.5f70.ec3a) Description: Connection to ISP Internet address is xxx.xxx.xxx/30 MTU 1500 bytes, BW 100000 Kbit, DLY 100 usec, reliability 255/255, txload 1/255, rxload 1/255 Encapsulation ARPA, loopback not set Keepalive set (10 sec) Auto-duplex, 10Mb/s, 100BaseTX/FX ARP type: ARPA, ARP Timeout 04:00:00 Last input 00:07:31, output 00:00:05, output hang never Last clearing of "show interface" counters never Input queue: 0/75/1588/0 (size/max/drops/flushes); Total output drops: 0 Queueing strategy: fifo Output queue: 0/40 (size/max) 5 minute input rate 0 bits/sec, 0 packets/sec 5 minute output rate 0 bits/sec, 0 packets/sec 540532 packets input, 39547654 bytes Received 1294 broadcasts, 0 runts, 0 giants, 0 throttles 0 input errors, 0 CRC, 0 frame, 0 overrun, 0 ignored 0 watchdog 0 input packets with dribble condition detected 600315 packets output, 41764749 bytes, 0 underruns

4 output errors, 8250 collisions, 1 interface resets 0 babbles, 0 late collision, 3220 deferred 4 lost carrier, 0 no carrier 0 output buffer failures, 0 output buffers swapped out Virtual-Access1 is up, line protocol is up Hardware is Virtual Access interface MTU 1492 bytes, BW 100000 Kbit, DLY 100000 usec, reliability 255/255, txload 1/255, rxload 1/255 Base PPPoE vaccess, loopback not set DTR is pulsed for 5 seconds on reset Last input never, output never, output hang never Last clearing of "show interface" counters 5d16h Input queue: 0/4096/0/0 (size/max/drops/flushes); Total output drops: 0 Queueing strategy: fifo Output queue: 0/40 (size/max) 5 minute input rate 0 bits/sec, 0 packets/sec 5 minute output rate 0 bits/sec, 0 packets/sec 0 packets input, 0 bytes, 0 no buffer Received 0 broadcasts, 0 runts, 0 giants, 0 throttles 0 input errors, 0 CRC, 0 frame, 0 overrun, 0 ignored, 0 abort 0 packets output, 0 bytes, 0 underruns 0 output errors, 0 collisions, 0 interface resets 0 output buffer failures, 0 output buffers swapped out 0 carrier transitions ------ show controllers ------PQUICC Ethernet unit 0 using SCC2, Microcode ver 0 Current station address 0004.dd0d.280c, default address 8167.0758.81cf idb at 0x81DB4CCC, driver data structure at 0x81D9AC68 SCC Registers: General [GSMR]=0x0:0x1088003C, Protocol-specific [PSMR]=0x80A Events [SCCE]=0x0000, Mask [SCCM]=0x001F, Status [SCCS]=0x0002 Transmit on Demand [TODR]=0x0, Data Sync [DSR]=0xD555 Interrupt Registers: Config [CICR]=0x00365F80, Pending [CIPR]=0x00000C00 Mask [CIMR]=0x20200000, In-srv [CISR]=0x00000000 Command register [CR]=0x640 Port A [PADIR]=0x0000, [PAPAR]=0x060C [PAODR]=0x0000, [PADAT]=0xFDFF Port B [PBDIR]=0x0000200F, [PBPAR]=0x0000200E [PBODR]=0x00000000, [PBDAT]=0x0003DFFC Port C [PCDIR]=0x0000, [PCPAR]=0x0000 [PCSO]=0x00C0, [PCDAT]=0x0F3E, [PCINT]=0x0000 wic enet regs ptr->ctrl reg is0xBD

SCC GENERAL PARAMETER RAM (at 0xFF003D00) Rx BD Base [RBASE]=0x2530, Fn Code [RFCR]=0x18 Tx BD Base [TBASE]=0x25B0, Fn Code [TFCR]=0x18 Max Rx Buff Len [MRBLR]=1520 Rx State [RSTATE]=0x18000000, BD Ptr [RBPTR]=0x2558 Tx State [TSTATE]=0x18000AE3, BD Ptr [TBPTR]=0x25C0

SCC ETHERNET PARAMETER RAM (at 0xFF003D30) CRC Preset [C\_PRES]=0xFFFFFFF, Mask [C\_MASK]=0xDEBB20E3 Errors: CRC [CRCEC]=0, Alignment [ALEC]=0, Discards [DISFC]=0 PAD Char [PADS]=0x0 Retry Limit [RET\_LIM]=15, Count [RET\_CNT]=15 Frame Lengths: [MAXFLR]=1518, [MINFLR]=64 Max DMA Lengths: [MAXD1]=1518, [MAXD2]=1518 Group Address Filter [GADDRn]=0000:0000:0000 Indiv Address Filter [IADDRn]=0000:0000:0000 Physical Address [PADDR1]=0C28.0DDD.0400 Last Address Set in Filter [TADDR]=0000.0000.0000 Persistence [P\_Per]=0, Backoff Cnt [BOFF\_CNT]=65535 BD Pointers: First Rx [RFBD]=0x0, First Tx [TFBD]=0x25C0, Last Tx [TLBD]=0x25B8

Software MAC address filter(hash:length/addr/mask/hits): Receive Ring

rmd(FF002530): status 9000 length 42 address 39E7B44 rmd(FF002538): status 9000 length 42 address 39E67C4 rmd(FF002540): status 9000 length 42 address 39ED644 rmd(FF002548): status 9000 length 42 address 39ECFC4 rmd(FF002550): status 9000 length 42 address 39EC2C4 rmd(FF002558): status 9000 length 72 address 39EE344 rmd(FF002560): status 9000 length F7 address 39EDCC4 rmd(FF002568): status 9000 length 72 address 39E2D44 rmd(FF002570): status 9000 length 72 address 39E74C4 rmd(FF002578): status 9000 length 72 address 39E81C4 rmd(FF002580): status 9000 length 72 address 39E9BC4 rmd(FF002588): status 9000 length 72 address 39E5AC4 rmd(FF002590): status 9000 length 72 address 39E4744 rmd(FF002598): status 9000 length 72 address 39EC944 rmd(FF0025A0): status 9000 length 72 address 39EA244 rmd(FF0025A8): status B000 length 72 address 39EBC44 **Transmit Ring** tmd(FF0025B0): status 5C01 length 3C address 39EFD4A tmd(FF0025B8): status 5C01 length 3C address 39F0ECA tmd(FF0025C0): status 5C01 length 3C address 39F100A tmd(FF0025C8): status 5C01 length 3C address 39F038A tmd(FF0025D0): status 5C01 length 3C address 39F060A

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective 150 Ray Welshman 19 February 2004 04, As part of the Information Security Reading Room Author re

## **GSNA** Practical 3.0

tmd(FF0025D8): status 5C01 length 3C address 39EF70A tmd(FF0025E0): status 5C01 length 3C address 38A644A tmd(FF0025E8): status 5C01 length 3C address 38A5B8A tmd(FF0025F0): status 5C01 length 3C address 38A52CA tmd(FF002600): status 5C01 length 3C address 38A48CA tmd(FF002600): status 5C01 length 3C address 38A61CA tmd(FF002608): status 5C01 length 3C address 39F0B0A tmd(FF002610): status 5C01 length 3C address 39F128A tmd(FF002618): status 5C01 length 3C address 39EFFCA tmd(FF002620): status 5C01 length 3C address 39EFFCA tmd(FF002628): status 5C01 length 3C address 39EFFCA tmd(FF002628): status 5C01 length 3C address 39EFFCA tmd(FF002628): status 5C01 length 3C address 39EFACA 4160 missed datagrams, 0 overruns 0 transmitter underruns, 0 excessive collisions 5549 single collisions, 8411 multiple collisions 0 dma memory errors, 0 CRC errors

0 alignment errors, 0 runts, 0 giants QUICC SCC specific errors: 4160 buffer errors, 0 overflow errors 0 input aborts on late collisions 0 throttles, 0 enables

Interface FastEthernet0 Hardware is PQUICC MPC860P ADDR: 81CBDBEC, FASTSEND: 8001209C **DIST ROUTE ENABLED: 0** Route Cache Flag: 1 ADDR LOW =0x000B5F70, ADDR HIGH =0x0000EC3A, HASH HIGH =0x00000000, HASH LOW =0x00000000 R DES ST =0x039BBF20, X DES ST =0x039BC060, R BUFF SIZ=0x00000600, ECNTRL =0xF0000006 IEVENT =0x00000000, IMASK =0x0A000000, IVEC =0xC0000000. R DES ACT=0x01000000 X DES ACT=0x00000000, MII DATA =0x504A0062, MII SPEED =0x00000014, R BOUND =0x00000600R FSTART =0x00000500, X FSTART =0x00000440, FUN CODE =0x7F000000, R CNTRL =0x0000006 R HASH =0x320005F2 X CNTRL =0x0000000 HW filtering information: Promiscuous Mode Disabled Software MAC address filter(hash:length/addr/mask/hits): pquicc fec instance=0x81CC0024 rx ring entries=32, tx ring entries=32 rxring=0x39BBF20, rxr shadow=0x81CC0230, rx head=0, rx tail=0

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective 151 Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

As part of the Information Security Reading Room

txring=0x39BC060, txr shadow=0x81CC02DC, tx\_head=28, tx\_tail=28, tx\_count=0

### RX\_RING\_ENTRIES

status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39D4060 status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39C0E60 status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39C5AE0 status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39DC640 status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39CBA80 status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39D1A20 status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39C01A0 status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39CB420 status 8000, len 500, buf ptr 39C8120 status 8000, len 40, buf ptr 39D8CE0 status 8000, len 55, buf ptr 39D46C0 status 8000, len 55, buf ptr 39C9AA0 status 8000, len 5D, buf ptr 39C4E20 status 8000, len 5D, buf ptr 39DA660 status 8000, len 40, buf ptr 39DCCA0 status 8000, len 55, buf ptr 39D00A0 status 8000, len 40, buf ptr 39D6D00 status 8000, len 55, buf ptr 39D3A00 status 8000, len 5D, buf ptr 39DDFC0 status 8000, len 5D, buf ptr 39BE1C0 status 8000, len 40, buf ptr 39CE720 status 8000, len 55, buf ptr 39CD400 status 8000, len 40, buf ptr 39BDB60 status 8000, len 55, buf ptr 39D2D40 status 8000, len 5D, buf ptr 39C67A0 status 8000, len 5D, buf ptr 39D66A0 status 8000, len 40, buf ptr 39DBFE0 status 8000, len 55, buf ptr 39C47C0 status 8000, len 40, buf ptr 39BFB40 status 8000, len 55, buf ptr 39CED80 status 8000, len 5D, buf ptr 39DD300 status A000, len 5D, buf ptr 39CADC0

### TX\_RING\_ENTRIES

status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 38A4F0A status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 38A5E0A status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 39F13CA status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 38A540A status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 39F088A status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 39F04CA status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 39F074A status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 38A4DCA status 0, len 3C, buf\_ptr 39F024A

status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A57CA status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A5CCA status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39F150A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A590A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39EFC0A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39EF84A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A504A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39F09CA status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39EF98A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A66CA status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39F114A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A4B4A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39F0D8A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A658A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39EFE8A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A5F4A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A4F0A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A5E0A \*Mar 6 16:55:59: %PQUICC ETHER-1-LOSTCARR: Unit 0, lost carrier. Transceiver problem? status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39F13CA status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39F0D8A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 38A658A status 0, len 3C, buf ptr 39EFE8A status 2000, len 3C, buf ptr 38A5F4A throttled=0, enabled=0, disabled=0 rx framing err=0, rx overflow err=0, rx buffer err=0 rx no enp=0, rx discard=0 tx one col err=1954, tx more col err=6296, tx no enp=0, tx deferred err=3220 tx underrun err=0, tx late collision err=0, tx loss carrier err=4 tx exc collision err=0, tx buff err=0, fatal tx err=0 PHY registers: Register 00 1000 Register 01 782D Register 02 0013 Register 03 78E2 Register 04 01E1 Register 05 0021 Register 06 0004 Register 16 0084 Register 17 0580 Register 18 0062 Register 19 0000 Register 20 4732

----- show file systems ------

File Systems:

Size(t	b) F	Free(b)	Type I	Flags 1	Prefixes		
2968	88	26071	nvram	rw	nvram:		
-		- opaqu	ie rw	system	m:		
-		- opaqu	ie rw	null:			
-		- opaqı	ie ro	xmod	em:		
-		- opaqı	ie ro	ymod	em:		
-		- netwo	rk rw	tftp:			
* 16515	5072	608748	34 flas	h rw	v flash:		
-		- netwo	rk rw	rcp:			
-		- netwo	rk rw	ftp:			
-		- netwo	rk rw	scp:			
		- dir nvra	m:				
	0	,					
Directory	y of n	vram:/					
27	_	1 4 7 1	<i>(</i> ,	- 1-4-5	V.	<b>C</b> .	
27 - rw	7_	1471	<n <="" td=""><td>n date:</td><td>&gt; startun</td><td>config</td><td></td></n>	n date:	> startun	config	

27 -rw-	1471	<no date=""> startup-config</no>
28	46	<no date=""> private-config</no>
1 -rw-	0	<no date=""> ifIndex-table</no>
2	12	<no date=""> persistent-data</no>

29688 bytes total (26071 bytes free)

----- show flash: all ------

Partition Size Used Free Bank-Size State Copy Mode 16128K 10183K 5944K 8192K Read/Write 1 Direct

System flash directory:

File Length Name/status fcksum ccksum

addr

1 10427524 c1700-bk8no3r2sy7-mz.122-15.T9.bin

0x423A 0x423A 0x40

[10427588 bytes used, 6087484 available, 16515072 total] 16384K bytes of processor board System flash (Read/Write)

Chip Bank Code Size Name 1 1 8917 8192KB INTEL 28F640J3 1 2 8917 8192KB INTEL 28F640J3

----- show memory statistics ------

Head Total(b) Used(b) Free(b) Lowest(b) Largest(b) Processor 81CB14BC 30111812 5165744 24946068 24751860 24201180 I/O 38A4800 7714816 1516532 6198284 6091732 6198236

----- show process memory -----

Total: 37826628, Used: 6682184, Free: 31144444								
		TY Allocate		Freed Ho			Getbufs Retbufs Process	
0	0	152244	1089	2 563068	30	0	0 0 *Init*	
0	0	504 39	914156	5 504		0	0 *Sched*	
0	0	14684920	8830	568 654	412	1	63260 0 *Dead*	
1	0	0	0	6884	0		0 Chunk Manager	
2	0	188	188	3884		0	0 Load Meter	
3	0	9523080	95173	352 229	32		0 🔊 0 Exec	
4	0	292876	0	13736		0	0 IP SNMP	
5	0	0	0	6884	0		0 Check heaps	
6	0	599048	12326	54 2588	0	470	0900 589760 Pool Manager	
7	0	0	0	6884	0		0 AAA_SERVER_DEADT	
8	0	188	188	6884		0	0 Timers	
9	0	188	188	6884		0	0 Serial Backgroun	
10	0	188	188	6884		0	0 AAA high-capacit	
11	0	1228	16936	5 7236		0	0 ARP Input	
12	0	188	188	6884		0	0 DDR Timers	
13	0	0	0	6884	0		0 HC Counter Timer	
14	0	5812	1016	11680		0	0 Entity MIB API	
15	0	188	188	6884		0	0 ATM Idle Timer	
16	0	0 <	0	6884	0		0 SERIAL A'detect	
17	0	188	188	6884		0	0 GraphIt	
18	0	188	188	12884		0	0 Dialer event	
19	0	0	0	6884	0		0 Critical Bkgnd	
20	0	20916	0	13148		0	0 Net Background	
21	0	188	188	12884		0	0 Logger	
22	0	39308	324	7020		0	0 TTY Background	
23	0	0	0	9884	0		0 Per-Second Jobs	
24	0	0	0	3884	0		0 IPM_C1700_CLOCK	
25	0	0	0	6884	0		0 Net Input	
26	0	188	188	6884		0	0 Compute load avg	
27	0	0	0	6884	0		0 Per-minute Jobs	
28	0	188	188	6884		0	0 AAA Server	

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective155Ray Welshman 19 February 200420404,As part of the Information Security Reading RoomAuthor re

Author retains full rights.

29	0	0	0	6884	0		0 AAA ACCT Proc
30	0	0	0	6884	0		0 ACCT Periodic Pr
31	0	188	188	6944	0	)	0 AAA Dictionary R
32	0	803312	2458				1800 54720 IP Input
33	0	0	0	6884	0		0 ICMP event handl
35	0	ů 0	0	12884	0		0 SSS Manager
36	0	0	0	12884	0		0 SSS Test Client
37	0	376	376	12884		0	0 PPP Hooks
38	0	5044	0	11928	0		0 X.25 Encaps Mana
39	0	0	0	12884	0		0 VPDN call manage
40	0	17200	188		Ũ	0	0 PPPOE discovery
41	0	0	0	6884	0	•	0 PPPOE background
42	0	188	188	12884		0	0 KRB5 AAA
43	0	188	188	12884		0	0 PPP IP Route
44	0	188	188	12884		0	0 PPP IPCP
45	0	924	1016	10020		0	0 IP Background
46	0	176	0	10060	0		0 IP RIB Update
47	0		32076	12884		0	0 TCP Timer
48	0	4307336				•	0 0 TCP Protocols
49	0	0	0	6884	0		0 RARP Input
50	0	0	Ő	6884	0		0 Socket Timers
51	0	42784	4092			0	
52	0	32708	290		•	0	0 DHCPD Receive
53	0		95120	6884	0		0 IP Cache Ager
54	0	0	0	6884	0		0 PAD InCall
55	0	188	188	12884		0	0 X.25 Background
56	0	188	188	6884	0		0 PPP SSS
57	0	188	188	6884	0		0 Adj Manager
58	0	188	188	6944	0		0 PPP Bind
59	0	0	0	6884	0		0 Inspect Timer
60	0	2052	188	8748		0	0 URL filter proc
61	0	0	0	6884	0	-	0 Authentication P
62	0	0	0	6884	0		0 IDS Timer
63	0	0	0	24884	0		0 COPS
64	0	188	188	6884	0	)	0 Dialer Forwarder
65	0	0	0	6884	0		0 SNMP Timers
66	0	0 )	0	6884	0		0 XSM EVENT ENGINE
67	0	0	0	12884	0		0 XSM ENQUEUER
68	0	0	0	12884	0		0 XSM Historian
69	0	188	188	6884	0	)	0 LOCAL AAA
70	0	188	188	6884	0	)	0 ENABLE AAA
71	0	188	188	6884	0		0 LINE AAA
72	0	188	188	6884	0		0 TPLUS
73	0	188	188	6884	0		0 CRM CALL UPDATE
74	0	508916	0	12884		0	0 PDU DISPATCHER
75	0	188	188	6884	0		0 Crypto Support
			,		-		21 11

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective156Ray Welshman 19 February 200404,As part of the Information Security Reading RoomAuthor re

Author retains full rights.

© SANS Institute 2004,

70	0	0	0	10004	0		
76	0	0	0	12884	0		0 Encrypt Proc
77	0	0	0	8884	0		0 Key Proc
78	0	15284	724	1 23444		0	0 Crypto CA
79	0	0	0	8884	0		0 Crypto SSL
80	0	2936	272	27820		0	0 Crypto ACL
81	0	12432	0	25316		0	0 Crypto Delete Ma
82	0	71468	5780	)4 19664	4	C	0 Crypto IKMP
83	0	146324	1474	164 1228	84		0 0 IPSEC key engine
84	0	0	0	6884	0		0 IPSEC manual key
85	0	0	0	6884	0		0 CRYPTO QoS proce
86	0	188	188	6884		0	0 AAA SEND STOP EV
87	0	0	0	6884	0		0 Syslog Traps
88	0	376	188	7072		0	0 IpSecMibTopN
89	0	1864	0	8748	(	0	0 SAA Event Proces
90	0	0	0	6884	0		0 VPDN Scal
91	0	0	0	6884	0		0 DHCPD Timer
92	0	188	0	7072	0	)	0 DHCPD Database
93	0	10520	8014	16 2292	8	(	0 0 SNMP ENGINE
94	0	0	0	12884	0		0 SNMP ConfCopyPro
95	0	0	0	12884	0		0 SNMP Traps
96	0	0	0	6884	0		0 CRYPTO IKMP IPC
			668	1264 Total			

----- show process cpu ------

CPU utilization for five seconds: 0%/0%; one minute: 1%; five minutes: 0% PID Runtime(ms) Invoked uSecs 5Sec 1Min 5Min TTY Process

1 11	1 cantenne (	<u> </u>	
1	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Chunk Manager
2	16	98591	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Load Meter
3	26896	4845	5551 0.57% 1.64% 0.71% 0 Exec
4	532	1757	302 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IP SNMP
5	267012	50624	4√ 5274 0.00% 0.04% 0.05% 0 Check heaps
6	76	51	1490 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Pool Manager
7	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 AAA_SERVER_DEADT
8	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Timers
9	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Serial Backgroun
10	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 AAA high-capacit
11	2260	12987	174 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 ARP Input
12	4	2	2000 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 DDR Timers
13	12	24643	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 HC Counter Timer
14	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Entity MIB API
15	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 ATM Idle Timer
16	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 SERIAL A'detect
17	56	492734	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 GraphIt
18	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Dialer event

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective 157 Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

As part of the Information Security Reading Room

10	
19	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Critical Bkgnd
20	7820 76831 101 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Net Background
21	12 1545 7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Logger
22	104 492731 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 TTY Background
23	1256 492744 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Per-Second Jobs
24	0 1644 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IPM C1700 CLOCK
25	0   1   0   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%
	1
26	1 0
27	229952 8241 27903 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0 Per-minute Jobs
28	0 2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 AAA Server
29	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 AAA ACCT Proc
30	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 ACCT Periodic Pr
31	0 2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 AAA Dictionary R
32	276472 235501 1173 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IP Input
33	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 ICMP event handl
35	0   1   0   0.00%   0.00%   0.00%   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
36	16 65713 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 SSS Test Client
37	4 3 1333 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PPP Hooks
38	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 X.25 Encaps Mana
39	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 VPDN call manage
40	4 3 1333 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PPPOE discovery
41	3108 30791837 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PPPOE background
42	0 2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 KRB5 AAA
43	4 2 2000 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PPP IP Route
44	0 2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PPP IPCP
45	14016 8241 1700 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IP Background
46	32 8208 3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IP RIB Update
47	28 638 43 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 TCP Timer
48	884 618 1430 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 TCP Protocols
40 49	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 RARP Input
	1
50	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Socket Timers
51	44 37 1189 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 HTTP CORE
52	8 16 500 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 DHCPD Receive
53	528 8213 64 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IP Cache Ager
54	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PAD InCall
55	0 2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 X.25 Background
56	0 🔄 2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PPP SSS
57	1056 8216 128 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Adj Manager
58	0 2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PPP Bind
59	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
60	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
61	1
62	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IDS Timer
63	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 COPS
64	0 2 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Dialer Forwarder
65	0 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 SNMP Timers

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective 158 Ray Welshman 19 February 2004 As part of the Information Security Reading Room

66	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 XSM EVENT ENGINE
67	12	49274	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 XSM ENQUEUER
68	32	49274	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 XSM Historian
69	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 LOCAL AAA
70	ů 0	$\frac{1}{2}$	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 ENABLE AAA
71	Ő	$\frac{1}{2}$	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 LINE AAA
72	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 TPLUS
73	0	16434	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 CRM CALL UPDATE
74	660	1757	375 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 PDU DISPATCHER
75	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Crypto Support
76	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Encrypt Proc
77	4		4000 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Key Proc
78	0	4	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Crypto CA
79	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Crypto SSL
80	0	3	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Crypto ACL
81	0	16	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Crypto Delete Ma
82	220	33162	6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Crypto IKMP
83	1172	24649	
84	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IPSEC manual key
85	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 CRYPTO QoS proce
86	0	2	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 AAA SEND STOP EV
87	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 Syslog Traps
88	4	2 2	2000 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 IpSecMibTopN
89	1976	12310146	
90	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 VPDN Scal
91	0	4108	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 DHCPD Timer
92	2568	139606	18 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 DHCPD Database
93	744	1757	423 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 SNMP ENGINE
94	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 SNMP ConfCopyPro
95	0	1	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 SNMP Traps
96	0	43	0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 CRYPTO IKMP IPC

----- show process cpu history ------

		1	1	1	1	1	
12	-	-					

1111111	66666	111111111122222
100		
90		
80		
70		
60		
50		
10		

- 40
- 30 20

GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective 159 Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

© SANS Institute 2004,

As part of the Information Security Reading Room

----- show context -----

No valid exception information to display.

----- show diag ------

Slot 0:

C1721 1FE Mainboard Port adapter, 2 ports Port adapter is analyzed Port adapter insertion time unknown EEPROM contents at hardware discovery: Hardware Revision : 1.0 PCB Serial Number : FOC07010MUR Part Number : 73-7546-01 Board Revision : A0 Fab Version :04 Product Number : CISCO1721 **EEPROM** format version 4 **EEPROM** contents (hex): 0x00: 04 FF 40 03 5A 41 01 00 C1 8B 46 4F 43 30 37 30 0x10: 31 30 4D 55 52 82 49 1D 7A 01 42 41 30 02 04 FF WIC Slot 1: Ethernet 10bT WAN daughter card-Version 4 TLV Cookie Format Hardware Revision : 3.0 Part Number : 73-5797-03 **Board Revision** : A0 Deviation Number : 0-0 : 02

Fab Version PCB Serial Number : FOC06520B0E RMA Test History :00 RMA Number : 0-0-0-0 **RMA** History :00 Top Assy. Part Number : 800-09311-03 Connector Type : 01 Chassis MAC Address : 0004.dd0d.280c MAC Address block size : 1 Product Number : WIC-1ENET=

------ show c1700 ------

C1700 Platform Information: Interrupts:

Assigned Handlers... Vect Handler # of Ints Name 01 80214ED4 07589A24 MPC860P TIMER INTERRUPT 02 802844A0 00006BD4 16552 Con/Aux Interrupt 03 80281B9C 00000000 Timebase Reference Interrupt 04 8028FC18 00000005 WIC Network IO Int & pquice fec speed/dup INT handler 05 8028FC60 000ACE47 MPC860P CPM INTERRUPT 13 800138E4 001024FA pquicc fec interrupt IOS Priority Masks... Level 00 = [ 7C040000 ] Level 01 = [7C040000]Level 02 = [7C040000]Level 03 = [7C040000] Level 04 = [ 70000000 ] Level 05 = [ 6000000 ] Level 06 = [40000000]Level 07 = [ 00000000 ] SIU IRQ MASK = FFFFFFF SIEN = 7C04xxxx Current Level = 00Spurious IRQs = 00000000 SIPEND = 0000xxxx Interrupt Throttling: Throttle Count = 00000000 Timer Count = 00000000Netint usec = 0000000 Netint Mask usec = 000003E8= 0 Configured 0 Active = Longest IRQ = 00000000IDMA Status: Requests = 00462777 Drops = 00001588Complete = 00461189Post Coalesce Frames = 00461189Giant = 00000000Available Blocks = 256/256----- show controllers t1 ------

----- show controllers e1 -----

----- show controllers j1 -----

----- show region -----

Region Manager:

Start End Size(b) Class Media Name 0x038A4800 0x03FFFFFF 7714816 Iomem R/W iomem 0x60000000 0x60FFFFF 16777216 Flash R/O flash 0x80000000 0x838A47FF 59394048 Local R/W main 0x80008120 0x81207F5B 18873916 IText R/O main:text 0x81207F5C 0x81A17873 8452376 IData R/W main:data 0x8166B2A8 0x81697547 180896 Local R/W data: ADSL firmware 0x8197F328 0x81A17587 623200 Local R/W data:firmware 0x81A17874 0x81CB14BB 2726984 IBss R/W main:bss 0x81CB14BC 0x838A47FF 29307716 Local R/W main:heap

------ show buffers ------

Buffer elements:

500 in free list (500 max allowed) 1098834 hits, 0 misses, 0 created

Public buffer pools:

Small buffers, 104 bytes (total 50, permanent 50, peak 98 @ 3d00h): 50 in free list (20 min, 150 max allowed) 970535 hits, 89 misses, 133 trims, 133 created 0 failures (0 no memory) Middle buffers, 600 bytes (total 25, permanent 25): 25 in free list (10 min, 150 max allowed) 4806 hits, 0 misses, 0 trims, 0 created 0 failures (0 no memory) Big buffers, 1536 bytes (total 50, permanent 50): 50 in free list (5 min, 150 max allowed) 5897 hits, 0 misses, 0 trims, 0 created 0 failures (0 no memory) VeryBig buffers, 4520 bytes (total 10, permanent 10): 10 in free list (0 min, 100 max allowed) 0 hits, 0 misses, 0 trims, 0 created 0 failures (0 no memory)

Large buffers, 5024 bytes (total 0, permanent 0): 0 in free list (0 min, 10 max allowed) 0 hits, 0 misses, 0 trims, 0 created 0 failures (0 no memory) Huge buffers, 18024 bytes (total 1, permanent 0, peak 6 @ 2d23h): 1 in free list (0 min, 4 max allowed) 26125 hits, 5 misses, 33 trims, 34 created 0 failures (0 no memory) Header pools: Header buffers, 0 bytes (total 137, permanent 128, peak 137 @ 5d16h): 9 in free list (10 min, 512 max allowed) 125 hits, 3 misses, 0 trims, 9 created 0 failures (0 no memory) 128 max cache size, 128 in cache 494 hits in cache, 0 misses in cache Particle Clones: 1024 clones, 0 hits, 0 misses Public particle pools: F/S buffers, 256 bytes (total 384, permanent 384): 128 in free list (128 min, 1024 max allowed) 256 hits, 0 misses, 0 trims, 0 created 0 failures (0 no memory) 256 max cache size, 256 in cache 0 hits in cache, 0 misses in cache Normal buffers, 1548 bytes (total 512, permanent 512): 384 in free list (128 min, 1024 max allowed) 370 hits, 0 misses, 0 trims, 0 created 0 failures (0 no memory) 128 max cache size, 128 in cache 0 hits in cache, 0 misses in cache Private particle pools: FastEthernet0 buffers, 1536 bytes (total 96, permanent 96): 0 in free list (0 min, 96 max allowed) 96 hits, 0 fallbacks 96 max cache size, 64 in cache 542120 hits in cache. 0 misses in cache Ethernet0 buffers, 1548 bytes (total 32, permanent 32): 0 in free list (0 min, 32 max allowed) 32 hits, 0 fallbacks 32 max cache size. 16 in cache 112051 hits in cache, 194 misses in cache

show crypto ipsec client ezvpn
Easy VPN Remote Phase: 2
show ip nat statistics
show ip nat translations
show crypto map
No crypto maps found.
show access-list
Standard IP access list 10 10 permit xxx.xxx.xxx (715 matches)
show crypto isakmp policy
Default protection suite encryption algorithm: DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys). hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard authentication method: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature Diffie-Hellman group: #1 (768 bit) lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit
show crypto ipsec transform
show crypto ipsec profile
show crypto isakmp sa
GSNA Practical 3.0 Auditing a Cisco 1720 Router: An Auditor's Perspective

165

Ray Welshman 19 February 2004

dst	src	state	conn-id slot	
		show crypto en	gine connection activ	/e
ID In	terface	IP-Address	State Algorithm	Encrypt Decrypt
		show crypto ip	sec sa	
No SA	s found			
xyzlaw	7#			