

Global Information Assurance Certification Paper

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GSNA Practical Assignment Version 2.1 (amended July 5, 2002) Option 1

Auditing A Checkpoint VPN-1 Mobile User Virtual Private Network (VPN)

From An Independent Auditor's Point Of View

February 11, 2003

Overview

This paper will document the methodology used to perform a risked based audit of a CheckPoint 4.1 VPN-1 mobile user VPN solution and present the audit results at both a detailed and executive level. In developing an audit methodology for this specific mobile user VPN audit, a review of the current best practices was conducted the results of which are also documented. The reader can take away from this paper a checklist to be used to audit other CheckPoint VPN-1 mobile user VPN environments.

The company name and IP addresses have all been sanitized. 'Acme Corporation' will be used to represent the company being audited.

Assignment 1 - Research in Audit, Measurement Practice, and Control

System to be audited

The focus of this audit is a CheckPoint VPN-1 version 4.1 mobile user VPN solution that uses the CheckPoint SecureClient 4.1 mobile user VPN client. As shown in Figure 1 below, the Acme Corporation has deployed the VPN-1 gateway in parallel to the corporate Firewall. This places additional importance on ensuring it is configured securely since the VPN traffic will not be inspected by the corporate firewall resulting in the CheckPoint VPN-1 gateway performing both Firewall and VPN duties.

In addition to the corporate VPN, Acme Corporation also allows mobile users to gain access to corporate resources (particularly email) via Citrix remote client and Microsoft Outlook Web Access. The scope of this audit is limited to the CheckPoint VPN configuration but the other remote access solutions will be a factor in discussing the risks associated with the system.

The VPN-1 server is running on a Windows 2000 platform. The VPN client is supported by Acme Corporation only on the Windows 2000 Professional

platform. The majority of mobile users use high-speed Internet access (cable or DSL) so the client side portion of this audit was conducted using a high-speed cable connection. It is important to note that the two firewalls in the diagram are not being used to create a DMZ but each is a distinct entry point into the Acme network and each is configured and maintained without regard to the other.




Figure 1 Acme Corporation Remote Access Design Short-dashed red lines indicate VPN traffic, long-dashed red lines indicate Citrix ICA or SSL (OWA) traffic

Evaluation of the risk to the system

There are risks associated with both the VPN gateway and client configurations. Acme Corporation has a 'typical' mix of business servers on its internal network (they do not have a secret formula or credit card information stored on the network) so they take the stance that the likely attacker will be a competitor or disgruntled current/former employee. The following table summarizes the risks faced by Acme Corporation's VPN solution:

Risk#	What can go wrong	Likelihood of Issue/Exploit occurring	Consequences of Issue/Exploit
1.	VPN gateway allows unintended traffic to pass into the internal network due to misconfiguration of CheckPoint rules or Windows Operating system.	Medium	High - Potential compromise of the internal network
2.	Virus or Trojan on mobile user laptop	Medium	Severe - Potential compromise of the internal network
3.	Cracker gains internal information provided by VPN gateway	Low	Low – Information gathering to be used in a later attack
4.	Lack of strong passwords allow Cracker to impersonate valid user	High	Severe – Definite compromise of the internal network
5.	Unable to determine who did what in the event of a compromise Event correlation.	High	Medium – lack of audit trail makes tracking of intruder or malicious user difficult. Prosecution effort weakened, more damage done to network or more information stolen.
6.	VPN Gateway or Client is compromised due to lack of applied system patches	Medium	High - Potential compromise of the internal network and or client machine
7.	Theft or loss of client laptop	High	High - Potential compromise of the internal network and or client machine

8.	Lack of High	Medium	Low – Other remote
0.	Availability and	IVIGUIUITI	access solutions
	scalability can cause VPN		provide similar
			functionality
	outage	1 P 1	
9.	Lack of	High	High - Potential
	centralized		compromise of the
	account		internal network.
	management can		
	result in incorrect		
	network access		
	being granted		, T
10.	Lack of vendor	Medium	High - Potential
	support results in		compromise of the
	patches and		internal network.
	upgrades not		
	being applied	Ko	
11.	A hacker can	Medium	High - Potential
	capture data and		compromise of the
	decrypt it because	0	internal network.
	a low level of		
	encryption is used		
12.	Shared Operating	High	High - Potential
	System accounts		compromise of the
	allow helpdesk		internal network.
	users to modify		
	CheckPoint		
	management		
	accounts to allow		
	for Read/Write		
13.	access. Mobile VPN user	High	High Dotontial
13.		nign	High - Potential
	laptop provides		compromise of the internal network.
	direct access back		internarnetwork.
Ġ	into the corporate		
	network for a		
	hacker.		

14.	Because of the location within the network of the VPN gateway, unencrypted VPN traffic is not subject to additional Firewall inspection/filtering	High	Medium – Potential compromise of the internal network.
15.	No filtering on the Internet router allows non-VPN traffic to reach the VPN server.	High	Low – If the Gateway is configured properly, it will drop the traffic.

Current state of practice

Research to determine existing resources to be used to help conduct an audit of a CheckPoint mobile user VPN revealed very little specific detailed information. While VPNs are widely deployed in many organizations, there does not seem to be an abundance of information regarding checklists to be used to audit VPN configurations. Even information from the Virtual Private Network Consortium (http://www.vpnc.org/) was not directly applicable. Troubleshooting guides and manuals provide the most detailed 'how-to' procedures. These need to be used together with higher-level standards and best practices to arrive at an acceptable audit methodology and checklist.

A good starting point when reviewing security issues is the British Standards 7799 (BS7799 and also ISO17799). The standard says to include the following in the development of a formal policy for mobile computing and teleworking:

... requirements for physical protection, access controls, cryptographic techniques, back-ups, and virus protection. This policy should also include rules and advice on connecting mobile facilities to networks and guidance on the use of these facilities in public places.

It is important that teleworking is both authorized and controlled by management... (BS7799 section 9.8)

A good alternative/supplement to the BS7799 standard is the publicly available Request for Comments: 2196 Site Security Handbook. This guidebook provides some advice for remote connections that apply to VPN connections.

The components of a good security policy include:

- An Access Policy which defines access rights and privileges to protect assets from loss or disclosure by specifying acceptable use guidelines for users, operations staff, and management.
- An Accountability Policy which defines the responsibilities of users, operations staff, and management. It should specify an audit capability, and provide incident handling guidelines.
- An Authentication Policy which establishes trust through an effective password policy, and by setting guidelines for remote location authentication and the use of authentication devices.
- An Availability statement which sets users' expectations for the availability of resources. It should address redundancy and recovery issues, as well as specify operating hours and maintenance down-time periods.

Architecture recommendations:

- Firewalls are not always, or even typically, a single machine. Rather, firewalls are often a combination of routers, network segments, and host computers.
- Firewalls are typically thought of as a way to keep intruders out, but
 they are also often used as a way to let legitimate users into a site.
 There are many examples where a valid user might need to regularly
 access the "home" site while on travel to trade shows and
 conferences, etc. Access to the Internet is often available but may be
 through an untrusted machine or network. A correctly configured proxy
 server can allow the correct users into the site while still denying
 access to other users.
- The current best effort in firewall techniques is found using a combination of a pair of screening routers with one or more proxy servers on a network between the two routers.
- Most firewalls provide logging which can be tuned to make security administration of the network more convenient. Logging may be centralized and the system may be configured to send out alerts for abnormal conditions. It is important to regularly monitor these logs for any signs of intrusions or break-in attempts.

Security Services and Procedures:

 When using cryptography products, like PGP, take care to determine the proper key length and ensure that your users are trained to do likewise. As technology advances, the minimum safe key length continues to grow.

- Given today's networked environments, it is recommended that sites concerned about the security and integrity of their systems and networks consider moving away from standard, reusable passwords.
- Portable hosts are a particular risk. Make sure it won't cause problems if one of your staff's portable computer is stolen.
- All logins, whether successful or unsuccessful should be logged.
 However, do not keep correct passwords in the log.

An article entitled "Management Strategies Best Practices For VPN Implementation" by Browne, Lewis, Hamilton, and Weaver provides a high-level checklist of sorts for VPN deployment. These areas are relevant to this audit:

- The VPN gateway location in the network.
- External authentication services recommendation.
- Client operating system strategy
- The assignment of IP addresses to remote access VPN users.
- o Logging requirements
- VPN gateway redundancy design

Aside from VPN specific resources, the individual underlying components of the VPN solution have more information available about them.

Checklists on Firewall, Windows 2000 and Personal Firewall configurations. An excellent resource for this information is NIST

(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-41/sp800-41.pdf NIST Special Publication 800-41 January 2002 Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy). http://www.auditnet.org/docs/CheckpointFirewall.txt and SANS (www.sans.org)

Assignment 2 – Create an Audit Checklist

The following checklist was developed from existing high-level checklists, technical manuals and personal experience. It covers an audit of a CheckPoint VPN-1 mobile user VPN. Both the client and server will be audited. Specific risks are mapped back to the risk matrix in Assignment 1.

Audit Step 1.	Security Policy for VPN/Remote access	
Control Objective	The documentation and communication of a corporate	
	security policy and the existence of standards for the deployment and use of VPN Remote access.	
Reference	BS7799 (Section 3), NIST (Pub SP 800-41, SP 800-47,	
	SP 800-46), RFC 2196 (section 2.2)	

Risk	Without a formal policy, inconsistent settings may be applied. Business objectives may not be met. Risks # 1,5
Compliance	A formal policy exists or it does not. Are there written procedures and is there an acceptable use policy? Is the policy communicated to the user community?
Testing	Obtain the policy from IT or HR and interpret the policy to determine if existing configuration supports it. Consider all undocumented and documented procedures that may exist in place of a formal policy. Sample user community to determine policy awareness level.
Objective/Subjective	Subjective- review and interpretation of the policy, communication of policy to user community.

Audit Step 2.	Physical Security
Control Objective	Unauthorized physical access to the VPN gateway server
,	must be protected.
Reference	BS7799 (Section 7), RFC 2196 (section 4.5.1)
Risk	Without proper security, access to the box would allow a
	person to attempt password guessing, ability to
	create/modify CheckPoint user accounts, booting from
	floppy, or accidental/intentional denial of service. Very
	high likelihood. Risks #5
Compliance	While different levels of security are possible depending
	on business requirements, a basic level of security (e.g.
	server is behind a locked door and is password
	protected) needs to exist to achieve compliance: Server
	is locked in a room with restricted access. Logs are kept
	of server access. Server is in a locked rack and is
	password protected.
Testing	Observe precautions in place by asking to visit the server
	room.
	Record steps that a visitor is required to go through to get
S)	access (e.g. Sign log book)
	Attempt to access the server and record controls on
	server access (e.g. Locked rack, password protected
	screen)
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Server access must be limited to authorized
	personnel, behind a locked door and password protected.

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Audit Step 3.	License and Support
Control Objective	The VPN gateway and clients must be properly licensed
	and covered under technical support and software
	maintenance
Reference	BS7799 (Section 10), NIST (SP 800-40 Section 5),
	CheckPoint User Center
Risk	Access to critical patches may depend on a valid support
	contract. Phone support may be needed if in-house
	support is lacking. Eval versions of software should not
	be in production. Could result in denial of service if eval
	expires. Risks # 10, 6
Compliance	The software is registered and covered under software
	maintenance and licensed for the correct number of users
	as shown in the CheckPoint User Center. The level of
	technical support required is dependent on business
	requirements.
Testing	Visit the CheckPoint User Center
l resuing	https://usercenter.checkpoint.com have the administrator
	log in using the appropriate credentials to view the
	registered product list.
	Bun DV printle command from VDN 1 /bin directory. The
	Run FW printlic command from VPN-1 /bin directory. The
	output will look like:
	Host Expiration Features
	10.1.1.1 Never cpvp-vsc-100-v41 CK-xxxxxxxx
	10.1.1.1 Never CPVP-VEE-U-3DES-MODULE-V41
	CPVP-VEE-U-3DES-MGMT-V41
	Indicating a 100 user SecureClient license (cpvp-vsc-100)
<u> </u>	and Enterprise Edition VPN-1 server (CPVP-VEE-U-
Č-	3DES)
	Run FW ver command from VPN-1 /bin directory (Run
2 7	the command once with the –k switch and once without
	any switches as the build number may vary slightly). The
	output will look like:
	This is Check Point VPN-1(TM) & FireWall-1(R) Version
	4.1 Build 41514 [VPN + DES + STRONG]
	A good site to visit to determine what build number
	equates to what service pack is:
	http://www.phoneboy.com/fom-serve/cache/377.html
	Compare what is installed on the server to what the User
<u> </u>	Compare which includes on the content to what the cool

Center reports.
Objective – Must have registered software and have
software maintenance

1.0	
ce and Scalability	
n must perform within manufacture's	
limits and be able to scale to support	
PN users.	
CheckPoint FireWall-1 Performance Tuning Guide,	
t Administration Guide (Chapter 19), Server	
er's specifications	
bjectives may not be met if the server can't	
itional VPN users or support more	
us users. Risks #8	
re sufficient to support current and future VPN	
iness requirements will determine when a	
erator Card or faster CPU would be needed.	
ce performance enhancement settings should	
System Enhancements - check that the	
ettings have been made:	
IT memory strategy set to "Maximize	
hroughput for Network Applications"	
3	
Inneeded services and drivers are disabled	
See OS hardening test too).	
Services: Alerter, Computer Browser, DHCP	
client, Messenger, Server, Task Scheduler	
Devices: Parallel, ParPort, ParVdm, Serial,	
WINS Client	
The Netbios Interface and Wins Client (TCP/IP)	
unbound from the network bindings.	
Porformance boost for foreground applications	
Performance boost for foreground applications hould be disabled.	
Hould be disabled.	
Pagefile optimized with a fixed size page file of	
t least 2 times the amount of RAM available	
n a another (preferably dedicated) disk drive.	
uning TCP/IP registry values to improve	
etwork performance.	
•	
Parameters that affect the IP forwarding	
performance:	

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Current ControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters \ForwardBufferMemory = 296960

REG_DWORD, multiple of 256, default 74240. Buffer the IP allocates to store packet data in the router queue. The default value is enough for 50 1480-byte packets.

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Current ControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters \NumForwardPackets = 200

REG_DWORD, default 50. Number of IP headers allocated for router queue. Should be at least as large as ForwardBufferMemory / IP data size of the network.

- Increasing these two parameters can have significant effect on throughput especially with 'slow' policies.
- Other TCP/IP stack parameters:
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Current ControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters \TcpWindowSize

REG DWORD, default 8760 for Ethernet. Larger TCP receive window size will improve performance over high-speed networks. For highest efficiency should be even multiple of TCP Maximum Segment Size (MSS).

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Current ControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters $\MaxFreeTcbs = 0xFA0$

REG_DWORD, default 2000, timewait table size

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Current ControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters MaxHashTableSize = 0x400

REG DWORD, default 512, TCB hash table size

	FireWall-1 System Enhancements - check that the following settings have been made:
	 Expand the VPN-1 memory pool a good rule of thumb number for busy firewall memory allocation parameter is 16MB. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentCont rolSet\Services\FW1\Parameters \Memory = 16000000
	 Increase the connection table limit to 50000 (default 25000). With that number of connections it is also important to increase the table hash size to 65536 (default 8192) for faster lookups. Insufficient connection table size leads to connections being dropped and serious performance degradation. Adequate hashing noticeably improves performance. In \$FWDIR/lib/table.def file, 'connections' value: connections = limit 50000 hashsize 65536
	Windows Performance monitor should be run to check CPU utilization during a period of normal VPN usage. The hardware spec that affects VPN-1 performance by far the most is processor speed.
	128 MB of RAM is a minimum for a high performance firewall system.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – CPU utilization over the course of a normal usage period is not maxed out, CheckPoint performance recommendations have been implemented.

Audit Step 5.	Firewall Rule base
Control Objective	Functionality of the VPN Gateway's Firewall settings must be configured appropriately and simply to block all non-VPN traffic.
Reference	BS7799 (Section 9), NIST(Pub SP 800-41), CheckPoint Manual
Risk	Focus on VPN functionality may cause admin to overlook Firewall functionality. Could result in compromise of internal servers. Risks # 1, 5

Compliance	Make sure only desired VPN traffic is allowed in and out of the VPN-1 Gateway. VPN-1 log should show all non-VPN traffic is dropped.
Testing	 Review the rule base and Firewall Properties page for misconfiguration and complexity. Only VPN related rules should be necessary.
	 Check against corporate security policy.
	 Scan Firewall for open ports (using a tool like Fscan) – look for non-VPN related open ports.
	 Attempt to use the VPN-1 server as an outbound gateway from an internal workstation by setting the default gateway to be the internal address of the VPN-1 server.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Standard best practice firewall rules in place (e.g. Drop all as a last rule). Firewall blocks all non-VPN traffic.

Audit Step 6.	VPNAccess
Control Objective	The VPN Gateway's rule configuration and properties
	configuration must allow only encrypted access by
	authenticated users.
Reference	BS7799 (Section 9), NIST (Pub SP 800-46 section 7),
	CheckPoint manual
Risk	Determine if access is undermined by other Firewall rules.
	Are proper restrictions in place to prevent information
	gathering. Risks # 3, 1
Compliance	Make sure only authorized users have access to VPN
	resources and there is no rule allowing non-VPN access to
, Ča	the same resources. PING test should fail if there is non-
	authenticated VPN connection.
Testing	Check for the existence of rules that have the Action
	'Client Encrypt' look for valid destinations to test access to.
	These VPN rules should be the first rules in the rulebase.
	Attempt to ping a resource with and without an
	authenticated VPN connection.
	Under the Dealton County Table of the Financial Dramatics
	Under the Desktop Security Tab of the Firewall Properties
	page The option to 'Respond to Unauthenticated Topology Requests' should be unchecked.
	•
	Attempt to setup a client without using a known account to see what information can be acquired (topology
	download).
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Objective/Subjective	Subjective- Review of rules against security policy.
	Objective – Authenticated users should be the only ones
	allowed to obtain topology information and access to VPN
	resources.

Audit Step 7.	Operating System Hardening
Control Objective	The VPN Gateway's operating system must be hardened
	and maintained to prevent system compromises.
Reference	NIST (SP 800-43), SANS, CheckPoint FireWall-1
	Performance Tuning Guide
Risk	Unneeded services, as defined by CheckPoint and a combination of best practices (See SANS) and business requirements (A subjective assessment), should be disabled otherwise they invite attack. Risks # 5, 6
Compliance	Has a hardening standard been followed when building the VPN-1 server. Determine what services are running. At least the following should be stopped: Alerter, Computer Browser, DHCP client, Messenger, Server, Task Scheduler. NetBIOS should not be bound to the external interface.
Testing	Run the Netstat –an command. Run IPCONFIG /ALL command. List all Services from Control Panel -> Services. Request server build documentation look for standards (NT security templates used etc).
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Only essential services should be running, documented server build should exist.

Audit Step 8.	VPN User Account Management
Control Objective	Proper account management procedures must be in place
	to ensure appropriate VPN access is granted.
Reference	BS7799, NIST(Pub SP 800-46 section 7), CheckPoint
	Manual, Management Strategies Best Practices For VPN
	Implementation
Risk	Unwanted user may be given access accidentally. Risk is
	high without centralized management in place. Total
	compromise of resources might result. Risks # 9
Compliance	Is the user database maintained on the VPN-1 Gateway
	or is it centralized elsewhere. Policy in place to
	add/remove users. Only users with valid Corporate
	Windows 2000 Domain accounts should have a
	CheckPoint VPN account created
Testing	List current users allowed VPN access (Manage->Users in

	the Policy Editor). By comparing the CheckPoint User Database against the Windows 2000 Domain user database, accounts in the CheckPoint database but not in the Windows 2000 database are suspect. HR needs to confirm status of users. Look for policy to support account creation/removal.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – look for unauthorized users in user database and look for centralized management (e.g. RADIUS)

Audit Step 9.	Virus Protection for Mobile User
Control Objective	Mobile user's desktop machines must be protected with
	the corporate standard Anti-Virus software.
Reference	BS7799 (Section 8), NIST (SP 800-46)
Risk	Compromise of a client machine with a Trojan might allow
	access to the corporate network by an unauthorized user.
	Client machine could become a participant in a Denial of service attack. Risks # 2
Compliance	Is there a corporate antivirus strategy and policy. Are updates pushed to all mobile VPN users.
Testing	Check client configuration to determine if policy is being
	followed. Test that the Anti-Virus software:
	 Initializes with the boot of the operating system
	 Runs in the background and automatically scans all incoming files
	 Automatically updates virus signatures on a weekly basis. If this option is unavailable, then the signatures should be updated manually on a weekly basis.
	 Attempts to recognized unknown or "mutated" viruses not contained in the virus signature database file.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Are patterns up-to date on client machine?

Audit Step 10.	Log Settings
Control Objective	VPN traffic must be logged and logs must be maintained
	and reviewed.
Reference	BS7799 (Section 8.4), NIST, CheckPoint manual,
	Management Strategies Best Practices For VPN
	Implementation

Risk	Without proper logs, troubleshooting, auditing and incident response is very difficult. Intruders could go undetected allowing free reign in the corporate network. Risks #5
Compliance	Determine if logging is enabled on both the OS and the VPN-1 software. Is there evidence of log reviews and maintenance? What rules require logging can be subjective based on business requirements but VPN and Drop ALL rules should almost always be logged.
Testing	Inspect the rules to see where logging is enabled. Confirm that all implied rules are logged under the Security Policy tab of the Policy Properties in the Policy Editor. Generate traffic to match each rule to see that it is logged. For Client Encrypt rules, use the VPN Client and attempt to access internal resources. For the Drop ALL rule, use Ping and Telnet to try to connect to an internal resource. For any other rule that allows or denies a specific type of traffic, use the appropriate client or Telnet on the port that is open (Telnet Port#) to generate traffic to match the rule. Run the AT command to see if the CheckPoint logswitch command is scheduled to run in order to roll the log. Ask for a high-level report. On the client, temporary log files can be made by creating Fwenc.log for tracking SecuRemote actions and Sr.log for tracking packets blocked by SecureClient Policy.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Is logging enabled, reviewed and maintained?

Audit Step 11.	Laptop physical protection
Control Objective	Mobile user's laptops must be protected from theft or data
	loss.
Reference	BS7799 (Section 9.8), NIST, RFC 2196 (section 4.5.1)
Risk	A stolen laptop with cached credentials would allow total access to corporate resources. Risks # 7
Compliance	Theft itself can't be completely prevented but at least the use of a power on BIOS password and file encryption should be employed. Login credentials should not be cached although this is a subjective business requirement decision.
Testing	Look for corporate policy guidelines, inspect a laptop by booting it up. Is a BIOS password enabled? Does the Windows Operating System auto-login? Under the Passwords option in the SecureClient VPN software is Single Sign On Configured and enabled?
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Are power on passwords and encryption in place? Is Single Sign On enabled

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Audit Step 12.	High Availability / Disaster recovery
Control Objective	A High Availability / Disaster recovery strategy must be in
	place to prevent loss of VPN service.
Reference	BS7799, NIST, CheckPoint manual
Risk	Business objectives may not be met if there is an outage of the VPN service. Users may lose productivity. Many single points of failure increase risk. Risks # 8
Compliance	Review policy regarding high availability, are there multiple policy servers and VPN entry points? The existence of multiple Internet connections and at least a cold spare server. The level of High availability in all components is a subjective business requirement.
Testing	If more than one VPN gateway exists, Attempt to access VPN services from more than one Gateway. Pull the plug on one gateway to determine fail over behavior while laptop is PINGing a resource via the VPN. Confirm current Firewall is backed up and a cold spare server is identified and compatible for a restore.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Does fail over work – Is there a Disaster recovery plan and cold spare server?

Audit Step 13.	Patch Level
Control Objective	Current and compatible Patch levels of OS, CheckPoint
	Server and VPN client software must be maintained.
Reference	BS7799 (section 10), NIST (SP 800-40)
Risk	Unpatched software and operating systems are classic
	entry points for hackers. There is a high risk of an exploit
4	of an unpatched server. Risks #6, 10
Compliance	Look for the latest revisions of all software components of
	the VPN solution
Testing	Perform FW ver on the gateway, Look at the Help – About
Cy .	menu option in the CheckPoint client, issue the Winver
	command in the Windows Operating system
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Patches are at manufactures specified current
	level

Audit Step 14.	Accountability
Control Objective	VPN users entering the internal network must be identifiable by IP address using Network Address Translation.

Reference	BS7799, CheckPoint Manual, Management Strategies Best Practices For VPN Implementation
Risk	If users are allowed access without a known IP address it will be difficult to spot VPN user activities and to restrict use based on IP address. Risks # 5, 1, 4
Compliance	Are VPN users assigned a known range of addresses when they are granted VPN access.
Testing	Confirm that IP Pool NAT is enabled under the IP Pool NAT tab of the Policy Properties in the Policy Editor. Under Manage->Network Objects in the Policy Editor, Confirm the Address range in the object containing the IP Nat Pool. Make sure the range can accommodate the licensed number of users. Start a VPN session and check the Log to see that the VPN client's source address is translated to an address in the NAT Pool.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Are VPN users identifiable by IP address on the internal network by being NATed to a Pool address.

Audit Step 15.	Encryption
Control Objective	Appropriate encryption level and settings must be in use
	for VPN connections
Reference	BS7799 (section 10), NIST (SP 800-46), CheckPoint
	Virtual Private Networks manual (Chapter 9)
Risk	Unless the highest level of encryption is used, it may be possible for a hacker to capture data and decrypt it. This is a medium risk due to the effort involved but the compromise could be significant. Reliance on pre-shared secrets and usernames is not as secure as certificates because they can be guessed. Risks #11

Compliance	Is 3DES encryption in use? Are pre-shared secrets or certificates in use?
	Authentication: For IKE encryption (The only type recommended), The SecuRemote Client and VPN-1 server authenticate each other by verifying that the other party knows the preshared secret, which is the user's password (as defined in the Authentication tab of the user's IKE Properties) OR the user checks Use Certificate, enters an Entrust profile file name and a Password to access the certificate. The SecuRemote Client authenticates itself to the VPN-1 server by using its certificate. The VPN-1 server verifies the certificate against a certificate revocation list (CRL). The VPN-1 server authenticates itself by sending the SecuRemote Client its certificate and a copy of a valid CRL signed by the Certificate Authority. Key Exchange:
	Once the user has been authenticated, the SecuRemote Client and VPN-1 server exchange encryption keys, in preparation for encrypting the actual connection. The method of key exchange depends on the encryption scheme used: FWZ or IKE.
	Connection: After encryption keys have been exchanged, the connection begins. The connection is encrypted according to the encryption scheme used: FWZ or IPSec (for IKE).
Testing	On the VPN client, confirm Tools->Encryption Scheme has IPSec selected. Check the VPN properties of the Firewall object and edit the IKE settings. Review the CheckPoint log to verify that the setup of the VPN connection uses 3DES IPSEC. If possible, capture VPN traffic with a
A	packet sniffer to confirm that it is indeed encrypted.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – 3DES encryption should be the only level supported. IKE should be used instead of FWZ

Audit Step 16	VPNAdministration
Control Objective	Least amount of access is granted to the VPN Gateway for
	users to perform job duties, accounts are not shared.
Reference	BS7799 (section 8)

Risk	Make sure access levels are appropriate for the job. Write access is not needed for the helpdesk to view log files. Unintended changes to the system could occur. Risks # 5, 12
Compliance	Users should have only the appropriate power at both an Operating system and VPN-1 level necessary to perform their job. Each user has their own individual account.
Testing	Look for segregation of duties and appropriate level of privilege for the job. List all CheckPoint GUI client IPs and Users. Verify that all IP addresses that are allowed GUI access have a business need.
	List all management accounts in Windows and confirm each account has the appropriate level of privilege for the job and that shared accounts are not in use. Verify read only accounts cannot make unexpected
	changes by trying to create a new object and try to install a policy from the CheckPoint Policy Editor.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Accounts are not shared and access levels are appropriate.

Audit Step 17.	Personal Firewall
Control Objective	The VPN client's personal Firewall settings must be
	enforced on the mobile user's desktop
Reference	BS7799, NIST, CheckPoint Manual
Risk	A VPN client machine must have protection from
	unauthorized inbound access. If compromised, a mobile
A.	VPN user laptop would provide direct access back into the
Ċ.	corporate network. Risk is very high for Cable/DSL 'always
	on' connections. Risks #13
Compliance	Is the personal firewall policy set to disallow all inbound
ĠŸ'	connections? Attempts to access the corporate network
	will fail if the personal firewall is disabled.
Testing	Check that the personal firewall blocks inbound
	connections by scanning the client with a port scanner
	(e.g. Shields Up).
	Disable the Firewall client on the Mobile user laptop by
	selecting the Policy option and then select 'Disable Policy'
	and attempt to access the corporate network (PING a
	host)

Objective/Subjective	Objective – Scan shows all connections are blocked, VPN
	Gateway disallows connections if personal firewall
	disabled.

Audit Step 18	Documentation
Control Objective	Network and VPN documentation must be maintained.
Reference	BS7799, NIST, RFC 2196
Risk	Lack of documentation makes change control impossible. Alternate paths around the VPN-1 Gateway could exist. Risks # 5
Compliance	Are documents reviewed on a scheduled basis and kept up to date via a change control process?
Testing	Confirm current diagram exists. Compare documented rulebase with production rulebase and note discrepancies. Review change control logs to find last change made to VPN-1 Server.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Current documents are produced

Audit Step 19.	VPN Design
Control Objective	The VPN Gateway must physically be located on the corporate infrastructure so as not to compromise security.
Reference	BS7799 (section 9), NIST (SP 800-41), Management Strategies Best Practices For VPN Implementation, RFC 2196 (section 3.3)
Risk	Locating the VPN gateway in a position on the network that allows traffic to by-pass the firewall can allow for unintended access. Risks # 14
Compliance	Is there a justification for the design and location of the VPN gateway? Is the unencrypted VPN traffic subject to Firewall inspection?
Testing	Review network diagram to look for alternate access points into the corporate network. Use Traceroute to confirm VPN traffic enters via the VPN-1 gateway. Confirm the range of NAT pool address is routed back to the VPN-1 Gateway on the internal network.
Objective/Subjective	Subjective- Determine design justification Objective- Determine VPN traffic is routed into and out of the VPN gateway.


Audit Step 20.	Router Configuration
Control Objective	The Internet router must be configured to screen non-VPN
	traffic out.
Reference	SANS, NIST, RFC 2196 (section 3.3)
Risk	Proper ingress and egress filtering allow the router to
	screen non-VPN traffic before it reaches the VPN server.
	Risks # 15
Compliance	Is the router configured to screen non-VPN traffic
	destined for the VPN Gateway?
Testing	Send VPN and Non-VPN traffic to/from the VPN Gateway
	and examine the router logs to see what was allowed.
	Use the VPN client to establish a normal VPN session.
	Confirm via the router log and/or Access control list that it
	allows the key exchange to take place and passes the
	encrypted traffic.
	Use Telnet to try to connect to the VPN-1 Gateway directly
	and confirm via the router log and/or Access control list
	that it blocks the connection
	Confirm Best practice Egress/Ingress Filters are in place in
	the Access control list.
Objective/Subjective	Objective – Unwanted traffic is dropped.


Assignment 3 – Audit Evidence

Conduct the audit

12 of the 20 checklist items are presented here including five Stimulus Response Test Items:


T-	
Audit	Test 1 VPN Administration
Step 16	
Control	Least amount of access is granted to the VPN Gateway for users to
Objective	perform job duties, accounts are not shared.
Testing	Look for segregation of duties and appropriate level of privilege for
	the job.
	List all CheckPoint GUI client IPs and Users. Verify that all IP
	addresses that are allowed GUI access have a business need.
	List all management accounts in Windows and confirm each account has the appropriate level of privilege for the job and that shared accounts are not in use.
	Verify read only accounts cannot make unexpected changes by trying to create a new object and try to install a policy from the CheckPoint Policy Editor.





The above screen shot shows that only two internal remote workstations are allowed GUI (management) access to the VPN-1 Server.

The following 2 screen shots show that while logged into the VPN-1 Management console as the Read-Only Adminbackup user, the option to remove or create new network objects is not available and the option to install/uninstall a policy or database is not available.



Audit	Test 2. License and Support
Step 3	
Control	The VPN gateway and clients must be properly licensed and covered
Objective	under technical support and software maintenance
Testing	Visit the CheckPoint User Center https://usercenter.checkpoint.com
	have the administrator log in using the appropriate credentials to view

the registered product list.

Run FW printlic command from VPN-1 /bin directory. The output will look like:

Host Expiration Features

10.1.1.1 Never cpvp-vsc-100-v41 CK-xxxxxxxx


10.1.1.1 Never CPVP-VEE-U-3DES-MODULE-V41 CPVP-VEE-U-3DES-MGMT-V41


Indicating a 100 user SecureClient license (cpvp-vsc-100) and Enterprise Edition VPN-1 server (CPVP-VEE-U-3DES)


Run FW ver command from VPN-1 /bin directory (Run the command once with the –k switch and once without any switches as the build number may vary slightly). The output will look like:

This is Check Point VPN-1(TM) & FireWall-1(R) Version 4.1 Build 41514 [VPN + DES + STRONG]


Compare what is installed on the server to what the User Center reports.










Audit	Test 3 Accountability
Step 14	
Control Objective	VPN users entering the internal network must be identifiable by IP address using Network Address Translation.
Testing	Confirm that IP Pool NAT is enabled under the IP Pool NAT tab of the Policy Properties in the Policy Editor.
	Under Manage->Network Objects in the Policy Editor, Confirm the Address range in the object containing the IP Nat Pool. Make sure the range can accommodate the licensed number of users. Start a VPN session and check the Log to see that the VPN client's source address is translated to an address in the NAT Pool.







Audit Step 6	Test 4 VPN Access
Control	The VPN Gateway's rule configuration and properties configuration
Objective	must allow only encrypted access by authenticated users.
Testing	Check for the existence of rules that have the Action 'Client Encrypt' look for valid destinations to test access to. These VPN rules should be the first rules in the rulebase. Attempt to ping a resource with and without an authenticated VPN connection.
	Under the Desktop Security Tab of the Firewall Properties page The option to 'Respond to Unauthenticated Topology Requests' should be unchecked. Attempt to setup a client without using a known account to see what information can be acquired (topology download).












Audit Step 8	Test 5 VPN User Account Management
Control Objective	Proper account management procedures must be in place to
	ensure appropriate VPN access is granted.
Testing	List current users allowed VPN access (Manage->Users in the Policy Editor). By comparing the CheckPoint User Database against the Windows 2000 Domain user database, accounts in the CheckPoint database but not in the Windows 2000 database are suspect. HR needs to confirm status of users. Look for policy to support account creation/removal.
Findings	
FAIL	





Active accounts discovered that belong to fired employees. Only users with valid Corporate Windows 2000 Domain accounts should have a CheckPoint VPN account created. By comparing the CheckPoint User Database against the Windows 2000 Domain, the accounts that were in the CheckPoint database but not in the Windows 2000 database were suspect and confirmed to be terminated employees by HR.















Audit	Test 6 Encryption
Step 15	
Control	Appropriate encryption level and settings must be in use for VPN
Objective	connections
Testing	On the VPN client, confirm Tools->Encryption Scheme has IPSec
	selected. Check the VPN properties of the Firewall object and edit the
	IKE settings. Review the CheckPoint log to verify that the setup of the
	VPN connection uses 3DES IPSEC. If possible, capture VPN traffic with
	a packet sniffer to confirm that it is indeed encrypted.







Audit Step 17	Test 7 Personal Firewall
Control Objective	The VPN client's personal Firewall settings must be enforced



Encrypted

C:\>ping 172.x.x.x

Pinging 172.x.x.x with 32 bytes of data:


Reply from 172.x.x.x: bytes=32 time=120ms TTL=128 Reply from 172.x.x.x: bytes=32 time=10ms TTL=128 Reply from 172.x.x.x: bytes=32 time=80ms TTL=128 Reply from 172.x.x.x: bytes=32 time=20ms TTL=128

Ping statistics for 172.x.x.x:

Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss),

Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:

Minimum = 10ms, Maximum = 120ms, Average = 57ms



Disable policy on desktop and try PING again.

C:\>ping 172.x.x.x

Pinging 172.x.x.x with 32 bytes of data:

Request timed out.

Request timed out.

Request timed out.

Request timed out.

Ping statistics for 172.x.x.x:

Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 0, Lost = 4 (100% loss),

Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds: Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 0ms, Average = 0ms
Without Policy, VPN connection not allowed.


Audit Step 7	Test 8 Operating System Hardening		
	Test 8 Operating System Hardening		
Control	The VPN Gateway's operating system must be hardened and		
Objective	maintained to prevent system compromises.		
Testing	Run the Netstat –an command. Run IPCONFIG /ALL command. List		
	all Services from Control Panel -> Services. Request server build		
	documentation look for standards (NT security templates used etc).		
Findings	Services Started or Disabled (from Administrative Tools -> Services):		
	Name Description Status Startup Type Log On As		
PASS	Services that are Disabled or Manual		
1 7.00	Alerter Notifies selected users and computers of administrative alerts. Disabled LocalSy stem		
	Application Management Provides software installation services such as Assign, Publish, and Remove. Disabled LocalSystem		
	Clip Book Supports Clip Book V iewer, which allows pages to be seen by remote ClipBooks. Disabled LocalSy stem		
	Compaq System Shutdown Service Shuts down the system in the event of overheating or loss of cooling in response to commands from the Compaq Integrated System Management Controller driver.		
	Disabled LocalSy stem		
	Computer Browser Maintains an up-to-date list of computers on your network and supplies the list to programs		
	that request it. Disabled LocalSy stem DHCP Client Manages network configuration by registering and updating IP addresses and DNS names.		
	Disabled LocalSy stem		
	Distributed File System Manages logical volumes distributed across a local or wide area network. Disabled LocalSystem		
	Distributed Link Tracking Client Sends notifications of files moving between NTFS volumes in a network domain.		
	Disabled LocalSystem		
	Distributed Link Tracking Server Stores information so that files moved between volumes can be tracked for each volume in the domain. Disabled LocalSy stem		
Distributed Transaction Coordinator Coordinates transactions that are distributed across to			
	databases, message queues, file systems, or other transaction protected resource managers. Disabled LocalSystem		
Fax Service Helps you send and receive faxes Disabled LocalSy stem			
	File Replication Maintains file synchronization of file directory contents among multiple servers.bled LocalSystem		
	Indexing Service Indexes contents and properties of files on local and remote computers; provides rapid access		
	to files through flexible querying language. Disabled LocalSystem		
	Internet Connection Sharing Provides network address translation, addressing, and name resolution services for all computers on your home network through a dial-up connection. Disabled LocalSy stem		
Intersite Messaging Allows sending and receiving messages between Windows Advanced Ser			
	Disabled LocalSystem IPSEC Policy Agent Manages IP security policy and starts the ISAKMP/Oakley (IKE) and the IP security driver.		
	Disabled LocalSy stem		
	Kerberos Key Distribution Center Generates session keys and grants service tic kets for mutual		
	client/server authentication. Disabled LocalSy stem License Logging Service Disabled LocalSy stem		
	Logical Disk Manager Administrative Service Administrative service for disk management requests		
	Manual LocalSystem Messenger Sends and receives messages transmitted by administrators or by the Alerter service.		
	Disabled LocalSystem		
	Net Logon Supports pass-through authentication of account logon events for computers in a domain.		
	Disabled LocalSystem NetMeeting Remote Desktop Sharing Allows authorized people to remotely access your Windows desktop		
	using NetMeeting. Disabled LocalSystem		
	Network DDE Provides network transport and security for dynamic data exchange (DDE).		
	Disabled LocalSy stem Network DDE D SDM Manages shared dy namic data exchange and is used by Network DDE		
	Manual LocalSy stem		


```
Provides security to remote procedure call (RPC) programs that use
NT LM Security Support Provider
transports other than named pipes.
                                                   Disabled LocalSystem
                             Configures performance logs and alerts.
Performance Logs and Alerts
                                                                                  Manual LocalSystem
Print Spooler
                    Loads files to memory for later printing.
                                                                        Disabled LocalSystem
QoS RSVP
                    Provides network signaling and local traffic control setup functionality for QoS-aware
programs and control applets.
                                         Disabled LocalSystem
Remote Access Auto Connection Manager Creates a connection to a remote network whenever a program
references a remote DNS or NetBIOS name or address.
                                                             Disabled LocalSystem
Remote Access Connection Manager
                                        Creates a network connection.
                                                                                  Disabled LocalSystem
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Locator
                                         Manages the RPC name service database.
                                                                                            Manual
          LocalSystem
                               Allows remote registry manipulation.
                                                                                  Disabled LocalSystem
Remote Registry Service
Routing and Remote Access
                              Offers routing services to businesses in local area and wide area network
                              Disabled LocalSy stem
environments
                    Enables starting processes under alternate credentials
RunAs Service
                                                                                  Disabled LocalSystem
                                                                                  Disabled LocalSystem
Server Provides RPC support and file, print, and named pipe sharing.
Smart Card
                    Manages and controls access to a smart card inserted into a smart card reader attached to the
                    Disabled LocalSystem
computer.
Smart Card Helper
                    Provides support for legacy smart card readers attached to the computer.
          Disabled LocalSy stem
SNMP Trap Service Receives trap messages generated by local or remote SNMP agents and forwards the messages
to SNMP management programs running on this computer.
                                                                        Manual LocalSy stem
TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper Service Enables support for NetBIOS over TCP/IP (NetBT) service and NetBIOS name
                    Disabled LocalSystem
Telephony Provides Telephony API (TAPI) support for programs that control telephony devices and IP based voice
connections on the local computer and, through the LAN, on servers that are also running the service.
          Disabled LocalSystem
          Allows a remote user to log on to the system and run console programs using the command line.
Telnet
          Disabled LocalSystem
Terminal Services Provides a multisession environment that allows client devices to access a virtual W indows
2000 Professional desktop session and Windows-based programs running on the server.
          LocalSystem
Uninterruptible Power Supply
                              Manages an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) connected to the computer.
          Disabled LocalSystem
Utility Manager
                    Starts and configures accessibility tools from one window
          LocalSy stem
Windows Installer
                    Installs, repairs and removes software according to instructions contained in .MSI files.
          Disabled LocalSystem
Windows Management Instrumentation
                                         Provides system management information.
                                                                                            Manual
          LocalSystem
                                                                                  Disabled LocalSystem
Workstation
                    Provides network connections and communications.
         -----Services that are Started ------
Check Point ELA Proxy
                                         Started
                                                   Automatic LocalSystem
Check Point VPN-1 / FireWall-1
                                         Started
                                                   Automatic LocalSystem
COM+ Event System Provides automatic distribution of events to subscribing COM components.
          Manual LocalSystem
                              Compaq Foundation Agents
Compaq Foundation Agents
                                                             Started Automatic LocalSystem
Compaq NIC Agents Compaq NIC Agents Started Automatic LocalSystem
                                                   Started Automatic LocalSystem
Compaq Remote Monitor Service
Compaq Storage Agents
                            Compaq Storage Agents
                                                             Started Automatic LocalSystem
DNS Client
                    Resolves and caches Domain Name System (DNS) names.
                                                                                  Started
                                                                                            Automatic
          LocalSy stem
Event Log Logs event messages issued by programs and Windows. Event Log reports contain information that can
be useful in diagnosing problems. Reports are viewed in Event Viewer.
                                                                       Started Automatic LocalSystem
                              Started Automatic LocalSystem
Event Log Watch
Logical Disk Manager Logical Disk Manager Watchdog Service Started Automatic LocalSystem
Network Connections Manages objects in the Network and Dial-Up Connections folder, in which you can view both
local area network and remote connections. Started Manual LocalSy stem
                    Manages device installation and configuration and notifies programs of device changes.
Plug and Play
          Started
                    Automatic LocalSystem
Protected Storage
                    Provides protected storage for sensitive data, such as private keys, to prevent access by
unauthorized services, processes, or users. Started Automatic LocalSy stem
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Provides the endpoint mapper and other miscellaneous RPC services.
Started Automatic LocalSystem

Removable Storage Manages removable media, drives, and libraries.
                                                                        Started
                                                                                  Automatic LocalSystem
Security Accounts Manager
                              Stores security information for local user accounts.
                                                                                  Started
                                                                                            Automatic
          LocalSystem
SNMP Service
                    Includes agents that monitor the activity in network devices and report to the network console
```


works tation. Started Automatic LocalSystem System Event Notification Tracks system events such as Windows logon, network, and power events. Notifies COM+ Event System subscribers of these events. Started Automatic LocalSystem Task Scheduler Enables a program to run at a designated time. Started Automatic LocalSystem Windows Management Instrumentation Driver Extensions Provides systems management information to and from drivers. Started Automatic LocalSystem Windows Time Sets the computer clock. Started Automatic LocalSystem Results of fscan (fscan x.x.x.x -bp 1-65535) issued from the Internet against the external address of the VPN-1 Server shows only CheckPoint Services - VPN ports open. Scan started at Tue Dec 8 01:20:47 2002 264/tcp x.x.x.x x.x.x.x 265/tcp X.X.X.X 500/tcp Results of 'ipconfig /all' command issued on the VPN-1 Server: Windows 2000 IP Configuration Host Name.....acme Primary DNS Suffix: Node Type : Hybrid IP Routing Enabled. : Yes WINS Proxy Enabled....:No Ethernet adapter Internal: Connection-specific DNS Suffix .: Description : 3C om Ether Link XL 10/100 PC ITX NIC (3C 905B-TX) Physical Address. : 00-10-4B-xx-xx-AC IP Address. : 172.x.x.x Subnet Mask 255.xx.x Default Gateway DNS Ser vers : 172.x.x.x 172.xxx
Primary WINS Server : 172.x.xx Secondary WINS Server : 172.xx.x Ethernet adapter External: Connection-specific DNS Suffix .: Description : Compaq NC 3120 Fast Ethernet NIC Physical Address. : 00-80-5F-xx-xx-98 IP Address. : 2.x.x.x Subnet Mask : 255.255.255.0 Default Gateway : 2.x.x.x DNS Servers : 2.x.x.x

Audit Step 5	Test 9. Firewall Rule base
Control Objective	Functionality of the VPN Gateway's Firewall settings must be configured appropriately and simply to block all non-VPN traffic.
Testing	 Review the rule base and Firewall Properties page for mis- configuration and complexity. Only VPN related rules should be necessary.
	Check against corporate security policy.
	 Scan Firewall for open ports (using a tool like Fscan) – look for







Audit Step 11.	Test 10 Laptop physical protection
Control Objective	Mobile user's laptops must be protected from theft or data loss.
Testing	Look for corporate policy guidelines; inspect a laptop by booting it up. Is a BIOS password enabled? Does the Windows Operating System auto-login? Under the Passwords option in the SecureClient VPN software is Single Sign On Configured and enabled?



Audit Step 10	Test11 Log Settings
Control Objective	VPN traffic must be logged and logs must be maintained and
	reviewed.
Testing	Inspect the rules to see where logging is enabled.
	Confirm that all implied rules are logged under the Security Policy tab of the Policy Properties in the Policy Editor.
Ċ	Generate traffic to match each rule to see that it is logged.
	For Client Encrypt rules, use the VPN Client and attempt to access internal resources. For the Drop ALL rule, use Ping and Telnet to try
	to connect to an internal resource.
	Run the AT command to see if the CheckPoint logswitch command
	is scheduled to run in order to roll the log. Ask for a high-level report.
	On the client, temporary log files can be made by creating Fwenc.log
	for tracking SecuRemote actions and Sr.log for tracking packets
	blocked by SecureClient Policy.





Search for dropped traffic in log to see matches on Rule 8

fwenc.log file header form client machine:

Running VPN-1 SecuRemote Version 4.1 SP-4 3DES
Build number: 4185;
Windows 2000 version
Using Entrust Toolkit version: EntrustIPSec Negotiator(tm) Toolkit 5.1.100.361
SDL enabled
SSO enabled

AT command shows no scheduled jobs. Manual log rotation is required – no documented procedure to 'roll' log.

Audit Step 19	Test 12 VPN Design
Control Objective	The VPN Gateway must physically be located on the corporate infrastructure so as not to compromise security.
Testing	Review network diagram to look for alternate access points into the corporate network. Use Traceroute to confirm VPN traffic enters via the VPN-1 gateway. Confirm the range of NAT pool address is routed back to the VPN-1 Gateway on the internal network.
Findings	No good design justification for placing the VPN gateway in parallel with the corporate firewall (see figure 1). The
FAIL	Corporate Firewall should be protecting all network traffic. Network diagram was available but no policy document was available to support the current design.
(5)	C:\ >tracert InternalHost
	Tracing route to InternalHost [172.x.x.x] over a maximum of 30 hops:
	1 30 ms 30 ms 30 ms x.x.x.x (VPN Server) 2 30 ms 30 ms 10 ms InternalHost [172.x.x.x]
	Trace complete.
	Traceroute Indicates traffic entering the Corporate network via the VPN gateway.

Measure Residual Risk

A good deal of residual risk exists with the VPN system as it exists today. Lack of policy and procedures coupled with out of date and unsupported software will lead to system compromise.

Test 1 revealed the use of shared administrative accounts that make accountability difficult to enforce. Access to the Server itself is too widespread allowing a user to modify their CheckPoint administrative privileges. This issue can be corrected by assigning all administrators unique accounts in both Windows and CheckPoint, limiting the number of users that can log onto the VPN-1 Windows server console. This change of procedure would have a minimal impact in terms of cost or additional resources.

Test 5 showed that because there is no policy governing VPN user account creation and deletion old user accounts continue to be active on the VPN-1 Server. This threat can be mitigated by synchronizing the account creation/removal process with the creation/removal of Windows Domain accounts. This change of procedure would have a minimal impact in terms of cost or additional resources.

Test 2 shows out of date software that is no longer covered under software maintenance or technical support. Given that CheckPoint will not be supporting or enhancing this version in the near future, the decision to upgrade or discontinue use needs to be made. As new security weaknesses are discovered, there will not be patches available. To correct this threat, a significant investment must be made in terms of cost and resources.

Test 10 revealed that mobile user's laptops are not protected from unauthorized access if they are stolen. To remedy this, procedures and guidelines need to be developed and communicated. This will consume some resources but go a long way to safeguarding company resources if a laptop with cached VPN credentials is compromised. The risk of theft, however, is very difficult to prevent.

Test 12 points out that the current network architecture that places the VPN server in parallel with the corporate firewall has no justification. A more secure solution would be to place the VPN server on the DMZ of the production Firewall. This will allow the corporate Firewall to inspect and log all VPN traffic after it is decrypted. It also removes a direct access point into the corporate network. To remediate this threat will take little cost but will result in downtime and the need for high-end resources.

Most of the control objectives were met to some extent but to correct all the problems discovered will take significant high-end resources and money. Given the other remote access methods in production at Acme Corporation, the question must be asked why the CheckPoint VPN needs to be left in production at all.

Is the system auditable?

The CheckPoint VPN-1 Gateway and client system is auditable by following the checklist outlined above. If there are additional requirements to audit CheckPoint internal communications or SecureClient interaction with the Windows 2000 TCP/IP stack then the checklist would have to be expanded to attempt to address these issues. In some cases, however, the only method to audit some manufacturer features would be inquiry. The more subjective areas of the audit involving corporate policy prove to be more difficult to audit since many procedures are not written down.

Assignment 4 – Audit Report or Risk Assessment

AUDIT REPORT - FOR INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

Executive summary

The audit of Acme Corporation's CheckPoint VPN-1 Gateway has revealed many vulnerabilities but many of them can be mitigated by taking simple and inexpensive steps. Two of the more costly and time consuming findings include: The technology in production today is not covered under maintenance and the location of the gateway on the network in parallel with the corporate firewall should be reconsidered.

Many procedural changes would go a long way to improving the security of the VPN solution in place today. Better account management is the most pressing need as many old accounts were discovered still active on the VPN gateway.

A review of the other Remote access solutions in place should occur to be sure security and business needs are being met by offering three different methods for remote users to retrieve email.

Most of the Audit Objectives were met. There were no audit steps that did not at least partially meet the objectives with the exception of the placement of the VPN server on the Network.

Audit findings

Test 1 of assignment 3: FAIL: There is use of shared administrative accounts (accounts like 'Helpdesk' and AdminBackup as shown in the screen shots). Access to the Server itself is too widespread with many users sharing the AdminBackup password.

Test 2 of assignment 3: FAIL: shows out of date software that is no longer covered under software maintenance or technical support. Both the production server and client are not up to date with patches.

Test 3 of assignment 3: PASS: All 100 potential VPN users are able to get an address from the Network Address Translation Pool issued by the VPN server when the VPN session is established. The VPN User is logged with the Translated Source address.

Test 4 of assignment 3: PASS: VPN rules are configured according to CheckPoint best Practices by being located at the top of the rulebase and limited to a source of VPN users group. If the client does not authenticate with a valid

user account, the topology of the corporate site can not be downloaded from the server.

Test 5 of assignment 3: FAIL: Old user accounts continue to be active on the VPN-1 Server. Users are created with templates. No procedure governs creation/removal of accounts or selection of user passwords.

Test 6 of assignment 3:PASS: Clients use IKE with 3DES IPSec encryption to establish a VPN connection. The connection is logged by the VPN server and shows the method used. Shared secrets are used in place of Certificates.

Test 7 of assignment 3: PASS: The personal Firewall on the client has to be enabled in order for access to internal resources to be allowed. By disabling the desktop policy access to internal resources is not allowed.

Test 8 of assignment 3: PASS: The Windows operating system that the VPN-1 server has been installed on is hardened to at least the best practice standards offered by CheckPoint. The majority of services have been disabled including the Server and Workstation services. A port scan from the Internet reveals only 3 VPN ports open on the VPN server.

Test 9 of assignment 3: PASS: The VPN-1 Server is configured to only allow VPN traffic into/out of the corporate network with the exception of PING traffic. This is confirmed by a port scan.

Test 10 of assignment 3: FAIL: Mobile user's laptops are not protected from unauthorized access if they are stolen. Cached VPN credentials are used for Single sign on.

Test 11 of assignment 3: PASS: Logging is enabled correctly, there is no formal review process. Logs are used reactively not proactively. No job scheduled to roll the logs on a regular basis.

Test 12 of assignment 3: FAIL: The current network architecture that places the VPN server in parallel with the corporate firewall has no justification.

Background/risk

Test 1 of assignment 3: VPN administration procedures have risks to Acme Corporation in that there are shared accounts in use resulting in loss of accountability. Administrators can make changes without being tracked. The Windows accounts have administrative rights. The Helpdesk can log into Windows and then change the access rights on the CheckPoint accounts. They can then modify access and rules on the VPN Server. This could result in a total compromise of the internal network.

Test 2 of assignment 3: The lack of support and software maintenance is a growing risk as CheckPoint moves to 'end of life' version 4.1 within a year. A decision needs to be made to renew or abandon the product. As the system ages, new exploits can be discovered that will not have fixes. New functionality in the VPN client is not available without an upgrade.

Test 5 of assignment 3: Old user accounts continue to be active on the VPN-1 Server. Users are created with templates. No procedure governs creation/removal of accounts or selection of user passwords. VPN User account management has proved to be difficult because the VPN users are maintained in a local CheckPoint database. There are no procedures in place to clean put old or unused accounts. Therefore terminated employees still have access to the VPN system.

Test 10 of assignment 3: Mobile user's laptops are not protected from unauthorized access if they are stolen. Cached VPN credentials are used for Single sign on.

Test 11 of assignment 3: Although logging is enabled correctly, there is no formal review process. Logs are used reactively not proactively. No job scheduled to roll the logs on a regular basis. The log files can grow to a large size and be difficult to archive. These logs are one of the only ways to detect abuses of the VPN system since on other Intrusion detection system is in place.

Test 12 of assignment 3: The current network architecture that places the VPN server in parallel with the corporate firewall has no justification. The design of the VPN gateway is a risk in that rules created on the corporate firewall have no impact on VPN users. Keeping the Corporate firewall in sync with the VPN server might prove difficult. Hackers have two Gateways to try to attack instead of just one. A compromise in either one will result in penetration of the corporate network.

Audit recommendations

At the heart of many of the above risks is the lack of policy governing the administrator's actions. The creation of detailed policy would be a good first step. Identifying roles and responsibilities would also benefit the organization.

Test 1 of assignment 3: A procedure should be created that eliminates the convenient shared administrator accounts currently in use. Administrators should be accountable for all actions. Accounts on the VPN-1 Server at the Operating System level do not have to match those of the CheckPoint Administration GUI (i.e. there are too many users with Windows Console access).

Test 2 of assignment 3: Software maintenance and support should be budgeted for each year to keep critical servers covered. The ability to get upgrades and patches is critical. The need for technical support might not be as critical if there is in-house expertise.

Test 5 of assignment 3: A procedure that governs the creation/removal of VPN user accounts and selection of user passwords should be developed. VPN User account management has proved to be difficult because the VPN users are maintained in a local CheckPoint database. The use of a central database for users and / or the introduction of token / certificate based authentication would better control who can access the Acme corporate network via VPN.

Test 10 of assignment 3: A policy governing the use of Mobile user laptops should be developed to limit unauthorized access to the corporate network if they are stolen. The use of Cached VPN credentials used for Single sign on needs a business justification.

Test 11 of assignment 3: A log review process should be developed for all security devices at a minimum. Management level reports would help detect unauthorized users of the VPN system.

Test 12 of assignment 3: The current network architecture that places the VPN server in parallel with the corporate firewall has no justification. Acme Corporation should try to create a network design with a minimum of entry points from the Internet. The development of a review process before devices are placed on the production network would also help prevent the 'evolution' of insecure temporary solutions that become permanent.

Costs

The big cost will be to pay for the lapsed support and maintenance of the CheckPoint software. Other costs will be measured in the amount of time it takes to adjust to new procedures.

Test 1 of assignment 3: This procedural change will have minimal impact on resources.

Test 2 of assignment 3: CheckPoint charges a fixed percentage of the cost of the software for maintenance and support. They will charge an additional fee for the lapse in coverage.

Test 5 of assignment 3: The procedural change will have minimal impact on resources. The move to token / certificate based authentication will involve significant effort and cost.

Test 10 of assignment 3: This procedural change will have minimal impact on resources.

Test 11 of assignment 3: The cost of reporting software or 'home-grown' code. Ongoing support and maintenance needs to be factored in.

Test 12 of assignment 3: The cost of redeploying the VPN server on a DMZ subnet protected by the corporate firewall will be small – just the labor to design and reconfigure and test. Ideally the mobile users will just have to update their VPN site information.

Compensating controls

If Acme Corporation does not want to pay to keep up with support on the VPN-1 gateway, one control that can easily be put in place is to position the VPN-1 gateway behind the corporate firewall. This will offer additional protection for the un-patched VPN-1 Gateway but it is not a long-term solutions. In the long term, if the cost is too high to upgrade, the existing Citrix solution may prove to be a more secure and reliable solution.

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